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#### NOTE

*Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.*

Documents of the Security (symbol S/. . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements of the Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

## FIFTEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-THIRD MEETING

Held in New York on Tuesday, 9 June 1970, at 3 p.m.

*President:* Mr. P. KHATRI (Nepal).

*Present:* The representatives of the following States: Burundi, China, Colombia, Finland, France, Nepal, Nicaragua, Poland, Sierra Leone, Spain, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Zambia.

### Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1543)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. Letter dated 26 December 1963 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/5488):

Report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/9814 and Corr.2).

### Statement by the President

1. The PRESIDENT: Before proceeding with the business before the Council this afternoon, I should like to say a few words to express the sympathy which all of us here feel for the people of Peru, who have recently experienced such a disastrous earthquake. We have all learned with grief of the widespread death and destruction caused by that sudden natural disaster and are gravely concerned about the grievous suffering left in its wake.
2. I should like to suggest that a telegram, be sent, on behalf of the Security Council, expressing our deep sympathy to the Government and the people of Peru for the tragedy they have suffered.
3. In the absence of any objection, I shall proceed to act on the Council's behalf.

### Expression of thanks to the retiring President

4. The PRESIDENT: Before proceeding to the item on the agenda for today's meeting, I also wish to convey the thanks of the Council, as well as my own personal admiration, to Ambassador Kosciusko-Morizet for the exemplary way in which he presided over the deliberations of the Council during the month of May. The unanimous decision on the question of Bahrain that the Council reached on 11 May 1970 [1536th meeting] was due in large part to the tactful manner of the President for that month. Ambassador Kosciusko-Morizet also showed the same tact and sense of justice and fairness when he presided over the Council's meetings during its consideration of the situation in the Middle East [1537th to 1542nd meetings].

### Adoption of the agenda

*The agenda was adopted.*

**Letter dated 26 December 1963 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/5488):**

**Report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/9814 and Corr. 2)**

5. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the usual practice of the Council when dealing with the question now before it, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece, pursuant to their request to participate in the discussion of the question without the right to vote, to take places at the Security Council table.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Z. Rossides (Cyprus), Mr. U. Bayülken (Turkey), and Mr. D. Bitsios (Greece) took places at the Council table.*

6. The PRESIDENT: The Security Council will now resume its consideration of the question relating to Cyprus on the basis of the report submitted to us by the Secretary-General in document S/9814 and Corr. 2; the first corrigendum applies only to the French text.
7. Members of the Council have also received copies of the text of a draft resolution, prepared for our consideration in the course of informal consultations, which is contained in document S/9831.
8. Several representatives have expressed the desire to speak before the Council votes on the draft resolution. The first speaker on my list is the representative of Cyprus, on whom I now call.
9. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): May I at the outset, Mr. President, be permitted to congratulate you on your assuming the Presidency of the Security Council. We wish to pay tribute to the distinguished representative of a small and valiant country which, through all its history, has effectively resisted all colonialist domination and preserved its independence and integrity.
10. The Security Council has on its agenda the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). I take this early opportunity to express our sincere appreciation for the excellent work performed by the United Nations Force in the island. In close co-operation with my Government it has significantly contributed to the pacification of Cyprus. The work of the United Nations Force in Cyprus has been singled out as perhaps the most successful

case of the United Nations peace-keeping operations. In that success the willing co-operation between the Government and the UNFICYP Command has been the main factor. I wish to convey personally to the Commander of the Force, General Prem Chand, and to the officers and men under his command, this expression of our appreciation.

11. In this connexion, I desire to place on record our feelings of profound gratitude to Secretary-General U Thant for his genuine concern over the problem of Cyprus and for his sincere efforts towards its just and peaceful solution. Our admiration goes to him also for his wisdom and humaneness as an enlightened world statesman. His independence of mind and dedication to world unity and peace through the Charter once more stood out in his recent pronouncements, early this year, concerning the Nigerian situation, when he spoke of the right of all Member States, by virtue of their being Members of the United Nations, to respect for their entity and unity and to the protection of their independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity.

12. Our warm thanks also go to the Secretary-General's collaborators in the Secretariat, both in New York and in Cyprus, Mr. Bunche, Mr. Rolz-Bennett and his Special Representative in Cyprus, Mr. Osorio-Tafall, for their unremitting devotion and diligence towards the successful operation of UNFICYP. We also wish to express our appreciation and thanks to those countries whose valuable contributions in military contingents and voluntary funds make possible the United Nations peace-keeping operation in Cyprus.

13. Before us is the report of the Secretary-General for the six-month period to 1 June 1970 [S/9814 and Corr.2]. As emerges from it, the intercommunal situation has remained calm and the improvement continues. The number of shooting incidents was reduced to fifteen, as compared to thirty in the previous period. The report also notes improvement in the relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and further reassuring signs of a return to normal conditions of intercommunal life.

14. In the economic field good co-operation was maintained in a number of bodies, such as the Grain Commission, Marketing Boards, the Higher Technical Institute, the Productivity Centre and the Cyprus Development Corporation, and others. As the Secretary-General in his report remarks:

"The imperative need for joint efforts aimed at a better utilization of the available means and resources of the Island for the benefit of all Cypriots has been repeatedly stressed in many quarters." [Ibid., para. 44.]

And it is well known that co-operation in the economic field is a contributing factor, as the Secretary-General says, in reducing and overcoming political differences.

15. However, efforts by the Turkish Cypriots towards creating a separate economy still persist. This

separatism is contrary to their own interests and is particularly regrettable at a time when efforts the world over are being made to unify the economy of nations. It is time that the spirit of co-operation in the economic as well as in the political field should be allowed to emerge in Cyprus. This spirit does exist in the rank and file of the Cypriot people, Greek and Turkish alike, and would yield its fruits if not hindered by outside influences and pressures.

16. It is gratifying to see from the report that in agriculture, which is the mainstay of the island, the situation in intercommunal relations appears "more stable than at any time since the outbreak of the disturbances" [Ibid., para. 45]. Increased participation of Turkish Cypriot farmers in the soil conservation and afforestation programme and mixed farming projects financed by the Government and the World Food Programme is another improvement. Mixed farming, as the report observes, is "one of the most significant agricultural projects so far undertaken, which should benefit a large number of Cypriots, both Greek and Turkish" [Ibid., para. 47]. It is, however, obvious that participation of Turkish Cypriots in economic developments is necessarily dependent upon the degree of their willingness to co-operate.

17. In the field of public services, as the report shows, there has been an encouraging development towards the return to normal conditions. The water supply for drinking and irrigation purposes in several Turkish Cypriot villages has been improved or repaired by Government authorities, while feasibility studies are made for proposed dam sites. Further progress was also marked in providing electric services to an increased number of Turkish Cypriot villages.

18. "Government help" to the Turkish Cypriots, as the report states, "is especially forthcoming in areas where supervision can be exercised by technicians" [Ibid., para. 46]. In order that supervision may be exercised by technicians of the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources it is necessary that they be not prevented from entering the relevant areas which are in a form of self-segregation; and this is a problem that arises whenever assistance is to be given, but the last report shows a great improvement in this situation.

19. In respect of freedom of movement, regrettably, there has been no change since the previous report [S/9521]. The Greek Cypriot people are still prevented from having access to Turkish Cypriot controlled areas, a matter of serious concern to the Government. In accordance with a list handed to UNFICYP and produced at the Political Liaison Committee, there are 123 public roads in Cyprus the use of which is wholly or partly denied to Greek Cypriots; that is, the overwhelming majority of the Cypriot people are still prevented from using a considerable number of the public roads of their country. Forty-six of those roads are, in addition, of vital necessity to Greek Cypriot farmers for access to their fields. And it may be recalled that, among the said roads, five are main communication roads such as Nicosia-Kyrenia, Famagusta-Chatos-Nicosia, and others. In contrast, the Turkish

Cypriots have free and unrestricted access to all parts and all roads on the Island. Even in militarily restricted areas they are now allowed by the Government to enter freely in order to cultivate their fields.

20. The Secretary-General, in his reports contained in documents S/9233 and S/9521, stressed how important it was that in response to the normalization measures of the Government the Turkish Cypriot leadership should lift the restriction of freedom of movement in areas under their control, warning that this abnormal situation could mar the prospects of the intercommunal talks.

21. In the intercommunal talks progress has been, regrettably, rather slow. This is disappointing. However, more important than their speedy conclusion is the end product of the talks, which must be in substance a sound and durable solution. As appears from the report of the Secretary-General, the main obstacle to the progress of the talks is the antithesis between the concept of unity, on the one side, and that of division, on the other. Unity goes along with conciliation and co-operation; division is the partner of mistrust and antagonism. The one is positive; the other, negative. Blending the two is indeed a difficult task.

22. The question of local administration has proved the most intractable, both in its meaning and in its application. Upon the accepted norms, local government could only have application to specific geographical localities; it never has been nor could it be determined on ethnic criteria. Nor could it be conceived as extending vertically from bottom to top to the point of creating a State within a State. Straying from the norms of a unitary State into the negativeness of division does not provide a solution; it only aggravates the situation.

23. The Government of Cyprus, while making every possible concession in order to meet the other side, cannot possibly go beyond the framework of a unitary State in a way that would destroy the integral unity of the island. The process of concession towards accommodation should always be governed by the main objective, namely, that the solution is just and workable. To obtain consent, whether by pressure or otherwise, to a settlement which is unsound in itself and which intensifies division or which is contrary to the principles of the Charter is not a solution. It is merely moving from one stage of difficulty into a worse and more complicated one, with far graver consequences to the people concerned and to international peace.

24. In this sense my President, Archbishop Makarios, while stressing that there was no intention or wish whatsoever to derogate from the rights of the Turkish Cypriots as equal citizens, made it clear that his Government would accept neither cantonization nor federalization of Cyprus.

25. The fundamental difficulties in the present problem are obvious. Difficulties, however, among men of reason and goodwill are not to be shunned but should

be faced and overcome through patient and diligent efforts towards mutual understanding. It is, therefore, an encouraging sign that both interlocutors, Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash, emphasized that the talks have not failed and should be continued despite the difficulties involved. Both sides are thus fully agreed at least on one premise: that there should be a new, determined effort in the talks. This shows that the road to mutual understanding is open. President Makarios, in a relevant statement, said "We shall continue the talks with inexhaustible patience and goodwill".

26. In this connexion we also note with appreciation from the report that in recent public statements the Foreign Minister of Turkey, Mr. Chaglayankil, no less than the Foreign Minister of Greece, Mr. Pipinelis, reiterated their full support for the intercommunal talks and emphasized the need for a peaceful solution on the basis of an independent unitary State.

27. We may therefore express the hope that in the next round of talks a new co-operative and determined effort will be made upon positive lines that can yield constructive results ensuring a just, workable and enduring solution, one which is in accordance with the principles of the Charter and the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

28. It should be realized that what unites the Greek and Turkish Cypriots as fellow citizens in their island country far transcends any differences that divide them.

29. We have to look at what is good and positive in one another, at what is good in people, in situations and in life. We are in a new era. Technology has unified our planet. Mankind has to recognize that reality and return to unity and peace if there is to be survival. This is the moral demand of our present age. It applies equally to the part as to the whole. And in my country, which is a small country, co-operation and unity within and between all segments of the population must come if its present difficulties are to be overcome and peace prevail in the island. For the problem of Cyprus, as other problems, is basically a moral one and turns upon the axis of man's ethical response.

30. We believe in the inherent ability of man for adjustment. We therefore look with hope for a new approach to the problem of Cyprus in a positive response so that the efforts towards a solution may this time prove meaningful and fruitful. Such a development would furthermore have a positive effect on the stability of the whole troubled region.

31. The PRESIDENT: I should like to thank the Ambassador of Cyprus for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

32. The next speaker on my list is the Ambassador of Turkey, on whom I now call.

33. Mr. BAYULKEN (Turkey): Mr. President, allow me first to express our congratulations to you in assum-

ing the presidency of the Security Council and convey to you our very best wishes.

34. Once again the Security Council meets to consider a report of the Secretary-General on this item [S/9814 and Corr. 2]. As usual the report is comprehensive and enlightening and recommends the renewal of the mandate of UNFICYP at its present strength for a further six months.

35. In its introduction, the report summarizes the conditions in Cyprus for the period covered by the report as follows:

“The intercommunal situation in the last six months has remained calm and there has been some improvement towards a return to normal conditions of life. However, certain developments, including acts of violence, occurring within one of the communities have tended to increase tension and apprehension in general.” [Ibid., para. 2.]

36. We believe that all those who are genuinely and sincerely interested in the attainment of a peaceful, just and agreed solution to the problem of Cyprus cannot but note with some regret and disappointment the situation evaluated in the report. As a matter of fact my delegation and the delegations which are most directly concerned with the problem, as well as the members of the Security Council which made known their views during the previous meeting of the Council on this item six months ago [1521st meeting], had been justifiably encouraged by the promising assessment of the situation in Cyprus at that time. In the words of the Secretary-General, not only had the situation then remained “calm with only a few incidents causing tension”, but “the continuing general desire to maintain peaceful conditions” had been “clearly evident throughout” and there had been “a steady improvement towards a return to normal conditions of life” [S/9521, para. 2].

37. However discouraging and regrettable this deterioration of the situation and the resulting impediment to progress towards better and more auspicious conditions for a return to normal life may be, my delegation believes that an unemotional and constructive approach by all to the problem at hand is what is required most in the present circumstances. In our opinion it is the only approach which might be instrumental in transforming “some improvements” into “steady improvements” for obtaining an uninterrupted reign of calm and quiet which are the prerequisites for achieving an agreed and peaceful settlement.

38. In relation to the duties of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force, to prevent a recurrence of fighting, we are gratified to note that a quiet military situation prevailed during the period covered by the present report. There has been almost no instance of obstruction—in fact only two cases concerning both communities—regarding the freedom of movement of UNFICYP and the isolated incidents were caused by ignorance or misunderstanding of orders having nothing to do with wilful obstruction. UNFICYP con-

tinued to maintain close liaison and good working relations with both communities. The shooting incidents were at an all-time low, for all areas, including the most sensitive.

39. As to the developments concerning the maintenance of law and order, the report states the following:

“During the period under review, a number of violent incidents, involving members of the Greek Cypriot community, generated tension and apprehension in the island. Fortunately, no intercommunal disturbances resulted from the incidents.” [S/9814 and Corr. 2, para. 33.]

40. In the analysis of this encouraging intercommunal situation, due credit is given for the restraint shown by the Turkish-Cypriot Community and its leadership during the difficult days in March, which in the words of the report has “undoubtedly contributed to an early stabilization of the situation” [ibid., para. 80].

41. I am sure the members of the Security Council and all those concerned will not fail to appreciate this constructive attitude of the Turkish community which underlines once again its profound and sincere desire for a peaceful and agreed settlement of the problem.

42. My delegation can find no better words in describing this positive attitude than the ones already inscribed in the report concerning the statement made by the Turkish community. With your permission, I shall quote that statement:

“On behalf of the Turkish-Cypriot community, a spokesman stated that any attempt on life, or use of violence against persons, was deplorable and that if such an attempt were made against persons in high authority or to achieve political objectives it became all the more regrettable as it tended to create a general feeling of insecurity; it was hoped that this kind of irresponsible action would not spread to undermine completely the present endeavours for finding a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem; terrorist activities, whether directed against the Turkish Cypriot community or within the Greek Cypriot community proper, could not be conducive to such a solution.” [Ibid., para. 35.]

43. In spite of the attitude of restraint displayed by the Turkish community, I believe it would not be too difficult to understand the genuine concern and the apprehension that has been felt by the Turkish community as a whole in the face of the serious developments, generating tension and alarm, which are dealt with at some length and detail in the report.

44. The depth of this genuine concern would be appreciated better when one reads the considered opinion of the Secretary-General, to the effect that while the tension seems subsided to a large extent, the “subsequent incidents indicate that the difficulties underlying these happenings are as yet by no means at an end” [ibid., para. 79].

45. I should like to add that while acts of violence with ominous consequences were taking place on the island, the theme of *enosis*, the union of the island with Greece, has again been in prominent use in several—including responsible—quarters. That should explain sufficiently the increased concern and alarm of the Turkish community. It is therefore only natural that the Turkish community's deep concern is not dissipated and that it is viewing the happenings which are not of its making not only with sincere regret but also with profound disquiet and utmost caution.

46. The report in its section describing the increase of violent incidents and the escalation of terrorist activities—paragraph 4J—mentions the fact that the recent recovery by the Greek Cypriot authorities of illegally—held weapons and ammunition amounted to some 300 rifles, 60 machine-guns, 400 sub-machine-guns and light-machine-guns, 800 pistols and revolvers, 1,200 grenades and 340,000 rounds of ammunition. These figures are impressive in themselves and require no further comment.

47. The question of illegally held weapons has always been one of the major sources of concern to the Turkish community. The above-described events have thus shown that its fears were not unfounded. It is in this context that the Vice-President, Dr. Küçük, addressed the Secretary-General and asked the United Nations to use its influence and good offices for neutralizing the threat of a possible use of such arms against his community.

48. My delegation feels that the disturbing developments which the report mentions and which I have touched upon very briefly have also been most unfortunate as they have emerged at a period when slow but steady progress towards mutual confidence among the two communities was being recorded.

49. In section III entitled "Activities towards a return to normal conditions", the report does not fail to relate some improvements in intercommunal life which have appeared to us to be a cause for satisfaction.

50. We would wish sincerely that the developments which are most likely to bring about sustained conditions of confidence and mutual understanding to the benefit of both sides might continue and take precedence over all others; but, as I said, in order that those improvements may keep a steady upward trend, they should be beneficial to both sides. As points at hand, I should like to mention the problem of displaced Turkish Cypriots; paragraph 56 of the report speaks of some progress in this matter. But from the same paragraph it also appears that, all in all, forty-five Turkish Cypriot families were able to return to their former villages. Considering that these displaced persons total more than 20,000 people, one cannot fail to register the disappointment for the very slow pace of the resettlement and rehabilitation. Actually, the Turkish Cypriot community still awaits an answer to the proposals which it submitted in this matter to the Greek Cypriot community. On the process of normalization, my delegation also would like to point to some rights and

benefits of which the Turkish Cypriots are still deprived, such as pensions and social insurance and so on. It is common knowledge that for years no share from the public revenue has been allocated to the Turkish community and it is also known that the salaries of the Turkish Cypriot members of the civil service are borne by the Turkish community.

51. When viewed under the general conditions which naturally affect the process of normalization, and when analysed within the escalating activities of terrorism and violence of the recent months, as indicated in the report, the cautious attitude of the Turkish Cypriot community should be understandable in matters relating to the freedom of movement. In fact, paragraph 59 of the report conveys the Turkish community's viewpoint on this matter and contains equally information as to the passage of several hundred Greek Cypriots through the Turkish areas between January and May 1970.

52. I am constrained to repeat what I said with respect to "normalization" in the previous meeting of the Security Council six months ago. I have to point out once again that during the period under review the balance-sheet of normalization continues to leave much to be desired. I note with regret, with reluctance but also with conviction, that a more satisfactory situation could have been achieved in this field even, if I may say so, irrespective of the events to which I have referred a while ago, had the Greek community demonstrated more willingness and understanding towards the problems of the Turkish community. One fundamental measure of understanding required from the Greek community is to refrain from the use of normalization as a pretext for either depriving the Turkish community of its present constitutional rights or endangering its security. Although seriously attached to the cause of peace and peaceful settlement, and eagerly seeking a mutually agreed and satisfactory solution, the Turkish-Cypriots should not be expected to surrender their vital rights and forgo their security until a mutually acceptable solution is reached.

53. I am sure that the Council in its good conscience will recall the many warm responses of the Turkish community to the Greek-Cypriot measures for reconciliation and for resumption of co-operation. The Turkish community has been ever ready, even anxious to match every act of constructive and co-operative good will directed to ameliorating the hardships it has faced since the 1963 events. In spite of its ordeal, it has been careful not to trespass beyond the bounds of its constitutional rights. It has always sought to remain within the legislation in force in 1963. The administrative measures it has taken were imposed upon it by the present circumstances of its daily life. As is recorded in the Secretary-General's report, these measures are of a temporary nature and do not prejudice the constitutional structure of the State on which, in fact the intercommunal talks are based.

54. I now turn to intercommunal talks. The Secretary-General in his report gives a factual account of the efforts of Mr. Denktash and Mr. Clerides with regard

to the dialogue between the two communities. We all know the difficulties encountered in those talks. However much we may all regret that talks have not as yet produced sufficient results towards an agreed solution, we consider that, in addition to some important work already done, the determination of the leaders of the two communities and of the Governments most directly concerned with the problem constitutes an element of encouragement and hope. My Government continues to support the intercommunal talks and gives every possible assistance in this respect. As underlined in the report, the Prime Minister of Turkey, Mr. Demirel, described intercommunal talks as an important stage on the road to a solution and stated that it is everybody's interest "to capitalize upon that possibility" [ibid., para. 70].

55. The report also quotes from the statements of my Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Caglayangil, emphasizing the need for the two communities, determining jointly and through agreement, the conditions for living together and preserving at every stage the characteristics of an independent Cyprus State.

56. With regard to the possibilities of achieving an agreed basis for a solution, the Secretary-General says the following in the present report:

"In spite of all the difficulties, I still believe that the elements necessary for a political settlement in Cyprus do exist and that a compromise solution, including both political and economic elements, and protecting the legitimate interests and aspirations of both communities, could be worked out. I appeal therefore to both sides to continue the intercommunal talks in good faith, with a determination to get results and a willingness to make concessions." [ibid., para. 82.]

57. Considering the realism and the inspiring wisdom of this evaluation and appeal, my delegation wishes to convey its deep appreciation to the Secretary-General, and hopes most sincerely that it will be welcomed in the same manner by all concerned. We believe that a successful outcome of the talks will depend, more than anything else, on realism, constructive approach, and statesman-like attitude.

58. Before concluding, I should like to express our deep appreciation once again to Secretary-General U Thant and to his immediate collaborators here in New York and in Cyprus in the field. I wish to make special mention of Under-Secretaries-General Mr. Ralph Bunche and Mr. Rolz-Bennett, as well as of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Osorio-Tafall, and the Commander of the Force, Major-General Prem Chand, and those serving under them, who through their diligent, patient and constructive efforts, ensure the smooth functioning of the United Nations Force in Cyprus.

59. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the representative of Greece, on whom I now call.

60. Mr. BITSIOS (Greece) (*interpretation from French*): I should like to congratulate you, Mr. President and to convey my best wishes to you for the duration of your presidency of the Council.

61. In his report of 1 June the Secretary-General recommends the maintenance of the Force at its present strength for a further period of six months. My delegation supports that recommendation.

62. Analysing the reasons that led him to put this request to the Council, U Thant cites, among others, the fact that the Cypriot Government and the Turkish-Cypriot leadership consider that the Clerides-Denktaş

"... talks still offer the only acceptable way to settle outstanding differences and that, even if there is little basis for immediate optimism, they should none the less be continued". [ibid., para. 81.]

The Secretary-General concludes by stating: "This is also my view" [ibid.].

63. Speaking of the relations between the two segments of the population, in paragraphs 42 and following of his report, as well as in his observations at the end of paragraph 83, the Secretary-General notes the presence of further reassuring signs concerning the return to a normal situation, owing to the improved co-operation between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

64. However, even on that level the situation still leaves much to be desired, as is apparent from paragraphs 22, 23, 24, 59 and 83 of the report, in particular with respect to the lessening of the areas of confrontation and freedom of movement. Accordingly, the Secretary-General presses his reasoned opinion that, pending a political solution, partial arrangements as suggested by his Special Representative and by the Commander of the United Nations Force could be elaborated, which would facilitate a return to normalcy, contribute significantly to a rapprochement, and would at the same time increase the chances for progress in the talks now under way.

65. There is no doubt that in these two very important areas—i.e. the question of co-operation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and the talks designed to find a solution to their disputes—the contribution of the United Nations Force and the assistance of Ambassador Osorio-Tafall and General Prem Chand are of great value and consequently, necessary.

66. It is because we are convinced of the usefulness of the United Nations presence in Cyprus in the present circumstances that Greece will continue to lend its moral and financial support to the Force by contributing to defray its expenses. Our contribution recently exceeded the figure of \$8 million.

67. I am fully aware of the fact that other Member countries of the United Nations have had to make substantial sacrifices to set up and maintain the Force and that they are entitled to expect greater progress



in the Clerides-Denktash talks—progress that would open the way to lasting pacification and, therefore, to the withdrawal of the Force.

68. I am among those who have constantly regretted the slow pace of the Nicosia negotiations, both in my consultations with the Secretary-General and in my statements in the Security Council, although I recognize the difficulties that those talks are encountering.

69. In my speech to the Security Council made at the meeting held on 11 December 1969 [*1521st meeting*] I again conveyed to the Council the concern we felt at the fact that these talks were marking time. In particular I said:

“... we are more than ever convinced that the two parties in Cyprus must intensify their efforts to ensure that the talks they are holding will lead to useful results.

“In the past I have had occasion to assure the Council that we on the Greek side consider the time factor important, and we maintain this opinion.”

70. Later in that same meeting, almost all members of the Council expressed their fears that the static situation might engender not a spirit of conciliation but rather a hardening of the positions involved.

71. The representative of the United Kingdom even spoke of four factors dominating the situation, and he added that the human and economic factors:

“... make for good relations, for reconciliation and for peace. The other two factors, political and military, could work the other way—for separation and segregation and the perpetuation of dispute and division.”

72. It seems to me that Lord Caradon's diagnosis was correct, for the reasons that prevent the parties from making tangible progress in the talks underway seem to be largely political and might lead, as Lord Caradon foresaw, to separation, segregation and division.

73. However, it is appropriate to recall the point of departure of the Nicosia talks. The point on which all sides agreed was based on the principle of the independence and unity of the Cypriot State.

74. Mr. Clerides, who had been entrusted by his Government with the responsibility for conducting these negotiations, summed up his mandate on 29 October 1969 as follows:

“Greece and Turkey have agreed that the problem of Cyprus should be settled by peaceful means, for they are aware that an armed confrontation of the two countries would have catastrophic consequences, both for Greece and Cyprus as well as for Turkey. They have thus come to the conclusion that

the framework within which to seek a solution to the Cyprus problem should be the maintenance of an independent Cypriot State, the constitutional system of which should however be revised so that, on the one hand, the State would be unitary and, so that on the other hand, the Greek majority of Cyprus would respect the ethnic existence of the Turkish minority by granting it the necessary constitutional guarantees.

“In the light of what I have just mentioned, the appeal of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the start of talks between Greek and Turkish Cypriots was accepted by Greece, Cyprus and Turkey, and was supported by east and West, as well as by the non-aligned countries.

“Since by the very nature of things, a peaceful solution of the Cyprus problem is not only desirable, but necessary, Greece and Cyprus agreed that the most advantageous and most equitable procedure should be that of talks between Cypriots—a procedure that we are pursuing in close co-operation with the Greek Government.”

75. This statement by one of the negotiators has not, as far as I know, been denied. Moreover, you may have noted the statements made on 20 May 1969 by Mr. Küçük who said:

“What the Turkish Cypriots were aiming at was ‘securing respect for their right to live in peace and security as a partner community within a unitary State i.e., the Republic of Cyprus’.” [*S/9233, para. 67.*]

76. More recently the representative of Turkey stated here on 11 December 1969 [*1521st meeting*], and I venture to quote him again:

“As regards his remarks on the unitary State, the leader of the Turkish Community did not object to a unitary State. The question is how the unitary State will be framed.

“... The problem is, really that the independence of Cyprus should be maintained and within the context of this independence the two communities should have good working relations, keep their identity and not fear each other.”

77. Other statements along the same lines appear in paragraphs 69 and 70 of the Secretary-General's report [*S/9814 and Corr. 2*]. It would appear from this that there is no tangible difference in the respective positions. Where therefore do the difficulties lie? Apparently they stem from the complex details of the proposals that the negotiators have before them. Certainly, the side represented by Mr. Clerides would not refuse to recognize that the agreement to follow should, as Mr. Küçük wishes, take account of the specific identity and interests as well as the security of the Turkish Cypriot community, or even of their desire to settle their own local affairs, as Mr. Denktash has explained.

78. But the Greek Cypriot side is equally anxious to safeguard the specific identity of the State of Cyprus,

to ensure that a system of Government is in force which will give the Greek and Turkish Cypriots the feeling of belonging to a single State, for if by trying to do too much you break the unitary character of the State, you thereby affect its territorial integrity and do away with its independence. And this would run counter to a series of ideas that the Council members have in mind, without my having to enumerate them.

79. There, it seems to me, is where the difficulties lie which inject a certain element of immobility in the talks, and which cause my delegation some concern. For our part, we hope that these talks will revert to their natural course so that they may lead to a viable solution which would once and for all do away with the terrible crises that have beset the island for so long. The Greek Government is dedicated to this objective. It will spare no effort to contribute to the success of this operation of reconciliation and peace.

80. I had intended to limit my statement this afternoon to the essentials, and what is essential for the Security Council is the state of the relations between the two segments of the population of Cyprus and the development of their talks which seek practical and viable solutions concerning their joint existence. If concrete and positive results are attained in this direction, the task of the United Nations in Cyprus, according to the resolutions of the Security Council, would be largely completed.

81. It was therefore my duty to set forth briefly to the Council our appraisal of the development of these aspects of the question of Cyprus which are before this body and to offer the Council the formal assurance that the course of conduct of the Greek Government is in conformity with the letter and spirit of the resolutions of the Security Council as a whole.

82. The outline that I have just given, although sketchy, does however serve a positive purpose. It leads us to see more clearly what still remains to be done to achieve the desired goal, that is to say, the pacification of the island of Cyprus.

83. It is not by recriminations that this result will be achieved. We shall still need a large measure of goodwill and mutual understanding to solve this problem, and what is important is the position of the Governments directly concerned in this political issue, as expressed by their attitudes and their statements.

84. The representative of Turkey implied a few minutes ago that certain events that had occurred in Cyprus had or might have an adverse effect on the favourable course of the talks and on relations between the two communities.

85. Indeed, events have occurred which we are the first to condemn as morally and politically intolerable. They have broken the peace and calm that the Greek Cypriot population needs so badly in this tempestuous period of its existence. Therefore no one will be surprised if I say that these events are in large measure the results of the uncertainty in which the Greek Cyp-

riots have lived for so many years, at times under the threat of foreign military intervention, at times under the vain expectation of a solution which would guarantee their future based on international principles enjoyed by the majority of the international community of States. But to say that events that have effected only the Greek Cypriot population of the island might, or do in fact prevent these talks from making progress is an attempt to turn them to account. This is tantamount to saying that the Turkish Cypriot negotiators might, on this hypothesis have been able to effect some progress in the talks but they were prevented by events, events which had nothing to do with the Turkish Cypriots and which in no way affected them; for it is a fact, and this is set down in black and white in the Secretary-General's report that the relations between the two segments of the Community, far from having deteriorated during the past six months have, on the contrary, made slow but definite progress. One could even say with the Secretary-General that if the Turkish Cypriots had shown themselves to be more understanding in the question of deconfrontation and in that of freedom of movement we would have witnessed an even greater relaxation of tension.

86. Before concluding, I should like to convey to the Secretary-General and to his distinguished colleagues an expression of our great appreciation for their devoted efforts to the cause of peace and for what the United Nations has done in Cyprus.

87. The PRESIDENT: I have no further speakers on my list. As no other representative has asked to speak at this time, the Council will proceed to vote on the draft resolution contained in document S/9831.

*A vote was taken by show of hands.*

*The resolution was adopted unanimously.<sup>1</sup>*

88. The PRESIDENT: Several representatives have asked to speak after the vote, and I shall call on them in turn.

89. Mr. HILDYARD (United Kingdom): Mr. President, may I first extend to you, Sir, on behalf of my delegation, a warm welcome as President of this Council for the month of June. Some of us have already had experience of your skill as Chairman in one of the committees set up by this Council. We know that from you we can expect the authority of a soldier and the tact and understanding of a diplomat. We are fortunate to have as our President such an outstanding son of your noble country.

90. I should like also to associate my delegation with the tribute which you paid to the Ambassador of France who acted as President of the Council during the month of May. I cannot hope to add to the very warm words with which the leader of my delegation welcomed him at the first meeting of the Council for that month [1536th meeting], but I should like to express to him personally our appreciation and admiration.

<sup>1</sup> See resolution 281 (1970).

91. Before turning to the item on our agenda, I should like also to express my delegation's welcome and support for the message which you have addressed, on behalf of the Council, to the people of Peru in the terrible disasters which have befallen them.

92. We are grateful again to the Secretary-General for a lucid and constructive report [S/9814 and Corr. 2]. He does not encourage illusions or complacency, but he puts the difficulties in proportion. In spite of all our hopes that the island had now entered on a period of calm, there has been a recrudescence of violence. We share his profound relief that President Makarios escaped unhurt when his helicopter came under fire on 8 March and we welcome, with the Secretary-General, the signs that the tension which was so in evidence at that time may have subsided. The United Nations presence must certainly have been a factor for calm and stability in those difficult days. At least as the report brings out, there have been practically no serious intercommunal incidents during the period under review, such as would inevitably have inhibited the slow growth of confidence between the two communities. We remember the melancholy situation which obtained until the early months of 1968, and we know how much is due to the United Nations Force and the Secretary-General's Special Representative.

93. Here I should like to join in the tribute which has so deservedly been paid to the Special Representative, Mr. Osorio-Tafall. His ability and skill have been invaluable. We are also fortunate in the Force Commander, General Prem Chand, who, in the comparatively short time that he has been in Cyprus, has won widespread admiration and esteem.

94. As the representative of Cyprus has reminded us, the United Nations Force in Cyprus is the most impressive peace-keeping operation in the history of the United Nations. It is indeed an operation in which even an Organization as uncomplacent as the United Nations, and rightly uncomplacent, can feel justifiable satisfaction and pride.

95. What of the future? In his report the Secretary-General expressed the view that the elements necessary for a political settlement in Cyprus do exist and has recommended that the intercommunal talks should be continued. My Government wholeheartedly shares that view and supports the Secretary-General's appeal to the parties to go on with the talks in good faith with a determination to get results and a willingness to make concessions. We note that co-operation between the communities at the village level for the solution of day-to-day problems has increased and that this could be a good omen for co-operation at higher levels. The United Nations Force has helped and can continue to help. In the end, however, everything depends on the communities themselves. As my Foreign Secretary said recently said at Ankara: "A policeman can keep the peace between two neighbours, but only the neighbours themselves can make the peace".

96. In these circumstances it is logical that the Secretary-General has recommended, and that the Security Council has agreed, that the mandate of UNFICYP should be extended for another six months. My delegation was glad to vote for this extension. We are grateful for the Secretary-General's efforts to reduce the cost of the operation, in particular by reducing the size of the forces involved. It is clear from the report that there is little if any scope for more cuts in the immediate future, but we hope that the Secretary-General will continue to keep in mind the possibility of further reductions consonant with the needs of the situation and the operational effectiveness of the Force.

97. Meanwhile, I am glad to be able to state that the United Kingdom will maintain its contingent in UNFICYP for the six months period. We shall meet all its costs. Assuming that other contributors agree to keep their voluntary contributions at the same level as before, we are prepared to make the same voluntary contributions as in the past, that is £625,000, the equivalent of \$1.5 million for the two quarters.

98. I should like to take this opportunity to reaffirm my Government's unqualified support for the independence and unity of Cyprus. Given continuation of the present restraint—and the statements which we have heard from the representatives of the three parties today show both restraint and a spirit of conciliation—we can hope that the intercommunal talks will be given the encouragement and support which they clearly need, and that both sides will proceed with a due sense of urgency. We hope and believe that the time will come when all the inhabitants of this beautiful island will be able to live together in friendship and peace.

99. The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for the kind words expressed to me.

100. Mr. MWAANGA (Zambia): Mr. President, I should like to congratulate you on your assumption of this high and worthy office of President of the Security Council for the month of June. Your personal qualities, Sir, give us entire confidence that you will perform your duties in such a manner as will meet with our often optimistic expectations.

101. My complimentary remarks would hardly be complete if I did not pay a tribute to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Kosciuszko-Morizet of France, for the exemplary manner in which he presided over our deliberations last month. We shall always remember his skill, sense of fairness and humor.

102. My delegation voted in favour of the resolution contained in document S/9831 extending the presence of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus because we believe now, just as in the past, that this is in the interest of all the people of Cyprus.

103. Last December, when I spoke in my capacity as the representative of Zambia [1521st meeting], I

expressed regret that no significant progress had been made so far towards resolving the outstanding political and economic issues in Cyprus. I wish to reiterate this regret. We know that the people of Cyprus want peace more than any one of us, and it is our hope that nothing will prevent them from achieving this goal of peace. We look forward to a time when it will be deemed unnecessary to continue maintaining the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus.

104. We are indebted to the Secretary-General for his having provided us, as always, with such a comprehensive report on the situation in the island. We encourage the Secretary-General and his colleagues to continue doing everything possible to bring about national reconciliation in Cyprus, and to that end we pledge our never-wavering support.

105. The PRESIDENT: I thank the Ambassador of Zambia for his kind remarks.

106. Mr. KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET (France) (*interpretation from French*): May I, Mr. President, be permitted to tell you first of all how grateful I am for the extremely kind words you found to describe my term as President of the Council for the month of May. I also wish to express my gratitude to all my colleagues who were kind enough to join in those words.

107. As for yourself, Mr. President, we know you well, and I can assure you that the French delegation has complete confidence in you at this moment when you are assuming such a heavy task. The manner in which you expressed our collective feeling by addressing a message of solidarity and sympathy to the people of Peru shows the fashion in which you intend to carry out your duties, and we thank you.

108. This time again, the, so to speak, almost ritual debate of our Council on the question of Cyprus terminates in a unanimous vote of a resolution extending for a new six-month period the mandate of the peace-keeping force established under the terms of resolution 186 (1964), of 4 March 1964. The French delegation, as on previous occasions, voted in favour of that text and would like to explain briefly the considerations that led it to do so.

109. The last report of the Secretary-General, [*S/9814 and Corr. 2*], notes that during the period between 2 December 1969 and 1 June 1970 calm has prevailed between the rival communities in the island, and that progress has been achieved towards the restoration of normal conditions of life. However, although the number of incidents involving gunfire during the last six months was much smaller than during corresponding previous periods, peace has not yet been brought to the minds. We may regard as testimony to this fever the despicable attempt of 8 March against the life of the President of the Republic of Cyprus, together with the assassination, a week later of Mr. Polycarpus Gheorghadjis, former Minister of the Interior. Indeed, as the Secretary-General stressed, the firm measures taken by the Government and the moderation shown

by the Turkish Cypriot community and its leaders during the difficult weeks of the month of March made it possible to prevent a worsening of the tensions. But the persistence of those tensions, together with the absence of any significant progress in the conversations going on between representatives of the two communities, leads to the conclusion that, despite a certain improvement in collaboration which has been brought about in various fields between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, no quick solution of the fundamental problems of Cyprus can be expected.

110. In these circumstances, the Secretary-General thought that the best he could do was to recommend maintenance of the Force in the island for another six-month period. The Council agreed with this, since it received assurance that the Secretary-General's recommendation was the result of thorough consultations with all interested parties and that it met with the full agreement of those parties. However, it cannot be concealed that the prolongation of a provisional arrangement that the Council, more than six years ago, envisaged as lasting for only three months, cannot be regarded as entirely satisfactory. Despite the implementation of some of the suggestions of the Secretariat survey team that went to Cyprus last year, and despite a certain reduction in the number of armed forces involved, the Cyprus operation still continues to raise delicate financial problems for our Organization. Above all, one wonders whether the continued presence of the United Nations Force, though it indeed assures the maintenance of a precarious kind of peace, fully corresponds to the objectives with which it was charged by the Council. For paragraph 5 of resolution 186 (1964) recommended in particular that the function of the Force should be "to contribute to . . . a return to normal conditions". But, as the French delegation has emphasized on many occasions, one may fear that the presence, constantly renewed, of United Nations forces has had rather the effect of perpetuating, or crystallizing a dangerous situation and that it has served as a pretext for indefinite postponement of any final settlement of the Cyprus problem by the parties directly involved, despite the efforts of the Secretary-General and of the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Mr. Osorio-Tafall—and I can personally testify—having known him personally and seen him at work elsewhere in difficult circumstances—to Mr. Osorio-Tafall's cool competence, will power and high awareness of his responsibilities.

111. Still, the Secretary-General tells us that

" . . . the elements necessary for a political settlement in Cyprus do exist and that a compromise solution, including both political and economic elements, and protecting the legitimate interests and aspirations of both communities, could be worked out." [*Ibid.*, para. 82.]

How then, in these circumstances, can one fail to express the wish that, as urged in the resolution just adopted, the parties concerned will redouble their efforts so that true peace may be restored between

the two communities which today are divided, so that all concerned, without forgetting their origin, may become Cypriots and nothing else, as a previous speaker has put it. For its part, the French delegation hopes that this appeal will be finally heeded by those to whom it is addressed, for it would be dangerous and futile for the two communities involved to hope to go on living forever under a provisional and temporary system.

112. There is no doubt whatsoever that, although it is always difficult to reconcile unity with diversity, the only possible way lies in not merely coexisting, but also in living together and co-operating—which implies a maximum of local freedoms but also a minimum of central powers if what is desired is at the same time to assure respect for the rights of the communities and the satisfactory functioning of an independent State.

113. The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of France for his kind words.

114. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): Mr. President, it gives me great satisfaction to begin my statement by expressing to you personally the congratulations of the Soviet delegation on your assumption of the high and responsible office of President of the Security Council. Knowing your personal qualities and your political and diplomatic experience, we express our firm conviction that you will be brilliantly successful in discharging the tasks entrusted to you.

115. I should also like to congratulate your predecessor, Ambassador Kosciuszko-Morizet of France, and express our deep satisfaction at the important work he has done in fitting that responsible post. During his term as President of the Security Council, through the united efforts of all peace-loving States, succeeded in formulating a condemnation of the evils of aggression, and justice prevailed as a result of the decisions taken.

116. The Soviet delegation is eager to associate itself with your initiative in suggesting that we should express our condolences to the Government and people of Peru, a country which has been the victim of a frightful natural disaster. The Soviet press has today published a cabled message of condolences sent by Mr. N. V. Podgorny, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, to Mr. Juan Velasco Alvarado, President of Peru, in connexion with the earthquake which ravaged that country.

117. Turning to the substance of the issue under discussion, the Soviet delegation deems it necessary to make the following observations. The position of the Soviet Union on the substance of the Cyprus question which is today before the Security Council has repeatedly been set forth in statements by the Soviet Government and by representatives of the USSR, including statements made in the Security Council. That position retains its full force and significance now.

118. The Soviet Union has always considered that the question of Cyprus can and must be settled exclusively by peaceful means, in the interests of the whole population of Cyprus—in other words, in the interests of both national communities. Such a settlement must be based on the strengthening of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus which, as a sovereign State and a Member of the United Nations, pursues a policy of peace and non-alignment with military blocs. It is precisely a settlement of this kind which the Soviet Union strongly advocates.

119. At the same time, the Soviet Union considers that the solution of the internal problems of the Republic of Cyprus is a matter for the Cypriots themselves, and for them alone. They must put their internal affairs in order themselves, without any interference from outside. Neither other States nor the United Nations have the slightest right to interfere in the internal affairs of the Republic of Cyprus or to impose on the Cypriot people who constitute its two communities, Greek and Turkish, any formula for the settlement of the internal problems of that State.

120. The Soviet Union is resolutely opposed to any attempt to infringe upon the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, opposed to any intention—such as appears to be harboured, as in the past, by certain States—to contrive a settlement of the question of Cyprus behind the backs of the Cypriot people to the detriment of their vital interests, in furtherance of the imperialistic purposes of certain Powers which are members of the NATO military bloc. The Security Council, and the United Nations as a whole, must display the utmost firmness in resisting any attempts and intentions to subordinate the fate of the people of Cyprus to the implementation of military plans in the Mediterranean area and the neighbouring Middle East.

121. All this assumes particularly great significance at the present time when, as a result of the subversive activities of the international imperialist forces and their agents in Cyprus, tension has increased and acts of terrorism directed against the country's political leaders and public figures defending its independence have become more frequent, culminating in the villainous attempt on the life of the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, and the brutal assassination of the former Minister of the Interior and Defence, Mr. Georghadjis. It is quite clear that the tension in Cyprus, as noted by the Secretary-General, has intensified the threat to the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus and to peace and security in the eastern Mediterranean area as a whole. In these circumstances the seriousness of the threat to the independence and security of Cyprus posed by the existence of foreign military bases in the territory of that State becomes increasingly obvious. These military bases are in themselves a source of constant tension in Cyprus.

122. The general approach of the Soviet Union to the question of Cyprus is based on its over-all foreign policy, as laid down by V. I. Lenin, the great founder of the Soviet State, the hundredth anniversary of whose birth mankind is celebrating this year. From the very

first days of its existence, the Soviet State, following Lenin's guidance, has pursued a policy of peace and friendship among peoples and has resolutely and consistently opposed colonial enslavement and the oppression of peoples by imperialism. To this day the Soviet Union remains a confirmed advocate of the liquidation of the vestiges of colonialism in all its manifestations, in all parts of the world where the twin evils of colonialism and racism have not yet been liquidated, where they have not yet been completely eradicated, and where imperialism, with the help of military bases, threatens the freedom and security of peoples.

123. The Soviet delegation also wishes to draw attention to the fact that, in the current report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus [S/9814 and Corr.2], it is again stated that negotiations are taking place in Cyprus between representatives of the Greek and Turkish communities with a view to settling the problems which exist in the relations between them. We take the position that those negotiations are an internal matter of the Republic of Cyprus. We sincerely hope for the early success of those intercommunal talks, since only such talks based on mutual understanding and goodwill and free from outside interference, can lead to the creation of conditions which will ensure peace and security for all Cypriots, Greek and Turkish alike.

124. At the same time, the Soviet delegation particularly wishes to stress that it shares the concern expressed in the report of the Secretary-General regarding the lack of progress on basic issues in those intercommunal talks. In this connexion, the question inevitably arises whether there is not some negative influence being brought to bear on the talks by those forces, those international imperialist circles, which recently provoked a worsening of the tension in Cyprus and which, naturally, have no interest in a successful outcome of the intercommunal talks, since such success would be a severe blow to their plans for a "settlement" of the question of Cyprus on a basis which would be in the interests of certain of the NATO Powers. The breakdown of the negotiations and a recurrence of internecine strife in Cyprus would, of course, serve the interests only of those anti-popular forces and would provide a pretext for foreign interference in the affairs of the State of Cyprus and its people. Such a course of events would inevitably pose a threat to the independence of the Cypriots and imperil the Republic of Cyprus.

125. In conclusion, I should like to refer to the question of the United Nations operation in Cyprus. The report of the Secretary-General on that operation for the period 2 December 1969 to 1 June 1970 includes a recommendation that the force known as the "United Nations Peace-keeping Force" should be continued for a further six months.

126. It must be noted, however, that over six years have elapsed since those forces were sent to Cyprus. The stationing of those forces in Cyprus for such a lengthy period can in no way be regarded as normal. The Soviet delegation considers it essential to stress

that this peace-keeping operation of the United Nations cannot and should not be continued indefinitely. This operation, by reason of its very nature and of its length, cannot serve as a prototype or model of a normal United Nations peace-keeping operation. The very presence of foreign troops in the territory of an independent sovereign State, even under the auspices of the United Nations, can be only an extraordinary measure and must be brought to an end at the earliest opportunity. The Soviet delegation expresses the hope that such an opportunity will present itself not later than the end of the current six-month period during which the Force is to be stationed in Cyprus. It is on that understanding, and taking into account the position of the parties concerned in this matter, above all the position of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, that the Soviet delegation will refrain from raising at this time the question of the withdrawal of those forces from Cyprus.

127. With regard to the resolution adopted by the Security Council, the Soviet delegation deems it essential to note in particular the fact that in connexion with the extension of the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force for a further period of six months the resolution reaffirms the provisions of Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and subsequent decisions of the Council relating to the question of Cyprus. That was the key factor in determining the Soviet Union's attitude toward the resolution in question.

128. The delegation of the USSR is authorized to state that the Soviet Union, for the reasons given, did not oppose the extension of the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Force for a further six-month period, it being understood that this extension will be in full conformity with the provisions of the Security Council resolution referred to by me, in other words, that the functions of the United Nations Force in Cyprus will remain unchanged and that it will continue to be financed in accordance with the present system, i.e. on a voluntary basis.

129. The PRESIDENT: I should like to thank Ambassador Malik for the kind words that he addressed to the Chair.

130. Mr. TERENCE (Burundi) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, the delegation of Burundi would like to address to you its congratulations on your assumption of the Presidency of this Council. My delegation would like also to take this opportunity to pay a tribute to your dynamic qualities, which have helped us to settle the problems of the United Nations generally and those affecting the African continent in particular. It is these qualities that have led you to assume the Chair formerly held by my humble self in the United Nations Committee on Namibia,<sup>2</sup> which is currently in session. So long as you hold this high office my delegation will be happy to offer its contribution, which, albeit modest, will be given in full measure.

<sup>2</sup> *Ad Hoc* Sub-Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 276 (1970).



131. My delegation is also happy to express satisfaction at having taken part in meetings of the Security Council last month under the guidance of a person who represents a country that has very close relations with the Republic of Burundi, and who is also a friend, His Excellency Ambassador Kosciusko-Morizet, who made it possible for the Security Council to appraise the contrast between his brilliant French mind and his name. I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to congratulate him for the dignity, skill and diplomacy with which he guided the work of the Security Council, thanks to which the Council was able to note with gratification that a development has occurred—one that is partially satisfactory and which has made it possible for calm to be restored.

132. I now come to the present problem. I have been instructed by the Government of Burundi to make a statement within the framework of peace and unity, which are the two essential *sine qua non* for the two communities on Cyprus. As a matter of fact, any proposals by the Security Council or by the United Nations in general should be directed towards the restoration of peace and the creation of a climate, at first psychological and later political and social which would be designed to safeguard and cement the unity of the Cypriot people and to inspire the two constituent elements with mutual confidence. This unity is in the higher interests of the two communities, which, owing to the vicissitudes of history, are called upon not only to coexist, but also to intermingle. The fact that they are different in their ethnic origin, far from being an insurmountable obstacle to coexistence, should provide the foundation for a complementary and mutual enrichment, these being two pillars of one single edifice, Cyprus. From this standpoint it is up to the Cypriot people themselves as a single national entity to dwell less on their respective historical allegiances and more on their present common fate, namely, that of being a people, a nation, and they should embrace as their primary task the job of building an indivisible State, and assuming control of their destiny.

133. It is to that sacred duty, the defence of the indivisible sovereignty of Cyprus, that my Government firmly commits itself. The Republic of Burundi is a tireless champion of peace and harmony among the sons and daughters of one mother, the homeland.

134. From that point of view, the two communities, regardless of their relative size, are entitled to claim their right to life and citizenship and to enjoy these rights on an equal footing.

135. These are the overriding principles and guidelines which have led my Government to support the pacification action of the United Nations on that island, an island which in other respects is a tourist's paradise.

136. Mr. KASPRZYK (Poland): Mr. President, permit me, first of all, on behalf of the Polish delegation, to congratulate you warmly on your assumption of the high office of President of the Security Council. I

should like to assure you of my delegation's full co-operation. We are convinced that under your experienced guidance the discussion in the Council will be successful.

137. May I also be permitted to address our delegation's thanks to Ambassador Kosciusko-Morizet of France who, in a very talented and brilliant way, discharged his responsibilities as President of the Council in the month of May.

138. The Polish delegation would like to take this opportunity to express its deep sympathy to the Government and people of Peru in connexion with the most tragic catastrophe that has taken place in that country. In that respect, we therefore join you, Mr. President, in the cable which you have proposed on behalf of the Security Council.

139. We have before us the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus for the period of 2 December 1969 to 1 June 1970 [S/9814 and Corr. 2]. We have also a resolution we have just voted for, which provides once more for the extension of stationing of United Nations forces in Cyprus for a further six-month period.

140. As all the representatives could notice, there is a difference between the evaluation of the situation in Cyprus in the present report of the Secretary-General and that in the report of 3 December 1969. The previous report starts its chapter VIII entitled "Observations" by stating: "The improvement in the situation in Cyprus, which began in December 1967, has continued during the period under review" [S/9521, para. 73].

141. Unfortunately, the present report of the Secretary-General does not contain such a formulation and at the beginning of its corresponding chapter it states that:

"... the calm which had characterized the situation in Cyprus for some time was disturbed by a series of violent actions culminating in the attempt, on 8 March, on the life of the President of the Republic", and that "tension caused by this dastardly attempt was increased by the murder, one week later, of Mr. Polycarpus Georghadjis, the former Minister of the Interior." [S/9814 and Corr. 2, para. 79.]

142. Those disturbances could not have a positive impact on the intercommunal talks and that is why the Secretary-General in his report had to say that "in the prevailing circumstances, it would be unrealistic to expect an early solution of the basic problems of Cyprus" [ibid., para. 81].

143. The preceding difference in the evaluation of the situation in Cyprus in the reports is also reflected in resolutions. The previous resolution 274, (1969) of 11 December 1969, in its third preambular paragraph, noted "that the improvement of the situation in Cyprus" had "continued". We do not find those words in the present resolution.

144. In other words, the report and the new resolution indicate that there were serious elements of deterioration of the situation in Cyprus. That cannot be considered as accidental. Behind it are those forces which would like to undermine the independence of the Republic of Cyprus. It is also evident that certain NATO circles are intensifying the tensions in Cyprus because of their growing activity in the Mediterranean and Middle East.

145. In this connexion, our delegation would like to recall that Poland has always supported the struggle of the Cypriot people against imperialism and colonialism. From the very creation of the Republic of Cyprus we have strongly supported its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Poland has always stood for the removal of foreign military bases from Cyprus and for the peaceful solution of the question of Cyprus without foreign interference.

146. Our delegation voted for the provisions of the resolution extending the stationing in Cyprus of United Nations forces for a further period of six months. We should like, however, in this connexion, to stress that this extension should be effected in accordance with the provisions of the Security Council resolution 186 (1964), that is, that the present function and the existing procedure for the financing of United Nations forces in Cyprus should be maintained.

147. We should also like to join those delegations which have drawn the Council's attention to the fact that it is already more than six years since the United Nations forces have been stationed in Cyprus. That situation cannot be considered as normal. We therefore should like to express our belief that the opportunity will arise soon when the United Nations troops can be withdrawn from Cyprus.

148. Mr. BUFFUM (United States of America): Mr. President, may I join the many who this afternoon have already expressed their deep pleasure in seeing you in the President's chair for this month. Your well-known personal qualities and your long experience here will assure us all that the work of the Council during June will be as fruitful as any wise leadership can possibly make it.

149. I should also like to join in paying tribute to the manner in which the representative of France presided over our proceedings during that very difficult month of May. I think we would all agree that his Presidency can be characterized as nothing less than brilliant.

150. Finally, before turning to the subject on our agenda, may I, too, express our appreciation for your initiative in transmitting condolences to the Government of Peru on the tragic losses which it suffered as a result of the recent earthquake. I know that all of our minds and our hearts were indeed touched by the magnitude of death and suffering which was experi-

enced and we are happy that you had transmitted those sentiments on behalf of all of us.

151. Now, with regard to today's agenda item, it is the view of my delegation that the Council's action in extending the mandate of the United Nations Force in Cyprus for another six months is happy evidence of our common conviction that the presence of the United Nations Force in Cyprus indeed makes an important contribution of maintaining peace between the two Cypriot communities and thereby contributes to the possibility of a permanent solution of the communal problems. In addition, we should like to give particular recognition to the dedication and the splendid performance of the officers and men of the United Nations Force and their new Commander, Major-General Prem Chand. The successful reorganizational measures taken by the General in response to suggestions of a Secretariat survey team are particularly deserving of note. These steps, in our view, have increased the operational flexibility and effectiveness of the Force and at the same time have produced significant savings. Therefore, these measures deserve our particular commendation.

152. Then, too, the Secretary-General's report [S/9814 and Corr. 2], which we have before us today, is most useful and informative. I think we are all taking encouragement from the fact that the intercommunal situation has remained calm during the past six months, despite the heightening of tension which resulted from the deplorable events of last March. The regrettable attack on President Makarios, along with the other violent incidents which have been referred to here this afternoon and detailed in the Secretary-General's report gave rise to special concern. We are most gratified that the attack on the President of Cyprus failed and that the measures taken by the Government of Cyprus, together with the restraint and statesmanship exhibited by the Turkish Cypriot leadership, permitted tensions to subside without intercommunal strife. I should like to add that we deplore acts of violence of any sort on the island, and we hope that all concerned will work actively to prevent them.

153. Hope may also be drawn from the fact that there has been some movement towards normal conditions of life on Cyprus. Nevertheless, I should be less than candid if I did not point out that my Government regrets that it has not been possible to put into effect more of the United Nations proposals in the area of deconfrontation and normalization.

154. We are frankly disappointed at the lack of progress in the intercommunal talks. The position of the United States on this subject remains unchanged: again we would urge both participants in the talks, and the communities for which they speak, to maintain attitudes of compromise and accommodation, and to examine their positions and all proposals with a view to accepting what is best in the long run for Cyprus, rather than what they may judge to be best in the short term for their respective communities.



155. Now, we concur fully in the Secretary-General's view that the elements necessary for a political settlement in Cyprus do exist and that a compromise solution which protects the legitimate interests and aspirations of both communities can be worked out. We continue to believe that such a solution, premised on an independent Cyprus, can best be reached through the intercommunal talks and we therefore hope that Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash, the very able negotiators for the two communities, will continue to pursue their efforts in the same positive spirit which they have demonstrated in the past.

156. However, we feel constrained to point out that as these negotiations drag out over a long period of time, the two communities in isolation from each other tend to develop separate civic roots, and that this process of development in isolation can tend to work against achieving the just solution we all desire.

157. In this connexion, it is perhaps worthwhile to draw particular attention to paragraphs 43 and 44 of the report and to reiterate the Secretary-General's remark that inter-communal co-operation in the economic field can contribute greatly to reducing and ultimately overcoming political differences. We are confident that the able and judicious representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Osorio-Tafall, whom we are indeed happy to see in our midst again today, will continue to render all possible assistance to the parties and to provide whatever good offices they may find useful.

158. Finally, I should like to add a brief word on the financial situation. My Government considers that it would be most unfortunate if the measures already taken by the United Nations Force to lower costs were to lead members to conclude that the financial crisis had passed. If that were the case, we would find ourselves in the anomalous position of seeing these highly desirable measures lead indirectly to a worsening of the situation, rather than an amelioration. As the Secretary-General informs us, there is still a deficit of \$7.5 million. For its part, the United States intends to meet its financial obligations fully. In the past we have pledged approximately 40 per cent of the total costs of the United Nations Force in Cyprus; we are prepared to continue to do so, but we do not believe that any one nation should assume a disproportionate share of what is a common responsibility and that is the reason for the condition which we attach to our pledge. Therefore, once again we urge that the Member States of the United Nations family be approached, with a view to securing additional contributions for increases in the level of former contributions. To support the Force with rhetoric is fine, but the United Nations needs far more tangible support if it is to be effective, and, in our view, Council members bear a very special responsibility in this regard.

159. Let me conclude by once again expressing the deep appreciation of my Government to the Secretary-General and his staff, to the United Nations Force in Cyprus and its Commander, and to the Secretary-General's Special Representative. They all fully deserve our support and encouragement.

160. Mr. TOMEH (Syrian Arab Republic): To the view of all the delegations that have addressed their felicitations to you, Sir, on your assumption of the high office of the Presidency of the Security Council, the delegation of Syria wishes to add its own voice. Those of us who have known you as colleagues for a number of years have always admired your tact and your wisdom which represents the wisdom of Asia at its best and highest. Indeed, your taking the initiative today in addressing a cable of condolences to the people and Government of Peru in their plight and tragedy is in itself an indication of your deep humanism and your deep humanity.

161. I also wish to take this occasion to associate my delegation with all those delegations that expressed their admiration to the representative of France, Ambassador Kosciusko-Morizet, for his Presidency over the Council during the month of May. As the representative of an Arab State, I cannot but underline the fact that during the month of May and under the Presidency of the French representative, two Arab problems were discussed as you yourself, Mr. President, have mentioned.

162. The first was the problem of Bahrain in which it was affirmed that the overwhelming majority of the people of Bahrain want to be in a fully independent State, fully enjoying its sovereignty. We then expressed the hope, as we express it now, that other peoples in the Arabian peninsula, those among the Arab peoples who are struggling for their independence and freedom, will soon achieve, as we are sure they will, their peoplehood, nationhood and full sovereignty.

163. Turning now to the substance of the question we are discussing, we cannot but express our appreciation for the report submitted to the Council by the Secretary-General [S/9814 and Corr. 2], a report characterized by its realistic approach as well as its realistic recommendations for the improvement of the situation in Cyprus.

164. We wish equally to express our appreciation for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus. Our concern regarding the question of Cyprus as an Asian Member is too evident to be explained. First of all, Cyprus is in the Mediterranean Basin of Asia; it is in our own vicinity. Therefore, we consider peace in that area as being a very basic and important condition for peace in the whole continent of Asia—indeed of all the continents of the world.

165. It is our continent now which is suffering most the results of aggression and the tragedies and calamity of war. Suffice it to mention that no less than fifteen States on the continent of Asia are right now at this moment in an active and actual state of war as a result of imperialism and its machinations in our area. Whether it be South-east Asia or western Asia, referred to as the Middle East, we all know of the ravages of war that are devastating that part of the world.

166. With the three parties concerned, my country, Syria, as indeed all Arab countries—and by the three

parties concerned I am referring specifically to Turkey, Greece and Cyprus with its two communities—has traditional ties of friendship and understanding. Therefore we sincerely wish that the two communities of Cyprus will be able to realize full understanding, much more than they have done so far, in order to overcome the legacy of imperialism that has been left in Cyprus and indeed in our part of the world in general.

167. To the people of Cyprus, to its two communities, to the parties concerned, we express our sincerest hopes that peace will ultimately be found.

168. We have voted for the resolution which calls, among other things, for the prolongation of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus for six months more. Nevertheless, we cannot but note that the United Nations Force in Cyprus is now entering its seventh year. Therefore, it is no accident that it is still there. The conditions that called for its existence at the beginning are indeed the justification for its continuation at the present time. Ultimately, peace itself is the guarantee of peace and therefore the only foundation on which peace can be obtained in the area is full understanding that can be reached through the two communities of Cyprus: the Greek community and the Turkish community.

169. Finally, I wish to express my great appreciation and admiration for the very considerate approach with which the three parties addressing the Council have dealt with the problem, in a spirit of peace and understanding.

170. The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Syria for the friendly sentiments he expressed in my regard.

171. Mr. SAVACE (Sierra Leone): Mr. President, may I on behalf of my delegation take this opportunity of congratulating you on your assumption of the high office of President of the Security Council. Your wise counsel and great leadership are known to the members of this Council and therefore need no elaboration.

172. We congratulate your predecessor in office, Ambassador Kosciusko-Morizet for his exemplary performance last month. During his tenure, as we all here can attest, important questions were discussed and very serious attempts made to reach a solution based on justice and self-respect for all.

173. Today the Council has met to consider the question of the United Nations operation in Cyprus dealt with in the report of the Secretary-General of 1 June 1970 [*S/9814 and Corr. 2*].

174. My delegation cannot help but put on record its tribute to the representatives of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey who in their statements have expressed the views of their Governments before the Council this afternoon. All of them have demonstrated considerable restraint and, in more ways than one, an undeniable emphasis on the need for conciliation. This trend we should like to see develop into a pattern of

behaviour of the people of Cyprus themselves in their internal relations.

175. The report of the Secretary-General is factually comprehensive. It is also replete with observations of significant relevance to the subject matter at issue. Our attention has been drawn to the restoration of normal economic conditions. We have observed that good co-operation between both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots is evidenced in such bodies as the Grain Commission, the agricultural marketing boards, the Higher Technical Institute, the Productivity Centre and the Cyprus Development Corporation. All of these are listed in paragraph 43 of the report. Improvements, we learned, have also taken place between the two sectors in such highly important areas of human endeavour as water supply, postal services, electricity and so on.

176. We are gratified to learn that intercommunal talks are still being carried on, slow-dragging though they may be, and we are convinced that while the two sections of that country are engaged in such exploratory talks the fear of active involvement in fighting will be much reduced and the hope for a peaceful settlement and understanding will not be dampened.

177. We understand from the Secretary-General that even though the talks have been slow and uneventful, yet they are the only acceptable alternative, to both the Cyprus Government and the Turkish Cypriot leaders, to a state of active war. My delegation this afternoon voted in favour of the draft resolution contained in document S/9831 to extend the life of the United Nations operations in Cyprus because it is convinced that a removal of that Force would result in a complete reversal of the trends which have developed and would presumably lead to a state of deterioration in the island. This we would not want to see happen.

178. My delegation would be remiss in its duty were it to end its intervention without expressing profound appreciation to the Secretary-General, to his Special Representative in Cyprus, Mr. Osorio-Tafall, to Major-General Prem Chand, as well as to the several members of his military and civilian staff who labour so hard to maintain peace in the island and have put the United Nations operation on a successful footing.

179. The PRESIDENT: I now call on the representative of Cyprus who has asked to speak in order to exercise his right of reply.

180. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): I have just a few words. It is not a question of replying with a long drawn-out argument. I only want to thank the members of the Council who referred to the question of Cyprus, to the strengthening of the independence of Cyprus, and to its territorial integrity and entity, and who spoke about the need of solving the problem in a spirit of co-operation and unity, as I indicated in my intervention.

181. My original intervention was really restricted to what should be done to strengthen the possibility of

the talks being successful, in a spirit of co-operation and understanding. For that reason, I avoided any reference to past events which might have been regrettable. However, inasmuch as they were mentioned by the representative of Turkey I have to say a few words about them.

182. First of all, with regard to the abnormal situation that was created in Cyprus by the violent acts and the abhorrent attack against the Archbishop, the President of Cyprus, I wish to thank the members of the Council who have expressed their sympathy for the Archbishop. The Government is in complete control of the situation and all the culprits have been arrested. The weapons that were stolen have been recovered to the greatest extent. According to the last report I received from Cyprus, 90 per cent of the weapons that were taken in the last raid have been recovered and the whole situation is under control.

183. Any kind of violence is regrettable. Any kind of antagonism is regrettable, and that is why we want a spirit of unity in Cyprus. But I should like to say that violent acts have appeared all over the world, and peculiarly at this time; under the date of 31 May, Mr. James Reston, writing in *The New York Times*, said:

“At a conservative estimate, . . . about one quarter of the sovereign States on planet Earth were engaged in inter-or intra-state conflict involving the use of regular armed forces . . .”.

Fortunately, in Cyprus we have avoided any of the bad aspects of it, thanks to the spirit of restraint that has prevailed.

184. With regard to the seizure of arms, it is interesting to see that in Uruguay—a very valiant country for which we have the greatest admiration and respect—a very similar thing happened. Bands broke into the naval school and took 700 weapons and quantities of ammunition. Forty persons were involved, and they were not arrested. So it was exactly the same thing. But in Cyprus the situation is under control.

185. However, there is another aspect that I should like to mention. The representative of Turkey referred to the uneasiness that this situation has created. I understand that. But, of course, there are other sources of uneasiness in Cyprus that I avoided mentioning. And I think that they should also be restrained, and it is easy to restrain them. As regards the armed bands, they are really irresponsible persons. But we would like to see the responsible Governments concerned in restraining sources of uneasiness and tension in Cyprus.

186. With reluctance, I have to refer to the event of 22 April, when the Defence Minister of Turkey, Mr. Topanoglou said in the Budget Committee of the National Assembly of Turkey:

“The Turkish armed forces are always ready against Cyprus. Our naval forces are always ever

ready. A permanent military force for invasion in Cyprus is stationed at the port of Mersina. They are reinforced every year with arms and equipment worth 250 million lira.”

187. Now, this concept of having a specific force, at the coast nearest to Cyprus, ready for invasion in Cyprus is something that is entirely contrary to the idea of preventing tension in the island. We understand that perhaps there were certain reasons for this statement to be made—probably internal reasons—but, in any case, the very fact that there is a feeling that a force from Turkey is ready to invade Cyprus creates tension in the island. We do hope that this situation will not be repeated and that we will not hear any more statements about readiness to invade Cyprus. Cyprus is an independent and sovereign country and is entitled to its territorial integrity, to its entity and unity, as the Secretary-General has said in respect of Nigeria, and we feel that we ought to be protected from any threats of invasion.

188. However, this is a matter of the past. I did not want to mention it, but I felt that since some other aspects were referred to as matters of uneasiness this should be referred to in the hope that it will not be repeated.

189. My distinguished friend from Turkey also spoke about the question of *enosis*. At every meeting of the Security Council it has become customary for the Turkish representative to refer to the question of *enosis* on one ground or another, on each occasion. But I think that there is no real fear in the mind of Turkey about *enosis*. Turkey knows it very well and the Government of Greece has made it very clear. Foreign Minister Pipinelis has said that the only desire and wish of Greece was to see a really independent, unitary Cyprus Republic. The relations between the Foreign Minister of Greece and the Foreign Minister of Turkey are excellent. As they have both stated, they are in complete understanding. This is a very fortunate event.

190. Therefore, in the circumstances, who is going to accomplish the union of Cyprus with Greece if not Greece? But Greece has excellent relations with Turkey, and there is thus no problem. We therefore do not see the reason for any uneasiness on the part of Turkey with regard to union with Greece.

191. The fact, however, is that the question does not turn on the union of Cyprus with Greece. What is involved is the question of the independence of Cyprus, of whether Cyprus will be allowed to have, in reality, the independence and sovereignty to which it is entitled, without foreign intervention or the threat of intervention and without the threat of force, and under a constitution based on a unitary State resting on conditions of unity, understanding and co-operation.

192. The PRESIDENT: The Ambassador of Turkey has asked to speak, and I now call on him.

193. Mr. BAYULKEN (Turkey): At this late hour in the meeting I shall try to be as brief as possible and not take much of the Council's time.

194. I think that, having been associated with the United Nations since 1952, I can possibly lay claim to some modest ability to appreciate the fact that political problems are not solved through recrimination or through attempts by one representative to seek momentary advantage over another, but that solutions can be achieved rather through patient, constructive efforts. I believe my main statement has sufficient relevance to what the Ambassador Rossides said just now, but I think I need to clarify just one or two points. Also, I think I owe a clarification to my colleague from Greece, Ambassador Bitsios, who spoke about the talks and the slow pace of the talks.

195. First of all, I believe I should dispose of the contention regarding the statement of the Minister of Defence which was made during the budgetary debate in the Parliament. It was in answer to a question put forward by a member of Parliament. Many members of this Council have at one time been members of parliaments; they know what sort of questions are directed at a minister responsible for affairs. The question was directed to the Minister of Defence at a time when very disturbing and violent acts had occurred on the island, such as the attempt against the life of Archbishop Makarios the imminence of a coup d'état and others. However, the Minister did not say that Turkey was ready to invade Cyprus. In fact, Turkey has never said it was ready to invade Cyprus. What Turkey up to now has said, and will continue to say, under its treaty rights, is that Turkey is a guarantor of the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus, and also of the state of affairs created under the Constitution of 1960. I believe that my colleagues from Greece, Ambassador Bitsios, will remember that Greece is also a guarantor under that treaty. There can therefore be no contention that Turkey is or will be ready to invade Cyprus. That is out of the question. Turkey has always been in the defensive position. This is the history of the whole question of Cyprus. However, I do not want to enter into a very detailed debate; it might take hours, even days.

196. Since my arrival at the United Nations, I have, of course, consulted the past record of the Security Council's meetings since 1964; and Ambassador Rossides, whom I know so well and so long, has maintained the theme of divisiveness, of separateness, the theme of unity against separatism, of unity against division. Well, in order, as I said, to be very brief, let me state an example of what sort of unity the Turkish community understands and what sort of unity is sometimes understood by certain people in the Greek community—though here I would like to make an exception in the case of Ambassador Rossides, because he has to act under instructions. As a matter of fact, what I am going to mention is included in the Secretary-General's report:

“For his part, Vice-President Küçük stated both in March and April that there was no sign as yet that the talks would yield a positive result; however, as both sides desired to continue the talks, it was too early to say that no results could be achieved.” [S/9814 and Corr. 2, para. 69.]

That is what he stated, and I would especially emphasize the words further on:

“Specifically, he stated that Cyprus must remain an independent State with a system of government in which the Greek and Turkish communities would be able to feel that they belonged to, and identified themselves with, such a State and were able to coexist in peace, freedom and security without either community running the risk of being subjugated by the other or threatened with the alienation of its national character.” [Ibid.]

I should like to emphasize the words “would be able to feel that they belonged to, and identified themselves with, such a State”. That is a sort of expression which favours Cypriot nationhood, Cypriot consciousness; it does not oppose it.

197. I shall now give another example by quoting a few lines from a speech which was not made six months ago or even before, but was in fact delivered on 30 March 1970 by Mr. Spyridakis, the Greek Cypriot Minister for Education. Education is a communal matter, and the creation of a Ministry of Education is against the Constitution; however, he is the Minister for Education of the Greek Cypriot administration. He drew attention to the dangers of “Cypriot consciousness” which it is sought to impose on the Greek Cypriots and pointed to the necessity of standing up against it in the “Hellenic spirit”. He said: “We neither deny our past nor establish a political life for ourselves outside Greece, which will continue to be the motherland for us.” He went a little bit further, and the speech ended with these words: “Cyprus belongs to Greece and is a part of the Greek ethnological arena. All friends and enemies must know this to be so.”

198. I should like to apologize for any erroneous interpretation of the facts because this is a summary interpretation, but this was exactly what he said.

199. Now, I think that the two examples that I submitted to the Council show very clearly where the danger lies. Therefore, I would ask Mr. Rossides, when he looks for unity and co-operation, to pay attention to these elements.

200. I should like to say that I was really surprised when the representative of Greece spoke of the slow pace of the talks. I hope I did not understand him correctly—I do not have the verbatim record before me—but I had the impression that he tried to apportion to the Turkish Cypriots responsibility for the slow pace of the negotiations. I think that is contrary to the real situation. I believe that I made quite clear in my statement the appeal of the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General said that there were grounds, possibilities, for the two to make concessions, to negotiate and succeed. How then could my colleague—if he did so; if not, I would withdraw my remarks—put the blame on the Turkish community? I think that I should say this in order to straighten the record. He mentioned my remarks made at a previous meeting of the Security Council. I do not depart from what I have said. I said

that the Turkish community was not against a unitary State and was trying to work out a solution which would befit its desires. But I said that the problem now was to frame the conception of a unitary State. After that comes local autonomy, etc., etc. So I do not understand how I really departed from what I said at that meeting.

201. As far as the Turkish position is concerned, I feel that I must mention what was stated in relation to the pronouncements of my Foreign Minister, which are included in paragraph 70 of the report, and were referred to in my main statement. I do not wish to repeat it, but I shall go on to the part which I did not mention: "such an independent, unitary State should be based on the principle of local autonomy."

So it is very clear what is involved. The Turkish position is clear and is stated in the report. I do not have to refer to other material.

202. I think that another text will really be necessary to set the record straight once and for all about these communal talks. And what are the real things involved? I should like to quote what Mr. Denktash in fact said in regard to these talks and why they are proceeding at a slow pace. He said:

"There are two stages of partnership in the State of Cyprus. The first stage is independence, territorial integrity and the sovereignty of the island. In these, the Turkish community has inalienable and undeniable vested rights and interests on equal footing with the Greek Cypriot community."

203. Then he explains why the conflict arose. I do not want to take up the time of members of the Security Council by reading the whole text. But then comes the element of the talks. After having explained the difficulties encountered because of the Constitution of 1960, he said that the Turks always respected the provisions of this Constitution, and he said further:

"Hence, in reconsidering the future set-up of the Cypriot State we have to evaluate the pros and cons of such constitutional provisions where one side is determined not to implement such provisions. We have come to the conclusion that if matters of State are separated from local autonomy matters and the community are given the right to run their own local affairs, ways and means may be found to do away with most of these rights at States level and give more emphasis to matters of security, day-to-day administration of local affairs, and thus bring about a new equilibrium to the balance of power between the two communities which have created the independent Republic of Cyprus with a view of reducing all points of intercommunal friction to the very minimum."

204. As I said, I did not quote the whole of the text, but I think what I have quoted shows the spirit in which the Turkish community approaches the reaching of an agreed solution with the Greek Cypriot community. It is not approaching the Greek Cypriot com-

munity in order to create divisiveness or separatism, but in order to reach an agreement which will secure for them a life of their own, such as they had for centuries, as was the case with the Greek Cypriot community. And I should like to recall that during the Ottoman Empire period the Greek Cypriot community had many of the rights that are today denied to the Turkish community. Therefore I do not understand this refrain about separatism or divisiveness. The Turks are not looking for divisiveness. And I should like to repeat that.

205. As to the violent acts, again I am surprised that the representative of Greece implied that they had taken place because of a danger of intervention from abroad and also because of the frustration felt in the search for a solution. First of all, I think that just a summary look at the report suffices to show that this is not the case. I think that the attempt on the life of Archbishop Makarios could not be just an element of a liaison with foreign intervention. I think that it was Greek Cypriots who attempted to take the life of the President. Thus I am at a loss to understand why foreign intervention is mentioned. Secondly, a glance at the international press of this difficult period would again suffice to show that the acts of violence had nothing to do with any foreign element of intervention; on the contrary.

206. I should like to make a final point, if I may, by asking why the representative of Greece actually mentioned the intervention of Turkey. Here are the treaties. Here is the Treaty of Guarantee.<sup>3</sup> As I said, we are signatories, as is the United Kingdom, to protect the independence of the Republic of Cyprus. Therefore, what kind of intervention is in question? I hope that my colleague will not return to that question, because he knows that Turkey has never had any intention of invading Cyprus. Turkey is and will be against any action which might do away with the independence of Cyprus, because under the Treaties<sup>4</sup> Turkey has an obligation. I think that Greece also has an obligation, as has the United Kingdom, until the Treaties are changed through peaceful negotiations and agreed solutions found which prescribe other ways. This is a fact that should be recognized.

207. I have said that I would try to be as brief as possible. I am sorry for having taken the Council's time, but I felt that I had to express these realities in order to set the record straight for my delegation.

208. As a final word I should like to take this opportunity of thanking all the members of the Security Council who spoke so constructively about this item.

209. The PRESIDENT: I call on the Ambassador of Greece, who wishes to exercise his right of reply.

<sup>3</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 382 (1960), No. 5475.

<sup>4</sup> Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 382 (1960), No. 5476); Treaty of Alliance between the Kingdom of Greece, the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus (*ibid.*, vol. 397 (1961), No. 5712).

210. Mr. BITSIOS (Greece) (*interpretation from French*): I thought the representative of Turkey, my friend Ambassador Bayulken, was somewhat at cross purposes in his second statement. I attribute this to the fact that he believed that efforts had been made to attribute to his country the intention of invading Cyprus. He has denied that very vehemently, and I am very satisfied to have heard Ambassador Bayulken speak to us in those terms. I note that this is the first point on which we are completely in agreement.

211. With respect to the status of guarantor to which he referred, my reply would be as follows: undoubtedly considerations of policy have led us both to support Cyprus's independence. In Greece we do not interpret the attributes of guarantor just mentioned by the representative of Turkey in the same manner. That question was debated here during the serious crisis of 1963 to 1964 and at that time I told the Security Council how we interpreted that clause of the Treaty of Guarantee. But what is important is not the way in which one party might act; what is important is that the intentions of our Governments at this time are sincere and that the two countries are now devoted to the creation of a truly independent Cyprus. I believe that my colleague from Cyprus will not dispute the sincerity of my Government's intentions. Therefore, that is the second point on which we are completely in agreement.

212. There is a third point regarding which I have noted that our policies also agree. That is, the question concerning what type of State will emerge from the talks underway in Nicosia. Mr. Bayulken was good enough to mention certain statements by leaders to the effect that the Turkish community also has decided in favour of a unitary State. That is the third point on which we agree.

213. There is a fourth point which Ambassador Bayulken raised, that is, that I had fixed responsibility for the lack of progress in the talks in Nicosia exclusively on the Turkish community. However, I did not mention the Turkish community in my statement. I said: Where do the difficulties lie? Apparently in the complicated details of the proposals that the negotiators have before them. There are a series of proposals involved and the negotiators are trying to reach agreement. Each party wants to protect his rights, and we all know that the Turkish community, in trying to protect its rights, is asking for certain prerogatives. The difficulty derives from the fact that the extension of these prerogatives would cause the other party to fear that the State would not be unitary. I was asking a question. Perhaps that is not where the difficulty lies. If there are other difficulties, I am not aware of them. It seems to me that that is the major difficulty. I did not blame anyone. So long as the negotiators wish to go on with their talks, so long as there is goodwill and so long as the Governments support these talks, I think we are in agreement. Therefore, there is a fourth point on which we agree.

214. Mr. Bayulken, you said that I had implied that your country wanted to invade Cyprus. No, I did not

say that. I did not make any accusations against anyone this evening. In trying to explain the events that occurred in March on Cyprus I simply said: the representative of Turkey repeatedly tried to explain to the Council the difficult conditions under which the Turkish Cypriots live. But the same thing is true of the other party. Just because the Greek Cypriot population is in the majority, it has not had an easy life during recent years. I said that the Greek community is this Greek majority, the Greek population of the island, despite the fact that it is in the majority, has lived through many years of great uncertainty, years in which it lived the fear of an invasion, which perhaps did not figure among the intentions of the Turkish Government and which perhaps never would have occurred. But, none the less, the danger was there and the Security Council is aware of this, because we brought the matter to the Council several times in the hope of a solution.

215. All that uncertainty about the future created a certain atmosphere in which tensions such as those we witnessed in the month of March develop quite naturally. That is what I wanted to say.

216. The PRESIDENT: I recognize the Ambassador of Cyprus.

217. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): I think that this exchange of views is very useful. This is one of the important functions of the United Nations, in the Security Council or the General Assembly, when a Member State is called upon to explain some of its actions. The explanation is already a move in the right direction. The representative of Turkey says, "No, we have no intention to invade". That is a good move. He has to say that. He cannot say, "Yes, we intend to invade". And the fact that he says, "We have no intention to invade, we certainly do not want to invade," is a welcome statement, because it contradicts the statement of Mr. Topanoglou, and that contradiction gradually creates a better climate, because Mr. Topanoglou will probably see that his statements are not so good. He puts the representative of Turkey in a difficult position to explain them and to say, "We are not going to invade". That is one of the important functions of the United Nations.

218. However, although I welcome that statement, I must disagree with my friend Mr. Bayulken. I disagree with him when he relates the threat of invasion to the Treaty of Guarantee.<sup>5</sup> The Treaty of Guarantee does not give the right to any of the guarantors or to Turkey to violate the Charter, Article 2, paragraph 4, and invade Cyprus, because it is a guarantor. Even before the United Nations and before the League of Nations, treaties of guarantee which purported to give the right of intervention by force were treated as null and void because they violated the basic principles of international law even then. How much less, now, under the Charter, could anyone say that the Treaty of Guarantee gives Turkey the right to send its forces to Cyprus because it thinks things are not all right there? Why? Is Turkey acting as the United Nations or the Security

<sup>5</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 382 (1960), No. 5475.



Council entitled to decide upon enforcement action, to protect the independence of Cyprus, or rather to destroy the independence of Cyprus by invading it? This is a very peculiar state of affairs. I am sorry, but I must say that the intention of invading Cyprus is not to protect the independence of Cyprus but to abolish it by partition—and I can refer to a series of official Turkish statements.

219. Mr. Kemal Satir former Vice-President of Turkey, in a public statement in 1964 said: "Cyprus will be divided in two sections, one of which will join Turkey." So there is the intention of partition.

220. The former Foreign Minister of Turkey, Mr. Erkin, clearly spelt it out when he said in a newspaper interview, in Athens: "The radical solution would be to cede one part of Cyprus to Greece and the other, closer to Turkey's Asiatic coast, to Turkey." Is that not clear evidence of partitionist intent? Then, federation was mentioned but partition was intended.

221. The Prime Minister of Turkey, Ismet Inonu, on 8 September 1964, some time after the statement by Erkin about partition, said: "Officially, we now promote the federation concept rather than the partition thesis, so as to remain within the provisions of the Treaty." Therefore, whenever the word "federation" is used, it means "partition" camouflaged under the word "federation", so as to be more palatable to the outside world.

222. Furthermore, what is intended by this partition? Merely partition? No. The intention is, as expressed by Dr. Küçük, to annex Cyprus. And what is the precedent? The precedent is that regarding Syria. *Halkin Sesi*, the mouthpiece of Dr. Küçük, in its editorial of 9 August 1965, writes: "Cyprus is another Alexandretta in the history of Turkey". And everyone knows what happened to Alexandretta. First, joint domination and so on, until eventually the occupation and annexation of Alexandretta by force followed. Dr. Küçük, who is so fond of the independence of Cyprus, says: "The power of Turkey will ensure an honourable life for the Turkish Cypriots in the same way as it did in Alexandretta, by annexing it." Is this not clear evidence of the real intentions of Dr. Küçük when he talks about independence?

223. What was the intention of the invasion contemplated by Mr. Topaloglou? Was it to "calm the situation", to protect the independence of Cyprus, or was the intention to partition the Island? I refer here to a letter addressed to Prime Minister Inonu on 5 June 1964, by the President of the United States, President Johnson. He said:

"It is my impression that you believe that such intervention by Turkey is permissible under the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960. I must call your attention, however, that to our understanding, the proposed intervention by Turkey would be for the purpose of effecting a form of partition of the island".

224. I think that we have the most authoritative document here showing that whenever Turkey threatens invasion of Cyprus its intention is to partition it, and its ultimate intention is to annex the whole island in the same way as Alexandretta. These are the realities of the situation and that is the reason why the stalling of the talks is going on because they have to keep the people of Cyprus divided, not united. If they unite into one State, a really independent State, there would be very little chance for partition. They have to keep it divided. That is why the enclaves are kept as enclaves, and in spite of all the efforts that were made by Archbishop Makarios and the Government to bring normalization to the island, there has been no response. The Secretary-General has repeatedly said that there must be response, that you must allow access into the enclaves. They would not allow that because they are afraid that by this kind of communication there would be conciliation and they could not in that case keep up the divisive spirit so as to prepare at some time, whenever it is convenient, for partition. He cited Dr. Küçük, when he says that his community is running the risk of being subjugated by the other, threatened with the alienation of its national character; a community so cowed as to be frightened of being "alienated of its character and being subjugated" yet which holds 123 public roads and denies access to the vast majority for years now.

225. Who is really threatened by subjugation, the Greek majority or the Turkish minority, with Turkey ready to invade Cyprus? That is the real crux of the matter. The tension in the island and everything that is abnormal in the island is a consequence of the fact that Cyprus has been kept under the continuous threat of invasion from Turkey. This uneasiness, this threat, creates an abnormal situation. If this situation were eliminated, the question of Cyprus would be solved overnight. The Greek and Turkish people in Cyprus have lived in peace for generations and they want to live in peace, if they are allowed to do so freed from outside intervention.

226. That is the situation. I am sorry to take time, but I had to say all this, and it is better said than left unsaid. It is better for the Security Council to realize what the situation is in Cyprus. Where the threat comes from, what the intentions are, why we have this unnatural situation that the talks cannot progress. I have stated this in a constructive way in the hope that we can move forward to unity, understanding and conciliation; and I still have this hope. As I have said, the fact that Ambassador Bayulken denies that there would be any possibility of an intention to invade Cyprus is a good sign. It is a step in the right direction. The fact that he denies or will deny that there is an intention to partition Cyprus is a good sign.

227. So the more these things are thrashed out in the United Nations, the better it is. The Governments in their capitals will see that in the United Nations they have to give an account of their actions or whatever they are and that is what is important.

228. However, now we have to look forward to the future. But the future for Cyprus must be one of peace, understanding, unity, and co-operation—not division.

229. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Turkey.

230. Mr. BAYULKEN (Turkey): As I said in my main statement and also in the remarks I made in an attempt to clarify the record, I mentioned the fact that it was not the intention of the Security Council that we could or should settle today the problem of Cyprus around this table. My clarifications were necessary in order to reply to what Ambassador Rossides had said about separatism and divisiveness. Now he has taken another aspect of the Cyprus problem. I shall try to be as brief as possible in replying to his points.

231. First, however, let me express my gratitude to the representative of Greece; I am very much satisfied by his explanation. In my reply I said that I had possibly not heard his words very well. If they were not meant in that way, I am ready to retract mine. Therefore that settles the matter, and I always consider it a good augury that agreement, *entente* and co-operation should exist between our two countries in regard to the Cyprus problem too.

232. Trying to be as brief as possible, and taking matters in chronological order, I hope the points that I am going to make will not surprise Ambassador Rossides. Let us start from the very beginning without going into the "genesis".

233. Is it partition, divisiveness and disunity which are first heard in the history of Cyprus, or is it *enosis* and union? Even at the time of the British Administration, when the Greek Cypriot community leadership tried to achieve *enosis*, the Turkish community was against that idea. If anybody has any doubt about it he might refer to the most comprehensive work on the history of Cyprus, written by Sir George Hill.<sup>6</sup> In fact, I have a copy here.

234. As for the second point, coming back to the present era, the era in which he and I have lived for almost twenty years, let us see what has happened. Were the demands for partition in 1945, 1946, 1949, 1950, 1951 and 1954 made on the part of the Turkish community? Or is the demand for union made on the part of the Greek community?

235. Then we come to 1954 and the request submitted to the United Nations. One of our colleagues, Ambassador Kyrou, thought that the United Nations would be the sort of organization that would just rubber-stamp such demands. The question had been discussed here for five Assembly sessions. What happened? Was there any rubber-stamping that would permit the Greek Cypriot community to achieve *enosis* without taking due regard of the Turkish community's rights and existence, or was it a resolution stating that the parties

concerned should try to reach a just and peaceful agreement on the question of Cyprus? In those days we were even denied by the Greeks the right of being a party to the Cyprus problem. It is quite a change that today I am not facing such allegations or such demands.

236. Then we come to the 1960 Agreements<sup>7</sup> I know that the Security Council is fully aware of most of the details concerning the views of the parties to the 1960 Agreements and of the events that happened afterwards in 1963. There are at least three or four volumes of records of the Security Council that contain information on the views of Ambassador Rossides, of Ambassador Eralp, of Ambassador Bitsios, and before him Ambassador Liatis, or of Mr. Kypriano. Well, we have all expressed our views, but none of those views has been inserted in a resolution saying, "Party X, you are right; all others are wrong". I think that Ambassador Rossides should remember this.

237. As for divisiveness, I think it is really very presumptuous to say that after 1960, the Turkish community tried to impose a solution on the Greek Cypriot community, which is four times larger than the Turkish community. In fact, the sad events of 1960 have shown amply enough that the Turkish community could not have been the perpetrator of acts of violence against anything, but rather that they were in a position of self-defense. I should just like to remind Ambassador Rossides of the reports of the Secretary-General. I shall not go into reports from the international press, for if I were to do so, as I said, it would take days and days. I shall mention only the reports of the Secretary-General.

238. In all cases General Gyani and other commanders mentioned in their reports the fact that the Turks were in a defensive position. There may be one or two trivial incidents of one group attacking the other in a particular area, but in general it is an established fact that the Turks in Cyprus are not perpetrators of acts of violence. They cannot be, because they are not numerous enough. Secondly, they do not have weapons and ammunition to the same degree as the Greek Cypriot community. Even if we accept for the sake of argument the concept that such a small community would like to or had the idea of attacking the larger one in order to achieve partition, the chronology of history shows that to be entirely false, because the first demand was for *enosis*—and that is the illness, Ambassador Rossides.

239. I remember the years we worked for the independence of Cyprus. I know that in your conscience you know it as well; but we are here as the representatives of our Governments and we have instructions. But I know that you know perfectly well that the 1960 Agreements were made in good faith. I will not take the time of the Security Council by reciting the state-

<sup>6</sup> *A History of Cyprus* (London, Cambridge University Press, 1949).

<sup>7</sup> Treaty of Guarantee (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 382 (1960), No. 5475); Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus (*ibid.*, No. 5476); Treaty of Alliance between the Kingdom of Greece, the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus (*ibid.*, vol. 397 (1961), No. 5712).



ments of Archbishop Makarios or Mr. Averoff or my Foreign Ministers of the day; I do not want to take the time. I think that this question of intervention to which you made allusion is entirely a falsified sort of allusion because, as I said—and I am ready to repeat it at any time under any circumstances—Turkey and the Turkish Government never had any intention of invading Cyprus. But the Turkish Government, I should like to repeat, yesterday and today has rights under the Treaty of Guarantee, and those rights are there to stay until a solution is found that will change the treaties by mutual agreement. That should be kept in mind. In saying this I think I have a right to explain the situation in its true light because I believe that however modest I am in a position to know more closely what the intentions and the positions of the Turkish Governments were in the past ten years. I think that that disposes of the question that Turkey would invade Cyprus.

240. I should like to conclude my remarks by again reverting to my main statement. As Ambassador Rossides said, those were the things of the past, and we should not look back, we should look forward. I think that in this sense his community would do well if, instead of insisting on the erroneous assumption that the Turkish Cypriots are trying to achieve partition,

they would change that erroneous attitude. They are not trying to achieve partition. If the debate was a debate on Cyprus, I would have liked to put a question to Ambassador Rossides, I would have liked to see whether the answer to such a question would be immediately yes or for ever no. But this is not a debate on the question of Cyprus.

241. We are just speaking of the renewal of the mandate. So I agree with the latter part of his statement when he said that we should look forward and in looking forward with, I think, hope, we should also, as I said in my statement, read carefully and give due credit to the appraisal of our Secretary-General whose tireless efforts on the question of Cyprus are well known. I mentioned his statement, I stand on it.

242. The PRESIDENT: I should like to express my profound satisfaction at the unanimous adoption of the resolution by which the Security Council has extended the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus until 15 December 1970. May I also express the hope that this further period of six months will be utilized more fruitfully to achieve the objectives of the Security Council.

*The meeting rose at 7.15 p.m.*

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