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SIXTEEN HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SEVENTH MEETING

Held in Africa Hall, Addis Ababa, on Thursday, 3 February 1972, at 5 p.m.

President: Mr. Mansour KHALID (Sudan).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Argentina, Belgium, China, France, Guinea, India, Italy, Japan, Panama, Somalia, Sudan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Yugoslavia.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1637)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. Consideration of questions relating to Africa of which the Security Council is currently seized and implementation of the Council's relevant resolutions.

The meeting was called to order at 5.15 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Consideration of questions relating to Africa of which the Security Council is currently seized and implementation of the Council's relevant resolutions

1. The PRESIDENT: At the outset, I shall call on the Secretary-General, who has a statement to make.
2. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: This series of meetings of the Security Council in Africa is, in my view, not only a historic event but a test. The people of Africa invited the Council to come here in order to feel the depth, the reality and the righteousness of aspirations that have long ago been fulfilled in the rest of the world: independence, freedom and human dignity.
3. His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of Ethiopia, a wise and great man, who once raised his voice in warning to the League of Nations, came to speak to us [1627th meeting] with the same inspired and lucid vision of the world's duty and the right course. President Ould Daddah, the current Chairman of the Organization of African Unity, came from Mauritania to present the Council [ibid.] with an agenda of considered action. Ten Ministers for Foreign Affairs have attended this session and lent their support to their suffering brothers in Africa. Men came from their fighting-grounds to tell us of their dreams and rights which are solemnly embodied in our Charter. Former colonial Powers have told us here in Africa how satisfied they were at having turned a page of history and replaced bonds of colonialism by bonds of friendship, equality and reciprocal interest.

4. This session of the Council is, in my view, one of the most dramatic demonstrations of the usefulness of the United Nations in providing a voice for the aspirations of the people for which the Organization was created. It is my hope that we will see the same demonstration of our usefulness in applying remedies and indeed solving the problems before us. In that respect, we must all co-operate in order to achieve that aim. If not, then it will be time to scrutinize the distance between the aspirations and rights of the people and the value and effectiveness of our work. It would not be enough to condemn the United Nations or the Security Council as a whole. It would be necessary to go to the roots of the problem and analyse thoroughly the exact causes of the state of affairs.

5. I have listened very intently to the voices I have heard here in the Council and in my talks with so many distinguished African statesmen. I have been deeply moved. May I assure you that I am ready to do my utmost, in every direction, in every place, and in every way that may be expected from me by this Council. I just cannot believe that there is no way out of the present situation. There must be a way. The time must come, I am sure, when the Governments concerned will see the new role they can play in international affairs devoid of the present injustices. It should not be so difficult—it will even be beneficial for them—to take the measures which are expected from them by the community of nations in order to ensure freedom, independence and human dignity in southern Africa, and thus contribute to the construction of a better and happier world.

6. I am ready to lend all my strength, efforts and devotion to help achieve this goal.

7. May I, finally, thank all representatives and speakers who have made kind reference to my appointment as Secretary-General. I want to assure them that I shall spare no effort to be worthy of the confidence placed in me.

8. The PRESIDENT: I thank the Secretary-General for his statement.

9. Before giving the floor to the representative of Guinea who wishes to introduce the draft resolution on Portuguese Territories contained in document S/10607, I should like to inform the members of the Security Council of the following other draft resolutions which have been submitted and are available in all languages. The first is contained in document S/10376/Rev.2 and is sponsored by Argentina. The second is contained in document S/10608, relating to Namibia; it is sponsored by Guinea, Somalia and

Sudan, and I am now informed that Yugoslavia is to be added as a sponsor. The third draft resolution, contained in document S/10609 and relating to the question of *apartheid*, is sponsored by Guinea, India, Somalia, Sudan and Yugoslavia.

10. Mr. TOURE (Guinea) (*interpretation from French*): My delegation has the honour, on behalf of the other two African States members of the Security Council and on its own behalf, to submit for the consideration of the Council a draft resolution on the Territories under Portuguese domination, contained in document S/10607. This draft, to a large extent, reproduces the essential parts of relevant resolutions adopted both by the General Assembly and the Security Council itself.

11. At the present session, we have had the opportunity to hear, on the spot, the leaders of the liberation movements, whose political maturity and sense of responsibility have made a big impression on us. This explains the just reference made in the second paragraph of the preamble to the statements of the qualified representatives of the African populations under foreign domination, who were invited by our Council to make statements before it.

12. The fourth, fifth and sixth paragraphs of the preamble indicate that in spite of all appeals to reason, in spite of all efforts on the part of everyone and all the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council itself, the Government of Portugal not only refuses to put an end to its colonial policy, but is even stepping up its oppressive and genocidal measures in its military operations against African Territories under its domination, as well as provocations and flagrant acts of aggression committed against independent African States bordering on these Territories. It is true that Portugal, in doing this, is benefiting from the material and moral support of its traditional partners.

13. The seventh and eighth paragraphs of the preamble stress the growing concern of the Africans in the face of the escalation of violence started by Portugal and the repeated use of chemical substances in its colonial wars.

14. The ninth and tenth paragraphs of the preamble state that the representatives of the liberation movements heard by the Council are the only and authentic spokesmen of the peoples of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea (Bissau), and also that the Council can be gratified at the progress they have achieved towards independence, national reconstruction and liberty.

15. In this connexion, the different testimony we have heard, even from the Western press, distinguished writers, including Basil Davidson, journalists and film makers, including the French National Television and Radio Service and Italian film makers, is sufficiently eloquent to stress the objective nature of picture like the ones we saw the other day and constitute obvious proof of the progress achieved by these liberation movements in terms of a national reconquest.

16. Operative paragraph 1 reaffirms the inalienable right of the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau)

to self-determination and independence, as well as the legitimacy of their struggle.

17. Operative paragraph 2 of the draft condemns the persistent refusal of Portugal to implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and all relevant resolutions of the Security Council.

18. The Council will agree with us that the situation resulting from the aggressive and stubborn policies of Portugal in its colonies and against neighbouring African States constitute a genuine and serious threat to international peace and security. That is why in operative paragraph 4 our draft resolution lays down a certain number of measures which must be demanded of Portugal. These include:

(a) The recognition of the right of the peoples under its administration to self-determination and independence;

(b) The immediate cessation of all military operations and acts of repression and the withdrawal of all Portuguese armed forces;

(c) The promulgation of an unconditional political amnesty and the restoration of democratic rights;

(d) The opening of negotiations with the genuine representatives of the people of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) to ensure the transfer of power.

19. Of course, our draft reminds Portugal that it must refrain from any violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of independent African States.

20. Operative paragraph 6 once again calls upon States to refrain from offering Portugal any material, military or financial assistance, which enables it to continue its repression in Africa.

21. Operative paragraph 7 invites all Member States of the United Nations, the specialized agencies and other organizations to provide or increase assistance to the peoples of Territories under Portuguese domination in order to enable them to continue their liberation struggle.

22. The draft resolution concludes with an appeal to Member States to take appropriate measures capable of compelling Portugal to abide by the provisions of this resolution.

23. While the sponsors of this draft resolution have not had enough time to undertake consultations with all delegations, I can tell the different delegations that the sponsors are ready for and open to exchanges of views aimed at enabling our Council to study in the most appropriate fashion the draft resolution before it.

24. In conclusion I should like to express the wish that this draft will meet with the widest support possible and that the unanimity of the members of the Council in adopting this draft will not only lead Portugal to understand the sense of history but also bring to Africa, particularly the peoples under colonialist repression, a new

reason for hope and belief in international solidarity and the sacred principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations: freedom, peace and justice.

25. Mr. ORTIZ DE ROZAS (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Mr. President, may I first express to you our most sincere congratulations on your assumption of the Presidency of the Security Council. As the representative of France, my friend Ambassador Kosciusko-Morizet, said yesterday [1635th meeting], this is not simply a matter of form. It is a recognition of your statesmanlike qualities, your diplomatic skill and your experience in international affairs. We are sure that under your Presidency and, in New York, under the Presidency of the permanent representative of Sudan, the Security Council will achieve very tangible success.

26. I should also like to congratulate the representatives of Somalia in the persons of the Somali Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the permanent representative to the United Nations, our very good friend Ambassador Farah, for the excellent way in which the Security Council was presided over during the month that has just passed.

27. If the Council is meeting in Africa this is not by mere chance. The invitation of the Organization of African Unity, which was welcomed by everyone, found in Ambassador Farah an enthusiastic and indefatigable champion who did not flag for a moment in his efforts until the Security Council took a favourable decision on this journey to Africa. I think that for that reason he and all the members of the Somali delegation deserve our most sincere gratitude.

28. The Security Council has before it the draft resolution sponsored by the Argentine delegation which is contained in document S/10376/Rev.2. This draft is nothing new to the members of the Council. In its original form it was introduced on 20 October 1971. In other circumstances I would not have had to delay the Council by referring to it once again. But in view of the time that has passed I feel it necessary to remind the Council of the reasons which led the Argentine delegation to submit this draft resolution.

29. I would therefore crave the indulgence of the members of the Council if I find myself compelled to repeat some of the details. These details are known to all, since when we submitted this text we also engaged in intensive consultations with the African Group, which was the primary party concerned, with all the members of the Council without exception, with the former President of the United Nations Council for Namibia, Ambassador Ogbu, of Nigeria, with its current President, Ambassador Shahi of Pakistan, with our former Secretary-General, our beloved and esteemed U Thant, and with our distinguished present Secretary-General, Mr. Kurt Waldheim. We also had consultations with the leaders of the political organizations from Namibia who were present in New York at the time when the draft was originally submitted. In fact, this morning I had the particular privilege of being invited to set forth my ideas in the plenary meeting of the African Group.

30. If I repeat these details it is because I want to express them now in the Security Council, since it is the customary practice of my delegation to support loyally and faithfully

in public what it states in informal meetings and in the corridors.

31. The Argentine text, in its original form of 20 October 1971, and in the first revised version of 22 October was ready to be put to the vote in the Security Council. But that date coincided with an event of great importance to the Organization and I refer to the development that resulted in the restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations. My delegation considered that it was not only normal but also desirable to await the arrival of the representatives of the People's Republic of China and their introduction to the work of the Organization. Unfortunately, just after our Chinese colleagues became members of the Organization, a crisis broke out in the Asian sub-continent which made it necessary to postpone consideration of this draft resolution. To some extent I am happy that this postponement occurred, because it allows us to discuss this problem on African soil, face to face with the distinguished representatives of all the countries of this continent.

32. We have stated—and we shall never tire of repeating—the ends our draft resolution seeks to attain. They are clear. In the first instance, we want the people of Namibia to be able to exercise its legitimate right to self-determination which, beyond question and without any restrictions, is recognized under the Charter of the United Nations. We believe that the people of Namibia can accede to complete independence and can become a member of our Organization as a free and sovereign, State. Lastly—and this is very important—in acceding to independence we want Namibia to preserve its national unity and its territorial integrity, without any type of division, be it regional or local. In other words, when this people and this Territory accede to independent life, they should do so as a single entity.

33. Let no one entertain any doubts. We are not acting in response to any foreign interest. The only aims that guide the Argentine delegation are those that I have just outlined.

34. As I said in my statement a few days ago [1630th meeting]—and I should like to repeat now—the situation in Namibia has reached a point where it demands a solution. On the one hand, we have the whole body of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council, which Argentina has supported without reservations. Those resolutions—and it is well to point this out—are still in full force and they should be applied in their totality. On the other, we have had recourse to the judiciary as witness the advisory opinion¹ handed down by the International Court of Justice, which, without any circumlocutions, states clearly its finding that the presence of South Africa in the Territory of Namibia is unlawful and, at the same time, confirms the validity of the resolutions adopted by the United Nations on this question.

35. It is now our duty and our responsibility to seek any possible means of solution which might bring the people of

¹ *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16.*

Namibia as soon as possible to the stage of self-determination and independence, within the strictest respect for human rights and the maintenance of their territorial integrity.

36. I should like to lay particular stress on one aspect: I want to make it abundantly clear that our draft resolution is in no way incompatible with all of the other resolutions that have already been adopted on this question, as well as with the draft resolution contained in document S/10608, which has just been circulated under the sponsorship of Guinea, Somalia and Sudan. Our draft in no way signifies that we are abdicating any principle or relegating to oblivion or postponing the application of these resolutions which, I repeat, continue to have full force and which have the total support of the Argentine delegation. On the contrary, we consider that our draft is complementary to all of these resolutions to the extent that it opens up a new approach.

37. Now, what is the aim of our draft resolution? The first paragraph of the preamble reads:

"Having examined further the question of Namibia, and without prejudice to other resolutions adopted by the Security Council on this matter,"

In other words, the point I have just mentioned is made very clear. The preamble goes on:

"Recognizing the special responsibility and obligation of the United Nations towards the people and Territory of Namibia,"

That is a truth that no one can dispute. It has already been mentioned in other relevant resolutions. The text then goes on:

"Reaffirming once again the inalienable and imprescriptible right of the people of Namibia to self-determination and independence,

"Reaffirming also the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia,"

Let us turn now to operative paragraph 1. The first words read: *"Invites the Secretary-General"*

38. Allow me to dwell an instant on an analysis of these words. Why do we extend an invitation to the Secretary-General? First of all, it is because we consider that with the prestige and the authority that are invested in the office of Secretary-General this offers the best prospect for success in any negotiations; secondly, for African, Latin American and Asian countries the office of Secretary-General is a guarantee of neutrality, free of any accusation of interest or party; and, thirdly, because the person of our present Secretary-General, Mr. Kurt Waldheim, merits our trust and confidence.

39. I want to be very frank and honest in my statement. In the consultations we had in New York one delegation of the Council—a permanent member—told us that it would have preferred to see a group of representatives of the Council set up to carry out the contacts mentioned in the

draft resolution. The opinion of that delegation commands our highest respect because its view is that the Council should not delegate its functions or give away its prerogatives. Therefore, I tried in every way I could to explain to the Council, when it conveys a mandate to anyone, from giving away any of its prerogatives or abdicating responsibilities, is emphasizing them. If it did not issue a mandate that would mean that it did not have the prerogatives and responsibilities.

40. But as I said, we have the greatest respect for the opinion of that distinguished delegation, and, in an effort to find a compromise solution, we submitted this second revision of our draft resolution in which we provide for a group of representatives of the Security Council—a group to be appointed—to work in consultation and in close operation with the Secretary-General. It goes without saying that those who make up this group will, in turn, through the relevant consultations, do nothing other than reflect the wishes of the Council in this matter. In other words, this is machinery through which the Secretary-General, the group to be set up and the Security Council would act as a single entity, to implement this draft resolution.

41. Now, what are we asking the Secretary-General to do? And this too is very important. We invite the Secretary-General

"to initiate as soon as possible contacts with all parties concerned, with a view to establishing the necessary conditions so as to enable the people of Namibia, free and with strict regard to the principle of human equality to exercise their right to self-determination and independence, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations"

42. Now, what do we mean by the phrase "parties concerned"? We mean, in the first instance, the Government of South Africa. We mean the Security Council, the United Nations Council for Namibia, the *Ad Hoc* Subcommittee on Namibia, the representatives of the political organizations of Namibia and all those persons and entities which, in his considered opinion, the Secretary-General would like to consult in order successfully to discharge his mandate.

43. What the mandate is is perfectly clear. It is to some degree a limited mandate because it is a mandate designed to create the necessary conditions to enable the people of Namibia freely to exercise their right to self-determination and independence. In other words, speaking as clearly as possibly can, here we are not postponing a solution to the problem of Namibia, we are not gaining time and we are not protecting anyone. We are simply seeking a new approach by which to lead that people to self-determination and independence in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

44. Operative paragraph 2

"Calls upon the Government of South Africa to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General in the implementation of the present resolution;"

That is also very clear, and we hope—we dare to hope—that the Government of South Africa will avail itself of this opportunity and will proceed with political realism and common sense. We also hope that if it is true as we heard in the Security Council [*1589th meeting*] from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of South Africa that that Government is acting in good faith when it affirms that it has no expansionist or annexationist aims in Namibia, it will have an opportunity to demonstrate this good faith and these intentions. The collaboration of the South African Government is essential, and if it does not act accordingly the Council will draw the appropriate conclusions.

45. Lastly, operative paragraph 3

“Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of the present resolution not later than 31 July 1972.”

Now, in accordance with the request of our colleague from Syria, Ambassador Tomeh, and as we were reminded in pressing terms—and quite rightly so—by the Ambassador of France, Mr. Kosciusko-Morizet, it is desirable, from every standpoint to fix a time-limit for the Secretary-General to carry out these contacts and for the Government of South Africa to have an opportunity to reply. This time-limit must be provided because, in the search for independence for Namibia, we cannot allow ourselves the luxury of wasting time.

46. My delegation is perfectly well aware that criticism has been expressed of our draft resolution. It has been said that it is a weak draft resolution in comparison with others. We in the Argentine delegation do not believe that resolutions are either weak or strong. We believe that resolutions can be effective or ineffective in achieving the aims that they set for themselves. In any event, it does not matter to us if it is described as weak if there is any likelihood that the draft resolution will bring the people of Namibia to independence.

47. Some press agency has said that this is tantamount to engaging in a dialogue with South Africa. We should immediately point out that that dialogue would involve negotiations, not on platitudes but rather to discharge the specific mandate to which I have already referred: to create the conditions for self-determination and independence. What is more, I think it is necessary to spell out the fact that these negotiations will be carried out by the Secretary-General with the Government of a State that is a Member of the United Nations. In the final analysis, call it dialogue, negotiation, contacts or whatever you like; the important and fundamental thing here is that this step should lead to independence for Namibia.

48. We are not unduly optimistic about whether this draft resolution will achieve what we are seeking. Indeed, we are fairly pessimistic, but we firmly believe that we should try by every means within our grasp to put an end to the situation of dependence in which the people of Namibia find themselves. As a last resort we should prefer to fail even though we are trying rather than fail because we have not made any effort at all. If, unfortunately, that should be the case, if the Government of South Africa should fail to

react positively, we will have completed our efforts and the Council will then know beyond any question what course remains open to it. South Africa may well have lost its last opportunity to co-operate with the United Nations and the Organization will have demonstrated that it had spared no effort or measure of good will.

49. I should like in very eloquent terms to thank the many countries of the various geographical groups that lent their support and co-operation to this initiative during the debate on the question of Namibia in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly. May I be permitted to single out the States of Africa. We understand full well and we share the feelings of the African countries at the unjust and illegal domination of which the people of Namibia are a victim. And, with even more reason, we understand and share their concerns and their desires. The support that the African Group has given to our draft reveals very clearly that political maturity and the desire for a peaceful settlement are not the exclusive heritage of anyone. On the contrary, by their actions, the African countries have demonstrated once again their spirit of complete co-operation with the United Nations. We express our deepest gratitude to them.

50. Mr. VINCI (Italy): My delegation has supported the draft resolution introduced by the delegation of Argentina since the time when it was originally submitted to the Council, last October. I recalled that text again in my statement yesterday [*1634th meeting*], expressing the view that it could serve a useful purpose. We now welcome whole-heartedly the move made by the representative of Argentina Ambassador Ortiz de Rozas in submitting today the text which appears in document S/10376/Rev.2, a text which in our view is consistent with the main principles and provisions of the United Nations Charter. We are grateful to Ambassador Ortiz de Rozas for the eloquent and clear way in which he has explained the text. We are, for our part, convinced that the proposal put forward by Argentina—which, as was stated by Ambassador Ortiz de Rozas, meets with the approval of our African friends—is in the interests of all the parties concerned.

51. I should like to restrict myself to one simple comment. In our view, the proposal in particular affords a unique opportunity to South Africa to do something which we have always advocated and advocated again yesterday—that is, to bring its position in line with its obligations as a Member State and to avoid the danger of a growing confrontation with the United Nations and with the international community as a whole. We hope that the South African Government will understand the message and not miss this opportunity which may be the last one. A negotiated solution within the United Nations can ensure the protection not only of the interests of the people of Namibia, but also of those in South Africa—in particular since South Africa, as its Ministers for Foreign Affairs stated [*1589th meeting*] when we discussed this issue at Headquarters in New York, is determined to bring the Namibians to self-determination and independence. We believe that it is of paramount importance and in the interests of the Government of Pretoria that the exercise of that right be accomplished within the framework of the United Nations in such a manner as to ensure full recognition of the results by this Organization, which also

means—and this also was reiterated by our colleague from Argentina—that the unity and integrity of the Territory must be respected.

52. We think furthermore, that there would be no better way for Pretoria to respond to the hand extended for the second time—after the Lusaka Manifesto² by the African countries with which the present and future generations of white South Africans must come to terms in order to coexist and co-operate peacefully, as we all hope will be the case.

53. I should like to submit a proposal concerning the composition of the group of the Security Council with which, as is indicated in operative paragraph 1 of the Argentine draft resolution, the Secretary-General would consult and co-operate in the fulfilment of its mandate. I propose to the President that the group be made up of the representatives of Argentina and Somalia. From the consultations which were held in New York among all members of the Council and especially from the further consultations held in Addis Ababa with our African colleagues, it is our understanding that this composition of the group would be acceptable to the Council. It is our earnest hope that the draft resolution, completed by the designation of the representatives of Argentina and Somalia, can be adopted forthwith unanimously.

54. Mr. SEN (India): Every country, every religion and every society is fighting all forms of discrimination in some way or another, in its own way with varying degrees of success, but it is only in South Africa that a form of slavery exists that is actively encouraged by its Government and is indeed elevated to its present constitutional status under the sinister name of separate development of different races.

55. The Security Council has adopted four resolutions on the subject of *apartheid* in South Africa: the first one was adopted on 7 August 1963 [181 (1963)]; the second on 4 December 1963 [182 (1963)]; the third on 18 June 1964 [195 (1964)]; and the fourth on 23 July 1970 [282 (1970)].

56. It is most discouraging to see that, in spite of definite steps spelt out in the last resolution, we are again confronted with a situation which has not improved but has in fact deteriorated since then, that is to say, over the past 18 months. In fact the major trading partners of South Africa are fortifying the white minority régime of South Africa through their economic co-operation and are benefiting from high rates of return, because of the cheap "slave" labour made possible by the exploitation of the non-white workers. That might not have been the intention of those traders, but that indeed is the effect. The reluctance of certain Powers to indict South Africa—much less to take action agreed by the United Nations—has cast legitimate and serious doubts on the commitments these Powers always make on issues of racial equality and justice. In 1958 Nehru said:

"It surprises me that countries, particularly those who stood for the democratic tradition and those who voted for the United Nations Charter and for the Human Rights Convention, express themselves so moderately or do not express themselves at all about the racial policy of the South African Union."

57. The figures for the 10 most important trading partners of South Africa, from South African statistics, are illustrative. In 1960 South African imports from its 10 major trading partners were to the value of 828 million rand. In 1970 they reached almost 2,000 million rand. In the corresponding 10 years, exports have gone up from 462 million rand to more than 1,000 million rand. New capital inflow to South Africa has also reached a record level of over \$1,000 million in the financial year 1970/71. This investment is almost wholly from the major trading partners of South Africa.

58. Would it be impertinent for us to ask what incentive the South African Government will have in coming to terms with the black people and civilization, if that Government obtains greater and greater benefit from its existing pernicious policies? Those who speak of greater need of communication may well ponder over this aspect. Is their present policy likely to induce South Africa to follow a different course?

59. As regards the armed strength of South Africa, the racist régime of Pretoria has adopted a military posture to maintain the white man's supremacy over South Africa by brute force. It has made preparations to strike against the independent countries to its north in terms of the doctrine of "anticipatory counter-attack". South Africa's military presence in Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Angola is to maintain that military posture.

60. South Africa now has military equipment worth more than \$2,800 million. Its budget estimates for defence increased from 40 million rand in 1959/60 to 271,600,000 rand in 1969/70. When fully mobilized, South Africa's armed forces would total 85,000. In addition, there are about 58,000 commandos or part-time militia.

61. Perhaps it would be relevant at this stage to say briefly what my own country has done in response to Security Council resolutions. Indeed, we initiated action against South Africa even before the United Nations took any steps. The High Commissioner for India in South Africa was recalled in 1946—and I might remind the Council in this context that we became independent in 1947, and therefore some of the credit should go to the British Government that we were able to withdraw our High Commissioner even when under the jurisdiction of the British Government. The Mission itself was withdrawn in 1954. In 1963 Indian ports were closed to South African ships and Indian ships prohibited from calling at South African ports. In the same year we informed the International Civil Aviation Organization that the Government of India would not permit aircraft belonging to the Government of South Africa and to companies registered under South African laws to fly over India while operating scheduled international air services or to make non-scheduled flights through or over India.

² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 106, document A/7754.

62. India was the first country to sever trade relations with South Africa in protest against its racial policies. The decision to impose economic sanctions was taken in principle as early as November 1944. When towards the end of 1945 the Government of South Africa announced that fresh legislation would be introduced for carrying out and extending its policies of racial discrimination, the Government of India took immediate action. All exports to and imports from South Africa were prohibited from July 1946 and this boycott has continued ever since.

63. India took this decision in spite of the fact that it had a favourable balance of trade with South Africa. India had substantially increased its trade with South Africa in the course of the Second World War. For a time it even ranked as South Africa's third most important source of imports. We lost the South African market in which we had earlier established ourselves and in which the demand for our products had been continuously growing.

64. In introducing this draft resolution which is before the Council in document S/10609, I find no better words than those of my Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi, who said:

"Equality is the dominant urge of man. Peace and justice can be achieved only when dignity of man without distinction of race or colour comes to be honoured. Racialism is a crime against humanity and all forms of racial discrimination must end. Millions of non-whites in South Africa and elsewhere still live under tyranny of racial arrogance and prejudice. The people of India will always raise their voice for racial equality and peace until the goal is reached."

65. The draft resolution asks for no wars; it does not bar discussion or include any doubts or speculations about what the black people want: the three points on which several speakers were eloquent yesterday and on which we shall have comments to make when we examine all the five drafts before us—perhaps tomorrow. However, at the moment I am exclusively concerned with commenting on the draft resolutions I have mentioned. This draft resolution has been sponsored by Guinea, India, Somalia, Sudan and Yugoslavia, and I have been authorized by the sponsors to move this draft resolution. The sponsors are concerned about the fact that they had very little time, for technical reasons, for the usual consultations before submitting this draft resolution. I apologize for that, but at the same time I should like to make it clear that the sponsors would welcome any constructive proposals or amendments which would help us in achieving the main objective of the draft resolution, that is, to put an end to *apartheid*.

66. As far as the preambular paragraphs of this draft resolution are concerned, the text is self-explanatory and I do not believe further comments will be necessary. We are all gravely concerned at the aggravation of the situation in South Africa and regard the policies and actions of the South African Government as seriously disturbing international peace and security in southern Africa, and all of us also deplore the persistent refusal of the South African Government to carry out the resolutions adopted by this Council in order to permit a peaceful solution in accordance with the Charter. Therefore I shall only deal with the

operative paragraphs of this draft resolution and I shall do so briefly.

67. Operative paragraph 1 condemns the South African Government for continuing its policies of *apartheid* in violation of its obligations under the Charter. We hope this paragraph will offer no difficulty to any one. Paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 191 (1964) and the second preambular paragraph of Security Council resolution 282 (1970) have already condemned South Africa for its policies of *apartheid*.

68. Operative paragraph 2 of the present draft, which reiterates the total opposition of the United Nations to the policies of *apartheid* of the South African Government, is also not new to the Security Council: the Security Council, in paragraph 1 of its resolution 282 (1970), had already emphasized such opposition to those policies.

69. Operative paragraph 3 recognizes the legitimacy of the struggle of the oppressed people of South Africa in pursuance of their human and political rights as set forth in the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This is in complete conformity with General Assembly resolution 2775 F (XXVI). Paragraph 5 of that resolution reaffirms the legitimacy of the struggle of the oppressed people of South Africa to eliminate, by all means at their disposal, *apartheid*, racial discrimination and similar ideologies and to attain majority rule in the country as a whole, based on universal adult suffrage. In this connexion, I should remind the Council of its own resolution 182 (1963), the tenth preambular paragraph of which recognizes the need to eliminate discrimination in regard to basic human rights and fundamental freedoms for all individuals within the territory of the Republic of South Africa without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.

70. Operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution before you urgently calls upon the Government of South Africa to release all persons imprisoned, interned or subjected to other restrictions as a result of the policies of *apartheid*. I do not think it is necessary for me to dilate here and now on the repressive legislations of the Republic of South Africa. The Bantu Administration Act and Proclamation No. 400 of 1960, the Suppression of Communism Act, the Unlawful Organization Act, the Public Safety Act, the Criminal Law Amendment Act, the Riotous Assemblies Act, the General Law Amendment Act, Section 21, and above all, the Terrorism Act, have provided the racist régime with a vast and complicated machinery which can be freely used for massive suppression of the rights of the black people. Those arbitrary and repressive measures are used by the South African Government to silence and harass all opponents of *apartheid*. All those who had the courage to express their voice in support of human rights should immediately be released.

71. Operative paragraph 5, which calls upon all States to observe strictly the arms embargo against South Africa and to deny all military co-operation to the South African Government, actually reaffirms resolution 282 (1970). I would particularly draw the attention of the Council to paragraph 4 of resolution 282 (1970). It is necessary for me

to repeat all seven clauses of that paragraph. It reads as follows:

"Calls upon all States to strengthen the arms embargo

"(a) By implementing fully the arms embargo against South Africa unconditionally and without reservations whatsoever;"

May I digress a little here and say that, in spite of various disclaimers put forth yesterday and before, we are not convinced that the record of some countries is as white as it has been claimed to be.

"(b) By withholding the supply of all vehicles and equipment for use of the armed forces and paramilitary organizations of South Africa;

"(c) By ceasing the supply of spare parts for all vehicles and military equipment used by the armed forces and paramilitary organizations of South Africa;

"(d) By revoking all licences and military patents granted to the South African Government or to South African companies for the manufacture of arms and ammunition, aircraft and naval craft or other military vehicles and by refraining from further granting such licences and patents;

"(e) By prohibiting investment in, or technical assistance for, the manufacture of arms and ammunition, aircraft, naval craft, or other military vehicles;

"(f) By ceasing provision of military training for members of the South African armed forces and all other forms of military co-operation with South Africa;

"(g) By undertaking the appropriate action to give effect to the above measures;"

Those seven measures were introduced and adopted by the United Nations, and when we hear day after day that money given to Portugal is now used somewhere else or that arms have been sort of earmarked, in the sense of being assembled in such a way that their barrels can turn in only one direction, we are entitled to show a certain cynicism and scepticism.

72. Operative paragraph 6 of our draft before you urges Governments and individuals to contribute generously and regularly to the United Nations funds which are used for humanitarian and training purposes to assist the victims of *apartheid*. I do not think that appeal requires any elucidation on my part.

73. Operative paragraph 7 is also a humanitarian appeal to inter-governmental organizations and non-governmental organizations and individuals for the assisting and training of South Africans.

74. Operative paragraph 8 decides to establish a committee of the Security Council to study and report urgently, not later than 30 April 1972, on ways and means to secure the implementation of the resolutions of the Security Council on this question.

75. We have been discussing this subject since 1946, and I think it is time that the Security Council took urgent action to ensure the implementation of its resolutions. I know only too well that all the problems which have been referred to will take considerable time for full implementation; but none the less, after hearing such eloquent assertions of positive abhorrence of *apartheid*, we should like to think—perhaps a little too hopefully—that the countries at present in the United Nations and all those outside will assert themselves once again to remove that evil.

76. It will be recalled that in June 1964 the Security Council adopted resolution 191 (1964), in paragraph 8 of which it established an expert committee of the whole to consider the feasibility, effectiveness and implications of measures to persuade South Africa to abandon *apartheid*, with economic sanctions particularly in mind. I should like to draw the Council's attention to that resolution, and if our suggestion is adopted—that another committee of the Security Council should be established—we should like very much that that committee examine this aspect of the problem. That committee, to which I have referred, made a lengthy report at the end of February 1965. That report has never been considered by the Security Council. Since that time, the situation has changed considerably. We think it would be useful to set up a small committee to study the whole matter anew, as indeed has been provided in operative paragraph 8 of our draft resolution. That committee would take into account the latest information and submit an urgent report to the Security Council.

77. The last operative paragraph requests the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance to the Committee established by the Security Council in the discharge of its task.

78. My delegation hopes that the draft resolution will not only obtain a unanimous vote but will also initiate effective action to put an end to this modern and intolerable form of slavery.

79. In spite of all that is happening in South Africa, we have not lost hope in the basic goodness of human nature. On his release from gaol, Mahatma Gandhi, in July 1914, left South Africa. But before sailing, he sent a pair of sandals he had made in gaol to General Smuts as a gift. Recalling the gift 25 years later, General Smuts wrote, "I have worn these sandals for many a summer since then, even though I may feel that I am not worthy to stand in the shoes of so great a man."

80. I am sure that the majority of white Africans have not lost those basic human values which were so well expressed by General Smuts about an Asian at that time; and if this Council and the world at large take effective measures, we are sure that the conscience of the white residents of South Africa can still be awakened. We hope it will not be too late, and that the Council will help in the awakening of that conscience.

81. Mr. MOJSOV (Yugoslavia): First of all, it is my particular pleasure to congratulate the representative of Sudan, the Foreign Minister, Mr. Mansour Khalid, on

assuming the Presidency of the Security Council for the month of February. We are particularly gratified that, after the able Presidency of the representatives of Somalia, the representative of another African country is presiding over our meetings here in Addis Ababa. We are already all impressed by his able conduct in this responsible work and his fairness and wisdom, and we promise him our full support.

82. Only four months ago the Security Council, in connexion with the advisory opinion rendered by the International Court of Justice, the highest judicial organ of the international community, considered at great length all the aspects of the problem of Namibia. As a result of these discussions, the Council adopted resolution 301 (1971) on 20 October 1971. In the meantime the General Assembly, during its twenty-sixth session, adopted two resolutions relating to Namibia. In view of this, my delegation does not intend on this occasion to review all the aspects of this highly significant issue for the United Nations, but to single out some main provisions of these resolutions and the need for their consistent implementation.

83. We also would like to make special reference to the present developments and trends in Namibia which are characterized by increased awareness by the people of Namibia of their inalienable right to live as free and independent citizens in their own country. The recent strike of some thousands of African workers in Namibia and their open conflict with the South African régime which is illegally occupying the Territory, and their courage in opposing the inhuman exploitation and oppression, make it imperative for the Security Council to examine in particular the newly arisen situation. This is even more essential in view of the fact that the economy of the Territory is controlled and managed primarily by international monopolies, whose operations are in no way facilitating and promoting the economic development of Namibia and the welfare of its people. These foreign monopolies, in their greed for greater profits, are resorting to the most inhuman forms and methods of plunder and exploitation of the natural resources and the labour force of Namibia. Foreign capital investments go into extractive industries. Since the people of Namibia have no way of conducting, let alone controlling, their operations, the basic structure of the Namibian economy is drastically changing. The high level of the exploitation of natural resources of Namibia is accompanied also by cruel exploitation of its people, especially through the so-called contract labour system, which is very similar to enslavement; the situation obtaining in this Territory can rightly be termed as slave-labour relations.

84. Security Council resolution 301 (1971), in its moderate tone, constitutes, in the opinion of my delegation, a very broad basis for the undertaking of wide-ranging and varied specific measures along the lines of creating conditions for speedier termination of the illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa—a Territory which for years has been legally under the direct jurisdiction of the United Nations.

85. Here, we are primarily thinking in terms of the commitments of all States to recognize the illegality of the

presence of South Africa in Namibia, and their duty to refrain from any act that could possibly imply support or encouragement for the prolongation of this abnormal situation. It is the duty of the Security Council to follow and observe in what measure these decisions are being consistently executed by all States. It also has the duty to energetically draw the attention of those States which act otherwise, to their obligations to implement its decisions, especially the decisions and provisions enumerated in paragraphs 11 and 12 of resolution 301 (1971).

86. In view of the fact that South Africa, through its flagrant refusal to withdraw its administration from Namibia, has not only created a situation endangering peace and security in this area, but is directly undermining the very authority and prestige of the United Nations, the Security Council should consider further steps and measures with a view to forcing South Africa to act in the spirit of the provision contained in paragraph 8 of that resolution. Here, we also have in mind the application of the necessary mandatory measures stipulated in Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations.

87. Having in mind all those recent developments in Namibia, and their political and international consequences, I now have the honour to introduce the draft resolution on Namibia [S/10608] sponsored by Guinea, Somalia, Sudan and Yugoslavia.

88. The provisions of this draft resolution are very clear and self-explanatory. In the preambular part, the draft resolution, in the beginning, takes note of the statement of the President of Mauritania, in his capacity as current Chairman of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity. It also takes note of the statement which the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia made before the Security Council. Further on in the preambular part, the draft resolution expresses concern over the present situation in Namibia and the repressive measures of the South African Government, following the strike of the African contract labourers in the country and the widespread and increasing manifestations of African resistance to the illegal occupation of the Territory by the South African Government.

89. The fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs express the conviction that urgent measures should be taken by the Security Council to find ways and means to secure the implementation of its resolutions, and that for this purpose what is needed is the full co-operation of all Member States, in particular the permanent members of the Security Council and the main trading partners of South Africa.

90. Finally, in the last preambular paragraphs, the draft resolution reaffirms the inalienable rights of the people of Namibia to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, and it also reaffirms the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia, which is of special importance because of certain plans of the racist régime of Pretoria to introduce the policy of so-called bantustans in Namibia.

91. In the first two operative paragraphs the draft resolution strongly condemns the refusal of South Africa to

comply with the resolutions of the General Assembly and Security Council pertaining to Namibia and reaffirms that the continued occupation by the South African authorities of Namibia is illegal and detrimental to the interests of the people of Namibia, as is also stated in the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice.

92. In operative paragraph 4 the draft resolution strongly condemns the recent repressive measures against the African labourers in Namibia, and calls upon the Government of South Africa to end immediately these repressive measures and to abolish the system of labour which may be in conflict with basic provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

93. In operative paragraph 5, and bearing in mind that many foreign enterprises and companies are working in Namibia, the draft calls upon all States whose nationals and corporations are operating in Namibia to ensure that such nationals and corporations conform in their policies of hiring Namibian workers to the basic provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

94. In operative paragraph 6 the draft considers that the continued occupation of Namibia by the Government of South Africa creates conditions detrimental to the maintenance of peace and security in the region, and has grave consequences as concerns international peace and security.

95. Two of the most important provisions, in practical terms, are contained in operative paragraphs 8 and 9 of the draft resolution. Operative paragraph 8 decides that in the event of failure on the part of the Government of South Africa to comply with this resolution, the Security Council will meet immediately to determine upon effective measures, in accordance with the relevant Chapters of the Charter, to secure the full and speedy implementation of this resolution. In operative paragraph 9, the draft requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of this resolution not later than 31 July 1972.

96. Finally let me add that the sponsors of the draft resolution feel that the revised draft resolution presented so ably by the representative of Argentina [*S/10376/Rev.2*] approaches the question of Namibia from a different and complementary angle which is also very useful. We also consider that that revised draft resolution does not overlap with the contents of our draft. Moreover, the representative of Argentina pointed out that if this draft resolution is adopted it will not prejudice other draft resolutions that may be adopted by the Security Council on this matter.

97. The most recent wave of strikes in Namibia and the growing manifestation of consciousness, militant spirit and determination on the part of the people of Namibia to resist the illegal occupation of the Territory by the administration and military forces of South Africa, and the resolute demands for the liquidation of slave labour relations which prevail today serve as unequivocal evidence that the suffering people of Namibia rightly expect freedom and independence. It rests with the Security Council and the United Nations to undertake concrete and effective measures and decisions so as to justify the hopes of the

peoples of Namibia and, in turn, to lend credence to the actions of the Security Council and the United Nations as a whole. That is why I should like to express the sincere hope of the Yugoslav delegation and the other sponsors that the draft resolution contained in document S/10608 will meet with a positive response and the support of all members of the Council.

98. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): Before stating the views of the USSR delegation on the draft resolutions on African problems being discussed in the Security Council—the resolutions submitted by the delegations of Guinea, India, Somalia, the Sudan and Yugoslavia—the Soviet delegation would like to touch briefly on the statements made yesterday in the Council by the representatives of certain Western Powers. Everyone listened to those statements with great attention, but anyone who expected to find in them concrete and practical suggestions for the solution of the African problems being considered by the Council was sorely disappointed.

99. Those statements, particularly the statements made by the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States [*1635th meeting*], gave no answer to the vital African questions that the Security Council has come to Addis Ababa to discuss.

100. Consequently, we can only agree with those representatives of African countries who, in talks with members of the Soviet delegation, expressed the view that the underlying purpose of the statements was to conceal behind a dense barrage of verbiage the unwillingness of the Governments of certain Western countries to assist actively and effectively in the liberation of the oppressed and enslaved peoples of southern Africa from Fascist and racist tyranny and colonialist subjugation. One of the African representatives described these statements very pointedly and accurately as “talking loud and saying nothing”.

101. Close study and analysis of these statements as they appear in the Security Council records can only lead to the conclusion that the words of these statements are at variance with the actions of those who spoke. They were primarily an exhortation to the oppressed and enslaved peoples of southern Africa to tread the path of patience, humility and submission, and not to resort to violence in their struggle against their oppressors and enslavers. They contained nearly prayerful calls for “peaceful progress” and “peaceful change” which, allegedly, would produce “more permanent results”. Appeals for submission, patience and humility remind us of the preachings of ministers of religion, but they cannot constitute an acceptable approach to the discussion and solution of the crucial political problems involved in the liberation of oppressed peoples in southern Africa. That these appeals are completely baseless is clear from the fact they are made by representatives of countries which are themselves employing violence—in Viet-Nam, Laos, Cambodia and Ulster—and are not taking any steps to halt the acts of violence and terror of their Portuguese military ally against the African patriots who are waging a selfless, just and heroic struggle against the colonialists in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea (Bissau).

102. Members of the Council have had an opportunity at the meetings in Addis Ababa not only to hear facts and figures from the representatives of African countries and liberation movements, but also to see the evidence of colonialist and racist violence from the film shown on the colonial wars being waged by the Portuguese colonialists against the patriots of Guinea (Bissau).

103. Yet are the Pretoria and Salisbury régimes refraining from the use of violence and terror? The representatives of African countries and liberation movements have related countless incidents of bloody repression, murder and terrorism by the racist régimes of Pretoria and Salisbury against the African people. Who, then, can believe in the sincerity of appeals not to use violence? These appeals should be addressed—indeed not just appeals but a strong demand by the Security Council—to the oppressors, not to the oppressed.

104. In yesterday's statements we did hear some words condemning racism and *apartheid*. But how can we reconcile these verbal denunciations with the vote of the United Kingdom and United States in the Security Council against the draft resolution on Southern Rhodesia submitted by the African States? The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Somalia recalled that vote in his speech earlier today [1636th meeting]. While the idea that "all men are created equal" is proclaimed in words and the racist policy of the white minority in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa is denounced, in actual fact the imperialist monopolies of the Western countries, as the African representatives have already pointed out, are with the knowledge and consent of their Governments actively co-operating with the Governments of Portugal and South Africa. As from 1 January the United States monopolies will also of course be co-operating with the racist régime of Southern Rhodesia by availing themselves of the official authorization to import chrome ore from Southern Rhodesia, in defiance and in violation of the United Nations embargo.

105. In those statements we heard expressions of regret that resolutions relating to Africa, which now number 128, are not being implemented, and we heard the suggestion that the reason for their non-implementation is that they are not realistic. But who makes United Nations decisions on southern Africa unrealistic? Who is helping the colonialists and racists to disregard and disobey those decisions? At the Security Council meetings here in Addis Ababa the African representatives have cited many facts attesting to the protection and assistance given by certain Western countries and their imperialist monopolies to colonial racist régimes in South Africa, Portugal and Southern Rhodesia, and to their co-operation with those régimes. Leaning on this assistance from outside, the racists and colonialists, with their characteristic cynicism and arrogance, are disregarding and defying United Nations decisions on decolonization in southern Africa. Consequently, those who are helping the colonialists and racists to defy United Nations decisions are as much responsible for the situation as the colonialists and racists themselves.

106. Mr. Abdul Minty, speaking at yesterday's meeting on behalf of the International Defence and Aid Fund and the Anti-*Apartheid* Movement, quite rightly addressed a direct

question to certain permanent members of the Security Council: "Who are your allies? Portugal and South Africa or the African people?" [see 1634th meeting, para. 10]. No answer was forthcoming to that perfectly fair question and yet the very thing that hinges on the answer is the realism of United Nations decisions, the real possibility of implementing them, the effectiveness of United Nations action on behalf of the peoples of Africa in their heroic and just struggle for freedom and national independence.

107. Those who urge the oppressed peoples of southern Africa to be patient and submissive are also disregarding the United Nations decisions recognizing the legitimacy of those peoples' struggle for freedom and national independence in the face of colonial and racist oppression. In many decisions the United Nations has legitimized this struggle and accorded the oppressed people the right to wage it. This being so, the main task of the Security Council and particularly of all its permanent members is to give full assistance and support to the oppressed peoples of southern Africa in their just struggle—not to take the oppressors and enslavers of these peoples under their protection.

108. We cannot but remark on another argument in the statements I have been referring to, an argument which may not have been properly noted. Much attention was devoted to matters relating to the economic development of African States which have become independent and sovereign. Naturally no one is going to deny the importance of the development problem, and indeed the United Nations is devoting much attention to it. The former Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, said that 80 to 85 per cent of all United Nations activities is now concerned with economic and social problems, although we all know that the United Nations was established as a political organization to serve the permanent goal of saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war and strengthening peace and the security of peoples.

109. So we all understand how important the problems of development are, particularly for African States. Yet it is quite clear to every single one of us that the Security Council did not come to Africa to consider matters relating to development. There are other bodies and places to do that. The Council is here to discuss the crucial and pressing problems involved in the liberation of the peoples of southern Africa from colonial subjugation and racist oppression. It should therefore be focusing its attention on matters relating to liberation and not development. It is not hard to see that talking about development at the Security Council meetings in Addis Ababa is intended to deflect attention from the main tasks and aims of the Council during its African session.

110. The statements made today by the Foreign Ministers of Somalia and the Sudan [1636th meeting], and yesterday's statement by the Indian representative, Ambassador Sen [1635th meeting], provided a brilliant reply to the statements I have been referring to. In their interventions they refuted the argument that the peoples of southern Africa should follow a course of submission, patience and non-opposition to evil when faced with terrorism, violence and the colonialist wars which the colonialists and racists are waging against them. Their interventions contain con-

crete proposals which the Security Council should consider and incorporate in the resolutions to be adopted during its meetings in Africa; it must also take appropriate, effective measures to implement such resolutions.

111. The voting on the five delegations' draft resolutions submitted to the Security Council will show who is whose ally and who is whose friend. The United Kingdom vote on these drafts, for example, will be the "test of acceptability" on its part of the freedom and independence of the peoples enslaved in southern Africa.

112. It is only by adopting these resolutions—which however the USSR delegation feels are not really strong enough—and by ensuring their implementation, that the Security Council will have justified the African peoples' hopes and aspirations for the Council meetings held in Africa. And it is only then that these meetings of the Security Council, the first in the history of the United Nations to be held away from Headquarters, will be worthy of going down in the annals of the United Nations as historic.

113. In conclusion I should like to state, on behalf of the Soviet delegation, that having listened to the explanations given by the sponsors and having studied the draft resolutions, the Soviet delegation supports the draft resolutions and will vote for them.

114. Before I end, I should like to draw attention to an important point in the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of Argentina [*S/10376/Rev.2*]. Spaces have been left in the text for the names of members of the Council who will be in the Security Council group that is to assist the Secretary-General in carrying out the tasks he is to perform under this draft resolution if it is adopted by the Council. The representative of Italy have just made a proposal to fill in those blanks and named two members of the Council—Argentina and Somalia. The Soviet delegation feels that the group should be more representative and should consist not of two members but of five. What are the reasons for this view? First, it is a matter of representation; it is most desirable that a group like this one should be more highly representative. Secondly, a larger group would give the Secretary-General a broader base to rely on in carrying out the tasks assigned to him under the resolution. Thirdly, Security Council practice, particularly in the past year I would say, has supplied precedents for forming and confirming Security Council missions. As a rule there are not less than three and in most cases not less than five members. We should also take into account the recent distressing experience of the former Secretary-General. We all remember the Security Council resolution on Jerusalem [*resolution 298 (1971)*] and the rather elaborate and complicated formula under which the Secretary-General was either to send a mission to Jerusalem or use some other "instrumentality". In discharging the task given him under this vague and convoluted formula, the Secretary-General shouldered the responsibility of forming a mission and communicating with the Israeli Government. As was to be expected, he received an immediate negative response, to all intents and purposes from Golda Meir, Israel's Prime Minister, and then took the whole burden of the undertaking's failure, to say nothing more, upon

himself. I think that the Security Council should reflect on how to safeguard the new Secretary-General from incidents of this kind. I think it would be advisable to protect him from any such eventuality. The Security Council and a solid group of five—five delegates from five countries—would be a firm guarantee for the Secretary-General that such distressing circumstances would not occur again. The Soviet delegation, for its part, therefore proposes that the Italian representative's proposal should be expanded to include three more names, specifically those of Guinea, India and Yugoslavia. We submit this proposal for the consideration of Council members and trust that, considering the various reasons we have adduced in its favour, they will support it.

115. One last comment on the Argentine draft resolution, and this in connexion with its symbol number. It bears an old number—*S/10376/Rev.2*—from New York, while the date—3 February—is an Addis Ababa date. This of course raises an important question: does the sponsor of this draft intend to ask for priority for his draft when we determine the order of voting on the five drafts before us? I point this out because of the many examples we have had and the Security Council's experience in the past. Sometimes such numbering is used for the purpose of requesting priority. If there is no such intention I shall say no more about it. If that is the intention, however, I reserve the right to speak again on this matter.

116. Mr. ORTIZ DE ROZAS (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): As is my custom, I listened to the representative of the Soviet Union with the greatest attention and since he has made comments on the Argentine proposal [*S/10376/Rev.2*], for my part I should like to have the pleasure of offering him some clarification.

117. First of all, before commenting on the Soviet observations, I should like most sincerely to thank the representative of Italy for the confidence that he has displayed in me in proposing that Argentina, together with Somalia, should constitute the group that is to work in close co-operation and collaboration with the Secretary-General.

118. With respect to the rule mentioned by the Soviet representative of having these missions made up of three to five members. I think that his memory is somewhat at fault because when we dealt with the specific problem of the complaint of Guinea against Portugal, it was the Soviet delegation that proposed two members, and those two members were, as we know, Syria and Argentina. So I think that here the Soviet representative has had a lapse of memory. We were very pleased to agree to accept and discharge the responsibility for the mission to Guinea together with our Syrian colleague, at the proposal of the Soviet Union, and we were very honoured by the fact that the Soviet Union should have proposed Argentina.

119. Secondly, with respect to the question of priority, the representative of the Soviet Union, who is an able and experienced representative, knows that such questions of priority do not come up in the case of revised texts because a draft resolution has the priority that is properly owing to the text in terms of the time when it was submitted as is

made abundantly clear in the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council.

120. There is another point, however. The draft resolution in its second revision, which includes the provision for a working group, is nothing more than an attempt to satisfy the concerns expressed by the Soviet delegation. If the Soviet delegation has no concerns, for my part I would be very satisfied to revert to the first revision of the draft resolution [*S/10376/Rev.1, of 22 October 1971*] and leave the responsibility for contact exclusively up to the Secretary-General. For as I said in my statement, the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America have full confidence in the office of the Secretary-General and in the person of Mr. Kurt Waldheim. So that for our part we would have no difficulty in reverting to the first revision of the draft resolution and leaving the whole matter solely up to the Secretary-General. If we have submitted this second revision, it was as a concession in an attempt to satisfy the concerns expressed by the representative of the Soviet Union.

121. We in the Argentine delegation would of course hope to have the favourable vote of the Soviet delegation for our draft resolution; it is a valuable vote and we should like to have it. We hope that the Soviet delegation will not stand in the way of the search for a solution to the problem of independence for Namibia, but if the Soviet delegation were to have any objection we would remind it of the words of Ambassador Malik at our last meeting in New York [*1626th meeting*] when he urged the other permanent members not to use the veto. We hope that the Soviet representative will fulfil and abide by his own exhortation. We also have very clearly in mind the words used by His Excellency the President of Somalia at the banquet tendered in Mogadiscio when reference was made to the abuse of the veto by the permanent members.

122. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): I can assure the representative of Argentina that I do not yet suffer from lapses of memory. Indeed, I must say that the representative of Argentina has been inaccurate. The Soviet delegation did not protest against two members on that occasion—others did. As it happened, the situation was rather exceptional. Usually, in keeping with established practice and precedents, Security Council missions and groups have consisted of not less than three and more often of five members. Even under the draft resolution³ that was submitted there were to have been three members, but developments obliged us to agree to two members; that was in no way the fault of the Soviet Union, and we firmly support groups of three or five members. In the present case we insist that there should be five members. The first mission,⁴ the basic and decisive one following hot on the heels of the Portuguese colonialist aggression against the Republic of Guinea, consisted of five members, as you are well aware. The Ambassador of Guinea agrees with this. The second group,⁵ established when the Portuguese colonialists carried

out an aggressive attack on Senegal, consisted of six members; but that was excessive. The representative of Argentina knows full well why it happened. So his line of argument is not altogether convincing and it would be better if he did not insist on having two members, but rather accepted five.

123. As to the references to the first revision of the draft resolution, we have all forgotten about it by now and are currently discussing the draft that was submitted today; let us concentrate on it. Many sponsors have submitted many drafts in the past, but we are now discussing this draft. The Soviet delegation supports it, has voiced confidence in the Secretary-General, the representative of Argentina and the representative of Somalia and thinks it advisable that this group should be expanded to include three more representatives who are worthy of the highest respect and trust—the representative of Guinea, the representative of India and the representative of Yugoslavia. If the representative of Argentina wishes to be alone in the group, if he does not want to admit these three representatives, that would seem quite inexplicable.

124. As for the question of priorities in voting, to judge by the Argentine representative's remarks, we seem to have correctly perceived the purpose of this symbol. There is clearly an intent to insist on priority in the voting. Does the representative of Argentina not think that such an arrangement might enable some members to avoid voting on the basic draft resolution on Namibia submitted by the African delegations? Does he not agree that such an action might be used as a cover for some to avoid a vote on that resolution or even to veto it on the grounds that the Argentine resolution on Namibia was already adopted and, since it provides for measures to be taken by the Secretary-General with the assistance of a group of members of the Security Council, no other resolution on Namibia need be passed? That is the doubt I have. If I am mistaken, I shall be only too happy to admit that I was wrong in my misgiving and in my assessment of the situation.

125. The PRESIDENT: I gave the floor to the representatives of the Soviet Union and Argentina on the understanding that they were making points of order, but I should prefer now to continue with the list of speakers, and if any member wishes to exercise the right of reply he can do so after those speakers have finished.

126. Mr. HUANG HUA (China) (*translation from Chinese*): After hearing the speeches made by certain representatives, I deem it necessary to add a few remarks.

127. In their speeches [*1635th meeting*], the United States and British representatives have tried hard to dress up their Governments as if they were deeply concerned for the sufferings of the African people, as if they were consistently opposed to colonialism and racism. This hypocritical rhetoric can deceive no one. They say that they also oppose the white colonialist rule in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia and that they have also favoured and applied economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia and have enforced an arms embargo on South Africa. Well, who was it that openly announced the selling of arms to the South African authorities last year? And who was it that openly declared not long ago its readiness to import chrome

³ Subsequently adopted as resolution 295 (1971).

⁴ Security Council Special Mission to the Republic of Guinea established under resolution 289 (1970).

⁵ Special Mission of the Security Council established under resolution 294 (1971).

from Southern Rhodesia? A certain representative asserted that there were no sales of arms from his Government to Portugal for use in Africa. This is all more deceptive talk. It may be asked: Whose weapons are the Portuguese colonialist authorities using in waging their ruthless colonialist wars in Africa? Who does not know that the South African and Rhodesian white racist régimes and the Portuguese colonialist rule in Africa can last till today precisely because imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, particularly the United States and Britain, have given political, economic and military assistance to them and supported them in forming a reactionary military alliance for the joint suppression of the national liberation struggle of the peoples of southern Africa? They themselves are the behind-the-scenes big bosses of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonialist authorities. This is an iron-clad fact which cannot be denied.

128. They also took pains to preach pacifism and non-violence to the African people who are being subjected to colonialist rule and to barbarous and brutal slaughter and repression. On the one hand, these allies of the white racist régimes of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonialist authorities support the latter in carrying out repression and genocidal colonialist wars against the African people; on the other hand, they ask the brutally oppressed people of Africa to give up the struggle and wait with patience. Listen to their preaching: "Down-trodden people of Africa, you are blessed. If only you wait until such overlords as John Vorster, Ian Smith and Marcelo Caetano show mercy, then equality, freedom and independence will descend upon you." To put it bluntly, their aim is to force the African people still under colonialist rule to accept submissively the colonialists' perpetual exploitation, enslavement and slaughter. This is the same gangsters' logic as is illustrated in the Chinese saying: "The magistrates were allowed to burn down houses, while the common people were forbidden even to light lamps."

129. That coincides with the "theory" that "even a tiny spark can cause a world conflagration" and that people "must work hard to put it out". According to such logic, only the imperialists would be allowed to subject others to aggression and intimidation, while the victims of aggression would not be allowed to defend themselves; only the imperialists, colonialists and neo-colonialists would be allowed to oppress others, while the oppressed would not be allowed to rise in resistance. The African people, the Arab peoples, the peoples of Indo-China and the people of the whole world love peace, but they love freedom and liberation all the more. After the Second World War, many African countries won national independence, and all this has been achieved as a result of the long struggles of the people of those countries and the world over. At present, when imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism have blocked all peaceful solutions, the people of southern Africa and other regions who are being subjected to ruthless colonialist oppression and slaughter have taken up arms to wage armed revolution against armed counter-revolution so as to win national independence and liberation. These struggles are perfectly just and will certainly win the final victory. No amount of political manoeuvres of pacifism and non-violence or armed repression can block this trend.

130. On the question of Southern Rhodesia, they have tried hard to justify the fraud of the so-called "settlement proposals"⁶ concocted by the British and the Southern Rhodesian authorities, as if the will of the local people could not be ascertained and the voice of the local people could not be heard without the so-called "test of acceptability" by the Pearce Commission in Southern Rhodesia. This is all the more highly absurd. The so-called Pearce Commission is in itself a tool for perpetrating the fraud concocted by Britain and Southern Rhodesia. The 5 million people of Zimbabwe have long made known their determined will to overthrow colonialist rule and achieve national independence through their protracted struggles. The recent heroic struggle waged by the Zimbabwe people has dealt a further heavy blow to the British imperialists and the colonialist authorities of Southern Rhodesia. In fact, the imperialists, colonialists and neo-colonialists are not merely feigning themselves deaf and mute there; they are trying to impose the fraud of the so-called "settlement proposals" on the Zimbabwe people, in spite of the strong opposition of the people of Zimbabwe, the whole of Africa and the rest of the world. Should they insist on so doing, they will certainly arouse the Zimbabwe people and the people of the world to still more vehement opposition and resolute struggles, thus hastening their own doom.

131. With regard to the five draft resolutions before us, we will express our views when they come up for discussion.

132. The PRESIDENT: Since there are no more representatives inscribed to speak on the substance of the draft resolutions before us, I wish to make a statement as the representative of SUDAN before calling on those members who would like to speak in exercise of their right of reply.

133. The Council has before it now five draft resolutions on the problems of colonialism and *apartheid* in Africa: the draft resolution on Southern Rhodesia contained in document S/10606 and sponsored by Guinea, Somalia and Sudan; the draft resolution on Portuguese Territories contained in document S/10607 and sponsored by Guinea, Somalia and Sudan; the draft resolution on Namibia contained in document S/10608 and sponsored by Guinea, Somalia, Sudan and Yugoslavia; the draft resolution on Namibia contained in document S/10376/Rev.2 and sponsored by Argentina; the draft resolution on *apartheid* contained in document S/10609 and sponsored by Guinea, India, Somalia, Sudan and Yugoslavia.

134. I wish to address myself at this stage to the draft resolutions on Namibia and Southern Rhodesia.

135. In dealing with these two issues, I want neither to delve into a historical analysis of the situation nor to embellish on facts that are common knowledge to everyone here. The Security Council has been concerned with these two problems for a quarter of a century. In commenting on the draft resolutions I shall content myself with comments on developments that have taken place within the last few months, after the call of the Organization of African Unity for this meeting of the Council in Africa.

⁶ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1971*, document S/10405.

136. As regards Namibia, on this issue Africa has reached the point of despair, and that despair is both legitimate and justified. After 13 years of futile negotiations with South Africa, from 1946 to 1959, the United Nations is giving us the impression of coming to the sad conclusion that the Pretoria régime is there to stay. A quarter of a century has thus been wasted in acrimonious debates in the General Assembly, the Security Council, and protracted proceedings at the International Court of Justice. During these years South Africa has adduced before the world bodies, in defence of its illegal actions, all arguments in its legal arsenal relating to the revocability of the Mandate, the competence of the Assembly to terminate it, the competence of the Court to rule on it, etc. But now all these matters, since General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) and Security Council resolution 276 (1970), the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice last June, and Security Council resolution 301 (1971), are no longer moot questions. The United Nations jurisprudence on Namibia stands now on those resolutions which assert: that South Africa's presence in Namibia is illegal; that it is under an obligation to withdraw its administration from the Territory; that by illegally occupying the Territory it must incur international responsibilities arising from the continuing violation of its international obligations; that States Members of the United Nations are under an obligation to desist from any intercourse with South Africa purporting to speak for Namibia; that the Security Council, being the chief peace-keeping agent, must take energetic measures to carry out the resolve of the United Nations.

137. We have now reached a point where words alone will not help. As the representative of Argentina aptly said the other day [1630th meeting], verbal escalation will not liberate Namibia. It has not done so in the past, and it will certainly not do so in the future. A path for new and energetic action was charted for us the other day by President Ould Daddah speaking for the whole of Africa. In his words, the Organization of African Unity formally proposes:

“that a council composed of members of the Security Council, including necessarily the five permanent members, should be entrusted with the administration of Namibia and should make all the arrangements to ensure its effective administration” [1627th meeting, para. 44].

138. We support this proposition not only as loyal members of OAU, but also because of our conviction that such action will earn the United Nations trust, which is already eroding in Africa. And for this end we support the draft resolution contained in document S/10608, although we would have liked to see operative paragraph 8 phrased in a way that would reflect the sense of urgency amplified by President Ould Daddah, speaking for the whole of Africa.

139. However, we wish to add that such action must be coupled with a diplomatic offensive by the Security Council and the Secretary-General to prepare the ground for an eventual Council intervention. In so saying, I have in mind the wise words of Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, President of the International Court of Justice, when he said in handing down his declaration before the Court:

“The Court having arrived at the conclusion that the Mandate has been terminated and that the presence of South Africa in South West Africa is illegal, I would, in response to the plea made by the representative of South Africa, suggest that South Africa should offer to withdraw its administration from South West Africa in consultation with the United Nations so that a process of withdrawal and substitution in its place of United Nations' control may be agreed upon and carried into effect with the minimum disturbance of present administrative arrangements. It should also be agreed upon that, after the expiry of a certain period but not later than a reasonable time-limit thereafter, a plebiscite may be held under the supervision of the United Nations, which should ensure the freedom and impartiality of the plebiscite, to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants of the Territory with regard to their political future.”⁷

To that end, too, we feel that the draft resolution presented by the representative of Argentina and contained in document S/10376/Rev.2 is acceptable.

140. South Africa, having been universally condemned for its actions in Namibia, wanted to fool the whole world by preposterously claiming that it was the wish of the people of Namibia to remain under its domination. This tasteless argument was actually adduced before the Court by those who spoke for the Pretoria régime—the same régime which in 1964 introduced *apartheid* into a Territory under its trust through the infamous Odendaal Plan and which has shamelessly removed 500,000 Africans from their homeland into barren reserve territories comprising only 25 per cent of Namibia, to make room in the 75 per cent of the rest of the land for the 96,000 whites. In making its claim, South Africa was perhaps motivated by an illusive hope for the success of its experience in Ovamboland to make a show-case of that Territory through the appropriation of sizable funds. But even that window-dressing has now crumbled to pieces.

141. The events of last month in Ovamboland are a case in point. What has started as a small “contestation” at Walvis Bay extended into all major urban areas in the Territory and developed into a conscientious political opposition. The strike of the 13,000 Ovambos is the most dramatic popular challenge to the power of the Pretoria régime since the Sharpeville massacres in 1960. The President of the United Nations Council for Namibia aptly described the situation when he told this Council last Friday that :

“... what we are witnessing in the strike which took place simultaneously at different places separated by great distances, such as Walvis Bay, Windhoek, Kleinaub and Tsumeb, are the first cracks and fissures in the structure of oppression, exploitation and human degradation built by South Africa in Namibia. There is no doubt that eventually these will lead to the complete collapse of that structure [1628th meeting, para. 87].”

⁷ See *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 65.*

It is for that reason that we consider that operative paragraph 5 of draft resolution S/10608 is most appropriate and deserves the unanimous support of this Council. Here again, we would, of course, have preferred a draft resolution that contained some of the very pertinent measures suggested by my friend the representative of India in his statement before the Council yesterday [1635th meeting].

142. I come now to Rhodesia. The facts on Rhodesia are also well known. What is new in this protracted tragedy is the recent so-called Smith-Home agreement. What is alarming about this agreement, read against the background of Security Council resolution 288 (1970) which impresses on the United Kingdom, the administering Power, the need not only "to enable the people of Southern Rhodesia to achieve self-determination and independence" but also to bring "the illegal declaration of independence to an end", is that the agreement signifies the first step in a process of abdication of responsibility by the administering Power.

143. The moment the United Kingdom Government submitted the so-called proposals for a settlement as the only possible solution, adding that the choice for the African people of Rhodesia is one between the Home-Smith accord or the perpetuation of the present state of affairs, it reneged on its obligations. In his statement before the House of Commons on Wednesday last, the British Foreign Secretary said:

"Rhodesia is a country where a white European minority rules the African majority. For the present, all the power lies with the Europeans. If their present constitution—the 1969 constitution—is continued, nothing in future, as far as anybody can foresee, will change that situation except for the worse. The Europeans are in physical command. Some refuse to face that conclusion. But that the Europeans have the power and the ability to use it to keep themselves in power in Rhodesia is a fact of life."⁸

144. According to Sir Alec Douglas-Home the choice for Africans now is between calamity and catastrophe. By concluding an agreement in this light, the United Kingdom Government is either acquiescing in the Pretoria racist system or at best confessing its inability to carry out a policy dictated by its own Parliament, as well as the United Nations. Indeed, the absurdity of what has been described by the British Foreign Secretary as the best possible way to achieve African enfranchisement was revealed by Mr. Robb of the Department of Mathematics in Queens University, Belfast, in his computerization of the agreement.

145. According to Mr. Robb, and given that Africans attained a minimum annual income of \$1,680, and that British aid allowed an increase of 50 per cent in the number of school children in the first five years, 33 1/3 per cent in the next five years, and afterward 15 per cent annually, the number of African voters would be equal to the number of white voters only in the years 2026. We are therefore expected to wait for the coming of the second millennium to

see Sir Alec's hopes realized! If the Africans have chosen to call this agreement a white man's sellout, no fair-minded person should call them unfair.

146. What the Africans are faced with today, and are entreated to accept, is an agreement wrongly conceived and equivocally formulated. We have had an opportunity to hear several remarks that the agreement is a blessing in disguise since it has enabled the Africans for the first time to express their views in a massive manner. This might be true, and perhaps the conclusions of *The Economist* that the Pearce Commission will be remembered in history only as the key that opened the Pandora's box of Africa emotion is also true. But what we need here is something more than consolation.

147. What we are afraid of is that what is otherwise a political problem might now be relegated into a legalistic question left for a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary to determine without due regard to its manifold political undertones. What is at issue here is not the integrity nor the soundness of judgement of Lord Pearce. It is rather the ability of a judge with a long history of forensic detachment to evaluate a politically loaded situation. The test of acceptability is not only quantitative; it is also qualitative. My friend Mr. Mungai, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kenya, cautioned the Council the other day on the judgements of Lord Pearce when he referred to Lord Pearce's views expressed in the Privy Council. Mr. Mungai recalled that

"... in the test case of 1968 the Privy Council admitted that the Smith régime was illegal, but Lord Pearce maintained that the nefarious detention laws were necessary and valid to preserve law and order in Rhodesia. This amounted to a grant of legitimacy to the Smith régime [1629th meeting, para. 19]."

148. We therefore wish to put on the record that any conclusions to be drawn in Rhodesia cannot be drawn on the basis of the counting of heads only, but taking into consideration the whole atmosphere of oppression of the Smith police State under which the consultations are taking place and which is exemplified in the massacres of Harare and Gwelo, the imprisonments of Africans and liberal whites, the restrictions on publicity, the refusal to allow the Pearce Commission to meet Africans in public meetings and the limitations imposed even on British Parliamentarians who view things in a different light from that of Ian Smith. Those are the salient facts and if they are not taken into consideration any verdict will be a miscarriage of justice.

149. It is in this sense that Africa has chosen to call for a constitutional conference. This not only corresponds with the wishes of the people of Zimbabwe, but also is in tune with the avowed position of the United Kingdom Government, which was again affirmed in the first of the five principles of the Smith-Home agreement. That principle reads that "unimpeded progress to majority rule, already enshrined in the 1961 Constitution, would have to be maintained and guaranteed".

150. The solution of the problem of Zimbabwe can never be found in a document which is nothing more than an

⁸ See *Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, Official Report, Fifth Series—Volume 829* (London, H. M. Stationery Office), col. 1420.

elegant piece of British constitutional equivocation. We have had several experiences of those exported British constitutions formulated long after the fact. *The Scotsman* was not far from the truth when it noted, in one of its editorials, commenting on the Smith-Home agreement, that "Constitutions exported by Britain tend, like British motor cars, to have a built-in obsolescence".

151. Britain's physical presence in Rhodesia may be a tissue-thin appearance, but its constitutional obligations and economic influence cannot be underrated.

152. For all those reasons we cannot but support the draft resolution on Rhodesia submitted this morning by Somalia [S/10606].

153. Alongside this action the Security Council must continue maintaining and upholding the resolutions relating to sanctions, the only weapon available to us short of war. The voluntary and selective sanctions that were escalated to mandatory sanctions in 1968 in view of the intransigence of the Pretoria régime are still the best available weapons.

154. We were indeed alarmed to hear the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom say, in his address to the House of Commons last Wednesday, to which I referred earlier, the following:

"Sanctions have been used to try to force a change and break that grip. They were to succeed, first, in weeks, then in months, and then in years. They have curbed investment in Rhodesia. As a result, there is extensive African unemployment, as I saw for myself lately." (He had been there for two days.) "They have limited Rhodesia's ability to earn foreign exchange, but, as anyone can see the moment he visits Salisbury, they have not even scratched the surface of the standard of living of the European or his control of Rhodesian society. That, again, is a fact of life."⁹

155. With statements like that we are hardly going back to square one if and when the British Government decides that the Smith-Home agreement has collapsed. We are indeed going back to a pre-Wilsonian policy. Needless to say, the best Wilson produced was not good enough for Africa. For that reason we are in full support of operative paragraph 8 of the draft resolution.

156. In talking about sanctions and embargoes, be it concerning Rhodesia, South Africa or in relation to Portugal, we associate ourselves with the views expressed yesterday by the representative of India [1635th meeting] that the appropriate organs of the United Nations must make public all infringements of those sanctions. In this connexion, and in my capacity as current Chairman of the African Council of Ministers, I wish to note with satisfaction the positive response to the urging of President Kaunda, President Ould Daddah and the mission of the Organization of African Unity that visited Western European countries last year. I am referring to the official protest made in NATO by Norway and Denmark and the withdrawal of their contributions to the Cabora Bassa

project by Italy and Sweden, as also the important assistance given by Sweden to the African liberation movement within the framework of the Organization of African Unity. Similar positive action is still to come from the allies of Portugal and the trade partners of South Africa.

157. Mr. VINCI (Italy): I thank the representative of the Soviet Union for the intention he has attributed to the proposal I have submitted to the Council to complete the draft resolution submitted by Argentina [S/10376/Rev.2] indicating that Argentina and Somalia would be the members of the Council with which the Secretary-General would co-operate and consult in fulfilling the mandate entrusted to him by that draft resolution.

158. I must say that I was taken a little by surprise by the suggestion Ambassador Malik has made. I was surprised for one simple reason: before the opening of this session there had been consultations between delegations, including the Soviet delegation, on this proposal, and we had received confirmation that a group composed of Argentina and Somalia—precisely two members—was agreeable to the Soviet Union.

159. Now, the representative of the Soviet Union has referred to precedents. I shall not deal with the precedent mentioned by the representative of Argentina concerning the mission to Guinea. We have had several other cases, and we have had different numbers of members.

160. Before speaking of an experience we all had during Italy's Presidency of the Security Council in August, I would draw the Soviet delegation's attention to the fact that the names he has suggested do not reflect a principle we have always followed and observed in the Council—namely, having groups that reflect the geographical composition of the Council. This does not detract from the great respect we have for Guinea, India and Yugoslavia. That is not the point. The point is that if we want to have a different composition we shall always have to respect the principle of geographical composition.

161. Yet more important than the fact that we had that agreement of the Soviet delegation on the composition of the group is, I think, the fact that the African members of the Council, if my understanding is correct, and those outside the Council, approve of the composition we have proposed.

162. I am sure Ambassador Malik does not think he knows better than the Africans how to deal with problems that are of direct concern to them.

163. I should also like to add that the consultations we have had in these last hours were preceded by lengthy, intensive consultations in New York lasting several months. And during those consultations there already existed a sort of general agreement to have a group composed of Argentina and Somalia, if I remember correctly—and I also think I do not have lapses of memory, at least not until now.

164. Now, the representative of the Soviet Union also said that to go ahead with this proposal and the whole draft

⁹ *Ibid.*

resolution would delay consideration of other draft resolutions. I can assure him that that would not be the case with my own delegation. But at the same time I must say that, at the last minute, after the consultations I have just referred to—consultations lasting for months—to raise this question on the composition of the group would involve us in intensive consultations which would precisely distract our attention from other draft resolutions of great substance.

165. The representative of Argentina has indicated very clearly the limited objectives of this draft resolution. I think it is for that reason that we all agree that a group of two Member States would be quite sufficient to assist the Secretary-General in carrying out his mandate. If we have to get involved in consultations again—at the last minute, now that we have only 24 hours remaining to conclude our order of business and all our work—I think that will make it much more difficult not only to go ahead with the proposals presented by Argentina and fully accepted by our African friends and, as I understand it, by all members of the Council, but will impair our work and at the same time, as I have already said, make it even more difficult to deal with the other draft resolutions.

166. Therefore I would make a sincere and friendly appeal to Ambassador Malik not to insist upon his suggestion in order to save time and use to the best of our ability, fruitfully and positively, the 24 hours remaining before the end of our session.

167. Mr. ORTIZ DE ROZAS (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The hour is late. We have a number of important protocolary engagements and I shall therefore be very brief.

168. I have little to add to the brilliant statement made by my friend, Ambassador Vinci of Italy, but I am compelled to offer a few words of clarification following the recent statement made by the representative of the Soviet Union. I must say that I am always pleased to have an opportunity to engage in a brief exchange of views with Ambassador Malik. He asked me not to press for a membership of two. I must say that I did not insist on a membership of two. I think that few delegations have shown greater flexibility than has Argentina with respect to this draft resolution [*S/10376/Rev.2*]. The first revision of the draft resolution, which Ambassador Malik prefers to forget about in concentrating on the second, involved not two members of the Council, or three or five—it involved the whole Security Council, the Secretary-General with the entire Security Council. That was what was implied in the first revision.

169. The representative of France yesterday [*1635th meeting*] proposed a formula that is perfectly acceptable to my delegation, namely, the Secretary-General in consultation with the five permanent members of the Security Council. For my part, I have no doubt that if the five permanent members were one day to administer Namibia they would not even be able to agree on where they should install a traffic light. But we would be prepared to accept that formula.

170. The representative of the Soviet Union has said that Argentina should not claim to be the only member of the

group. What claim do we have to be the sole member? This morning in the meeting of the African Group, which I had the privilege of attending—and I have 45 witnesses to this—I said that I placed the membership of the group in the hands of my African friends, and that for its part the Argentine delegation had no particular interest in being a member of the group. Can anyone ask for greater flexibility on this issue? Let other delegations such as Yugoslavia, Guinea or India with whom we have the best relations become members of the group. I think that the representative of Italy has placed the accent where it should be.

171. With regard to the question of priority, it seems to me that the representative of the Soviet Union is confusing the provisions of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council. I do not have any reason to request priority. Those who must ask for priority are those who submitted drafts later.

172. With regard to the possibilities of the African draft on Namibia [*S/10608*], being vetoed, I would say that I do not know why we should expect a veto on that draft, and I can state now that we are going to vote in favour of it. Security Council resolution 301 (1971), which was the most recent—and most important—resolution adopted on this subject, was adopted without a veto. I would say that Ambassador Malik should be concerned about Soviet vetoes and not about the vetoes cast by any other permanent members, because it is the Soviet delegation which has broken all records in casting vetoes in the Council. If I am not mistaken, I think that the number exceeds 200. The Soviet representative with respect to vetoes is way ahead of the other permanent members.

173. In conclusion, may I say that the exhortation, or should I say the concern, expressed by the Soviet representative about protecting the Secretary-General is very important. This reminds me to some extent of a saying that we have in my country. It is not really a saying, but an invocation, which runs as follows: "Lord, protect me from my friends; I can protect myself from my enemies."

174. Mr. BUSH (United States of America): I shall be very brief in exercising my delegation's right of reply. Obviously our statement did not meet with the total approval of some of the Ambassadors at this table, but I stand by the statement made by the United States delegation on behalf of the United States Government yesterday [*1635th meeting*], chapter and verse.

175. True, our Congress, concerned about national security, put a provision in the United States law that chrome essential to national security could under certain limited conditions be imported from Rhodesia. No chrome, to my knowledge, has been imported under these provisions. But this judgement by Congress had nothing to do with racial oppression. It had to do with something else. It had to do with other problems regarding the freedom of many countries, problems which properly are not the subject of this debate.

176. I repeat that, as I said yesterday, the United States support of sanctions to date has been second to none, and within the small limitations of this new legislation, the

United States will continue to comply fully with United Nations sanctions.

177. I am not at all surprised at the somewhat vitriolic attacks on the United States Government, because we have some fundamental differences with those who have attacked us here today. We are accused of wanting peaceful progress; we are accused of wanting peaceful change—and to this we plead guilty. I shall defend our position and, on the other hand, I am going to resist converting this meeting into a propaganda blast, into a name-calling contest, or assigning motives to some other country. There is still much work to be done, but, in our judgement, it has got to be done in an atmosphere of reason. Name-calling simply will not get the job done.

178. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) *translation from Russian*: I must say I am surprised that my just and innocent proposal for a larger group to assist the Secretary-General should have drawn such strong objections from the representatives of Argentina and Italy. With the sense of humour so characteristic of the representative of Argentina, he tried to bring in arguments that are irrelevant to this question.

179. It is true that the Soviet Union has often used the veto, not 200 times—that rather overstates the case, to which the representative of Argentina is given—but quite a few times, and all for a just cause. I have often said and I will say it again: were it not for the Soviet veto, the group of socialist countries, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, would today be in the position of the German Democratic Republic with regard to the United Nations. It was only the Soviet veto that ensured the admission of these socialist countries into the United Nations. An intense struggle went on for 10 years, and it was the Soviet veto that made the late Mr. Dulles agree to a “package deal” whereby these socialist countries were admitted at the same time as Italy, Spain and a number of other Western countries. What did the Western States do in the Security Council? At that time there were 11 members. They did not use the veto because they did not need to. The voting machine controlled by the State Department was always an obedient tool. When Albania was proposed for admission to the United Nations, none of the Western Powers voted against. They abstained. It was a concerted tacit veto to debar Albania from the United Nations. And they came out of it untainted.

180. But we were alone in the United Nations and in the Security Council, and our only weapon against this unjust position of the West was the veto; and that is why we value it. If it had not been for the veto we would have been overwhelmed. We and our friends are protected by the veto. We have used it only to see justice done, and the facts bear this out. I would therefore point out to the representative of Argentina that references to the veto are, to say the least, groundless.

181. Turning to the substance of the question, and taking into account the arguments put forward by the distinguished representative of Italy and the fact that the representative of Argentina has supported the arguments of the representative of Italy, and considering the Italian

representative's reference to the just principle of geographical distribution, I am ready to meet him half way. I must however point out that we were not consulted in this, but were simply informed in passing in the corridors that such a proposal would be made. That did not amount to consultation. I do not regard it as such. So I reserve the right to make my proposal and to insist on it. However, considering his comments to the effect that the group should be more representative and should be based on the principle of equitable geographical distribution, I wish to propose the following, for which there are precedents. The group should be composed of six countries, including Italy.

182. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): It is not customary in the Security Council for persons or States to be proposed across the floor for membership in particular committees. Rather the matter is left to the President, because he is in constant communication with each member of the Council and is able to assess where the consensus lies. I would suggest that we follow past practice, Mr. President, and that, in the course of your consultations this evening or tomorrow, you ascertain what is the consensus on two points: the number which should constitute the group and the States which should become members of that group. I am sure that you will be able to announce a consensus that will be acceptable to all the members of the Council.

183. Mr. VINCI (Italy): I should like to begin by making it clear that I had no intention of protesting against the suggestion made by the representative of the Soviet Union. As a matter of fact, I said from the beginning that I was asking for the floor on a point of clarification, and I think we owed a clarification to all the members of the Council.

184. I should also like to add that I think it is the understanding of all of us around this table that consultations take place wherever and whenever it is possible, and especially under pressure of business we take any opportunity to hold them. Of course, I should have liked very much to have found time to have Ambassador Malik to lunch and discuss this whole thing during the course of an enjoyable meal. But, unfortunately, he did not have time—less perhaps than I had—and I did not have time either, so that was quite impossible. But I can affirm again that the consultation did take place. It might have been a casual one, but it was what we consider a consultation.

185. Besides, as I said before, it was only a consultation that took place after many months of previous consultations, and, as far as we can remember, there was a general agreement to compose the group of two members, taking into account the restricted objectives of the draft resolution which we are considering.

186. Ambassador Malik raised another point on which I shall not dwell. I shall just restrict myself to saying that we were certainly grateful to the Soviet Union when it finally decided to support the application of Italy to become a Member of the United Nations.

187. I would again say that I am still afraid that to start consultations on enlarging the group would take some of our precious and limited time. I certainly do not object, but I would only make it clear that Italy is not a candidate for

the group. It was never our intention to put forward our name. We are of course grateful to Ambassador Malik for having mentioned the name of Italy as a possible member of the group.

188. I would conclude by saying that our preference still is for a very restricted group, and we would hope that the consensus that was reached in New York and which was still alive here before we opened this meeting could stand. Of course we are not adamant on that position and we would be ready to go along with the general agreement and the consensus of the Council.

189. The PRESIDENT: Before adjourning the meeting I should like to bring the following information to the attention of the Security Council.

190. From the consultations that have been conducted and the statements we have heard this afternoon, it appears to be the general view that it would be useful for the members of the Council to devote time this evening and tomorrow morning to informal consultations on the various draft resolutions that have been submitted to the Council today and their ramifications. Accordingly, it is my intention to schedule a meeting for 3 p.m. tomorrow and, if necessary, another meeting for 8 p.m. In this connexion I should like to remind members of the Council of the decision by the Council in resolution 308 (1972) adopted on 19 January 1972, to hold meetings in Addis Ababa ending not later than Friday, 4 February.

191. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): Mr. President, with all due respect for the comments you have made, and I think that they are very serious, well founded and useful, I should like to draw your attention to the fact that, as we all know, those African delegations, members or not of the Security Council, which drew up the draft resolutions submitted to the Council, had very thorough and detailed exchanges of views in the course of the drafting—perhaps they cannot be called consultations, but they were very extensive exchanges of views—with all the members of the Council. I therefore got the impression that these drafts are fairly familiar to those who support them and also to those who have reservations about them.

192. In view of this, and also because we have very little time left, just 24 hours are left, as the distinguished representative of Italy has reminded us, I wonder if we should devote so much time tomorrow specifically to consultations on these drafts. They were submitted today and every representative will have the opportunity and the time to review and reflect on them before tomorrow morning, and those who require to do so will even have the opportunity to consult their Governments as there will be time for this as well. It might therefore be advisable to schedule a meeting of the Council for 10 a.m. tomorrow to

continue the discussion if members wish to state their views on these drafts, and then proceed to the vote. In that way we would save time and would not be endangering the adoption of these draft resolutions by the Security Council through lack of time.

193. I think I detected in one or two of the statements by representatives a hint that we should discuss things here but take decisions in New York. Bearing in mind how little time we have left, we should take care to avoid any such eventuality or, to speak more directly, any such threat.

194. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): Mr. President, I am wondering whether there is agreement by the Council to the proposal I made that we should entrust to you the task of ascertaining the views of the Council through the process of consultation, on the size of the group and also on the membership.

195. Secondly, I should like to speak on the point raised by the representative of the Soviet Union. As a member of the contact group within the Council I should like to inform the Council that extensive consultations did take place on the draft resolution relating to Southern Rhodesia, but so far very little consultation has taken place on the other three draft resolutions submitted by the African members. Now it is important in draft resolutions of such significance that we should try to meet informally and see exactly whether we could reach agreement on the final text. It is for this purpose, Sir, that I would agree with your proposal that we should devote the remainder of this evening and the whole of tomorrow morning to informal consultations within the Council membership.

196. The PRESIDENT: It is now 8.30 p.m. With due respect for the remarks of the representative of the USSR, I feel that there is not enough time left this evening for members to consult with each other, and perhaps consult with their Governments, on the draft resolutions which were presented only this afternoon. As my friend the representative of Somalia said, the only extensive consultations that have taken place have been the consultations on the draft resolution on Rhodesia. We started this afternoon, in between meetings, consultations on the other draft resolutions, and I think it would only be fair to adjourn until tomorrow afternoon. I do not think that this would be detrimental to our debates because I am suggesting that we should hold a night meeting if necessary.

197. I also wish to tell my friend Ambassador Farah that in my consultations I will be taking into due consideration his remarks on the composition of the group and also paying due regard to the discussion that has taken place this afternoon in the Council.

The meeting rose at 8.30 p.m.