

UNITED NATIONS



SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

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TWENTY-SEVENTH YEAR

1681th

MEETING: 4 DECEMBER 1972

NEW YORK

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SIXTEEN HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-FIRST MEETING

Held in New York on Monday, 4 December 1972, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. Samar SEN (India).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Argentina, Belgium, China, France, Guinea, India, Italy, Japan, Panama, Somalia, Sudan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Yugoslavia.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1681)

1. Adoption of the agenda.

2. The situation in Namibia:

Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 319 (1972) concerning the question of Namibia (S/10832 and Corr.1).

The meeting was called to order at 4 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Namibia:

Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 319 (1972) concerning the question of Namibia (S/10832 and Corr.1)

1. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decisions taken by the Council at the 1678th and 1679th meetings I propose now, with the consent of the Council, to invite the representatives of Chad, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mauritius, Morocco, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Burundi and Zambia to participate, without the right to vote, in the discussions of the Council.

2. In view of the limited number of seats available at the table, and in accordance with the usual practice, I now invite the representatives I have mentioned to take the places reserved for them in the Council Chamber, on the understanding that they will be called to the Council table when it is their turn to speak.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Z. Gabre-Sellassie (Ethiopia), Mr. N. Barnes (Liberia), Mr. A. Benhima (Morocco), Mr. I. Taylor-Kamara (Sierra Leone), Mr. E. Ogbu (Nigeria), Mr. N. Terence (Burundi) and Mr. K. Nyirenda (Zambia) took the places reserved for them in the Council Chamber.

3. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decision taken by the Security Council at the 1678th meeting I now

invite the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia, Mr. Olcay, to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. O. Olcay, President of the United Nations Council for Namibia, took a place at the Council table.

4. The PRESIDENT: The first name inscribed on my list is that of the representative of Nigeria, whom I invite to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

5. Mr. OGBU (Nigeria): Mr. President, permit me to congratulate you on your assumption of the high office of President of this august body for the month of December. You come from a country that has common bonds with Nigeria, and your competence and experience in the diplomatic field are very well known to my delegation. We are confident that under your presidency the Security Council will achieve great things.

6. For the second time within three months the Security Council is faced with the question of what further action to take on a well-intentioned initiative which now seems to have led to a dead-end. Readiness to conduct contacts in good faith was the underlying assumption of the moves that resulted in Security Council resolution 309 (1972). Yet, after almost nine months of such contacts, it is clear that if the Government of South Africa is interested in taking advantage of the opportunity offered by resolution 309 (1972) to withdraw its illegal administration from Namibia, it has yet to demonstrate such interest.

7. In February of this year there were many delegations that were sceptical about the wisdom of extending an olive branch to a régime that believes only in force and repression. The record of South Africa in the past efforts at finding a negotiated settlement to the Namibian question has been one of South Africa trying to embarrass the United Nations. The earlier initiatives along this line failed mainly because South Africa maintained its illegal position and wanted the United Nations to endorse that position. Following the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in 1950,¹ the General Assembly decided to try the avenue of direct talks with the Government of South Africa. By its resolution 449 (V) of 13 December 1950 the General Assembly established an *Ad Hoc* Committee on South West Africa, consisting of five members, to negotiate with South Africa. For three years, the *Ad Hoc* Committee negotiated unsuccessfully with the South African Government. Another futile attempt was made when the Good

¹ See *International Status of South West Africa, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950*, p. 128.

Offices Committee on South West Africa, set up in 1957 under General Assembly resolution 1143 (XII), did not accomplish anything because South Africa insisted that the Committee should merely endorse its plan for the annexation of Namibia. Yet a third attempt, involving the visit in 1962 of the Special Committee for South West Africa for the purpose of exchanging views on the peaceful solution of the Namibian issue, also failed to accomplish anything.

8. In spite of such a dismal record, however, many delegations reluctantly went along with the initiative, resulting in resolution 309 (1972), hoping that the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of June 1971² would have softened the South African position. It seems South Africa has again taken us for a ride. There is no doubt whatsoever about the legal position. Following South Africa's refusal to discharge fully the terms of its Mandate over Namibia, and on the failure of all efforts to reason with it, the Mandate was terminated by the General Assembly in resolution 2145 (XXI), and the Territory was placed under the direct responsibility of the United Nations. To carry out the administration of the Territory pending the attainment of independence, the General Assembly established the United Nations Council for Namibia.

9. The legality of the action by the General Assembly in terminating the Mandate of South Africa over Namibia was confirmed by the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion of 21 June 1971. The Court found that the General Assembly had validly terminated the Mandate and, based on that conclusion, the Court advised that the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia was illegal and that South Africa was under obligation to withdraw its administration from the Territory and to cease its occupation of the Territory. Despite that advisory opinion and its acceptance by the Security Council, the Government of South Africa has bluntly refused to allow the United Nations Council for Namibia, acting on behalf of the Organization, to carry out the mandate entrusted to it with respect to Namibia.

10. In his address before the Security Council at its 1678th meeting the current President of the United Nations Council for Namibia, Mr. Olcay, Ambassador of Turkey, explained the steps which are being taken by that Council to discharge its mandate, but he also underlined the vital fact that as long as the South African Government persists in its occupation of Namibia, so long will it be impossible for that Council to assume fully the responsibilities entrusted to it. Even before the visit of Mr. Escher, the Secretary-General's representative, the members of the Council for Namibia who had had the opportunity of consulting with a good number of Namibians in New York, as well as elsewhere, had never been in doubt about their desire for self-determination and independence and for the unity of their country. It may be recalled that soon after the release of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in 1971 the Namibian people expressed endorsement of the opinion through various means. In spite

² *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16.*

of the campaign of terror waged constantly against them by the South African administration, it is significant that in an open letter to the Prime Minister of South Africa Bishop Auala stressed, on behalf of the 300,000 members of the Namibian Lutheran Church, the desire of the people of Namibia for self-determination and independence. The view expressed in that letter was again repeated before the Security Council last year when the Bishop participated in the consideration of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. It need hardly be mentioned that SWAPO (South West Africa People's Organization), that authentic voice of the Namibian people, has constantly made it clear that the desire of the Namibian people is for immediate self-determination and independence.

11. The series of contacts that began with resolution 309 (1972) were made for clearly defined purposes. In paragraph 1 of that resolution, the Council:

"Invites the Secretary-General, in consultation and close co-operation with a group of the Security Council, composed of the representatives of Argentina, Somalia and Yugoslavia, to initiate as soon as possible contacts with all parties concerned, with a view to establishing the necessary conditions so as to enable the people of Namibia, freely and with strict regard to the principle of human equality, to exercise their right to self-determination and independence, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations".

12. In an aide-mémoire presented to the Secretary-General by the group of three of the Security Council³ it was made clear that the purpose of resolution 309 (1972) was merely to try a new approach without prejudice to other resolutions on Namibia adopted by the Security Council. Thus, resolution 309 (1972) is linked to other Security Council resolutions as well as to the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, which, together constitute one legal, political, organic whole. It was also made clear that the sole purpose of resolution 309 (1972) was to enable the people of Namibia to exercise their inalienable right to self-determination and independence. Great stress was placed in this respect on the need to preserve the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia.

13. We are all aware that the Secretary-General's initial contacts with the Government of South Africa did not elicit any clear-cut response except an agreement to continue the contacts through the appointment of a representative. Security Council resolution 319 (1972), which approved the Secretary-General's proposal to appoint a representative to assist him in the discharge of the mandate given him by resolution 309 (1972), re-emphasized that the purpose of the whole exercise was to establish "the necessary conditions so as to enable the people of Namibia, freely and with strict regard to the principle of human equality, to exercise their right to self-determination and independence, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations."

³ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-seventh Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1972, document S/10738, annex I.*

14. That purpose was clearly elaborated by the Security Council group of three in an aide-mémoire presented to the Secretary-General on 26 September 1972, as follows:

"The main task of the representative should be to obtain a complete and unequivocal clarification from the Government of South Africa with regard to its policy of self-determination and independence for Namibia, so as to enable the Security Council to decide whether it coincides with the United Nations position on this matter and whether the efforts made under resolutions 309 (1972) and 319 (1972) should be continued.

"The need to maintain the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia must be kept in mind all the time.

"The Government of South Africa should discontinue the application of so-called 'homelands' policies and abolish any repressive measures in Namibia. This would create conditions in which the representative could perform his tasks. This would also serve as an indication of the readiness of the Government of South Africa to co-operate with the United Nations." [See S/10832 and Corr.1, annex I.]

15. From the report of the Secretary-General containing the report of his representative, Mr. Escher [*ibid.*, annex II], it is clear to my delegation that the Government of South Africa has bluntly refused to clarify its position on these very important basic issues. Where responses have been made by the South African Government they have been shrouded in such generalities and vagueness that the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the Government of South Africa, while wanting to give the appearance of being interested in talking with the United Nations, is, in fact, only playing for time. In replying, for instance, to Mr. Escher's request for clarification of the South African Government's policy with respect to self-determination and independence for Namibia, the Prime Minister of South Africa stated that, apart from what he had already told the Secretary-General in March 1972, he believed that the time was not appropriate to go into a detailed discussion of the interpretation of self-determination and independence, and that this could be done with better results once the necessary conditions had been established and the inhabitants had had more administrative and political experience. In this connexion, it is pertinent to refresh our memory immediately as to what the Prime Minister had told the Secretary-General in March. In his report dated 17 July 1972⁴ the Secretary-General wrote:

"During the discussion the Prime Minister reaffirmed the South African Government's policy of self-determination and independence for the peoples of Namibia. I explained the position of the United Nations with regard to Namibia and, in particular, with regard to its national unity and territorial integrity."

16. In paragraph 14 of the same report the Secretary-General referred to the many conversations he had with the South African Foreign Minister and the explanation he gave to the Minister that any useful discussions concerning the future of Namibia would have to be based on the self-determination and independence of the people of the

⁴ *Ibid.*, document S/10738.

Territory as a whole. Therefore, wrote the Secretary-General, a confirmation of South Africa's declared policy of self-determination and independence for the peoples of Namibia could not serve as a basis for continuing the contacts envisaged in resolution 309 (1972). It is clear again to my delegation that by referring to what he had already told the Secretary-General, the Prime Minister of South Africa, in effect, was telling Mr. Escher that the decision of his Government on self-determination and independence for Namibia, which the Secretary-General had already declared to be unacceptable as a basis for continuing the contacts envisaged in resolution 309 (1972), had not changed.

17. The reference to the necessary conditions and the need for more administrative and political experience cannot disguise the clear intentions of the South African régime. If, after more than 50 years of its presence in Namibia, the South African Government is only now thinking of establishing the necessary conditions for self-determination and independence, if, within that period the South African administration has done very, very little to afford the Namibians administrative and political experience, the inference is clear that the United Nations and the people of Namibia would have to wait another 50 years while South Africa tries to establish "the necessary conditions".

18. The bad faith of the Government of South Africa in conducting those contacts shows itself even more clearly when the Prime Minister informed Mr. Escher of the need to provide experience in self-government on a regional basis. The excuse given for regionalization was, in the words of the Prime Minister, "the special circumstances of Namibia". Though the Prime Minister himself did not define what those special circumstances were, we were able to get insight into the thinking of the South African Government from the elaboration provided to Mr. Escher by the South African Minister for Public Works, who stated "that the differences between the African ethnic groups were such that there was no alternative to separate development". In effect, the South African administration adheres to the belief that each ethnic group should be administered separately. This, of course, is the basis of the South African homelands policy. Regionalism, therefore, is merely another term, as far as South Africa's intentions go, for homelands.

19. The offer to establish an advisory council drawn from representatives of the various regions does not, in any way, improve the outlook, since we are all aware of the representative character of the administrations installed in the "homelands" that have already been created. Such an advisory council would merely be a puppet organ doing the bidding of the South African administration rather than serving the interest of the Namibian people since such a council would be appointed by the Prime Minister of South Africa.

20. At first sight, the undertaking by the Prime Minister of South Africa to remove restrictions of freedom of movement could be seen as an advance. However, when one recognizes that the reason given for the imposition of those restrictions in the first instance is said to be the necessity "to exercise influx control", one finds that no meaningful

relaxation of the restrictions imposed on Namibians can be made until the Government of South Africa completely abandons its policy of "homelands".

21. In contrast to the vague and unhelpful response from the South African Government to Mr. Escher's questions, it was clear that the people of Namibia had spoken in unmistakable and almost unanimous terms. Mr. Escher himself formed the impression that the people were agreed on the need for immediate withdrawal of the South African administration as a prelude to independence. The Namibian people stressed to Mr. Escher that there was no truth in the South African Government's allegation of hostility among the various ethnic groups and they maintained that the South African "homelands" policy was designed solely to divide the African population into small units making it easier for the South African repressive machinery to take care of each unit. The Namibian people stressed the desire for the unity of their country and the immediate physical presence of the United Nations.

22. In introducing his report, the Secretary-General was very candid when he informed the Security Council at its meeting on 28 November "that the report of the representative leaves unanswered or unresolved a number of issues which continue to occupy the minds of all of us" [1678th meeting, para. 13], that most of the issues on which positive responses were sought have, so far, been resisted by the South African Government and, therefore, progress could not be expected without protracted discussion and that the evidence received by his representative makes it clear that the majority of the population in Namibia support the establishment of a united, independent Namibia and expect the assistance of the United Nations in bringing that about.

23. My delegation agrees entirely with those conclusions drawn by the Secretary-General. We believe that the South African Government is intent on involving the United Nations in a protracted discussion which would provide it with an umbrella for carrying out its pre-determined policies in Namibia. We do not think that contacts, merely for the sake of being seen talking with the South Africans, will be in the long-term interest of the people of Namibia, nor will they do credit to the United Nations. For contacts to be meaningful, each side must understand clearly the position of the other side. The United Nations has made clear its position on the vital issues involved in the Namibian question. Until now, however, the position of the South African Government on those basic issues remains as confusing as it was at the beginning of the contacts. It seems to my delegation, therefore, that before we proceed any further it is necessary to pause at this point to seek a precise, unequivocal presentation of the position of the South African Government in order to ensure that the basis for contacts does in fact exist. The Security Council should direct the Secretary-General to seek clear and direct answers from the South African Government to the following questions: Seeing that the people of Namibia have opted for self-determination and independence, will the South African Government indicate precisely when it will remove its administration from the Territory? Pending the removal of that administration, will the South African Government desist forthwith from pursuing its policy of

"homelands", now euphemistically called regions? Will the South African Government immediately lift all restrictions on the freedom of movement of Namibians within the Territory and restore to the people their freedom of speech and political activity? Will the South African Government permit immediate United Nations presence in Namibia as clearly demanded by the Namibian people?

24. While awaiting the response of the South African Government through the normal diplomatic channels, the mission of Mr. Escher, in the opinion of my delegation, should be suspended. Meanwhile, also, the Security Council must ensure that it will pursue vigorously alternative means to enable the people of Namibia to enjoy their inalienable right to self-determination and independence.

25. The PRESIDENT: I should like to thank the representative of Nigeria for the kind words that he addressed to me.

26. The next speaker on my list is the representative of Burundi, whom I invite to take a place at the Council table and make his statement.

27. Mr. TERENCE (Burundi): Mr. President, permit me to congratulate you on your assumption of the Council presidency, which, I may note, is not merely an alphabetical succession to your distinguished predecessor, Mrs. Cissé of Guinea, the first woman to preside over the Council's deliberations. We may recall, Mr. President, that it was your country, India, which gave the General Assembly its first woman president—Mrs. Pandit—at the 1953 session.

28. There is also the coincidence that it was India which first introduced the issue of South African racism in the General Assembly, an issue largely dramatized by the great founder of free India, Mahatma Gandhi who, as a victim of that policy, virtually began his political career by organizing the first world opposition to Pretoria's pathological preoccupation with colour.

29. That was 89 years ago and nothing has changed except for the worse, and during 25 years of that period—that is to say, during the lifetime of this Organization—South Africa has developed its crude racism into a more sophisticated policy of *apartheid*, a strange commodity of which South Africa has become the thriving exporter to neighbouring régimes and—with an irony that challenges the conscience of all of us around this table—into Namibia, a United Nations Territory under the Charter with all the inalienable human rights developed under the Charter.

30. Now after all these years the Government of Pretoria has finally unbent sufficiently to permit a United Nations representative to enter the area, and while fully acknowledging the very fuzzy concept of "self-determination" does so with a vague, deferred concept of time measurable by the past 89 years since Gandhi. In the light of such stand-still history it is almost a waste of slim hope to discuss what the Secretary-General's representative has brought back in the way of a few South African acknowledgements, for what Prime Minister Vorster has cautiously conceded in principle he has taken back with a time-table of indefinite delay and procrastination.

31. If the new strategy is to play the time factor in the guise of negotiations it would seem futile to continue any further negotiations, even if they were to bring back maximum acceptance of United Nations principles. They would only be nullified by Pretoria's creeping hands of the clock.

32. This is the second time in two weeks that I have appeared before the Council on an African issue and on behalf of the Organization of African Unity. Since Namibia is within Africa and Africa within the framework of the United Nations—that means within the world community—my preoccupation will be with locating the issue in the global context. Other African representatives have stated their views, and I should add that although Namibia and the high principles at stake are of equal concern to all States Members of this Organization—the principles of human rights, the equality of races, the inadmissibility of colonial domination—the prestige of the Organization, the threat to peace and security, the authority of the United Nations Charter, are all involved in the Namibian issue equally for all Members from all continents.

33. If Namibia has a special meaning for the African Member States, it is because our vision of the Territory goes beyond all of these supreme principles to a concept which I may call the indivisibility of Africa.

34. This concept is not merely a slogan. It is more than a geographic entity. It is a doctrine which stems from our very concept of our newly liberated continent in our world which itself is moving in the direction of unification. It is inherent in our way of life, which knows no racial barriers, no sex barriers, and which is our natural reaction to years of colonialism and its legacy of artificial, divisive borders with the fragmentation of nationalism foisted upon us by juridical concepts of the nation-State.

35. It is our common denominator, derived from our common roots in foreign colonizing methods based on African spheres of influence, and should therefore enjoy the ready understanding of European Powers.

36. Finally, the African concept of indivisibility is total, admitting of no exception, not even South Africa or any other white entity because to us they, too, are part of Africa, and this was stated in a grand formula in the high principles enunciated in the now historic Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa.⁵

37. We may talk of Portuguese colonies, of Namibia, of Rhodesia, and perhaps five separate States may emerge from them ultimately, in the course of time, but from their very birth they will become assimilated into the African unity if, indeed, they have not already become so prenatally, so to speak.

38. It is this driving psychological factor which has made the Organization of African Unity a foremost pan-continental force in a single decade, when other continents took more than half a century, and still others are only on the threshold of such thinking. Therefore, any attempt to

set up racist islands on this continent in isolation from it is foredoomed to failure, like the snow-white ice-floes descending from the north to the vastness of the Atlantic.

39. African indivisibility is an integral part of the people of Africa. It is a ruling concept that makes African delegations here, from whatever country, talk in the single language of a single continent. Deeply rooted in our hearts and minds, it may be accurately described as the African ideology.

40. On the other hand, when we come to South Africa—as we now do on the issue of Namibia—we encounter the anti-concept. We are confronted with divisionism almost to a pathological degree: racial division by the doctrine of *apartheid*; political division by the “Bantustan” doctrine in Namibia; inter-State division by an unholy alliance of white régimes against the black peoples they ruthlessly dominate. Divide, divide, divide—this is the policy, this is the strategy, the counterclockwise concept of our time. In a period of history in which mankind speaks of one world, the mentality of South Africa gives it the unheroic role of the great divider.

41. Therefore it is not surprising that we now find ourselves engaged here in a discussion which essentially comes to this: that great divider has now embarked on the more ambitious but unworthy enterprise of dividing the United Nations itself. The play and the setting are Namibia; the lines appropriate to the script are—with some desecration of Socratic logic—the “dialogue”. The author of the plot is the great divider.

42. If this sounds harshly cynical in the appraisal of political motivations, we Africans are bound to recall that we were never too sanguine about the United Nations dialogue safari, and if we acceded to it at all, it was only to appease those who were inspired by some optimism—mostly non-Africans—who hold that a foot in the door may bring a feast in fruitful results. But it should be stated also that our appeasement concerned only tactics, not principles. The Council mandate to our esteemed Secretary-General, as he rightly emphasized, was based strictly on the uncompromising principle of the right of the Namibian people under the immutable United Nations principle of self-determination and independence. Even those words sound somewhat unrealistic in an area that, juridically speaking, has already advanced far beyond that concept. This dual principle is applicable only where a Territory and people stand in relation to an administering Power whose *de facto* or *de jure* standing exists either because of treaties or because of history.

43. But the Government in Pretoria no longer has that standing through either one or the other. Namibia is no longer a colony of South Africa and, by a series of major decisions from the highest world tribunals—the International Court of Justice, the United Nations General Assembly, its highest organ, the Security Council—Namibia is now in the custody of the United Nations, juridically, under a quasi-government known as the United Nations Council for Namibia, which Burundi was honoured to join recently thanks to the unanimous decision of the States

⁵ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 106, document A/7754.

members of the Organization of African Unity which are Members of the United Nations.

44. Namibia is juridically free and the presence of South Africa there constitutes a state of occupation of a foreign territory by force of arms and therefore aggression against the United Nations itself, which is perhaps tantamount to the highest degree of aggression that can be envisaged in any definition.

45. The defined terms of reference of the mission to Namibia—which no one disputes and which were formulated beyond any shadow of a doubt, with a double precaution against any deviation, by a three-member group of the Security Council, namely, Argentina, Somalia and Yugoslavia—were limited to the development of the modalities by which South Africa could cease its present aggression.

46. This inviolability of the principle of independence must have been very clear to the Government in Pretoria. The Council decision was known to the entire world. Mr. Waldheim went there in person and made the issue very clear, and it was on that very clear understanding that Mr. Alfred Martin Escher, Ambassador of Switzerland, embarked upon his mission. We are making a painful effort to extract some solace from a report which is an abundant source of disillusionment by a mission that set out to bring back an elephant and came back with a frog. There is the fact that the representative of the Secretary-General enjoyed freedom of movement, a fact which loses its lustre when we recall that he was a United Nations servant moving about in a United Nations Territory. There is the confirmation he brought back that the Namibian people aspire to independence under United Nations authority—a remarkable parallel to what the Pearce Commission discovered in Rhodesia. For us Africans this may be an interesting confirmation, but it is surely not overwhelming news. But what the Escher mission has not brought back—again paralleling the Pearce futility—is some indication, other than alibis and evasions, that the ruling circles are prepared to abide by that popular demand.

47. I will not endeavour to analyse the representative's report and its implications in detail. That task has been done with consummate skill by the speakers who have preceded me, in particular Mr. Benhima, Foreign Minister of Morocco and current President of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, Mr. Weeks, Foreign Minister of Liberia [1678th meeting], and others, and I refer especially to the very comprehensive and searching analysis by Mr. Olcay of Turkey, President of the United Nations Council for Namibia [ibid.].

48. From these detailed and comprehensive analyses we get the total picture of what is wrong with the results of the mission. From the report we get the distorted image of the original intent of the mission. We see a South Africa which conducted the talks and negotiations on the assumption that it had a right to be in the Territory; that it could lay down the rules and terms by which it could continue its occupation for an indefinite time to come, feeding the United Nations with occasional crumbs of small concessions

and sugar-coated phrases, while the United Nations remained out and South Africa continued to stay in.

49. In the strategy of the great divider, a United Nations presence there would become the perpetual and permanent rival of the Council of Namibia. It is this point which must be stressed as forcefully as possible; it is this point which goes to the very heart of the factors that must be considered in deciding whether the so-called dialogue should be continued. On this point I think perhaps the most important lesson this experiment in occupied Africa has demonstrated is the utter futility of dialogue with those who are deaf and who hear only the inner voices of their own dogmas. Namibia was a noble experiment in talks, with depressing results.

50. Basically the African dilemma stems from neither Namibia nor Portugal, nor Rhodesia nor any single Territory on our procedurally dispersed and fragmented African agenda. The Council met yesterday on Portugal, today on Namibia, tomorrow on Rhodesia, in a sequence of seemingly unrelated items until we lose sight of the woods for the trees. My delegation has in the Council meeting in Addis Ababa raised the issue of what I then suggested is the one and single item of Africa. Events since the Council session in Addis Ababa appear to have overtaken us here at the United Nations. I refer, of course, to the great détente which has seemingly overnight radically altered the relations of the big Powers. In this sudden transformation to a new and more favourable international climate, other events followed, particularly in Europe, that other continent which has had to fight two world wars in the apocalyptic struggle between the concept of indivisibility and the concept of divisionism in our time.

51. Europe, not so long ago the continent of every sort of divisionism, Balkanization, military alliances, military axes and even now the nuclear blocs—that Europe is now convened in Helsinki in a preparatory consultation for an all-European conference whose dream, no longer expressed in Utopian terms, is nothing less than a united Europe, the concept that Europe is one and that its salvation must eventually be found in the redemption of indivisibility.

52. I am speaking here not of an analogy but of a political juxtaposition to the African continent. Their interrelated destinies were historically decided. When we speak of the African colonies, what are we talking about except the problem of the European Powers in Africa? Europe was the colonizer whose conquest was Africa, the vast colony. The issues before us are the bitter legacy of that century-old relationship. The fears of a fully independent Africa even now merely reflect the fears of some Western Powers for their influence in Africa: fear of an encroaching communism, fear for their African holdings, fear of losing strategic positions to big non-capitalist Powers.

53. Much of the neo-colonialism that hamstringing our decision-making here is the corollary of the fears that gripped Europe with the years of the cold war struggle. To that fear South Africa, by its whiteness and European origin, has added a fear complex of its own as the focal point of all the European apprehensions.

54. That was the Europe of a long time ago—a very long time ago—that is to say, the Europe of last year. The big Powers in Europe have divested themselves of many obsolete apprehensions that related to yesterday's fear of communism or of communist power. Fear between Germany and the East has been commuted to treaties of peace and friendship. Their arms race is yielding to an arms reduction conference to match the European conference.

55. On the economic level the dogma of struggle is giving way to developing trade between the two social systems. And the Common Market is framing revisions from the emphasis on imperialistic exploitation in Africa to one of association with the African States. Fully more than 18 African States are now linked with the European Common Market which is itself being accepted by the COMECON countries in the East. The past week has given us a remarkable demonstration of the evolution in the European relationship with Africa. Seemingly, only yesterday the great de Gaulle, whose vision has seen the light of the Europe of indivisibility, moved across Africa to offer independence. Today it is his worthy and devoted successor, President Pompidou, who follows in his footsteps to supplement the political gesture with new concepts of duties to the developing nations. In this great transformation of Europe, have we not a right to ask what are its portents for Africa?

56. If the fears that hamper the final solution of the African problem are gone in Europe, we may ask, why do they linger in Africa? If the Western Powers no longer fear communism in Europe, which is right on their door-step, why do they continue to feel this fear in Africa? Since confrontation is bowing to negotiation in a larger framework, why do they tremble for their vested interests in Africa? If they themselves find trade with the East viable, why should they fear any economic relations that may develop between African States and the East?

57. Strategically the questions are even more pertinent and challenging. If they do not fear communist arms on their frontiers, why do they insist on supplying arms to South Africa? Are we not confronted with an overwhelming paradox unworthy of modern statesmanship when we abandon the axioms in Europe only to run in hot pursuit of their anachronistic corollaries across the Mediterranean to Africa?

58. We are sitting in this Council and debating, evaluating, analysing the merits of arguments and refutations from premises and assumptions that are vanishing before our very eyes. In the final analysis when we try to fathom the rights and wrongs of positions on Namibia, are we in fact confronted not so much with the arguments and the sophistry, but with the mentality of Pretoria, and what South Africa and its open and less visible allies think about Africa?

59. When I venture to say that events are moving faster than we think, this is not merely a pun of a reality, a phenomenon in a world of lightning change that tends to blind us to the potentialities of danger. The new assumptions in Europe which are developing in terms of its indivisibility must logically be mobilized to fostering the

unity of Africa—free from Freudian fears and their nightmarish evolution to conflict and confrontation.

60. In such an evolution what is called for is not so much entente with the anti-African régimes as a détente with a mighty Africa in terms of the new thinking that is altering the destiny of Europe. Perhaps the time has come when, in the painful struggle that lies ahead of us in grappling with the African issues, we might begin to think in terms of a doctrine of Euro-African détente as the turning-point in the relations of the two continents and forge a new relationship of coexistence between a regenerated Europe and a rising Africa whose indivisibility has already been formulated and consecrated over many years of struggle, liberation and independence.

61. What should be the nature of such an intercontinental détente? Where should it begin and in what direction should it move?

62. First, I think it must begin with the historic role Africa has played in the evolution and development of modern Europe, to which it has contributed so much of its wealth in raw materials for the industrialization of Western Europe—and still does—and of its blood spilled on behalf of the Western States in two world wars which made a signal contribution to their victories—and still does. That might appear to be an over-exaggeration, but I should like to say that at the age of six I saw our cows, our food and our people being sent to the war. That was in 1944 in the very heart of Africa, in the small country which is Burundi. In the United Nations there are some representatives whose fathers or elder brothers fought in the war—in Africa and outside Africa. It must be a recognition involving something of the principle of compensatory justice, if not in material reparations, certainly in moral terms founded on a new equality of relationships which can never be reconciled with the neo-colonialist policies now pursued in southern Africa with the anachronisms of armed economic hegemonies, bearing in mind that the ruling principle implicit in détente is that of equality between the parties.

63. Secondly, there should be a comprehensive and total plan for the complete and final liquidation of colonialism on the African continent, based on a two-to-three year time-table. If this sounds like a radical concept of time, let us recall that virtually all of free Africa now is the result of some 15 to 20 years of accelerated liberation. It involves merely the resumption of a process interrupted, as I have stated, by global considerations and premises now being abandoned in the revisionist relations of the big Powers in Europe. Let us resume where we left off.

64. Thirdly, there should be a complete review of the possibilities of a new economic relationship between the vast resources of Europe and the immense potential of Africa's resources not, as in the present cold war between the investor and the investee, not merely in trade and tariffs, but in a genuine co-ordination of what is and always has been and in the future can be a realistic and natural division of labour.

65. Those are the three major corner-stones on which the twin towers of a united Europe and an indivisible Africa

can be erected. Other principles can undoubtedly be developed out of the fertile diplomatic and consultative organs which already exist, such as the United Nations economic commissions for Europe and Africa. Their enormous capacities for intercontinental bridging have barely been explored. The spirit of such a *détente* for us Africans must stem from what I might call the democratization of goodwill and gratitude. I have in my statement here on Portugal expressed the profound appreciation of Africans for the hand of friendship extended to us by some Western European countries. But if I did not then share this sentiment with the Soviet Union and all of the socialist States, it is because theirs is an old friendship and our gratitude to them is an old sentiment that is now taken for granted, as all mellowed sentiments are. Historians are rarely sentimentalists and they will be compelled to note the paradox that it was those socialist European States which gained nothing from Africa which nevertheless came consistently to our struggle throughout the years.

66. We do not diminish by an iota from this emotion when we state that in the comity of nations friendship for some States and coolness to others is not conducive to the most ideal concepts of international harmony. We Africans would prefer to share our friendship with all nations, all the more because the great colonial empires of Europe, in a more enlightened mood than prevails today, necessarily played a constructive role in that great liberation process sometimes awkwardly and sometimes reluctantly, but we Africans forgot those difficulties in the final goals that were attained.

67. Even now there are countries in Europe which already have a claim on our hearts. I speak of our profound appreciation for the Scandinavian countries which are members of the Nordic Council which have become the practitioners of a new kind of regionalism, helping other regions to emulate their indivisibility, and whose labours here on behalf of enlightened policies might be emulated by those few Powers which surely cannot enjoy their lonely isolation in the "no" and "abstention" votes on the General Assembly resolutions adopted on colonialism from year to year, especially when this isolation extends even to their own continent. Europe may be more ready for a doctrine of a Euro-African *détente* than might be generally supposed.

68. If I speak of Europe, it will be no surprise to anyone that I include the United States, which is now a European Power by obvious political, military and economic ties. It is now participating in the preparatory talks in Helsinki, talks premised on the possibility of a united, peaceful European continent. The whole history of this great country is pivoted on its great anti-colonial revolution.

69. As long ago as 1961—it was on 25 September—President John F. Kennedy addressed the sixteenth session of the General Assembly and stated then on the issue of colonialism:

"... my country intends to be a participant, and not merely an observer, in the ... expeditious"—and I emphasize "expeditious"—"movement of nations from the status of colonies to the partnership of equals. That

continuing tide of self-determination which runs so strong has our sympathy and our support."⁶

Those are remarkable words, obviously carefully chosen to express United States policy, its value, its tempo, its degree of involvement not only with sympathy and support but also as a "participant". It is not the representative of the Organization of African Unity here who speaks for a stepped-up time-table for freedom but an American President who uses the word "expeditious". It is not the representative of the Organization of African Unity who speaks to you of equality but the President of a country who made this word a formidable fetish in human history.

70. But, above all, these words connote a solemn commitment made by the chief of a State before the highest parliamentary body of the peoples of the world. What has happened in the world since 1961 that justifies a change, except for a better climate more conducive to the decolonization epic he so ably described?

71. I have outlined a new era in the relationship of Africa and Europe: the doctrine of a Euro-African *détente* based on recognition of the indivisibility of Africa and the rising indivisibility of Europe. And since Namibia is a part of Africa the opportunity presents itself here and now, in the present meetings of this Council on the question of Namibia, to take the first step in what we hope need not be a 10,000-mile journey.

72. This is and can be a promising and auspicious first step and in some ways it is the easiest because of the hard fact that already Namibia is juridically no longer a colonial area; territorially and demographically Namibia already comes under the custodianship of the United Nations. By a trial-and-error procedure begun at Addis Ababa the Council finds itself involved in what is essentially a procedural problem about the comparatively trivial modalities of dialogue. This, I am sure, we shall dispose of after some contortions in the art of face-saving. We have no objection to dialogue as such with well-intentioned partners. Our objection/is to a dialogue with the ghosts of dead assumptions buried in the deep sarcophagus of an unhappy past. We are interested in the modalities of *détente* rather than the modalities of dialogue. We want to talk about a free Namibia, not about South Africa's usurped freedom to dispose of it.

73. The Council has heard here a number of suggestions that Namibia be set at once on the course to independence. That proposal, before the Secretary-General's mission, may have sounded unrealistic. But if the special envoy did not succeed in bringing us in his briefcase a noticeable commitment to the full independence of that United Nations Territory, he has at least brought us positive confirmation that the people of Namibia are ready for sovereignty, want freedom, and are prepared to acquire it with the midwifery and authority of the United Nations.

74. I speak for the OAU when I say that all Africa would receive the news of such a decision jubilantly, always

⁶ *Ibid.*, Sixteenth Session, Plenary Meetings, 1013th meeting, para. 76.

remembering that when we ask for Namibia we ask for Africa; when we ask for Rhodesia we ask for Africa; when we ask for Angola and Cape Verde and Mozambique, always we ask for Africa.

75. And why not? Africa, no less than Europe, has a right to aspire to and to claim such continental status. And together with Europe we can forge—as Kennedy so pertinently stated—a Euro-African partnership that will take a giant stride for the peace of the entire world. This doctrine is most fittingly symbolized by the words of a poet whom I shall quote. I am speaking of Walt Whitman, who wrote that a new race of men would appear on the earth—a race of pioneers, full of endeavour, “playing the very game of the world”. They will be men without prejudices, and men who “will give light wings to reason”. It is this new race which Walt Whitman announced in the following verses:

“A world of new primitives has risen with
perspectives of incessant and increased life:
A lusty and active race is installing and
organizing itself.

I sing of a new cult, I dedicate it to you
—Captain, Navigator, Explorer—

To you, Engineer, to you, Architect, to you,
Machine maker.

Come to me, I wish to create the indissoluble
continent,

I wish to make the most magnificent race
upon which the sun has ever shone,

I wish to make admirable, magnetic countries,
with brotherly love . . .”

76. I should like to say, Mr. President, how happy we are at the convening of these meetings, which are so ably presided over by you, a person of great dedication to United Nations principles, who represents a country from which we have received so much support for the complete decolonization of our continent. I should like you to know how much we admire your statesmanship, your coolness and your outlook on the problems facing us at the present moment.

77. The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Burundi for the kind words he addressed to me and to my country.

78. Mr. ABDULLA (Sudan): Mr. President, on behalf of the delegation of the Sudan, I take this opportunity to extend to you my sincerest congratulations on the occasion of your accession to the presidency of the Council for the month of December. It is a matter of satisfaction to my delegation that you represent a country with which the Democratic Republic of the Sudan maintains the best of relations. The role of your country in international affairs and matters of upholding human dignity and liberty, coupled with your outstanding personal qualities and experience as a diplomat, is a reassuring factor in the success of your mission. On behalf of my delegation, and as an old friend of yours, I can assure you of our full co-operation during your term of office.

79. Your predecessor in the Chair, Mrs. Jeanne Martin Cissé, won the admiration of my delegation for the able

manner, grace and dignity with which she guided this Council during the month of November.

80. We all recall that a large number of the members of this Council, in both Addis Ababa and New York, expressed great doubts as to the utility of the United Nations contacts with the Government of the Republic of South Africa with regard to the latter's recognition of the right of the people of Namibia to self-determination and independence as one united country and people and the immediate withdrawal of its illegal administration from that Territory.

81. From the outset my delegation reluctantly endorsed the provisions of paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 309 (1972). My delegation was convinced that it was futile to attempt to extract any unequivocal commitment from the Government of Vorster. We were of the opinion that, in view of the actual policy of South Africa towards Namibia, no dialogue would persuade it to change its basic policy towards the establishment of “Bantustans”, which aims at finally Balkanizing the Territory and eventually annexing it to the Republic. We have stated categorically in this Council that South Africa would be diametrically opposed to the meaning and interpretation of the United Nations principle of self-determination and independence for Namibia.

82. The affirmation of the Prime Minister of South Africa to the Secretary-General that his Government's policy was self-government and independence for the peoples of Namibia—in the plural—was an adequate indication of the actual policy of “Bantustans”, which the Government of South Africa continues to establish and consolidate. Hardly two weeks after the departure of the Secretary-General from Pretoria the South African Government proclaimed the Eastern Caprivi area as a “Bantustan”.

83. Indeed, Mr. Vorster made it quite clear in the South African House of Assembly, on 4 February 1972, that his Government's policy was to “lead our peoples”—in the plural again—“to self-determination”, and, in the same breath, he warned that:

“If he”—meaning the Secretary-General—“wishes to come to South Africa to act as mouthpiece of the Organization of African Unity and others”—and here I assume he meant the General Assembly and the Security Council—“and decisions taken in that connexion, he will nevertheless be welcome and still be very courteously received by us; but I can tell him in advance that he will be wasting his time.”

84. Despite this rude language, my delegation again, reluctantly, agreed to the extension of the Secretary-General's mandate through a representative. We were to be satisfied by any possible clarification that the Secretary-General's representative might extract from the Government of South Africa, or otherwise those who hold any optimistic views might finally be convinced of the futility of dialogue with a Government equalled only by Portugal in its dogmatism and self-righteousness. We acceded to the extension of the mandate as a final test of the goodwill of South Africa towards the ruling of the International Court

of Justice in June 1971 and the various United Nations resolutions in connexion with Namibia.

85. With this background, my delegation wishes to consider the main contents of the report of the Secretary-General, as presented in document S/10832 and Corr.1 of 15 November 1972. We are aware that the mission of the representative of the Secretary-General to Namibia and South Africa is an extension of the mandate of the Secretary-General, whose terms of reference are clearly stipulated in paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 309 (1972), which reads:

"Invites the Secretary-General to initiate as soon as possible contacts with all parties concerned, with a view to establishing the necessary conditions so as to enable the people of Namibia, freely and with strict regard to the principle of human equality, to exercise their right to self-determination and independence, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations".

86. Furthermore, the Secretary-General, in his report contained in document S/10738 of 17 July 1972, to this Council, outlined in paragraph 21 (a), the task of his representative as follows:

"The task of the representative of the Secretary-General will be to assist in achieving the aim of self-determination and independence and to study all questions relevant thereto."

87. In our judgement, the main purpose of the two missions was not so much to argue the decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council regarding the principle of self-determination, as it was to discuss the South African authorities' ways and means of realizing this end.

88. As for the task of obtaining "a complete and unequivocal clarification from the Government of South Africa with regard to its policy of self-determination and independence for Namibia", as rightly suggested in paragraph 3 of the aide-mémoire presented to the Secretary-General on 26 September by the group of three established in accordance with Security Council resolution 309 (1972), we completely share the group's anxiety and concern over what South Africa's interpretation means.

89. Those terms of reference and the clarification required should not divert us from the established fact that, by the rulings of the International Court of Justice and the decisions of the General Assembly and Security Council, South Africa's presence and administration in Namibia are illegal and it should therefore withdraw immediately from the Territory. The initiative of the Secretary-General and his representative was, therefore, but an attempt made on the optimistic assumption that South Africa was ready to transfer its power and that the United Nations should co-operate with the Government of South Africa to achieve that end.

90. We regret to submit from the start that, contrary to any such optimistic hopes, the report convinces us more than ever that the Government of South Africa is deter-

mined to maintain its illegal occupation of Namibia through the energetic application of its policy of homelands, with the obvious intention of finally annexing it to the Republic of South Africa.

91. The report of the Secretary-General's representative is quite revealing in two ways. In the first place, it reveals what Mr. Vorster means by self-determination and how he proposes to apply it in his own way to Namibia.

92. In the second place, like that of the Pearce Commission on Southern Rhodesia, after wide contacts and interviews during a tour of 17 days, the Secretary-General, in paragraph 17 of the report of his representative gives the verdict, already known to us, that "the majority of the non-white population of Namibia supported the establishment of a united, independent Namibia. They expected the assistance of the United Nations in bringing it about."

93. Even on this judgement Mr. Vorster denies that there were sufficient bases for such an impression.

94. From the start Mr. Vorster resorted to evasive and vague statements. As indicated in paragraph 14 of the report in question, he would not give his affirmation and acceptance of the United Nations position as explained by the Secretary-General's representative, namely, with regard to the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia. Instead, as the representative of the Secretary-General reports, Mr. Vorster states that his Government's policy is:

"to prepare the inhabitants of the Territory for, and to lead them on the way to, independence and self-determination. Once there was a fully representative view among the inhabitants, both South Africa and the United Nations would have to take cognizance of that view."

95. The implication of this reply is obvious. The statement very clearly shows that the South African Government is asking for a free hand in Namibia for a sufficient period of time during which it can consolidate its version of self-government in the form of councils of "Bantustans" packed with chiefs and yes-men, appointees under the control of South African administrators. It will be recalled that the administrator in South Africa has the power to make laws and to amend or repeal them. He even has the power to dismiss the members of these "native nations", or "homelands", as they call them.

96. This policy of self-government is further corroborated by the statement of Mr. du Plessis, the South African Minister for Public Works and Development, to Mr. Escher, on 23 October in Namibia. In paragraph 61 of the report Mr. du Plessis is quoted as saying that "the differences between the African ethnic groups were such that there was no alternative to separate development"—meaning "homelands". He stressed that the goal of the Government was to lead the "homelands" to self-determination and independence in an orderly manner. Thus, contrary to the vague and general terms that Mr. Vorster uses to sugar-coat his real intentions of leading the Namibian people to separate development, his Minister for Community Development defines very clearly that self-government means separate development, which is synonymous with "Bantustan",

“homeland”, or “native nation”. The Council need not be reminded of the fact that it is the decided policy of the Government of South Africa to divide Namibia into about 10 “Bantustans” under the pretext of self-development, not as places for training the people within those “Bantustans” in self-government—as Mr. Vorster claims—but as labour-reserve camps for providing cheap labour to the mines, the industries, and the farms, which are owned by foreigners and the white minority who live in Namibia. They are forced to collect there through pass-laws, and from there they are compelled to go to work wherever required. But, above all, the “Bantustans” serve to break the backbone of the national unity and territorial integrity of the Territory. For the United Nations to accept the development of homelands is to support the very policy which South Africa adopts in perpetuating the servitude of the Namibian people and in fragmenting their country further.

97. Having the consolidation of “homelands” in mind, Mr. Vorster implored the United Nations for patience and time, which can be seen from paragraph 20 of the report. He asserted that it would be unrealistic to expect agreement on the various issues involved in a matter of days or weeks. He even attempted to give the impression that he would have to take the views of his own people into account in order to take a decision, as if the “Bantustan” policy were yet to be discussed and approved.

98. In our considered opinion, that is a very disturbing statement, not only in so far as it begs for continuation of dialogue and the gaining of time, but also in so far as Mr. Vorster implicitly refuses to give a complete and unequivocal clarification of South Africa’s policy on self-determination and independence for Namibia as defined by the United Nations, or to agree to discontinue the application of the policy of “separate development” or “homelands”, the abolition of all discriminatory measures, and to guarantee equality for all Namibians. Mr. Vorster has not even modified his position regarding clarifying his policy of self-determination since his meeting with the Secretary-General in March 1972, for, on 2 November, he continued his evasive attitude and as indicated in paragraph 21 (b) of the report suggested that “this was not the appropriate stage to go into a detailed discussion of the interpretation of self-determination and independence—this could be done with better results once the necessary conditions were established and the inhabitants had more administrative and political experience.”

99. At last and through the persistence of the Secretary-General’s representative, the Prime Minister bluntly and frankly advocated his policy of what he calls “regional government”. Paragraph 21 (d) of the report states:

“The Prime Minister believed that experience in self-government was an essential element for eventual self-determination. Bearing in mind the circumstances, he felt that this could best be achieved on a regional basis.”

100. Therefore, no one could doubt any longer that Mr. Vorster meant to give a final message to the United Nations through the Secretary-General’s representative that South Africa plans to stay in Namibia and confront the United Nations with a fait accompli—a Namibia of 10 or 12

“Bantustans”. This is where my delegation parts completely from the Government of South Africa and disagrees completely with what seemed to the Secretary-General’s representative to be acceptable in principle—it is certainly in contravention of the principles and decisions of the United Nations with regard to Namibia.

101. As if to appear to work for a united Namibia, Mr. Vorster went on to suggest, as indicated in paragraph 21 (f), that he was prepared “to establish an advisory council drawn from representatives of the various regions, regional governments or authorities, and he would assume over-all responsibility for the Territory as a whole . . .”

102. Those who are familiar with colonial systems will not fail to see that this is an enlarged image of what is called self-government for a “Bantustan”, with the difference that it will be under the head of the Government of the Republic of South Africa. If this is not annexation, we may ask what is annexation? Namibia would then become one of the provinces that make up the Republic. The members of the advisory council will be selected from native chiefs, government officials, white appointees, appointed or dismissed by the Prime Minister or his representative in the Territory.

103. An advisory council is obviously advisory in nature, with limited local powers and, since it would not be elected by the free will of the people, it could not claim such powers.

104. Since the Prime Minister himself is the over-all power, then it follows that all sovereign power lies in the Republic of South Africa and not in Namibia. Once those powers lie in hands other than those of the Namibian people themselves, the mere talk of self-determination and independence becomes words without meaning, and the independence of Namibia is lost forever.

105. Without the concurrence of the Government of Pretoria in the complete abandonment of the “Bantustans” and the proposed advisory council, the establishment of a free climate for free general elections and the formation of a legislative assembly on the basis of “one man, one vote”, nothing can prove the good will of the Government of South Africa.

106. Despite this negative result, it is heartening that the visit of the representative of the Secretary-General to Namibia and his tour of about 5,000 miles in 17 days, have enabled the representative and his colleagues to provide this Council with the result of a plebiscite. That plebiscite shows very clearly that the views expressed by the Government of the Republic of South Africa are utterly inconsistent with and contrary to the overwhelming demand by the people of Namibia for the implementation of the decisions of the United Nations with regard to self-determination and independence in unity.

107. That national demand was freely and frequently put forward to the representative of the Secretary-General in conversations and during mass demonstrations by representatives of all the popular movements of Namibia, as represented by SWAPO, SWANU (South West Africa

National Union) and NUDO (National Unity Democratic Organization)—which constitute the Congress of Namibia—and also by representatives of the tribes of the Ovambos, the Hereros, the Damaras, who constitute the massive majority of the Namibian people. It is no less significant that the policy of South Africa in Namibia is denounced by no less than all the churches, all Christian denominations in Namibia, and the World Council of Churches, with the sole exception of the Afrikaner Dutch Reformed Church, since it is Afrikaner in body and soul and dedicated to the policy of *apartheid*. Even amongst the white minority, council members, the white business community and members of the Liberal United Party, there were many who admitted the fallacy and lack of wisdom of the policy adopted by South Africa in Namibia. As to the rest, those who preferred the policy of South Africa, they presented no valid counter reasons, apart from the fear of losing their present economic concessions or favourable social status. Yet, in actual fact, the report quotes a number of witnesses who confirmed the opinion that there is no indication of racial conflict in Namibia and that the African majority would welcome in their midst the white community after independence. It suffices to note that the South African Government has never made an issue of any racial conflict between blacks and whites in Namibia. For ulterior motives the South African administrators in Namibia made reference to possible conflict between the African tribes to justify separate development or “homelands”.

108. My delegation wishes at this juncture to commend the intensive investigations made by the Secretary-General's representative towards allocating the position of the massive majority in Namibia vis-à-vis the allegations of the authorities of South Africa and some of the white minority. Due to this elaborate investigation, my delegation draws the following conclusions from the report.

109. First, the report affirmed once more our constant view that the South African Government is not prepared to accept and comply with the United Nations decisions on the question of Namibia. Whereas the United Nations decided in favour of self-determination and independence for Namibia as one nation and one country, South Africa is determined to pursue the creation and consolidation of “homelands”.

110. Secondly, South Africa plays for time during which it consolidates its illegal presence in Namibia, and presents the international community with a fait accompli, extending its *apartheid* policy to Namibia. Hence Mr. Vorster's demand for patience on the part of the United Nations and for continuation of contacts.

111. Thirdly, during this period the resources of Namibia will be almost exhausted, leaving the Namibians at the mercy of the Republic of South Africa and its *apartheid* policy.

112. Fourthly, under the guise of regional government South Africa will actually maintain its administration, its forces, its special police and, above all, its oppressive laws. Subsequently any hope for the freedom necessary for the free decision of the Namibians on the political future of their country vanishes. In brief, South Africa will be left in

the field to suppress by force the present movements for national independence and eventually to annex Namibia to the Republic.

113. Fifthly, the failure of the two attempts at dialogue with South Africa and the conclusions drawn from them should provide concrete evidence to those members of the Council which keep advocating that this Council should seriously consider, together with all members of the Council, effective ways and means of implementing its decision on the question of Namibia.

114. Lastly, the main interest of South Africa in Namibia is economic exploitation of its people as cheap labour, and of its mineral resources, fisheries and ranches. Any human or political consideration is immaterial according to South Africa's philosophy of *apartheid*. This attitude is encouraged by the size of the revenues which the South African Government derives from taxes in Namibia. The revenues are employed to cover its administrative expenses in Namibia, with a surplus. It is a disgrace and a matter of concern at the same time that the foreign concerns which provide those taxes retain for themselves at the expense of the Namibian people exorbitant annual returns. The American company Newmont Mining Corporation alone, for example, obtained an average annual return on its initial investment in Namibia in 1946 of 347 per cent. The same company paid taxes to the South African Government until December 1968 to the total of \$80 million. Such foreign American, British, French and German concerns play a very positive role in supporting the South African illegal occupation of Namibia, thus frustrating the efforts of the United Nations and the Namibian people for the realization of self-government and independence in that Territory.

115. In the light of this summary of the situation, my delegation is forced to draw one main conclusion: namely, that the Government of South Africa is taking cover under the pretext of a prolonged, futile dialogue with the United Nations in order both to appease international public opinion and to consolidate her *apartheid* designs in Namibia. Its main interest in Namibia has been and continues to be cheap contract labour and exploitation of the Territory's wealth. Indeed, for over 50 years South Africa has not done anything worth while in the Territory towards the improvement of the living conditions and welfare of the inhabitants, much less towards the development of real self-government. It is therefore idle to give South Africa another chance, which it would obviously use to cause the Territory to disintegrate much further and break the backbone of the mounting liberation movement, as clearly demonstrated before and during the visit to Namibia of the Secretary-General's representative.

116. Time has proved that once a people decides to be independent, it will be, and invariably it acquires the art of government and standing together in the process for the sake and in pursuit of its own national existence. It happened in my country, in your own country, Mr. President, and, in a greater way, when de Gaulle made his offer to the French colonies in 1960.

117. In the case of Namibia the United Nations presence gives it a greater advantage than any of the African

countries which bypassed the experience in self-government as proposed by the Prime Minister of South Africa.

118. It is a vicious argument by South Africa to claim that "homeland development", constitutionally or economically, is better for the Territory. Tribal existence has never been a barrier to national liberation in Africa, and above all in Namibia, where only a few tribes live and where all are united in the struggle for independence. It requires no deep economic knowledge to decide that the pooling of the economic resources of the whole Territory is of more value than dividing the Territory into a number of independent economic units of "homelands". The total revenues from the resources of the Territory are more than enough to sustain a nation of three quarters of a million people. By acceding to independence now, Namibia can maintain its united identity by the simple transformation of the existing regional units into a local government system under one central government, democratically elected by the whole population. In other words, political will should create the State and the State will organize its local and central government.

119. My delegation is therefore fully convinced that, contrary to all the arguments put forward by the Government of the Republic of South Africa, no concrete results can be extracted from a Government which is itself in an actual dilemma created by its policy of *apartheid*. Namibia should be saved from that wild and senseless régime before the introduction of *apartheid*, which breeds hatred and violence—hatred which the Namibian people have successfully avoided up to the present time.

120. We wish to impress on the Council the importance of the immediate removal of South Africa from the Territory and the establishment of proper conditions in which the United Nations can discharge its responsibility towards Namibia, if necessary to the extent of deciding on measures under Chapter VII of the Charter so as to compel South Africa to withdraw its administration from Namibia.

121. It is of immediate importance that the Security Council decide at this meeting to correct any wrong impressions which the authorities of South Africa have formulated, or are thought to have formulated, through discussions with the representative of the Secretary-General. Mr. Vorster should not be left under any impression that his policy and way of thinking have been endorsed by this Council. On the contrary, it should be made absolutely clear to him that nothing short of the complete withdrawal of the South African administration from Namibia and the complete independence of the Territory as one nation and one people will be acceptable to this Council.

122. The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Sudan for the kind words he has addressed to me.

123. Mr. LONGERSTAEY (Belgium) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, allow me first of all to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency, assure you of the co-operation of my delegation and express the hope that success will be yours in the task which awaits you during this month of December. If I may be permitted to

introduce a personal note in these congratulations I should like to say to you how happy I am to see in the President's chair a friend as well as a colleague.

124. I wish to associate in this tribute the lady who preceded you. Because of the spirit with which she guided our debates and her perseverance in endeavouring to seek agreement among us, Mrs. Jeanne Martin Cissé has won even further esteem and appreciation.

125. Once again the Security Council has before it a report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the mandate entrusted to him to establish contact with all parties concerned in order to prepare Namibia for its accession to self-determination and independence.

126. My delegation has studied this document, which describes the negotiations between the representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Escher, and the Government of South Africa. We have studied in particular the memorandum which concerns the actual talks in Pretoria, the observations of Mr. Escher on his visit to Namibia and, finally, the conclusions which end his report. It is to be noted among the latter that the Prime Minister of South Africa considered that it was premature to go into a detailed discussion of the interpretation of self-determination and independence for Namibia. It seems that Mr. Vorster prefers to wait to do this until the necessary political conditions are established and until the inhabitants have had experience in internal self-government on a regional basis. For our part, we must regret that the Government of South Africa has not yet subscribed to the principle of national unity and territorial integrity for Namibia, without which self-determination and independence for the Territory cannot be conceived of, as the Council has repeatedly proclaimed. We feel rather more acutely the absence of a commitment by the Government of South Africa to this principle which is in accord with the wishes of the majority of the non-white population of Namibia, as Mr. Escher comments in paragraph 17 of his report. Further, the support of South Africa for this principle would have shed new light on the measures which it intends to take in regard to the future of the Territory, which would have constituted a series of stages towards the emancipation of the Namibian people. This is the case, for example, in regard to the experience in domestic self-government which South Africa wishes the population concerned to acquire. In the perspective of national unity and territorial integrity, this appears to be a transitory phase between regional power and a unitary régime. On the other hand, if it is divorced from this objective it may appear to be a continuation of the policy of "Bantustans" which South Africa has extended to Namibia.

127. Nevertheless, the South African Government has declared its willingness to make some concessions, the scope of which we must question, precisely because of the absence of the commitment which we had expected. This is the case, for example, in regard to the advisory council which South Africa has agreed to establish in Namibia. This institution—to which some have paid scant attention—will be what South Africa wishes it to be. It depends on the Pretoria Government whether it becomes an instrument of its will or reflects the political consciousness of the people of Namibia.

128. In the first case, South Africa would justify the apprehensions of those who see in such a council the means for that country to give an appearance of legality to its *de facto* power over Namibia. In the second case, South Africa would show its willingness to obtain the views of qualified representatives of the population and take account of their views whatever they might be. This means that the manner in which the members of the council are designated and the powers assigned to it will be of the greatest importance, and even more important will be its role in counterbalancing the "Bantustans". It is for South Africa to assume its responsibilities and to conceive this reform as providing an outline for a competent political structure for the entire Territory.

129. On these lines we take note with satisfaction of the fact that the Prime Minister of South Africa will himself take on the responsibilities for Namibia which are now spread over several Ministries. This is a step in the right direction. The exercise of one responsibility for the Territory as a whole should mean that Namibia will be united administratively, while awaiting self-determination.

130. We have less reason to be happy with the intentions of the Government of South Africa in regard to the abolition of restrictions on freedom of movement. Prime Minister Vorster has committed himself at the most to studying the question, taking into account the need to control entry to the Territory. On the other hand the agreement of the South African Government regarding the existence of legitimate political activity, including freedom of expression and the right of assembly, seems to us to contribute effectively to the establishment of conditions which will enable the people to exercise the right to self-determination.

131. We understand the impatience felt by several among us at the small progress made in the talks between our

Organization and South Africa. In truth, one cannot in a few months do away with a policy which dates back more than 50 years. The distance covered to date must be measured, no doubt, in relation to the objective pursued, that of self-determination and independence for Namibia, but it must also and above all be measured in relation to the point of departure. In any case, nothing would justify halting or even suspending negotiations. To continue negotiations is to reconcile the rights of Namibia, of which the Security Council is a guarantor, with a realism which consists in recognizing that the self-determination and independence of the Territory depend on South Africa.

132. It is the duty of the Security Council to maintain contacts with South Africa so as to maintain the pressure exercised by the resolutions it has adopted since the beginning of the year. At the same time, the Council cannot abandon the Namibian population, which we know counts on the assistance of our Organization. The visits of the Secretary-General and his representative have revealed the political consciousness of the Namibian people and aroused hope which must not be deceived.

133. For the rest, there is no alternative to the continuation of negotiations other than a return to the trial of strength which set our Organization against South Africa for so long, with what results we all know.

134. My delegation will take into account these considerations in voting on the draft resolution which will be submitted to the Security Council.

135. The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Belgium for the kind sentiments he has expressed to me.

The meeting rose at 6.00 p.m.