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SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

TWENTY-FOURTH YEAR

1479th MEETING: 19 JUNE 1969

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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

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FOURTEEN HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-NINTH MEETING

Held in New York on Thursday, 19 June 1969, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. M. SOLANO LOPEZ (Paraguay).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Algeria, China, Colombia, Finland, France, Hungary, Nepal, Pakistan, Paraguay, Senegal, Spain, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Zambia.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1479)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia:

Letter dated 6 June 1969 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the representatives of Afghanistan, Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Democratic Republic of), Cyprus, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Southern Yemen, Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia and Zambia (S/9237 and Add.1-2)

Reports of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) (S/8954 and S/9252).

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia

Letter dated 6 June 1969 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the representatives of Afghanistan, Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Democratic Republic of), Cyprus, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Southern Yemen, Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United

Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia and Zambia (S/9237 and Add.1-2)

Reports of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) (S/8954 and S/9252)

1. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): In accordance with the Council's previous decisions, and with its consent, I shall invite the representatives of Mauritania, the United Republic of Tanzania, Guinea, Somalia, India, Sudan and Saudi Arabia to participate in the debate on the question before us, without the right to vote.

2. Because the space available around the Council table is limited, in accordance with the practice followed in the past in similar cases I shall invite these representatives to occupy the seats which have been reserved for them, on the understanding that when they have statements to make they will be invited to sit at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. S. A. Ould Daddah (Mauritania), Mr. A. B. C. Danieli (United Republic of Tanzania), Mr. A. Touré (Guinea), Mr. A. A. Farah (Somalia), Mr. S. Sen (India), Mr. M. Fakhreddine (Sudan) and Mr. J. M. Baroody (Saudi Arabia) took the seats reserved for them in the Council chamber.

3. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): The Security Council will now continue its consideration of the question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia.

4. A draft resolution has been submitted by five States—Algeria, Nepal, Pakistan, Senegal and Zambia [S/9270]; it was distributed in all the working languages of the Council a few minutes ago.

5. The first speaker on my list is the representative of Algeria, who will introduce the draft resolution on behalf of its five co-sponsors. I call upon him now.

6. Mr. RAHAL (Algeria) (*translated from French*): By this stage in our discussions, the Security Council has heard the views of all its members. The delegations that have spoken since the beginning of this session have all emphasized the gravity of the situation in Rhodesia. They have referred to the inadequate results of application of the policy of economic sanctions and of the other measures called for in Security Council resolution 253 (1968). They have reaffirmed the responsibility of the United Kingdom for the aggravation of the situation in this part of Africa, and have

all expressed the need for the Council to adopt firm and effective measures to bring down the racist régime of Southern Rhodesia and preserve the rights of the people of Zimbabwe.

7. On behalf of Nepal, Pakistan, Senegal, Zambia and Algérie, I have the honour to introduce to the Council a draft resolution contained in document S/9270 of 19 June 1969. Our introductory statement will be brief, as the draft is self-explanatory. It corresponds to the statements made by its sponsors and by other delegations that have taken part in our debate, and in particular by those of the African States. We should like to draw attention more especially to certain factors which appear to us fundamentally important in this grave question now before the Council.

8. The preamble of the draft resolution recalls the earlier resolutions adopted on this question and reaffirms that the situation in Southern Rhodesia constitutes a threat to international peace and security, thus emphasizing the responsibility of the Council, whose main task is to maintain that peace and that security.

9. Again in the preamble, the sponsors express their grave concern that several States, in particular South Africa and Portugal, have not fully complied with the measures taken by the Security Council. Moreover, they are firmly convinced—as they have always been—that the primary responsibility for bringing about the conditions in which the people of Zimbabwe can freely exercise their right of self-determination and independence devolves upon the United Kingdom as the administering Power. Inasmuch as the United Kingdom has failed to act effectively to put an end to the minority régime, it must be held responsible for the deterioration of this situation with its tragic consequences for the Zimbabwe people.

10. As in the Council's earlier decisions, the sponsors of the draft have been concerned to reaffirm the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of Zimbabwe for the freedom and independence of their country.

11. Lastly, the preamble draws attention to the need to take into account reports of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968).

12. As we have already stated, these reports show that the measures considered in resolution 253 (1968) have not achieved the desired results, first because certain Member States continue to trade with the Smith régime, and secondly because South Africa and Portugal have refused to respect the Security Council's decisions.

13. In accordance with the decisions so far adopted by the Council, which has stressed the primary responsibility of the Government of the United Kingdom for the deterioration of the situation in Southern Rhodesia, and because of the failure of the measures taken previously, we urgently request the Council to adopt in conformity with the Charter, particularly with its Chapter VII, effective measures to put an end to the minority régime of Southern Rhodesia.

14. The course of action recommended in the operative part of our draft briefly is dictated by three main factors.

15. First, the sanctions which the Council decided upon earlier have proved inadequate. In view of this failure, the Council must now agree on effective measures for complete and mandatory sanctions, and to that end request all States to sever all economic and other relations, as prescribed by Article 41 of the Charter.

16. Second, experience has shown that it is not enough for this Council to decide on such measures without at the same time considering what measures must be taken to prevent any action aimed at hampering its efforts. Obviously the present situation in Southern Rhodesia is perpetuated by the support, overt or covert, of South Africa and Portugal; and since neither Lisbon nor Pretoria shows any readiness to change its attitude, the Council should not merely condemn them for their act of defiance but also take measures against them in conformity with the provisions of the Charter.

17. It is also incumbent on the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, to take all the necessary steps to end the minority régime. The Council should urgently call upon the United Kingdom to use all the means at its disposal, including force, to enable the people of Zimbabwe to exercise their right of self-determination and independence. The United Nations and the international community will undoubtedly help to speed up this process, but redress for the damage caused to the people of Zimbabwe is the responsibility of the United Kingdom.

18. Those, then, are the main elements which form the basis of the recommendations in our draft resolution for the course of action to be taken.

19. I cannot conclude this brief statement without reiterating our conviction that the cause of the people of Zimbabwe, who are fighting for their freedom, is a just one and, with the help of all countries that love peace and justice, will triumph in the end.

20. With these explanations I submit to the Council the draft resolution presented by Nepal, Pakistan, Senegal, Zambia and Algeria [S/9270] for consideration and approval.

21. As the text has been distributed in all the official languages of the Council, I do not think I need read it out. Nevertheless, I should like to draw the Council's attention to an error which has crept into operative paragraph 3. In the distributed text operative paragraph 3 reads: "*Decides* that all Member States shall sever immediately all economic and other relations . . .". The word "Member" should be deleted, so that operative paragraph 3 will now read: "*Decides* that all States shall sever immediately all economic and other relations . . .".

22. Mr. KHATRI (Nepal): The representative of Algeria has just introduced a draft resolution on behalf of the co-sponsors. As he has so admirably stated, the draft resolution reflects the principal points of view expressed during the debates by representatives around this table. All members of the Security Council have taken part fully in the discussions on the situation in Southern Rhodesia. In addition to the members of the Council, a large number of

representatives from Asian and African States have contributed their wisdom by participating in the debates. We are grateful to those representatives for the real concern shown by them over the situation that now prevails in southern Africa. Each of those representatives has, with the greatest degree of clarity and objectivity, brought home to the Security Council the urgency and magnitude of the problem we are facing.

23. The report of the sanctions Committee and the current discussions in the Council leave no particle of doubt in our minds that the measures taken so far have failed miserably. There is also no doubt whatsoever about the reasons for their failure. It has also been proved beyond any doubt that the racist minorities in southern Africa have been trying to perpetuate their hated régimes and the policies of discrimination among human beings. They are isolating themselves from the general trend of civilization and the march of history. But it is a pity that they are assured of their own resources and of material co-operation from various quarters which they need to keep them in power.

24. Moreover, the African and Asian representatives have underlined the real risk of a bitter and prolonged conflict between races which the policies of the racist régimes portend in Africa. A continent is being divided on serious racial and human-rights questions. The supporters of this criminal policy can no longer camouflage themselves.

25. It is high time the Security Council acted in order to put an end to this situation. It is also high time the Council, with one voice, recognized that the measures it has taken so far have failed and that stronger measures are required. It is in recognition of this fact and in the belief that the situation can still be averted that the African and Asian members of the Council have submitted the present draft resolution, of which my delegation has the honour to be a co-sponsor.

26. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): Before calling upon the next speaker on my list, I would inform the Council that the Secretariat has taken note of the error in operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution to which the Algerian representative drew attention on behalf of the co-sponsors, and it will take the necessary action.¹

27. Lord CARADON (United Kingdom): First, if I may, I wish to say a word to the Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry of Algeria. I understand that he is to return to his country tonight, and, therefore, we may not have another opportunity to thank him very warmly for coming to join us in our debate. He will not be surprised when I tell him that there are some things he has said with which I cannot fully agree, but I should also like to say that I, like other members of this Council, have been greatly impressed by the restraint, vigour and persuasiveness with which he has spoken to us in this Council. We thank him for coming and we shall remember him with admiration in this Council in future.

28. I do not propose this afternoon to endeavour to comment on the draft resolution that has just been

presented to us. I may have other opportunities to do so. Nevertheless, it may be helpful to the Council if I speak again at this stage. I wish to speak on one question, the question which must be uppermost in all our minds: what can be done—not what can be felt or said. We deal with issues on which many of us feel intensely. Certainly I make no complaint if there is strong language; it would be astonishing if there were not. What I wish to do at this stage is to turn from strong feelings and strong language to direct our attention to the single practical question of what can be done. I shall do so as clearly as I can.

29. This is no time for anything but very plain speaking. All of us have had to ask ourselves this question many times in recent years. I have certainly done so. It has been a question constantly in my mind: what can be done? Can Rhodesia be invaded by a British army? Can a trade embargo and a naval blockade of all southern Africa be mounted? Should the policy of economic sanctions against Rhodesia be continued and intensified? Let me take those three main questions.

30. We have heard a number of speeches calling on the United Kingdom to use force against Rhodesia. On this issue I know there has been strong feeling, but that strong feeling is, I believe, partly based on a lack of understanding. Comparisons made in our debate have shown the extent of that misunderstanding. The misunderstanding of the military and practical factors in the minds of some speakers is so serious that they even compare the situation in southern Africa with that in Anguilla. This suggests extraordinary misconceptions. Comparisons have been made between Rhodesia and other British colonial Territories where force has been used in the past to deal with disorder or violence. But there has been no recognition of the fact that the situation in Rhodesia has been and is quite different from that in the other Territories which have been named.

31. Since Rhodesia was first formed as a self-governing colony in 1923 there has never been a British army there. Nor since that time has there been any British official in administrative authority there. In these respects Rhodesia has been self-governing, with its own forces, for nearly half a century. What is the importance of that? It means that it is not a question of merely deciding to adopt a new local policy or of taking local action in order to maintain order as we did in colonies which Britain administered. It is a question of an invasion—an invasion in the middle of a continent. It is a question of starting a war. We know that once force is used escalation can easily ensue. We know that the results of violent action are incalculable. We cannot tell where force would lead. We all know that it is much easier to start a war than to end one. At least we are entitled to expect recognition of the fact that those of us who are against starting a conflict are serious and sincere in our reluctance to resort to force.

32. It should not be regarded as strange or even unusual in this Council, charged with the responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security and with the peaceful settlement of disputes, when we defend our opposition to starting a war. We have seen so many examples in the world of the results of violence and force that some of us may be forgiven for believing that, rather than the use of force,

¹ See document S/9270/Rev.1.

every possible alternative should first be explored—explored in peace and explored to the end.

33. Since the demand is that my country should undertake the military expedition, since the demand is that a British army should start this war, we have a right to be consulted and we have a right to be heard.

34. I come to the second question: Can sanctions be extended to apply to Portugal and South Africa? Can a trade boycott, backed as it would have to be by a naval blockade of all southern Africa, be mounted? Here I ask the indulgence of the Council in this most important and difficult matter. I have never failed to make my position and the position of my Government clear. I did so first as long ago as 1965. Then, speaking in the Special Political Committee on the question of *apartheid*, I carefully set out the considerations which my Government has to bear in mind, considerations which we cannot possibly overlook or disregard.

35. I have on subsequent occasions, in the General Assembly and in this Council, referred to that statement of our position and of our policy. Since I have never sought to avoid answering these awkward questions, since I have never tried to detract from what I said then, I ask the permission of the Council to go over again what I said as long ago as 1 December 1965. These are the factors, the considerations, which have to be remembered. They cannot be ignored. They had to be taken into account four years ago. They certainly cannot be set aside today. This is what I said in the Special Political Committee in 1965:

“I turn now to refer to the financial and economic stake which the United Kingdom has in South Africa. It is true that strong economic ties between my country and South Africa have grown up over a century or more. The development of South Africa has been undertaken mainly with British capital, and the economies of Great Britain and South Africa are, consequently, to a considerable extent, mutually dependent. This is no new development. Indeed, new British capital investment in South Africa is now very small compared with the massive investment, [particularly] in mining enterprises, in past decades. Some thousand million pounds of British capital has been invested in South Africa [in the past]; British exports to South Africa now amount to about £220 million a year, and British imports from South Africa to about £150 million. The effect of cutting off trade with South Africa would be to create extensive unemployment in British industry, including the shipping industry; cause serious loss of trade at a time when it is essential to pursue a major effort to increase British exports, and, in addition to other widespread losses, could immediately worsen the British balance-of-payments position by something of the order of £300 million a year. The Expert Committee on Sanctions, and the Special Committee on *Apartheid* too, have drawn attention to such facts. It is right that they should be emphasized. They cannot be wished away, nor can their great importance be disregarded or forgotten.

“Having stated some of the main factors in the situation as my Government sees it and having referred to the policy which my Government has declared and acted

upon, we come to the question whether it is possible, as maintained by the Committee on *Apartheid*, to proceed at once to the extreme action of a full campaign of economic sanctions against South Africa backed, as it would have to be, by a large-scale naval blockade.

“I recognize the intensity of feeling and strong conviction with which the case for immediate enforcement action is presented. I make no complaint if, arising from that intensity of feeling, accusations are made against my Government or even if our motives are misunderstood. We respect the strong views and the strong language to which we have listened. At the same time, everyone, I believe, will respect equal frankness from us. I do not expect everyone to agree, but I trust that the Committee will prefer me to speak bluntly, and to say that legally, financially, economically and politically my Government is unable to agree that a situation now exists in which we could justify the extreme action which has been advocated.

“... ”

“Let me say that I greatly hope that natural feelings of impatience and frustration and anger will not lead us to disputes among ourselves which could do no good to the people we want to help, and which could give comfort only to the South African Government. I trust that it will be recognized that the object we all have of achieving a change in South African policy will not be won by demanding what cannot at present be carried out or by creating divisions among ourselves, divisions which could only give comfort to those whose policies we so strongly condemn.

“I ask the Committee to face and accept the legal and economic and political and international facts of the situation. We must accept the fact that... in the circumstances of South Africa anything less than a major economic and strategic blockade would fail to achieve the required result. We must accept the fact that, as far as my country is concerned, it is impossible, at present, to go beyond the arms embargo which we have already imposed. We must accept the fact, moreover, that a full campaign of economic sanctions backed by a blockade would require resources beyond the present capacity of our Organization.”²

36. I do not wish to vary or detract from what I said then. I make no excuse for going back to what I said more than four years ago. The same considerations, the same factors, still apply. They apply with at least equal effect. My country is no better placed now to face military and economic wars than it was in 1965. Improvement of our international trade is still absolutely vital to us. It is still true that seriously to damage our trading and balance-of-payments position at this time would do us irreparable economic harm.

37. What then can be done? I come to the third question. Should the policy of economic sanctions against Rhodesia

² Quoted from the unofficial verbatim text; see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Special Political Committee, 472nd meeting, paras. 23-24.*

be continued and, if possible, intensified? I repeat what I said in this Council before. This is not the time to give up. It is the time to press on. I have much resented implications in this Council that my country has not strictly observed the sanctions which have been applied at our initiative and at our insistence. No country has done more. My country has borne a heavy share of the sacrifice. No country has been more scrupulous in giving effect to the decisions of this Council from the beginning, and including the unanimous decision of the Council taken in May last year.

38. We have promised that there will be no going back. I repeat again what my Foreign Secretary has said: "We must resolve to pursue steadily the present course of denying recognition and maintaining sanctions against an illegal régime which denies human rights." We shall play our full part.

39. Not only have we applied sanctions to the full, but in the Committee on Sanctions we have taken the lead in the work of closing gaps and tightening control. As our reports to the Committee on Sanctions have shown, there is still an important volume of trade flowing between Rhodesia and States which have supported the Council's measures, estimated, as the representative of Algeria reminded us yesterday, at no less than £44 million. This flow should be stopped. The pressure on the illegal régime should not be relaxed; it should be intensified. We are ready to consider with others whatever measures of intensification can be shown to be effective. These are the practical and urgent questions to which we should direct our consultations.

40. I make no excuse for saying that it is a hard and indeed a slow process on which we are engaged; but there is no other effective course open to us. This is the course which we should relentlessly pursue.

41. Tomorrow in Rhodesia the minority referendum is to take place. Then the minority will decide whether it wishes to go forward to political isolation and international ostracism and economic stagnation. If they so decide, they should know that they do so in the face of universal condemnation and a reaffirmed refusal of recognition and with the weight of sanctions continuing and increasing upon them.

42. That is the message which should go from this Council. I still hope and strongly advocate that it should be unanimous and that our Governments should then proceed to undertake the consultations to which we are all committed.

43. Permit me, Mr. President, to say a few words for myself. We here speak not for ourselves but for our Governments. So it must be, and so it should be. But I myself have long been involved in these problems in southern Africa, and I once had the honour of being appointed by the Secretary-General to give advice, with others, on those problems. Before that, I resigned from my position as an Ambassador here because I disagreed with my Government at that time. I disagreed on the issue of the need to consult all the people of Rhodesia on their constitutional future. Permit me to say that I would not have hesitated to resign again rather than be associated with any dishonourable settlement in Rhodesia which offended against the principles of consultation and consent. But permit me also to say that I do not disagree with the two main decisions which today I defend, the decision that the United Kingdom cannot now send an army to start a war in southern Africa and the decision that the United Kingdom cannot now justify an economic war against southern Africa.

44. As I have said, these are hard facts and hard decisions. But they are facts which have to be faced. None of us can run away from them.

45. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): As no other representative has asked to speak, I propose with the Council's consent to declare the meeting closed.

46. In accordance with the consultations that have taken place, the next meeting of the Security Council for the purpose of continuing its consideration of the situation in Southern Rhodesia will be held on Monday next at 3.30 p.m. I trust that members of the Council will make the fullest use of the time available between now and then to hold consultations.

The meeting rose at 5.5 p.m.

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