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1545th MEETING: 17 JULY 1970

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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

FIFTEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-FIFTH MEETING

Held in New York on Friday, 17 July 1970, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. Guillermo SEVILLA SACASA
(Nicaragua).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Burundi, China, Colombia, Finland, France, Nepal, Nicaragua, Poland, Sierra Leone, Spain, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Zambia.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1545)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. The question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa:

Letter dated 15 July 1970 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the representatives of Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Dahomey, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, India, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, People's Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yugoslavia and Zambia (S/9867).

Expression of thanks to retiring President and statement by the President

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): As we begin our work this afternoon, I should like to express to Ambassador Khatri of Nepal the thanks of the Council for the magnificent services he rendered to the Council as its President for the month of June.
2. I wish to greet all the distinguished ambassadors and the Secretary-General. It is a great honour for me to participate in the work of this Council with so many illustrious personalities from enlightened nations. In addition, it is a privilege for me to be President of this body to which the Charter of our Organization has assigned the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. I am occupying the post of President of this Council which many of you have honoured in the past twenty-five years, and it is my turn to do so just after our celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the signing of the

Charter of this Organization. Only a short time ago, on 26 June, we met in San Francisco and recalled the memorable Conference which had as its principal aim the organization of the world in law, freedom, justice, peace and security.

3. When I became a member of the Council as representative of Nicaragua, I stated [*1527th meeting*] that the legislators of San Francisco did not expect the post-war world to be free from international tensions—indeed they knew that tensions would continue to exist—and therefore that our mission would be to find ways to resolve those tensions.

4. The peoples of the world are aware that in this building the General Assembly of our Organization meets annually, with the participation of 126 nations; but they also know that here meets the Security Council, with the very grave responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. It would be wrong for the peoples of the world to believe that around this table there is much talk but little or no action. Let us act resolutely and carry out as men the responsibility which destiny has assigned us. Of course, we are not a government, but let us not forget that it is our right and obligation to express our views on the serious situations confronting the world.

5. I have said that the San Francisco Conference was primarily intended to organize the world within a system of law, freedom, justice, peace and security. All those concepts are intimately related. Peace is inconceivable without law, freedom and justice. Security is inconceivable without peace.

6. It is a fortunate coincidence that it is the turn of the representative of Nicaragua to preside over the Security Council during the month of July. In this month of July, which has rightly been called the month of freedom, there are a number of memorable dates. There is also a good deal in this month from which we may derive inspiration. It is with great pleasure that I note that never before in July have so many nations represented in the Security Council celebrated their national holidays. On 1 July the national holiday of Burundi was celebrated; 4 July was the national holiday of the United States; 14 July was Bastille Day in France; tomorrow, 18 July, is the national holiday of Spain; 20 July is the national holiday of Colombia; and 22 July is the national holiday of Poland. All these countries are members of the Security Council at this time, and this is indeed a fortunate coincidence for us all, particularly for me, as representative of

Nicaragua. As President of the Council, I am sure I am interpreting the feelings of the members of the Council in expressing most cordial greetings to the ambassadors of Burundi, the United States, France, Spain, Colombia and Poland and congratulating them on their national holidays.

7. In this inspiring month of July then let us endeavour to find the way, so often lost, to international peace and security. I am at the disposal of the Council.

8. Mr. KHATRI (Nepal): Mr. President, first of all, I should like to welcome you to the Presidency of the Security Council. As one whom we all recognize to be the embodiment of the Latin American sense of fairness and justice and a vast reservoir of diplomatic experience, you, Mr. President, are eminently suited to the exalted office which you now hold. Please accept our best wishes and pledge of co-operation. I should also like to thank you for your expression of friendly sentiments towards me personally and for your complimentary words concerning my Presidency of the Security Council during the month of June.

9. May I take advantage of this occasion to express my gratitude to all members of the Security Council for the courtesy and co-operation extended to the Chair in the course of our meetings and in formal consultations resulting in the adoption of two unanimous decisions.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa:

Letter dated 15 July 1970 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the representatives of Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Dahomey, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, India, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, People's Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yugoslavia and Zambia (S/9867)

10. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I would inform the members of the Council that the representatives of Mauritius [S/9872], Somalia [S/9874] and India [S/9873] have requested to be invited to participate in the consideration of the question appearing as item two on the agenda. If there are no objections, I propose to invite the representatives that I have just mentioned, in accordance with established practice in the Council, to take seats at the Council table and to participate in the debate without the right to vote.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. R.K. Ramphul (Mauritius), Mr. A.A. Farah (Somalia) and Mr. S. Sen (India) took places at the Council table.

11. The PRESIDENT: (*interpretation from Spanish*) Before calling on the first speaker on my list, I should like to inform members of the Council that this meeting has been convened at the request of thirty-nine Members of the United Nations that the Council resume consideration of the question of racial conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa, in order to examine, in particular, the situation produced by violations of the arms embargo called for in earlier Security Council resolutions. The letter requesting this meeting is contained in document S/9867.

12. I should also like to inform the Council that the representative of Chad has requested that the name of his country be added to the list of signatories of the request contained in document S/9867, so that the number of countries requesting this meeting is now forty.

13. I should also like to draw the attention of members of the Council to the letter of 2 July on this item contained in document S/9858, addressed to the President of the Council by the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa.

14. I now call on the first speaker on my list, the representative of Mauritius.

15. Mr. RAMPHUL (Mauritius): Mr. President, first of all I should like to thank you, as well as all members of the Security Council, for acceding to my request to participate in this meeting of the Security Council. I am grateful to you, Sir, for allowing me to address the Council at this stage.

16. It is my privilege and honour to represent the African Group at the United Nations at this meeting of the Security Council, which we hope will result in positive and resolute action commensurate with the situation as defined in the communication dated 15 July by which a number of African States and others requested the convening of the Security Council [S/9867].

17. The question of racial conflict arising from the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa has been before the Council since 1960 when the Council had to take up the matter following the Sharpeville massacre. Apart from appeals to the South African Government to abandon its racist and repressive policies which that Government has rejected with impunity, and attempts at searching for a solution to the South African problem through studies by experts, the only concrete measure instituted by this body against South Africa has been the embargo on the supply of arms and military equipment to South Africa.

18. The African States, as loyal Members of the United Nations, are anxious to see that any meaningful measure is not defeated. This is the reason why they have decided to request the Council to review the question of racial conflict in South Africa, particularly the whole question of arms embargo, with a view to strengthening its own decision and to taking other effective measures, having regard to the Council's primary role in maintaining peace and security throughout the world.

19. May I recall that, by that decision, the Security Council called upon all States to cease forthwith the sale and shipment to South Africa of arms, ammunition of all types, military vehicles and equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition in South Africa. It is our belief that the full implementation of that resolution would have put an end to the acquisition by South Africa of arms and military equipment. However, as members of the Council may note in the reports of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*, and particularly in a "Note on military forces and equipment of the Republic of South Africa" prepared by the Rapporteur of the Special Committee in document A/AC.115/L.279 and Corr.1, which has been transmitted to the Security Council, the South African Government, in spite of the Council's embargo, has continued to receive arms and military equipment as well as spare parts for military equipment from a number of countries, and has been able to receive licences, technical assistance and foreign capital for a great expansion of the manufacture of arms, ammunition, military vehicles and other equipment. Member States which have contributed to this military build-up of South Africa are listed in the note by the Rapporteur. If we take into account the number of items listed in paragraph 42 of that note, France has been the major supplier.

20. Of course France and the other countries concerned will probably say that their supplies have been made either under contracts entered into before August 1963, when the resolution on the arms embargo [181 (1963)] was adopted, or in accordance with their stated views that the embargo covers only arms which can be used for internal repression and for imposing *apartheid* and that, consequently, they can provide South Africa with the arms and equipment it needs for its external defence.

21. The African States feel that such a restrictive interpretation of the resolution defeats its purpose, since most of the arms which these Member States would like to include in the category covered by the embargo are manufactured in South Africa. The African States would like to believe that it was not the intention of the Council in 1963 and 1964 to adopt empty and ineffective resolutions.

22. At this stage, we should like to ask members of this responsible, august body to review and clarify the situation. Our position is that all those who have contributed to the military build-up of South Africa since August 1963 have contravened the arms embargo.

23. Taking into account the situation obtaining in southern Africa and the commitment of South Africa in the whole area, the African States believe that the distinction between arms and equipment for internal security and arms for external defence is no longer valid for the following reasons. An armed conflict is now opposing the forces of the liberation movements of the oppressed peoples of southern Africa to the armed forces of their oppressors. South Africa has committed itself, not only to a policy of repression of the organized movements of the opponents of its policies of *apartheid*, but also to a policy of military and economic support of the white minority régimes in southern Africa.

24. On 30 January 1970, the President of South Africa reminded us that South Africa had deployed security forces on the northern borders of Namibia, in the Caprivi, and on the northern borders of Southern Rhodesia in order, he said, "to counter the possibility of terrorist infiltration". He also stated that the South African Defence Force had continued unabatedly to extend its preparedness for action on land, in the air and at sea in order to resist any form of military aggression that could possibly be committed against the Republic. Unconventional warfare was receiving special attention, he added.

25. I should like to invite the attention of distinguished members of the Council to the nature and requirements of the unconventional warfare mentioned by the South African State President. The type of operations that South Africa and Southern Rhodesia have been conducting against the combined forces of the liberation movements of South Africa and Zimbabwe cannot be regarded as simple police operations, requiring only small arms. We are witnessing in southern Africa a guerrilla warfare which is not different from that waged in the guerrilla wars that are raging in other parts of the world.

26. The African States submit that, in this unconventional warfare against the liberation movements, South Africa has been using arms and equipment supposedly supplied for its external defence. One should certainly include in this category some types of aircraft. In this connexion, I should like to draw your attention to the statement of the South African Minister of Defence, reported in the communication dated 2 July 1970 to the Council, document S/9858. The Defence Minister said that the South African Air Force was being geared to a new peak of readiness to combat "terrorists"—meaning the freedom fighters—and that South Africa's most recent orders for aircraft were those types which were designed to play an important role in unconventional or guerrilla warfare.

27. In *The Observer* of London, Mr. Colin Legum, on 21 June 1970, reminded all concerned that the helicopters supplied by France and the Buccaneer aircraft supplied earlier by Britain were extensively used for internal security, although ostensibly intended only for purposes of external defence. The situation is clear, and we believe that the Security Council can draw the conclusions that are called for.

28. It should be recalled that the struggle of the liberation movements has been recognized as legitimate by the United Nations and that Member States have been requested to provide increased assistance to the movements. The African States have come to wonder, in this context, whether those Member States which provide South Africa with weapons and equipment which can be used against the freedom fighters realize that they are actively arming the enemy.

29. The Organization of African Unity is committed to active support of the liberation struggle, and for this reason it would like to know who are the enemies of Africa. We submit that those who are assisting and arming the colonialists and racists of southern African cannot be regarded as our friends.

30. The African States are calling for a complete embargo on the supply of arms, ammunition, military equipment and vehicles to South Africa, not only because South Africa is relying on its constant military build-up to defy the United Nations with regard to Namibia and Southern Rhodesia, but also, and more particularly, because this military build-up constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security in the region. South Africa has repeatedly threatened the independent States of Southern Africa for their support of the opponents of *apartheid*.

31. President Kaunda stated on 4 December 1969:

"It is quite clear to us that South Africa will not use the Buccaneers, the Mirages, the Shackletons, the Impalas, etc., and all the missiles and various armaments supplied by the West or . . . the Western interests. She will definitely use them against Zambia and all other independent African countries determined to make African independence a reality . . .

" . . . We will not sit idly by and watch the West arm the South Africans, who have made their intentions clearly known. They have not only threatened to attack us. They have in fact encouraged others to do so. Already, equipment supplied by Britain, France and the United States has been used against us by the allies of South Africa. Aircraft supplied by Western countries have been used to violate our airspace."

32. We trust that those who are contravening the Council's embargo will see clearly that they are sowing the seeds of a violent conflict not only in southern Africa, but in the whole of Africa, a conflict which will certainly involve non-African nations as well. As we pointed out in our communication to the Council, a disturbing aspect of the situation is that the failure of the Security Council to denounce the violations of the embargo had encouraged others to reconsider their commitment to the observance of the embargo.

33. Above all, we are concerned about the position which the new British Government might take on the matter. We are aware of the statement, in 1968, by Sir Alec Douglas-Home, then "Shadow Foreign Minister", assuring the South Africans that when the

Conservatives returned to power they would resume arms supplies to South Africa, and of the fact the Tory campaign guide had endorsed this position. We are disturbed by press reports published when the South African Foreign Minister met the new British Foreign Secretary in London early this month. According to those reports, the new British Government was expected to move swiftly in lifting the arms embargo, Conservative Ministers being solidly determined to defend the decision, as export orders could be worth £225 million over the next three years. According to the *Guardian* of 23 June, the Conservative Government has even already decided to resume the sale of arms to South Africa. This, the newspaper added, had been agreed between the Prime Minister and his Foreign Secretary and was the first major policy decision of the Heath administration in foreign affairs.

34. *Le Monde* of 3 July stated:

" . . . the commercial argument for lifting the embargo is not to be slighted. The South African market represents more than 150 million pounds in military supplies which other countries, France and Germany to start with, are getting ready to provide if the British do not."¹

35. The African States request the Security Council to intervene in this arms trafficking by strengthening its arms embargo and making it mandatory.

36. Should the British Government actually resume the supply of arms and military equipment to South Africa, it would go against the wishes of the majority of the members of the Commonwealth who believe that the British Government would be encouraging the racist Government of Pretoria to pursue its policies of *apartheid*. The question then arises: is the United Kingdom planning to live independently of the Commonwealth?

37. Considering that the United Kingdom has long-term economic interests in the rest of Africa, we also wonder whether the British Government is willing to jeopardize those interests for the short-term profit it would derive from the sale of arms to South Africa. We then ask the British Government: is the United Kingdom planning to live independently of the rest of Africa?

38. Finally, we submit that any decision by the British Government to resume the sale of arms to South Africa would seriously prejudice the efforts of the United Nations in upholding in that country the purposes of the Charter and the fundamental freedoms and human rights. We therefore ask a last question: is the United Kingdom, a permanent member of the Security Council, planning to wreck the efforts of the United Nations by aiding and abetting the South African racists? We hope that the Security Council will face up to its responsibilities and take all the necessary measures that are required to strengthen its arms embargo and make it mandatory.

¹ Quoted in French by the speaker.

39. The PRESIDENT: (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of Somalia.

40. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): Mr. President, my delegation would like to thank you—and through you the members of this Council—for extending to it the courtesy of allowing it to participate in this debate.

41. The people and Government of the Somali Democratic Republic are totally committed to the international campaign against *apartheid*. As the President of the Somali Revolutionary Council, General Mohammed Siad Barre, said in an address to the nation on 1 July—the occasion of the tenth anniversary of independence—“Our enjoyment of independence and freedom is meaningless and futile when our brothers in southern Africa are oppressed and denied their inalienable rights”.

42. The Security Council last discussed the question of the South African Government's racist policies in June 1964. At the conclusion of its debate the late Adlai Stevenson, the representative of the United States, said:

“ . . . let me express the hope, which I am sure is common to all the representatives here present, that when we next meet on this question we will be able to perceive more improvement in the racial situation in South Africa than we have heretofore.”
[1135th meeting, para. 50.]

43. Six years have passed since that statement was made but, regrettably, instead of improvement there has been—again to cite a phrase of the late Adlai Stevenson—“calculated retrogression”. I will, in the course of my statement, give an account of some of the principal developments that have contributed to the present unsatisfactory and disturbing situation, but, before I do so, allow me to recall briefly why it had been considered that action by the Security Council was necessary and some of the important conclusions that emerged from the Security Council's consideration of the question in 1963 and 1964. Against that background subsequent developments will be better understood and the nature and extent of our task clearly projected.

44. By 1963 it had become obvious to many Member States that the South African Government had not responded in any way, and had no intention of responding in the slightest degree, to their collective and individual attempts to persuade it to abandon the policies of *apartheid*. It was obvious to those States that the policy of peaceful persuasion, of diplomatic initiative of keeping the door open so that reason and morality might prevail had failed dismally. The Good Offices Commission, the United Nations Commission on the Racial Situation in the Union of South Africa of 1952, direct consultations between the Secretary-General and the Government of South Africa in 1961, and discussions in the various organs of the United Nations had all been unsuccessful attempts at peaceful persuasion.

45. In the course of the debates of 1963 and 1964 the following general principles emerged as the basis for Security Council action. First, the Council reaffirmed that *apartheid* is evil and abhorrent and that it is incompatible with the moral, social and constitutional principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Second, it was recognized that all Member States of the United Nations are committed to take action in co-operation with the Organization to promote the observance of human rights without distinction as to race. Third, it was reaffirmed that the policies and practices of *apartheid* are of proper and legitimate concern to the United Nations. Fourth, it was agreed that the *apartheid* policies of South Africa had led to a situation which was seriously disturbing international peace and security, and that Member States should take such separate or collective action as was open to them in conformity with the Charter to bring about an abandonment of those policies.

46. Having noted those general lines of action agreed upon by the Security Council, let us take note of some of the principal measures which the Security Council proposed should be taken to deal with the situation. In resolution 181 (1963) of 7 August 1963 the Council called upon the South African Government to abandon its racist policies and to liberate all persons imprisoned, interned or subjected to other restrictions for having opposed those policies. The resolution also addressed itself to the international community by calling upon all States to cease the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition of all types and military vehicles to South Africa.

47. When the Security Council convened four months later to resume consideration of the question and to consider the Secretary-General's report on developments during the interim period,² it found that there had been no improvement in the situation. In the face of the South African Government's refusal to comply with its demands the Security Council appealed to all States to comply with the arms embargo called for in resolution 181 (1963) and strengthened the provisions of the embargo by including in it the sale and shipment of equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition.

48. At the 1135th meeting of the Council in June 1964 the call for an arms embargo was reaffirmed, the *apartheid* policies of the South African Government were again condemned, and an expert committee composed of representatives of each present member of the Security Council was formed to undertake a technical and practical study concerning the feasibility, effectiveness and implications of measures which could, as appropriate, be taken by the Council under the Charter of the United Nations.

49. In the course of those sessions several delegations urged that the Council take more resolute measures commensurate with the realities of the situation and

² See *Official Records of the Security Council, Eighteenth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1963*, document S/5438 and Add.1-6.

proposed that these should include coercive action under Chapter VII of the Charter. There were expressions of views opposing that line of action, notably from three of the permanent members of the Security Council who happen also to be among the main trading partners of South Africa. They urged continued discussion and persuasion through public and private diplomacy. Unfortunately, that approach continued to be championed by the same States in the years that followed, even though they were fully aware that it would achieve no results.

50. However, let us now examine the extent to which the hopes for improvement in the racial situation in South Africa have been fulfilled. In August 1963 the United Kingdom representative said in the Security Council debate:

“ . . . we believe that the situation in South Africa cannot continue. One Government should not ignore the voice of the rest of the international community, which tells them clearly that *apartheid* is wrong and can lead only to disaster and misery . . .

“We must also believe that the Government of South Africa, even at this late hour, cannot be indifferent to a clear call from the Council to find a new path to justice, freedom and prosperity for all its people, and to recover good standing in the world as a whole.” [1054th meeting, paras. 92 and 93.]

51. The futility of that belief has been clearly illustrated by developments not only in South Africa but in the whole of southern Africa since 1963. All Members of this Organization without exception are aware that the Government of South Africa continues to ensure the widest and severest application of the policies of *apartheid*. There has been no relaxation, for example, in the application of the Group Areas Act of 1950. Hundreds of thousands of Africans have been forcibly moved from their homes to tribal areas with which they have had little or no contact in the past or to areas where they are relocated against their will. In Johannesburg alone 133,000 Africans have been affected by Group Areas removals. In answer to a parliamentary question last year, the South African Minister of Community Development disclosed that 59,000 coloured families and 36,000 Asian families had been affected by the declaration of the Group Areas Act as of 30 December 1968. The Minister refused to disclose the figures for African families involved since it is now the policy to withhold such information.

52. However, *The New York Times* of 12 July this year carried a dispatch by a special correspondent writing from Johannesburg, who claimed that the South African Government had revealed: “that there were 3.8 million ‘superfluous’ blacks in urban areas who would be resettled”. The dispatch continued: “Plans have just been announced for the removal of 100,000 blacks from the vital Natal watershed under pressure from eight white farm associations.”

53. It may not be easy for many of us to imagine the misery and suffering that such uprooting entails,

unless they have experienced similar situations, such as those that prevailed during the régime of Nazi Germany or that still prevail in the Middle East. The correspondent of that newspaper also commented on the situation arising from the notorious pass law system. He writes:

“It is estimated that nearly two million people, nearly all blacks, were prosecuted as criminals last year for infringements of the pass laws, which restrict freedom of movement, place of residence and choice of occupation.”

54. The human suffering caused by such wholesale arrests and the accompanying process of endorsing Africans out of the urban areas is incalculable. For hundreds of thousands of Africans, it means broken families, unemployment, poverty, bewilderment and racial bitterness. What of the much-touted Bantustans which are supposed to provide for the separate but equal development of the black people of South Africa? *The New York Times* of 13 July this year quotes Chief Buthelezi of the Zulus on the subject of the desegregated Zulu homeland. He said: “An explosive situation is building up. People are asking for food, land, jobs, and I have nothing to give them. The reserves are full to capacity”.

55. To ensure the permanence of the racist system there has been a steady corrosion, since 1964, of the political and legal rights of the non-white population—a corrosion so pervasive that it has even affected the rights of the white citizens of South Africa. Among the more notorious legislative acts is the Terrorism Act of 1967, which gives so wide a definition to the label “terrorist” that it can be applied to anyone the South African authorities wish to punish.

56. Another piece of repressive legislation is the Suppression of Communism Amendment Act, No. 24 of 1967. One of its provisions is the debarring of listed or convicted so-called communists from practising the legal profession. The conveniently loose interpretation given to the term “communism” by the South African Government practically guarantees that only those members of the legal profession who support the racist policies of South Africa will be able to practise in the country. Furthermore, there has been no relaxation in the brutal treatment of opponents of *apartheid* although this matter has been the subject of many denunciations by the General Assembly and by other Committees of the United Nations.

57. These developments alone would be sufficient for the United Nations to conclude that the hopes cherished in 1963 and 1964 for an improvement in the situation have been dashed. But in addition, the threat to human rights and to peace presented by the existence of *apartheid* has assumed a new dimension. Since 1964 the South African Government has made attempts to extend its policy of racial discrimination to neighbouring territories. As pointed out by the Secretary-General this development has given rise to a loss of faith in many quarters in the possibility of peaceful evolution towards a society based on justice and equality. The

Secretary-General added that those attempts had increased the danger that the continued pursuit of *apartheid* would not only increase tensions within the whole of South Africa but bring about racial conflagration.

58. This development is evident in the relations of South Africa with the neighbouring territories of Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique and Angola where the régimes of Ian Smith and of the Portuguese colonial Government are being sustained through the active and open support of South African money, trade and arms. In Southern Rhodesia, the racist régime has been able to withstand economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations primarily because of South African and Portuguese collaboration, although some other Members of this Organization are not without guilt. Liberation movements in Southern Rhodesia have not only to contend with the forces of their oppressors but with those of South Africa. The Portuguese administration, which is now employing more than 150,000 troops to contend with the activities of the liberation movements in the territories of Angola and Mozambique, is being given substantial financial aid and military assistance by South Africa.

59. If I have dwelt at some length on some of the developments that have taken place in the six years following the last meeting of the Security Council on this subject, it has been done with the purpose of illustrating that there has not been any improvement in the lot of the non-white peoples of South Africa. Contrary to the hopes that had been raised at the time by the announcement of the arms embargo and by the renewed commitment of the permanent members of the Security Council to take appropriate action to persuade South Africa to abandon its racist policies, there has been a worsening of the political situation both in South Africa and in the neighbouring territories. The situation is far more dangerous than it was in either 1963 or 1964. Yet, at that time the Council described the situation as "seriously disturbing international peace and security".

60. It will be recalled that several Council members, including the Afro-Asian members, considered the situation at the time dangerous enough to merit action under Chapter VII. Surely, if the situation in 1964 could be described as "seriously disturbing international peace", subsequent developments which I have just described have made the situation a clear threat to international peace and security. The evidence lies in the intensification and extension of the *apartheid* laws, the mounting resistance within the country, the illegal presence of the South African Government in Namibia—itself an act of aggression—the adoption of racist laws by the Ian Smith régime and the deployment of South African armed units in Southern Rhodesia, the military collaboration of South Africa with the Portuguese colonial régimes in Angola and Mozambique, the rise of liberation movements and the outbreak of guerrilla warfare.

61. With these developments in mind, it is necessary for the Security Council to take stock of the situation

in southern Africa and more specifically to inquire how the South African Government has been able to acquire the military and economic power to carry out its internal and external aggressions with impunity and while it was subject to an arms embargo.

62. Permit me to recall that when the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 182 (1963) of 4 December 1963, three permanent members of the Security Council, namely, the United States, the United Kingdom and France, qualified their compliance with the resolution in the following terms.

63. Sir Patrick Dean, the United Kingdom representative said:

"The decision of the Security Council on 7 August called on all States 'to cease forthwith the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition of all types and military vehicles to South Africa'. Although we abstained on that resolution, I explained that we would comply with it in the sense that no arms would be exported to South Africa from the United Kingdom which would enable the policy of *apartheid* to be enforced.

"... Since it is our position that arms should not be exported enabling the policy of *apartheid* to be enforced, we are equally prepared to take steps to prevent the sale and shipment of equipment and materials for the manufacture of such arms.

"My Government will thus interpret operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution by operating our export licensing system to cover equipment and materials clearly designed and intended for the manufacture of such arms and ammunition. If there is any plant or machinery clearly designed for the maintenance of such arms and ammunition, we shall also prevent its sale and shipment to South Africa." [1078th meeting, paras. 16, 17 and 18.]

64. The representative of France stated:

"... I would recall to the Council that last summer—as I said here on 6 August—my Government had already been considering what steps it could take to help improve the disturbing situation in South Africa. I stated that the French authorities would take all the steps they considered necessary to prevent the sale to the South African Government of weapons which could be used for purposes of repression. Today I am authorized to state that in the future these steps will apply also to equipment and material for the manufacture and maintenance of such weapons." [Ibid., para. 31.]

65. The representative of the United States stated:

"Such considerations as these led the United States more than a year ago to announce a policy forbidding the sale to the South African Government of arms and military equipment whether from Government or commercial sources, which could be used to enforce *apartheid*.

"And they led to our decision, which I announced in this chamber last August, to terminate all sales of military equipment to the Government of South Africa by the end of this calendar year"—that is, 1963—"subject to our honouring existing contracts and our right, as I then stated:

" . . . to interpret this policy [in the future] in the light of requirements for assuring the maintenance of international peace and security.

" If the interests of the world community require the provision of equipment for use in the common defence effort, we would naturally feel able to do so without violating the spirit and intent of this resolution . . ." [Ibid., paras. 60 and 61.]

66. At the time when these commitments to the arms embargo were made by the permanent members of the Security Council and others, there was considerable hope that the lead given by them in particular in this direction would assure the success of the embargo. But as the following statistics will show, this was not to be the case. When the embargo was declared in 1963 the South African defence budget for 1962-1963 was just under R12 million and the South African standing army had reached the figure of 12,700. Today, in 1970, the defence budget is R272 million and the standing army has a regular strength of 39,700 and numbers 85,500 when fully mobilized. To equip this army the South African Government has acquired by purchase and through manufacture a formidable arsenal of weapons of every description.

67. As the note entitled "Military Forces and Equipment of the Republic of South Africa" issued by the Special Committee on *Apartheid*³ indicates, the South African armed force has about 500 military aircraft, about 100 helicopters, about 200 tanks, several hundred armoured vehicles, about thirty naval ships, a wide array of missiles, and facilities—extensive facilities—for manufacturing a wide variety of arms, ammunition and military equipment.

68. Of course, this situation has not come as a surprise to anyone who has followed or who has been concerned enough to read the annual reports of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*. Each year the report has contained details of the growth of South Africa's military machine, and has pointed to the sources of the military assistance which the South African Government was receiving. In nearly every year reference has been made to the central role played by France in providing such assistance. By 1968, South Africa had become France's third biggest customer for the sale of military equipment, coming after Israel and Belgium. It led the French newspaper *Le Monde*, in its issue of 25 June 1969, to comment:

"The South African armed forces, among the strongest on the African continent, are equipped with French material, from submarines and radar equipment to helicopters and Mirage fighter planes. The

excuse most often cited by the De Gaulle régime was that the types of weapons furnished by France are unlikely to be used as instruments of repression against the African populations. This, however, is not a very convincing argument, and there is no question that they have been used outside the borders of the Republic, notably in Angola and South West Africa."

69. The Secretary of the Anti-Apartheid Movement in the United Kingdom, Abdul S. Minty, has made a special study of the arms situation in South and southern Africa, and has published his findings in a booklet entitled *South Africa's Defence Strategy*.⁴ In his view, the major loophole in the international arms embargo is the ease with which Western Governments permit South Africa to purchase licenses and blueprints for military equipment. He writes:

"While the Governments of Britain, the United States, West Germany and Belgium formally pledge support for the arms embargo, they sanction the supply of military know-how, permit their firms to invest capital in South African arms firms, and do nothing to discourage their citizens from migrating to take up posts in the arms firms. Italy and France supply military weapons, permit investment in the South African arms industry, allow skilled technicians to migrate and sell patents for military equipment.

"Even in areas where the boycott has been applied, ingenious arrangements have enabled South Africa to obtain weapons and equipment. For instance, engines for the Impala aircraft being built in South Africa are of British design: the South African licensing arrangement is with an Italian firm, though the original licence comes from Rolls Royce, and work on these engines has been supervised in South Africa by a team from Rolls Royce."

70. Another loop-hole in the arms embargo was provided by the interminable life of some of the arms contracts negotiated with South Africa before the imposition of the embargo. While my delegation acknowledges the contribution which countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom have made in fulfilment of the embargo, their reservation to continue indefinitely the supply of spare parts for military equipment already dispatched under earlier contracts, and their insistence on fulfilling contracts entered into at the time of the embargo, has assured for South Africa an important and continuing source of military power.

71. In November 1964 the British Prime Minister announced that the existing contracts for the Buccaneer low-flying naval strike aircraft would be supplied, but no future orders would be accepted. He went on to explain that "Her Majesty's Government will, of course, allow the shipment for the sixteen Buccaneers as and when required".

72. According to the study made by Mr. Abdul Minty, a further breach occurred in June 1965, when the British

³ Document A/AC.115/L.279 and Corr.1.

⁴ Anti-Apartheid Movement, London, 1969.

Government sanctioned the sale of £400,000 worth of four-wheel drive Vauxhall motor chassis for armoured cars or lorries to the South African army. Britain continues to supply ammunition for South Africa's Centurion tanks and 25-pounder guns, as well as spare parts for Canberra bombers of the air force and the naval Shackletons in Cape Town.

73. The United States military export sales to South Africa amounted to \$35.5 million in the fiscal years 1962-1968 and \$3.1 million in the fiscal year 1969. The Department of State has stated that for the most part the statement referred to sales of Lockheed Hercules C-130 aircraft and spare parts transferred before 2 August 1963 and subsequent shipments of spare parts for which there was provision in the original contracts. But this again reinforces our contention that such a loop-hole exists and is harmful to the successful implementation of the embargo.

74. The main task to which we must now address ourselves is the examination of the use of the arms embargo as a major weapon in the international campaign against *apartheid*. In the opinion of my Government and of the other African States which requested this debate, the arms embargo must not only be continued but must be strengthened. The force of resolution 181 (1963), 182 (1963) and 191 (1964) have been weakened from the start by the reservations of some States and by the almost total non-compliance of others. In fact, the resolutions have been made virtually ineffective by the distinction made between arms for external defence and arms for internal security and, as I have shown, by the continued supply of parts to maintain arms already supplied. The resolutions have also been made ineffective by the granting of foreign licences to South African manufacturers to enable them to produce their own weapons internally and by continued technical aid for and investment in South African arms concerns.

75. Commenting on the distinctions made between arms for external and internal defence, the *Guardian Weekly* of 11 July contained an article by Lord Chalfont, a prominent British politician. He wrote:

“ . . . the argument that there are certain weapons that can be used for—political repression and others that cannot is too silly to be regarded with anything but astonishment that serious politicians can even be bothered to try it on an intelligent public.”

This is a personal opinion, but it is vividly supported by the example of the war in Viet-Nam, where heavy bombers and, in fact, all the armaments of total warfare, with the exception of nuclear devices, have been used in an internal guerrilla-type war. As a commentator in the London *Observer* pointed out in the issue of 12 July, “even purely naval arms could, in the years to come, become important in fighting guerrilla ‘freedom-fighters’”. He went on to ask whether the British Government was ready to say that Britain would actively help South Africa in frustrating the militant opponents of *apartheid*.

76. The Security Council should discredit, with all the authority it can command, the attempt to undermine the force of the arms embargo by unrealistic distinctions and by measures which ensure the expansion of South Africa's own arms industry.

77. The attitude which the newly elected Government of the United Kingdom is likely to adopt towards the arms embargo is another cause for deep concern. It has been speculated, and indeed it has been maintained by some authoritative commentators in the British press, that the sale of arms of all kinds to South Africa is to be resumed by the British Government.

78. If this is done—and we Africans certainly hope that it will not happen—there would be several adverse effects. First of all, it would obviously give further encouragement to other nations to disregard the embargo. Secondly, by associating itself openly with the South African Government, Britain would do much to break down the moral isolation of South Africa, which the United Nations has sought to use as a weapon against *apartheid*, and about which the South African Government is particularly sensitive. Thirdly—and there is no question about this—it would give moral and material support to the extension of the policies of *apartheid* and to the suppression of the South African liberation movements whose struggle has been declared legitimate by the United Nations. Fourthly, it would give support to the extension of the policies of *apartheid* beyond the borders of South Africa.

79. The new policy is planned, we are told, on the basis of a belief in a nebulous threat to Britain's lifeline which makes it essential to maintain the security of the Cape route. It is difficult to believe that in this nuclear age there are statesmen who still think in terms of outmoded naval strategies or of gunboat policies, and it is discouraging to think that a British Government would even contemplate placing itself beyond the pale of international opinion on such shaky ground. We are told that the supply of arms might be limited to naval ships and equipment, but, as Lord Kennet observed in his letter to *The Times* of London of 24 June,

“ . . . a good deal of South Africa's population lives within a few miles of the coast and a good deal of the rest of it within a few miles of a navigable river. Naval bombardment is as effective as any other . . . and of course, the more South Africa is armed from outside, the more will her northern neighbours seek to be armed, too.”

80. I was interested to learn of a statement made recently by Lord Caradon, Britain's former representative to the United Nations. He said, “A decision to lift the arms ban would be a very dangerous thing for the future of Britain and the world”. Britain has still to redeem itself on the question of Southern Rhodesia before it can hope to recover Africa's confidence and goodwill. If it should renege on its commitment to the arms embargo and side with South Africa, the Government of Great Britain can rest assured that it would lose the trust and friendship of Africa for ever.

81. It is our earnest hope that Prime Minister Heath will not allow such an eventuality to develop. It is apparent from the press and from British parliamentary proceedings that there is a considerable body of opinion in the United Kingdom which is strongly opposed to any measure that would reopen the sale of arms to South Africa. We therefore look to the restraining hand of the British Prime Minister.

82. We were to some extent encouraged by the deft manner in which he handled racist and other extreme elements of his party while leading the Opposition. Now that he is leader of the Government, we trust that he will spurn the attraction of the dubious profits which an arms sale to South Africa would bring and cultivate, instead, relations with the rest of Africa.

83. Now that my delegation has attempted to analyse at some length the situation which faces the United Nations, members of the Council are no doubt asking what action Somalia recommends should be taken to improve the situation. Of course, the ideal approach would be to make a comprehensive examination of this matter and to make comprehensive proposals. However, this course will have to wait for another meeting, since the purpose of this meeting is to save the arms embargo.

84. First, the embargo should be strengthened and the considerable loop-holes which exist in its application must be filled to prevent it from remaining fiasco.

85. Secondly, universal adherence to the embargo must be secured. The Security Council should call upon those States which have been violating the embargo to refrain from doing so and to impress upon others the necessity of continuing their observance of it.

86. In my capacity as Chairman of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*, I addressed a communication [S/9858] to this distinguished Council through you, Mr. President, on 2 July setting out a series of measures which, if implemented, would undoubtedly strengthen the arms embargo. In addition to those measures, my delegation would suggest two others, namely, a prohibition on the supply of military patents and effective action on the part of all States to discourage skilled technicians from migrating to South Africa to take up employment in the armaments industry.

87. Finally, I would point out that the arms embargo is the only United Nations measure against *apartheid* which carries the authority of the Security Council. In the opinion of my delegation, this Council must squarely face the fact that its authority in this matter has been flouted; and that, if it remains indifferent to present violations and those which seem likely to take place in the near future, its moral and constitutional position will be impaired seriously. My delegation is not unaware of the unfortunate political reality which lies in the fact that some of the chief offenders in the matter under consideration are themselves members of the Security Council. We trust, however, that

it is not yet futile to hope for a return of the moral leadership which the world expects from the permanent members of this Council.

88. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I now call on the representative of India.

89. Mr. SEN (India): I hope to be brief. Also I think that, after the speech by my distinguished friend and colleague, Ambassador Farah of Somalia, it will not be necessary for me to repeat all the arguments.

90. The struggle against the aggressive and oppressive actions of South Africa started nearly three quarters of a century ago when Mahatma Gandhi led the movement of popular defiance against racial discrimination. Since then this movement has grown considerably and has spread throughout the world. It was the delegation of India that first brought to the notice of the United Nations the practices of the racist régime of South Africa. Some people have never forgiven us for it; but we are, none the less, proud that we did so, and over the years our initiative has gathered more and more strength and South Africa stands today universally condemned and can find real solace only in the embrace of colonial Portugal.

91. It is with this background that I have asked to speak before this Council, and I should like to thank you, Mr. President, and the other members of the Council for permission to do so. I should also like to offer our congratulations to you on your Presidency of the Security Council for the month of July, and to express our thanks to the distinguished Ambassador of Nepal for his Presidency of the Council last month.

92. For more than twenty-five years the international community has expressed its disapprobation and moral condemnation of *apartheid*. The present request has been supported by forty Member States, and many more would have joined had there been time to consult and contact them. However, the question is important, and the Council will have to decide on practical steps that may have to be taken in order to carry out its earlier resolutions.

93. It is quite clear that the numerous resolutions of the United Nations calling upon the South African Government to desist from its discriminatory policies have had little or no effect. Resolutions calling upon Member States to take measures of a political and economic nature against South African policies have also not produced result. Meanwhile, South Africa has not only intensified its racist practices but has also built up a formidable military machine to oppose the freedom movement and to spread and to support by force of arms its racist doctrine and practices in the neighbouring Territories of Namibia, Portuguese colonies and Southern Rhodesia. South Africa indeed poses a grave challenge and threat to the peace of southern Africa. There are few parallels in history where the views and voices of so many have been ignored by so few and for so long.

94. We have read with great interest the recent debate in the British House of Lords on the intended plan

of the Government of the United Kingdom to renew arms supply to South Africa. Lord Caradon, who was with us until the other day, moved an amendment which would inhibit the present British Government from pursuing its objective. It does not surprise us that in the British Upper House Lord Caradon's motion was decisively defeated.

95. The arguments used by the British Government can be summarized as follows: it is bound by the Simonstown Agreement.⁵ May I remind the Council that all Members of the United Nations are also bound by the United Nations Charter. Secondly, it was said that the defence requirements of the British Government, both in their narrower and their wider contexts, call for the resumption of arms supply to South Africa. This argument was adequately met by Lord Chalfont, who did so much as a British Minister for disarmament in the last Government in promoting East-West dialogue in the recent meetings at Rome of the NATO Powers. Lord Chalfont pointed out that the Simonstown Agreement is outdated and outmoded for any defence preparations or strategy of the present-day world; indeed, they are irrelevant.

96. Of course, the arguments about communism and Soviet influence in the area were used religiously; but I wonder how much of it is really believed. We have heard similar arguments about communism in South-East Asia and also in the Middle East. I do not know who is winning these battles, but I do know that because of these pet theories, hundreds of Asians are losing their lives daily, their countries are being laid waste, their fields, factories and homes are being destroyed, and their human persons and dignity are being maimed and defiled in numerous ways. I assume that it is no one's intention that similar tragedy should be let loose in southern Africa. I also wonder what a Youth Assembly of any independence and character will have to say about such a development.

97. Then the argument was used that the sale and supply of arms to South Africa will bring money to those who provide these weapons. We understand that argument, but I am sure such cynical cupidity, such dangerous greed, cannot be expected to be endorsed or approved by this Council. Obviously, many aristocrats and plutocrats are interested only in money, although their polished manners forbid them to speak about it in public or in private.

98. Then, we are regaled with two other arguments: the arms would be used only against external dangers and not for suppressing the local population. Our colleague from Mauritius has already explained this aspect of the problem in great detail and I shall therefore not dwell on it. We have heard this type of argument so often that I should merely be wasting the Council's time in trying to expose its fallacy. We have heard the theory of supplying arms to be used only for specific

purposes and for no other. We do not have to go deep into history to realize what has happened when particular Governments have decided to use such arms for purposes very different from what the donors had in mind.

99. The United Nations has also adopted resolutions encouraging liberation movements. Will those arms help or hinder such movements, even if they are used for external purposes! Is it not the blacks against whom those arms will be used, even internally?

100. Equally offensive is the theory that the supply of arms does not in any way reduce the detestation which donor countries feel towards *apartheid* or towards régimes based on total racial discrimination. I suppose those countries will expect us to believe that such a supply of arms does in fact discourage those racial practices and racist régimes. Logic and morality can be perverted in many ways, and I suppose that some Christian gentlemen are more adept at it than their barbaric ancestors, heathens and such other lesser breeds.

101. We believe that the British Government wishes to consult the Commonwealth countries and weigh all other factors before coming to a decision. As a Commonwealth country, we are of course, gratified by this attention. But all Commonwealth countries are bound by the Council's resolution as well. Besides, it does not need much imagination to decide how each individual Commonwealth country would react to any proposal for resumption of arms supply to South Africa. However, we are grateful to know that no hasty decision will be taken.

102. The only threat to peace and security in and around the southern half of Africa comes from the South African régime's covert aggression and subversion against the neighbouring independent countries and peoples under the colonial yoke, struggling for their freedom. This is proved by the data on South Africa's defence budget, which, over the last decade, has increased from R44 million to R272 million a year. Ambassador Farah has already given many other details. Of the nearly \$1,000 million spent on defence during that period, more than half was on the acquisition of weapons, aircraft, naval stores, and other heavy equipment. The South African air force is being geared to the task of combatting "terrorists"—which simply means the struggle for freedom of the oppressed people. The contention that South Africa is receiving those weapons for external defence and not for the purpose of enforcing *apartheid* has not been borne out by the facts, nor has it ever been accepted by the Security Council. On the contrary, the Security Council, during its deliberations in 1963 and 1964, recognized that there was little chance of persuading South Africa to discard its racist policies without an effective embargo on the supply of arms to South Africa from other countries. This was reflected in resolutions 181 (1963) of August 1963, 182 (1963) of December 1963, and 191 (1964) of June 1964.

⁵ Agreement relating to the transfer of the Simonstown Naval Base: see *Exchanges of Letters on Defence Matters between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Union of South Africa, June 1955* (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1955, Cmnd. 9520).

103. The Security Council thus became committed to a certain course of action aimed at weakening South Africa's capacity to impose its racist policies in southern Africa. But neither these nor other measures, such as the cutting-off of economic and trade relations and the prevention of the flow of investments, have had much result, because of the actions of certain States whose exports to South Africa alone make the crucial difference between success and failure of the embargo. Many loop-holes have been found to circumvent the purpose of those resolutions. A favoured technique has been the claim that weapons are being supplied under old contracts, the terms of which are rarely specified. In a country like South Africa, where the indigenous people are kept in a state of virtual serfdom, even the supply of shotguns and hunting equipment by South Africa's trading partners adds to the oppressive apparatus of that country. The policy of surreptitious support for South Africa's war machine has done much damage by undermining effective United Nations action against *apartheid*.

104. In the light of the foregoing, my delegation proposes that the Security Council, keeping in mind the threat to peace which has arisen from South Africa's action in the whole of southern Africa, take immediate action to implement its relevant resolutions and call upon Member States to do the following.

105. First, to take effective steps to prevent the flow of arms and military hardware to South Africa, directly or through third countries. Member States should be asked to implement fully the various resolutions on the arms embargo, without reservations or restrictive interpretations.

106. Second, to withhold the supply of, and spare parts for, all vehicles and equipment for the use of the South African armed forces.

107. Third, to prohibit all kinds of investment and technical assistance, including licences for the manufacture of arms and ammunition, naval aircraft, and the like.

108. Fourth, to discontinue military training, and other forms of military co-operation, for the South African armed forces.

109. The Security Council might also consider the possibility of keeping the specific question of an arms embargo under constant review. It might also consider the establishment of a sub-committee to deal with this question of arms, among other questions. An expert committee was established in 1964, but its report⁶ was not discussed by the Security Council.

110. As a supplementary measure, the Secretary-General might also be requested to keep this subject under continuing review, either directly or through a special representative, and be authorized to intercede if need be, with those Governments that supply arms

and equipment to South Africa and persuade them to discontinue such supplies.

111. I agree with all that the two previous speakers have said. I do not wish to make any propaganda or speak for effect. There are many specialists in such dissertations. I speak out of agony and desperation, and I hope that this Council will be sensitive to the feelings of a very large number of Member States. Some of us are entitled to wonder how many of the present permanent members, but for the protection of the Charter, would have passed the bar of peaceful intentions—an argument which has often been used to deny the legitimate rights of another permanent member.

112. Time is running out. Africa is angry, and rightly so. Youth is disillusioned, and we older men and older countries must not be so hypocritical as to say, day in and day out, that we wish to work for our children and their children, and then proceed to destroy all their prospects for a full and happy life. The Africans and the young may tolerate us for some time, may forgive us our lack of wisdom—but not for very long.

113. Mr. JOUEJATI (Syria): Mr. President, my delegation considers it an honour and a pleasure to express to you our best wishes for success during your Presidency of the Security Council this month. The problems of international peace and security are tremendous and we are sure that with your tact, wisdom and impartiality you will fulfil your functions in the best manner commensurate with right and justice. The eloquent statement with which you opened this meeting, Sir, is not for pure ceremony. It constitutes real guidelines to be followed by all.

114. I would not let this occasion pass, Mr. President, without expressing on behalf of my delegation our high esteem and sincere appreciation to your predecessor, His Excellency the Ambassador of Nepal, and his distinguished delegation for their assiduous efforts in tackling the problems we were all faced with and for the full discharge of their responsibilities.

115. We are grateful to the Chairman of the Special Committee on *apartheid*, to its Rapporteur, to the Special Committee at large, to the African Group and its distinguished Chairman, to the Ambassador of India and to the delegations signatory to document S/9867 of 15 July 1970, for raising, on a basis of urgency, the question of the implementation of the previous relevant resolutions adopted by the Security Council imposing an arms embargo on the Government of South Africa. In this context, resolutions 181 (1963), 182 (1963) and 191 (1964) are solemn and unambiguous.

116. The question is indeed urgent. The authorities of Pretoria, almost assured of impunity in their defiance of world public opinion, international law and United Nations resolutions, in so far as their practice of *apartheid*, their illegitimate occupation of Namibia and their violations of the mandatory measures decided upon against the racist régime are concerned, are now intensifying their efforts and contacts, seeking to break the will of the international community to impose a total embargo on arms destined for them.

⁶ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twentieth Year, Special Supplement No. 2*, document S/6210 and Add.1.

117. Their hope of achieving this is promoted by the failure of the Security Council to decide on sanctions against them, a failure due to the unrelenting opposition of certain of its key members to the application of the relevant chapters of the Charter. They invoke the pretext of self-defence in order to procure the most sophisticated weapons as though they were not themselves, through the policies of *apartheid* and expansion, responsible for the serious threat to peace and security in southern Africa. They even invoke the requirements of their security whereas it is they who render everyone, inside and around South Africa, terribly concerned, terribly insecure.

118. Paradoxical indeed is this argument putting the emphasis on the necessities of self-defence and security for the aggressor, that is, the security of its illegitimate acquisitions, while denouncing even the most preliminary reaction of the victim of aggression against the injustice inflicted upon it—denouncing it as a menace to international peace and security.

119. This is the latest brand of imperialist philosophy translated into action by the subjugation of peoples and the destruction of their homes and resources. It is to the merit of the signers of the letter raising the question under consideration that they are calling for a halt to the sinister drift into cynicism and immorality in the conduct of international relations.

120. Their Excellencies the Ambassadors of Mauritius, Somalia and India dwelt on the sophistry in this context of dividing arms into a category for internal use and another for external use—one for naval use and another for land use. In support of their evidence I merely wish to give an illustration. None other than *The Economist* of London, in its number of 4-10 July, had this to say about the use of the Buccaneer aircraft:

“Originally the Buccaneer had a purely naval role. Because of its long range it is ideally suited to the protection of sea routes. But, again because of its range, it can be used as a strike plane over land . . . Indeed, it is probably the best plane of all for operations over the vast land spaces of southern Africa and it could reach out to the north, beyond the boundaries of South Africa.”

121. In these circumstances the request of the African and other delegations to raise the problem is acutely relevant to the present situation where brute force is supported and enhanced in order to prevail over the right of peoples to their self-determination. Indeed, the maintenance of the military superiority of the usurper against his victim is becoming a doctrine, sometimes advocated openly and often practised in full awareness, with utter disregard of international justice and morality and with utter disregard of the rights and the fates of the human beings under ruthless occupation or struggling for the attainment of their inalienable rights.

122. Urgent and relevant as it is, the request of the delegations I mentioned to consider the item of an arms

embargo on South Africa is also highly commendable in itself. In fact, it seeks to mobilize the capacity of the highest organ of the United Nations to remedy an explosive situation causing alarm to millions among the African masses and to a number of sovereign States, and threatening to poison international relations. In the last analysis, therefore, the request is inspired by the noble motive of reactivating the role of the United Nations and its highest organ, the Security Council, in the maintenance of international peace and security and the removal of threats of conflagrations, theses that have been lately dwelt upon with eloquence by His Excellency the Secretary-General, for whose efforts we are deeply grateful.

123. It cannot be said that the request is arbitrary or that it is seeking the impossible. In fact, the Security Council has been very restrained and very lenient towards the Government of South Africa. It has opened before it every avenue of persuasion, exerted every possible moral pressure, without so far taking any really drastic measures against that Government. The resolutions of 1963 and 1964 on the arms embargo sought merely to diminish the capabilities of the authorities of Pretoria to inflict more harm on the African majority subjected to the practice of *apartheid*, on the Namibians subjected to foreign rule and denied their inalienable rights, and on the neighbouring young and developing African States fully dedicated to peace and justice. The request does not seek more than the implementation of these resolutions on the arms embargo, their re-invigoration, and the removal of any sophisticated interpretations of their clauses so that the arms embargo may be total, as it was originally intended to be.

124. My delegation believes the Council should act in positive response to this just, reasonable and, indeed, minimal request. Can one ask the Council less than that it should implement its own resolutions? As the distinguished Ambassadors of Mauritius, Somalia and India pointed out, can one ask the Council for less than that this implementation should be dependent not on any change of any Government but on a fundamental change in the policies of the Government of South Africa itself?

125. If no change in the racist and expansionist policies is brought about—and there is no evidence that there has in fact been such a change—it behoves the Council to remain firm in regard to its decisions and to give effect to those decisions. After all, to the extent that its authority is dissipated through complacency towards violators of its decisions, the hopes of humanity which are founded upon it will tend to ebb further and further. There was hope for a more just and more peaceable world when the United Nations and its Security Council were established. If it is to retreat before each challenge and each act of defiance, ultimately the whole of humanity will suffer.

126. Mr. MWAANGA (Zambia): Mr. President, allow me to convey to you the congratulations and best wishes of my delegation on your assumption of the high office of President of the Security Council

for the month of July. You can count on the maximum co-operation of the delegation of Zambia in the execution of your most difficult task. I should like to take this opportunity also to pay tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador Khatri of Nepal, for the efficient and able manner in which he conducted the Council's business during the month of June.

127. In August 1963 the Security Council called on all States "to cease forthwith the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition of all types and military vehicles to South Africa". We meet today because some Member States have continued to defy Security Council resolutions 181 (1963), 182 (1963) and 191 (1964) and also because there are certain States, including the United Kingdom, that have indicated their desire to join the ever-growing list of United Nations offenders.

128. The question of arms sales by the United Kingdom to South Africa has been the subject of much discussion in various parts of the world since the Conservative Party came to power in Britain last month. We understand that these arms would mainly be for "external defence of the Simonstown Naval Base". The Security Council arms embargo against South Africa was backed by the then Conservative Government led by Mr. Harold Macmillan, subject to a stipulation made at the time by Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the present Foreign Minister, that it would be interpreted as affecting only arms that could be used for internal repression and not those required for external defence—a position also adopted by France in its present role as the largest supplier of deadly weapons to the racist Government of South Africa.

129. Can a distinction be made between arms supplied for internal repression and those supplied for external defence? The answer to that question must be "no". This view was supported by Lord Carrington, the present British Defence Minister, when he was acting for the Foreign Secretary in December 1963. In an interview with the British Council of Churches, he said the following:

"The Government cannot guarantee that no weapon could ever in any circumstances be used for this purpose"—meaning enforcing *apartheid*—"Even naval weapons could at a pinch be used to bombard a land target."

130. As far as we know, no African country today is preparing to attack South Africa militarily. The only real threat to South Africa's security lies within its own borders, and the Western Powers know that. It is the African people of South Africa who will and who must in the end destroy white supremacy. It is against this threat that South Africa is trying to draw in the whole of the Western world. Every year Western economic involvement in South Africa increases, more Western capital is invested, more Western goods are sold. This simply means that the West has a stake in *apartheid* and South Africa is working tooth and nail to make sure it defends that stake—by the sale of arms to South Africa, by incorporating South Africa

in its own defence system. The West has a clear economic interest in white South Africa's defence; but South Africa has tried also to give the West a strategic interest and build up its importance as the turning point on the Cape route. It is desperately trying to build up the Russian threat in the Indian Ocean and the south Atlantic and to present itself as a defence against it.

131. Although the British Government under Harold Wilson announced its support for the Security Council arms embargo in 1964, the British embargo during the Labour Government's term in office was more formal than real. Britain continued to supply "spare parts" for equipment supplied before the arms embargo entered into force. Those spare parts included parts for the Buccaneers, for the South African air force's Canberra bombers and for the Navy's Shackletons. The list of spares also included ammunition for South Africa's Centurion tanks. One other disturbing feature is that the term "arms" has so far been narrowly interpreted not only by Britain but also by other Western countries.

132. The present arms embargo does not cover naval equipment supplied under the Simonstown Agreement. The equipment includes such items as 4.5-inch naval shells which have been changed slightly so that they qualify as "practice ammunition". Nor does it cover the purchase of licences and blueprints for military equipment. Engines for the Impala aircraft being built in South Africa are of British design. British firms can invest freely in South African industries, including the arms industry. The munitions-manufacturing firm, African Explosive and Chemicals, part of which was recently taken over by the South African Government, began as a joint venture in which Imperial Chemical Industries held 42 per cent of the shares. Skilled British technicians have emigrated to South Africa in great numbers. Work on the Impala aircraft has been supervised in South Africa by a team from Rolls-Royce.

133. Under the Simonstown Agreement there is close naval co-operation between Britain and South Africa. Britain trains South African naval personnel. In March 1970 the British and South African navies held joint anti-submarine exercises off the South African coast.

134. I should like to observe, with disappointment and bitterness, that France has openly defied the Security Council resolutions on the sale of arms to South Africa. In May 1968 *Le Monde* stated the following: "During the period in which the arms embargo has been observed by the United States and Great Britain, France has become the principal supplier of arms to South Africa." France has supplied the South African air force with its most modern fighter aircraft, jet bombers and helicopters, including Mirage delta-jet fighter-bombers and small Alouette helicopters.

135. In May 1969 and South Africa signed a new agreement for the supply of Transalls—heavy military transport planes developed jointly by France and West Germany. In April 1967 South Africa and France negotiated the purchase of the South African navy's first submarines, and under that agreement France was

to build three Daphne submarines, worth £4.5 million each, for South Africa. Those submarines can carry twelve torpedos, have a submerged speed of 16 knots and a radius of 3,000 miles. In 1968, South African naval personnel visited France for training and the submarine launched at Nantes was delivered to South Africa in 1969. In March 1970 it was revealed that South Africa was negotiating to buy three missile-firing gunboats from France and that the South African Defence Minister, Mr. Botha, would visit Cherbourg shipyards later that month. France has helped South Africa to develop a ground-to-air missile system. When he released details of this project in May 1969, the South African Defence Minister, Mr. Botha, said that the project had been partly financed by France and that it was, to quote his own words "a happy example of international co-operation".

136. Only this morning a Reuter's dispatch, sent from Paris by Gilbert Sedbon, stated the following: "France has offered to sell South Africa anti-submarine aircraft in the face of possible tough competition from Britain's Nimrod plane if the new British Government reverse policy and lift an arms embargo"—against South Africa.

137. We know that Britain intends to sell arms to South Africa for what has been described as "external defence". We know that Zambia, Tanzania and the other independent African countries are some of the external forces against which South Africa wants to use these arms. We know that they would attack us with the slightest excuse. The Buccaneers, which South Africa is interested in buying, supplied for naval defence are frequently used in the Caprivi Strip along the Zambia-Namibia frontier for reconnaissance and bomber planes against freedom fighters. Impala strike trainers manufactured in South Africa by an Italian firm using Rolls-Royce engines under a British licence, work in close liaison with anti-guerrilla operations. It will be argued by the merchants of racism and *apartheid* that guerrilla insurgents represent a form of external attack. Such a narrow-minded view commits British, French and other Western arms to be used freely against the liberation movements of South Africa, thus setting the West against those fighting to overthrow the white supremacist régimes in that part of the world. Britain, France and other Western countries will thus find themselves stigmatized as the friends of the defenders of white supremacy.

138. In our opinion, what really matters is not the stigma, but the practical consequences of being allied to the white supremacist régimes of southern Africa. First, the liberation movements will be forced to give up all hope of getting Western support and will be left with no alternative but to align themselves with the communist Powers. Secondly, many African countries—just as vital to Britain's trading and political interests—will turn their backs on Britain and be forced to rely more and more on non-Western or even anti-Western Powers. This danger has long been foreseen by the President of Zambia, Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, who said recently:

"Britain and the West must in their interests choose between South Africa and the rest of Africa, in terms of investments, now and in future. They must choose between South Africa and the rest of the continent in terms of what they consider to be their strategic interests . . ."

139. President Kaunda's view is supported by *The Guardian*, a leading British newspaper, which stated in an editorial on 3 July 1970:

"The Government ought not, in pursuit of the narrowest British interest, to cross a UN picket line in South Africa . . . Lip service opposition to racialism will not be enough to convince the black nations of our seriousness. The long-term British interests require that they are convinced of our friendship."

140. The aims of the Conservative Party on this vital question have been undisputed for some time. Mr. Antony Barber, now a British Cabinet Minister, responsible, I believe, for negotiations with the European Economic Community, visited South Africa last March in his capacity as a Tory Shadow Defence Minister and stated: "I can state without fear of contradiction that a Conservative Government will revert to the policy of selling arms to South Africa. South Africa is our ally and we will treat it as such."

141. According to a confidential document in our possession, reference CCOC 274, dated February 1970 and entitled "Overseas Issues Facing the next Conservative Government Defence Outside NATO", prepared for the Conservative Party by a committee under the Chairmanship of Sir Frederic Bennett, the following is an extract from that report:

"(a) Politically a first step would be to restore relations based on the recognition of mutual interest with South Africa, to encourage trade and sell arms for external defence. The farce of Rhodesian sanctions should be ended.

"The present situation is of a character to lead South Africa from enforced political isolation to adopt some form of uncommitted neutrality. An immediate consequence of neutrality would then be the denial of the Simonstown base facilities of the British Navy.

"(b) Tory policy should foster already existing trends among the independent African States to encourage *détentes* between those States on the one hand and Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa on the other. It should be made perfectly clear that such a policy is in the long-term interests of Africa as a whole. If Malawi, for instance, can achieve such a *détente* without condoning *apartheid* surely we need be no less realistic. Above all there must be no repetition of Viet-Nam in southern Africa.

"(c) On the naval and military side, steps should be taken to re-activate the Simonstown agreement and re-negotiate the command structure including the re-appointment of a British Naval Commander-in-Chief for the area.

“(d) The practice whereby submarines of the United Kingdom Navy have trained with the South African Navy should be restored and extended to other vessels. Stockpiling of naval stores in Cape Town and Durban should be re-examined with a view to continuity.

“(e) There should also be a friendly re-examination with Portugal of ways and means of utilizing the Anglo-Portuguese alliance to establish mutually valid and workable defence arrangements in the southern Atlantic. It is pertinent in this context to think of naval port facilities at Beira (Mozambique) and Lobito (Angola) and Cape Verde.

“(f) If the NATO area of commitment cannot be extended to this vital supply route transporting by far the greatest part of the NATO strategic oil requirements, then on both political and strategic grounds a case might be made for a regional pact for the defence of southern Africa and the Cape route. Participants might be the United Kingdom, South Africa, Argentina and Brazil.”

142. The British Government may say on the other hand that the views of this Committee do not necessarily represent those of the Government. We reject this argument, because these views have also been publicly expressed by many senior members of the British Government including Mr. Antony Barber and the Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home. We must also acknowledge that a resumption of arms sales from Britain is South Africa's minimum demand. Its real aim is a place in the “free world” defence system. For nearly three years Sir Alec Douglas-Home has argued for closer defence links between Britain and South Africa. He has even suggested that NATO should come to an agreement with South Africa to defend the Southern Ocean area.

143. We warn Britain not to resume the sale of arms to South Africa. We warn France and other Western Powers to stop supplying arms to the *apartheid* régime of South Africa in defiance of African opinion and Security Council resolutions. Our concern is not the type of arms South Africa gets; it is the very principle of supplying arms to the pig-headed white minorities of South Africa, who are the known enemies of the people of Africa. Our opposition to the resumption or to the supply of arms to South Africa is based on the following reasons.

144. First, the sale of arms to South Africa, however limited, has the effect of increasing the intransigence of South Africa.

145. Second, the sale of arms to South Africa, be it for naval purposes or otherwise, will enable South Africa to release some of its present military resources for aggression against its independent African neighbours.

146. Third, the sale of arms to South Africa will act as a great morale booster to the abominable policy of *apartheid*.

147. Fourth, the sale of arms to South Africa will enable it to get more and more involved in fighting Portugal's colonial wars in Angola and Mozambique and also involve it in fighting colonial wars in Rhodesia.

148. Fifth, the sale of arms to South Africa will make it impossible for the United Nations to establish its authority in the international territory of Namibia.

149. Sixth, the sale of arms to South Africa, in flagrant violation of Security Council resolutions, will severely weaken the authority of the United Nations.

150. Seventh, the sale of arms to South Africa will automatically drive the final nail in the coffin of majority rule.

151. Eighth, the sale of arms to South Africa will put the Western Powers in direct confrontation with independent Africa.

152. In a world where the boundaries of race and poverty coincide so directly, the non-white world is increasingly likely to determine its attitude towards white Western countries on the basis of their record on issues of race and colour. Countries which are intimately linked with the white régimes in South Africa are not likely to win high esteem, and for those like Britain and the United States, with internal racial tension against their non-white minorities, links with South Africa can serve as an added source of internal racial conflict.

153. The domestic and international aspects of race-relations situations are closely interlinked and need to be seen in a global context. It is also important to appreciate that racist groups abroad derive inspiration and support from the existence of white racist South Africa. If the Western major Powers in fact enter into a closer military relationship with South Africa, I must truthfully warn that this will have grave effects on the relationships between these Powers and the non-white world, as well as on the course of the liberation struggle as a whole.

154. A clear pattern of “kith and kin” is beginning to emerge. Western Governments have become more and more reluctant to support international action against *apartheid*, while at the same time they come under increased pressure to become more pro-South African—with the risk of direct intervention in the future to preserve the *status quo*.

155. Professor Larry W. Bowman of Brandeis University, in Massachusetts, expressed his view in 1968 in the following words:

“The greatest long-term threat which southern Africa poses to world stability is, in my opinion, the very real possibility that left-leaning guerrilla movements will one day be near success, only to have the West intervene on the side of the whites.”

156. It is not the liberation movement which wants a race war in southern Africa. It is the white rulers

and their supporters who are represented in the United Nations and here in the Security Council who have brought about a bitter racial conflict by denying to the African, Indian and coloured peoples all basic, political and human rights. The African liberation struggle is not a narrow racial struggle, but one to bring about a democratic South Africa—free of racial superiority, free of *apartheid*, in which all people of South Africa will live as children of one God. It is in our interest as members of the human race to fight for the fulfilment of this goal. We must support the liberation movement and extricate Western Governments from involvement with the obnoxious *apartheid* system; for if these Governments do not withdraw, they will be called upon in future to share the responsibility for the catastrophe which will be inflicted on the human race as a whole.

157. We support without any reservations the measures which the Special Committee on the Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa has asked the Security Council to take in order to ensure the implementation of a complete and mandatory arms embargo on the supply of all weapons and military equipment to South Africa. To this end we would like the Security Council to urge all States to implement fully the arms embargo against South Africa, without reservations and restrictive interpretations; to withhold the supply of all vehicles and equipment for use of the South African armed forces; to cease the supply of spare parts for military equipment used by the South African armed forces; to revoke all licences granted to the South African Government or to South African companies for the manufacture of arms and ammunition and military vehicles; to prohibit investment in or technical assistance for the manufacture of arms and ammunition, aircraft, naval craft or other military vehicles; and to cease provision of military training for members of the South African armed forces and all other forms of military co-operation with South Africa.

158. We recognize that we live in a world in which materialism by far surpasses political morality. I should like to remind the Western Powers that there are only 3 million whites in southern Africa as opposed to a potential market for their goods of 300 million people in the rest of independent Africa.

159. "Which do they choose?" I ask. "What do they say?" I ask. They have to choose now where they will have friends. Is it to be independent Africa or the white minority with its dwindling market? They cannot continue to have the best of both worlds any more. They cannot love us and love our enemies at the same time. Both from the material angle as well as from the moral angle, the West has got a case to answer.

160. Mr. PASTINEN (Finland): Mr. President, I am pleased to have this opportunity to offer to you the congratulations of the Finnish delegation on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of July and to pledge to you our co-operation.

161. I should like to express our thanks to the outgoing President, Ambassador Khatri of Nepal. The Finnish delegation has reason to be particularly grateful for his constructive leadership in bringing to a successful conclusion the consideration of my Government's proposal to initiate periodic meetings of the Security Council in accordance with Article 28, paragraph 2, of the Charter. We believe that this is an important step which, in the words of the consensus reached [S/9835], could enhance the authority of the Council and make it a more effective instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security.

162. This urgent meeting of the Security Council has been convened at the request of thirty-six representatives of African States and of India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Yugoslavia to consider the question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa and more particularly to review the functioning of the arms embargo instituted against South Africa by the Council in 1963. The Finnish delegation understands the reasons which have prompted the representatives of the African States to request a meeting of the Council at this particular time. We share the profound anxiety which is expressed in their letter and which has been further emphasized in their statements to the Council.

163. The Finnish delegation hopes that every effort will be made in response to the request of the African States to arrive at conclusions which would be based on broadest possible support in the Council.

164. The resolutions of the Security Council on the arms embargo of 1963, reaffirmed by the Council in 1964, were considered in the general context of the situation resulting from the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa. The representatives of the African States now propose that the Council consider the question again in the same context.

165. The position of the Finnish Government on the question of *apartheid* is well known. Therefore I do not need many words to reiterate it here today. Suffice it to say that the *apartheid* policy of racial discrimination and segregation deeply affronts our sense of justice, our Nordic concept of freedom under law and our faith in the equality and dignity of the human individual.

166. As to the international aspects of the question, the Finnish Government considers that the racial policies pursued by South Africa are contrary to the obligations which States have assumed under Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter in pledging themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the United Nations to promote universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.

167. In the view of the Finnish Government, the system of *apartheid* constitutes a source of potential conflict endangering the stability of international relations.

It is therefore a legitimate concern for the international community and the United Nations. If no progress can be achieved through international efforts, the danger of violent racial conflict in southern Africa will continue to grow. No country, however far from the scene, can afford to ignore this danger. It is our conviction, therefore, that the United Nations must not fail in its efforts to put an end to the system of *apartheid*. It follows that my Government remains ready to do whatever is necessary to enable the United Nations to achieve these ends by peaceful means.

168. In these international efforts, the decisions of the Security Council on the arms embargo are of crucial significance. They mark the first instance in which the international community moved from words to deeds, from condemnation to action, in its efforts to come to grips with the dangerous situation in southern Africa. The purpose of the original arms embargo was twofold: first, to deny the South African authorities the arms which they are using in implementing their policy of racial oppression; secondly, it was conceived as a step in preventive international action designed to limit the danger of conflict in a situation which was characterized by the Council as seriously disturbing international peace and security.

169. Those aims have not been achieved. Despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of Member States have faithfully complied with the arms embargo, the military might of South Africa has continued to grow. This transpires clearly from the reports of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*, which recently completed a special study of the matter. At the same time, systematic racial discrimination has been extending its hold to Rhodesia and Namibia, thus aggravating the situation further. It can be said that South Africa is using its military power not only to enforce its racial policies in South Africa but also to defy the United Nations decisions on Namibia. The Security Council Sub-Committee on Namibia⁷ has called this fact to the attention of the Council. In one of its recommendations it asks the Council to consider the possibility of reaffirming its arms embargo and of requesting all States to take more stringent measures to give effect to it.

⁷ *Ad Hoc* Sub-Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 276 (1970).

170. But the essence of the arms embargo on South Africa lies in its political importance. As I said, it was the first instance in which the international community moved from words to deeds in order to come to grips with the dangerous situation in southern Africa. The deficiencies of the embargo should not lead us to underestimate the historical significance of that decision. The fact that such a decision could be reached in the Council reflects a fundamental reassessment of values in international life, the virtually universal acceptance of the truth that the world community, if it wishes to promote an orderly evolution of international relations, can no longer tolerate the persistence of mass violations of fundamental rights and freedoms. The arms embargo has thus become a test of the resolve of the international community to carry out the pledge it has undertaken under Article 56 of the Charter.

171. It is with these considerations in mind that the Finnish delegation, which finds it natural that the Security Council consider ways and means by which the arms embargo could be made more effective, will determine its attitude to the proposals which may be submitted to the Council.

172. The PRESIDENT: (*interpretation from Spanish*): I have no further speakers on my list. If no one wishes to speak at this time, I intend to adjourn the meeting.

173. If my statement at the beginning of this meeting was primarily for the purpose of extending greetings to the members of the Council, for I am delighted to be with them, let my last statement express to them my thanks for their kind words about me as I become President of the Security Council for the month of July. Members of the Council have, of course, honoured me with their words, and I now have the obligation of living up to them.

174. It is my understanding that representatives agree that the Council should meet again on Monday next at 3.30 p.m.

The meeting rose at 6.50 p.m.