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NOTE

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SIXTEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-FIFTH MEETING

Held in New York on Monday, 28 February 1972, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. Mohamed FAKHREDDINE (Sudan).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Argentina, Belgium, China, France, Guinea, India, Italy, Japan, Panama, Somalia, Sudan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Yugoslavia.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1645)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia:
 - (a) Letter dated 15 February 1972 from the representatives of Guinea, Somalia and the Sudan to the President of the Security Council (S/10540);
 - (b) Fourth report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) (S/10229 and Add.1 and 2);
 - (c) Interim report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) (S/10408).

The meeting was called to order at 4 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia

- (a) Letter dated 15 February 1972 from the representatives of Guinea, Somalia and the Sudan to the President of the Security Council (S/10540)
- (b) Fourth report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) (S/10229 and Add.1 and 2*)
- (c) Interim report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) (S/10408**)

1. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the Council's previous decision at the 1640th meeting, I propose to invite the representative of Saudi Arabia to participate, without the right to vote, in discussion of the item on the agenda.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. J. Baroodi (Saudi Arabia) took the place reserved for him in the Council Chamber.

* Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year, Special Supplement No. 2 and Corrigendum and Special Supplement No. 2A.

** Ibid., Supplement for October, November and December 1971.

2. The PRESIDENT: The Security Council will now continue its consideration of the question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia. The Council has before it document S/10541/Rev.1 which contains the revised text of the draft resolution sponsored by Guinea, Somalia and the Sudan.

3. Since no member of the Council wishes to speak at this stage, I take it that the Council is ready to vote on the revised draft resolution. I shall, therefore, call on those members which wish to speak in explanation of vote before the vote.

4. Mr. LONGERSTAEY (Belgium) (*interpretation from French*): My delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted by Guinea, Somalia and the Sudan, the revised version of which appears in documents S/10541/Rev.1.

5. The affirmative vote which my delegation intends to cast was made possible by the spirit of conciliation evinced by the sponsors, particularly by the representative of Somalia, who agreed to make certain changes in their text. My delegation is in particular gratified that operative paragraph 1 has been improved by taking into account the remarks made by the representative of France. The new text is unquestionably an improvement over the original text, since it refers expressly to resolution 253 (1968) of the Security Council by which sanctions against Southern Rhodesia were decided upon and also to the aims and objectives set out therein.

6. Instead of that plural we would have preferred the singular, which would have better expressed the singleness of purpose of that resolution. The fact is that the sanctions have but one objective—to put an end to the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia, as is stated moreover in paragraph 3 of resolution 253 (1968).

7. We are pleased with the amendments to operative paragraph 2, which were also inspired by the remarks of the representative of France. That paragraph stood to gain by confirming that it is only the Security Council resolutions applying sanctions against Southern Rhodesia that are binding. Thus the scope of the obligation of Member States under Article 25 of the Charter is also defined.

8. As for paragraph 6, which is the logical sequel of the preceding one, we find this to be a reaffirmation of part of the terms of reference of the Committee on sanctions defined in paragraph 21 (c) of resolution 277 (1970) of the Security Council. Thus the Committee is once again

charged with a double task, which is to study and to recommend the means to ensure the implementation of sanctions.

9. Incidentally, we can only be gratified by the endorsement thus given by the Council to an interpretation which we, with others have always held, in the Committee on sanctions. Because, for us, resolution 277 (1970) gives the Committee on sanctions not a general right to make recommendations, but rather the right to propose to the Security Council the modalities for the implementation of its past decision in regard to sanctions. Thus we are less convinced that it would be wise to charge the Committee on sanctions, as provided in the last phrase of paragraph 6, with the task of itself making suggestions on its own terms of reference.

10. Here we should like to recall that the responsibilities entrusted by the Council to the Committee under resolutions 253 (1968) and 277 (1970) are technical and do not extend to the specifically political aspects of the question of Southern Rhodesia. Despite our doubts on this, we are in agreement with paragraph 6 as a whole, it being understood that the Council has granted the Committee on sanctions the authority to prepare recommendations on its terms of reference without, however, making this mandatory, as was the case with the terms of reference given in its previous resolutions.

11. Mr. OGISO (Japan): I believe that Japan's views regarding Southern Rhodesia are very well known to members of the Council. However, let me recapitulate them very briefly.

12. We firmly believe in the inalienable right of the people of Southern Rhodesia to self-determination and independence. We have consistently supported the principle of majority rule in Southern Rhodesia on the basis of universal suffrage. We have fully supported the resolutions adopted by the Security Council concerning Southern Rhodesia. This includes, of course, the resolutions imposing sanctions against the Smith régime. These resolutions, adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter, are mandatory in character, that is, they constitute for all Member States clear-cut obligations. For our part, we have made every effort to implement faithfully the provisions of those resolutions and shall continue to do so.

13. Turning now to the specific business before the Council, it may be argued that the sanctions imposed upon Southern Rhodesia have not been altogether successful. We all know that the sanctions have not been effective enough to achieve the desired goal of bringing an end to the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia.

14. Nevertheless, it is the continuing responsibility of the Council, having imposed sanctions, to be on the alert for any and all adverse developments which might tend to undermine their effectiveness and set up dangerous precedents. We look upon the revised draft resolution submitted by Guinea, Somalia and the Sudan [*S/10541/Rev.1*] as being entirely in line with that responsibility of the Council and we therefore support that draft. We shall consider this draft resolution, if adopted, as

being essentially a timely reminder to States of their obligations under the Charter to implement fully the provisions of the resolutions of the Council imposing sanctions against Southern Rhodesia.

15. Mr. KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET (France) (*interpretation from French*): I should merely like to thank the sponsors of the draft resolution, our colleagues from Guinea, Somalia and the Sudan, for having accepted our suggestions. We believe that this draft resolution will thus gain strength and thereby gain effectiveness. It goes without saying that we do and shall continue to endorse the decision thus taken.

16. The French delegation will cast an affirmative vote on this draft resolution.

17. There is one point to which I should like to draw the sponsors' attention and this is, in point of fact, by way of thinking aloud: In view of the procedures of the sanctions Committee and the experience the Council has gained in this matter, I wonder whether this time a one-month's time limit is adequate. Would it not be more wise to say 15 April rather than 1 April? In all events, it will not prevent us from voting in favour of this draft resolution if the date of 1 April is retained, but I think it would perhaps be wiser to give the Committee a month-and-a-half to enable it successfully to complete the task entrusted to it under the present draft resolution.

18. Mr. MOJSOV (Yugoslavia): I should like at this stage of our deliberations to make a few comments on the revised draft resolution now before us in explaining the favourable vote the Yugoslav delegation will cast on this draft resolution.

19. May I begin by congratulating the sponsors of the draft resolution, Guinea, Somalia and the Sudan, on their timely, hard and statesmanlike work in producing for our consideration a serious, well-founded, effective and realistic draft. The revisions entered after consultations and after having heard suggestions from various members were made by the sponsors in the best spirit of maintaining the essential, specific, concrete substance of the draft, thus facilitating its widest possible acceptance. The revised draft is firm yet restrained. We supported the original draft, and we have no difficulty with the revisions.

20. In our previous statement [*1641st meeting*] on the subject we said that we considered the draft to be the minimum required by an already grave situation doubly aggravated by the recent unfortunate violations of sanctions. The decision to import chrome from Southern Rhodesia was a most serious breach and most dangerous precedent.

21. Our delegation feels the Council should adopt this draft resolution unanimously because it satisfies two great needs in the Council's continued dealing with the situation in Southern Rhodesia. First, it deals effectively and directly with the situation at hand. It addresses itself to the problem of reaffirming, maintaining and strengthening sanctions and categorically demanding that all States stop or prevent violations of them. This action was necessary and should not have been delayed. All States, all Governments and world public opinion are to be put on notice that this body

will not remain indifferent whenever any violation of sanctions takes place and will do all it can to prevent and stop them. We are, at least, not going to make it easy for anyone to help the illegal Smith régime in that way.

22. Secondly, there is for us a larger purpose in adopting this draft resolution. It becomes a part of the continuing Security Council action vis-à-vis the situation in Southern Rhodesia. It shows that we are indeed seized of it and shall remain so without any let-up until the people of Zimbabwe obtain their right to self-determination and independence under the Charter and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). That is why we are particularly gratified that the draft recalls in its second preambular paragraph all previous resolutions of this Council on Southern Rhodesia and that operative paragraph 1 decides "that the present sanctions . . . shall remain fully in force until the aims and objectives set out in resolution 253 (1968) are fully achieved". We must, indeed, avoid anything that would give the wrong impression that, after the Addis Ababa meetings and the absence of decisions by this Council because of two vetoes, we are somehow acquiescing in what is now taking place in Southern Rhodesia.

23. There have been attempts to utilize the inability of the Council to adopt decisions on the larger situation in Southern Rhodesia as somehow indicating that we drift with developments and that we too are awaiting the results of the so-called test of acceptability as something that can have any bearing on the basic, clear and unmistakable requirements that this body has established as the only acceptable ones for ending the rebellion and giving the people of Zimbabwe their rights and their country.

24. This draft resolution, as we see it, by reaffirming the policy of the Council in one specific field—sanctions—and by recalling all other decisions of the Council serves as an earnest that the Council is firm in maintaining the whole structure of its well defined position on the Southern Rhodesian question as a whole and that it will not, now or in the future, admit anything contrary to it.

25. Finally, we think that operative paragraph 6, inviting our Committee on sanctions *inter alia* to make any suggestions concerning its terms of reference and other measures designed to ensure its effectiveness gives welcome room for all of us to think anew and try to contribute concretely to our collective better work in implementing the sanctions system.

26. For all those reasons the delegation of Yugoslavia will vote in favour of the draft resolution.

27. The PRESIDENT: Before I call on the next representative who wishes to speak in explanation of his vote, I call on the representative of Somalia to make a statement on behalf of the sponsors of the draft resolution.

28. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): I wish just to announce that the three sponsors of the draft resolution agree with the proposal made by the representative of France that 15 April should be the date by which the sanctions Committee should report to the Security Council. The draft resolution will be amended accordingly.

29. Mr. PHILLIPS (United States of America): The United States Government, both inside and outside of the United Nations, has supported the right of self-determination and has opposed the odious practice of racial discrimination. The United States has always voted for Security Council decisions imposing mandatory economic sanctions against the rebel régime in Rhodesia. I submit that the United States has been second to none in the vigorous enforcement of those sanctions. The effectiveness of the action of my Government is documented in the reports of the sanctions Committee.

30. Members of the Council are aware of a special situation affecting the United States enforcement of the sanctions on Rhodesia. I refer, of course, to the so-called Byrd Provision of the Military Procurement Bill, the provisions of which, I am certain, are well known to all around this table.

31. The considerations leading to the enactment into law of the Byrd Provision emerged clearly in the statements and testimony on the legislation in our Congress. Among these was the concern of Congressmen that, while the United States was becoming dependent on a single high-priced source of chrome ore, Rhodesian ore was being exported in quantity to other countries. Since the United States was scrupulously observing the sanctions, United States executive officials found it impossible to offer any persuasive refutation of that conclusion. The Congress felt that for compelling reasons of national security the United States should not be placed in a distinctly disadvantageous position with regard to the importation of strategic commodities.

32. It is an inescapable fact of life that this legislation, having been duly enacted in accordance with our constitutional processes, is now the law of the land. However, as Ambassador Bush made clear both at Addis Ababa and in later statements in various African countries he was privileged to visit, the United States remains interested in seeing that sanctions work. I reaffirm that we stand ready to assist the sanctions Committee in its efforts and we pledge that we will continue our full participation in its activities. But we also believe that this Council should face squarely the true nature of the problem confronting the United Nations concerning the effectiveness of the sanctions programme.

33. The United States continues to be committed to the sanctions programme voted in Security Council resolution 252 (1968) but we also believe that the enforcement of these sanctions by other countries is patently inadequate. It seems to us that countries that are open with information about their imports are at a disadvantage compared with countries that are not open with such information. To put it more bluntly, there are widespread violations of the sanctions which are not being brought to light, while the light is being focused on relatively unimportant exceptions to the application of sanctions in the case of my country. Others have during this debate alluded to this aspect of the sanctions programme.

34. Let us be blunt about the nature of the problem. The sanctions are not going to work if there is a double standard

about compliance with them. There are countries around this very table that have consistently voted for the sanctions and that say they favour strengthening the machinery, yet which may be violators of the very programme they claim to support.

35. The first and essential step is to acknowledge that sanctions, while they have had a measurable effect on the Rhodesian economy, have not been working very well with respect to a number of Rhodesian exports for a long period of time. Rhodesian exports continue at levels which appear to approximate and in some cases exceed pre-sanctions levels. This can be explained only by a widespread pattern of violation of or indifference to the requirements of the sanctions effort.

36. There have been alleged violations which concern at least nine countries sitting in this Council, including most of the permanent members. In fairness both to the countries against which the allegations have been made and to the countries which have tried scrupulously to adhere to the sanctions, these allegations should be investigated.

37. The fourth report of the sanctions Committee established that Rhodesian indirect exports to world markets through third countries rose from \$8 million in 1966 to \$215 million in 1970. It is common knowledge that in the last few years Rhodesia has been able to export the bulk of its mineral output. These exports must go somewhere—and they have not gone to the United States.

38. It is notable that the fourth report of the sanctions Committee points out that exports of chrome ore from South Africa to some major industrial countries more than doubled and in one case rose more than 10 times within the past four years. Many of the importing countries are members of this Council—and it is most difficult to escape the presumption that much of this increased purchase of ore did come from Rhodesia. As members of the Council are aware, we have been unable to obtain general agreement that, where there is reasonable question about the origin of imported minerals, those minerals be subject to the effective chemical tests that are available. As the members of the Council know, only the United Kingdom, the United States and Denmark have actually taken steps to prosecute firms found to be in violation of sanctions.

39. In 1965 Rhodesia exported \$67 million worth of strategic materials. All indications are that Rhodesia's exports of strategic commodities in 1970 were as high as or higher than the 1965 exports, and none of those commodities was imported into the United States. Somebody bought those goods. Somebody has been buying them each year since sanctions went into effect. It has not been the United States, which has scrupulously enforced the sanctions programme. In short, the United States has not been the problem.

40. As a result of our recent legislation, the United States no longer prohibits the importation of strategic commodities. But let us keep this in perspective. Prior to sanctions, United States imports of those commodities amounted to less than 2 per cent of Rhodesia's total pre-sanctions exports. The United States continues, therefore, to enforce scrupulously the embargo on commodities which constitute

98 per cent of Rhodesia's pre-sanctions exports. Therefore the Byrd Provision is only a very small part of the problem, and the United States is prepared to report all exceptions under it. All indications are that in 1968, 1969, 1970 and 1971 Rhodesian exports of strategic commodities were as high as or higher than they were in 1965. In those four years the United States took only one lot, which had been paid for before sanctions. That one lot represented 6 per cent of one year's production of only one commodity and less than one-half of 1 per cent of Rhodesia's total exports through third countries. I say again, the United States has not been the problem.

41. My Government therefore suggests that this Council ask the sanctions Committee to request from Governments periodic reports on the importation of strategic minerals from all sources. The list of minerals should show world-wide trade in all those key commodities which are also produced in Rhodesia. The reports should also indicate sources of origin for each item or commodity. Reports of this nature should greatly assist the sanctions Committee to obtain a fuller picture of on-going trade with Rhodesia. We could envisage that in case of questionable shipments the Committee would be able to request and obtain samples of such shipments and subject those samples to chemical analysis to determine their origin. My Government would be prepared to co-operate fully in this effort.

42. My delegation will abstain on this draft resolution. We support the basic principle involved, which is the continuation of the sanctions programme against Southern Rhodesia. But even though they are not mandatory we cannot accept those parts of the draft resolution which directly or indirectly affect laws which have been adopted and are now in force and which under our Constitution must be implemented.

43. Mr. VINCI (Italy): I will be very brief in explaining the vote which my delegation will cast in favour of the draft resolution contained in document S/10541/Rev.1. In doing so I shall refrain from mentioning the whole record of the contribution which my country and my delegation have made to the completion of the process of the emancipation of Africa, in full solidarity with the feelings and aspirations of our African friends. The record of Italy is, I believe, quite clear on, *inter alia*, the implementation and enforcement of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia and it speaks for itself since it is recorded in all the documents of the Committee on sanctions.

44. I wish to state that my delegation shared most of the reservations which were expressed at the 1641st meeting by the representative of France on the draft resolution submitted to the Council by Guinea, Somalia and the Sudan. Our main reservations related to operative paragraphs 1 and 3 and we wish to express our sincere appreciation to the sponsors and especially to Mr. Farah for having met the points made by Mr. Kosciusko-Morizet and for having revised the text in order to make it more consistent with the provisions contained in resolutions previously adopted by the Council.

45. Finally, I should like to thank the sponsors for having accepted the suggestion made by the representative of

France with respect to the date indicated in operative paragraph 6. We also felt that it would be wiser to give a little more time to the Committee on sanctions to report back to the Council with any suggestions the Committee might wish to make concerning its terms of reference and other measures designed to ensure the effectiveness of its work.

46. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): The Security Council is considering a very serious question. The delegation of the USSR stated its attitude towards the question under discussion and towards the draft resolution at the previous meeting on this question [1642nd meeting]. We cannot, however, remain silent in the face of the violation by the United States of America of a mandatory decision of the Council, particularly since in order to conceal this violation, allusions, hints and direct statements have been made to the effect that the price of Soviet chrome has compelled the United States of America to embark on a course of violating Council resolutions concerning sanctions against the racist régime of Southern Rhodesia. This is such a far-fetched and fabricated argument that there would be no need to mention it if today, too, the United States representative had not made hints of a similar kind in seeking to justify the violation by the United States of the Council resolutions.

47. The fact that the United States has violated a Security Council resolution, as members of the Council know, had already been admitted by the United States representative, Mr. Bush, in Addis Ababa. Today, his deputy, Ambassador Phillips, has confirmed it. Speaking in the Security Council in Addis Ababa, Ambassador Bush stated:

"True, our Congress, concerned about national security, put a provision in the United States law that chrome essential to national security could under certain limited conditions be imported from Rhodesia". [1637th meeting, para. 175]

48. Now reports have appeared in the press that 25,000 tons of Rhodesian chrome are already being loaded in a Mozambican port, incidentally, it should be pointed out, Ambassador Ortiz de Rozas, on the Argentine ship *Santos Vega*, which is then bound for New Orleans.

49. The fact that the United States has violated the sanctions, with the participation of Portugal and now with the co-operation of an Argentine ship, should be given due weight by the Security Council. This question is now being considered in the Council and members of the Council have before them a draft resolution submitted by the three African countries which are members of the Council.

50. As I have already pointed out, the position of the USSR on this question was set out in detail at a previous meeting, on 25 February 1972. I have now asked to speak in order to repudiate categorically the attempts of the official representatives of the United States and certain organs of the American press to divert attention from the violation by the United States of the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, by far-fetched references to some alleged dependence of the United States on the import of chrome from the Soviet Union. None other than the

representative of the United States in the Security Council, Mr. Bush, announced in his statement at a press conference on 22 February 1972 that a law permitting the import of chrome from Southern Rhodesia had been adopted by the United States Congress, allegedly because the Congress was concerned over the fact that the United States was buying that strategic material in the USSR at twice the price at which chrome had previously been imported from Rhodesia.

51. The purpose of such a statement is to conceal and justify the actions of the United States which run counter to the United Nations, by reference to international trade in chrome in order to conceal and justify violations of a Security Council resolution which is binding on all States Members of the United Nations concerning sanctions against the racist régime of Southern Rhodesia. These references and attempts at justification and this legislative action by the United States in violation of a Security Council resolution are clearly directed towards strengthening the Smith racist régime; they have a political significance, they are political in character, and they are political and not trade or economic acts.

52. The trade in chrome on the international market, and its price, have nothing whatsoever to do with the question under consideration. Moreover, the price of chrome sold by the Soviet Union corresponds to the price of chrome on the international market and the United States is surely not kind enough to pay the Soviet Union twice the going price for Soviet chrome. That has never happened in history and will never happen. The United States has bought and is buying Soviet chrome at generally recognized international prices. Therefore to refer to the level of Soviet prices means that there is absolutely no other argument to justify the violation of a Security Council resolution. Furthermore, everyone knows that the Council has never prohibited the export of goods or material of any kind, including chrome ore, from the Soviet Union. So why is the purchase of Soviet chrome by the United States mentioned here?

53. It is not difficult to see that this argument has been dragged up in order to find some kind of justification for such a gross and cynical violation by the United States of a Security Council resolution. The Council has placed an embargo, a ban, on trade with Southern Rhodesia and it is the violation by the United States of that ban, of that resolution of the Council, that is being discussed at the meetings of the Council.

54. If we look into this matter more closely, it will become absolutely clear that arguments about the price of chrome and references to the national security of the United States are being used by the United States representatives in the Security Council and by part of the American propaganda machine solely to conceal and justify the political action taken by the United States aimed at supporting the racist Smith régime. The crux of the matter is that the United States, together with the United Kingdom, is assisting and co-operating with the racist colonialist régimes in southern Africa, not only the Southern Rhodesian régime but also the others, and is taking measures in violation of a Security Council resolution with a view to strengthening and supporting those régimes. That is the crux of the matter.

55. In the meantime, according to reports in the American press, the United States has sufficient stocks of chrome not to have to import any for some years. Obviously, the United States which, since the time of the "cold war" has been preparing itself for war, has accumulated such enormous stocks that it can live for some years without importing a single gramme of chrome from abroad. But this point has been passed over in silence by the United States representatives in the Security Council. Another fact, too, merits the attention of the Council, namely, that even before the introduction of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia the United States had reduced its purchases of chrome from the Soviet Union to approximately one half of the total quantity of chrome imported into the United States. What does this mean? This means that the United States has imported approximately one half of its chrome in recent years from other countries, and not only from the Soviet Union. Consequently, since it has enormous stocks which will last for many years and has the possibility of getting at least 50 per cent of its annual chrome imports from other countries, there was no need whatsoever, from the economic or strategic point of view, or from the point of view of national defence interests, for the United States to import chrome ore from Southern Rhodesia in violation of the Security Council resolution on sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. Consequently, if the United States wishes, and if it wants to add further reserves of chrome ore to its stocks, which will already last for many years, it can buy chrome in other countries and not only in the Soviet Union, and need not refer to Soviet chrome and the high price of that chrome, if it has a genuine desire not to violate Security Council resolutions but to implement them strictly as the Charter requires of every Member of the United Nations.

56. Thus, all these concrete facts refute both the assertion of Ambassador Bush and today's repetition of that assertion by Ambassador Phillips by means of hints, to the effect that the United States is allegedly receiving chrome from only one source and therefore desperately needs a second source—Southern Rhodesia, the Southern Rhodesian régime.

57. We will adduce one further argument. A leading article in today's issue of *The New York Times* devoted to this problem stated:

"The national defence argument, at least, was fraudulent. The United States has so much chrome in its stockpile that the Administration submitted legislation last year to provide for the disposal of 1.3 million tons over three years."

The United States has enormous stocks.

"The Office of Emergency Preparedness has estimated that the stockpile is 2.2 million tons in excess of any foreseeable strategic need."¹

These are concrete facts, from an authoritative source, from *The New York Times*.

"This country had been importing large quantities of Russian chrome before sanctions, (please, Ambassador) as much as 49 per cent of all chrome imports".

Thus it is confirmed that the United States imports only 49 per cent of its chrome ore from the Soviet Union and 51 per cent from other countries. How then can we believe the assertions of Mr. Phillips and the earlier assertions of Mr. Bush that the United States receives chrome from only one source—from the Soviet Union: Your own newspaper, your own press, refute those assertions.

"Yet the Administration took no action during the Congressional debate either to set the record straight on chrome or to sustain the American commitment to the United Nations."¹

So stresses *The New York Times* of 28 February 1972. This directly bears out what I said, that there has been a direct disregard of a United Nations resolution, of a Security Council resolution, and attempts have been made to justify it. But from time immemorial, even before the dark days of the "cold war", the Americans have always found the best justification is to throw the blame on the Soviet Union. They believed this in the past, it is stupid to repeat it now, and it is time for the United States representatives to understand this reality.

58. The President of the United States in his official statements appeals for the reality of the contemporary world to be taken into account, but these appeals for a *real-politik* have obviously not yet reached the United States representative in the Security Council. Let us hope that these appeals do reach him.

59. This is the situation with regard to the references to Russian chrome and its price. From all this only one conclusion is clear: any references to Soviet chrome and its high price are fabricated and are a diversionary manoeuvre undertaken by the United States with a view to concealing the moral and economic support which they give to the racist Smith régime.

60. Today Ambassador Phillips used another diversionary manoeuvre. He alluded indirectly to other countries, he made hints. This is also a diversionary manoeuvre, the purpose of which is to justify the illegal actions of the United States, its gross violations of the Security Council resolutions on sanctions against the racist fascist régime in Southern Rhodesia, and to reassure the Africans and look good in their eyes. There can be no doubt that neither the earlier diversionary manoeuvre concerning Russian chrome ore nor today's new diversionary manoeuvre will succeed or mislead anyone.

61. The attempts to cast aspersions on the anti-colonial, anti-imperialist policy of the Soviet Union and the attempts to drive a wedge between the USSR and the African countries will also be unsuccessful. We have already spoken on that in our last statement.

62. The Soviet Union shows its full solidarity with the African people in southern Africa, in their just struggle to gain freedom and independence, and has assisted, still

¹ Quoted in English by the speaker.

assists and will continue to assist them. It was this position which guided the delegation of the USSR at the meetings of the Security Council in Addis Ababa, too. We co-operated actively, on a friendly and fraternal basis, with the African representatives and we consider that we achieved some success at those meetings and unmasked colonial terrorism, racism and neo-colonialism and adopted resolutions, which were on the whole quite good ones, by an overwhelming majority of the votes of the members of the Security Council.

63. The Soviet Union is strictly and unswervingly implementing the decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly concerning Southern Rhodesia, including the question of sanctions. It does not maintain any relations with the racist régime in Salisbury, neither diplomatic, economic, trade, or any other relations, and no slanderous insinuations to that effect can help any delegation to conceal its own violations of the Security Council decisions. We have said this previously and wished to emphasize it yet again.

64. The best course for the United States and its delegation in the Security Council to take in this particular situation today would be to reconsider their position and embark on a policy of strict implementation of the Security Council resolutions concerning sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, including the embargo on the export of chrome ore.

65. A report has been received from Paris today, a report from Agence France-Presse, transmitted from Lusaka. During his visit to Lusaka, Mr. Bush also attempted to justify the resumption of the importation of Rhodesian chrome by the United States. In that connexion he said: "The United States at the same time supports 90 per cent of the United Nations resolutions on Rhodesia." Only 90 per cent, yet it is the obligation, the duty, of all members of the Council—not to mention the fact that it is the duty and obligation of all States Members of the United Nations and above all of the permanent members of the Security Council—to implement the resolutions of the Council of that kind 100 per cent, and not only 90 per cent. This is precisely the essence of the appeal in the draft resolution which was submitted today for the consideration of the Security Council by the three African States which are members of the Security Council. The best possible course would be for the Council to vote unanimously in favour of that draft resolution and to comply with it strictly.

66. The Soviet delegation supports the draft resolution and will vote in favour of it.

67. THE PRESIDENT: The representative of the United States wishes to speak in exercise of his right of reply, and I now call on him.

68. Mr. PHILLIPS (United States of America): This will be a brief statement because I do not want to engage in a kind of class lesson economics discussion with the representative of the Soviet Union. I have just been looking over my statement, and I am not aware that I have accused the Soviet Union of anything today. This may be an unusual day, but I have not accused them of anything. I have not

accused them of importing Rhodesian chrome. I have not accused them of smoking Rhodesian tobacco. I have not accused them of any such evil things. In the light of that, it is somewhat surprising that Mr. Malik has shown such rather great sensitivity to this issue today. He made a rather elaborate defence against nothing. Perhaps, though, it is only sheer coincidence that certain market fluctuations in the price of chrome have indeed taken place. It may be purely coincidental. I am not an outstanding economist; I am merely an amateur economist. But it is a fact—and it is difficult to deny—that the price of chrome did very nearly double shortly after the sanctions programme went into effect, and I think it can equally be demonstrated that since the Byrd amendment was adopted the price of Soviet exported chrome has substantially gone down.

69. Now I can understand that this is an unfortunate situation from the point of view of the Soviet Government. I know that Soviet economic doctrine is not based primarily on the profit motive, but I suspect that a rather handsome profit may have been enjoyed during the period when the United States fully subscribed to the sanctions programme with respect to chrome. Of course, now this will no longer be a windfall for the Soviet Government.

70. As I said, I do not want to get involved in a long drawn out discussion of economics. I should simply like to say that, for our part, we are not trying to camouflage anything. I believe the Soviet representative talked about our camouflaging things. We are quite open. We have said exactly what the problem is, what we intend to do, what we have done, and we suggested that the problem may be a bit more complex than some others here have indicated. So, we are not trying to camouflage anything.

71. I am very pleased that the representative of the Soviet Union was able to see that editorial in *The New York Times*. I was going to send him a copy in case he had not seen it. I wish that *Pravda* and *Izvestia* sometimes could give us quite such candid criticisms of their Government's policies as *The New York Times* sometimes does in our case. But be that as it may, I should like to conclude by saying that we have stated our case very candidly. We have nothing to hide. I am very sorry that the Soviet representative took umbrage at my non-attack against him, and I hope that it is not a sign of a guilty conscience.

72. Mr. ORTIZ DE ROZAS (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): While referring to a press release published today—actually, as will have been seen, it was an editorial in *The New York Times*—the representative of the Soviet Union in his statement mentioned Argentina in connexion with the flag of a cargo ship, the *Santos Vega*, which is allegedly carrying chrome ore from Rhodesia to the United States. In this connexion I have prepared some clarifications, which I had intended to make available to the Committee on sanctions, but I believe it is desirable to provide these clarifications now.

73. My delegation learned of this situation on 14 February, following an informal comment made by the representative of Somalia. Mr. Farah said informally at a meeting of the non-permanent members of the Security Council that in the newspaper *The Irish Times*, published in

Dublin, in the issue of 12 February, he had happened to read, when he was in London on his way back from Addis Ababa, that an Argentine cargo ship would be loading, on Tuesday, 15 February, 25,000 tons of chrome ore from Southern Rhodesia to be transported to the United States. We are of course most grateful to Mr. Farah for having drawn our attention to a matter of undoubted importance. On the basis of that information, we tried to obtain and we did obtain—not without some difficulties, I must say—a copy of the above-mentioned article, which we immediately cabled to the authorities in Argentina.

74. I have taken the liberty of presenting this brief account so as to make it clear that my country started the appropriate investigation as soon as it was informed of the case. We wish to place that clearly on record, because we do not consider it necessary to wait until we are given an official communication from the United Nations to start inquiries, as is usually the case where sanctions violations are concerned. On our own initiative we decided to begin without delay to find out the facts and the background of that article. We did so because we have been and still are faithfully complying with the sanctions applied in this field. Unfortunately, as I have just explained, it was only on Wednesday, 16 February, that the appropriate inquiries could be started.

75. I should now like to inform the Council of all the facts which we have available at this time.

76. First, the cargo ship in question appears indeed to be the *Santos Vega*, owned by Gotaas-Larsen Argentina S.A. It is a bulk cargo ship of approximately 30,000 tons, which, according to the company from which information was urgently requested, reached Beira, Mozambique, on 15 February, and was scheduled to leave between 19 and 20 February.

77. Secondly, the commercial firm in question indicated that: (a) The agents at the port of Beira were Messrs. George Cory Mann, Post Office Box 44, Beira, the shipper being the Pote Mineral Company of the United States and a person by the name of Figuerós or Figueroa acting as the carrier of the cargo up to Beira; (b) This was a contract on the international open market (Meridore Charter 1965, as revised); (c) 24,912 long tons of concentrated mineral ore were loaded. It is assumed that it was concentrated chrome ore; (d) The consignee was the Foote Mineral Company of the United States; (e) The captain of the ship declared that he did not know the origin of the merchandise nor its quality or chemical composition, and that he relied on the shipper's statements, in accordance with the customs and usages of the shipping trade. The shipping company reported that no one on the ship is obliged to investigate the origin of merchandise and that it is up to the fleet company to declare the nature of the goods; (f) The route of the *Santos Vega* is from Beira to an American port on the Gulf of Mexico, to be made known by the importer 72 hours before arriving in the Gulf of Mexico. According to the company, that is the normal procedure in this type of business, since frequently cargoes are sold while en route. The freight consisted of mineral ore in bulk, whose origin, as I have indicated, was not known.

78. Thirdly, our Government, through the competent authorities, in due course requested from Gotaas-Larsen a complete report on this matter. The purpose of my Government in carrying out this inquiry was to order the company to discharge the mineral in the event that it should be proved that the mineral was of Rhodesian origin, and this has not been definitely ascertained up to now.

79. I am now able to state in advance that, if it is confirmed that the cargo was from Rhodesia and is being carried with the knowledge of those responsible for the ship, the Government of Argentina will consider the penalties or administrative measures to be applied in accordance with our national legislation on the subject.

80. In conclusion, I wish to emphasize that in my country the necessary legal and administrative measures were enacted a long time ago to avoid situations of this kind. These measures continue to be fully in force and, therefore, we shall continue to ensure their strictest application.

81. Argentina, which traditionally complies scrupulously with its international obligations, reiterates its support for the action taken by the United Nations in this field. In that same spirit we shall now vote in favour of the revised draft resolution before us, and we support all the other resolutions that have been adopted to impose sanctions against the illegal régime of Southern Rhodesia.

82. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of the Soviet Union in exercise of the right of reply.

83. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): I shall be brief. The reply by the United States representative, Ambassador Phillips, is wide of the mark.

84. In my statement I referred to the words of Mr. Bush, the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations, and I pointed out that if it had not been for his statement that the sole source of chrome ore for the United States was Russia, and if it had not been for the hint made today by Mr. Phillips that the United States receives chrome ore from one source, I should not have spoken. But I quoted Mr. Bush only in summary. I can now quote from the original. This is the statement made by Mr. Bush on 22 February after his tour of 10 African countries. I shall quote from the press release of the Mission of the United States to the United Nations, on page 3 of which it is stated:

“This legislation was passed not in an effort to further racism and colonialism, but because of the concern of the Congress about an entirely different problem, namely, the fact that we were buying this strategic material from Russia at twice the price we were paying for it from Rhodesia before.”

85. By the facts I have adduced and by my references to *The New York Times*, I have convincingly demonstrated the unsoundness of your argument that the United States adopted legislation violating a decision of the United Nations allegedly only because of Russian chrome ore. That is a ludicrous basis, as I have proved in my statement.

86. As for the remark of Mr. Phillips regarding publication in the pages of *Pravda*, I can assure him that the part of the leading article from *The New York Times* which I quoted will be reprinted in *Pravda* and those who read *Pravda* will read it with interest.

87. The PRESIDENT: If no member of the Council wishes to speak at this stage in explanation of vote before the voting, I shall take it that the Council is ready to proceed to vote on the revised draft resolution submitted by Guinea, Somalia and the Sudan, contained in document S/10541/Rev.1, with operative paragraph 6 amended to read as follows:

"Requests the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) to meet, as a matter of urgency, to consider ways and means by which the implementation of sanctions may be ensured and to submit to the Council, not later than 15 April 1972, a report containing recommendations in this respect, including any suggestions which the Committee might wish to make concerning its terms of reference and any other measures designed to ensure the effectiveness of its work;"

88. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): I should like to request a separate vote on operative paragraph 1.

89. Mr. SEN (India): I wish to suggest simply a drafting change. I am not proposing it formally but I am suggesting it to the sponsors for their consideration. The word "fully" appears twice in operative paragraph 1. This is just a stylistic change, to use the word "completely" instead of "fully".

90. The PRESIDENT: Operative paragraph 1 would then read:

"Reaffirms its decision that the present sanctions against Southern Rhodesia shall remain fully in force until the aims and objectives set out in resolution 253 (1968) are completely achieved;"

I take it that the sponsors agree to this proposed amendment, namely, that the second "fully" in operative paragraph 1 should be changed to "completely".

91. A separate vote has been requested on operative paragraph 1.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: Argentina, Belgium, China, France, Guinea, India, Italy, Japan, Panama, Somalia, Sudan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United States of America, Yugoslavia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Operative paragraph 1 was adopted by 14 votes to none, with 1 abstention.

92. The PRESIDENT: We shall now vote on the draft resolution, as amended, as a whole.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: Argentina, Belgium, China, France, Guinea, India, Italy, Japan, Panama, Somalia, Sudan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

The draft resolution was adopted by 13 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.²

93. The PRESIDENT: I shall now call on those representatives who have asked to be allowed to explain their vote after the voting.

94. Mr. JAMIESON (United Kingdom): My delegation has on previous occasions made it clear that we do not believe that resolutions on any aspect of the Rhodesian question are necessary at this time. For that reason it has abstained both on the paragraph vote and on the vote on the resolution as a whole. However, it is clearly the wish of the majority of the members of the Council that a resolution should be adopted on the question of sanctions. Since, unlike the draft on the Rhodesia question in general with which we were confronted in Addis Ababa, this resolution does not seek to impose any directive upon my Government in the discharge of its responsibilities, we have not opposed it.

95. It is, of course, clear that the objective of sanctions is the objective which is stated for them in resolution 253 (1968). My delegation does not accept certain interpretations which have been advanced during the course of the debate.

96. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): My delegation is gratified by the overwhelming vote not only in support of the resolution as a whole but also in support of paragraph 1 in particular. When I introduced the draft resolution [1641st meeting] I pointed out that when the sponsors spoke of the "aims and objectives" of resolution 253 (1968) we had very much in mind the provisions of paragraph 2, which reads as follows:

"Calls upon the United Kingdom as the administering Power in the discharge of its responsibility to take urgently all effective measures to bring to an end the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia, and"—and this is very important—"enable the people to secure the enjoyment of their rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in conformity with the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);"

97. Now that we have been able to reassure the international community of the intention of this Council to continue, with all the vigour and all the means at its disposal, the enforcement of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, we

² See resolution 314 (1972).

should not neglect to look also into the political aspects of the situation.

98. Mr. President, when you made a statement at the Council's 1642nd meeting, you mentioned a message which had been addressed to the President of the Security Council by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity. In that communication the Council of Ministers, which represents 41 Member States of this Organization, expressed "the hope that the Security Council, and in particular its permanent members, will re-examine the question of Rhodesia fundamentally, on the basis of draft resolution S/10606", which was presented to the Council in Addis Ababa, but was, unfortunately, vetoed.

99. The communication asked the permanent members to repair the historic error of 4 February 1972 and the wrongs committed against the peoples of Africa.

100. It is reported in the press that the Pearce Commission will in the next two weeks or so complete its task in Southern Rhodesia and return to the United Kingdom. But that should not deter this Council from expressing itself on the political aspects involved in the situation. And what are the political aspects? That the people of Southern Rhodesia—the African people—should be brought into full consultation on shaping and charting their own political destiny. The resolution rejected by the United Kingdom in Addis Ababa emphasized that there should be a round-table conference at which the genuine representatives of the African majority would be represented. It is our hope that in the near future the Security Council will once again be seized of this important aspect of its work.

The meeting rose at 5.20 p.m.