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SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

TWENTY-FIFTH YEAR

1564th MEETING: 10 DECEMBER 1970

NEW YORK

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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

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FIFTEEN HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FOURTH MEETING

Held in New York on Thursday, 10 December 1970, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. Y. A. Malik (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Burundi, China, Colombia, Finland, France, Nepal, Nicaragua, Poland, Sierra Leone, Spain, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Zambia.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1564)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. Letter dated 26 December 1963 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/5488):

Report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus (S/10005 and Corr.1).

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Letter dated 26 December 1963 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/5488):

Report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/10005 and Corr.1)

1. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Russian*): In accordance with the usual practice established in the Council for the consideration of this question, I propose, with the consent of the members of the Security Council, to invite the representatives of Cyprus [S/10033], Turkey [S/10034] and Greece [S/10035] to take places at the Council table pursuant to their request to participate in the discussion of this question without the right to vote.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Z. Rossides (Cyprus), Mr. U.H. Bayulken (Turkey), and Mr. D. S. Bitsios (Greece), took places at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Russian*): The Security Council will consider the question of Cyprus on the basis of the report by the Secretary-General submitted to the Council on 2 December 1970 in document S/10005 and Corr.1.

3. Members of the Security Council have also received advance copies of the text of a draft resolution prepared during informal consultations for consideration. This draft resolution is contained in document S/10036. The English text of this draft resolution has been reissued for technical reasons.

4. Some representatives have expressed a wish to speak before the Council proceeds to vote on the draft resolution. The first speaker on my list is the representative of Cyprus, on whom I now call.

5. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): May I first be permitted to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the Presidency of the Security Council.

6. We meet again for the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Force in Cyprus and have before us the report of the Secretary-General for the period ended 1 December 1970. In the first place, I wish to state that the Government of Cyprus has accepted the recommendation of the Secretary-General for the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months. I make that statement in view of the fact that, in accordance with Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, Cyprus must signify its acceptance.

7. I take this opportunity of expressing our deep appreciation for the positive work carried out by the United Nations Force on the island in co-operation with my Government. The Force has made an important contribution to the pacification of Cyprus. In fact, it has become well known that the peace-keeping work in Cyprus has been particularly successful.

8. In this connexion I should like to convey to the Commander of the Force, Major General D. Prem Chand, and to the officers and men under his command, the expression of our warm appreciation.

9. I should now like to place on record again our deep gratitude to the Secretary-General for his genuine concern over the problem of Cyprus and for his dedicated efforts towards achieving a just and peaceful solution of the problem. Our profound esteem for his outstanding work as the head of the United Nations is very sincere and genuine.

10. Further, I should like to express our appreciation to his Special Representative in Cyprus, Mr. Osorio-Tafall, for his constructive work in the island, and to the collaborators and assistants of the Secretary-

General, Mr. Bunche and Mr. Rolz-Bennett, who have been faithful in carrying out their duties with regard to Cyprus. And, of course, our appreciation and thanks go to those countries whose valuable contributions in military contingents and voluntary funds have made it possible for the United Nations Peace-keeping Force to operate in Cyprus.

11. The report shows that the situation during the last six months has remained generally calm. As is indicated in the report, shooting incidents have been further reduced from thirty to twelve in the corresponding period of last year. The Secretary-General in his observations remarks, however, that:

“The record of the past six months shows neither progress towards further normalization and limitation of confrontation nor a return to the tense and explosive situation which existed prior to the commencement of the intercommunal talks in June 1968.” [S/10005 and Corr.1, para. 115.]

12. The situation is described as one of “negative stability” [*ibid.*]. The Secretary-General continues by expressing regret that he must once again voice his disappointment that notwithstanding the persistent efforts of his representatives in Cyprus regarding a return to normal conditions, especially to freedom of movement along all roads for unarmed citizens, the situation remains unchanged.

13. As was mentioned in his previous report, that of June 1970 [S/9814], there are 123 public roads, including five main communication roads, on which Greek Cypriots have no freedom of movement or access. Those roads are obstructed by armed Turkish Cypriots from the enclaves. The Secretary-General made earnest and repeated calls upon the Turkish Cypriot leadership to open up those roads, as also the enclaves, in response to the Government’s normalization measures, particularly since all Turkish Cypriots enjoy full and unrestricted freedom of movement on all roads on the island.

14. As stated in the present report, “this longstanding anomaly has again given rise to a number of incidents” [S/10005 and Corr.1, para. 85]. It obviously is a great anomaly when over 80 per cent of the population of the island is still prevented from moving on so many of its communication roads. The solution of this situation by peaceful means should not be beyond the reach of all concerned.

15. Further, the observations of the Secretary-General emphasize the need to reduce the dangers of close military confrontations in sensitive areas of the island and refers to

“ . . . a number of suggestions . . . made to the Turkish Cypriot leadership which, if agreed to, could, at minimum risk to them, help to generate an atmosphere of increased mutual confidence and contribute significantly to the improvement in the living conditions of their community.” [*Ibid.*, para. 116.]

It may be recalled in this respect that proposals by the United Nations Force in Cyprus regarding the elimination of confrontation were agreed to by my Government, as was stated in the report of December 1969 [S/9521, para. 77].

16. Another question referred to in the present report, under “Observations”, as needing attention is the problem of displaced persons and their rehabilitation. We are in full agreement with the need to solve this problem also. My Government’s policy has all along been to encourage and assist the return of the Turkish Cypriots. That is consistent with its over-all policy towards a return to normality. Thus, it has built or repaired about 350 houses belonging to Turkish Cypriots in various villages; but in most cases the owners, as the report indicates, did not return. Presumably, they were discouraged by the Turkish Cypriot leadership from returning, except in areas where such return would serve a political purpose—such as, for instance, the extension of an enclave—which in itself runs counter to normalization—or for other political advantage. In that sense, they have all along been pressing for the return of the Turkish Cypriots to sensitive areas near confrontation, such as Omorphita and Neapolis, which would not help normalization but would have the reverse effect. Thus the Turkish Cypriot leadership has given political rather than humanitarian overtones to this problem. In consequence, out of sixteen villages in which such houses were built by the Government, in eleven not a single Turkish Cypriot has returned and the rebuilt houses still remain unoccupied. That is no encouragement to build more houses.

17. We express the sincere hope that the question of normalization—in respect both of the opening of the public roads to all citizens and of the return of the Turkish Cypriots to their homes—will be approached in a new and positive spirit to achieve the understanding and co-operation necessary for their proper solution, thereby creating a better climate of confidence that would facilitate and enhance progress in the current intercommunal talks.

18. However, there is another, more hopeful, aspect of the situation, as may be seen from the report. While progress on the vital aspects of freedom of movement and elimination of confrontation have not shown improvement, “an encouraging exception to the present immobility is the increased co-operation between the two communities in the economic field” [S/10005 and Corr.1, para. 117]. Indeed, in this field and in that of public services considerable progress in normalization has been achieved through closer co-operation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. As the report states, many more Turkish Cypriots have found employment in Government-controlled areas. Among encouraging signs of co-operation is the increasing participation of Turkish Cypriot representatives in such bodies as the grain and loan commissions, in the Labour Advisory Board, in the marketing boards for agricultural products and also in improvement boards in mixed villages.

19. Furthermore, the growth in trading and industrial activity has brought about increased contacts between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, mainly in the private sector. However, despite this positive development of intercommunal co-operation in many fields, which essentially benefits the Turkish Cypriots, the policy of the Turkish Cypriot leadership towards a separate economy has regrettably, as the report notes, not been reversed. This policy of separatism is contrary to the very interests of the people of Cyprus as a whole and is particularly retrograde at a time when efforts are being made the world over to unify the economies of nations. The realities of life and the common interests of Greek and Turkish Cypriots emphasize the obvious need for co-operation within a single economic system. The spirit necessary for such co-operation does exist among the cypriot people, Greek and Turkish alike, as has been reported by the Secretary-General. It would blossom in the economic sector as well as the political sector were it not discouraged by outside influences.

20. In the field of agriculture, which is the mainstay of the island, a situation of severe drought, which reduced the grain and olive crops by one half, was this year met with assistance from the Government to both Greek and Turkish Cypriot farmers valued at £500,000 and a total of 3,000 tons of barley, as well as the distribution of food, with the assistance of the World Food Programme, valued at £300,000, to Greek and Turkish villages alike.

21. It is significant to note in this respect that this drought brought the Greek and Turkish farmers in the stricken areas closer together, as the Secretary-General has remarked, and created a spirit of solidarity among them. That is an indication that the community of interests between the two elements of the population is a powerful factor in guiding them towards the positive value of collaboration and away from the sterility of division and antagonism. As the Secretary-General remarks in his observations, this development "seems to indicate that with goodwill and when their common interests are involved a rapprochement between the communities is definitely possible" [*ibid.*]

22. A growing spirit of conciliation and trust among the people is the essential element for progress towards solving the problem and bringing an auspicious influence towards solution of the problem.

23. This brings us to the intercommunal talks. That their pace is slow there can be little doubt. The prospects for a long-term settlement are a matter of speculation; they do not seem very bright at present. However, perseverance in a good effort and for a good cause is always a virtue and should bring its reward.

24. Independently, however, of their actual yield at any given time, the talks have their merit as a means of communication and exchange of views. There is a dialogue; reasoned arguments have to be used, and if they are to have any weight, they have to be based on fundamental principles of the Charter. This

introduces the element of reason and justice as a vital factor in the effort to solve the problem.

25. Furthermore, the talks have definitely contributed to a better climate in the island and to the prevailing calm. In spite of basic differences of approach that still exist, my Government is determined to continue the talks with patience and perseverance, and with inexhaustible goodwill, towards a workable solution. Both the interlocutors have stressed that despite divergent views about major problems the local talks provide the only course for solving differences and eventually reaching over-all agreement.

26. We fully agree with the Secretary-General's observation that the talks should be steadfastly and honestly pursued with the aim of achieving a reasonable and workable solution which would be neither a victory nor a defeat for either side. For, indeed, no solution can be a good solution if it is good for one side and bad for the other. A solution is either a sound and workable solution, a just solution, when it is a victory for both sides, or it is an unjust, unsound and unworkable solution, in which case, it is a defeat for both sides.

27. The fundamental disagreement appears to be on local government, which prevents substantial progress. This is a new element. It did not exist in the Constitution under the Zurich and London Agreements on which the Turkish Cypriots depend so much. However, the question is there now; it is being discussed and it has proved to be the most difficult and intractable problem in respect both of its meaning and of its application.

28. As I stated at the last Security Council meeting on this subject, last June:

"Upon the accepted norms, local government could only have application to specific geographical localities; it never has been nor could it be determined on ethnic criteria. Nor could it be conceived as extending vertically from bottom to top to the point of creating a State within a State. Straying from the norms of a unitary State into the negativity of division"—constitutional or otherwise—"does not provide a solution; it only aggravates the situation.

"The Government of Cyprus, while making every possible concession in order to meet the other side, cannot possibly go beyond the framework of a unitary State in a way that would destroy the integral unity of the island." [*1543rd meeting, paras. 22 and 23.*]

29. The process of negotiation towards accommodation should always be governed by the over-all purpose of achieving a solution which is just, workable and enduring. To that end, we cannot abandon fundamental principles and universally accepted constitutional norms. What we seek is a just and democratic solution within the principles of the Charter and the relevant United Nations resolutions on Cyprus. Our objective

is an independent unitary State in which all Cypriots will enjoy equal rights of citizenship without discrimination as to race, language or ethnic origin.

30. The Turkish Cypriot people already have, and will continue to have, full autonomy in all matters concerned with religion, education, culture, personal status and the like. They are also ensured of proportionate representation in all fields of public life. Our overriding concern is to achieve a settlement anchored within the positive framework of mutual understanding, conciliation and unity.

31. To that end, progress in normalization, in a prevailing situation of calm, and the continuation of the talks will, we hope, create the necessary climate for the solution of the problem, which in its nature is simple but has been artificially complicated in a manner contrary to the interests of the people of Cyprus, both Greek and Turkish. We trust that in an enlightened new approach to this problem, and in the spirit of our times, a solution will be reached not only in the interest of the people of Cyprus but also in that of peace and security in this sensitive region of the Mediterranean.

32. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Russian*): I thank the representative of Cyprus for the words of welcome and congratulations he has addressed to the President of the Security Council.

33. The next speaker on my list is the representative of Turkey, on whom I now call.

34. Mr. BAYULKEN (Turkey): Mr. President, I should first like to associate myself with the congratulations that have been expressed to you upon your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council, and to extend our very best wishes to you.

35. I should like to thank you, Mr. President, and the members of the Security Council for giving my delegation the opportunity to participate in the deliberations of the Council today.

36. We are meeting once again to consider the renewal of the mandate of the United Nation Force in Cyprus. We have before us the report of the Secretary-General dated 2 December 1970. As usual, it is a comprehensive report and brings us up to date with the situation on the island. I shall take it as a term of reference for my remarks.

37. The Secretary-General, in the introduction to his report, summarizes the conditions in Cyprus for the period under consideration as follows:

“The situations in the last six months has remained generally calm, but sporadic acts of violence and a somewhat large number of incidents have tended to increase tension and distrust between the two communities.” [S/10005 and Corr.1, para. 2.]

38. Indeed, he has focused his concern on the heart of the matter which has prompted our increased worry in the last six months. All those dedicated to a peaceful

solution could not have failed to notice the string of incidents and could not but have felt disappointed at their regrettable consequence on the already slow and laborious process of confidence-building between the two communities.

39. Paragraph 35 of the report reiterates the importance attached by the Secretary-General to the consequences of these incidents. With the Council's permission, I shall quote again from the report:

“While, as already stated, the military situation has remained generally calm, certain acts of violence and incidents have occurred which, even though they have not seriously endangered the peace, have tended to augment tension and to add to the sense of mutual distrust. Some of these incidents, particularly the fatal shooting of a Turkish Cypriot civilian and the wounding of two others at a National Guard summer camp near Trikomo, are described in some detail below.”

40. The report allocates several paragraphs—37 to 50—to the tragic events at Trikomo, where the shooting of three Turkish Cypriots during illegal apprehension was followed by an equally illegal and unconstitutional judicial process.

41. This incident, in which an individual was killed, with twenty-seven wounds fired from close quarters, and in which the culprits were pronounced not guilty, was enough in itself to trigger the apprehension of the Turkish Cypriots with regard to the practices and intentions of the Greek Cypriot Administration.

42. Paragraphs 61 and 62 follow with the incidents in Zeybekköy, where the Greek Cypriot administration appeared to be manoeuvring to change the established practices between the two communities.

43. Again, in paragraphs 87, 88, 89, 90, 91 and 95 we find reference to top-level appointments, such as cabinet posts, by the Greek Cypriot administration in open contravention of the constitutional requirements.

44. Challenging established practice, this chain of appointments cannot fail to impress one as a new attempt to engage the basic principles of the problem.

45. During the period in which these tension-building incidents took place, the cry of *enosis*, namely the subversion of independence, found new, intensive and repetitive echoes in the voices of official Greek Cypriot leaders, inspiring further distrust. It is no secret that distrust between the two communities lies at the root of the present difficulties. I am sure I am not pronouncing Solomon's wisdom when I say that peaceful resolution lies in mutual effort at building up confidence. But I must regretfully confess that the events I have listed above and the pronouncements I have mentioned have not been conducive to that end.

46. If the Council will recall, in every previous appearance before its members my delegation has stressed the building of confidence and the nurturing

of goodwill as the first imperative for the attainment of a peaceful and agreed settlement. As I have always emphasized, trust is the weathercock which determines the atmosphere of the relations between the two communities in this critical period of intercommunal talks. As all of us dealing with international affairs are well aware, trust is not a simple matter of spiritual or intellectual atmosphere. Indeed, trust is the basic problem of security. This is especially true with the Turkish Cypriot community. Their past experience and their present position dictate their concern.

47. The report mentions two developments vitally involving this aspect of the problem, developments which, I must state, have aroused the grave concern of my Government.

48. Paragraph 28 of the report deals with the distribution to the Greek Cypriot police of arms from the stocks imported in 1966. It will be recalled that the importation and distribution of those arms had elicited the concern of the Council and of the Secretary-General. In fact, in his report to the Council on 11 June 1968, the Secretary-General referring to attempts to distribute those arms, stated:

“The Force had always refused to accept any distinction between light and heavy arms, as the undertaking given to me by the Government of Cyprus covered all weapons without distinction.” [S/8622, para. 26.]

49. I beg the forbearance of the Council as I repeat my delegation's statement at that time by quoting from the verbatim record of the 1432nd meeting:

“Finally, I have to refer to a matter which goes to the very root of the sense of security with which the Turkish community must be provided if the present atmosphere is to prevail. I refer to the heavy and light weapons which the Greek Cypriot Administration imported to the island in December 1966. Council will recall the tangible increase in tension and worsening of the situation which was incurred as a result of that move and the concern which the Secretary-General expressed in his addendum to the report of 8 December 1966 [S/7611/Add.1].

“ . . .

“It is our earnest hope that UNFICYP will continue its representations with the Greek Cypriot Administration in order to dissuade it from such action, calculated to create new tensions and suspicions. In the name of my Government, as well as in the name of reason, I also call upon the Greek Cypriot leadership to reconsider such a step. We maintain the hope that the Greek Cypriot leaders are sufficiently endowed with sagacity to weigh the advantages and dangers of such a move. Is it better to distribute a few hundred new and shiny arms, many of them really heavy weapons of mass destruction; or is it wiser to exercise restraint and allow the fresh attempts at reconciliation which are now afoot to flourish? The answer to that question will

materially affect the course of events in Cyprus in the months ahead.” [1432nd meeting, paras. 32 and 34.]

50. The above statements express the grave concern of the Secretary-General, of UNFICYP and of my delegation with regard to the importation and distribution of those arms. Paragraph 28 of the present report raises the question of distribution once again, drawing a distinction between light and heavy arms. In view of the foregoing statement by the Secretary-General as quoted from his report of 11 June 1968, and with full regard for the consequences of that distribution respecting intercommunal security and confidence as voiced by my delegation in 1968, I must emphasize my Government's refusal to accept any distribution. I am sure that the descriptive passage in paragraph 28 of the report does not denote acquiescence on the part of the United Nations.

51. The second point of concern on armaments finds mention in paragraphs 29 through 33 of the report. With your permission, I will quote the first two paragraphs of that section:

“On 13 June 1970, an UNCIVPOL patrol was refused access to the Limassol docks where military stores were being unloaded. Not since 1967 had UNCIVPOL been prevented from entering the harbour; nor would it appear, as far as UNFICYP is aware, that any sizable shipment of military stores arrived at that port in 1968 or in 1969.

“The attention of the Government was drawn to this new restriction on UNCIVPOL's freedom of movement, which was considered contrary to an oral agreement concluded in September 1964 providing for UNFICYP to be given advance notification of the arrival at Limassol of ships carrying military stores and for members of the United Nations Force to be admitted to the docks at the time of unloading.”

52. As the Council will immediately recognize, this is a matter that involves the security of the Turkish community. It is also a matter of mutual trust between the two communities. And, last but not least, it is a matter that evenoms the general atmosphere of the island, thus jeopardizing peace and calm.

53. The agreement of 1964 with regard to the import of arms has been in operation for the last six years. On many occasions the Secretary-General has expressed his grave concern over the importation of arms and military material and equipment. My Government cannot accept any change in the implementation of this agreement. Once again, I must reiterate our desire to draw attention to the grave consequences of such a move.

54. The report takes up normalization as another important item. In paragraph 72 it says that “since my last report, the situation with regard to normal conditions has not changed significantly, although there have been some encouraging developments, particularly in the field of public services”. The report

goes on to point out some developments in the economic field, in agriculture, in public services and in social insurance.

55. In this connexion, in paragraph 117 the Secretary-General expresses his hope for the establishment of a number of common services and mixed institutions whose main objective would be to serve the Cypriots as a whole. The Secretary-General believes that such services and institutions would also help to achieve a rapprochement between the two communities. We agree with him. Several proposals were made by the Turkish community for the establishment of such institutions. In fact, as I said in my previous intervention before the Council, the Turkish community stands ready to reciprocate with goodwill any offer, any proposal that does not entail an implicit or explicit infringement of its constitutional rights and prerogatives. But, regrettably, in most instances no progress has been achieved. The Turkish proposals were either laid on the shelf or subverted to political ends.

56. There are more than 20,000 people on the island who have been displaced since 1963. They are living away from the shelter of their homes, away from their farms, deprived of their livelihood. Surely their return to their own ancestral locations is a very important aspect of return to normal conditions. The Secretary-General recognizes in his report that they constitute an important element in the process of normalization, and states that "with some goodwill, it should be possible to approach the whole problem . . . from a humanitarian rather than from a political point of view" [*S/10005 and Corr.1, para. 84*]. We are informed by the report that UNFICYP is prepared to assist in their return. The Turkish community has already proposed a joint committee with the participation of UNFICYP, but unfortunately the situation has remained stagnant. The ordeal of the 20,000 Turkish Cypriots continues unchanged.

57. In addition to the deprivation of this important segment of the population of the use of their property, the Turkish community as a whole is deprived of its share of the public revenue of the State, as well as the aid that Cyprus is receiving from international sources. When one talks of normalization, surely this aspect of the problem cannot be excluded.

58. As a final point on normalization, I should like to take up paragraph 85 of the report. The position of the Turkish Cypriot community on this issue is clear. It is living under difficult conditions; it is struggling for the protection of its constitutional rights. It has extended its co-operation to the dangerous limits of its security; under the prevailing conditions in the island, its security necessarily remains its prime concern. Past experience has justified this sensitivity. Indeed, I feel I must return to the initial theme of my remarks: namely, the building up of confidence and the nurturing of goodwill. Confidence and goodwill breed a sense of security; security leads to co-operation in other areas. I am sure that the members of the Council will agree with me that the cart should not be placed before the horse.

59. I must conclude my statement with reference to that aspect of the problem which is a matter of disappointment as well as hope for us all. I am referring to the intercommunal talks. This contradiction finds expression in paragraph 115 of the Secretary-General's report, in which he states that "with the passing of time, this situation is threatening to become the way of life of all Cypriots".

60. My Government has on many occasions drawn attention to this danger, which is inherent in the continuation of the situation. The Turkish community of Cyprus has endured and proved that it can withstand all the hardships of a physically separate existence. The longer this separation continues, the more it becomes normal.

61. The passage of time can thus only render a solution more difficult. This is the disappointing aspect of the talks.

62. The Secretary-General, in paragraph 119 of his report, states that the negotiations should be "steadfastly and honestly pursued with the aim of achieving a reasonable and workable compromise, which would be neither a victory nor a defeat for either side".

63. He further states: "I believe that the elements necessary for a political settlement in Cyprus do exist and that a compromise solution could be worked out" [*ibid, para. 120*].

64. I fully share that sentiment. My Foreign Minister expressed the position of my Government on this important issue during the general debate at the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly and with your permission, Mr. President, I will quote the relevant passage. He said:

"The peculiar nature of the Republic of Cyprus, composed of two national communities and based on the equality of rights of those two different ethnic entities as well as their proportional participation at all levels of public activity, has been ratified by constitutional and contractual provisions.

"The main objective of the talks that are under way between the two communities of Cyprus is to explore the possibilities of a return to constitutionality and the restoration of normal conditions. These negotiations, which have been going on since June 1968, have not thus far led to an agreement between the two communities of the island.

"Despite the lack of optimism which is increasingly felt, we should like to go on hoping that some day in the near future the door will open to a just and equitable solution of this question, safeguarding the independence of Cyprus as well as the respective rights and interests of the two communities within the framework of the balance established, recognized and respected at the inception of the State."¹

¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Plenary Meetings, 1849th meeting, paras. 110-112.

65. We are pleased to note that the Secretary-General in the concluding part of his report—more specifically in paragraph 120—refers to the purpose of the inter-communal talks within the context of these general principles. Indeed, since the very beginning of the efforts to work out a peaceful solution, the Turkish community has been motivated by the same purpose expressed by the Secretary-General and has directed itself to the re-establishment of an independent, sovereign and unitary State, based on local autonomy, not on local government. Let me repeat that we continue to hope that in the near future the door will open to this just and equitable solution.

66. Finally, may I be allowed to express once again my Government's appreciation to Secretary-General U Thant, and Under-Secretaries-General Bunche and Rolz-Bennett, as well as to the Special Representative of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Osorio-Tafall, and the Commander of the Force, General Prem Chand, and all those serving under them. Today if we can look forward with some hope it is due largely to the constructive and patient efforts of those devoted people.

67. Before concluding, I should also like to express our appreciation to the contributing countries that make it possible for UNFICYP to continue its important task.

68. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Russian*): I thank you for the kind words you have addressed to the President.

69. The next speaker on my list is the representative of Greece, on whom I now call.

70. Mr. BITSIOS (Greece) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, my delegation is very happy to see you presiding over the work of the Security Council, and wishes to congratulate you. I wish to thank you, Sir, as well as the other members of the Council, for having granted my request to be allowed to present the views of my delegation on the report of the Secretary-General covering the past six months. It is always pleasant for me to offer to U Thant the assurance that the Greek Government highly appreciates the unflagging interest that he has shown in the situation in Cyprus, in a return to normalcy, and in the welfare of the population as a whole. Thus the findings that he periodically submits to us on the development of the situation in the Republic of Cyprus are of great interest to us, and will, once again, be the basis on our observations.

71. What is striking in the conclusions of the report is that the Secretary-General should state that the present situation in Cyprus is "one of 'negative stability', quiet on the surface, but strained, abnormal and fraught with the serious danger inherent in the continuing close confrontation of well-armed and trained forces" [*ibid.*, para. 115].

72. This qualification does not surprise my delegation. Our view was and remains that the

"positive stability"—if I may use this term as the antithesis of "negative stability"—can only be established in Cyprus by a positive conclusion to the negotiations between the two parts of the population. I have very often stated and reiterated to the Council: there is no more rational formula than that of negotiations between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. But I have also contended that the rate of these negotiations should be speeded up and lead to a result as quickly as possible in the interests of the entire population as well as that of peace and security.

73. We maintain that stand in the assurance that it would be to the detriment of all parties concerned if the ill omen which seems to flow from the comments of the Secretary-General were to be realized, that is to say, to use his own words, that the present confrontation is threatening to become the way of life of all Cypriots.

74. It is for this reason that we are happy that the report is not entirely devoid of a certain note of optimism since the Secretary-General tells us that the two parts of the population now understand that the problem of Cyprus cannot be solved by resort to force.

75. If this is the guiding motive of all sides and underlies the views of all in Cyprus, then it would be opportune and consistent that the military confrontation which the report details, be reduced, if it is not possible to eliminate it totally. We continue to support any effort to this end made by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and of the Commander of the United Nations Force. I should like to express our praise here for the services that they have rendered to the cause of peace.

76. Furthermore, we are happy to read in the report of some new encouraging events tending towards a return to normal which did take place during the period covered. We note, for example, the progress achieved in the field of agriculture, where the Greek and Turkish Cypriot farmers who have received governmental assistance to confront the drought, have co-operated more closely together. The Secretary-General has also informed us of certain progress achieved in the field of public services and others.

77. We also support any steps tending to increase co-operation between the two elements of the population in different fields and particularly in the field of the economy, in the field of displaced persons as well as the restoration of freedom of circulation along the road network where the Greek civilian population still continues to experience difficulties. All of these collateral measures will lead to the creation of an atmosphere of confidence which will greatly assist the two negotiators, Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash, in their delicate and difficult task.

78. Speaking of negotiations, we note another positive observation by U Thant when he assures us that he will continue to believe that the necessary elements for a political settlement do exist.

79. It is in fact satisfying to note that the conversations are continuing and that on all sides qualified personalities of the parties concerned have in their statements, which the report mentions, stated that despite the existing difficulties, their desire is to maintain these contacts and to arrive at a solution.

80. On 5 September last, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Palamas, made the following statement concerning the problem of Cyprus:

“The policy on the Greek side is still unchanged in the sense of continuing the conversations between the Cypriots in order to achieve a solution of the Cyprus problem. There is no change in the position on the Greek side concerning the framework of the conversations taking place.”

81. Furthermore, in Brussels, Mr. Çağlayangil and Mr. Palamas exchanged views on the situation in Cyprus. They particularly expressed their hope that the intercommunal conversations in Nicosia would soon lead speedily to a positive result.

82. That was and still is the position of the Greek Government. It will, as in the past, continue to encourage the holding of conversations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and it is to be earnestly hoped that they will be imbued with a new dynamism that will allow them to arrive at a long-term solution to the many elements of the problem.

83. In the meantime we support the recommendation of the Secretary-General for a six-month prolongation of the mandate of the United Nations force in Cyprus according to the terms of Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964.

84. My Government, whose contribution to the financing of this operation has now risen to \$9.25 million, will do all in its power to maintain this contribution, while hoping that the appeal launched by the Secretary-General will find a favourable echo among the other Members of our Organization.

85. Before concluding I should like to repeat the thanks of my delegation to the Secretary-General and to his distinguished assistants, both here and in Cyprus for the patience and perseverance with which they have, over a long period of years, carried out a peaceful mission which does honour to the United Nations. Their mission would not have been possible without the understanding and the sense of responsibility which the Security Council has consistently shown and without the spirit of solidarity which the Member States have shown who are participating in the composition of the United Nations force, as well as those who have contributed so generously to its financing.

86. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Russian*): The list of those wishing to speak before the vote is exhausted. If no representative wishes to speak now, the Security Council will proceed to vote on the draft resolution contained in document S/10036.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

The draft resolution was adopted unanimously.²

87. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Russian*): Some members of the Council have put their names down to speak after the vote.

88. Sir COLIN CROWE (United Kingdom): It is gratifying to see that the Security Council is unanimous in agreeing to the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Force in Cyprus.

89. We are all agreed on the need to achieve a permanent settlement of the problems of Cyprus. We are all agreed that, in the long run, the only basis for such a settlement will be found in the continued existence of an independent and unitary State, in which all the peoples of the island can live peacefully side by side. We are all agreed that efforts must be made to overcome the differences which so unhappily exist between the two communities on the island. We are agreed, too, that the best hope of doing this lies in the intercommunal talks.

90. I should like to take this opportunity of thanking the Secretary-General for another admirable and clear report. This report brings out very well just how much the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) contributes to the creation and preservation of an atmosphere in the island which allows the intercommunal talks to continue and have some chance of success.

91. It would also be appropriate for me at this point to join in the tributes which have been paid to the Secretary-General's Special Representative on the island, Mr. Osorio-Tafall, and to the Commander of UNFICYP, General Prem Chand, both of whom so deservedly enjoy the confidence and admiration of us all.

92. My Government shares the Secretary-General's regret that more progress has not been made towards a return to normal conditions on the island, but we welcome the fact that there have been some signs, however few, of such normalization, and we share the Secretary-General's hope that progress can be made towards that end, for example, by the establishment of common services and mixed institutions whose main objective would be to serve the people of Cyprus as a whole. Practical forms of intercommunal cooperation in the administrative and economic fields are one of the best ways of building up trust between people.

93. My Government believes that, in all the circumstances, the Secretary-General was right to recommend a further six-month extension of the mandate of UNFICYP and we welcome the fact that the Security Council has agreed to that recommendation.

94. I am therefore glad to be able to state that the United Kingdom will maintain its contingent in

² See resolution 291 (1970).

UNFICYP for the period of the renewed mandate and will meet all its costs. Provided other major contributors agree to maintain their voluntary contributions at the same level as before, we are prepared in addition to make our usual voluntary financial contribution of £312,500 towards the cost of the Force for each of the two quarters, beginning 16 December 1970. We hope, however, that the Secretary-General will continue to keep in mind the possibility of further reductions in the strength and cost of the Force, if the operational needs of the situation should permit them.

95. Those who bear the burden of providing financial and material support for UNFICYP cannot be expected to do so indefinitely. We are therefore—and I stress this—anxious that the parties to the dispute should now make a more intense effort to achieve a constitutional settlement.

96. Mr. PHILLIPS (United States of America): May I first of all say how pleased we are to have present with us today the Secretary-General's Special Representative in Cyprus, Mr. Osorio-Tafall, as well as the Commander of the United Nations Force, General Prem Chand. They deserve, I think, the thanks of us all for the very important services they are rendering the United Nations in helping foster conditions which we hope will facilitate progress towards a peaceful solution of the problems of Cyprus.

97. The United Nations Force in Cyprus has continued to perform its functions with high efficiency and great skill. It has prevented incidents from occurring, and has handled those which did occur during the past six months in a manner which prevented their escalation. In the United States view, the presence of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) continues to be necessary for the maintenance of peace in Cyprus. Accordingly, we have supported extension of the UNFICYP mandate for a further six-month period. We consider that the purpose of that extension, like the previous ones, is not to give permanent status to UNFICYP, but to facilitate the attainment of a satisfactory solution of the intercommunal problem and thus permit not only the withdrawal of UNFICYP in due course but also the resumption of a normal life by all the people of Cyprus.

98. We regret exceedingly the necessity of having to point out that that return to normal conditions was not advanced during the past six months. As the Secretary-General stated in his excellent report:

"The situation now prevailing in Cyprus is one of 'negative stability', quiet on the surface, but strained, abnormal and fraught with the serious danger inherent in the continuing close confrontation of well armed and trained forces." [S/10005 and Corr.1, para. 115.]

This assessment must remain very much in our minds.

99. My delegation believes that, for the moment, UNFICYP should not be further reduced in size. As and when the intercommunal situation improves,

further reductions can and should be contemplated. This is particularly important because the difficulties of meeting UNFICYP costs have abated only slightly. We appreciate the efforts of the Secretary-General to obtain additional pledges, as well as payments on previous pledges, and we hope that present contributors and others will respond. At a time when the United Nations is seeking to revitalize its peace-keeping procedures it would be most incongruous if UNFICYP's task in Cyprus were to be prejudiced by lack of necessary financial support. My Government is prepared to do its part, but considers that no single Member should bear a disproportionate share of the burden. In this connexion, I should like once again to make clear that in linking the amount of our payments to the amounts paid by others, the United States hopes to encourage additional contributions.

100. The United States notes with pleasure that in the period under review—June to December 1970—the serious incidents which occurred during the previous review period were not duplicated. As the Secretary-General points out in his report, however, a number of dangerous incidents did occur, most notably the one at Trikomo on 11 August. Fortunately, these were handled with good sense and calmness by all parties. Perhaps we may hope this portends a permanent reduction in intercommunal tension. Cyprus needs internal stability: it is the essential precondition for progress towards lasting intercommunal arrangements and for further general economic growth.

101. We observe with regret that the intercommunal talks seem to have lost momentum, virtually no progress having been made in the last six months. Both sides seem to have adopted more rigid positions. Yet those talks represent the best method of settling the intercommunal problem. Unless the talks can move forward in a spirit of accommodation and trust, Cyprus and its neighbours and friends can never be sure that the stability of the area will not be disrupted. We therefore urge both sides to redouble their efforts to deal with the difficult but far from insoluble constitutional problems of a Cyprus settlement. It is important that semantic difficulties and disputes over abstractions should be bypassed, so that there may be the necessary concentration on specific measures which will safeguard the legitimate rights of all elements in Cyprus within the framework of a unified, independent and democratic State.

102. While this process is going on, the parties should continue at the same time to seek agreement on measures which will tend to normalize living conditions in Cyprus for all its inhabitants. We applaud the serious efforts now being made to settle the long-standing problem of refugees. For too long this subject has been bedevilled by what appear to us to be political considerations, while human beings continue to suffer. We hope the current efforts will produce real and lasting results. If they should not, we suggest that the parties consider a resort to some type of independent third-party assistance to ascertain facts, evaluate difficulties and assist the two sides in arranging equitable remedial measures. It seems to us that the United Nations itself

is best fitted to provide this independent third-party function. The impartial expertise of the Secretary-General Special Representative, together with his highly competent staff, is already at hand. Such third-party assistance could be useful in pushing through to fruition the long-standing proposals for the elimination of confrontation through a reciprocal pull-back from areas of close armed contact between the two communities.

103. Though the danger in Cyprus may be smaller today than it has been at certain periods, it obviously still exists. We are sure that all members of this Council will join with us in expressing the hope that before it is time again to consider an extension of the UNFICYP mandate some real progress towards a solution may be made. Peace-keeping in Cyprus, as elsewhere, is intended to facilitate peace-making and not to substitute for it. We hope all interested parties will quickly demonstrate their intention to do their share to bring about a just and equitable solution to the Cyprus problem.

104. Mr. TOMEH (Syria): The Security Council has good grounds for renewing for another six months the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus. We wish to pay the Secretary-General, his staff, his Special Representative in Cyprus, the Chief of Staff and the personnel of the United Nations Force in Cyprus a high tribute for the salutary role they are playing in calming the tension between the two communities and circumventing every possible misunderstanding which may lead to aggravation of the tension.

105. On the whole, as the report in our hands clearly concludes, the situation has remained calm. However, the few incidents which have occurred are regrettable, as they entailed unnecessary loss of life. These can be avoided through more co-operation, which is necessarily conducive to the removal of mistrust. The Government of Cyprus and the Turkish leadership are showing statesmanship and exercising restraint, and we appeal to them to enhance this process. It is essential now for Cyprus and for its independence and unity, which we all uphold, to transform the "negative stability", of which the report speaks, into a positive and durable one.

106. Many activities in the economic and technological training fields point to positive developments in the consolidation of communal links. The more these grow the more the oneness of interests and aspirations emerges. That is the goal to work for. Although the talks between Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash have not yet removed the differences, there are signs of progress and many points of agreement, and we appeal to both leaders to intensify their efforts. Their country would reap the most beneficial results from their agreement. If they could accomplish this, they would have the gratitude of Cyprus and the esteem of the international community.

107. We are most encouraged in our sincere wishes for the prosperity of Cyprus and the concord of its citizens by the statements of the Prime Minister and

the Foreign Minister of Turkey pledging not to spare any effort or sacrifice for the achievement of peace and justice in Cyprus. The emphasis of the Prime Minister of Greece on the independent and unitary framework of Cyprus and the consolidation of *détente* and peace is likewise most welcome.

108. Today we have heard our colleagues, the Ambassador of Cyprus, the Ambassador of Turkey and the Ambassador of Greece, and we express to them our appreciation for their constructive attitudes. With all the parties we have the most intimate relationships, spiritual, cultural, political and economic, apart from the historic ties of neighbourliness which bind us all together. Therefore let us voice the sincere hope that, with the contribution of all, unity and peace will reign in independent and sovereign Cyprus.

109. Mr. SAVAGE (Sierra Leone): The Council is meeting again to consider for the second time this year the extension of the life of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus. The report of the Secretary-General, contained in document S/10005 and Corr.1 of 2 December 1970, which is before the Council and covers the period from 2 June to 1 December 1970, has provided this body with a fair, balanced and objective analysis of the situation existing in the island.

110. Our appreciation goes to the Secretary-General and to his Special Representative, Mr. Osorio-Tafall, as well as to the Force Commander, Major General Prem Chand, for the serious efforts they have made in their various areas of influence and authority to bring together the peoples of the island. Thanks to them, my delegation notes, there has been a considerable reduction in the number of shooting incidents that took place this year in comparison with previous years, and no member of the Peace-Keeping Force suffered any casualty in action during the period under consideration. We note in particular the reduction in manned military posts from fifty-nine to fifty-six.

111. It is a matter of concern to my delegation, as I believe it is to all delegations gathered here today, that no significant improvement has been made on last year's position. At the same time, it would not be doing justice to the efforts of all concerned to say that some encouraging developments had not been observed. In the area of semi-autonomous and non-governmental institutions, for example, closer co-operation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots is much in evidence. This is indeed substantiated by the return of the Turkish Cypriots to the grain and loan commissions and their participation in the newly established labour advisory board and in other areas of mutual co-operation, such as public services and social insurance and to some extent in the fields of agriculture and rehabilitation.

112. Some achievements are also noticeable in the intercommunal talks going on between the two interlocutors, Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash, who represent the Greek and Turkish Cypriot elements, and even though little significant or far-reaching gains have been

made, yet my delegation agrees with the Secretary-General's evaluation that the talks have helped considerably to reduce the political crisis, lessen tension, make it possible to conduct daily work in an easier atmosphere and thereby dissipate suspicions existing between the two sides.

113. Apart from this, however, no substantial progress has been made in advancing the intercommunal talks after two and a half years. From the report of the Secretary-General, we note that no significant advance has been made towards a return to normal conditions, particularly in the area of freedom of movement for unarmed citizens along all roads in the island.

114. Perhaps one reason preventing any major armed clashes could be attributed to the attitude of the leaders of both communities. In his address to the United Nations last October at the 1882nd plenary meeting, His Beatitude, Archbishops Makarios, specifically referred to the determination of both sides to solve their differences at the conference table. Vice-President Küçük has also made public his hopes for a solution based on a partnership which takes into account their national identities and communal interests.

115. The restraint demonstrated in the speeches of the representatives of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey this afternoon no doubt echoes the general outlooks of their Governments and reflects in the main the fact that all sides of the dispute are agreed that the problem cannot be settled by force; that an independent, sovereign and unitary State of Cyprus is desired by all without exception.

116. My delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution contained in document S/10036 because it is convinced that the removal of the Force would result in a worsening of the situation.

117. Mr. KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET (France) (*interpretation from French*): Regularly every six months our Council meets to consider a report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus. Regularly, the only solution is to ask the Security Council to extend the mandate of the United Nations Force for a further six-month period. Regularly, this recommendation is unanimously approved by the Council, in view of the agreement to such extension by the parties directly concerned.

118. The French delegation has once again supported such a resolution. However, it would like once again to indicate its misgivings at the perpetuation in Cyprus of a precarious and threatening situation. That situation has rightly been depicted by our Secretary-General as "quiet on the surface, but strained, abnormal and fraught with the serious danger inherent in the continuing close confrontation of well armed and trained forces" [*ibid.*, para. 115], and all delegations have repeated these words from the Secretary-General's excellent report.

119. The trend which we already noted last June has continued, it is true, and the number of firing incidents has again decreased. Nevertheless, in Trikomo there has been loss of life; despite the constant efforts of the United Nations Force, no progress has been made towards a desirable military disengagement; freedom of movement remains hindered; the persistence of deep mistrust and suspicion are a continuing obstacle to the return home of thousands of displaced Turkish Cypriots; while in the economic sphere, the trend towards separate development has not really been stopped. Over the years this uneasy and absurd existence has become the daily way of life for the island population. Between the two communities, though they are inevitably destined to live and to work together, the gulf grows wider every day, and armed men stand guard on either side of the abyss.

120. It is clear that the indefinite maintenance of the United Nations Force, while fortunately helping to avoid the worst, is not sufficient to prevent the rising danger. It is clear that a return to normal means that there must be, and soon, a political solution between the parties directly concerned based on a sincere desire to co-exist in peace and to co-operate with respect for the legitimate rights of the reconciled communities, but also with the constant concern to work together so that the Republic of Cyprus may be a State fully and peacefully enjoying the prerogatives of sovereignty and independence, a country where the energies of all are employed in ensuring the welfare, prosperity and dignity of all.

121. Yet this solution, which has been pursued in vain for years and which we all earnestly desire, is in no way beyond reach. Our Secretary-General already told us this in his report dated 1 June; he reminds us again today that "the elements necessary for political settlement in Cyprus do exist" [*ibid.*, para. 120] and he feels that a compromise can undoubtedly be arrived at, particularly with regard to the crucial question of local government. As of now, the report tells us, "there are a number of helpful measures which both sides could take without endangering their political and security positions" [*ibid.*, para. 116].

122. The suggestions made to the Turkish Cypriots could, if agreed to, help to create an atmosphere of greater mutual trust and go far towards improving the living conditions of their community. And a determined move on the part of the Government to solve the problem of displaced persons would perhaps help, by putting an end to a painful and alarming situation, to start things moving towards the necessary greater understanding and greater unity. The Cypriot Head of State, too, speaking at the 1882nd plenary meeting on 23 October last from the rostrum of the United Nations, assured us that "this problem is simple in nature and easy of solution when free from artificial complexities introduced from outside". His Government, as he said among other things, "was seeking a just and democratic solution based on the free will of the people of Cyprus in conformity with the principles of the Charter and the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly".

123. Finally, on 21 September last, the talks between the representatives of the two communities went into their fourth phase. In the opinion of those principally involved, "despite divergent views about major points, the local talks have provided the only course for solving differences and reaching eventual over-all agreement" [*ibid.*, para. 10].

124. Despite the profound differences that subsist on the problem of local administration, the Turkish Cypriot representative feels that "as a result of these talks. . . the political crisis had considerably abated, tension had lessened and daily work was being conducted in an easier atmosphere" [*ibid.*]. If a final settlement is unfortunately not yet in sight, the two parties, we are told, do now recognize that "a settlement can be worked out on the basis of an independent, sovereign and unitary State of Cyprus in which the two communities participate" [*ibid.*, para. 120].

125. In the circumstances, my delegation feels that the maintenance of the United Nations Force for a further period of six months could, by avoiding fresh confrontations, help to smooth what the report describes as an arduous road to a reasonable and practical compromise.

126. But it should be emphasized once again that the presence of the United Nations Force is justified only to the extent that it can facilitate such a development. The quasi-automatic prolongation, in difficult financial circumstances, of an operation decided upon almost seven years ago could certainly not be viewed favourably if its only effect was to crystallize a dangerous situation and serve as a pretext for the indefinite postponement of the necessary compromise. From that point of view I should like, in concluding, to make two comments.

127. First, like the Secretary-General we regret that the parties are still more or less reluctant to respond positively to the repeated appeals of the Special Representative, Mr. Osorio-Tafall, and the commander of the Force, General Prem Chand, "to reduce, if not altogether eliminate, close and dangerous military confrontations in several sensitive areas of the island" [*ibid.*, para. 116]. The Secretary-General's choice of the Cyprus team has been particularly fortunate. It may be said that the Cyprus team is a model team. Both parties then should take advantage of the presence of men as impartial, moderate and imbued with the spirit of justice and peace as Mr. Osorio-Tafall and his colleagues, so that they may play their role as catalysts of *détente*, *entente* and co-operation, and so that they may conciliate what is opposed and unite what is divided.

128. Our second observation is that this year's serious drought led the farmers of the two communities to co-operate more closely and to settle with ease a number of local disputes—even in zones regarded as very sensitive. This spirit of co-operation in a time of natural disaster surely suggests we can expect more of men's wisdom. The climate of reconciliation that for a while prevailed among simple peasants can surely

spread to their leaders. As the resolution says, it is the leaders that should display greater moderation and resolutely pursue their concerted efforts with new dynamism, as has also been emphasized, so that an anguished population may at last know peace.

129. There have been many such exhortations over the past seven years; in the end, they must surely be heeded.

130. Mr. MWAANGA (Zambia): My delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution contained in document S/10036 because we believe it is basically in the best interests of all the people of Cyprus.

131. It is with a certain amount of disappointment that we observe from the report of the Secretary-General that the period under review has been marked by an atmosphere of "negative stability". We have always held the view that unless substantial progress is made towards resolving the outstanding political questions on the island the presence of the United Nations Force might become a permanent feature of the island.

132. We hope that the intercommunal talks, which started two and a half years ago, will produce answers that will lead to a long-term settlement of this important problem.

133. The question of financing peace-keeping operations of the United Nations is an important and urgent one. It is obvious that the system of financing such important peace-keeping efforts of the United Nations through insufficient and uncertain voluntary contributions from Member States is unsatisfactory and unrealistic to say the least. We hope that the Security Council will recognize the absurdity of that anomaly and move speedily to take corrective measures. The Secretary-General cannot be expected to finance this expensive yet necessary effort from empty coffers.

134. We express our sincere appreciation to the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, to the Commander of the Force, to the officers, men and civilian staff of the United Nations Force in Cyprus for the commendable manner in which they have performed their important duties. We are grateful to the parties immediately concerned for the restrained manner in which they have explained their respective positions. We have every reason to believe that that feeling of cordiality will be reflected among the people of the island itself.

135. Without being over optimistic, I venture to say that this may be the last meeting of the Council I shall attend as a member of the Security Council. I therefore consider it appropriate to take leave of my colleagues on the Council. I have enjoyed working with all of them, and will always cherish the co-operation and assistance they have given me throughout my two long and sometimes bitter years as a member of the Security Council.

136. It has not always been possible for me to agree with the positions taken by certain members on all the issues that have been before the Council. I can, however, say that even when agreement did not exist understanding remained a permanent attribute of the Zambian delegation.

137. When we became members of the Security Council two years ago we had high hopes of the ability of the Security Council to resolve the outstanding problems threatening international peace and security. As we make our exit from the Council, it is necessary to state that our high hopes have been considerably deflated by the Council's inability to protect the interests of small States and to enforce its own decisions. The Council suffers from a very serious crisis of confidence in the world today and that dangerous state of affairs will continue unless this principal organ of the United Nations is prepared to grow and undergo natural changes that will bring it more in line with the realities of 1970. We cannot continue forever to live in the year 1945 and the sooner we recognize that reality the better for all of us and the better for the United Nations.

138. From a purely selfish point of view we are very happy to be coming to the end of our turn, because the Security Council will no longer have the representative of Zambia to kick around. Were someone to ask us what our contribution had been in the Council during the last two years, I would simply say, I do not know.

139. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Russian*): I believe I shall not be at fault if I express gratitude to the representative of Zambia for his personal contribution and for the contribution of his country to the work of the Security Council. I should also like to thank him for the good wishes which he has extended to the Security Council and to the members of the Council on his departure.

140. Mr. JAKOBSON (Finland): The Secretary-General states in his report on Cyprus that the situation there has remained generally calm and that no major incidents have occurred during the last six months. But the report does not convey any sense of progress. The Secretary-General, on the contrary, describes the situation as one of "negative stability". He adds that with the passing of time this situation is threatening to become a way of life in Cyprus, a way of life in which the continued presence of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force has become an integral part. This is a matter that must cause considerable concern.

141. We are, of course, aware of the complexity of the issues in the intercommunal talks and we do not underestimate the difficulties involved. But the warning repeatedly voiced by the Secretary-General that the passage of too much time might hamper rather than facilitate a settlement seems to us more than amply justified. The Security Council cannot resign itself to the automatic renewal, every six months, of the United Nations peace-keeping presence on the island. Having created the conditions in which the intercommunal talks can take place, the Council is entitled to express its firm expectation that these talks should be carried on with energy and determination.

142. While the basic problem of Cyprus remains unsolved, it is understandable that the Secretary-General has had no choice but to propose a further extension of the mandate of the United Nations Force in Cyprus. The presence of the United Nations Force continues to be, in large measure, a guarantee of continued tranquillity and a prerequisite for any prospect of progress in the intercommunal talks.

143. Since the Security Council now has decided to extend the mandate of UNFICYP, I am authorized to state that Finland is prepared to maintain its contingent with UNFICYP for the next period under the same arrangements as before. We are similarly prepared to continue voluntary financial contributions for the maintenance of the Force on the island.

144. However, with regard to the manner in which UNFICYP is being financed, I am obliged to repeat once more my Government's view that reliance on voluntary contributions, from a relatively small number of Member States, is unacceptable in principle and unsatisfactory in practice. We firmly hold the view that peace-keeping operations based on decisions that the Security Council has taken on behalf of all Member States should be paid for by all, and we trust that this principle will be upheld in any future agreement on the financing of peace-keeping operations.

145. Let me conclude by commending, on behalf of my Government, all those who have worked and continue to work, with such great patience, for a peaceful settlement in Cyprus.

146. Mr. SEVILLA-SACASA (Nicaragua) (*interpretation from Spanish*): I too wish most cordially to congratulate you, Ambassador Malik, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council. Your outstanding abilities and well-known international expertise guarantee the success of your tenure. We know that you are achieving that success to everyone's satisfaction.

147. I am also happy to congratulate the Ambassador of Syria, Mr. Tomeh, on the skilful way in which he discharged his duties as President during the month of November. We were not at all surprised at his success, for we know his diplomatic ability and his deep humanity.

148. May I now express the hopes of Nicaragua that a happy and fraternal understanding will be achieved among the noble people of Cyprus. While, in the resolution that we have unanimously adopted this afternoon, we state that "in the present circumstances the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus is still needed if peace is to be maintained in the island", nothing could please us more than to hear—and I would hope that it could be very soon—that the United Nations presence is no longer required for the maintenance of peace in that noble nation.

149. If the Republic of Cyprus is, as we know it to be, one of the great treasures of history, peace for our friends the Cypriots should be the greatest treasure

for them: peace of mind, peace in the souls of men, peace in the thoughts of men, peace in the homes of men, and peace that will reaffirm the great future of that nation, born, as were all our nations for freedom and glory.

150. That is hope of my country, Nicaragua. I speak these thoughts very happily this afternoon, congratulating our outstanding Secretary-General, U Thant, for the excellent report he has submitted to us—excellent because it is constructive and gives us guidelines regarding the United Nations operation in Cyprus. My congratulations are also addressed to his distinguished assistants, all of whom are worthy of our highest admiration.

151. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Russian*): I thank you for the words of welcome and congratulations you have addressed to the President of the Security Council.

152. Permit me now to make the following statement as representative of the SOVIET UNION.

153. The position of the Soviet Union on the question of Cyprus has been explained on many occasions in statements by the Soviet Government and in statements by representatives of the Soviet Union in the Security Council and elsewhere. This position remains fully valid and unchanged.

154. The Soviet Union has based and still bases its position on the fact that the question of Cyprus should be settled by peaceful means in the interests of the people of Cyprus and in the interests of the relaxation of tension in that part of the world. Such a settlement should be based on respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, which, as a sovereign State Member of the United Nations, pursues a policy of peace, a policy of non-alignment with military blocs.

155. There is, and there can be, no doubt that the solution of the domestic affairs of Cyprus is a matter for the Cypriots themselves. The question of Cyprus must be settled without outside interference. The lawful rights of the Greek and the Turkish people in Cyprus must be fully respected by all. The Soviet Union is resolutely opposed to any attempt to infringe upon the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus and to any plan to settle the question of Cyprus behind the back of the people of Cyprus to the detriment of their interests and to further the imperialist purposes of certain Powers which are members of NATO.

156. It is our deep conviction that, in order to ensure the complete independence and integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, all foreign troops should be withdrawn from its territory and all alien military bases there should be dismantled.

157. The Soviet delegation would also like to emphasize the need for all States Members of the United Nations to refrain from any action likely to

worsen the situation in Cyprus in accordance with Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964.

158. Today the Security Council is once again considering the Cyprus question in connexion with the report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus for the period from 2 June to 1 December 1970.

159. The Soviet delegation could not fail to note the fact that this report mentions that the talks in Cyprus between representatives of the Greek and Turkish communities are continuing with a view to settling the problems that have arisen between them. We sincerely hope for the speedy success of these talks since only through such talks, based on mutual understanding and goodwill and free from outside interference, can conditions be created which would ensure a peaceful life and security for all Cypriots—both Greek and Turkish—who are all citizens of a sovereign State, the Republic of Cyprus.

160. The delegation of the Soviet Union would, in particular, like to say that it shares the concern, expressed in the Secretary-General's report, over the lack of progress on fundamental questions in these talks.

161. The report contains a recommendation that the stationing of United Nations Forces in Cyprus should be extended once again for a further period of six months.

162. In this connexion it should be noted that almost seven years have already elapsed since the United Nations forces first appeared in Cyprus for reasons which are well known. Such a lengthy stay in the island cannot in any way be regarded as normal. The Soviet delegation still maintains that this United Nations operation cannot, and should not, continue indefinitely. It stands to reason that such a lengthy stationing of foreign troops in the territory of an independent sovereign State, even under the auspices of the United Nations, can only be a short-term exceptional measure, which should be terminated at the very first opportunity. The Soviet delegation expresses the hope that this opportunity will present itself not later than the end of the next six-month period for the stationing of United Nations forces in Cyprus. On this understanding only, and also in view of the position taken on this question by the parties concerned and, in particular, by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, the Soviet delegation will not now raise the question of the withdrawal of these forces from the territory of Cyprus.

163. With regard to the resolution just adopted by the Security Council, the Soviet delegation considers it necessary, in particular, to note that, in connexion with the proposal to extend the stationing of United Nations forces in Cyprus for a further period of six months, the resolution reaffirms the provisions of Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and also subsequent decisions of the Council on the Cyprus question. We regard this circumstance as a key factor in determining the attitude of the Soviet Union to the resolution which has just been adopted.

164. The delegation of the USSR is instructed to state that, for the reasons indicated, the Soviet Union did not vote against the adoption of the resolution providing for an extension of the stationing of United Nations forces in Cyprus for a further period of six months, on the understanding that this extension is to be effected in full accordance with the provisions of the first resolution of the Security Council on the Cyprus question to which I referred, namely, that the functions of the United Nations forces in Cyprus will remain limited as before and that the present arrangements for their financing will be maintained, that is to say that the financing will continue to be on a voluntary basis.

165. Mr. TOMEH (Syria): I have asked to speak in order to express my profound thanks and gratitude to the Ambassador of Nicaragua for the very warm and courteous thoughts he has expressed about me.

166. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Russian*): The representative of Cyprus has asked to speak in exercise of his right of reply. I now call upon him.

167. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): At the outset I should like to thank the members of the Security Council for their kind words in respect of Cyprus and for the understanding they have shown of the problem. First of all, I should like to thank particularly the representatives of Nicaragua and of Syria for their warm words concerning the history of Cyprus and its position in the world. Then I should like to refer to the deep understanding of the problem of Cyprus shown by the representative of France. He has hit the nail on the head and has shown that he has studied the question deeply and in a spirit that derives from dedication to the principles of the Charter and to the need for their application in the world if we are to have peace. I therefore thank him particularly for mentioning the rights of the Cypriot people, as a single whole, to self-determination, and also for realizing and emphasizing that the question of Cyprus is a simple one that could easily be solved if there were no outside interference.

168. Next I want to thank the representative of the United Kingdom for speaking about the independence and unity of Cyprus—about the people of Cyprus living together side by side as one people and to the United States representative for his reference to the need for a solution in Cyprus within the framework of a unified, independent and democratic State. Then I should like to thank all the other representatives who spoke about the position of Cyprus and the problem before us.

169. Now I should like to say a few words—or perhaps more than a few—to the representative of Turkey, who made a disparaging statement about the Government of Cyprus regarding an incident in Trikomo. That incident took place in a restricted military area—no one was allowed to enter it, neither Greeks nor Turks nor any one else—and as we all know, military discipline in such areas is very strict, and one has to be very careful. Suspicious movements of persons who run away when they are asked to stop

is a matter which might create a psychological situation in which the guard who has responsibility finds himself obliged to fire.

170. Now, in this case there was admittedly excess. That is why the guards were punished. But how many cases do we hear of every day in which there is such excess? According to the law, if one is in a restricted military area and is called upon to stop, and does not stop, the guard is entitled to shoot. Therefore, the coroner was not unjustified in finding that there was no criminal responsibility.

171. At the same time the guards were tried on disciplinary offenses and the court punished those responsible for so acting, in confusion. One was sentenced to forty days, and the other to two months imprisonment. The Government paid compensation of 14,000 in one case, and £ 8,000 in another, and £ 300 in yet another. So I think that this extraordinary blowing up of this case is merely a propaganda affair and has no relation to realities. But let us compare that situation with any other situation.

172. At midnight those three Turkish Cypriots chose to go into a restricted military area; they left the public road and took a special road to go there. They were in a car without lights on, and this was considered suspicious.

173. Now we come to another incident in the report: Limnitis. A Greek Cypriot teacher has missed a convoy. He therefore asks a guard from UNFICYP to accompany him to a Turkish Cypriot post in order to be allowed to go to his village for a legitimate purpose. There he is manhandled, without cause, by the Turkish armed men, merely because he asks to pass. This was not a restricted military area and he had to go there for a legitimate purpose. True, when the matter was taken up then, those responsible said: "When there is a legitimate purpose and he is accompanied by UNFICYP we will allow it", which means they recognized that it was a legitimate purpose.

174. Now I come to the other point raised by the representative of Turkey: the arms. I would remind him that Cyprus is a sovereign State, a Member of the United Nations and not a vassal State of Turkey; Turkey cannot dictate to Cyprus what it shall do and what it shall not do, what arms it should have for its police and what arms it should not have. Cyprus is a Member of the United Nations and it has complete independence and sovereignty. It may, of its own accord, accept a United Nations Force, but only to the extent that it is willing to accept such a force. From the very beginning the Republic of Cyprus has said that its decision of arming itself, when necessary, was its sovereign right. It agrees to co-operate with UNFICYP, but grants no right to any other State to interfere in its internal affairs.

175. Then I should like to point out discrepancies in statements of the representative of Turkey. On the one hand he says that he wants and treasures the independence of Cyprus, and on the other hand he

treats Cyprus as a vassal State and tramples upon its independence. On the one hand the representatives of Turkey speak about being opposed to *enosis* and wanting to save the independence of Cyprus and on the other they are ready to throw away the independence of Cyprus if they can get a part of its territory. I shall quote only one instance. The former Foreign Minister of Turkey, Mr. Erkin, said that the "radical solution . . . would be to cede one part of Cyprus to Greece and the other, closest to the Turkish Asiatic coast, to Turkey".

176. Now, why this discrepancy between proclaiming the independence of Cyprus and being so sensitive about anything that is said in a sentimental way in Cyprus about the natural desire for *enosis* on the one hand and the trampling upon independence if they were to have a bit of Cyprus, on the other?

177. These discrepancies are indicative of a situation that is not natural. It is not natural because Turkey's actions do not accord with its statements on the independence of Cyprus; we have said that very many times. If it really wanted the independence of Cyprus it would have helped in the conciliation and normalization on the island.

178. When the Turkish representative speaks of the constitutional rights of Turkish Cypriots, to what does he refer? To the divisive provisions and the imbalance of a constitution that brought the trouble. These are provisions characterized by the Mediator appointed by the Secretary-General under Security Council resolution 186 (1964) as those of the oddity of a constitution. But if these rights were to be revived they would lead to the same situation. Therefore the efforts in the talks should be to bring a logical constitution in accordance with the norms for a State that can be viable, a constitution that can be workable. So if Turkey wants to have an independent Cyprus—and we hope that Turkey will eventually come to take this position—it should help towards achieving accommodation in the sense of a unitary State, with the Greeks and Turks in Cyprus living together in a spirit of understanding and mutual respect as one people, with all their rights guaranteed but in a unified State, not in a State divided from top to bottom.

179. The representative of Turkey asks that the Cypriot Government should pay the Turkish Cypriots in the enclaves—who refuse to recognize the Government and who are in rebellion against it—a part of the revenue. The Government does a great deal in a humanitarian spirit for the Turks, but to ask the Government to subsidize with revenues an administration which is set up in opposition to it is going to the extreme. As a matter of fact, in other analogous cases there is no similar treatment. We have taken quite a different line in Cyprus, one leading towards the peaceful solution of the problem; that is what we are doing.

180. When the representative of Turkey speaks about a climate of calm on the island and about normalization, does he not agree that it must be in the sense of conciliation and not of continuing enmity? If you incite to

revenge this is not making any effort toward normalization. I am reluctant to do this, but in the circumstances I have to refer to a letter which I sent to the Secretary-General on 7 October 1970 in which I drew his attention to a speech delivered by the commander of the Turkish contingent. He said to his men that they must continue the spirit of revenge against the people of Cyprus. In his statement Cyprus is referred to as "the southern sector of Turkey". That commander, who is a responsible person, has already annexed Cyprus to Turkey and speaks of it as the southern sector of Turkey and, in another part, as "the Cypriot part of Turkey". Then he says: "Let your flame of revenge and grudge against those who aim at oppressing us and trying to usurp our rights always remain alive and let your desire for revenge last forever."

181. We are desirous of having peace and calm in the island. For that reason I did not circulate this letter; I said that we would let it alone. But when I hear so many propaganda efforts being made because of an incident in Trikomo, an incident that took place in a climate of tension—created by these types of words—I cannot help but show such inflammatory statements to the Security Council in order that it may realize the situation.

182. My main statement was made with the aim of promoting co-operation and understanding, but when such points are raised I have to reply to them.

183. The next question I have to discuss is with regard to the displaced persons. I have said that they have refused to return and that that was the main reason why more houses had not been built, as had been explained by one of the interlocutors in these talks, Mr. Clerides. When the displaced persons do not return to eleven villages out of sixteen and leave the houses unoccupied and derelict, how can the Government continue to build more houses which would not be occupied? To show that the purpose is political, I would refer to the report of the Secretary-General of 8 December 1967, which says:

"For considerable time, the Government has urged the refugees to return to their homes, assuring them that they will be in safety there, and in some villages it has repaired or rebuilt abandoned Turkish Cypriot houses in the hope that this would attract some Turkish Cypriot families back to their homes."³

But it did not attract them. The statement of the Secretary-General continues:

"These measures have so far been of no avail, however, and despite the unsatisfactory existence which they lead in the most overcrowded refugee centres, such as Kokkina, where housing facilities are so inadequate . . . [they] have not returned home.

³ *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1967, document S/8286, para. 127.*

It is known that the Turkish Cypriot leadership does not favour the return of the refugees to their former homes located in Government-controlled areas at present. To justify this position, the Turkish Cypriot leadership stresses consideration of security and safety of the refugees, although there can be little doubt that one of the major reasons for its attitude is a political one"—this is just what I have said before—"namely that as long as no acceptable political solution has been found, the maximum possible number of Turkish Cypriots must remain outside the Government's authority."⁴

184. One thing is required to solve the question of Cyprus: understanding and conciliation on the basis that Cyprus is and will remain an integral unit, undivided and unpartitioned; that the people of Cyprus are and will remain one people composed of two or more elements, but one people that are not going to be broken up, nor their country divided in two or more parts. If that position is understood and accepted, the question of Cyprus can be solved overnight.

185. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Russian*): The list of speakers is exhausted. The representative of Turkey is asking to speak, apparently in exercise of his right of reply. I now call upon him.

186. Mr. BAYULKEN (Turkey): I regret to have to speak again to make some clarifications. I believe that my main statement has already shown the basic problems with which we are faced and the difficulties inherent in the solution of this question; at the same time, it made clear the goodwill of the Turkish community as well as the determination of the Turkish Government to reach an agreed solution safeguarding the legitimate interests of all the parties concerned. As Ambassador Rossides considers that some of the points in my statement need clarification, I am afraid I have to make some clarifications relating to his points as well.

187. Regarding the Trikomo incident, I think that Ambassador Rossides tried to minimize it. In order to make it clear why I dwelt on the question at some length in my statement, I should like first to read the statement of Mr. Hassan, who was the object of the shooting, as it is set forth in the report:

"At Trikomo T junction, we decided to stop again in order to consume some brandy drinks at a nearby bar. As there were no people there, we changed mind, and continued our way to Famagusta. When we had just passed the said bar, there is on the left-hand side of the road a village track road where my friend, Fevsi, drove the car into this road. We covered about fifty yards of this village road, and we stopped our car very near to the seashore. All of us remained into the car for fresh air."—It was the month of August—"Five minutes later a Greek Cypriot National Guard reached my side and he asked me in Greek language what we were doing here. I said to him in English that we stopped here

for fresh air, but he did not understand what I said to him. . . Then the soldier ordered all of us to be alighted from the car and we did so. He then ordered us to pull up our hands and we did so, and then he made us run to the nearby military camp. Outside the gate of the camp we stopped and we were surrounded by another five or six soldiers with guns. One of these soldiers, who were all unknown to me, ordered us to in line and he started kicking us. At this particular time I heard a shot and in the meantime I saw an officer coming from the camp along the gate. After the shot, I saw my friend Fevsi lying on the ground and Mustafa started running away where the soldiers opened fire against him. At this stage, I got afraid and ran away and I was shot as well and I was wounded on my right hand. I succeeded to arrive on the Risso Famagusta road and the soldiers running after me but not shooting." [S/10005 and Corr.1, para. 41.]

188. As to the observation of Ambassador Rossides that there was some propaganda and exaggeration in the statement that I made to the Council, I should like to reply by reading further from the report of the Secretary-General:

"UNFICYP was not able to carry out a thorough enquiry into this most regrettable intercommunal incident. This was primarily due to the fact that the shooting occurred at a National Guard camp which UNCIVPOL was not able to enter. For this reason, its investigations were confined in the main to securing, where possible, relevant statements and other pertinent information as well as attending the Coroner's inquest as observers. Despite the limited scope of its inquiries, it would appear to UNFICYP that, while it was unwise for the three Turkish Cypriots involved to enter the militarily restricted area late at night in the manner in which they did, the force used by the National Guardsmen in their endeavour to hold the men in custody was obviously excessive, especially as the Turkish Cypriots were unarmed and surrounded by at least an equal number of trained and armed sentries. It is also questionable whether the behaviour of the three men that night could be considered as constituting a threat to the security of the camp." [*Ibid.*, para. 50.]

189. Ambassador Rossides said that indemnities were paid. I do not know whether we should be grateful that indemnities were paid for the killing of one man and for the wounding of two innocent unarmed men, and should express our thanks. I do not know whether the lives of innocent unarmed men are valued so cheaply that indemnities can replace them.

190. Ambassador Rossides mentioned the question of freedom on the roads. My statement takes care of that. I mentioned all the reasons why that question has important implications for the security of the Turkish Cypriots.

191. Ambassador Rossides spoke about mistreatment of a Greek Cypriot teacher. However, I understand that the report stated that this incident occurred late at night and that the unfortunate mistreatment in question was a result of a heated discussion. Therefore

⁴ *Ibid.*

there was a question of provocation for the mistreatment. In any event the Greek Cypriot teacher was not killed—there was only an embarrassment for a few minutes.

192. Ambassador Rossides stated that the question of arms was a matter for a sovereign State and that Cyprus was not a vassal State. I do not remember making any allusion in my statement suggesting that Cyprus was a vassal State. In raising this problem of arms and many other pertinent problems related to the Cyprus question I mentioned only the report of the Secretary-General and the agreement reached between the Greek Cypriot Administration and the Secretary-General and UNFICYP. Therefore I cannot follow his logic that there is any allusion suggesting that Cyprus is a vassal State. There is an agreement; that agreement has not been honoured and the Secretary-General stated that that is the case. There is also an indication in the present report that this arms question could again entail grave danger.

193. I shall now refer to the statements regarding *enosis*. Mr. Rossides mentioned that there were discrepancies in the statements of some Turkish former Ministers and that Turkey, if given a part of Cyprus, would be ready to come to a settlement. I think that sort of argument is a fallacy, because to maintain such an argument means that we are going to forget that the question of Cyprus has been discussed in the United Nations and other organizations since 1954. I cannot follow his logic. The question of *enosis* is at the heart of the problem.

194. Turkey, he said, if I quote him rightly, does not want the independence of Cyprus. That is news to me, and, I am sure, to the Members of this Organization and to all concerned, and I am really amazed at the pronouncement of such a statement. The report of the Secretary-General contains the statements of the Turkish Prime Minister and the Turkish Foreign Minister. The representative of Greece spoke of the recent meeting of our Foreign Ministers. In this Council there have been many instances indicating that the independence of Cyprus was the basis of the agreement which the two communities could promote among themselves for constitutional matters. Therefore I really wonder whether such a statement requires an answer.

195. Mr. Rossides again reverted to the "logical constitution". What is the logical constitution and the illogical constitution? Whenever Mr. Rossides or the Greek Cypriot community likes it, it is a logical constitution. When they do not like it, it is not a logical constitution. I would only remind him that the President of the Constitutional Court in Cyprus in 1960, when the Court was instituted, together with the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, pronounced more than once that the Constitution was workable and needed only goodwill to make it so. We all remember that because of such a statement and such a judgement that high officer of the independent Republic of Cyprus was hounded out of the island.

196. I am also really surprised, bitterly surprised, that Mr. Rossides said such a thing as that the Turks were in rebellion. That is news to me and, I am sure, to the members of this Council, because, when the Turks were attacked in the days of December 1963, they had these catastrophes to face: forty Turkish villages completely destroyed, fifty-seven partly ruined and twenty-seven thousand displaced persons. And now we hear that there is a rebellion on the part of the Turkish Cypriots! I think that to dwell on this is really to take up the time of the Council unnecessarily. Everybody knows what the question of Cyprus is and what the conditions are in which the Turkish Cypriots find themselves, and it is all the more amazing to find the representative of Cyprus speaking in this way when the two communities are now conducting talks with a view to achieving an agreed settlement.

197. In order to find some possible answer in regard to my very short reference to *enosis*—and I have indeed restrained myself in not quoting all the declarations by the most responsible leaders in Cyprus as regards *enosis*—I might say this. He mentioned that the commander of the Turkish contingent made a statement and in that statement he spoke of annexing part of Cyprus to Turkey. I believe that the speech of the Turkish colonel was delivered in the Turkish contingent's military camp and was addressed to his soldiers. There are many statements like that made by the officers, and there are of course many statements made by the General of the National Guard to his soldiers. However, I am putting aside the colonels and the generals. I am going to refer to more responsible people. I myself will only refer to the statement made by Mr. Komodromos, the Minister of the Interior and Defence, not six months ago, not six years ago, but on 22 November of this year. The Minister speaks of "one nation"—Cyprus. I quote from a newspaper report:

"The Minister of the Interior and Defence, Mr. Komodromos, yesterday congratulated the members of the Armed Forces on their fitness and said he was proud of such an army, ready and able to serve the country loyally and satisfactorily.

"Mr. Komodromos was addressing National Guardsmen during firing exercises at their practice range.

"The Minister called the Cyprus Army a 'Greek Army' in the same sense that fighting was a Greek virtue and the island was part and parcel of Greece.

"Mr. Komodromos expressed gratitude for the contribution of the Greek Army officers in creating a disciplined army conscious of its legacy and responsibilities.

"He concluded by expressing the wish for an early realization of national aspirations, and for an early materialization of 'one single, united and undivided Greek nation'."

198. I think I shall not revert to other statements made by even more responsible and more highly placed leaders in Cyprus.

199. Mr. Rossides also, I think, mentioned in his statement that he tried to forget the past and that he tried to be constructive. I would not challenge his intentions. On the contrary, I am very glad when he tries to be constructive. It is in that way that agreement can be achieved. However, I think he described my statement as being not constructive. I am not going to fish for compliments from the members of the Security Council, but even if I do not remember all the statements correctly, with all the words, still I remember that many representatives also spoke very highly of the Turkish representatives's statement during this debate.

200. With respect to the displaced persons, I am sorry that we have to refer to it again. What we said in our statement was that the Turkish community stands ready to reciprocate any offer which is made with goodwill, which does not try to do away with its constitutional privileges and prerogatives, and which is not made subject to political ends. In the case of the displaced persons, my answer to his clarification regarding Mr. Clerides's written or oral statement is the following, which was issued on 16 November last from the Turkish Cypriot leadership. It reads as follows:

"The complaint by Greek Cypriots that the Turkish Cypriots had not returned to the villages where some of the houses had been repaired is an excuse and tactic by the Greek Cypriots to have this matter recorded in the Secretary-General's next report.

"The position on the subject, as UNFICYP is well aware, is that Turkish Cypriot leadership has for the last two years been trying at all levels to have this matter solved as a whole, as suggested by Mr. Ortega in his report. As it is well known, this matter has also been taken up by Mr. Denktash with Mr. Clerides, both in their meetings and in writing. As is also well known by UNFICYP, the Turkish Cypriot side has all along been trying for an early solution of this matter. The individual cases the Greek Cypriots are often mentioning are not a direct responsibility of the Turkish Cypriot leadership. The return of the refugees to their villages cannot be, in the view of the Turkish Cypriot leadership, as is confirmed by Mr. Ortega in his report, solved on an individual basis because there are complex questions such as education, religion, economic matters and co-operative movements which have to be provided before all the inhabitants of a village could go back.

"Unless all the social, religious and economic requirements are catered to, it is both unrealistic and unfair to expect all the individuals to return. To use this human element as an excuse to justify Greek Cypriot unwillingness to settle this outstanding problem does not indicate good faith on the part of the Greek Cypriot leadership. This is more than clear when one considers the fact that in a single

case more than 5,000 Turkish Cypriot residents are prevented under official orders from taking up their former residences."

201. On the other hand, I shall refer very briefly to the report of the Secretary-General; I think that his judgement is very clear. He says—not to the Turkish Cypriot leadership, but to the Greek Cypriot leadership—that this is a humanitarian problem and that they should solve it. That is a very clear judgement. It is not the judgement of my delegation, but the judgement of the Secretary-General.

202. As I have said, I do not want to take the time of the Council unnecessarily. I should like to conclude my remarks by saying that the difference between the two communities is not a matter of abstractions or semantics. It is a matter of substance—a matter of substance which involves the survival of the Turkish Cypriots within an independent, sovereign and unitary State, based on local autonomy, not on local government—I stress, based on local autonomy. Phrases such as "independent and unitary", "democratic and unitary" States or Governments, are misleading, because they do not convey the sense of the basic issue, the issue that Cyprus is an independent State because it is founded on the two communities and is based on their partnership. The elimination of the independence of the one community eliminates the independence of Cyprus. It is imperative to recall these vital realities to reach an agreed and peaceful settlement.

203. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Russian*): The representative of Cyprus has asked to speak in exercise of his right of reply. I now call upon him.

204. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): Mr. President, thank you for calling on me again. I am sorry to have to take a little more time, but this time I shall be very brief.

205. The representative of Turkey has read out the statement of one of the men who was wounded in that incident. That statement confirms that they were running away when they were shot. Secondly, I agree with him that the conduct of those national guardsmen was excessive; but I said so from the very beginning. I said that it was excessive: that is why they were punished and sent to prison.

206. With regard to the logical constitution, he asked: "What is a logical constitution? Anyone's logic may form any constitution he pleases. One may say that this is logical and that the other one is illogical." I agree with him. But what I said was that a logical constitution is one based on the accepted norms. There are universally accepted norms, democratic norms, norms for unitary States and for local government or local autonomy. You cannot go outside those norms and create a sort of peculiar thing that had never existed before and that will not be workable; and if it were not workable it would lead to disruption. Then it would be said: "You see, we have tried everything. It does not work, so let us think of something else now." That

is what we want to avoid. We want a workable solution that will preserve the unity, the territorial integrity and the independence of Cyprus. That is the position which my Government holds.

207. The representative of Turkey emphasized that "local autonomy" was the right of the Turks. From what does this right derive? They claim all their rights from the Zurich and London Agreements. They speak about their rights, but every right they claim is derived from the Zurich and London Agreements. Yet even those agreements do not contain any provision about "local autonomy". How was it then introduced in the talks? It was suggested as a proposal not a right. There is no right of local autonomy under the Zurich and London Agreements on which they depend. They can say, "We want local autonomy and we no longer depend on the Zurich and London Agreements", or "We depend on the Zurich and London Agreements"—in which case they cannot claim autonomy.

208. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Russian*): The representative of Greece has asked to speak in exercise of his right of reply. I now call upon him.

209. Mr. BITSIOS (Greece) (*interpretation from French*): I cannot refrain from noting the marked predilection of the representative of Turkey, when adducing arguments, to pick up the argument of *enosis*, the union of Cyprus with Greece. May I remind him that the question of the union is not a question that exclusively concerns his Government or the Government of Cyprus. There is a third party concerned, and that is Greece. The representative of Turkey knows full well that in a desire to contribute to peace and stability in the region, the Government of Greece made the great sacrifice of agreeing that the solution with respect to Cyprus would be an independent State. I have spoken of sacrifice because if 80 per cent of the population on Cyprus had been of Turkish origin, Turkey would doubtless not have made the same gesture.

210. But, as I have said, the Greek Government agreed that the negotiations for a new solution would be based upon the independence of Cyprus. But what is our colleague from Turkey trying to do? Is he trying to challenge the good faith of the Greek Government? I mentioned the communiqué issued a few days ago in Brussels, from which it appears that his Foreign Minister does not challenge the good faith of Greece regarding that solution. Together with the Foreign Minister of Greece, he declared the desire to see the negotiations continued until a solution was arrived at. I am therefore constrained to think, when Mr. Bayulken, time after time raises the question of *enosis*, that he does not send a message of peace to the island of Cyprus, for I am sure that outside the United Nations it is in Cyprus that the words pronounced here are heard.

211. I regret to note that the statement made today by the representative of Turkey was one of the most pessimistic he has ever given. He read and studied the report, and in his statement raised only its pessimistic aspects, contrary to the statement of the representa-

tive of Greece, who read the report seeking to find and stress its optimistic aspects so as to send to Cyprus an optimistic message, a message that would open the door to the conclusion of negotiations. In effect, the representative of Turkey only spoke of the Trikomo incident; he spoke of the question of weapons; he only spoke of *enosis*. He has done nothing but dig up the past. And in his second statement he spoke of the independence of Cyprus as subject to the independence of one party or the other. My delegation finds that very difficult to understand. Cyprus is an independent State. It is a Member of the United Nations. It has a sovereign Government which the representative of Turkey refuses to call a government; he consistently refers to it as an "administration". I recall that in 1964 the then representative of the Soviet Union squarely asked the representative of Turkey whether he challenged the existence of the Government. He replied that he did not and that Turkey had an ambassador in Cyprus. I would therefore suggest that if, as all members of the Security Council seem to have stated, we want the Cyprus negotiations to succeed, we should adopt a more moderate and optimistic tone.

212. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Russian*): The representative of Turkey has asked to speak for a second time in exercise of his right of reply. I now call upon him.

213. Mr. BAYULKEN (Turkey): I shall be very brief.

214. To answer Mr. Rossides on the international norms of which he spoke, I should like only to remind him that when, in 1960, all the parties agreed on the Constitution of Cyprus, following negotiations between the two communities, there was no question of the Constitution not conforming to international norms. That is something new, an innovation. But now that the two communities are working to find an agreed solution—a new, mutually acceptable basis for a new constitutional framework—I think that it is useless to insist on what conforms or does not conform with international norms.

215. With regard to what the representative of Greece said concerning my mentioning *enosis*—that I might be questioning the goodwill of his Government—I think that it is irrelevant. It has not been my intention to question his Government's goodwill; but I would kindly remind him that optimism based on reality is durable while optimism based on words might in the end deceive everyone. On the other hand I should also like to stress another fact: administrations may change but nations and States remain. Therefore the parties in question should be very careful to reach an agreement that will be real, durable and mutually acceptable.

216. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Russian*): The representative of Cyprus has asked to speak for a third time in exercise of his right of reply. I now call upon him.

217. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): Fortunately, as speakers exercise their right of reply for the second

and third time they become briefer and briefer. This statement will be extremely short.

218. When I referred to logicity and international norms I was not referring to the past but to the agreement we are now going to have. I said that the agreement must be based upon accepted norms. We must not have another form of Constitution that is an oddity and therefore unworkable.

219. I think this discussion has been helpful because it has elicited from my colleague from Turkey certain statements that are helpful. First we heard from him officially and in this hall that Turkey does not intend to have any kind of partition or division in Cyprus and that it is dedicated to the independence of Cyprus. We welcome that statement, and we accept it. And we now expect—and this is a heavy responsibility—that Turkey's policy in Cyprus will be one tending to conciliation and the creation of a spirit of co-operation and unity among the people of Cyprus so that the independent Republic of Cyprus can continue to exist, blossom and progress in peace.

220. This discussion has been constructive. I believe we can part now with the satisfaction that at least we may have an optimistic view of what is going to happen in the future.

221. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Russian*): The representative of Turkey has asked to speak in exercise of his right of reply. I now call upon him.

222. Mr. BAYULKEN (Turkey): I shall be much more brief. With regard to the statement of Ambassador Rossides, I hope for "mutual acceptance and agreed solution this time", and we all hope, very fervently, that when it comes, it will be "logical" and will not again be defined as "illogical", as was their contention concerning the 1960 Constitution.

223. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Russian*): If the reciprocal exercise of the right of reply by the parties represented here is now concluded, we will assume that the discussion of the question under consideration has been completed and we shall proceed to adjourn the meeting.

224. Before adjourning the meeting, since all representatives taking part in the session of the General Assembly are present here, I should like to voice a wish for the successful completion of the Assembly's work as it appears that no further meetings of the Security Council are expected before the end of the session.

225. Secondly, I should like to wish all representatives present here a happy Christmas and New Year holiday. And, in conclusion, I should like to express the hope that between now and the end of December and throughout the whole of the coming New Year there will be peace on earth and that there will be no need for urgent and special meetings to consider disputes. On this note, we will conclude today's meeting.

The meeting rose at 6.35 p.m.

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