

UNITED NATIONS



SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

TWENTY-FIFTH YEAR

1529th MEETING: 30 JANUARY 1970

NEW YORK

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FIFTEEN HUNDRED AND TWENTY-NINTH MEETING

Held in New York on Friday, 30 January 1970, at 10.30 a.m.

President: Mr. Nsanzé TERENCE (Burundi).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Burundi, China, Colombia, Finland, France, Nepal, Nicaragua, Poland, Sierra Leone, Spain, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Zambia.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1529)

1. Adoption of the agenda.

2. The situation in Namibia:

Letter dated 26 January 1970 addressed to the President of the Security Council from the representatives of Afghanistan, Algeria, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Ceylon, Chad, the Congo (Democratic Republic of), Cyprus, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Nepal, the Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, the People's Republic of the Congo, the Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Southern Yemen, the Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, the United Arab Republic, the United Republic of Tanzania, the Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia and Zambia (S/9616 and Add.1-3).

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Namibia

Letter dated 26 January 1970 addressed to the President of the Security Council from the representatives of Afghanistan, Algeria, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Ceylon, Chad, the Congo (Democratic Republic of), Cyprus, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Nepal, the Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, the People's Republic of the Congo, the Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Southern Yemen, the Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, the United Arab Republic, the United Republic of Tanzania, the Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia and Zambia (S/9616 and Add.1-3)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the previous decision of the Council

[1527th meeting], I shall invite the representative of Turkey, the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia, Mr. Çuhruk, to take a seat at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. N. Çuhruk (Turkey), President of the United Nations Council for Namibia, took a place at the Security Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I have just received a letter from the representative of India in which he requests to be allowed to participate in the Council's debate on the question before it. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Council agrees that the representative of India, Mr. Teja, should be invited to participate in the debate without the right to vote, in accordance with the provisional rules of procedure and the practice of the Council.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. J. S. Teja (India) took a place at the Security Council table.

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The Security Council will now continue its consideration of the question before it. I should like to draw members' attention to document S/9616/Add.3, which increases to fifty-seven the number of signatories of the letter of 26 January 1970, by adding the name of Cameroon. That document has just been distributed. In addition, members of the Council have before them the revised five-Power draft resolution [S/9620/Rev.1].

4. Mr. KULAGA (Poland): In my very first words as representative of a new member of the Security Council I should like to express my sincere appreciation of the kind words of welcome that you, Mr. President, and the representatives round this table have addressed to Poland, the country I represent, and to me as representative of Poland.

5. I could not fail to avail myself of this first official opportunity of offering you, Mr. President, my delegation's heartiest congratulations on your assumption, in the most spectacular manner, of the presidency of this Council. We are fortunate that so distinguished a representative of Africa should preside over the debates of the Security Council as it enters the seventies, by taking up an outstanding grave problem of colonialism in Africa.

6. It may perhaps seem immodest for me to join in the vote of thanks to Ambassador Mwaanga of Zambia for his dedicated conduct of the Council's proceedings in December 1969. I do so, however, most sincerely—if only from

the position of an outside, though keen, observer of the proceedings of the Security Council at that time. It is with the same sincerity that I join in the expressions of appreciation to the outgoing members of the Security Council: Hungary, Algeria, Pakistan, Senegal and Paraguay.

7. Poland has the honour of serving on the Security Council, as a non-permanent member, for the third time. For us it is a matter of gratification to be able to participate in the Council's work. But, even more, we regard our membership of the Council as an honour and a responsibility. We come here fully conscious of that responsibility to make our contribution to the Council's fulfilment of its primary task: the maintenance of international peace and security. To that cause the Polish People's Republic has always endeavoured to contribute. Peace and security, peaceful co-operation among States, support for the great struggle of colonial peoples for independence and equality have always been among the basic tenets of our foreign policy. They derive from our socialist ideology, from our historical experience, from our ordeal in the last world war, from the need to develop our country. Peace and security in Europe have been our most immediate concern, a goal for the attainment of which we have spared neither effort nor initiative. We have been doing that in the full realization that peace and security in Europe are a factor essential to international peace and security. We have been doing that concurrently with our efforts in other fields of international relations.

8. It is in that spirit that Poland occupies its seat on the Security Council, with the same determination to contribute to the utmost of its possibilities to the solution of the many important problems that confront the Council. It is in that spirit that I sincerely reciprocate the statements by my colleagues round this table expressing their readiness to co-operate towards finding the solution of those problems.

9. Fifty-seven States Members of the United Nations have requested that the problem of Namibia should be included in our agenda. This indeed is a measure of the concern felt by the overwhelming majority in the United Nations at the situation in Namibia, of the indignation at the behaviour of the Republic of South Africa, of the resolve to demand action for the implementation of the United Nations resolutions concerning Namibia, of the expectations that the most competent organ in this respect, the Security Council, will decide on effective ways and measures to make such action materialize.

10. Over the twenty years or so during which the United Nations has had to deal with the problem of Namibia, Poland has many a time expressed its support for the cause of the liberation of the people of Namibia, in accordance with their inalienable right to freedom and independence. That stand has been consistent with the fundamental position of the Polish People's Republic of unstinting support for the national liberation struggle of peoples under colonial domination. We are glad today to be able to give expression to that *constante* of our foreign policy in the forum of the Security Council.

11. In the course of the deliberations in the United Nations on the problem of Namibia all the elements of that

problem have been delineated with the greatest clarity. The political and legal framework for the United Nations action on Namibia has been precisely drawn. Its cornerstone is General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), that is, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Its foundation is contained in General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) terminating the Mandate of the Republic of South Africa over South West Africa, now known as Namibia. Along with many resolutions of the General Assembly, we find in resolutions 264 (1969) and 269 (1969) of the Security Council, first, a reaffirmation of the right of the people of Namibia to freedom and independence and of the legitimacy of their national liberation struggle; secondly, we find a restatement of the illegality of the presence of the South African administration in Namibia and thirdly, a call for an immediate withdrawal of South Africa's authorities from Namibia. Now, the ways and means to be applied in order to fill in that legal and political framework are stated in the provisions of the United Nations Charter, in its Articles 41 and 42, in particular, and in the prerogatives of the Security Council.

12. As to the will of the overwhelming majority of international public opinion there is no doubt that it demands most categorically that action be taken to give effect to the Security Council's resolutions. Fifty-seven signatures under the request for the convening of the Council are an eloquent testimony to that—but the Republic of South Africa remains unmoved.

13. Its voluminous reply to resolution 269 (1969) may try to dilute the negative answer of South Africa in a maze of "legal" arguments, but the essence of that reply is still a practical, curt, "no", to the categorical injunctions of the Security Council contained in its resolution 269 (1969), just as it had been to General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) and subsequent resolutions on that question. And it was not only words that South Africa used to negate the authority of the United Nations highest organs in contravention of the Charter, and specifically of its Article 25. South Africa has been following and intensifying its policy of persecution of Namibians, of terror directed against the freedom movements, of fragmentation of the country under the unbelievable pretext of "promoting self-determination of its peoples"—in order to exploit it economically and subjugate it politically, to extend and consolidate there the rule of *apartheid*.

14. What the Council is facing is not a mere act of passive non-compliance with its decision by a State Member of the United Nations. It is a case of an aggressive action of a State that is aimed at consolidating its annexation of another country. It is a case of an aggressive encroachment on the authority of the United Nations which has assumed direct responsibility for that country with the aim of bringing it to independence. It is a case of an attempt not only to preserve but to expand and consolidate colonial and racist domination in a large part of Africa. It is, therefore, a most flagrant case of total defiance of the United Nations by the Government of the Republic of South Africa.

15. The larger political role of the Republic of South Africa as the mainstay of colonialism and reaction in

southern Africa and as an active supporter of the illegal Smith régime in Southern Rhodesia and of Portuguese colonialists in Angola and Mozambique is a matter of record in this Council. So is the growing military potential and aggressive posture of South Africa vis-à-vis African freedom movements and progressive independent countries of the region.

16. This political and ideological challenge to the United Nations posed by South Africa is, of course, a function of its racist ideology, but it is made possible by its economic and military potential which is the material backbone of its aggressive and defiant posture. As for that potential, it has not grown in a vacuum.

17. The last decade has undoubtedly been one of great progress in the field of decolonization. It has also been marked by a growing determination finally to put an end to colonialism. In that process as applied to Namibia three important dates stand out: 1960, 1966 and 1969.

18. Of course, 1960 was the year of the historic Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. That very year, the amount of foreign capital invested in South Africa was \$3,685 million. That figure is taken from a study on the impact of General Assembly resolution 1761 (XVII) on South African trade and investments, which was distributed as a United Nations document.¹

19. The year 1966 was marked primarily by the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 2145 (XXI) which terminated South Africa's Mandate over South West Africa. That resolution constituted a great qualitative step forward in the application of the Declaration to the Territory of South West Africa. It came at a time when demands for an end to the involvement of the Western—mostly British, American and West German—economic, financial, military and other interests in colonial countries and South Africa were being formulated and those interests qualified as impeding the implementation of the 1960 Declaration.

20. That same year witnessed a surge of foreign capital investment in South Africa up to the amount of \$5,313 million, which is an increase of approximately 50 per cent compared with 1960.

21. The year 1969 brought, in political terms, another important step in the efforts towards the liberation of Namibia in Security Council resolutions 264 (1969) and 269 (1969). Simultaneously, as was pointed out in the discussion in the Security Council when the question of Namibia was last taken up, foreign capital investment in South Africa had already jumped to \$6,000 million.

22. Those parallel processes are very indicative. On the one hand, we see an up-trend both qualitative and quantitative in the expression of the will of anti-colonial forces to implement basic United Nations principles in bringing about the independence of Namibia; and on the other, an ominous escalation in the involvement of foreign capital in South Africa, a capital which reinforces the

economic, financial and military potential of South Africa, that is, the material backbone of South Africa's aggressive and defiant posture towards the United Nations.

23. It is therefore evident that South Africa could have drawn only one conclusion from that involvement. South Africa did draw that conclusion and continues to draw it.

24. We have not brought out all these elements for the sake of repetition or of enlivening a maiden speech. We have done so in order to point out the imperative need for translating moral condemnations of South Africa's policies into practical steps designed to make South Africa change and abandon those policies. Moral condemnation without a willingness to follow it by action is not enough—I would say not nearly enough. Moral condemnation together with economic trade and military co-operation with South Africa is much worse.

25. The present deliberations of the Council should, therefore, in the opinion of the Polish delegation, proceed in but one direction—that of reaching prompt decisions on ways and measures to ensure the implementation of the Council's previous resolutions, to make South Africa withdraw from Namibia, to ensure to the people of Namibia its right to shape its destiny in accordance with its will.

26. We have now in front of us a draft resolution [*S/9620/Rev.1*] which has been undergoing several changes. We note, first, that this draft is admittedly—and I quote the words of Ambassador Jakobson of Finland—"limited in scope and purpose" and, further, of an "interim" nature [*1527th meeting, para. 45*]. We note, secondly, that the amendments introduced by Ambassador Jakobson yesterday have brought improvements to the original text, a text which raised a number of doubts for my delegation, upon which, however, I see no need to dwell now. I am referring to the amendments to the fourth preambular paragraph and to paragraph 6 in particular; since I am speaking of paragraph 6, I should like to express the opinion of my delegation that the *ad hoc* sub-committee provided for in that paragraph should, in our opinion, consist of all the members of the Security Council. Thirdly, we note that the draft resolution does not have any bearing on the larger framework of economic and other interests in South Africa whose importance and role for the question of Namibia in particular I have underlined, and which is dealt with in a number of standing resolutions of the General Assembly, in particular resolution 2307 (XXII). Fourthly, paragraph 9 should not—and I understand it does not—preclude us from taking up the question of Namibia if other circumstances should make it necessary.

27. Starting from this attitude of principle and with the specific remarks on the draft resolution which I have just presented, my delegation would be ready to support the draft resolution.

28. Mr. WARNER (United Kingdom): At this first debate of the year 1970, it is impossible not to feel regret at the absence of our former comrades, the representatives of Algeria, Hungary, Pakistan, Paraguay and Senegal. Their contribution to the work of this Council was great, and we

¹ Document A/AC.115/L.267 of 13 August 1969.

who remain must miss their friendly presence and their fertile minds.

29. However, like other speakers in this debate before me, I should like to welcome the five new members, the representatives of Burundi, Nicaragua, Poland, Sierra Leone and Syria, who have joined the Security Council this year. Like a successful transfusion of new blood, they are already actively sustaining our body politic. We congratulate you, Sir, especially on your succession to the presidency at the beginning of your time with us. We already know you to be a most eloquent speaker and a most active doer, and we look forward to co-operating with you.

30. I am glad also to associate myself with the tributes that have been made by all to the expert and expeditious way in which Ambassador Mwaanga conducted our proceedings in December. It is particularly appropriate to praise Ambassador Mwaanga's past achievements today because of his imaginative and patient efforts in connexion with our present debate. I should like to say how much my delegation has welcomed the consultations that he and other co-sponsors have held with us before these meetings.

31. As regards the subject of today's meeting, I believe that the position of my Government is sufficiently well known to make it unnecessary for me to repeat it in detail. Briefly, it is that we have always thought and said that the people of South West Africa should enjoy real self-determination and independence. We have frequently said that the Government of South Africa has forfeited the right to administer the Mandate over the Territory. We have expressed publicly our repugnance at aspects of South African administration, such as the Terrorism Act, and we have made clear to the South African Government our concern about the trials of South West Africans that have taken place under that legislation. At the same time however we have consistently drawn attention to the practical considerations that we believe have to be faced and to the need for the United Nations to act only within its capabilities. However much we deplore it, South Africa is in fact controlling the Territory of South West Africa. We have made our rejection of this state of affairs clear to the South African Government. The action which we can take, however, is limited. We have made no secret of our own inability to contemplate action which would rapidly turn into complete economic warfare against South Africa. We have explained why we have felt that the adoption of resolutions which are ineffective or inoperable cannot serve the interests of the people of the Territory or of the United Nations; and for all these reasons we have abstained on a number of resolutions, notably General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966 and Security Council resolutions 264 (1969) and 269 (1969).

32. It will therefore come as no surprise to the members of this Council that we cannot on this occasion give our support to the draft resolution before us [*S/9620/Rev.1*] since the basis of that draft lies of course in those earlier resolutions on which we have already abstained in the past. Moreover, in some respects, notably paragraph 5, the draft resolution seems to us to ignore some of the circumstances to which I have already referred. My delegation will therefore abstain in voting on the draft resolution before us.

33. I now come to paragraph 6 of the draft resolution. My Government would welcome any study of the legal, economic and other implications of the presence of the South African authorities in Namibia and recommendations for effective and practical steps such as appeared to be contemplated at an earlier stage in our debate. We would co-operate in any such work. We would provide information. But we do not know whether the committee which is now proposed in the revised draft is intended to undertake such work, or whether, as some other speakers have perhaps seemed to suggest, it is limited to making recommendations for Chapter VII action. We do not know what will be the composition of the committee. I cannot therefore at this stage say precisely what will be the attitude of my Government towards it. We will, however, carefully study the proposal as soon as its scope is somewhat clearer.

34. Finally, I should like to reply to something which has been said in the course of our debate. I have had the genuine pleasure of paying tribute to Ambassador Mwaanga and I am therefore most reluctant to differ in any way with him, but I thought that in his statement two days ago [*1527th meeting*] he implied two things: first, that the United Kingdom was still giving military and arms support to the Government of South Africa, and secondly that there was a possibility that my Government might cease to apply the embargo on the sale of arms to that country. This is perhaps not exactly what he said, but it might be difficult for anyone reading his remarks to avoid that conclusion. I should therefore like to reaffirm to the Council that there has been no change in my Government's policy of applying an arms embargo in line with Security Council resolution 191 (1964). Furthermore, I am authorized to say that my Government contemplates no change in this policy.

35. It therefore goes without saying—and I now refer to what was said at yesterday's debate [*1528th meeting*—that further military ships, cruisers and aircraft have not been bought in my country by South Africa since the embargo was imposed. I hope that no member of the Council will have gained the impression from the provisional verbatim record of yesterday's debate that *The Times* of London said any such thing. It did not do so.

36. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, when a point of order is raised I must call on the speaker raising it, and I therefore call on the representative of the Soviet Union.

37. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): In connexion with the United Kingdom representative's remark, I would like to draw the attention of members of the Security Council to an extract from *The Times* of London, which I have in front of me here and which reads as follows—I shall read it in English so that the United Kingdom representative will find it clearer and easier to understand:

“... the embargo does not actually put a stop to arms traffic between South Africa and Britain”.²

² Quoted in English by the speaker.

These are the facts; and this is precisely what I pointed out in my statement. The article goes on to say:

“She has bought ships, armoured cars, and both Mirage and Mystere fighters from France. She is building the Belgian rifle under licence. The latest addition to the South African arms industry is the Impala jet fighter, of which initially 400 will be built. American light aircraft, which could be useful for counter-insurgency, are being assembled there under licence, and in all South Africa has acquired licences to build 140 different types of ammunition and bombs from overseas”.²

[The speaker continued in English.]

Such are the facts, and I am very much surprised that the British representative denies those facts.

[The speaker resumed in Russian.]

38. I have another extract from the same newspaper, concerning the agreement between the United Kingdom and South Africa. It reads as follows:

“The agreement guarantees Britain the unfettered use of naval facilities in South Africa in the event of a war in which Britain was involved. Britain’s allies would receive the same facilities whether or not South Africa was a co-belligerent”.²

These are facts taken from the pages of *The Times*.

39. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I call on the representative of the United Kingdom on a point of order.

40. Mr. WARNER (United Kingdom): I am most grateful to you, Mr. President. I am also grateful to Mr. Malik for supporting the point which I made in my statement. The passages which he read us bear no resemblance to, or have a very different character from, what I find on page 47 of the provisional verbatim record of the 1528th meeting. That was the point I wished to make.

41. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I call on the representative of the Soviet Union on a point of order.

42. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): It is well known that every delegation has the right to submit corrections and drafting changes to the provisional record which is prepared immediately after the meeting; and we shall do this.

43. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): We now continue our debate and in accordance with the list of speakers I call upon the representative of Nationalist China.

44. Mr. LIU (China): Mr. President, I should like first of all to extend to you the congratulations and good wishes of my delegation both on your election to the Council and on your assumption of the presidency. The growing importance of Africa in world affairs is demonstrated by the fact that the Security Council in two successive months has

been presided over by distinguished sons of that continent. My delegation associates itself with the many tributes to your immediate predecessor in the Chair, Ambassador Mwaanga, for the skill and effectiveness with which he guided the Council’s deliberations last month.

45. I should also like to take this opportunity of expressing my delegation’s welcome to my other new colleagues who, like yourself, Mr. President, have brought to the Council a fresh mind backed by considerable experience and they will surely contribute much towards the work of the Council in no less distinguished a manner than the outgoing members who have just completed their term of service.

46. Permit me now to address myself briefly to the draft resolution before the Council [*S/9620/Rev.1*]. The position of my delegation on the question of Namibia has been clear and consistent. As far back as 1946, when the General Assembly held its first session in New York, speaking on behalf of my Government in the Fourth Committee [*9th meeting of Sub-Committee 2*], I stated in no uncertain terms that South West Africa as a Mandated Territory should be placed under international supervision. The views I then expressed were reaffirmed by my delegation through the years in the General Assembly.

47. It was on the basis of our firm conviction, and in the light of the advisory opinions and judgements rendered by the International Court of Justice that my delegation, along with an overwhelming majority of Member States, voted for General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) terminating South Africa’s Mandate over South West Africa and bringing the Territory under the direct responsibility of the United Nations. The Security Council has since, in successive resolutions, formally endorsed the action of the General Assembly and called upon the Government of South Africa to withdraw immediately from Namibia.

48. It is a cause of profound regret that the United Nations has been prevented from exercising its functions in Namibia, in spite of the efforts of the United Nations Council for Namibia under the able chairmanship of the representative of Turkey. I think that there is no significant difference of opinion that the adamantly unco-operative attitude on the part of South Africa warrants strong censure by the world community, but differences do arise as to how the Security Council can best discharge the responsibility it has assumed for the people of Namibia.

49. It is all too clear that any coercive measure will have little effect without the active and full support of all Member States, particularly those countries which are in a special position to influence the course of events in South Africa.

50. In the search for a solution to the problem of Namibia, further study and exploration may be useful. My delegation, therefore, welcomes the proposal to set up an *ad hoc* committee which will examine the legal, economic and other aspects of the problem and will submit its recommendations for such effective and practical steps as may be taken towards its solution. We shall accordingly vote for the draft resolution.

51. Mr. VALLEJO ARBELAEZ (Colombia) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Mr. President, I should like first of all to extend to you the congratulations of my delegation on your assuming the presidency of the Security Council. At the same time, we should like most warmly to congratulate the representative of Zambia, Ambassador Mwaanga, for the way in which he conducted the Security Council debates during the month of December. Furthermore, I should like to express our cordial appreciation and thanks to the delegations of Algeria, Hungary, Pakistan, Paraguay and Senegal, the non-permanent members of the Security Council whose terms ended on 31 December 1969, for the friendly way in which we were able to carry out our joint endeavours. By the same token, I wish most cordially to offer our welcome to the delegations of Burundi, Nicaragua, Poland, Sierra Leone and Syria on their joining the Security Council.

52. I wish to add that, as a member of the United Nations Council for Namibia, Colombia can attest to the fact that the members of that body have constantly carried out with dedication and concern many undertakings related to the implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council with respect to Namibia. The successive Presidents of that body have unceasingly stressed the importance of that problem and the generally unfavourable results of United Nations actions on the matter have in no way dampened their ardour. Each of the members has acted identically. I feel it necessary to state this as explicitly as possible, since it is only just to do so.

53. The fact that such meagre results have been achieved after prolonged efforts might lead to discouraging conclusions. The representative of Spain referred in his statement [1528th meeting] to the fact that the question of Namibia, or South West Africa as it was known at one time, had been the subject of concern to the United Nations since the very outset of the Organization. In the time that has elapsed, many resolutions have been adopted and the results achieved have not measured up to the efforts devoted to solving the problem. But can we say, as a result, that those efforts were sterile? Certainly not. A collective awareness has expressed itself, a legal fact has been set forth and an unjust situation has been unanimously condemned. Those facts cannot be turned back nor are they devoid of consequences. We can say that not much more time will pass before law will prevail over arbitrary acts and regain its sway.

54. The countries of Latin America, including Colombia, emerged into independent life at the end of a colonial process that lasted for three centuries. That fact impresses a special feature on our conduct, which is one of inborn anti-colonialism. Our experience was not new-born during the last decades nor in the century through which we are living. Over 150 years ago and we must stress this—that process culminated and in that long lapse of time not only have our convictions become deeply rooted, consolidated and a part of our national essence, but we have also accomplished a most admirable result: our relationship with the one-time metropolitan country has become more thorough, more significant and deeper than might have been possible in the past.

55. Because of that inborn feeling to which I referred earlier, we could hardly cease to share the concern and indignation of the African peoples at the situation prevailing in Namibia, a situation which we have denounced in this Chamber and in the United Nations Council for Namibia, fully aware of our historical background and responsibilities as a member of the international community.

56. In conclusion, my delegation wishes to state that it will support the draft resolution submitted to the Security Council, because we wish to leave no stone unturned, to bring to bear all the elements of judgement and to carry out all efforts that might directly or indirectly lead to a settlement of the situation in Namibia.

57. Mr. BERARD (France) (*interpretation from French*): I already had the opportunity at our last meeting in December 1969 [1526th meeting] to tell the representatives of Algeria, Hungary, Pakistan, Paraguay and Senegal how deeply and sincerely we regretted to see them leaving our Council, where they had worked most effectively. I also had the opportunity to express to our outgoing President, the representative of Zambia, Ambassador Mwaanga, our appreciation for the way in which he guided our deliberations during the month of December.

58. I should like in turn to express to the new members of our Council and their countries our deep satisfaction at seeing them brought into our work. Burundi could not have chosen a man more aware of the work of the United Nations and better able to preside over our meetings than you, Mr. President. We are very pleased that our work during the month of January has been under your guidance.

59. The representative of Nicaragua, Ambassador Sevilla Sacasa, the other day gave us a remarkable demonstration of Latin eloquence. We are grateful to him and we know how much his delegation will help us in our work. The representative of Poland knows of the close links which for centuries have associated his country with mine. May I add that he and I in our childhood had the same education? I am therefore convinced that the co-operation between him and his country and all the members of the Security Council will be especially close. Sierra Leone has sent us, in the person of Professor Nicol, a man whose qualities and merit are exceptional. Finally, the representative of Syria, Mr. Tomeh, has been a colleague and friend for many years, and I am particularly happy to see him across the table from me today.

60. During our meeting in August last [1495th meeting] my delegation recalled that it viewed the policies followed by the Pretoria Government in South West Africa with the same severity as the representatives of the countries of that continent. It stated, however, that it reached different conclusions about the measures to be taken to cause the authorities of South Africa to cease ignoring the obligations undertaken in the Mandate Agreement of 17 December 1920.³

61. Since last summer, unfortunately, information received from the Territory has revealed that the Administer-

³ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Session, Supplement No. 12A*, annex A.

ing Authority has not changed its policy. A few days after the Security Council vote, the Windhoek Court did not hesitate to condemn five inhabitants of South West Africa to life imprisonment under the deplorable Terrorism Act of 1967.

62. Finally, the letter addressed to the Secretary-General on 26 September 1969 [S/9463, annex I, of 3 October 1969] states that the policy of creating autonomous areas will be continued despite the condemnations of that policy.

63. Thus, as was stated in the General Assembly by my Foreign Minister, Mr. Schumann, the régime of racial segregation so rightly condemned in this Assembly is being extended to a territory of international status.⁴

64. Confronted with a policy which deliberately ignored the obligations of the Mandate, the United Nations has over a period of years adopted successive resolutions, but it is to be feared that they have not fully achieved their objective. One may even wonder whether the positions taken by the General Assembly and the Security Council have not served as a pretext for the Government of South Africa to justify or try to justify as well as it can the regressive legislation it has applied since 1967.

65. Furthermore, those resolutions may have finally shaken the confidence placed by the inhabitants of the Territory in our Organization and may have engendered in many of them a certain pessimism with regard to the activities of international institutions.

66. As my delegation has already had occasion to state, one may thus wonder whether, if we persist along this road, we do not run the risk of placing ourselves progressively in a situation without solution.

67. The favourable manner in which the Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa⁵ was received at the last session of the General Assembly, with an almost unanimous vote, showed that, in order to restore in the south of Africa racial equality and respect for human dignity and to conclude the process of decolonization, the Member States and particularly those of the African continent were prepared to seek new solutions. Could such solutions not come precisely from the work of the *ad hoc* sub-committee whose creation is envisaged in the draft resolution [S/9620/Rev.1] before us? That is certainly not impossible, and the wish of the sponsors of the draft to guide the work of this future body towards effectiveness seems encouraging in this connexion.

68. It is also to be hoped that the South African Government, taking full advantage of the time available before the end of the proposed studies will give tangible evidence of the desire, expressed in its report of September 1969 [see S/9463], to serve the interests of the populations and to lead them to "political sovereignty".

69. Although the text before us is placed in a legal framework about which we have always expressed reserva-

tions and therefore cannot be supported by my delegation, we welcome with sympathy the spirit of moderation which we believe we detect in it. We should like to find in that spirit, as well as in our debates, reason for strengthening our conviction that the United Nations, through a realistic appraisal of the situation, can contribute effectively to the solution of the very difficult problem of which we are seized.

70. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I have just received a letter from the representative of Pakistan in which he requests to be allowed to participate in the Council's debate on the question under consideration. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Council agrees that the representative of Pakistan should be invited to take part in the debate without the right to vote, in accordance with the provisional rules of procedure and the practice of the Council.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. A. Shahi (Pakistan), took a place at the Security Council table.

71. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker on the list is the representative of India, on whom I now call.

72. Mr. TEJA (India): Mr. President, permit me first of all to thank you and the other members of the Security Council for the opportunity of expressing my delegation's views on the question under discussion. I should also like to record our gratification that a distinguished son of Africa occupies the high office of President of the Council for this month. We are confident that under your wise and dynamic guidance this Council will take effective action and fulfil its duty towards all the oppressed peoples of Africa.

73. We have asked to be allowed to participate in this debate because of our firm conviction that the United Nations must discharge its responsibility in securing freedom and independence for Namibia. It is because of our abiding concern for the freedom of the people of Namibia that over the past twenty-four years my country has taken an active part in the United Nations discussions on this issue.

74. The Security Council is meeting at a time when there is a great deal of pessimism and even cynicism about the role that the United Nations can play in solving the many long-standing problems of the southern half of Africa. It has been said that our Organization should not take any hasty actions which might close the door to a peaceful solution or expose its own weaknesses. Consequently, the argument runs, the only practical step that the United Nations can take is to mobilize public opinion which some day, it is hoped, may induce a change of heart in the racist and colonialist régimes. We reject that philosophy of resignation and permissiveness, which is precisely what the régime in South Africa would most like to see in the United Nations.

75. There is no doubt in our mind that the will of the international community on the issue of Namibia has been clearly and repeatedly expressed, both in the United Nations and elsewhere. It was this determination that led

⁴ *Ibid.*, Twenty-fourth Session, Plenary Meetings, 1763rd meeting, para. 72.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Twenty-fourth Session, Annexes, agenda item 106, document A/7154.

the General Assembly in 1966 [resolution 2145 (XXI)] to revoke Pretoria's Mandate over South West Africa and to decide to administer the Territory directly, through the United Nations Council for Namibia. The Assembly later formally set a date for the independence of the Territory. Last year the Security Council in its resolution 264 (1969) specifically reaffirmed and recognized the Assembly's termination of the Mandate and the assumption of direct responsibility for Namibia until its independence. Even more significantly, the Security Council decided that in the event of South Africa's non-compliance it would meet immediately to determine on the necessary steps or measures to be taken under the relevant provisions of the Charter. It is thus quite clear to us that both principal organs of the United Nations are committed to take further action to implement their decisions on Namibia.

76. Today, when the Security Council meets under the shadow of South Africa's continued defiance, it is pertinent to ask ourselves a question that has so often been raised in the Afro-Asian world: why has the United Nations so far failed in its declared duty and responsibility towards the people of Namibia? Is it the indifference of the international community to the plight of a small people living under the subjugation of a powerful, ruthless and technologically advanced régime, or is it the defiance of South Africa alone that is to blame for that failure? Or is it the overt and covert support of South Africa's powerful friends and allies in the Western world? Surely, the community of nations is not indifferent and devoid of concern towards the future of Namibia, for the vast majority of Member States of the United Nations do support the idea of effective action against South Africa. However, the history of this problem shows that but for the political encouragement and active economic and financial succour of South Africa's major trading partners and suppliers of armaments, that country would not have been able to defy the United Nations for so many years and with such impunity. Indeed, that fact is also generally recognized. It is a matter of record that the General Assembly has called for the imposition of sanctions against South Africa, including an embargo on the supply of arms to that country. Further, in its resolution 269 (1969) of 12 August 1969 the Security Council called upon all States to refrain from all dealings with the Pretoria régime purporting to act on behalf of Namibia. However, it is no secret that certain Members of our Organization have not seen fit to comply with these decisions of the Assembly and the Council. On the contrary, some of them have even intensified economic and financial relations with South Africa, thereby encouraging that country to persist in flouting its obligations under the Charter. The pursuit of narrow, short-term and selfish gains has thus undermined the prestige and authority of our Organization and exposed it to contempt and ridicule.

77. The Security Council finds itself at a particularly decisive and historic moment today. The need for meaningful action by the United Nations is widely recognized and has been amply reaffirmed on many previous occasions. At this particular moment, therefore, the Security Council faces the issue of what to do next to implement this will of the United Nations. In our opinion the question is not so much to decide whether to apply this or that Article of the

Charter as to follow the logic of the Council's own decisions within the totality of the Charter.

78. In March 1969, when the Security Council recognized its special responsibility towards the Territory and the people of Namibia, it recorded its intention of taking steps to fulfil that responsibility. The Council affirmed the inalienable right of the people of Namibia to freedom and independence and recognized the Assembly's decisions and recommendations. Further, the Council made the pronouncement that the presence of South Africa in Namibia was illegal and contrary to the Charter and detrimental to the interests of the population. Finally, the Council called upon South Africa to vacate its administration from the Territory immediately. In short, resolution 264 (1969) of 20 March 1969 committed the Security Council to give further substance to the Assembly's decision to assume direct responsibility for Namibia until independence. The United Nations has thus a perfectly legal and valid basis for further action. South Africa's refusal to comply with those decisions is not only an insult and challenge to the Security Council but an act of aggression on a Territory where it has no *locus standi* whatsoever. By its refusal to fulfil its obligations under Article 25 of the Charter, South Africa has also forfeited all rights and privileges of membership of this Organization.

79. I shall not deal today with the oppressive conditions inside Namibia which have been described in detail by other speakers around this table, nor shall I take the Council's time in listing South Africa's violations of the Charter and of the specific resolutions of the principal organs of the United Nations. That catalogue is too long and, in any case, it is a frustrating experience to recite it. I need only say that as far as Namibia is concerned South Africa has persistently refused to honour its obligations in every respect. It has rejected the United Nations demand to withdraw its authority from the Territory. It has ignored the Assembly's call to discontinue and desist from oppressive measures against the people. It has shown utter contempt and disregard for the territorial integrity of Namibia. It has persisted in applying the odious policies of *apartheid* to the Territory of Namibia.

80. At the last series of meetings of the Security Council on this subject in August 1969 my delegation emphasized that the time had now come to take more effective action. As indicated in the statement of the representative of India, Ambassador Sen, on 4 August 1969 [1493rd meeting], our proposals were aimed at loosening the Pretoria régime's economic and political stranglehold on the Territory of Namibia. Since then many ideas and suggestions have already been put forward, and my delegation would particularly like to see the Security Council take action along some of the following lines.

81. First, the Security Council has to decide that Member States should take effective steps to prevent the flow of arms and other military hardware to South Africa directly or through third countries. Secondly, all States must take suitable measures to stop fresh investment in Namibia by their nationals or private companies registered under their laws, as long as South Africa continues its illegal occupation of Namibia. Thirdly, all States must be asked to ensure that

their companies and nationals operating in Namibia pay the taxes and levies for such operations not to the South African régime but to the United Nations Council for Namibia. Fourthly, the Council should request Member States to discontinue recognition of travel documents issued by the South African Government in so far as they pertain to the citizens of Namibia and take positive steps to extend recognition to travel and visa documents issued on behalf of the United Nations. Fifthly, United Nations Members should be asked to give full legal effect to the United Nations termination of South Africa's Mandate by all possible means.

82. These interim measures should be applied immediately by the Security Council. My delegation is fully conscious, however, that more energetic action under Chapter VII will be necessary to bring about the full implementation of the United Nations mandate to secure the freedom and independence of the people of Namibia. My delegation is convinced that only speedy and effective action can avert the breach of peace in southern Africa.

83. Many years ago on the eve of the Second World War—I believe it was in 1938—Jawaharlal Nehru, speaking of fascism, said:

“Freedom, like peace and war, is indivisible. If the aggressors of today have to be checked, the aggressors of yesterday have also to be called to account. Because we have sought to cover up past evil, though it still persists, we have been powerless to check the new evil of today.”

Those prophetic words apply with equal force to the neo-fascism of South Africa.

84. The forces of oppression, domination, hate and bigotry, unleashed by South Africa and enthusiastically supported by Portugal and the illegal minority régime of Southern Rhodesia, can be adequately dealt with if all Member States present here exhibit the same will and firm determination. On this threshold of the seventies we dare to hope that the Organization will fulfil the expectations that were reposed in it twenty-five years ago.

85. Mr. ORTEGA URBINA (Nicaragua) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Before briefly explaining the vote of my delegation, I should like to express our appreciation to the representatives who, in their statements, have voiced appreciation and recognition of the outstanding personality of the Head of my delegation, Ambassador Sevilla Sacasa.

86. My delegation has very carefully and with a favourable eye studied the draft resolution at present before the Council which was presented formally and in very precise terms by the representative of Finland. I am happy to announce that we agree with the purport of that draft resolution [*S/9620/Rev.1*]. We do believe it appropriate to obtain more information on the consequences and the effects that may be visited on third parties by the acts of the Government in South Africa in illegally assuming representation of the people of Namibia after termination of the Mandate over the Territory and also on the adequate means of ensuring fulfilment of the terms of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) and resolutions 264 (1969) and 269 (1969) of this Council.

87. I must also add that we do have slight objections, particularly to what is said in paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, in which the Council pronounces itself on the validity of the measures adopted by South Africa since the termination of the mandate, covering both political and merely administrative acts. The consequence of the illegal activities of South Africa, in the opinion of my delegation, should be determined in the light of both domestic and international law, by the courts of Namibia once the rule of law has been re-established there, or by judges or arbiters selected by the parties affected by the illegal acts of South Africa. However, we shall not object to these aspects of the form of the draft resolution since we agree with its substance, and, furthermore, since, as drafted, it seems to command the support of the majority of this Council.

88. Therefore, Nicaragua will vote in favour of the draft resolution.

89. Mr. PHILLIPS (United States): In his statement to this Council, last night the representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Malik, devoted considerable time to what I can only describe as propaganda and slander. Indeed, that seemed to be the principal contribution that he made in his intervention to our debate on the serious issue which is now before this Council. I cannot help feeling that that is an unfortunate reflection of harsh, old-fashioned cold-war psychology which one would have hoped the Soviet representative had outgrown.

90. As for the draft resolution before the Council, which has been submitted by the delegations of Burundi, Finland, Nepal, Sierra Leone and Zambia, the Soviet representative dismissed it airily in two sentences, stating that it was now in the process of being drafted. Now that type of approach does not help the Council to make progress on the important issue before us.

91. I should like to reply briefly to some of the slander directed by the Soviet representative to the United States. Ambassador Malik alleged that my country is supplying arms and military equipment to the Government of South Africa. That is a complete fabrication and utterly without foundation. Let me here and now solemnly affirm that since 1963 the United States has prohibited the sale and shipment to South Africa of arms, ammunition, military vehicles and equipment or materials for their manufacture and maintenance.

92. I should also like to take this occasion to reaffirm that the United States has faithfully kept and intends to continue to keep its commitment banning the sale to South Africa of all forms of military equipment.

93. Now, of course, it is true that the United States could have helped its balance of payments substantially by selling arms to South Africa, as indeed others have done—others, I might add, represented in this chamber, whom the Soviet Union conveniently failed to mention.

94. I do not wish to tax the patience of the Council by prolonging such an exchange of political polemics as was initiated by the Soviet representative. I did feel it was necessary, however, to set the record straight about United

States policy with respect to the arms embargo against the Government of South Africa.

95. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I call now on the representative of the Soviet Union, presumably on a point of order. Or does he wish to exercise his right of reply?

96. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): I should like to reserve my right to reply, at the end of the discussion, to the statement by the United States representative.

97. Mr. MWAANGA (Zambia): Mr. President, thank you for giving me the floor. I had actually asked for the floor to speak at the end of the debate, before the vote, but since in your wisdom you found it necessary that I should take the floor at this stage, I am most grateful to you.

98. I hesitate to take the floor again at this late hour, but if I do so it is only to acknowledge, with warm appreciation, the many tributes paid to me by all my distinguished colleagues for my presidency of the Security Council during the month of December 1969.

99. As I said before, it was through the co-operation of all the members of the Council that I was able to make the humble contribution for which my colleagues have paid a tribute to me. In recognition of the value of co-operation, my Government has approached all international questions with an open mind, if not in terms of ultimate objectives, certainly in the search for solutions to problems.

100. It is in that spirit that we approached this question. For in a matter of this nature steam-rolling will yield no results. Our basic aim is to re-engage the minds and time-proven capabilities of all the members of this Council so that together we may find a peaceful solution to the problem of Namibia.

101. It is our fervent hope that all the members will co-operate, in amity and not in acrimony, in the search for justice and equity for the people of Namibia towards whom we hold a special responsibility. That responsibility cannot be discharged properly if we wrangle among ourselves. We have serious and urgent work to do and we must get down to it.

102. I wish to re-emphasize, if this is necessary, that the draft resolution that we have proposed [*S/9620/Rev.1*] is strictly of an interim nature. It is intended to enable the Council to prepare for more substantive proposals, as was stated by Ambassador Jakobson of Finland, who said on 28 January 1970:

“The draft resolution now before the Security Council is obviously limited in scope and purpose. It should be regarded as an interim resolution, the purpose of which is to help the Council make more substantive decisions in the months to come. It is, in our view, a useful and practical step in the process of United Nations action for the purpose of discharging its responsibility towards the people of Namibia” [*1527th meeting, para. 45*].

103. It is true that this draft resolution is an interim one. Yet, unless we exert our energies with a team spirit during the forthcoming months, the next step, which we must take soon after the report of the committee has been prepared, may be hard to realize. For our part, therefore, we guarantee our maximum co-operation with all in this worthy endeavour.

104. Paragraph 9 of the draft resolution, in the opinion of the co-sponsors, does not exclude a Council meeting on Namibia should the situation demand it. My country is irrevocably committed to the struggle of the people of Namibia and all other peoples struggling for freedom and independence. It is for this reason that we shall continue to render moral and material assistance in accordance with the decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

105. I thought that these few clarifications on the draft resolution, on behalf of the sponsors, might be useful in shedding some light.

106. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I now call on the representative of Pakistan.

107. Mr. SHAHI (Pakistan): Mr. President, the Pakistan delegation is grateful to you and to the other members of the Security Council for allowing us to participate without vote in the Council's deliberations on the question of Namibia. We sought this participation on the grounds of my Government's deep and active concern with this question since the time it came in its present form before the United Nations.

108. Our concern is twofold. First, in the very nature of things, Pakistan cannot but whole-heartedly support the accession to independence of the people of Namibia on the basis of their right to self-determination. I might recall that in 1966 Pakistan was among the earliest proponents of the termination of South Africa's Mandate over the Territory of Namibia. We took this firm position because of our sincere belief that the refusal of South Africa to discharge every one of the responsibilities attendant on the Mandate made the continuance of that Mandate intolerable. Since 1967 Pakistan has had the privilege of serving on the United Nations Council for Namibia. During our tenure of membership of the Security Council, in 1968 and 1969, we had the satisfaction of co-sponsoring resolutions 246 (1968) of 14 March 1968, 264 (1969) of 20 March 1969 and 269 (1969) of 12 August 1969. The latter two resolutions are the texts on the basis of which the Security Council is now called upon to take further action.

109. Secondly, Pakistan is specially interested in this problem because it is one of the three or four major international questions which pose a direct challenge to the authority of the Security Council and to the effectiveness of the United Nations. As a Member State vitally affected by the success or failure of the Security Council in fulfilling its commitments and in securing the implementation of its resolutions, Pakistan cannot but be dismayed at the spectacle of the Council reaching a dead end in regard to action on situations which violate the Charter and endanger peace. Nothing is so detrimental to the Council's authority

as the pervasive air of futility, the persistent hesitancy in following up resolutions adopted after due deliberation. Nothing weakens the prestige of the Council so much as the general feeling that agreements are sometimes reached on texts with wholly different assumptions in mind. As much as any local situation, however threatening, as much as any international conflict, however dangerous, it is this recurrent impasse about the actions of the Security Council which may undermine international peace.

110. If Pakistan appears before the Security Council today, it is because we feel that the time has come for this atmosphere of impasse to be dispelled. There is need now for the Security Council to demonstrate a greater purposefulness and consistency in regard to the grave and deteriorating situation in Namibia. Since we have had the experience of dealing with this situation in the Security Council, we do not for a moment ignore the political realities which inevitably influence the Council's attitude. We know that while unanimity is easily obtainable on a theoretical formulation, differences arise over the concrete action that needs to be taken. Why do differences often inhibit action? The reason is not that different members have inherently different notions of practicability. The reason is the lack of a common political will to implement the resolutions of the Security Council. We trust that during the current deliberations the Council, in loyalty to its purposes and functions under the Charter, will close its ranks. We trust that it will show that it is willing to use its resources to bring about the implementation of the resolutions it has solemnly adopted.

111. I do not intend to take the time of the Security Council in repeating the arguments which were advanced in support of resolutions 264 (1969) and 269 (1969). At this stage my delegation's basic submission to the Security Council is that the Council should now adopt a resolution which logically follows from those resolutions and does not represent a detour, far less a departure, from the direction taken in them. The position is that in resolution 264 (1969) of 20 March 1969 the Security Council, in paragraph 1, recognized:

"... that the United Nations General Assembly terminated the Mandate of South Africa over Namibia and assumed direct responsibility for the Territory until its independence",

and in paragraph 2 the Security Council declared that:

"... the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia is illegal and contrary to the principles of the Charter and the previous decisions of the United Nations and is detrimental to the interests of the population of the Territory and those of the international community".

Further, in paragraph 3 the Council called upon the Government of South Africa "to withdraw immediately its administration from the Territory". Moreover, the Council invited all States to exert their influence in order to obtain compliance by the Government of South Africa with the provisions of the resolution, and in paragraph 8 decided that:

"... in the event of failure on the part of the Government of South Africa to comply with the provi-

sions of the resolution, the Security Council [would] meet immediately to determine upon necessary steps or measures in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations".

112. It must be recalled that that resolution was adopted by a vote of thirteen in favour and none against, with two abstentions. In other words, two of the four permanent members voted for it while two others abstained on it without opposing it.

113. Resolution 269 (1969) was mainly a reaffirmation of resolution 264 (1969). The supplementary element in resolution 269 (1969) was the setting of a deadline for the withdrawal of South Africa's presence from Namibia. Those who think that that element was controversial need to be reminded that the injunction contained in the earlier resolution was also for the withdrawal of the South African administration from the Territory "immediately".

114. In response to the Security Council resolutions the Foreign Minister of South Africa has clearly stated in his letter of 26 September 1969 addressed to the Secretary-General—and I quote from its concluding paragraph:

"On no account will we abandon the peoples of South West Africa who for half a century have placed their trust in us to lead them on the path of progress, peace and stability" [see S/9463, annex I].

115. In other words, on no account will South Africa comply with Security Council resolutions 264 (1969) and 269 (1969). A rejection by a Member State of a clear call made by the Council could not be more unequivocal than the one conveyed in this communication of the Pretoria régime.

116. It follows that the task before the Security Council is to identify the measures which can now be taken to bring the maximum possible pressure to bear on Pretoria to relinquish its illegal hold on the Territory of Namibia. The issue before the Council is not what measures are within its competence. It is not whether measures under Chapter VII of the Charter are legally appropriate. It is clear that even those issues have already been settled by earlier resolutions. The two issues now are: first, what measures would be adequate for removing South Africa's presence from Namibia and, secondly, which of those measures are realistically feasible?

117. Here we come to the crux of the problem. It is clear that the Asian-African Members are unanimous in their sincere belief that nothing short of measures under Chapter VII of the Charter will be adequate and that such measures are eminently practicable, but the second part of this proposition is not accepted by some of the permanent members of the Security Council. I would therefore submit that those permanent members should indicate now what action they consider feasible to bring about the implementation of resolution 264 (1969) of the Security Council. In doing so they have to convince the vitally concerned Asian-African Member States that such action will also be adequate.

118. It is not realistic to think that this practical problem can be conclusively solved during the current deliberations of the Security Council. We appreciate that there are aspects of the problem which do not lend themselves to public debate. At the same time, it would be intolerable if those deliberations led to a position which in any way detracted from the force of resolutions 264 (1969) and 269 (1969) or served to consign them to oblivion.

119. In view of those considerations the Pakistan delegation believes that priority should now be given to developing a suitable procedure for placing the problem of removing South Africa's presence from Namibia under the constant review of the Security Council. The question has now reached a stage in which it should no longer be necessary for the Asian-African Members to request its consideration by the Council. The Council's commitment made in paragraph 8 of resolution 264 (1969) and paragraph 6 of resolution 269 (1969) was meant to be of a self-executing nature with respect to at least the determination of the necessary steps for the fulfilment of that commitment.

120. The programme of action visualized by my delegation would be such as would help the members of the Security Council, especially its permanent members, first, to identify the steps which would not only be feasible but also effective for bringing about compliance by South Africa with the resolutions of the Security Council and secondly, to arrive at firm conclusions as early as possible with regard to a sequence of such steps and thus to enable the Council to fulfil its pledge made in resolutions 264 (1969) and 269 (1969).

121. In suggesting a procedure of that nature my delegation begs the Council to adopt a strictly businesslike approach to the problem. I repeat what I said before, that is, that the Council has already disposed of the legal issues involved in this question. No new studies are needed beyond the ones which have already been made. The time has now come for suitable action.

122. The Asian-African Member States have proposed action under Chapter VII and have declared that they are prepared to take such action to the limit of their capacity. But given the economic and power realities, action by the Asian-African Member States alone can hardly make any change in the situation. Therefore, the responsibility is also on the other Member States, particularly the permanent members of the Security Council, to come forward with concrete proposals of their own.

123. If they are not prepared for measures under Chapter VII to be taken immediately, they still owe it to the Security Council, and indeed to themselves, to spell out what alternative steps they are prepared to take which, in their considered judgement, would be effective in bringing about South Africa's immediate withdrawal from Namibia.

124. The procedure that we are suggesting is that the permanent members should consult each other and report their agreed conclusions to the Security Council. Under the Charter it is they who bear the special responsibility where action has to be taken by the Security Council. My

delegation cannot believe that in view of their pivotal position in the world, in view of their awareness of the almost world-wide and acute concern with ending South Africa's odious colonial hold over Namibia, the permanent members would not wish to fulfil their Charter obligations in this situation.

125. I must confess that my delegation had some serious misgivings about draft resolution S/9620, which was presented to the Council on Wednesday [1527th meeting], even though it was emphasized by its sponsors that it was of a strictly interim nature. However, I am happy to say that most of those misgivings have been allayed by the revisions to the text made in the Council yesterday. The revised version [S/9620/Rev.1] to the best of our judgement accords with the views that I have expressed. We hope that it will be adopted unanimously by the Security Council.

126. In conclusion, may I express to you, Mr. President, and to the members of the Security Council, the sincere thanks of my delegation for the kind references made to the role of Pakistan and of the other outgoing members of the Security Council during their term of membership? I express to the new members of the Security Council our profound esteem and to you, Sir, as President of the Security Council, our plenary trust and confidence in your leadership.

127. Mr. TOMEH (Syria): The Security Council in its quest for solutions to difficult problems and, consequently, in its quest for peace in the world at large should have a comprehensive view of all the factors that enter into a problem. We are discussing the problem of Namibia and the obduracy of the racist régime of South Africa. Among the issues that have arisen which are of the utmost danger and have far-reaching consequences is that of the flow of arms into South Africa and the manufacture of arms in South Africa. The representative of Zambia raised that aspect, among other dangerous aspects of the problem, in the lucid, brilliant and straightforward statement which he made two days ago. I am referring to the flow of capital and arms into South Africa, which has led to the increasing obduracy of that racist régime. The question of arms manufactured in and imported into South Africa has been further discussed yesterday and today. In his statement the representative of India also referred to this problem as, if I remember correctly, "the flow of arms . . . to South Africa directly or through third countries". It is in that context that my delegation wishes to bring some further clarification to the problem.

128. I repeat that in the context of world peace it is the obligation of the Security Council not to leave a stone unturned in order to reveal the truth.

129. The Jewish Telegraphic Agency on 20 January 1970 reported the following from London:

"The South African Government has begun to organize the export of tanks to Israel marking 'a new stage of their co-operation'. The South African tank is a sixty-five-ton giant 'armed with a heavy gun and designed according to the model of the British new tank'. This is an apparent

reference to Britain's new Chieftain tank which Israel has been trying to buy from Great Britain."

130. I must explain that the reports of the Jewish Telegraphic Agency are published in New York by the Jewish Agency, which is, in accordance with the status law of the Knesset of Israel, a legal and a functioning part of the Government of Israel, but operating in the United States with the approval, consent and encouragement of the United States Government.

131. The Jewish Telegraphic Agency on 21 January 1970, under the heading, "No comment on charge that Israel is receiving arms from South Africa", stated:

"The Israeli Foreign Ministry had no comment today on a charge that South Africa was shipping arms to Israel . . . The charge, which appeared Sunday, stated that the South African Government was planning the export of giant sixty-five-ton tanks to Israel."

132. This criminal relationship is both old and new. In the *Tricontinental Bulletin* of June 1968 we read the following:

"The first news of a projected plan to enable Israel to intervene in South Africa against the oppressed and exploited African people has now come to light. We have on several occasions made specific reference to the aggressive imperialist-inspired actions of Israel. Now, although South Africa is already producing jet fighter-bombers at the Atlas Aircraft Corporation plant near Johannesburg, Israel has entered the field as a prospective supplier of aircraft to be used against [African] militants.

"It is reported in the South African press that the deputy director-general and the chief engineer of Israeli Aircraft Industries, the biggest aircraft production organization in the Middle East, were among a group of sixty prominent Israelis who visited South Africa recently as guests of El Al, the Israeli airline."

133. That information is borne out by two reliable United Kingdom sources. First, the *Jewish Chronicle*, which is published in London, states in its issue of 31 May 1969:

"Two members of the Knesset, Mr. S. Tamir and Mr. E. Shostak, at present on a visit to South Africa, are an embarrassment to the South African Zionist Federation."

The article goes on to say that the purpose of the visit of those two members of the Israeli Knesset was connected with efforts being made by a political group in Israel calling itself the "Free Centre" to establish an "Israel-South Africa League". The article goes on to say:

"Earlier in his interview, Mr. Maisels said that the South African businessmen who attended the economic conference held in Jerusalem in April have followed through with a swift practical reaction.

"They have decided to set up a business organization to promote two-way trade between Israel and South Africa.

"Mr. Maisels said that the participation of the extremely influential South African delegation in the

economic conference, and their determination to create practical economic ties between Israel and South Africa, would contribute greatly towards a closer understanding between the peoples of the two countries.

"In this connexion, he welcomed the appointment by Israel of a special Consul for Trade in South Africa, Mr. Amitai Ben Yosef."

134. It is also borne out by *The Economist* of London of 3 August 1968, which contains a report very similar to what I have just read. I will confine myself to the last paragraph of the article in that very reliable publication. It states:

"... Mr. Vorster himself had warned President Kaunda even more bluntly that, if Zambia continued sheltering guerrillas, 'We will hit you so hard that you will never forget it.' The minister of transport, Mr. Ben Schoeman, has also weighed in with an oblique warning that South Africa may carry the fight into Zambia. South Africa was deeply impressed by the Israeli example, and the feeling is growing that the forces of the white south could deliver a quick knock-out blow against the guerrilla camps—an air raid perhaps—and get away with it. No doubt a lot of dust would be kicked up at the United Nations, but would anybody actually do anything about it?"

135. Besides the United States—which has, in its recognition of a statement by the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Sisco, not denied the facts with regard to its volunteers of military rank—South Africa has given permission to South African pilots of the Jewish faith to join the Israeli Air Force whenever the need arises. I am stating all this in the context of the need to make the Security Council fully aware of all the aspects of the problem under discussion, because it is our duty to fight racism and we must know how far-reaching the tentacles of this octopus might be.

136. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): As there are no further speakers on my list in regard to the substance of the question, it is the turn of the delegation of BURUNDI briefly to state its views on the question before the Council.

137. In preparing this statement in my capacity as a member of the Council, I have singled out the main points that have to be taken into account, as bearing on peace in the world and in southern Africa in particular. As I do not wish to tax your patience, I shall not dwell at great length on the arguments that have been developed in the General Assembly or in the Security Council in support of the right of peoples—and in this case of the Namibian people—to independence. The speakers who have preceded me have, with sufficient talent and firmness, expressed their profound convictions as well as their faith in the inalienable and absolute right to self-determination.

138. In keeping with the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the delegation of Burundi associates itself with the injunction already expressed in this forum on many occasions insisting that the Namibian people must without delay have restored to it the rights that are recognized to all men. The United

Nations, which subscribes to the legal and natural principle that all men are equal, cannot, without abandoning its most imperative duty, be satisfied with an intolerable silence at a time when a people, whatever its colour, is deprived of the most elementary human, economic and political rights.

139. Since we, Members of this noble Organization, are convinced that justice requires mutual respect from all men and that the Namibians belong to that category of worthy men, regardless of what the colonialist and racist Government of Pretoria may think, is it not imperative for the Members of the United Nations to rise as a single man to restore the rights of our Namibian brothers and restore to them the status of men, a status of which they were unjustly deprived in the name of a most dubious morality invoked to justify colonization?

140. You, with faith in the fundamental rights of man, in equality, in fraternity, you who have subscribed to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, you who still attach value to the Charter that governs our Organization, you have the obligation to order South Africa to abandon illegality and put an end to a policy which in these days is a disgrace to mankind. To condemn the policy of Pretoria, Salisbury and Lisbon is to challenge the very myth that led to the disintegration of the continent and to its partition among the great Powers after the Berlin and Versailles Conferences.

141. The very principle of colonization having been shaken and its basis challenged since it constitutes a violation of the foundations of our society, is it not time to ask the representatives of those unrepentant colonialist and racist régimes, one after the other, why they stubbornly persist in this attitude of exploitation, subjugation and humiliation? Is it not appropriate in that regard to quote something said by Pascal: he who tries to act like an angel succeeds only, in the final analysis, in acting like a beast. Is it not obvious that that applies perfectly to the case before us?

142. Assuming that there still exists among us an outdated belief in racial superiority, I should like to ask the Security Council to authorize the representative of South Africa—he is not here at the moment and if I remember correctly, his name is Mr. Botha—to come to the Security Council. We who believe in the superiority of man, regardless of his colour, his ideological beliefs and his faith or lack of faith in mankind, we who believe that one man, be he white or black, is equal to any man, we should have liked the representative of South Africa to be present so as to come to this table and prove to us the human faculties possessed by the Whites of South Africa that are not possessed by the Blacks. We should have liked him to be here to tell us what organs the white South African has that the black man lacks. We should have wished him to show us what scientific bases there can be for this accident of colour to give the white man of South Africa supremacy over the black man.

143. Those are the questions that we should have liked to put to him and that we shall ask in other circumstances. His refusal to submit his defence, like his absence, is nothing but an admission of his guilt, of the guilt of the régime he

represents and of the criminality of white men in South Africa—if not of all white men at least those who preach this pernicious doctrine in that part of the world.

144. Consequently, all the Members of this institution, all the Powers—and particularly the great Powers—can only join their voices to those of the countries, including my own, that condemn the policy followed by South Africa—both the racial designs and the colonial objectives of that policy. Those Powers cannot but pronounce a single verdict: to mete out to South Africa the treatment it deserves.

145. During its twenty-five years of existence the United Nations has endured failures inflicted on it by some of its Members, those who have made themselves conspicuous by their irreverence towards the Charter, and even by their profanation of it. Within the category of those who profane the Charter and its sacred character one finds South Africa, Portugal and the rebel Government of Southern Rhodesia, who have been unyielding enemies of the Security Council and the United Nations in general.

146. The impunity which they have enjoyed in spite of their constant contempt for the Security Council has contributed to stripping the Council of its powers and of placing it at the mercy of its detractors. Instead of arming themselves powerfully against those who are determined constantly to flout the authority of the United Nations, some members of the Council seem to view complacently the repeated rebuffs of the worshippers of *apartheid* in southern Africa and the rabid colonialists of Portugal. But tolerance, indifference and complicity are nothing but a blessing granted to the insurgents who rob the Council of its role, its prerogatives and its responsibilities.

147. Whereas the great Powers were thought to be better able to influence, to exercise pressure on Pretoria, Salisbury and Lisbon to lead them to obey the resolutions of the United Nations, they were overcome by the temptation to follow in the footsteps of the rebels. Indeed, to judge from some official attitudes, the position of those Powers can only lead to a belief in a certain disavowal by them of the decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, thus giving support to the three rebel capitals. It goes without saying that they thus not only add grist to the mill of the insurgents but also, and above all, they risk aggravating the situation and hastening the decline in the effectiveness of our Organization.

148. The trend in the Council to shirk its responsibilities—one that formerly appeared to be mere negligence—seems now to be turning into a real political doctrine that could well be the doctrine of the ostrich, which at the approach of danger buries its head in the sand so that it will not see the danger that threatens it.

149. Through a new resolution on Namibia the Security Council intends to remove any ambiguity and to take up the challenge so as to resume the exercise of its rights and rehabilitate itself by rehabilitating mankind.

150. Since the Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa, which the Organization of African Unity endorsed, has

been rejected by the rebels of Pretoria, Salisbury and Lisbon, despite its moderate and peaceful terms, those oppressed peoples will have no alternative left but to turn to weightier means. Those weightier means are the recourse to violence to which they are pushed by the defiance and contempt of the usurpers of power in South Africa, Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea (Bissau) and Rhodesia.

151. My delegation would like this fact to be fully understood. In voicing it we believe that we echo and interpret the general feeling of the African continent. Contrary to certain interpretations, the African Governments do not want to shed blood, but when there is no other alternative, despite the opportunities that the Organization of African Unity has given the aforementioned usurper Governments, we trust that the nations, great, middle-sized and small, that have any dealings with the Governments that still control that part of Africa and which do not wish to listen to reason, will understand that that solution—and I am speaking of violence—is only a makeshift solution. It must be clearly understood because, when peoples seek to free themselves, they can use the most adequate means, even armed war. Let those Powers that support South Africa, let the collaborators of South Africa or the partners of that régime understand that they must refrain from calling Africans brutal or savage and realize that they will have been obliged to turn to this last resort. But we Africans attach a special price to mankind and therefore our acts must not be misinterpreted since they will represent a solution to which the Africans will have been driven reluctantly. Indeed, in many circumstances it has been shown that we have an abiding respect for human life.

152. In conclusion, I should like to thank all members of the Council, particularly those who have addressed compliments and congratulations to the Government and people I represent. I am particularly happy to thank the representative of the Soviet Union for the special value he attached to the policy and the importance of the Government of Burundi and also the voice of our Government as represented here by the delegation of Burundi. We also express our thanks to the representatives of Zambia, Syria and Poland and to all those who have addressed heartfelt congratulations and promises of close, fruitful and beneficial co-operation to the delegation of Burundi. We believe that to those who spoke from the heart one cannot apply the Spanish saying: "The new pitcher contains good water"—everything new, everything beautiful.

153. I thank members for their patience, particularly at this very late hour at which I have had to speak to the Council and abbreviate my statement.

154. Speaking as PRESIDENT of the Council, before proceeding to the vote, I call upon the representative of the United States, Ambassador Phillips, who wishes to make a statement.

155. Mr. PHILLIPS (United States of America): I merely wish to avail myself of this opportunity before we do vote to make a brief explanation of vote with respect to one paragraph of the draft resolution before us. The paragraph

to which I refer is paragraph 5. I would call attention to the fact that the criterion established in that paragraph is consistent with paragraph 2, which has the effect of reaffirming the illegality of South Africa's continued occupation of Namibia. Such a criterion would obviously not exclude such acts as protests to the South African Government concerning its actions in the Territory, nor would we take it to preclude actions aimed at the protection of citizens of United Nations Members or the rights of Namibians themselves which may be necessitated by the continued illegal control exercised by South Africa.

156. With that understanding, it is the intention of my delegation to vote in favour of draft resolution S/9620/Rev.1.

157. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I have no more names on my list of speakers. If no representative wishes to speak, we shall now proceed to the vote.

158. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): I asked to speak in exercise of my right of reply at the end of the discussion; and I meant before the vote, not after it.

159. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The representative of the Soviet Union will perhaps forgive me. I had understood that he had requested to speak after the vote. However, he has a perfect right to speak before the vote and after the vote, too, if he so wishes. I am sorry, I was misinformed. I was certainly not averse to calling on him. I call on him now.

160. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): I would like to make the position clear. I asked to speak in exercise of my right of reply, in order to answer the comments which the United States representative has made here on the statement by the Soviet delegation.

161. With regard to the Soviet delegation's position on the draft resolution [S/9620/Rev.1], I had earlier asked to speak, after the voting, in explanation of my vote. At the moment therefore, if you have no objection, Mr. President, I shall take advantage of your kind invitation for me to speak in exercise of my right of reply.

162. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I certainly see no objection to that and I am sure that the misunderstanding will be overlooked by the representative of the Soviet Union since it was inadvertently committed.

163. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): Mr. President, perhaps my request to you was not altogether clear; and, if so, I apologise.

164. I listened with great interest and not a little surprise to the short but extraordinarily nervous statement by the representative of the United States. He followed the old tradition, custom and practice which the representatives of the United States regularly used to adopt in the Security Council twenty years ago during the coldest years of the

“cold war”, and he used the words “slander” and “propaganda”.

165. I am very familiar with this practice of the United States representatives, because twenty years ago I was sitting at this very table as representative of the USSR. Every observation by the Soviet delegation which was not to the liking of the United States delegation was always characterized by the single word “slander”. However, Mr. Representative of the United States, the times have changed, the peoples have grown up, Africa and Asia have started to move, and the world is now richer by more than fifty new sovereign independent States. Everything has changed, and one only wishes that the United States representatives would change as well. In our day and age, loud cries of “slander” and “propaganda” will not convince anyone. What is needed are facts and well-founded arguments.

166. What was it in my statement that the United States representative did not like? The fact that I made some references to Lenin? The fact that I drew attention to Lenin’s great liberating mission in the history of mankind? But these are facts, recognized even by the enemies of Lenin; and the United States representative will not therefore be able to refute them here, however hard he tries.

167. I may remind this distinguished gathering once again that Lenin was a passionate advocate of the equality of peoples—large and small, white and black—a matter to which the President of the Security Council so eloquently referred in his statement here as representative of Burundi. Lenin was constantly appealing for respect for the national rights and interests and special characteristics of each people, large and small. Lenin said:

“Only exclusive attention to the interests of various nations can remove grounds for conflicts, can remove mutual mistrust, can remove the fear of any intrigues and create that confidence . . . without which there absolutely cannot be peaceful relations between peoples or anything like a successful development of everything that is of value in present-day civilization”.⁶

168. These are the words of Lenin. Is this propaganda? No, it is reality. Without respecting the rights of large and small peoples in the same degree, it is impossible to live in the modern world; and it is time that the United States representative also understood this. If this is propaganda for him, for us it is the sacred truth, for us it is the State policy of the Soviet Union—deepest respect for the rights and interests and special characteristics of large and small peoples.

169. In my statement I propagandized the words of the Head of the United States Mission, Mr. Yost, for whom I have the deepest respect. Mr. Yost said that the presence of South Africa in Namibia is illegal. Is this propaganda by me? I was merely propagandizing what Mr. Yost had said. I only asked him, having said “A”, to say also “B”—so that by our joint efforts and with the participation of all the

permanent members of the Security Council we could adopt a strong and effective resolution providing for appropriate effective measures with a view to putting an end to the presence of South Africa in Namibia and liberating the Namibian people which is suffering under the tyrannical domination of the South African racists. Is this propaganda, Mr. United States Representative? This is the noble propaganda of anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism and anti-apartheid. I am proud to be making propaganda of this kind here, as the Soviet representative. I am proud that my allies today are fifty-seven Permanent Representatives of the countries of Africa and Asia in the United Nations. Their letter is in front of each of you on the table. They have addressed to the Security Council an urgent request for a discussion on the liberation of Namibia. Thus, they too are making propaganda against imperialism, racism, apartheid, and colonialism. I am glad to be making this kind of propaganda together with them.

170. These are the facts, these are the arguments. With the word “propaganda”, which the United States representative has used here, he has not convinced anyone of anything. On the contrary, he has merely shown that he is not with the fifty-seven representatives and he is not with me—he is somewhere on some other plane.

171. In my statement I quoted from a South African newspaper. Obviously, in my reply to the statement by the United States representative, I shall have to read out this quotation in English—that is, in the language which is easier for him to understand—as I did in my reply to the United Kingdom representative. I have here in front of me the South African newspaper *The Rand Daily Mail*, of Tuesday, 4 November 1969. The headline reads: “U.S. Navy is ready to lift South African ports ban”.⁷ What does the paper say? Here is another headline: “U.S. arms sale to Republic under fire”.⁷ The correspondent is Raymond Heard: “Washington—South African and American officials say there is ‘nothing spectacular’ about new Pentagon figures saying that South Africa is America’s second-best arms customer in Africa, notwithstanding the arms embargo.”⁷

172. This reference to figures issued by the Pentagon and published in a South African paper—is this slander by me? If it is slander, tell the South African representative. He is here, he is sitting in this room. I can see him. Let him tell the editors of this paper that their paper is engaging in anti-United States slander. Please. You can perfectly well do this. But what has this got to do with me? I was only referring, I think, to a fairly well-informed source.

173. The paper goes on:

“According to a listing of military export sales provided by the Defense Department”—that is, the United States Defense Department—“South Africa received 24.85 million rands worth of hardware in the fiscal years 1962-1968. In the fiscal year 1969, it got military equipment worth 2.17 million rands.”⁷

174. These are the facts. What slander is there here? What grounds are there for making such a statement and asserting

⁶ See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 33, p. 386.

⁷ Quoted in English by the speaker.

that the Soviet delegation is engaging in slander? This is not characteristic of the Soviet delegation. Throughout the whole period of existence of the United Nations, the Soviet delegation has been basing all its statements on facts and scientific arguments, and not on fabrications. If such practices are characteristic of someone else, let the United States representative address his words to those who do in fact resort to these practices.

175. Such are the facts, and such are the arguments.

176. Mr. PHILLIPS (United States of America): It is not my desire, as I said a few moments ago, to prolong the discussion. It is already late and it is getting close to our lunch hour. But Ambassador Malik seems to like this kind of debate and I do feel an obligation to reply very briefly.

177. Of course, unlike the Press in the Soviet Union, the Press of the United States is not the official organ of the United States Government. I am perfectly aware of the fact that the Soviet delegation is fond of clipping American newspapers, and I dare say that it has a very ample file.

178. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): It is a South African, not an American newspaper.

179. Mr. PHILLIPS (United States of America): American, South African and, I gather, British. I would only repeat what I have said with respect to the specific allegations of the Soviet representative, namely, that the United States has lived up to the embargo imposed on the Government of South Africa in 1963, and at the time that that embargo was imposed the representative of the United States then in the Security Council made clear—and the records will show it—that this would not preclude the fulfilment of orders made prior to the imposition of the embargo. In case the Soviet representative is interested, the figures he cites—and I will not vouch for their accuracy—do refer to spare parts, to equipment of a non-military nature. That is clear for the record, and if he is interested I shall be happy to provide him with details at an appropriate time.

180. I was interested to hear the quotations from Lenin. I was not aware that I had made remarks which would bring forth such an outpouring of quotations. I was waiting to hear one quotation which I myself recalled with some interest, and it was one attributed to Lenin to the effect that "Promises are like pie-crusts—made to be broken". Somehow it seems to characterize the policies of the Government of the Soviet Union over past years.

181. When I hear stated in apparent seriousness the allegation of warm concern for the equal rights of all peoples, and when I compare this with the actions of the Soviet Union—actions which are not ancient history, actions involving the brutal subjugation of peoples, friendly peoples, peoples whose only fault was to be in disagreement with the Government concerned—I wonder about the adequacy of this explanation of Soviet policy.

182. Finally, I must admit quite freely that the representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Malik, has had far more experience in this Council than I have. There is no

doubt that he has made many more speeches, but I believe that the speech for which he will best be remembered, and what was probably the greatest contribution he made to the effective action of this Council, was his boycott of the meetings of this Council in June 1950.

183. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): Mr. President, I think it would be unworthy of the Soviet delegation to reply to these really slanderous statements by the United States representative, which are fabricated from beginning to end.

184. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The Security Council will now vote on draft resolution S/9620/Rev.1.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: Burundi, China, Colombia, Finland, Nepal, Nicaragua, Poland, Sierra Leone, Spain, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United States of America, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

*The draft resolution was adopted by 13 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.*⁸

185. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I call on the representative of the Soviet Union who indicated earlier that he wished to explain his vote.

186. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): The delegation of the Soviet Union voted for the revised draft resolution [S/9620/Rev.1] because this resolution, in its spirit and orientation, does as a whole reflect the desire and the wish of the overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations—and particularly the States of Africa and Asia—to bring about the liberation of Namibia from the tyrannical domination of the South African racists and colonizers. At the same time, the Soviet delegation considers it necessary to stress that this resolution is inadequate in its nature and as regards the content of the measures it envisages for the achievement of this objective. We regard it as a purely interim or—one might even say—procedural resolution. It is obvious that it cannot in itself lead to a solution of the problem under discussion.

187. As many delegations have emphasized during the discussion, it is already high time to settle this important question in its substance. The Security Council could have contributed substantially and effectively to such a solution to this problem if there had been unanimity among all members of the Security Council, particularly among the permanent members of the Security Council—a unanimity which could have been expressed in the form of specific demands for the complete cessation of all economic, trade, transport and other relations with South Africa. The

⁸ See resolution 276 (1970).

resolution which has just been adopted contains merely an appeal to States to refrain only from certain forms of relationships. In the opinion of the Soviet delegation, the sub-committee whose establishment is provided for in the resolution which has just been adopted should therefore study very carefully not only the material on the discussion on this question in the Security Council—that is to say, the records of the Council—but also the very detailed and circumstantial material on the discussion of the question of Namibia during the General Assembly's session. There it is possible to find very many valuable ideas and proposals expressed in the course of this discussion both by the delegations of the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America and by the delegations of the countries of the socialist commonwealth. It will be useful for this sub-committee to study all these ideas and proposals, and draft an effective programme of measures for submission to the Security Council.

188. With regard to the provision in the resolution concerning the establishment of a sub-committee, the Soviet delegation believes that it might have been possible to do without a sub-committee of this kind. In other circumstances, if the attitude of certain delegations had been different, the Security Council might have been able to adopt an effective resolution, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII, Article 41, of the Charter of the United Nations, which would genuinely have contributed to the attainment of the objective for which we are met here today.

189. However, in view of the wishes of the sponsors of the draft and the fifty-seven States which requested the Security Council to discuss this question on an urgent basis, the Soviet delegation has decided at the present stage not only to refrain from objecting to this proposal but in fact to support it, particularly since the intention is to establish a sub-committee to carry out this important task—to carry out the important mission which has been entrusted to it—within a strictly limited period of time, before 30 April 1970. In this connexion, the Soviet delegation wishes to state its profound conviction that the membership of the sub-committee should include all members of the Security Council. This is the first point. It would also be advisable to settle this matter without delay, before the end of January under the presidency of our distinguished President, the representative of Burundi. This is the second point.

190. For all these reasons, and having regard to the fact that the resolution adopted by the Council will keep the question of Namibia before the Security Council, the Soviet delegation voted for this resolution, considering it as a step on the way to the adoption by the Council of more effective and genuinely productive measures to turn South Africa out of Namibia and liberate the Namibian people. This is the objective and the ardent wish of all the States and peoples of Asia and Africa, judging by the request which they addressed to the Security Council and judging also from the statements made by the representative of the States of these two continents during the discussion of this question.

191. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): There are no more names on the list of speakers. In my

capacity as President of the Council for this month, I hope that the Council will allow me to express my sincere gratitude for the atmosphere of co-operation which, from the beginning to the end, has characterized the work done under my presidency. A common concern has appeared with respect to this problem because it is in fact linked to other questions, as I have had occasion to state in my two interventions, namely, racial and colonial questions.

192. We are especially grateful to the members who do not usually vote in favour of draft resolutions of this nature for having joined the sponsors of the draft resolution and the other members of the Council who stood on the side of reason and justice. I hope that those members who associated themselves with us today will show the same courage, an at least equal determination and a spirit of just as close co-operation in seeking, together with us, and finding a final solution of this complex problem which is important for all mankind.

193. I also wish to thank the Afro-Asian delegations in general, and the African delegations in particular, which, while not members of the Security Council, have been constantly present here, even when we have met at such late hours as at present. We should like to appeal to them to continue to demonstrate this same spirit in the future when similar problems are debated in the Security Council, because this is proof of the genuine interest they all have in this question which is of such deep concern to us.

194. Before concluding, I should like, in view of the enthusiasm and energy that have characterized our work and which seem to me to deserve some consideration, to propose, in accordance with paragraph 6 of the resolution just adopted, that private consultations between the President and the other members of the Council be held this afternoon. May I, with the agreement of the Council, propose that these consultations begin at 4 p.m. in the office of the President of the Council?

195. Mr. MWAANGA (Zambia): I do not wish to reopen any subjects for discussion, but I respectfully suggest that the consultations be held at 4.30 p.m., in view of the lateness of the hour.

196. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The Council has heard the suggestion of the representative of Zambia. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Council agrees that the consultations take place this afternoon at 4.30 p.m.

197. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): I wanted to say that I would like you to consider that consultations have already taken place with the Soviet delegation, and that the Soviet delegation has expressed its view that all members of the Security Council should take part in the work of this sub-committee.

198. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I thank the representative of the Soviet Union. However, despite the views already expressed by the representative of the Soviet Union, the President would wish him to be good enough to participate in the consultations also, since the

views he has expressed and the consultations to be held are not incompatible, in my view.

199. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) *(translated from Russian)*: We shall try to reach agreement.

200. The PRESIDENT *(interpretation from French)*: Then I shall stand by my proposal that the consultations be held with all the members of the Security Council without

prejudice to the views already expressed by the representative of the Soviet Union.

201. As no other speaker has asked for the floor on the question of Namibia, we may consider that the debate on this item is concluded and the Council will continue to be seized of the question.

The meeting rose at 2.15 p.m.