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# SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

TWENTY-SEVENTH YEAR

**1682<sup>nd</sup>** MEETING: 6 DECEMBER 1972

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## SIXTEEN HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SECOND MEETING

Held in New York on Wednesday, 6 December 1972, at 3.30 p.m.

*President:* Mr. Samar SEN (India).

*Present:* The representatives of the following States: Argentina, Belgium, China, France, Guinea, India, Italy, Japan, Panama, Somalia, Sudan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Yugoslavia.

### Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1682)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. The situation in Namibia:  
Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 319 (1972) concerning the question of Namibia (S/10832 and Corr.1).

*The meeting was called to order at 4 p.m.*

### Adoption of the agenda

*The agenda was adopted.*

**The situation in Namibia:**  
**Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 319 (1972) concerning the question of Namibia (S/10832 and Corr.1)**

1. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decisions taken at the 1678th and 1679th meetings I propose now, with the consent of the Council, to invite the representatives of Chad, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mauritius, Morocco, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Burundi and Zambia to participate, without the right to vote, in the discussions of the Council.
2. In view of the limited number of seats available at the Council table, and in accordance with the usual practice, I now invite the representatives I have just mentioned to take the places reserved for them in the Council Chamber, on the understanding that they will be invited to take a place at the Council table when it is their turn to speak.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. B. Abdoul (Chad), Mr. Z. Gabre-Sellassie (Ethiopia), Mr. N. Barnes (Liberia), Mr. R. Ramphul (Mauritius), Mr. A. Benhima (Morocco), Mr. I. Taylor-Kamara (Sierra Leone), Mr. E. Ogbu (Nigeria), Mr. N. Terence (Burundi) and Mr. K. Nyirenda (Zambia) took the places reserved for them in the Council Chamber.*

3. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decision taken at the 1678th meeting of the Security Council I now

invite the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia, Mr. Olcay, to take a place at the Council table.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. O. Olcay, President of the United Nations Council for Namibia, took a place at the Council table.*

4. The PRESIDENT: The Security Council will now continue its discussion of the item on its agenda. The Council has before it a draft resolution, which has not yet been introduced, but which has been circulated in document S/10846. We shall defer discussion of this particular draft resolution until it has been introduced.

5. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): Mr. President, before proceeding to the substance of the item on Namibia which is being considered by the Council, may I, on behalf of the Soviet delegation and on my own behalf, congratulate you on your accession to the high and responsible office of President of the Security Council and wish you every success in the performance of your difficult tasks in connexion with the Council's work.

6. Your diplomatic skill and your great experience in the work of the United Nations are known to all, and we are sure that these high qualities will have a positive effect on the Security Council's work.

7. We are very pleased to welcome you for another reason, namely that the relations between our two countries—the Soviet Union and India—and their peoples are relations of sincere friendship, respect and mutual trust based on the principles of peaceful coexistence and good-neighbourly co-operation.

8. In August this year, in a message sent to the President of the Republic of India, Mr. Giri, and to the Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi, on the occasion of the anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of peace, friendship and co-operation between the USSR and India, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. Brezhnev, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Mr. Podgorny, and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Mr. Kosygin, expressed their conviction that the friendship and the fruitful, mutually advantageous co-operation between the Soviet Union and India would continue to gain strength and to expand in accordance with the Treaty to the benefit of the Soviet and Indian peoples and in the interests of ensuring peace on earth.

9. We should also like to express our gratitude to your predecessor in that office, the outstanding representative of the friendly African country of the Republic of Guinea, Mrs. Cissé, who so actively and effectively guided our work in the month of November. We congratulate her wholeheartedly on her successful performance and fulfilment of her duties as President of the Security Council. She turned an important new page in the Security Council's long history in that she was the first woman to occupy the high office of President of the Security Council.

10. Before proceeding to the substance of the item under consideration, I should like to turn for a few moments to one other problem.

11. The socialist countries unanimously and resolutely call for an end to colonial and racist domination in southern Africa and the national liberation of the people of Namibia.

12. In that connexion I should like to refer to a recent statement made by the Government of the German Democratic Republic on this item, contained in an official document of the General Assembly issued on 13 October 1972.<sup>1</sup> It states the following:

"The German Democratic Republic repeatedly came out against the illegal occupation of Namibia, demanding the liquidation of political, economic and social discrimination against the African and coloured people in Namibia, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. With deep concern the Government of the German Democratic Republic notes that the racist régimes in Pretoria and Salisbury now as before disregard the Charter and relevant decisions of the United Nations."

13. The Soviet delegation takes this opportunity to express its satisfaction that the German Democratic Republic has at last been granted the right to have its own Permanent Observer, an official observer, at the United Nations. This is proof of the recognition of the role and authority of the German Democratic Republic, an independent and sovereign socialist State, in international affairs.

14. Thus the long period of discrimination against the German Democratic Republic within the United Nations system, discrimination practised with a stubbornness worthy of better purposes by certain Western Powers, has come to an end. The United Nations documents—and over the last two or three years at least there have been many such documents—show that the Soviet Union, the socialist countries and a number of other countries have actively supported the principle of the universality of the United Nations and fair treatment for all States; in particular, they took steps to ensure that official statements of the Government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic were issued as official documents of the United Nations. There are also documents which clearly show how certain Western Powers opposed and worked against those efforts. Suffice it to recall Security Council document S/10660 of 24 May 1972 which contains a letter from the Permanent Representative of the

USSR to the United Nations on this matter. It states that some Western Powers, flouting the principles of the United Nations Charter and the principle of the Organization's universality, have once again, as in the worst years of the "cold war", sought stubbornly to call in question the circulation as official Council documents of official statements addressed to the Council by the Government of a sovereign State, the German Democratic Republic.

15. No less discriminatory and absurd, and quite unjustified, was the decision taken last summer by the Assembly of the World Health Organization at Geneva, imposed by certain Western countries, that the German Democratic Republic would not be accepted into that particularly humanitarian organization. Unfortunately, Mr. President, some developing and non-aligned countries, going along with that injustice, voted in favour of that unfair decision.

16. Now, as a result of the tremendous efforts and continuing struggle of the socialist States and a number of other peace-loving States who advocate equality of rights for States and peoples, respect for their sovereignty and observance of the principle of the universality of the United Nations, an important victory has been won. The German Democratic Republic has at last been granted the right to have its own official Permanent Observer at the United Nations. We are deeply convinced that in the very near future it will become a member of this Organization along with the other sovereign German State, the Federal Republic of Germany. Justice has triumphed, and we note this with great satisfaction. This is the reward of those who have struggled constantly, ever since the United Nations came into existence, for justice and equality for all States and peoples. This will further strengthen the principle of the universality of the United Nations and will help to bring to an end the discrimination practised in this Organization against other States, whose access to the Organization some people are trying to deny.

17. It gives us great pleasure to welcome and congratulate Mr. Horst Grunert, the official Permanent Observer of the German Democratic Republic to the United Nations, who is here today in the Security Council chamber; we wish him excellent health in the special conditions of the human environment on Manhattan Island and we also wish him every success in his struggle, together with representatives of other States, to strengthen international peace and the security of peoples and to develop friendly relations and co-operation among all States.

18. Turning now to the question of Namibia, I must first of all observe that this item, as is well known, appears repeatedly on the agenda of United Nations bodies. Both the General Assembly and the Security Council have very clearly stated their views on it. The Security Council has adopted over 10 resolutions on Namibia. Basically, the main provisions of all these resolutions are as follows. Firstly, the people of Namibia have the inalienable right to freedom and independence in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples [*General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)*]. Secondly, South Africa's Mandate over Namibia was brought to an end by the United Nations, and

<sup>1</sup> A/8845.

consequently any continuing presence in that country of South African troops, police or authorities is illegal. Thirdly, the national unity of the people of Namibia and the territorial integrity of that country are inviolable, and all steps taken by the Government of South Africa to destroy the unity and territorial integrity of the country, such as establishing "Bantustans" and "homelands", have been condemned by the Security Council. The Government of South Africa has been warned that it will be held responsible by the international community and the United Nations for any violation of the legal rights of the people of Namibia to self-determination and national independence.

19. However, it must be noted that the United Nations resolutions are not being implemented by South Africa. The South African authorities are continuing to ignore all United Nations decisions and to keep Namibia illegally under their colonial domination. The reason for this challenging attitude on the part of Vorster's racist Government is no secret. The reason is that the Republic of South Africa and its colonialist and racist policy with regard to Namibia have the direct support of certain Western Powers and, in particular, of their international monopolies whose imperialist aggressive nature was revealed and unmasked more brilliantly than at any previous meeting of the General Assembly by President Allende of Chile in his statement to the General Assembly during the twenty-seventh session.<sup>2</sup> It is those international monopolies, the great octopus of modern imperialism, which are collectively exploiting the population of Namibia and, in their role as collective colonialists, participating in the plunder of its natural resources. This new form of colonialism is, indeed, collective colonialism setting itself up in opposition to the collective efforts of the United Nations to free that country from the domination of the South African racists and colonialists.

20. The United Nations has tried various approaches and procedures in seeking a solution to the problem of the liberation of Namibia.

21. One of the most recent was Security Council resolution 309 (1972) adopted at the Council's series of meetings away from Headquarters held in Africa in February this year, on the initiation of direct contacts between the United Nations and South Africa through the intermediary of the United Nations Secretary-General, with assistance in implementing that mission from a special group of the Security Council consisting of three of its members, namely Argentina, Somalia and Yugoslavia.

22. In July of this year the Security Council considered the first report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of that mission<sup>3</sup>. The report showed that during the Secretary-General's visit to Namibia and South Africa the South African authorities attempted hypocritically to convince the United Nations that South Africa's policy with regard to Namibia was "a policy of self-determination and independence" and that the Government of South

Africa was willing to co-operate with the United Nations in seeking a solution to the problem of the self-determination and independence of Namibia. It is therefore quite logical to ask what has in fact been done by the South African authorities in the period since the adoption of Security Council resolution 309 (1972) in February 1972, to enable the people of Namibia to attain independence.

23. The Security Council is now considering the Secretary-General's second report [*S/10832 and Corr.1*] on the implementation of that resolution. The report shows clearly that the South African authorities are continuing to pursue in Namibia a policy of colonial oppression, *apartheid* and dismemberment of the country through the establishment of "Bantustans" or "homelands", that they are trying to exploit the Secretary-General's mission as a cover for their racist and colonialist policies and are even attempting to get United Nations approval for those policies.

24. The Government of South Africa has been informed—as it has been so many times in the past—of the position of the United Nations with regard to the need for guaranteeing the territorial integrity and national unity of Namibia and of granting it independence. The representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Escher, informed Vorster that his trip to Namibia had left him with the very definite impression that "the majority of the non-white population of Namibia supported the establishment of a united, independent Namibia". However, the Prime Minister of South Africa, obviously still pursuing the same old colonialist and racist objectives, considered that there was "insufficient basis" for those impressions gained by the Secretary-General's representative concerning the real aspirations and hopes of the people of Namibia to see their country united, free and independent. As reported in paragraph 21 (*b*) of the report of the Secretary-General's representative, Vorster bluntly stated that it would not be appropriate to go into a detailed discussion of the question of self-determination and independence of Namibia, on the usual false pretext of all colonialists and racists that the population of Namibia did not yet have sufficient "administrative and political experience". Using that same pretext, Vorster also declared, as reported in paragraph 21 (*d*), that such experience "could best be achieved on a regional basis".

25. Thus the leader of the South African racists and colonialists continues openly to advocate dismembering Namibia by breaking it up into regions in accordance with the old "divide and rule" practice of the imperialists and enslavers of other peoples.

26. It is also significant that, as an alternative to the proposal made by Mr. Escher that an authority should be established for the whole of Namibia, the Government of South Africa is suggesting the establishment of some kind of token "advisory council", consisting of representatives of the so-called regional governments. The South African racists continue to restrict the freedom of movement of the Namibian people in their own country. They are imposing various restrictions on movement which fully enable the South African authorities to maintain the system of isolated "homelands" and continue the policy of deliberately dividing Namibia into separate regions.

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh Session, Plenary Meetings, 2096th meeting.*

<sup>3</sup> *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-seventh Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1972, document S/10738.*

27. Thus it is perfectly clear from the report that the Pretoria régime, as in the past, is working to divide Namibia into separate regions or "homelands" and by so doing destroy the territorial integrity and national unity of the country and perpetuate its own colonialist and racist domination over Namibia. The difference is simply one of tactics. The former open and stubborn opposition of the South African authorities to the granting of freedom and independence to the people of Namibia and the implementation of United Nations decisions has now been replaced by assurances that are in no way binding and by the tactic of disguised but no less stubborn unwillingness to implement the Security Council and General Assembly decisions.

28. The verbal assurances given by the Government of the Republic of South Africa to the representative of the Secretary-General are in essence simply camouflage, a manoeuvre intended to confuse the United Nations and world public opinion and to create the impression that something is being done and some measures are being taken. But in actual fact the Security Council is faced with a brazen attempt by the South African racists to postpone indefinitely the granting of independence to Namibia.

29. We cannot avoid drawing the conclusion from all this that the situation as regards Namibia has not changed at all: the people of Namibia are still living under the colonialist and racist oppression of the Pretoria régime, under an illegal foreign occupation imposed on them by force. White racists in southern Africa are continuing to use terrorism and repression and are extending to Namibia the racist laws, practices and policies of *apartheid*.

30. The Secretary-General's report thus merely confirms the validity of those doubts which have frequently been expressed by the Soviet delegation in the Security Council both before and during the Council's series of meetings away from Headquarters held at Addis Ababa with regard to the advisability of taking the steps provided for in Council resolution 309 (1972). It also confirms the justice of the observations frequently made by the Soviet delegation at that time. We should like to remind the Council that from the very beginning the idea of talks with the South African racists, of so-called "dialogue" with those inveterate advocates of racism and *apartheid*, failed to win the confidence or support of the Soviet delegation. We also expressed some apprehension lest the appointment of a representative of the Secretary-General for Namibia should only provide an excuse for the South African racists to delay further the implementation of the United Nations resolutions on Namibia calling for the preservation of the territorial integrity of Namibia and the immediate granting of freedom and independence to its people. In the view of the Soviet delegation, the report now being considered by the Council leaves room for no further doubt on that score and can encourage no illusions, if anyone had such illusions.

31. We fully agree with the distinguished representative of Somalia, Mr. Nur Elmi, who said in his statement at the 1679th meeting that the report not only is disappointing but constitutes a retrograde step.

32. At Addis Ababa the Soviet delegation refrained from opposing the adoption of Council resolution 309 (1972) in

spite of the serious doubts it expressed with regard to the advisability of adopting such a resolution, simply because the African countries felt that as a last resort even that approach, namely, the so-called "dialogue", could be tried. They, like the Security Council as a whole, were proceeding from the premise that the implementation of that resolution would be strictly in conformity with the previously adopted United Nations decisions on the granting of independence to Namibia and would not prejudice those decisions.

33. Such efforts were indeed made by the African countries but they were not successful. Why? It is perfectly obvious that it was because of the racist and colonialist policies of South Africa, which did not wish to free Namibia from its colonial domination.

34. It is now clear to everyone that the procedure provided for in resolution 309 (1972) will not bring progress. Therefore we cannot agree to prolonging a situation which can only serve as a cover for the continuing domination of Namibia by South Africa. United Nations decisions have long since terminated South Africa's Mandate over Namibia. Attempts to hold a "dialogue" with the South African racists on the granting of freedom and independence to Namibia and its people are useless and even harmful.

35. Some people are inclined to place all the blame for the failure of these efforts on Mr. Escher. It is difficult to agree with that view. We do, however, agree with the fair criticism of Mr. Escher voiced in the Security Council and elsewhere by some representatives of African countries. Obviously Mr. Escher should not have given promises which exceeded his powers. But the main reason for the failure of his mission is not, of course, that; the main reason is the position of South Africa and the stubborn and persistent unwillingness of the Government and the Prime Minister of South Africa to abandon their predatory, annexationist policy with regard to Namibia, to put an end to their illegal occupation of that country and to withdraw from it their troops, police and administration and thus grant the people of Namibia the possibility of freely and independently deciding their own fate.

36. It was not only Mr. Escher who talked with the Head and members of the Government of South Africa. At the beginning of this year South Africa and Namibia were visited personally by the Secretary-General, but did that visit and the talks he held with the Government of South Africa produce any positive results? No, they did not. The racists of southern Africa have not changed their colonialist policy or their policy of racism and *apartheid* with regard to the people of Namibia.

37. Bearing in mind all these circumstances and taking account of the views expressed by the representatives of certain African countries, the USSR delegation does not feel it would be advisable to prolong any further the mandate for talks, or "dialogue", as it is also called, with the racists of southern Africa. Certain representatives of African countries have rightly pointed out that continuing the Secretary-General's contacts in these circumstances, while the Government of South Africa refuses to give any

substantive clarification regarding the question of the independence of Namibia, would not be conducive to the attainment of the objectives of resolutions 309 (1972) and 319 (1972). Continuing the contacts, the "dialogue", with Vorster's Government would, in the view of the Soviet delegation, be not only pointless but also harmful. It could only create the illusion that some steps were being taken by the United Nations with regard to Namibia. But everyone knows that illusions disappear while facts remain. The colonial domination of Namibia and its people by the racists of southern Africa is continuing. To continue a "dialogue" in these circumstances would only serve as a useful cover for the racists of southern Africa.

38. The people of Namibia can no longer tolerate colonial oppression by the South African racists. Namibia is experiencing a mass awakening of the national conscience and is moving forward to an open struggle for independence. The Secretary-General's report officially confirmed that "the majority of the non-white population of Namibia supported the establishment of a united, independent Namibia". The working class of Namibia is moving towards action. As one means of protest and struggle in the conditions of Fascist police terrorism which prevail in Namibia, the workers have begun to resort to the general strike. The extension of racist laws to Namibia is arousing opposition on the part of more and more elements among the population.

39. The Soviet people understand and sympathize with the noble aspirations and aims of the people of Namibia for freedom and independence. In the USSR, the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of which we shall be celebrating on 30 December this year, over 100 nations and peoples are living as a united, free and equal family of Soviet peoples. National inequality, oppression and racial discrimination in any form are foreign to us and we detest them. The Soviet people are actively strengthening their union with all the progressive forces of today—the international working class movement and those struggling for national and social liberation of the peoples. The consistent implementation of the decisions taken at the Twenty-fourth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is reflected in the support shown by our fatherland for those peoples who are struggling for their freedom and independence against imperialist aggression, colonialism and neo-colonialism in all its forms and manifestations.

40. The Soviet Union strongly supports the immediate liberation of Namibia from the tyranny of the South African racists and their unlawful rule. This was indicated by the consistent and firm position taken by the Soviet delegation throughout the debate on the question of Namibia in both the General Assembly and the Security Council.

41. Taking into account the views expressed by the African and Asian countries and the importance they attach to the United Nations Council for Namibia, the Soviet Union has decided to become a member of that Council. Proceeding from its position of principle, the Soviet Union will, together with the other members of the Security Council and the members of the United Nations Council for Namibia, work for the full implementation of United

Nations decisions calling for the immediate realization of the inalienable right of the people of Namibia to freedom and independence.

42. During its meetings away from Headquarters held in Africa, the Security Council adopted resolution 310 (1972) as well as resolution 309 (1972). In resolution 310 (1972) the Security Council again reaffirmed that the continued occupation of the South African authorities in Namibia was illegal and detrimental to the interests of the people of Namibia. The Council again called upon the Government of South Africa to withdraw immediately all its police and military forces as well as all its civilian personnel from the Territory of Namibia. The Council also decided that, if the Government of South Africa did not comply with the resolution, it would meet immediately to decide on effective steps or measures, in accordance with the relevant Chapters of the Charter, to secure the full and speedy implementation of the provisions of the resolution.

43. Since South Africa is still failing to implement, and, indeed, ignoring these United Nations decisions, including Security Council resolutions 309 (1972) and 310 (1972), and is stubbornly continuing to follow its annexationist, colonialist and racist policies with regard to Namibia and its people, the time has come for the Council to consider what measures can be taken that will be effective in bringing about the immediate liberation of Namibia from the racist occupiers who have illegally seized the country. The Security Council has an obligation to help the people of Namibia attain their freedom and independence.

44. In connexion with the draft resolution which you, Mr. President, mentioned in your introductory statement, the delegation of the USSR reserves the right to study the text carefully and to give its views on it later in the discussion of this item.

45. The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Soviet Union for the kind words he has addressed to my country and to me personally.

46. Mr. VINCI (Italy): Mr. President, allow me to express to you, first of all, my sincere congratulations and best wishes on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council. In giving you the assurance of the full support of my delegation, I am confident that under your able, efficient leadership we will achieve good, fruitful results, as we did while Mrs. Cissé was in the Chair guiding our work during a very busy month.

47. The contacts of the United Nations through the Secretary-General with the Government of South Africa concerning the future of Namibia are now in an initial and very sensitive stage. Our task at present is not a discussion of the various aspects of the situation in Namibia, because this has already been done and we have adopted a score of important resolutions on the matter. Our task is rather to give the Secretary-General clear directives for further action which will help us to achieve our goal, namely, self-determination and independence for Namibia. Nowhere as in deliberations of such a specific nature is a united concert of action on the part of the Council more necessary. It is indispensable for the Secretary-General who, whatever our

decisions, must receive the strong support he needs for further steps. It is necessary, at the same time, to make clear our firm position vis-à-vis South Africa.

48. We have studied the report of the Secretary-General on the mission of his representative and we have listened with great interest to the statements made by the Foreign Ministers of Liberia and Morocco, as well as those made by other colleagues, and by Mr. Mueshahange. We feel particularly indebted to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Morocco who, speaking on behalf of the Organization of African Unity, made a very constructive statement [1678th meeting]. We wish also to express our gratitude to the Secretary-General for having given us his authoritative evaluation [*ibid.*] of the talks, and to his representative, Mr. Escher, for the thorough inquiry he has conducted in Namibia in the short time available to him.

49. The report has two main aspects relating to two different tasks of the mission: one, the survey of the situation in the Territory with regard to the wishes of the people; and two, the contacts with the South African Government. In our view, the first aspect is of paramount importance. In fact, Mr. Escher and his aides have been able to tour the Territory, covering long distances, talking with people in all walks of life, raising and discussing with them a wide range of problems concerning their future. The report on the visit is at present the most thorough and complete analysis of the opinions and wishes of the people of Namibia. It is the first time that our Organization has been provided with a document of such a wide range of political assessment. I will not examine in detail the wealth of information contained in this document, but I would like to draw attention to three main points that emerge from the report.

50. First, the aspiration of the overwhelming majority of the population to achieve independence and national unity is now a political reality, formally ascertained, that cannot any longer be ignored by anybody, and especially not by South Africa. We have noted the maturity of views expressed by all those interviewed in the international Territory. Differences of opinion appear to be restricted only to constitutional structures of the future independent country.

51. Secondly, the mission of the Secretary-General's representative has set in motion a certain amount of political activity in the right direction. The influence of international public opinion and of the decisions of our Organization has been more deeply felt in the Territory. The problem of the future of Namibia and the influential role played by the United Nations are now ever-present in the minds of everybody in that remote country. Even some whites have come to realize that "a solution should be found urgently... under the auspices of the United Nations" [S/10832 and Corr.1, annex II, para. 79], and that the policy of fragmentation of the country "was doomed to failure" [*ibid.*, para. 80].

52. Thirdly, the majority of the people have expressed the wish that the United Nations continue to be present in the Territory. It appears from the report of the representative that the presence of the United Nations is called for as a

means to spur political activity, to ensure guidance and help in attaining the goal of self-determination and independence, and as a guarantee against possible repression and victimization.

53. When we pass to the second aspect of the report, namely, the talks with the South African Government, we have a much less satisfactory picture. I shall not conceal that we were, in fact, rather disappointed by this part of the report. It is true that we will never be satisfied until Namibia is firmly set on the path of self-determination and independence. It is also true that the Secretary-General's representative had very little time at his disposal to go deeper into the talks with the South African Government since he was there for barely a month, and he had to spend most of his time on an essential prerequisite to the talks, namely, a most complete survey of the opinions of the peoples concerned. We have not overlooked the fact that his task was an extremely difficult one. Let me say, however, in all frankness that we expected from the Government of South Africa a more forthcoming approach to the talks.

54. Having said this, I wish now to examine objectively the nine points in paragraph 21 without any undue optimism but also without drawing from them extremely negative conclusions for which there is no sufficient ground, at least for the moment. In other words, let us carry out what is our duty and responsibility here—to evaluate calmly and coolly those first results of the contacts with South Africa. I shall not dwell on whether the nine points constitute an agreement: first of all, because a plain reading of the report shows that this is not the case; secondly, because there are no reciprocal concessions that could provide the substance for an agreement; all we have is a number of proposals or promises put forward by the Prime Minister of South Africa, which Mr. Escher has simply recorded; thirdly, because the statement made by the Secretary-General in this Council has dispelled any doubt on the matter.

55. We all agree, there is no doubt about it, that no accord with South Africa will be concluded without the consent of the Security Council. The South African proposals as they now stand are certainly, in our view, too cautious and vague and are a less than clear approach to the many problems which the South African *de facto* presence in the Territory raises. They may be smokescreens to conceal the real purposes of Pretoria; we cannot say for sure as there is no evidence in one sense or the other. That is why we feel that, whatever the doubts understandably held, we should not jump to negative conclusions. If we were to summarize in one word our evaluation of the proposals, we would say, very simply that they are ambiguous. They all need to be clarified and discussed in depth. The Prime Minister announced, for instance, that he "would assume overall responsibility for the Territory as a whole—i.e., distinct from the Ministries now responsible for different sectors". Does this mean an end to the policies of various ministries and particularly of the Ministry for "Bantustans"? Does it open the way to a new and unitary approach to the question? Is this the first step towards a lessening of the dependence of the Territory on the South African administrative structure? These are all points that need to be clarified.

56. The Prime Minister of South Africa also indicated that he "would be prepared to establish an advisory council drawn from representatives of the various regions". Since we have no details about this council and do not know anything about its composition and its powers, with all respect for honest logic, we cannot but suspend our judgement on the matter. We have heard some speakers refer in a pessimistic tone to their own experience of such colonial devices. But, since those speakers represent independent States, it seems to us that their experience, however disappointing, has not prevented, even if it has not helped, their ultimate accession to independence. Of course, we do not deny that the advisory council could, under certain conditions, delay the process towards self-determination. We simply say that at present we have no elements on which to express judgement and that the proposal deserves to be discussed because the advisory council, if properly constituted, could enhance the unity of the Territory and accelerate the process towards independence. It could also, by its peaceful action, serve to convince South African public opinion that the process is inevitable and, after all, to the benefit of both countries, South Africa and Namibia.

57. As far as freedom of movement is concerned, what is meant by the removal of "restrictions without impairing influx control"? Does this imply a distinction between freedom of movement of all persons and freedom also for them to establish their residence wherever they choose? What are the limitations on settlement in various districts and towns, and what can be done to remove those limitations also? These points are open to further discussion and clarification.

58. The agreement by the Prime Minister that "legitimate political activity, including freedom of speech and the holding of meetings" should be ensured in Namibia is somewhat more concrete and precise than other proposals. It is certainly regrettable that such normal and basic rights are only now beginning to be taken into consideration for Namibia after so many years of arbitrary rule. But we are not here in order to debate past history; we are now studying ways and means of solving those problems that the colonial past has bequeathed to us.

59. The question of Namibia is the concern of the entire membership of the Organization; it is not a problem of exclusive African interest. This is so because the question stems from an unfulfilled Mandate given to South Africa by the international community, and because in our resolutions we have affirmed that Namibia is the responsibility of the United Nations. It is because of this concern that my delegation owes the Council, in the present delicate phase of the contacts, the expression of its views in the most clear and frank manner.

60. Italy has been associated in the search for a solution to the Namibian problem since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI). In this connexion, allow me a brief digression to refer for a moment to the statement made by the representative of Sierra Leone [1678th meeting], who named my country among those with economic interests in Namibia. This problem of foreign participation in the economy of Namibia has been

studied for a long time by several organs of the United Nations and is the object of exhaustive documentation by the Security Council and the General Assembly. If my good friend, Mr. Taylor-Kamara—who I am sorry is not here—had read those documents published at the expense of the United Nations, he would have learned that there are no Italian investments or companies in Namibia; nor are Italian concerns exploiting the fishing areas close to the Namibian coast. I should like to draw his attention to the most recent of such studies, which is contained in the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.<sup>4</sup>

61. We have been associated with the search for a solution for Namibia since 1966. My country has been a member of the *Ad Hoc* Committee for South West Africa set up by the General Assembly to find ways and means for the implementation of that resolution. Together with Canada and the United States, we formulated in 1967 proposals which, *inter alia*, provided for contacts with South Africa exactly in the terms of the action decided upon this year by the Council. A different proposal existed at that time which, in our view, could not produce any concrete development and which, moreover, did not receive the support of any major Power in this Council.

62. An examination, last autumn, of the question by the *Ad Hoc* Sub-Committee for Namibia established by the Security Council and the failure since 1967 to produce any significant result convinced us even more of the advisability of reviving our original proposal for a more reasonable and realistic approach to the problem. That proposal is contained in paragraph 20 of the report of the *Ad Hoc* Sub-Committee to the Council.<sup>5</sup> Thanks to the efforts and ability of the Argentinian delegation, the proposal became a reality with the adoption of resolution 309 (1972), and after so many years during which the United Nations had to content itself with passing resolutions we could at long last and for the first time set foot in the Territory and establish direct contact with the local population.

63. The Security Council, which has initiated this action, must now, in our opinion, pursue these developments and see to it that they bear the expected fruit. We fully share the views expressed with impartiality and authority by the Secretary-General in his address to the Council, to the effect that the door should not be closed to further contacts with South Africa. We think, in fact, that if one day we should decide to close that door, it should be only when it becomes clear beyond any doubt that South Africa is not committed to the achievement of self-determination and independence by the people of Namibia. The door would be closed then as a result of the fault of South Africa, not of our own fault.

64. At this stage we must, in our view, pursue the talks with three main objectives in mind: first, to maintain direct contact with the Territory as unanimously advocated by its

<sup>4</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 23, vol. II.*

<sup>5</sup> *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year, Special Supplement No. 5.*

people; secondly, to ensure that the political activity, including freedom of speech and the holding of meetings, becomes a reality; thirdly, to obtain from the Government of South Africa a commitment to allow the people of Namibia to exercise freely their inalienable right to self-determination and independence in accordance with the Charter. The South African Government must have studied in the meantime the report of the Secretary-General's representative on the wishes expressed by the peoples in Namibia and would be well advised to take them duly into account if its policy towards the Territory is to be founded on reality.

65. If the Council decides on the continuation of the contacts, it is necessary that its decision be couched in the most simple and straightforward terms, taking the greatest care not to modify the mandate of the Secretary-General and not to allow interference by other bodies in an action that has been initiated by the Security Council and is its responsibility alone.

66. It seems to my delegation that the draft resolution just circulated is in line with the views I have put forward. Once again I should like to express our sincere appreciation to Mr. Ortiz de Rozas, Ambassador of Argentina, for the efforts he has deployed in order to keep the door open for the United Nations in Namibia.

67. The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Italy for the kind words he has addressed to me personally.

68. Mr. ORTIZ DE ROZAS (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Mr. President, may I first of all congratulate you on assuming the presidency of the Security Council for the month of December. We are particularly pleased to do so because of the close ties of friendship between your country, India, and my own, Argentina, and also because of friendly personal relations between us. We know that with your clear thinking, your diplomatic skill and your enormous patience the Council is ensured in advance that its work will be fruitful.

69. We also wish to express our appreciation to Mrs. Jeanne Martin Cissé, the representative of Guinea, for her contribution as President of the Council last month. We believe that Mrs. Cissé has set a precedent which will be hard to follow since it will be difficult in the future for any other lady who becomes President of the Security Council, or even for any of us of the opposite sex, to follow her or reach the high level of efficiency which she demonstrated.

70. On 4 February of this year at its memorable Addis Ababa meetings the Security Council adopted resolution 309 (1972) on Namibia. It did so, as is well known, at the insistence of the delegation of Argentina and on the basis of a draft resolution which it had submitted for the consideration of the Council, after lengthy and intense consultations, on 20 October 1971.

71. I am not much given to quoting paragraphs from my own statements; however given our responsibility as the authors of that initiative and in the interest of the complete clarity as to objectives and procedures with which this question should always be treated, perhaps I may be

permitted to repeat what I said when I introduced that draft resolution:

"In the first instance, we want the people of Namibia to be able to exercise their legitimate right to self-determination which, beyond question and without hedging, is recognized under the United Nations Charter. We believe that the people of Namibia can attain complete independence and can join our Organization as a sovereign, free State. Lastly—and this is very important—we believe that in acceding to independence Namibia should preserve its national unity and its territorial integrity, without any type of separation, be it regional or local. In other words, when this people and this Territory accede to independent life, they should do so as a single entity.

"No one should be mistaken. We are not acting under the influence of any foreign or domestic interest. The only things that guide the Argentine delegation are the purposes that I have just outlined." [1637th meeting, paras. 32-33.]

72. We now reiterate what we then affirmed. Our proposal was directed and continues to be directed towards a new approach to solve this problem quickly, peacefully and effectively. It was not intended to give anyone, much less the Government of South Africa, a means to use delaying tactics or to avoid the sacred duty of leading Namibia towards independence. Were these to be the results, despite the straightforward nature of our intentions and of the efforts we have made, we would then have to revise what we are doing and if need be, perhaps even change course completely. This message should be perfectly understood and grasped by Pretoria. We believe that we have not yet reached the end of the road, but nevertheless, only a short distance remains.

73. It is in the light of these prior observations, which are fundamental, that I shall now comment on the report which is before us regarding the implementation of resolution 319 (1972), which was sponsored by Argentina and adopted by the Council at its meeting on 1 August last.

74. At the outset I wish once again to express our gratitude and appreciation to the Secretary-General for his very valuable endeavours to fulfil in the best possible way the difficult mandate which has been entrusted to him. Despite the complexity and the great burden of responsibilities inherent in his lofty position, from the very outset Mr. Waldheim has paid very particular attention to the quest for solutions to the problem of Namibia within the framework of resolutions 309 (1972) and 319 (1972).

75. As a member of the group of three which was established by the Security Council and as Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Sub-Committee for Namibia. I have been in the privileged position of enjoying close contact with the Secretary-General, a position which has enabled me to observe and admire the extraordinary skill and profound interest he is bringing to bear in order to complete successfully the mission we have assigned to him. The propriety and sincerity of his thinking and of his conduct were demonstrated once again in the important statement which he read to us at the beginning of our debates and to which I shall refer subsequently.

76. Under the provisions of paragraph 5 of resolution 319 (1972), the Secretary-General appointed Mr. Escher to assist him as his representative, in the fulfilment of his mandate. May I here interrupt briefly so as to greet most cordially this distinguished Swiss diplomat with whom I have been friends for several years, ever since we both had the honour of representing our respective countries in Austria.

77. The time allowed Mr. Escher to fulfil his functions was regrettably very short. It would have been short for anyone who had a detailed knowledge of the situation, and all the more so in his case when the indispensable activity in the field had to be preceded by a careful study of the background and a series of prior consultations with the other parties concerned.

78. I must therefore emphasize the praiseworthy promptness with which Mr. Escher took over his post and visited Namibia a few days after he was appointed. On his mission he was accompanied and advised by an experienced group of Secretariat staff who shared his responsibility.

79. Following the order of the report, I shall now proceed to a critical review of its contents.

80. Annex I contains the aide-mémoire presented to the Secretary-General by the group of three, dated 26 September 1972. This document accurately reflects the position of Argentina. In complete agreement with the delegations of Somalia and Yugoslavia, we established an initial priority in the task of the representative of the Secretary-General during the second round of contacts. This consisted, as indicated in paragraph 3, in obtaining from the Government of South Africa:

“a complete and unequivocal clarification from the Government of South Africa with regard to its policy of self-determination and independence for Namibia, so as to enable the Security Council to decide whether it coincides with the United Nations position on this matter and whether the efforts made under resolutions 309 (1972) and 319 (1972) should be continued.”

81. That paragraph, which had been carefully thought out and analysed, had a substantive *raison d'être*. In fact, according to the first report of the Secretary as a result of the contacts he had with the Prime Minister of South Africa under resolution 309 (1972), the Government of that country confirmed in regard to the question of Namibia “that its policy is one of self-determination and independence”.

82. Without in any way underestimating the importance of this “confirmation”, or perhaps because of its fundamental importance, many delegations which participated in the debate during July last, including Argentina, believed it necessary to clarify beyond any doubt the meaning which the South African authorities gave to the terms “self-determination” and “independence” in relation to Namibia.

83. For our part, we felt that this was the key to the successful solution of the problem of Namibia. If the South African interpretation coincided with what the

United Nations understands by self-determination and independence, the most difficult aspect would have been resolved. With reciprocal goodwill, we would then have to decide on the appropriate measures to attain this objective. Essentially the approach advocated by resolution 309 (1972) would thus have been crowned with success.

84. That is why paragraph 6 of the aide-mémoire states that:

“On the basis of the acceptance of the above-mentioned points, it would be useful to identify specific problems in Namibia, to establish their priorities and to suggest the necessary measures to overcome them in order to assure the prompt attainment of self-determination and independence by the people of Namibia.”

85. Unfortunately it was not possible to obtain from the Government of South Africa the clarifications requested by the group of three, and this leads me to an analysis of annex II of the report.

86. As is reported in paragraph 21, which is unquestionably the most important paragraph, Mr. Escher asked the Prime Minister to make clear the policy of his Government in that connexion. But instead of the clear-cut and categorical reply which would really have signified the great step forward for which we were all hoping, Mr. Vorster merely said that:

“in his view this was not the appropriate stage to go into a detailed discussion of the interpretation of self-determination and independence—this could be done with better results once the necessary conditions were established and the inhabitants had more administrative and political experience”.

87. In our opinion this reply could not have been more frustrating. It is difficult for us to understand this evasive answer by the Prime Minister when it was really simply a question of explaining what is supposed to be a policy of his Government, as confirmed to the Secretary-General a few months ago.

88. Moreover, how much longer will one have to wait until the inhabitants have had—to use the expression of Mr. Vorster—“more administrative and political experience” and we can then receive the clarifications we have requested? Another 54 years of South African presence in Namibia? Frankly, I do not believe that the Security Council is prepared to wait until then.

89. There are many doubts which still subsist, and which do not relate exclusively to the aspects which Mr. Escher was supported to delve into. For example, does the regional basis mentioned to acquire experience in self-government constitute a confirmation of the practice of “Bantustans” which has been rejected by the United Nations time and time again?

90. What would be the functions of the “advisory council” which the Prime Minister is prepared to establish? How would it be set up? By a decision of the South African Government, or by means of free elections with the

appropriate participation of all the political organizations of the Territory and by a procedure which would meet with the approval of the Security Council?

91. What does "influx control" consist of, which is used as a pretext to restrict freedom of movement?

92. These are but a few of the questions which also need to be answered.

93. Quite frankly, we would have hoped to observe some tangible progress as we studied this part of the report but not even by stretching our goodwill to the utmost can we say that we are satisfied.

94. What is really encouraging, that which in itself fully justifies Mr. Escher's mission, does not flow from his negotiations with the South African authorities, but from the many meetings which he had with various sectors of the people of Namibia.

95. Thanks to the implementation of resolutions 309 (1972) and 319 (1972), for the first time a large number of political, religious and student leaders, as well as ordinary individuals, had an opportunity publicly and privately to state to a United Nations emissary their wishes regarding the future of the Territory. For the first time, too, we now have a body of factual and impartial opinions compiled in Namibia itself.

96. These opinions in their overwhelming majority are unequivocally in favour of the immediate abolition of the policy and practice of "Bantustans", the withdrawal of the South African administration, self-determination and independence and the preservation of the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia.

97. Strictly speaking, everything that the people of Namibia said to Mr. Escher is tantamount to a plebiscite, which confirms that the United Nations position on the subject is well founded.

98. The political activity caused by the visit of the representative of the Secretary-General is another element which should be emphasized. It means that the people have become aware of the situation and have taken a positive attitude which, if continued, could lead to the objectives we have set. Here we should register our satisfaction at the freedom given to all these groups of persons to talk with the United Nations mission and even to express publicly and in full view their grievances against the Government of South Africa. We trust that, as promised by Prime Minister Vorster, nobody will be punished or harassed for having participated in these demonstrations.

99. Whether it is admitted or not, Mr. Escher's visit was viewed by the inhabitants of the Territory as the beginning of a United Nations presence in Namibia. Several groups have requested that this presence should be more effective and permanent. This is one of the points which is well worth exploring if the contacts are to be continued.

100. Among other aspects which are praiseworthy, the Escher mission served as a catalyst to bring about the

unification of different political organizations in a national convention. This trend towards a grouping together should be intensified so as to form a homogeneous front to support the common aspirations of the people of Namibia.

101. South Africa has often said, and insisted, that there are great difficulties in leading Namibia to self-determination and independence. Among others, ethnic and language differences, differing degrees of development among various groups and rivalries and suspicions between minorities and majorities have been mentioned. We certainly realize that the task is not an easy one and that serious obstacles may arise. But we are absolutely convinced that they can all be overcome if the administering Power is firmly determined to do so.

102. The case of Papua and New Guinea will serve to illustrate our thinking. It seems to us that the problems of Namibia are negligible compared with those of these two Territories. And yet, with a progressive attitude and the will to co-operate with the United Nations, Australia has been overcoming immense difficulties, strengthening unity between populations that speak more than 400 different languages, strengthening territorial integrity and intensifying the political preparation of the leading classes which are to be responsible for the future of that independent nation.

103. The example set by Australia should serve as a model to be imitated in Namibia. We shall never tire of repeating that for this to occur South Africa must completely change its attitude. It must once and for all understand in all its magnitude the full scope of the steps taken by the Security Council in adopting resolutions 309 (1972) and 319 (1972) and the efforts that it is making now. South Africa must proceed with political realism, availing itself of this unique, golden opportunity for a peaceful and final settlement of the problem of Namibia.

104. This solution does not consist in granting the people of Namibia, as though it were an extraordinary concession, the elementary human rights enshrined in the United Nations Charter. It means coming to grips fully and without delay with the task of setting up the means whereby that people can freely pronounce itself on its destiny. It consists in promoting national unity and not in promoting or creating local entities. It consists in preserving the integrity of a Territory which it received in mandate so as to hand it over intact to its legitimate owner, the people of Namibia. It consists in determined co-operation, in good faith, with the United Nations so as to bring about self-determination and independence as soon as possible.

105. The members of the Council, and particularly the representatives of the African States, have so far shown great patience. Patience, however, is not inexhaustible. It would indeed be a serious mistake to believe the contrary or to speculate that demonstrations of goodwill can be pushed beyond a certain limit.

106. It would also be a serious mistake to distort the meaning of the contacts which the Secretary-General or his representatives maintain solely for purposes of internal policy. We do not wish to judge or assess recent South

African press dispatches reporting certain declarations which affirm the existence of alleged agreements concluded with Mr. Escher. In his explicit statement, Mr. Waldheim has categorically denied these reports, confirming what we all know, that is, that there can be no agreement for the simple reason that neither Mr. Escher nor the Secretary-General himself are authorized to take substantive decisions, which are the exclusive functions of the Security Council.

107. The fact of the matter is that any distortion of the facts, or any attitude which is not in accord with the truth, far from contributing to a solution, will only make it more difficult or impossible to reach a solution.

108. This will probably be my last statement on Namibia, since within a few days the term of office of Argentina on the Security Council will come to an end.

109. I wish to avail myself of this opportunity to express our gratitude to all the delegations here present for the very valuable co-operation they have rendered us in our efforts to find a satisfactory outcome to the delicate problem of Namibia. We are particularly grateful to the representatives of Somalia and Yugoslavia, Mr. Nur Elmi and Mr. Mojsov, and their assistants in their respective delegations, and to our esteemed friend Mr. Farah. With them we had the privilege of sharing anxieties and concerns in the group of three. We were in complete agreement. At all times and in all circumstances we thought and acted alike, which enabled us to present identical points of view to the Secretary-General, thus facilitating his delicate mission. Mr. Waldheim is well aware of my feelings of great friendship and admiration for him. My work on Namibia has given me further reason to confirm and strengthen those feelings.

110. To the other African delegations, to all those who also have directly participated in our initiative, I express the profound gratitude of the delegation of Argentina for their understanding, tolerance and support. They know how passionately and sincerely we have endeavoured to advance a just and legitimate cause: the independence of Namibia.

111. That concludes my substantive statement on this item of our agenda. I should now like to introduce the draft resolution in document S/10846 to the Council.

112. This document bears the name of Argentina. Argentina's name also appeared as a sponsor of the text adopted as resolution 309 (1972) at the memorable Addis Ababa meetings. That resolution reflected the hope that through a new approach we could hasten and achieve independence and self-determination for Namibia.

113. Resolution 319 (1972), which was adopted by the Security Council on 1 August of this year, reflected a cautious expectation, because we were still confident that a proper clarification of the policy of self-determination and independence on the part of the Government of South Africa would enable us to make concrete progress in the quest for our objectives.

114. The draft resolution now before the Security Council this time also bears the name of Argentina. But we are

bound to acknowledge in all sincerity that today it reflects discouragement. No one, I believe, is satisfied with the present situation, or is particularly enthusiastic about prospects for the future—not even the delegation of Argentina. We fervently hope that this new resolution will not be condemned to failure because of South Africa's lack of understanding or its reluctance to co-operate with the Security Council.

115. This draft resolution is the result of extensive consultations, in which my delegation always engages before submitting a document of such importance to the Security Council. As a preliminary matter I should like to point out that while the original text, as is logical, was drafted in Spanish, the basic working paper used in our consultations was in English. We submitted both texts to the Secretariat, but we note that in the English text certain changes have been made which are of some importance since they involve significant words which were the subject of extensive consultations. I shall now explain what those changes are so that they can be corrected and so that we can come back to the agreed English wording.

116. In operative paragraph 1 of the English text we read: "the people of Namibia have recently had". That is not the wording we used; it should be: "the people of Namibia have again had"; so the word "recently" should be replaced by "again".

117. In operative paragraph 2, instead of "majority of those consulted" it should read: "majority of the opinions". Also in the English text of operative paragraph 2 we read: "thus endorsing the steadfast position of the United Nations on this question". The agreed English text had read: "further confirming the consistently held position of the United Nations on this question". Also in operative paragraph 2, not only in the English text but also in the texts in the other working languages, the word "independence" should be preceded by "national".

118. Operative paragraph 5 of the English text reads: "to enable the people of Namibia, freely and with strict regard to the principle of human equality to exercise their right". The text should read: "to ensure that the people of Namibia, freely and with strict regard to the principle of human equality, exercise their right".

119. Finally, in operative paragraph 6, instead of "to secure a peaceful transfer" the text should read: "to bring about a peaceful transfer".

120. I shall now analyse the various component parts of this draft resolution. The first preambular paragraph is a repetition of identical paragraphs which were contained in resolutions 309 (1972) and 319 (1972). Here I wish to point out that, in the opinion of the delegation of Argentina, the two resolutions adopted on the question of Namibia remain fully valid and in force.

121. The second preambular paragraph simply reaffirms what has been stated so often in United Nations resolutions, namely, the special responsibility and obligation of the United Nations towards the people and Territory of Namibia.

122. The third preambular paragraph is of some importance. It did not appear in the two previous resolutions but my delegation, as well as other delegations we consulted, felt it necessary to recall the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, the highest court of justice; that advisory opinion supports the United Nations position on the subject.

123. The fourth preambular paragraph reaffirms the inalienable and imprescriptible right of the people of Namibia to self-determination and independence.

124. We have introduced the fifth preambular paragraph so that there will be no doubt as to what is affirmed here and so that in future no one can give the text any mistaken interpretations.

125. In operative paragraph 1 the Council observes with satisfaction that the people of Namibia have again had an opportunity of expressing their aspirations clearly and unequivocally, in their own Territory, to representatives of the United Nations. We are very pleased with this paragraph because this is the result of the two initiatives undertaken by Argentina which took concrete shape in Council resolutions 309 (1972) and 319 (1972) and because, strictly speaking, this was the first time that the people of Namibia was able to express its opinions to a United Nations emissary in its own Territory, as the text states.

126. Operative paragraph 2 needs no explanation. As I said in my statement, this is tantamount to a plebiscite by the people of Namibia in favour of the immediate abolition of the "homelands" policy, the withdrawal of the South African administration from the Territory, Namibia's accession to independence and the preservation of its territorial integrity. This is what the United Nations has maintained in a great many resolutions.

127. Operative paragraph 3 recalls something we all regret and regret very deeply, and that is that the Government of South Africa has not seen fit to provide the complete and unequivocal clarification, requested of it by the representative of the Secretary-General, which formed part of the aide-mémoire of the group of three.

128. Operative paragraph 4 is a substantive paragraph of great importance, not only because it solemnly reaffirms the inalienable and imprescriptible rights of the people of Namibia to self-determination, national independence and the preservation of their territorial integrity, but also and particularly because it is on this basis and no other that a solution must be sought for Namibia, and because it reaffirms or renders more emphatic the statement that we reject any interpretation, measure or policy to the contrary.

129. That paragraph is also very important because it is on the basis of its provisions that in operative paragraph 5 the Council invites the Secretary-General to continue his valuable efforts. The two paragraphs together constitute the mandate that is now being given to the Secretary-General. It will be noted that unlike the two preceding resolutions we now do not have the words "with a view to establishing the necessary conditions to enable the people of Namibia . . . to exercise their right to self-determination and

independence". This is because, regrettably, it would seem that the Government of South Africa has taken advantage of the phrase, "the necessary conditions" to delay the reply which we had all expected with regard to its policy of self-determination and independence. These words no longer appear in the draft resolution, and, if the efforts of the Secretary-General are to be successful, the Government of South Africa will have to clearly define its policy of self-determination and independence.

130. Operative paragraph 6 again calls on the Government of South Africa to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General in the implementation of this resolution in order to secure a peaceful transfer of power in Namibia. My delegation considers that the Government of South Africa, in its talks with the Secretary-General, should not only bear very much in mind resolutions 309 (1972) and 319 (1972), and this draft resolution if it is adopted, but should also take into account the firm position of the United Nations which has been built up on the basis of many resolutions which have won the approval of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

131. Operative paragraph 7 requests the other parties concerned to continue to extend their valuable co-operation to the Secretary-General with a view to assisting him in the implementation of the resolution. Here I am bound to say, with the frankness with which I always address the Council, that this is diplomatic wording. It is diplomatic wording because what we want to say is that these other parties concerned, and we know who they are because they have been officially identified, should be consulted more thoroughly. That is to say, when they are approached it should not be to tell them what has already been confirmed, which would be tantamount in practice to a notification; instead these parties should be called in so as to ascertain their valuable views and to ask them for guidance in the quest for solutions.

132. Availing myself of his presence here, I wish also to refer in particular to the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia. The co-operation of Mr. Olcay of Turkey has been very valuable to my delegation in working out this draft resolution. I should like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to him and to emphasize the need to consult him more frequently and more extensively.

133. Finally, the last two paragraphs require no explanation.

134. I shall conclude by expressing my hope that, despite the discouragement felt by the sponsoring delegation and so many other delegations around this table, we shall be able to adopt a text unanimously, and, unless there is a positive reaction on the part of South Africa, this will perhaps be the last attempt of this kind that we make.

135. The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Argentina for his very full presentation of the draft before us, for his statement, and for his kind remarks about me personally.

136. Before I call on the next speaker, I should like to be absolutely certain that all members of the Council have got

the changes which the representative of Argentina indicated.

137. Mr. MOJSOV (Yugoslavia): It is with very special pleasure that my delegation, and I personally, greet you on your assuming the presidency of the Council. Your great country and mine are bound together by ties of lasting and long-tested friendship, and by our dedicated co-operation, together with others, within the great movement of non-alignment from its very inception. Your personal talents and extraordinary experience assure us that under your guidance the Council is in good hands and that you will steer us along paths of co-operation and harmony. In that, Mr. President, you will always have our full support.

138. At the same time, let me express once again our deep appreciation for the most fruitful work done by Mrs. Cissé during her able presidency of the Security Council during the past month.

139. In addressing myself now to the question of Namibia, let me state at once my delegation's view that, after our meeting in Addis Ababa, when the Council last considered the Namibian issue, we have now arrived at a crucial point in time in the development, or rather in the stagnation, of our new effort directed towards South Africa. Almost a year has passed since then and, instead of finding one in a series of signposts along the way, we are again at the crossroads. That this is so has been amply demonstrated by the special atmosphere and quality of our consideration now of this item and by the draft resolution that has just been introduced and explained by the representative of Argentina.

140. The representatives of African States had already widely participated in the debates on Namibia. Their contributions, their penetrating analysis of the origins of the Namibian issue before the United Nations and of the history of its consideration and of South Africa's unremitting enslavement of the Namibian people and constant defiance of the United Nations, their critical analyses of the report and the results of the special mission of the Secretary-General's representative—all these constitute a major effort requiring the most acute attention of the Council and of all the parties concerned.

141. This is, indeed, the first time since the adoption of resolution 309 (1972) that some fundamental criticism cannot be avoided. And this is the first time, too, that widespread, grave and serious doubts have been raised as to the propriety and purpose of continuing the effort based on that resolution, adopted at Addis Ababa.

142. Thus, we are again to decide how to proceed when so clearly and arrogantly faced with the total commitment of South Africa not only to the continuation of its illegal occupation, but also to turning the United Nations and our present action into an instrument for facilitating its continued refusal to grant self-determination and independence to Namibia. The Government of South Africa, in spite of all our efforts so far, has refused to give clear and unequivocal explanations and assurances, as it was requested to do.

143. Consequently, this is not the moment for merely renewing the same mandate for another period of several weeks or months, but for facing the issue squarely and acting accordingly. My statement today will be devoted solely to this. My task is greatly facilitated by the remarkable contributions made by several participants in the debate so far, with whose findings, conclusions and forebodings we fully associate ourselves.

144. Indeed, the statements by the distinguished Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors of African countries and by the Secretary for External Relations of SWAPO contain all the necessary analyses of the report before us and the refutation of all the unacceptable, unfortunate points reported in it which have to be rejected if we are to maintain our commitment to the people of Namibia in accordance with our basic obligations under past United Nations decisions.

145. It goes without saying that our hand in this has been strengthened and that our resolve in redoubling our commitment to, and our solidarity with, the people of Namibia has been reinforced by the new evidence of their capability and readiness to assert their inalienable human and national rights against overwhelming odds. It is a startling and basic contradiction of the report that the abundant evidence of indomitable will on the part of the Namibian people and their political leaders was not translated into a more decisive and unyielding position in the conversations with the South African Government.

146. But having said this, I hasten to add—lest anyone should use this factual, positive part of the report as a basis for undermining the essential legal position of the United Nations in relation to Namibia—that there is nothing in it or in the mandate that provides, or that should provide, for the United Nations or anyone acting on its behalf to go into any kind of joint, combined operation together with South Africa in establishing whether and when the people of Namibia are ready to exercise their right to self-determination and independence. The occupation of Namibia by South Africa being illegal and its Mandate under the League of Nations terminated, South Africa has no right there, and the only matter that the United Nations can properly discuss with Pretoria, since it is physically present in Namibia, is the transfer of power and the withdrawal of South Africa from Namibia.

147. These are, in the final analysis, what we understand to be the essential ingredients of the mandate to enable the people of Namibia to exercise their right to self-determination and independence. And, in accordance with all the basic United Nations decisions on Namibia, there can be no doubt whatsoever, as far as we and the great majority of Member States are concerned, as to the right of the people of Namibia to independence, full national freedom, territorial integrity and the unity of their country. Actually, we were never meant to be engaged in a discussion with South Africa as to whether the people of Namibia are ready or able to exercise those rights.

148. We welcome the new confirmation by the people of Namibia of their desire—as they expressed it at great peril to the Secretary-General's representative—that the United Nations should do what is already its solemn duty. But again we knew all along that it could not but be so.

149. It is because we think, as I have indicated, that we have arrived at a kind of crossroads, that I feel that it is now appropriate for the Yugoslav delegation to shed some light on how we saw and continue to see our presence, activities and duties in the group of three.

150. My delegation agreed to become a member of the group when it was asked to do so by many delegations and when it was evident that African delegations, too, were concerned with the adoption of resolution 309 (1972), in the context of having the adoption of other resolutions secured. We took Yugoslavia's selection as one of the three members both as a recognition of our stand on African matters and as a special responsibility.

151. We entered the group, with others, with the primary task, as we saw it, of assisting in the new effort, always remaining in the framework of the strict legal and political position established by all the relevant United Nations resolutions and by the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, and of assisting the Secretary-General, who was invited to undertake his effort in consultation and close co-operation with a group of the Security Council.

152. It is with this in mind that the group presented, *inter alia*, its two aide-mémoires, one in order to help the Secretary-General in his arduous task of conducting contacts with the Government of South Africa, and the other to help prepare the subsequent mission of his representative and put it in the correct framework, as described above. This is the reason why the first aide-mémoire<sup>6</sup> underlined, *inter alia*, that resolution 309 (1972) in no way detracted from all the other resolutions which remain in full force and that, through them, it is linked to the relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, which all together constitute one legal and political organic whole. It required, also, that, as an initial step, the Government of South Africa should inform the Secretary-General of its acceptance of resolution 309 (1972), so as to enable further efforts on the basis of that resolution.

153. In paragraph 3 of the second aide-mémoire, which is contained in the report before us, the main task of the representative was set to be, *inter alia*, to obtain a complete and unequivocal clarification from the Government of South Africa with regard to its policy of self-determination and independence for Namibia. That requirement was meant to be the criterion for the Council to decide whether this effort should be continued at all.

154. I should like to state here that we are very gratified by the considerable attention and approval that the representatives of African States, of SWAPO and other concerned friends of Africa and Namibia have accorded to the group's aide-mémoires. In that we see that the group has fulfilled at least a modest part of its task, as entrusted to it by the Council.

155. It is enough, I submit, to establish that the Government of South Africa has failed to respond adequately to

the major points stressed in the two aide-mémoires, in order to realize that we are indeed faced with an extremely abnormal situation or, rather, with South Africa's usual rebuffs.

156. This only further underlines the group's responsibilities, the responsibility of each of its members, whoever it may be. From the very beginning we have considered it our duty to participate in the group's work as long as this effort enjoyed the support upon which the establishment of the group was originally based.

157. We have also been mindful that the basic premise of resolution 309 (1972) was that South Africa, at long last, was supposed to be ready to come to terms with the United Nations on Namibia, that it was prepared to stop opposing the trends of history, and that the important Western partners of South Africa were decisively prepared to co-operate fully with the United Nations in the process of making South Africa cease blocking self-determination and independence for Namibia.

158. But with our latest experience we wonder whether South Africa had ever engaged in contacts with the Secretary-General in good faith at all. We wonder whether South Africa had really ever wished to return to a rational approach, to the only possible solution of the problem of Namibia in harmony with the resolutions and positions of the United Nations and the International Court of Justice.

159. I have already stated that we associate ourselves with the comments made by the representatives of African States and SWAPO on the individual parts and paragraphs of the report before us, especially concerning paragraph 21 and several paragraphs of section IV, entitled "Conclusions". There is no need, therefore, for me to repeat them.

160. It will therefore suffice if I limit my comments on the report to the following general statement.

161. We, too, with no less firmness, totally reject every interpretation, assertion, measure and suggestion, everything that has appeared in the report as a result of South African intransigence and that is not in complete accordance with the basic tenets of the structure of the United Nations position on Namibia, namely, the inalienable right of Namibia to self-determination, independence, territorial integrity and national unity; that all decisions on internal arrangements in Namibia belong solely to the people of Namibia on the basis of "one man, one vote"; that the occupation of Namibia by South Africa is illegal. The United Nations has firm responsibilities to assure the freedom and independence of Namibia and all Member States have clear obligations to behave accordingly.

162. Having said that, we note that there is a general feeling, shared also by African representatives, that, while rejecting the unacceptable positions of South Africa as suggested in the report, while condemning its refusal to comply with United Nations resolutions to provide the required clarifications and assurances, and while requesting the discontinuance of those efforts that have failed to produce results that would justify their uninterrupted continuation, the Secretary-General should nevertheless be

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, Twenty-seventh Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1972, document S/10738, annex I.

authorized to continue his efforts for a specified time, taking into full account the present deliberations, the sense and the purpose of the Council.

163. That over-all feeling here is expressed in the Argentine draft resolution before us, whose text has been the object of many long and difficult consultations in which my delegation has taken an active and direct part, together with African and other members. We feel that it essentially meets the needs of the moment and that it addresses itself clearly to most of the issues and problems raised in the report.

164. The draft resolution could indeed have been more explicit in making a direct request for a United Nations presence in Namibia, the immediate cessation of "homelands" policies, the immediate abolition of all repressive measures and the establishment of all necessary freedoms in Namibia. Actually, in our opinion, these points are met in one way or another by the demand for strict respect for past resolutions and by the reassertion of all crucial purposes and principles of the United Nations position on Namibia as well as almost all the basic points contained in the aide-mémoire of the group of three.

165. It could be maintained that operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution seems to extend the mandate just as before, as if nothing in particular had happened. But it is clear that taken in its totality, with the specific wording finally agreed upon, its link with operative paragraph 4, and the reference to continued efforts rather than to contacts, and in the light of the debate in the Council, neither the author of the draft nor anyone else could possibly act, after all this, as if nothing had happened: namely, as if the Pretoria Government has not refused to give clarification in accordance with the demands made by the Secretary-General and his representative. This should be clear even to the Government of South Africa.

166. What can we do now, if this draft resolution is adopted, to contribute as much as we can to a different kind of outcome for our continued effort? I think we can do several things.

167. First, we can compel South Africa to appraise its situation more realistically by making it very clear to it that, unless by 30 April 1973 it accepts Security Council resolution 309 (1972), unless it clarifies its position on self-determination and independence and reassures us adequately on the matter of the unity of Namibia, and unless it ceases to export *apartheid* there, it will not be possible to continue the present effort as heretofore.

168. Secondly, the United Nations is not powerless in this situation, as some would like us to believe. In several statements during our present debate many valuable ideas have been put forward with regard to what the United Nations can and must do. Many direct or indirect measures have been suggested that could be brought to bear on the situation—including the following: the appointment of a High Commissioner for Namibia and intensification of the work and expansion of the activities and powers of the United Nations Council for Namibia and other United Nations bodies in general; the possible proclamation by the

United Nations of the independence of Namibia, with all the consequences regarding international representation; exerting further pressures for the implementation of the embargo on arms supplies to South Africa; the redoubling of efforts towards the application of sanctions against it; various kinds of direct assistance for the struggle of the people of Namibia and its political movements and representatives; challenging South Africa in its attempts to represent Namibia in international meetings, treaties, conventions, and so on. Our general experience abundantly shows that only if we are firm in conducting an unremitting struggle for the self-determination and independence of Namibia and for the end of its illegal occupation, and only if we back up this particular effort by concrete action by all other means, can we hope to meet with any success in our present effort.

169. We believe—although the draft resolution does not explicitly say so—that the Secretary-General in his next report should try to formulate a whole range of alternative policies and measures for the United Nations to implement should this last attempt to produce the necessary results also fail.

170. We have to resume and redouble our efforts in those directions, not only if and when our present attempt at contacts with South Africa has failed totally, but immediately, from this moment.

171. It is in this context that the Yugoslav delegation continues to shoulder its responsibility, as a member both of the Security Council of the group of three, in our joint effort, which must be under constant and most vigilant review, and it is in this context that the Yugoslav delegation is ready to support the draft resolution contained in document S/10846.

172. The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Yugoslavia for the kind remarks he addressed to me and to my country.

173. Mr. DE GUIRINGAUD (France) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, allow me first of all to express my delegation's pleasure at seeing that the presidency of the Council for this month has devolved upon an ambassador of your great talent and experience, a man who is familiar with the most complex tasks of international diplomacy and is so knowledgeable about everything concerning the United Nations.

174. Your predecessor, Mrs. Cissé, is aware of the confidence which we felt in seeing her occupy the Chair. In guiding the difficult debates of last month to a satisfactory conclusion, she set her seal in a most elegant fashion as the first lady President in the history of the Council.

175. By reason of its long history and the content it has grown to have over a period of 26 years, and by its very subject—a Territory under an international mandate—this question of Namibia differed, on the very eve of the Addis Ababa meeting, from all others with which the Council had to deal. In directing the Secretary-General, following a rather unusual procedure, to undertake an extensive mission, the purpose of which was more clearly defined

than the means of achieving it, by adopting resolution 309 (1972) we both recognized and strengthened the specific nature of the Namibian question.

176. In the last analysis, we decided to put aside, provisionally and without forgetting them, certain doctrinal controversies in order to approach this problem from a strictly pragmatic standpoint, so that conditions might be established which would enable the Namibian people to exercise its right to self-determination.

177. Therefore, it is in this spirit—namely by preferring concrete observations to considerations of principle—that I should like to set forth the position of my delegation after studying the latest report of the Secretary-General.

178. What has occurred since our last meeting dealing with this Territory, namely, since last August?

179. Mr. Waldheim, in implementation of resolution 319 (1972), appointed a representative to assist him in the implementation of his mandate. He selected a very experienced Swiss Ambassador, Mr. Escher, who, at the end of a very long career agreed to resume work, this time for the United Nations, and to make, in less than three weeks' time, an exhaustive trip covering several thousand kilometres in a region whose unfavourable climate and whose inextricable political problems were hitherto unfamiliar to him. I wish, first of all, to pay a tribute to his devotion, his courage and also to his youthful physical stamina.

180. His report is the main element of the document which has been submitted to the Council by the Secretary-General. Allow me to analyse this report now, without following the order of items contained therein, but in dealing immediately with what seems to us to be the most essential points.

181. Since this question concerns self-determination, I will proceed immediately to section II of annex II in which the representative of the Secretary-General described his visit to the Territory: 17 days of travel covering 4,853 miles; 74 meetings held; consultations held with hundreds of people; queries of thousands of others; these figures as well as the map which accompanies the report show that the United Nations group made a very lengthy contact, a contact in depth with the population. It did not fly over the Territory, rather it met with the people. This fact should be emphasized for more than one reason. Firstly, it is unprecedented, as most of those who addressed the Council before me and who have made a very useful contribution to our work have pointed out. As I said, this fact is unprecedented. Formerly, those who were invited were able to spend only a few days in the Territory. Last February Mr. Waldheim, who was pressed for time, made only a very brief stay there before returning. Last October, on the contrary, Mr. Escher and his associates were able to observe and hear views in all parts of the Territory and, what is no less important, they were also seen there and their own views were heard there.

182. This long journey is also of interest to us because of the information with which it has provided us as to the views of the Namibians who have been queried, who, in

their very great majority, came out in favour of the early accession of a united Namibia to self-determination and independence with the help of the United Nations.

183. Finally, the mission carried out by the representative of the Secretary-General is worthy of our attention because of the undeniable influence it seems to have had on local opinion.

184. Tiring as it was for those who undertook this trip, it seems to have modified the very elements of the situation even before we were able to draw our own conclusions from it.

185. Perhaps that might apply also to the conversations that were held with the South African Government, which are mentioned in section II of annex II, to the extent that those conversations may have led the South African Government into changing its attitude concerning the Territory. But, on this point, the report does not enable us to formulate a very precise opinion. Indeed, Mr. Escher's report, in particular paragraph 17 of section I thereof, shows that the South African Prime Minister, despite the categorical position taken on this subject by the Namibians themselves at the time of the hearings that were held before the representative of the Secretary-General, persists in questioning whether the majority of the non-white population does indeed desire the creation of a united Namibia, with the assistance of the United Nations. It also appears that Mr. Vorster did not agree with the assertion of his guests, according to which the "homelands" policy should be abandoned and a central Namibian Government set up.

186. However, at the same time, the Prime Minister intimated that such an agreement might be given in the rather near future. Although he deliberately opposed the positions of the Council on the question of self-determination, Mr. Vorster nevertheless announced at the same time the creation, in Namibia, of a single administrative authority—his own authority—as well as the establishment of an advisory council, a council of which we unfortunately know neither the composition nor terms of reference. He referred also to an experiment in internal autonomy on a regional basis without stipulating whether this implied the abandoning of the "homelands" system.

187. Furthermore, Mr. Vorster promised to examine the possibility of removing curbs on freedom of movement but, he added, without impairing influx control, which is hardly a commitment on his part, we must agree.

188. Finally—and this is undeniably the sole positive element—the South African Prime Minister stated, as reported in paragraph 21, that there should be legitimate political activity, including freedom of speech and of assembly in the Territory. This modest commitment, if it is upheld, may well lead to very important consequences. The experience of democratic régimes shows that where political activity can be exercised freely and where political parties may set forth publicly their programmes, the population concerned will soon realize the possibilities available to it to express itself and important changes may well result therefrom.

189. Thus, the report of Mr. Escher does provide us both with concern as well as encouragement; with doubt as well as hope.

190. However, there is one certainty which derives from reading this report, namely, the endeavour undertaken with so much apprehension last February should be continued, and this for several reasons.

191. First of all—and this fact in and of itself influences my delegation's position—a great hope has been born in a people, a hope based on new confidence in the United Nations. If the Council, only a few months after having undertaken this step, were to abandon it because it was not entirely successful, the people of Namibia, relegated to their solitude, would be entitled to lose faith in an Organization which does not persevere in its efforts, and everyone knows who in Africa and elsewhere would be pleased by such a withdrawal undertaken by the Council.

192. The second reason to continue this mission falls within the realm of common sense. Decisions have been announced and reforms have been promised. Even if we have some doubts about them, and especially if we have doubts, we should enable ourselves to ascertain precisely the substance of these matters. If our doubts are dispelled, we then should be informed as to how those decisions and those reforms will be carried out and we must be provided with the necessary data in order to enable us to ascertain the consequences they will have on the political and economic life of the Territory, whilst at the same time observing the reactions of the inhabitants of the Territory. It is certainly not by abandoning our endeavours that we would obtain clarifications on everything that remains unclear to us.

193. On the other hand, if the Secretary-General retains his mandate, which is very flexible, he could keep us informed in the coming months and thus he could enable us to define our position in the light of the information he supplies.

194. The method chosen by the Security Council at Addis Ababa to deal with the Namibian question consists, as I have already said, in dealing with facts and acts rather than with the philosophy underlying them. Well, let us be faithful to our method. Just as a farmer, however meagre his crop may be, is always careful to gather in his scanty harvest of wheat or millet, let us also take note of the results of Mr. Escher's mission, however modest those results may be and let us try to proceed further. This procedure perhaps is somewhat lacking in glory, but it is by no means devoid of wisdom. Furthermore, I do not see why such a procedure would imply a renunciation of any member's own approach to the situation in Namibia or any abandonment of any member's point of view on the subject. My delegation, in any case, does not see it in that way and believes that those positions, which are well known to the Council, will be completely safeguarded if the mission is continued.

195. Remarkable work has been done since the Addis Ababa meeting by the group of three. At a time when two members of that group are perhaps participating for the last

time in our debates on the question of Namibia, I should like to pay a tribute to the very exceptional and useful work done by that group in order to help us find a solution, and particularly to the two members of that group who are about to leave us: first of all, Mr. Ortiz de Rozas, Ambassador of Argentina, who has assumed great responsibilities in this matter, with such intelligence and political wisdom; then, Mr. Nur Elmi, who has replaced Mr. Farah as the head of the Somali delegation; both of them have made tremendous contributions to our consideration of this question. As regards these three representatives, the Council owes a debt of gratitude which I should like, for my part, to express here.

196. Finally, I would not wish to conclude this statement without addressing to our distinguished Secretary-General our thanks and congratulations for the meritorious efforts he has made since the Council, at Addis Ababa, entrusted him with the delicate mission of making these difficult contacts with all parties concerned, particularly with the Pretoria Government. I have no doubt that the Council will renew its confidence in him and I express, in advance, wishes for success in his future efforts.

197. The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of France for the kind sentiments he has expressed to me personally.

198. Mr. PHILLIPS (United States of America): Mr. President, in dispensing with greetings to the incoming and outgoing Presidents you will, I am sure, understand that I do so in keeping with our established policy in this regard and not out of any lack of respect for the leadership you bring to this Council as its President or indeed for the outstanding performance of Mrs. Cissé as our President during the month of November.

199. Of all the varied African issues which come before this Council the case of Namibia is unique. For this is an area in which the United Nations has a very particular interest as a result of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, and of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971.<sup>7</sup>

200. In recognition of that special interest the Security Council, during its meeting in Addis Ababa, adopted resolution 309 (1972) which established the mandate of the Secretary-General to initiate contacts with all parties concerned in an effort to establish the conditions for the exercise of self-determination. As a result of his delicate and skilful efforts the Security Council was able to extend the mandate in resolution 319 (1972). And as the draft resolution before us "observes with satisfaction", a most gratifying result of those efforts was the opportunity for the people of Namibia to express their aspirations directly to representatives of the United Nations—a point underscored a moment ago by the representative of Argentina to whom we pay a tribute for the patient leadership he has provided in negotiating the draft resolution before us.

<sup>7</sup> *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16.*

201. Now we are faced with the question of whether, in the light of the Secretary-General's report, containing the report of his representative, Mr. Escher, we should continue this effort. Many representatives around this table have expressed the belief that the progress achieved since the last report has been, if anything, slight.

202. But progress is a relative term, which should be considered within the context of the history of the problems we are considering. In the case of Namibia we are dealing with the knotty problem which has been with us for a long time; it will not be resolved quickly and it will not respond to simple, oratory or unrealistic declarations of this or other United Nations bodies. The progress or climate for change we have achieved since the adoption of resolution 309 (1972) is greater than it seems when compared to that achieved between the birth of the United Nations and February 1972.

203. Since some progress has been made it behoves us not to give up easily. What is possible in diplomacy must often be created by thorough and protracted contacts which permit not only the gradual resolution of the problem but also necessary internal adjustments in the States concerned. The exchanges of ideas, better understanding of attitudes and the clarification of different viewpoints can accelerate the negotiating progress and identify areas of agreement. The very process of talking can help create the atmosphere in which subsequent agreement can be achieved. And let us not under-estimate the constructive possibilities of quiet diplomacy which exist as long as the channels of communication remain open.

204. My delegation joins other members of the Council in strongly supporting the continuation of the initiative set out in resolution 309 (1972), and we urge all parties concerned to make a sincere effort to move ahead and to exhibit the greatest understanding and patience in the conduct of the talks. Furthermore we hope, especially since a rather close deadline of 30 April has been fixed for the next report of the Secretary-General, that the re-establishment of contact with the parties concerned will be prompt. If this is so, there should be adequate time not only for trips to South Africa and Namibia but also for periodic and concurrent consultation with the Secretary-General, the group of three and others at Headquarters in the light of developments. The five months we have before that deadline may not be sufficient to resolve the problem but, if it is judiciously used, we should be able to have a clearer idea of what still lies ahead of us.

205. With regard to Namibia itself, I should like to reiterate here the wholehearted support of the United States for the underlying principles and objectives reflected in this resolution. We believe it leaves the door open for all parties to negotiate and talk about the future status of the Territory and its people, the kind of future which we round this table desire for all peoples.

206. The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States for his statement and for his introductory remarks.

207. Mr. HUANG Hua (China) (*translation from Chinese*): The Chinese delegation has listened to the statements made

by many representatives. Now we should like to make a few remarks on the question of Namibia.

208. The Chinese delegation has felt serious scepticism about the policy of the United Nations having "dialogue" with the South African authorities. That was why we did not participate in the voting on Security Council resolution 309 (1972) last August, after having stated our position.

209. The facts have proved that the South African authorities have no intention of making the slightest change in their reactionary position on Namibia. Far from yielding any positive result, the "dialogue" is being exploited by the South African authorities. While stepping up their reactionary "Bantustan" policy and intensifying their colonialist rule, the South African authorities are now trying to use their "dialogue" with the United Nations to obtain United Nations recognition of the "Bantustan" policy and legalize their illegal rule in Namibia.

210. The relevant United Nations resolutions point out in explicit terms that South Africa's occupation of Namibia is illegal and that the South African authorities must immediately withdraw all their military and police forces as well as their administration. However, during the "dialogue", the South African Prime Minister arrogantly asserted that "once the necessary conditions were established and the inhabitants had more administrative and political experience" a discussion of the "interpretation of" South Africa's policy "of self-determination and independence" could be held with better results. If such nonsense were accepted, would it not constitute a legalization of the South African authorities' occupation of Namibia? Would it not lead to a total abandonment of the Namibian people's sacred right of self-determination and independence to the South African racists? This is indeed an insult to the people of Namibia, the rest of Africa and the whole world. What qualifications do the most reactionary and fatuous racist authorities of South Africa have to "train" and "educate" others? We believe that the industrious and courageous Namibian people are fully entitled to determine their own destiny and have all the capabilities and wisdom to manage their own country. The South African authorities allege that the Namibian people do not have administrative and political experience. This is a vilification habitually used by the colonialists and racists against the Asian, African and Latin American peoples for the purpose of depriving the local people of their right to independence and prolonging their brutal colonialist and racist rule.

211. The relevant United Nations resolutions clearly point out that Namibia's national unity and territorial integrity must be preserved and the South African authorities' "Bantustan" policy of divide and rule must be opposed. During the dialogue the South African Prime Minister said that "experience in self-government was an essential element for eventual self-determination . . . this could best be achieved on a regional basis". What is "self-determination" on a regional basis? It means continued pursuit of the "Bantustan" policy of dealing with the Namibian people's liberation struggle by means of divide and rule. But the South African authorities do not rest at that. They further propose to establish a so-called federation on the basis of "Bantustans" under the unified leadership of the

South African Prime Minister. That is a demand not only for United Nations endorsement of their "Bantustan" policy but also for United Nations recognition of the Prime Minister of the South African colonialist and racist régime as the legal head of Namibia. We absolutely cannot agree to this. The South African Prime Minister also plays the trick of forming what he calls an advisory council. What kind of stuff is the advisory council? It will be nothing but a hired tool made of some white racists and puppets to be designated by the South African Prime Minister.

212. The relevant United Nations resolutions clearly point out that the Namibian people are entitled to inviolable rights and basic human rights and that the South African authorities must abrogate their repressive laws and decrees and release the detained political prisoners. Over the past nine months the South African authorities have taken no measure whatsoever in this direction. On the contrary, they have reinforced various repressive measures and policies of *apartheid*. A great number of freedom fighters for the independence of Namibia have been slain, imprisoned or exiled. The Namibian people have been deprived of all basic rights. During the recent dialogue, the South African authorities said that they could examine the possibility of removing restrictions on the freedom of movement and that they were in agreement that there should be "legitimate" political activity, including freedom of speech and the holding of meetings. Please note the word "legitimate". In the eyes of the South African authorities, the Namibian people's struggle for independence has always been "illegitimate". What they mean by "legitimate" is that the Namibian people must allow themselves to be manipulated by the South African authorities at will and accept the latter's reactionary rule; all acts to the contrary are illegitimate and must be suppressed.

213. It is quite strange that these spurious and deceptive promises given by the South African authorities should be described as positive elements in the report. Moreover, the "self-government" and "regional basis" as advocated by the South African authorities, which are in fact synonyms of "Bantustan", are, however, regarded as "acceptable in principle". Is this not a total negation, through the instrumentality of the United Nations, of the correct resolutions on Namibia adopted by the United Nations in recent years? Is this not a forthright denial of the principles of self-determination and independence enshrined in the United Nations Charter?

214. In the opinion of the Chinese delegation, the "dialogue" has created confusion within and outside the United Nations, and it has been used by the South African authorities to extricate themselves from their political isolation and mollify their condemnation by the people of various countries. It has brought adverse effects on the Namibian people's struggle for liberation. The South African authorities are vigorously trumpeting that as a result of the "dialogue" they "had repeated maximum benefits with minimum concessions". Does this not call for deep thought?

215. The Chinese delegation shares the views indicated by many other delegations that the report of the Secretary-General's representative and the proposal for continued

"dialogue" are unacceptable. In the circumstances in which there is no change whatsoever in the South African authorities' persistence in their reactionary rule over Namibia and in their contempt for the Charter principles and the relevant United Nations resolutions, it is indeed hardly understandable what is the positive meaning for continued dialogue with the South African authorities. Therefore, basing itself on our consistent stand on this question, the Chinese delegation has decided not to participate in the voting on the draft resolution before us.

216. We wish also to point out that both the present report of the Secretary-General's representative to the Security Council and the report of last July to the Council are oversimplified in the portion about their talks with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister of South Africa. The Security Council will obviously find it difficult to take this as a basis for considering such a serious political problem of major importance. We would request that the verbatim record of the talk between Mr. Escher and the South African authorities be submitted promptly to the Security Council. We think that our request is not unreasonable, and there should be no difficulty in meeting this request.

217. Mr. NAKAGAWA (Japan): Mr. President, first of all let me congratulate you on your assumption of the high office of President of the Security Council. I wish to pledge to you the whole-hearted co-operation of my delegation during the month of December.

218. May I also convey my congratulations to your predecessor, Mrs. Cissé, Ambassador of Guinea, for the brilliant and efficient manner and the feminine grace in which she discharged her tasks as President of the Council during the month of November.

219. Turning to the question now on our agenda, my delegation wishes to recapitulate very briefly at the outset the basic position of my Government on the question of Namibia.

220. My Government welcomed the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971 which in effect confirmed the validity of the United Nations decision to terminate the South African Mandate and to assume direct responsibility for the Territory until its independence. Japan has consistently supported this decision of the United Nations. As has been repeatedly stated by us on a number of occasions, we do not recognize South Africa's authority over Namibia and we consider that South Africa's continued presence in Namibia is illegal. We therefore firmly believe that South Africa is under obligation to comply with the decisions of the Security Council demanding immediate withdrawal from the Territory.

221. With regard to the means of securing implementation of these decisions of the Security Council, it is the well-expounded position of my Government that all peaceful means should be fully explored in creating the necessary conditions for such implementation and in bringing about thereby a settlement of the question of Namibia.

222. It is indeed on the basis of such a position of my Government that I stressed the significance of the dialogue

being conducted by the Secretary-General with all the parties concerned, including the Government of South Africa, by stating on 27 September in the general debate at the current session of the General Assembly:

“Particularly under the present circumstances, in which direct talks between the parties concerned have become virtually impossible, it is my firm belief that the United Nations should be utilized in a more positive and constructive manner as a forum for consultations in which the parties concerned participate.”<sup>8</sup>

223. My delegation has carefully studied the second report on the question now on our agenda submitted by the Secretary-General on 15 November. We have also listened very carefully to the statements made by the Secretary-General as well as a number of other previous speakers, including Mr. Mueshichange of SWAPO on this agenda item.

224. With regard to the contacts by the representative of the Secretary-General in pursuance of resolution 319 (1972), my delegation wishes to state first of all that it holds Mr. Escher in high esteem for the manner in which he conducted his assignment. We are fully aware of the highly difficult nature of his assignment, particularly in view of the limited time allowed for the discharge of his responsibility. We wish to express our warm appreciation to him for his invaluable dedication throughout the discharge of this highly difficult task.

225. As for the contribution made by Mr. Escher's mission to Namibia, my delegation wishes to endorse wholeheartedly the observation made by the Secretary-General in his statement to the Council on 28 November:

“One useful aspect of the report of the representative is the fact that it has removed any doubts that might have existed about the political aspirations of the people of Namibia. The evidence received by the representative makes it clear that the majority of the population in Namibia support the establishment of a united independent Namibia and expect the assistance of the United Nations in bringing this about.” [1678th meeting, para. 16.]

226. We should never underestimate the significance of this achievement which will play an important role in the long run in consolidating world public opinion.

227. As for the establishment of the necessary conditions referred to in resolutions 309 (1972) and 319 (1972), my delegation shares the view set forth by a number of previous speakers that no tangible results have been obtained so far with respect to a complete and unequivocal clarification by the Government of South Africa of its interpretation of self-determination, independence and national unity for Namibia. However, there is no reason why we should become pessimistic or desperate on account of continued non-compliance on the part of the Government of South Africa, because from the very beginning of the contacts initiated under resolution 309 (1972) between

the United Nations and South Africa, we have been fully aware of the difficulty involved in expecting quick and clear-cut results on the question of those principles. It is indeed highly opportune to recall at this stage our initial determination when we embarked on the new approach envisaged under resolution 309 (1972) and to reaffirm our position with renewed determination in the face of inevitable deadlocks and set-backs.

228. As has been stated on a number of occasions in the past, my delegation believes that the contacts initiated under resolutions 309 (1972) and 319 (1972) between the United Nations and South Africa are practically the only possible ways and means of breaking the impasse which we have been facing for so many years on the question of Namibia.

229. We are also of the opinion that the Secretary-General will need more time before reaching any conclusion as to the usefulness of the present contacts in bringing about a settlement of the question of Namibia. In this respect, my delegation fully agrees with the Secretary-General when he said to this Council:

“While it may be too early to speculate on the future course of events in the Territory, it would appear desirable that in the months ahead the United Nations should remain in touch with developments.” [1678th meeting, para. 24.]

230. We sincerely hope that the mandate entrusted to the Secretary-General under resolutions 309 (1972) and 319 (1972) will be further continued to enable him to pursue, through his representative, his present contacts with all parties concerned, including the Government of South Africa.

231. My delegation will therefore vote in favour of the draft resolution contained in document S/10846, which has been formulated in such an even-handed manner by the Argentine delegation and introduced with such eloquence by the representative of Argentina.

232. The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Japan for the kind words that he has addressed to me.

233. Sir Colin CROWE (United Kingdom): Mr. President, I am not a great believer in, nor am I very good at, flowery compliment, but I feel I must all the same, however briefly, express my sincere admiration and appreciation to Mrs. Cissé, your predecessor, for her handling of our affairs last month, and to you our congratulations and best wishes for your month of office. I know we are in good hands.

234. A few weeks ago, when the Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution concerning the Portuguese Territories in Africa, one of the sponsors wisely remarked that, although its terms were not the most satisfactory he had hoped to obtain, they were drafted in recognition of what he called “the political realities”. So often we have to face the fact that what is ardently desired by some members of the Council—or even on occasion by all members of the Council together—is not immediately attainable because of political realities. At such times it is the genius of the Council as an institution to find ways of

<sup>8</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh Session, Plenary Meetings*, 2042nd meeting, para. 18.

making progress—however painfully and slowly—towards long-term goals in spite of immediate difficulties, and in the process we sometimes astonish even ourselves by the good will and readiness to compromise that can be found among us.

235. I do not need to rehearse the history of the Security Council and United Nations involvement in the question of South Africa, which is as long and complex as any which is still on our agenda. Others have already pointed out that the suggestion that we should invite the Secretary-General to undertake exploratory contacts with all the parties concerned was originally put forward many years before the Council finally adopted it in February this year. In the intervening time, several other courses of action were attempted, either by the General Assembly or by this Council. My delegation was not able to associate itself with some of these, which we considered did not take sufficient account of the realities of the situation or of our own carefully considered view of the legal aspects.

236. It is not my intention to be controversial on this point, and indeed we have explicitly agreed in Security Council resolution 309 (1972) that our present endeavours are without prejudice to other resolutions adopted by the Security Council on this matter. I therefore only wish to point out that it was the fact that the method that had so far been tried had not produced the desired result which caused us all to look for another way forward. We would all agree that, since the existing situation is satisfactory to none of us, the test of any method is that it should show some sign of forward progress.

237. As evidence of my delegation's thinking a year or so ago, perhaps I may quote what I said at the conclusion of my statement to the Council on 6 October 1971. I said then:

“No one, of course, can guarantee that any negotiation is going to be successful or 100 per cent satisfactory to either side. Nevertheless, progress along these lines does seem to be the most positive of the options that are open to us. Whatever our opinions on the legal aspects, can we not agree that we should explore every possibility of steering away from a collision course which would be unlikely to alter, except for the worse, the present *de facto* position? In the opinion of my delegation we ought to make the attempt.” [1589th meeting, para. 67.]

238. That was what I said a year ago, and it still seems to my delegation that this is the right path to pursue.

239. We do not and we cannot expect an immediate solution of the entire problem, but we feel that, to put it at the lowest, there is not need to be pessimistic about the prospects. In the past nine months—which is not a very long time—the Secretary-General has had two detailed rounds of contacts with all the parties concerned: firstly himself, and secondly for the most part through his representative, Mr. Escher. Tributes were rightly paid when we considered the first report by the Secretary-General to the skilful and scrupulous way in which the Secretary-General took up his task. His efforts have continued to be invaluable, and I think we should all also be grateful to his representative for

his readiness to assume a complex and burdensome task at short notice, and for the unsparring way in which he and his collaborators in very difficult circumstances did so much in so short a time to meet the deadline of 15 November. Much important information about the views and intentions of all the parties concerned has been obtained, and we are thus in a much better position to consider how further progress may be achieved.

240. In the view of my delegation there is no doubt that we ought to continue the Secretary-General's contacts on the same basis as hitherto. We well understand the hesitations and doubts that have been expressed in the course of our debate. What has been achieved certainly falls well short of what we may hope for and what yet may be attained. This is hardly surprising in an operation of such long standing and of such difficulty.

241. As I observed at the beginning, the most constructive agreements in this Council are very often those which are the hardest to arrive at. I should like to pay a tribute to the spirit of constructive compromise which has characterized the discussions so very ably managed by the Argentine representative and his delegation, and which have resulted in the draft resolution before us.

242. This draft resolution invites the Secretary-General to continue his valuable efforts. It does so without prejudice to the other aspects of the situation, on which each of us must be at liberty to retain our positions. But it reaffirms the views we have already expressed in previous resolutions and debates concerning the right of the people of Namibia to self-determination, national independence and the preservation of their territorial integrity. It clearly does not seek to pre-empt the free choice of the people of Namibia in exercising their right to self-determination. This, as members of the Council will be aware, is a point to which my delegation has always attached importance in questions concerning self-determination for the people of dependent Territories.

243. It might have been better, in the opinion of my delegation, for us to have avoided the inconvenience we have had in the latest round as a result of too tight a time-table and to have given the Secretary-General a little longer before he reports—though not of course a limitless period. We understand the reasons why it would be convenient for there to be a progress report available next May but we would hope that this requirement would not hamper or interrupt the Secretary-General in any progress he may be making at the time. However, we know that he is a man who will not be daunted by the most arduous tasks and in voting for this draft resolution, I hope unanimously, we shall be recognizing again that the task we have set him is not an easy one. We shall continue to look, I believe realistically, for the full co-operation of all those with whom he will be in contact. If by following this path we can hope to advance the conditions and prospects of the people of Namibia even a little we shall surely have justified the expenditure of any amount of effort.

244. The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for the kind words he said about me.

245. As no other member of the Council wishes to speak I shall make a statement in my capacity as the representative of INDIA.

246. A close study of the evolution of the problem of Namibia discloses two important and closely related trends. The United Nations decided, supported by the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, that no claims of the Government of South Africa can be sustained as regards Namibia and that consequently the United Nations should take over the Territory and administer it. Along with this it was also decided that the United Nations control over Namibia would be of a temporary nature and that as soon as the proper machinery and other arrangements had been satisfactorily worked out the United Nations would fade out of the picture and the Namibian people as a whole would be independent and exercise their full right of self-determination. In this context we have listened to all the speakers who analysed the problem in depth and detail and have been particularly impressed by the statements of various African Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors, the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia, the representatives of SWAPO and, of course, of the Organization of African Unity. They all show a common concern which we share. We have of course examined the report of Mr. Escher and the Secretary-General's written and oral comments on it with the utmost care and sympathy. I do not think it necessary at this stage to make a detailed scrutiny of these papers; rather I shall confine myself to some general observations.

247. In the view of my delegation, resolutions 309 (1972) and 319 (1972), while based on a United Nations approach, did not make it clear either to the Secretary-General or subsequently to his representative—directly or indirectly—which of the two aspects of this problem was to be negotiated with the Government of South Africa through the contacts the Secretary-General and his representative were authorized to establish. In the circumstances such contacts as were established were used for working towards a number of arrangements which might eventually, it was hoped, mean that the people of Namibia would exercise its inherent right of self-determination and independence, free from all coercion and through the full political process of free discussion and free movement of people, and without any, even distant, implication that the South African theory of "homelands" or of *apartheid* would be accepted.

248. Once we assume this interpretation of resolutions 309 (1972) and 319 (1972) we may conclude that some progress on methodology, as reported first by the Secretary-General and later by Mr. Escher, has been made. However, there has been no acceptance of the totality of the United Nations approach to this problem by the Government of South Africa and we are in a dilemma: on the one hand, we have to decide whether, without such an acceptance, further pursuit of the present contacts and negotiations might not help the Government of South Africa rather than the United Nations; and, on the other hand, we do not wish to give the Government of South Africa the possibility of suggesting that, while it was prepared to move in a so-called pragmatic sense in the right direction, the United Nations did not allow it an adequate opportunity.

249. In the view of my delegation this dilemma has been overcome by the present text of the draft resolution. Not only the wording of the draft resolution but also the discussion that has taken place in the Council should make it abundantly clear to the Government of South Africa that unless the approach of the United Nations to this problem was accepted, the scope for negotiations would indeed be limited if not completely eliminated. By fixing a time-limit for the South African Government to make its position known to the Council in unequivocal and categorical terms, we help the Secretary-General in pursuing such contacts as the Council is authorizing him to undertake. If at the end of the process the Council came to the conclusion that the régime in Pretoria will not abandon any of its obstinate obsessions, we would be in a much stronger position to say that all our efforts to bring South Africa to its senses through the new approach had failed, and we should then have no option but to pursue other methods to achieve our goal and resolve. It is in this spirit that my delegation will support the draft resolution submitted by the representative of Argentina. Meanwhile, we would hope that all States friendly to the Government of South Africa would influence that Government to realize that if it persisted in opposing the United Nations in every facet of this problem, it would not only be justly condemned by the world community as a whole but could expect much greater active opposition by the liberation movements in Namibia itself and much stronger action by the United Nations.

250. While we are discussing the fundamental nature of this problem, we in our delegation think that the time has come to take a more careful look at the various organizations and arrangements which are now concerned with the problem of Namibia. On the one hand, we have the Council for Namibia, which is charged with the task of administration and at the same time expected to be concerned with the future developments towards independence and self-determination. Then we have the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia to carry out simultaneously the wishes of the Secretary-General and such mandates as the Council for Namibia may realistically give to him. In addition, we have authorized the Secretary-General and his representatives to establish contacts with the Government of South Africa for eventual self-determination and independence for the people of Namibia as a whole. Furthermore, we have the Security Council, together with its *Ad Hoc* Sub-Committee, to exercise total supervision over the entire situation. Lastly, there is the Committee of Twenty-Four and other related bodies which from time to time discuss the problem of Namibia.

251. My delegation does not believe either that the division of work in the various places has been worked out and co-ordinated satisfactorily or that the present diffused arrangements can bring about the kind of solution we all desire. I mention this problem, not in the hope of finding a solution immediately, but simply to bring it to the notice of the members of the Council so that in the near future and with the full co-operation of the Secretary-General some better and more effective arrangements can be worked out.

252. In conclusion, as I have already stated, we shall vote for the draft resolution and we are confident that the

Secretary-General's next report will give his views clearly and categorically in a way which will help us to decide whether South Africa has mended its course and its attitude or is bent on flouting the general will of the international community, regardless of the cost it and others, particularly the Namibians, may have to pay. Finally, we wish the freedom movements of Namibia greater success and assure them of our total support.

253. As no other member of the Council wishes to speak on the substance of the problem I shall now call on the representatives who wish to explain their votes before the vote.

254. Mrs. CISSÉ (Guinea) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, before explaining our vote on the draft resolution before us, my delegation wishes to express to you its congratulations on your accession to the presidency of the Security Council for the month of December and to thank you for the words of praise that you addressed to me when you assumed the presidency. I wish to associate myself with the tribute paid to your personal qualities and also to the tribute paid to your great country, which maintains friendly relations with my own.

255. I should like to thank the Secretary-General for the kind words he addressed to me.

256. To my colleagues on the Security Council who have always been most co-operative with and indulgent towards me, thus facilitating my task, I offer my wholehearted gratitude. I also express my appreciation to the many speakers who in their statements recalled with praise the action of my Government and my country for the promotion of women's rights.

257. Turning to the draft resolution before us, my delegation, which on several occasions has expressed its disappointment regarding the results of Mr. Escher's mission, would doubtless have preferred a text which more vigorously emphasized that disappointment. We would have preferred the text forcefully to express condemnation of South Africa because of its total scorn for United Nations resolutions and because of the arrogant manner in which it interprets the texts of the Security Council.

258. In operative paragraph 1 the Council "observes with satisfaction that the people of Namibia have recently had an opportunity of expressing their aspirations clearly and unequivocally, in their own Territory, to representatives of the United Nations". My delegation would have preferred to have a second paragraph which condemned South Africa for its refusal to co-operate with the United Nations, thus indicating the disappointment that has been reflected in most of the statements made by the Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors from Africa.

259. In operative paragraph 6, my delegation would have wished, after the words "this resolution", to have a reference to other relevant resolutions of the Security Council. However, in our desire to co-operate we shall not insist on these amendments.

260. In associating ourselves with the desire of the Security Council to obtain a quick and specific reply from

South Africa, we remain flexible in regard to the quest for new approaches to the question of Namibia. This is why we emphasize that, though we would have preferred a firmer resolution we are prepared to support the draft resolution, so eloquently introduced by the representative of Argentina, Mr. Ortiz de Rozas. We are convinced that the Secretary-General will use every means available to him to bring to a successful conclusion the difficult task that has been entrusted to him. My delegation wishes to associate itself with the hope expressed by Mr. Ortiz de Rozas that in the future South Africa will co-operate more fully with the United Nations, thus acting in accord with the legitimate desires of the people of Namibia for independence.

261. The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Guinea for the kind words she has addressed to me.

262. Mr. NUR ELMI (Somalia): When I spoke a week ago on the question on our agenda, the prestigious Chair of the presidency of this Council was occupied by Mrs. Cissé, the representative of the Republic of Guinea, whose qualities of leadership we all admired. Allow me, therefore, to express to you now, Mr. President, on behalf of my delegation, our sincere congratulations on your assumption of the office of President of the Security Council for the month of December. I wish to assure you, Sir, of my delegation's full co-operation. You come from a great country with which the Somali Democratic Republic enjoys friendly relations. The Somali people will always remember the important and decisive role which India, together with other friendly countries, played in the drafting and adoption of General Assembly resolution 289 B (IV), which placed my country under the International Trusteeship System 24 years ago, and its subsequent successful efforts in establishing a United Nations Advisory Council to supervise the implementation of the Trusteeship Agreement.

263. My delegation deems it necessary to make a statement in explanation of its vote. We will cast a vote in favour of the draft resolution contained in document S/10846 because we have been particularly outspoken in our criticism of the developments described in the Secretary-General's report on the question of Namibia. But even though we are not particularly satisfied with some of its provisions, we have been able to accept the draft resolution for three reasons: first, because it takes into account some of our constructive criticisms and reaffirms certain basic principles which we felt had been compromised by unfortunate developments that took place in the course of the recent talks with the South African Government; second, because it rejects any interpretation, measure or policy that is not based on the principle of self-determination, independence and territorial integrity for Namibia; and third, because we feel, in our concern for the Namibian people, that one more attempt should be made to ensure that the people of Namibia receive their right to self-determination and independence. Two of the cardinal principles that have always governed the Namibian question have been the inalienable right of the people of Namibia to self-determination and independence, and their right to preserve their national unity and territorial integrity as the basis of that independence. The draft resolution reaffirms these principles. It is important that it should do so, in view of the failure of the South African Government to clarify its

policy towards self-determination and independence for Namibia, and in view also of the unacceptable principles and proposals put forward by the South African Prime Minister in this regard.

264. We cannot under any circumstances accept a vague promise of eventual self-determination, conditioned by unacceptable policies such as the acquisition of sufficient political and administrative experience, to be unilaterally determined by the racist régime in Pretoria.

265. South Africa's plan to divide Namibia on tribal and racial lines has been too clearly rejected by the people of Namibia and by the United Nations for me to need to elaborate further on this point. However, my delegation welcomes the fact that the Secretary-General's representative was able to obtain, in Namibia, additional evidence of the strong desire of the majority of the people of Namibia to preserve their national unity and territorial integrity as the basis for their independence, and that this finding has been recorded in the present draft resolution.

266. My delegation has always considered it a matter of paramount importance that the special responsibility and obligation of the United Nations towards the people and the Territory of Namibia should never be questioned or even temporarily put aside. We note with relief that this principle has also been reaffirmed in the draft resolution. In this connexion, my delegation strongly hopes that there will be progress along the lines indicated in operative paragraph 6, which calls on the Government of South Africa to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General in the implementation of the resolution in order to bring about a transfer of the administration of Namibia.

267. As I have already emphasized, my delegation believes that no avenue should be left unexplored in the search for a just solution to the Namibian problem. We believe also that the South African Government has now been given another opportunity to carry out its responsibilities as a Member of the United Nations. While the results so far attained have not been at all promising, my delegation shares the view that the Secretary-General should continue his valuable efforts to ensure that the people of Namibia exercise their inalienable right to self-determination and independence. Operative paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the draft resolution provide clear and unequivocal guidelines for the continuation of the Security Council's initiative. With regard to operative paragraph 6, however, we insisted, in the course of the extensive consultations which took place during the drafting stage of the present draft resolution, that reference be made to other relevant resolutions pertaining to Namibia.

268. Unfortunately, this pertinent reference to resolutions adopted by this very Council has been rejected by some of the permanent members of the Security Council. We are gratified, however, that in his introductory statement the representative of Argentina was gracious enough to place special emphasis on this point. We hope that his statement will be reflected *in extenso* in the records of the Council.

269. In conclusion, I should like to take this opportunity to pay a well deserved tribute to the representative of

Argentina, Mr. Ortiz de Rozas, for the commendable efforts which he and his delegation have made in establishing a common ground of agreement. The draft resolution is the result of his skilled and patient diplomacy which brought together opposing views so that the hope of progress on the Namibian question could be kept alive.

270. The PRESIDENT: I wish to thank the representative of Somalia for the kind remarks he made about my country and me.

271. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): Before making a statement in explanation of vote, I should like to suggest to the sponsor of the draft resolution, the representative of Argentina, that he should amend operative paragraph 8 of his draft, which states that "the President of the Council shall appoint, in consultation with all members, representatives to fill the vacancies that will occur in the group established in accordance with resolution 309 (1972)". That proposal is not in keeping with the Council's earlier decision. In resolution 309 (1972) the Council itself appointed the group; accordingly, any changes in the composition of the group should be made by the Council itself and not by the President of the Security Council, even in consultation with all members of the Council. Therefore, in keeping with the previous decision, that paragraph should be amended to the effect that the Security Council itself should appoint new representatives to fill the vacancies.

272. Mr. ORTIZ DE ROZAS (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The draft resolution which is before the Council was informally circulated among members on Thursday last in order for delegations to have time to make all their suggestions and observations. Up to the time when it was introduced to the Council, no observations had been made with regard to operative paragraph 8.

273. However, as everyone knows, my delegation always co-operates in order to meet the legitimate wishes of our colleagues. The value we attach to the favourable vote of the Soviet Union is also well known and we believe that what is at stake is to amend the draft resolution so as to make it possible for the Soviet Union to join its vote in favour of it to that of all the other members of the Security Council.

274. Accordingly, as always, I am happy to accept the suggestion made by my friend Mr. Malik, and operative paragraph 8 will therefore read as follows:

"Decides that, immediately following the partial renewal of the membership of the Security Council on 1 January 1973, the Council shall appoint representatives to fill the vacancies that will occur in the group established in accordance with resolution 309 (1972);".

275. We believe that this amendment will accommodate the representative of the Soviet Union and make it possible for him to cast his very valuable vote in favour of the draft resolution.

276. At the same time, since I have the floor I should like to express my gratitude for the very generous remarks of

several delegations concerning our participation in the submission of this draft resolution. As I said before, if anyone should be grateful, it is I who should be grateful to them for the valuable contribution of their ideas and for the support they have at all times given me.

277. The PRESIDENT: The Council will now vote on the draft resolution in document S/10846.

*A vote was taken by show of hands.*

*In favour:* Argentina, Belgium, France, Guinea, India, Italy, Japan, Panama, Somalia, Sudan, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Yugoslavia.

*Against:* None.

*Abstentions:* Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

*The draft resolution was adopted by 13 votes to none, with 1 abstention.<sup>9</sup>*

*One member (China) did not participate in the voting.*

278. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): I should like to thank the representative of Argentina, for kindly agreeing to abide by the principle affirmed by the Security Council in its resolution 309 (1972), and thus set matters right and uphold the principle recognized and endorsed by the Security Council at its meetings away from Headquarters held at Addis Ababa.

279. If the only reason for the Soviet delegation's intention to abstain in the vote on the draft resolution as a whole had been paragraph 8 and this principle, I should unquestionably have voted in favour of the draft resolution. But the fact is that the reason for the Soviet delegation's abstention in the vote on this draft resolution is based on other important considerations of principle. Although the draft resolution confirms the right of the people of Namibia to self-determination and independence, and also confirms the principle of the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia, it does not contain any specific demand that South Africa should take steps to implement that right and principle in practice.

280. Paragraph 5 invites the Secretary-General to continue his efforts, in consultation with the group of three established by the Security Council in resolution 309 (1972). In other words, it is proposed to extend the mandate given to the Secretary-General to continue the contacts he has made with the South African authorities. I should therefore like to recall that the delegation of the Soviet Union expressed serious reservations even at Addis Ababa with regard to the advisability and productiveness of a dialogue with the South African racists. We stressed that persuading and entreating the South African racists would not lead to any positive results. Only joint and united efforts by all countries who take an anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist position can force the South African racists

to implement United Nations decisions. We stated at the time that Security Council resolutions 309 (1972) and 319 (1972) on the subject of the dialogue with South Africa did not meet the main requirements of the problem of the liberation of Namibia and could only divert the efforts of the United Nations, particularly the Security Council, from the main objective of securing the immediate liberation of Namibia from illegal domination by the South African racists.

281. However, at that time, taking into account the urgent appeals of the African representatives, we agreed to vote for resolution 309 (1972). But subsequent developments and the debates in the Security Council have fully confirmed our doubts and our uncertainty as to the possibility that a dialogue with the racists would prove successful. These events and subsequent developments have shown that South Africa and its ruling circles do not intend to implement the decisions of the United Nations but are continuing their policy of racist domination over the population of Namibia and of dismemberment of the Territory of Namibia. All this leaves the delegation of the USSR without the slightest doubt about the real intentions of the Government of South Africa, which is still, as in the past, pursuing the objective of maintaining its racist and colonialist rule in Namibia.

282. We can draw the definite conclusion that no changes at all have taken place in either the political situation in Namibia or the policy and acts of the authorities at Pretoria. The policies of annexation, illegal appropriation of Namibia and colonial oppression of its population are still being pursued.

283. At the time when the Secretary-General and his representative were in contact with South Africa, the South African authorities did not halt their activities aimed at strengthening South Africa's position in Namibia, destroying the unity of that country and violating the Security Council resolutions providing for the maintenance of its national unity and territorial integrity. In these circumstances it is quite obvious that prolonging the Secretary-General's mandate with respect to Namibia can only be used by the South African racists as a cover for further delay in implementing the United Nations resolutions on Namibia which provide for the maintenance of the integrity and the national unity of Namibia and the granting of freedom and independence to its people.

284. We are also taking into account the serious reservations and dissatisfaction expressed by a number of African delegations which have participated in the current debate on this item in the Security Council. In view of the South African authorities' stubborn and unyielding policy of perpetuating their colonialist and racist domination of Namibia, we are deeply convinced that when the Secretary-General's third report on the implementation of his mandate is discussed on 30 April 1973 we shall be confronted with the same results as today. Other methods, other procedures and other decisions are required of the United Nations and its principal organs, in particular the Security Council. Such methods and procedures are provided for in the Charter of the United Nations, and the Security Council has been given the right to apply such

<sup>9</sup> See resolution 323 (1972).

measures. Another decision to prolong the mandate for talks will not bring positive results. It can only create the illusion that the United Nations is doing something, and meanwhile that decision will in fact be used by the racists to strengthen further their domination of Namibia. For all these reasons, and because of what we have been experiencing since February, the Soviet delegation felt it could not vote for this draft resolution.

285. I should like once again to express my thanks to the representative of Argentina, for restoring justice and acting in accordance with the principle endorsed by the Security Council that the decision in question should be taken by the Security Council and no one else. I regret that because of the considerations I have mentioned I was not able to meet his request and support his draft resolution.

286. The PRESIDENT: As a matter of clarification I should state that the document on which we voted underwent several minor modifications: first, modifications by the representative of Argentina himself in correction of certain errors and then, later on, when he accepted the suggested amendment of the Soviet Union. Since the text does not reflect all these modifications I thought this should be made quite clear.

287. Mr. ORTIZ DE ROZAS (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Mr. President, I wish to thank you for the clarification you have just made because actually the draft resolution was not put to the vote in an amended form, which would make it possible to retain the original text. If we accepted the amendment proposed by the representative of the Soviet Union, it was not out of respect for a principle, because with regard to resolutions there is no such thing as an established principle which has to be followed forever after. What we accepted was a suggestion and we did so because it came from the delegation of the Soviet Union—and for that reason only—and we maintain it.

288. The PRESIDENT: You accept the amendment?

289. Mr. ORTIZ DE ROZAS (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Yes.

290. The PRESIDENT: We have thus come to a happy conclusion to all the hard labour that was put in, and I must thank the Council for its co-operation, and in particular I must congratulate Mr. Ortiz de Rozas for the conclusion of his hard and skilful work.

*The meeting rose at 7.50 p.m.*