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1466th MEETING: 27 MARCH 1969

NEW YORK

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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/. . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements of the Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

FOURTEEN HUNDRED AND SIXTY-SIXTH MEETING

Held in New York on Thursday, 27 March 1969, at 10.30 a.m.

President: Mr. Károly CSATORDAY (Hungary).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Algeria, China, Colombia, Finland, France, Hungary, Nepal, Pakistan, Paraguay, Senegal, Spain, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Zambia.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1466)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. Letter dated 26 March 1969 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/9113).

Adoption of the agenda

1. The PRESIDENT: The provisional agenda for this morning's meeting is before the Council in document S/Agenda/1466.

2. The meeting has been convened in accordance with the urgent request addressed to me yesterday afternoon by the Permanent Representative of Jordan, copies of which have been circulated in document S/9113.

3. Just a moment ago I received a communication from the Permanent Representative of Israel, copies of which will be circulated provisionally as soon as possible,¹ also requesting an urgent meeting of the Council. It seems to me that the Council may wish to add this new letter as item 3 of the agenda for this meeting.

4. Mr. YOST (United States of America): I understand that it has been the practice of the Council, since 1967, in discussing various aspects of the Middle East situation to head its agenda "The situation in the Middle East", and then to enter under that general heading whatever letter or letters might have been submitted. I would think that that was a very wise procedure and avoided repetition. It is certainly clear that these various aspects of the situation are so closely linked that it is impossible to deal sensibly with one without getting into other aspects.

5. I therefore should like to suggest that in the light of this new letter to which you refer, Mr. President, our provisional agenda be amended so that item 2 would be "The situation in the Middle East", and thereunder as sub-

headings would appear a reference to the two letters which have been received.

6. The PRESIDENT: To reply very briefly to the remarks made by the representative of the United States, I wish to point out that the practice of the Security Council has not always been the same. There have been several instances in which the different complaints have been combined, and there have also been instances when they have been dealt with separately, as different agenda items, as on the last such occasion—which was on 29 December 1968—in document S/Agenda 1460/Rev.1. Thus, there are precedents for both courses of action, and that is why the President suggested that the letter of the Permanent Representative of Israel be included as item 3. But I leave this question to the members of the Council.

7. Does anyone else wish to make observations concerning this question?

8. Mr. AZZOUT (Algeria) (*translated from French*): The agenda now before the Security Council is correct, in our opinion, in the sense that the delegation of Jordan wished to draw the Council's attention to a specific point, namely, the aggression which his country has suffered. It is true that for the past two years the item on the agenda has been entitled "The situation in the Middle East", but for eighteen years the item on the Security Council's agenda was always entitled "The Palestine question". I do not see why the agenda which we are considering today should not be labelled "The Palestine question".

9. On the second matter—that of putting the two letters on the same footing—the Algerian delegation would like to draw attention to the terms of the meeting's agenda as you have presented it, Mr. President. The Algerian delegation is aware that to some extent a practice has developed in the Council of combining in a single document the agenda item and the letters submitted to the Council asking for it to convene in order to put an end to a dispute or a situation likely to endanger international peace. Nevertheless, while my delegation understands the usefulness of a procedure which makes it possible to bring together in a single document all the information before us relating to a situation endangering international peace, it would like to point out that this procedure has the effect of giving equal status to the legitimate complaint which Jordan has submitted to the Council and the delaying tactics of Israel, which have now become habitual and are calculated to create the feeling in the Council that the victim shares with the aggressor responsibility for the serious events which we have been convened to consider. It is for this reason that we

¹ Subsequently distributed as document S/9114.

would have preferred to have two completely separate items. We are prepared, however, to accept your suggestion, Mr. President.

0. The PRESIDENT: It seems that no more members of the Council wish to speak on this subject.

11. I have taken note of the suggestion of the representative of the United States, and also of the remarks made by the representative of Algeria, and I still feel that there is no overriding rule that would prescribe that the Council should act in one way or the other. Rule 7 of the provisional rules of procedure states:

“The provisional agenda for each meeting of the Security Council shall be drawn up by the Secretary-General and approved by the President of the Security Council.”

12. The provisional agenda was drawn up and approved by the President. In view of the lateness of the submission of the letter of the representative of Israel it had to be added later, and the suggestion of the President was to include it as item 3. I hope that there will be no need to take a formal decision on the matter, since previously this practice has not caused any difficulty in discussing the item under consideration. I am quite convinced that this time we can also proceed smoothly and without any difficulty by having the three items on our agenda.

13. Mr. YOST (United States of America): Mr. President, of course, when the original agenda was drawn up with your approval, the second letter had not been received. But in the light of the receipt of that second letter and of the considerations which I put forward—and I should like to emphasize that I would certainly find it difficult if not impossible, as I think many other members of the Council might also, to discuss the subject raised in one of those letters without getting into the subject raised in the other—I should like to propose formally that item 2 of our agenda should read as follows:

“The situation in the Middle East:

“(a) Letter dated 26 March 1969 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan addressed to the President of the Security Council.

“(b) Letter dated 27 March 1969 from the Permanent Representative of Israel addressed to the President of the Security Council”.

14. Sir Leslie GLASS (United Kingdom): I am asking for the floor on a point of clarification, Mr. President. You have rightly pointed out that there were different precedents about how the items were set in order. But there was also the question on which the precedent is always the same, that we start with the title “The situation in the Middle East”, and I was not sure what you had decided on that matter. In adopting the agenda we must look at the over-all implications of the way the agenda is set out, and my delegation would not wish the proper duty of this Council to consider the situation generally to be considered as limited in any way. Therefore I myself would like to say again, not formally, that the heading “The situation in the Middle East” is a proper heading. You have not given your views on that subject, Mr. President.

15. Mr. AZZOUT (Algeria) (*translated from French*): For the reasons which I tried to explain a few moments ago, the Algerian delegation is obliged to oppose the merging of the two letters under the same item of the agenda.

16. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): In your clarifications to the Council, Mr. President, you showed quite convincingly that there is no prescribed or uniform manner of including items in the Security Council’s agenda or any rigid rule that must be followed in drawing up the agenda and listing the items on it.

17. You mentioned quite convincingly the precedent of last December, when the complaints, statements or communications addressed to the Security Council by the Permanent Representative of one of the Arab countries and the Permanent Representative of Israel were included in the agenda as separate items. However, each of those items was preceded by the title “The situation in the Middle East”. I imagine that it would be possible, in view of what has been said here, to agree on a compromise based on the December precedent, and if any member of the Security Council insists that the words “The situation in the Middle East” should appear in the agenda, we might insert the words “The situation in the Middle East” in both item 2 and item 3.

18. In that way we would abide by the precedent we established at the Security Council meeting of 29 December and we would resolve the procedural problem to everyone’s satisfaction, avoiding a long procedural debate and enabling us to proceed to the substantive consideration of the most serious and important matter which has been brought before the Security Council.

19. The PRESIDENT: There are now three alternatives before the Council. The last of these has been proposed by the representative of the Soviet Union. It is identical with a procedure already followed by the Council, so there is a precedent for it. It also meets the suggestion of the representative of the United States in that it gives the heading of the item to both letters separately, namely “The situation in the Middle East”.

20. If the representative of the United States could accept that suggestion, we could then, of course, avoid a formal decision and the agenda could be issued in the form proposed by the representative of the Soviet Union.

21. Mr. YOST (United States of America): I would be prepared to accept the suggestion of the representative of the Soviet Union on the understanding—which is also in accordance, I believe, with the precedent—that each speaker may feel free in his remarks to deal with all items of the agenda. In this connexion I might quote the statement of the President of the Council at the December meeting which has been referred to. He said, in response to the representative of Canada:

“...I should like to say that it is my understanding that in their statements members of the Council may refer to any part of the agenda as it stands.” [*1460th meeting, para. 8.*]

22. If it is agreed that we follow the precedent set at that time, I should be happy to agree to the suggestion of the representative of the Soviet Union.

23. The PRESIDENT: I am glad to know that the representative of the United States is willing to accept the compromise proposal, made by the representative of the Soviet Union, to have the agenda drawn up in three items: first, "Adoption of the agenda"; second, "The situation in the Middle East: Letter dated 26 March 1969 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/9113)"; and third, "The situation in the Middle East: Letter dated 27 March 1969 from the Permanent Representative of Israel addressed to the President of the Security Council". The document number will be added. In this form we can issue the agenda and start the discussion, with the understanding that speakers may refer to any aspect of the items under discussion so far as it is relevant to the meaningful examination of the problem.

24. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that it is so decided.

The agenda, as amended, was adopted.

The situation in the Middle East

Letter dated 26 March 1969 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/9113)

The situation in the Middle East

Letter dated 27 March 1969 from the Permanent Representative of Israel addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/9114)

25. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the provisional rules of procedure and with the normal practice of the Council when dealing with the question before it, I propose now, if I hear no objection, to invite the representatives of Jordan and Israel to take places at the Council table in order to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. M. H. El-Farra (Jordan) and Mr. Y. Tekoah (Israel) took places at the Council table.

26. The PRESIDENT: The first speaker whose name is inscribed on my list is the representative of Jordan. I now call on him.

27. Mr. EL-FARRA (Jordan): Let me at the very outset express the gratitude of my Government and my delegation to you, Mr. President, for convening this urgent meeting of the Security Council. We are also grateful to the members of the Council who, unanimously and without exception, realizing the urgency of this question, endorsed the need to convene the meeting.

28. We have had good reasons to come to the Security Council before today because Israel has never relented in its madness of power. The fact that we have not come before the Council for some time is not because Israel stopped its acts of madness, but because of our desire to create conditions conducive to the success of peaceful efforts. This peace-loving attitude, however, has in no way deterred the Israeli arrogance of power.

29. It is not my intention to put before the Council a detailed study of the daily Israeli attacks on Jordan. Shelling our villages in the North has become a daily practice of the Israeli armed forces. We on the East Bank of Jordan no longer have mornings without deaths; on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip many of the people no longer have evenings without imprisonment, torture and slaughter. And every passing day carries with it more destruction, bloodshed and insecurity, more threats to the economic life of our Christian and Moslem Jordanian citizens. This is often escalated by cowardly raids by Israeli military aircraft carrying out bombing, rocketing and strafing. The sending of waves of Israeli jet fighter-bombers deep into Jordanian territory has become an official policy arrogantly proclaimed by the Israeli authorities.

30. The Israeli attacks during the last three months culminated in a massive and concerted attack from the air and the land against civilian centres and means of communication. Israeli raids have extended deep inside Jordan territory—they have reached the capital of Amman—to murder civilians and destroy bridges. These Israeli acts of aggression were the subject of my letter of 2 December 1968 [S/8911]; for, on 1 December 1968, Israeli armed forces embarked on a concerted attack using machine-guns, tanks, field artillery and military aircraft against the villages of Samma, Taibih Shunah Shomaliya Manshiya and Al-Bogourah. The city of Irbid in the North was also subjected to heavy shelling.

31. All these brutal Israeli attacks in the North happened at the same time that Israeli units were penetrating deep inside Jordanian territory in the South, in direct violation of the cease-fire resolutions and in utter disregard of the Armistice Agreement. Israeli jet fighters taking part in this raid bombed a convoy of civilian trucks on the main highway between Amman and the port of Aqaba, killing two Saudi Arabian civilians and injuring three others. A fourth civilian, a Jordanian, was wounded. The six Saudi Arabian trucks were completely destroyed. Having destroyed life, Israeli armed units landed from helicopters, under the protection of jet fighters, and proceeded to their targets. They destroyed two bridges; one a highway bridge connecting the Port of Aqaba with the capital of Jordan, and the other a Hijazi railway bridge. However, on 2 December 1968—and this is an additional attack—Israeli military aircraft bombed the area of Kufer Yoba and killed two soldiers and seriously wounded two men and a child.

32. These Israeli naked attacks and violations, grave in their motivation, scope and results, did not prompt my Government to request a meeting of the Security Council, a request that could have been justified by the Israeli raids and attacks of 1 and 2 December 1968; it simply brought a letter [ibid.].

33. But the Israelis and their leaders were not satisfied with the killing and destruction they wrought on 1 and 2 December. For they attacked again with more brutality on 3 December. The Israelis used the occupied Syrian Golan Heights to shell the villages of Kum, Kufur Asad and Samma. Their shelling soon spread to cover the whole northern part of the Jordan valley, including again the shelling of the city of Irbid itself, where ten houses were destroyed.

34. The village of Kufur Asad was subjected to brutal bombing by waves of Israeli military aircraft. Reports on this raid indicate that thirty civilians were killed and more injured, most of them elderly people, women and children. Forty houses were destroyed. It took the Israeli air force only thirty minutes to destroy what these people had been building for years and years. A. C. Forrest, who visited the village, said in an article published in the *Presbyterian Life* of 1 February 1969:

“A rocket had a direct hit on one house and penetrated through the air raid shelter below. It killed fourteen and injured eighteen others. Most of them were children and old people.”

He further said that the area attacked: “. . . is full of citrus orchards, and the plains around produce wheat and other cereals.” He added: “It is also possible that the Israeli raids are meant to intimidate and drive the Arabs out.”

35. Here again my Government did not request a meeting of the Security Council. We limited ourselves to sending another letter dated 3 December 1968 [S/8916].

36. Again on 4 December, and for the fourth consecutive day, Israeli forces continued to attack Jordan from the land and from the air. Israeli bombardment was extended to densely populated villages in the North.

37. From 11 December to 14 February 1969, seventy-six Israeli attacks were carried out against Jordanian citizens causing severe damage to their mosques, local markets and municipal and post office buildings, and to their means of livelihood. These attacks were reported to the Secretary-General in my letter dated 4 March 1969 contained in document S/9039. In many of these attacks napalm was used to burn the crops and destroy other agricultural equipment.

38. In the last six weeks, the Israelis intensified their daily raids against Jordan. Hardly a day passes without an Israeli raid being carried out against Jordanian civilians. Israel sends its planes in waves to destroy innocent human life and inflict property damage. Between 14 February and 21 March Israeli waves of fighter-bombers attacked villages, farms, towns and cities, nearly all over the East Bank of Jordan, not excluding the capital Amman. In their attacks, the Israelis bomb, rocket and strafe civilians and destroy their means of livelihood. Napalm was used in many of their raids and crops were burnt. Some of these attacks were reported to you, Sir, in my letters contained in documents S/9083 of 16 March and S/9085 of 17 March 1969.

39. Yesterday, at 14.30 hours local time, Israeli jets attacked rest houses and winter resorts in Ein Hazar, one kilometre from Es Salt City, less than thirteen miles from the capital of Jordan, Amman. These resorts are frequently visited by civilian Jordanian citizens. The main roads connecting the villages around Es Salt and the city itself were also raided, bombed and strafed. Heavy bombs and other destructive weapons were used.

40. These are places where travellers between the East Bank and the West Bank stop for refreshments before crossing the Jordan River. The raid was carried out by four Israeli fighters. It killed taxi drivers and many of their passengers who were relaxing for a while before continuing their trip. It destroyed the taxis and the trucks as well as six houses in the area. One elderly lady, Zarifa Abu Hum, who was also travelling from the West Bank but remained in the taxi because she could not walk to the rest house, is still in a coma in the hospital of Es Salt.

41. She was the only survivor in the group that had shared the taxi; the driver and the four other companions were killed instantly. A fifty-year-old road construction worker, Mohamed Kaddah, was carried to the same hospital in very serious condition. He escaped death only because he managed, despite a shattered leg, to crawl to safety fifty yards behind rocks. The other five companions who were working on the same road were killed. Two teenage students walking on the road reviewing their lessons on the way home were killed by the first bomb and rocket sent by the Israeli planes. Two children and two elderly women were among the dead. *The New York Times* reported that, according to information received, there were no military installations in the immediate area, and no anti-aircraft fire had been directed against the Israeli planes. *The New York Times* special report stated that:

“. . . for a distance of seventy-five yards, the road was marked by bomb craters and fallen cases of West Bank fruits and vegetables that are brought each day to Amman in the large Mercedes trucks favoured by Jordanians. Damaged trucks and cars were sitting on both sides of the road. There were signs that napalm had been used.”

42. Reuters reported this morning that, according to eye-witnesses, rockets from four Israeli planes damaged farm houses and destroyed six fruit and vegetable trucks.

43. After completing their brutal attack against helpless, innocent civilians, an Israeli spokesman publicly admitted the attack and arrogantly boasted that “the handful of Israeli planes had returned safely”.

44. As a result of these Israeli attacks, so far eighteen civilians have been killed and twenty-three wounded. Among those killed was an entire family from the Kuloob tribe and a twelve-year-old boy.

45. Many of the casualties were elderly women and children. Six houses and a number of trucks were destroyed. The attacks caused serious and heavy damage to the main roads linking the villages to the city of Es Salt. One of the rockets left a ten-metre-deep pit. Some have not exploded.

46. Mr. President, you may recall that in my letter of 16 March 1969 I reminded the Council that:

"... if the Israeli use of napalm and other destructive weapons in brutal defiance of the United Nations cease-fire resolution, is allowed to go unchecked, the Israelis will continue to embark upon more violations and acts of aggression." [S/9083.]

Yesterday, the Israelis launched another grave attack, causing heavy loss of life and damage to property.

47. The severe international condemnation of Israel, following its raid on Beirut Airport, prompted its leaders to think of a new policy to conduct its aggression. They wanted to keep up their attacks—or, rather, escalate them—and, at the same time, keep the attention of world public opinion away from the condemnation of their attacks.

48. Israel found this new policy in what its leaders euphemistically called "active self-defence". It is a new offensive policy of aggression, whereby Israel usually sends a few of its jet fighter-bombers deep inside Jordanian territory to hit, heavily and massively, civilian targets in the shortest possible time. They attack villages, refugee camps, towns and cities. They attack means of communication and destroy irrigation projects, as well as burn crops. Their techniques have become known. Israeli military aircraft bomb civilian targets heavily and then follow that up by rocketing and strafing; they end their short but indiscriminate and brutal raids by dropping time-bombs that explode when civilians gather to carry away their dead.

49. Mrs. Meir, the new Prime Minister, has made it clear that she intends to maintain this policy. Military leaders like to speak of their attacks and raids in terms of "lessons". The above attacks show clearly that what Israel follows is not "self-defence", but, rather, active aggression.

50. This is the complaint of Jordan. It shows that Israeli attacks have included almost all populated areas in the East Bank of Jordan, in the North and in the South. The attacks of last week reached the suburbs of Amman. The complaint shows, beyond doubt, a clear-cut act of aggression. It embodies clear evidence of Israeli defiance and a brutal challenge to all peaceful efforts of the Security Council, as well as of the big Powers.

51. It was not the intention of Jordan to come to the Council now. We certainly did not want to prejudice the peaceful efforts of the four permanent members of the Security Council. It has been the policy of Jordan to support and help any peaceful effort, and it was for this reason that my Government has never hesitated to co-operate with the United Nations efforts. We co-operated with the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Thalman; we co-operated with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Gussing; we co-operated, and continue to co-operate, with the Security Council; we co-operated, and shall continue to co-operate, with Ambassador Jarring. We shall certainly co-operate with the four permanent members of the Security Council, and wish them success. We encourage any effort to bring about peace with justice to our troubled area.

52. However, while this has been Jordan's position towards peaceful efforts, Israel has done everything possible to frustrate those efforts; they are using them as opportunities to satisfy their vicious designs.

53. You, Mr. President, and the members of the Security Council showed a genuine willingness to see peace in our area. You and the members of the Security Council came with the 22 November 1967 resolution for this purpose and it was adopted unanimously by this august body. We accepted your resolution. Israel did not do so and continued its acts of lawlessness. Time and again you condemned Israel and deplored its behaviour. Last December you solemnly warned Israel: "... that if such acts were to be repeated, the Council would have to consider further steps to give effect to its decisions" [resolution 262 (1968)]. Now, what is your answer to this latest brutal Israeli attack? With all due respect, I direct my question to the four permanent members of the Security Council. What are they going to do, having special responsibility under the Charter, to protect the rights of the farmers, the children, the aged and the refugees of Jordan, the right of those people to live in peace? What are they going to do now that it is clear that this Israeli act of aggression was calculated and intended to frustrate and undermine all their peaceful efforts? Israel sent its Foreign Minister, Mr. Eban, to visit certain capitals, to use all his talents of distortion and misrepresentation, as well as to use all the pressure groups in the capitals he visited, in order to dynamite the efforts of the Big Four. Apparently he did not succeed. And he was given to understand that the Big-Power meeting would take place soon. So Mr. Eban rushed back home and on the same day we were attacked. Our innocent men, women and children were murdered in cold blood. Why? And why now? And why that campaign of fake rumours and vicious propaganda directed only against Jordan and why only this week? Why all this tactic of distortion and evasion? The reason is very simple. What the Israelis could not achieve through Mr. Eban they tried to accomplish through bluff and deceit. But since all this did not work, the only remaining alternative to dynamite and frustrate the efforts of the Big Four is the resort to the old Israeli cowardly tactics. Therefore they resorted to bombing innocent civilians in Jordan.

54. That being the case and since the four Powers are interested to see peace prevailing in the land of peace soon, their first duty, we submit, is to see to it that Israeli acts inspired by the arrogance of power are discontinued. We hope that they will take the initiative to see to it that all Israeli attempts to obstruct their efforts are checked. That is all the more so since what Israel is in effect telling the Big Four in advance is "Do not work for peace. Leave everything to us. We want either complete surrender according to our terms and conditions or continued war". Any accommodation of this Israeli arrogance will not bring peace. This complaint of Jordan's poses a challenge and a test to the Security Council, but particularly to its four permanent members. It poses a challenge to our friends and colleagues, the permanent representatives of the four big Powers on the Security Council. Their action and possible initiative today will determine the way to the future. If no adequate and effective measure is taken now, the Security Council will face more conflicts in our troubled area. Unless

adequate action under Chapter VII of the Charter is adopted now, more and more Israeli acts of madness and lawlessness will follow. This can be predicted because we are dealing with Zionists who are intoxicated by their victory, blinded by their arrogance of power and encouraged both by the delivery of more arms which are being used to accommodate their aggression and by the lack of adequate action by the Security Council. The arrogance of power has blinded their minds. Ironically they are proud of their acts but their acts evoke shame, not pride. We find consolation in the fact that the Israelis do not speak for all Jews everywhere.

55. Unless Israeli aggression is arrested, the task of the Big Four will become more difficult. Inaction invites disaster since our people will not be intimidated by Israeli terror or submit to the Israeli will. If the efforts of the Big Four for peace are to succeed, they are advised to use their influence and weight to stop the Israeli acts calculated to frustrate their efforts—efforts for peace, and we want peace.

56. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Israel.

57. Mr. TEKOAH (Israel): For twenty centuries the Jewish people has struggled to preserve its existence in the face of imperialist conquest, dispersion and persecution. For twenty years the reborn Jewish State has strived to safeguard its existence and independence in the face of Arab war. Through these years Israel has succeeded to repel the Arab invasion of 1948, to beat off the Egyptian terror offensive in the fifties, and destroy in 1956, the Fedayeen bases in Gaza and Sinai; and, in the sixties, to withstand repeated onslaughts from the territory of Jordan and from Syria, carried on under the guise of a "people's war", to ward off the concerted campaign of all the Arab States in 1967 aimed at Israel's destruction and the annihilation of its people. Yet, despite the Security Council cease-fire which called for an end to "all military activities in the area", Arab military aggression goes on unabated. The war against Israel continues. President Nasser declares that this is only the beginning. In Damascus the cry is that there will be no rest until Israel is completely shattered. From Baghdad comes total rejection of any pacific settlement. From Amman, Prime Minister Rifai only yesterday uttered a call for intensified terror operations in co-ordination between the regular armed forces and the terror organizations. The cease-fire is persistently violated by regular forces and irregular commandos. Warfare against Israel is pursued with vehemence and indiscriminate cruelty, and in the absence of effective United Nations action Israel has no choice but to defend itself.

58. This is what happened on the morning of 26 March when Israel took action to disable terror bases in Jordanian territory.

59. Since 20 January 1969, there has been a marked upsurge in terror warfare. More than 200 sabotage raids and firing attacks across the cease-fire line have been recorded, leaving out of account the incessant attacks by the Egyptian army in the Suez Canal sector and the acts of mining in its vicinity perpetrated by Egyptian soldiers and agents. The majority of these terror acts were carried out

by terror squads and in particular by El-Fatah. They included attacks by small arms, mortar, bazooka, and Katyushka fire, on the Israeli villages of Daganya, Newe Ur, Bet-Yosef, Kinneret, Poriyya, Sedom, Ne'ot Hakikar, Timna and Mizpe-Ramon; sabotage raids with grenades and explosives, directed against civilians; incidents of mining; and six clashes with terror units in which seventeen saboteurs were killed and six captured.

60. During the last month, these attacks have resulted in eight Israelis being killed and sixty-one wounded. One of these was a United Nations Observer injured in the explosion in the supermarket in Jerusalem.

61. Conspicuous during this period is the increase in acts of aggression along the Israel-Jordan cease-fire line.

62. Jordan's role in warfare by terror against the people of Israel is a major one, since Jordanian territory serves as the main jumping-off ground for attacks against Israel. Jordan is the central base of the terror operations. The terror organizations' units are free to roam the country, to cross the Jordan River for raids into Israel, and enjoy full protection on the part of the regular Jordanian army.

63. The main terror organizations maintain headquarters, branches, recruiting offices and bases in Jordan. According to the *Washington Post* of 29 December 1968, "...el-Fatah's headquarters [is], a villa near the American Embassy directly across the street from the Royal Jordanian Automobile Club". El-Fatah's recruiting office is located in Amman, in the refugee camp Hussein in Jabel Hussein, near the mosque and the UNRWA school.

64. *Time* magazine of 13 December 1968 reports that the headquarters of the Palestine Liberation Organization is also situated in Amman. The Palestine Liberation Office recruiting office is on as-Salt Street. It contains nine rooms, under the title of two attorneys.

65. The recruiting office of Ghabhat el-Fida el-Qawmi is in Wadi Seer Street, near the central post office.

66. The headquarters of the Egyptian Commando Battalion No. 141, which operates from Jordan and its recruiting office are situated in Amman, at Jabel Amman near the Intercontinental Hotel in the vicinity of the Third Square.

67. Also in Amman, there is the liaison committee which co-ordinates operations between the Iraqi Expeditionary Force and the terror headquarters. The Committee is headed by an Iraqi colonel by the name of Muhammad Sarsuf.

68. The Palestine Liberation Popular Front maintains a branch in Jordan's capital.

69. The main terror bases are in the as-Salt area, in Karameh; Dibin, about 8 kilometres west of Gerash el-Bayaa, near Amman; Al-yadúdah approximately 10 kilometres south of Amman and Dabrat, approximately 12 kilometres south of Shubek; and in particular in the Iraqi Expeditionary force camps near Mafrak and Irbid. Other

bases are scattered here and there in the vicinity of the Jordanian Army camps. The administration and the policing in those camps are in the hands of the Jordanian authorities. Officers of the Jordanian Legion take part in training the raiders.

70. On 16 November 1968 an agreement was reached regulating relations between the Jordanian Government and the commando organizations. That much publicized agreement was destined to regularize the mutual relationship between the Government of Amman and the terror units and give the saboteurs clear licence to violate the cease-fire with Jordan's approval. The agreement makes no mention of the fact that Israel and Jordan have a cease-fire agreement. The arrangements in the agreement implicate Jordan to such a degree that nobody can delude himself any longer about the Jordanian Government's responsibility for violating the cease-fire.

71. Among the most important articles of that agreement are the following:

(1) The terrorists are forbidden to shell targets in Israel from Jordanian Army gun positions. They are permitted to shell from their own positions.

(2) When the terrorists want to strike directly at targets in Israel they should select them at least ten kilometres west of the cease-fire line, not on the line itself.

(3) The terrorists must mount no operations from within Aqaba town.

72. These, and other details, were published by the Egyptian Middle East News Agency on 19 November 1968.

73. Two weeks after the signing of the agreement the Lebanese daily *el-Nahar* wrote:

"Jordanian newspapers published on 27 November 1968 an announcement by the forces of el-Saiqa. The announcement stated that one group of el-Saiqa commandos carried out terror operations in Israeli-held territory and returned to its base in Jordan under the cover of concentrated Jordanian fire."

This was the first time that Jordanian papers gave such details about co-ordination between the Jordanian Army and the terror organization.

74. The Manchester *Guardian* writes on 3 September 1968:

"Some of Jordan's best army officers . . . are playing an increasingly important role in the Palestinian guerrilla movement. They are the men who, in time, may give it the professional fibre which, in large measure, it still lacks."

75. Dana Adams Smith reported from Beirut, in *The New York Times* on 25 November 1968, that the arrangement between the Jordan Government and the terrorist organizations

"...gave the groups that had been operating extra-legally a semi-legal status and an acknowledged place in

the Jordanian state; it also left them free to carry on their guerrilla thrusts against the Israelis without interference or control by the Jordanian armed forces."

76. The total number of terror raids and other incidents in the Jordanian sector since the beginning of 1969 exceeded 100. Civilian settlements were shelled, patrols ambushed, vehicles mined and Israeli positions fired at, and raiders continued to cross the cease-fire line in order to commit murder and sabotage.

77. One of the serious aspects of the situation is that the raiders take up positions in established staging bases in Jordanian villages in an effort to embroil the civilian population in the consequent clashes. Despite this Israeli fire has never been directed against civilians, but against terrorist concentrations or terrorist positions from which fire had been opened against Israel.

78. Israel's toll along the cease-fire line since January has been eight soldiers killed and twenty-five wounded, among them four civilians.

79. The most serious incidents which occurred in the period under survey were the terror activities carried out by raiders inside populated centres. On 16 February a hand grenade was thrown in one of the streets of Nablus. Eight local inhabitants were injured as a result of the explosion. On 21 February an explosive charge went off in a supermarket in Jerusalem. Two university students were killed and nine persons were injured. An additional charge was discovered and removed. Dr. Habbash, head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which maintains headquarters in Amman, claimed credit for this act. On 6 March, twenty-nine Hebrew University students and staff members were wounded after an explosive charge had gone off in the national library cafeteria. According to the Middle East News Agency on 8 March 1969, this act too was carried out by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

80. Mr. President, the main target of yesterday's action was the El-Fatah base at Ein Huzair, about three kilometres south of the town of as-Salt. This is an isolated site quite far from the settlements of the civil population. After the Israeli action against the terrorist bases at as-Salt in August 1968, the General Command of El-Fatah transferred itself to Ein Huzair and converted it into its operational headquarters. The choice of this place was not accidental, since Ein Huzair is situated on one of the two main routes to the Jordan valley. The base itself is made up of several structures—three of them are armouries of various sorts storing weapons, ammunition and explosives; others are living quarters for the officers while the rank and file of the marauders are relegated to tents. Wadi Shuayeb through which the road from Salt in the direction of the Allenby Bridge passes, is an area of operational bases. There are no civilian villages in it. The few and scattered private buildings dotted here and there are used by the marauders for different purposes.

81. The Ein Huzair base is an operational centre and central storage depot. It is a zone for regrouping before going out on terror operations. It also serves as a supply

depot for units from other bases where they are re-equipped and supplied with transport before being sent on to other points such as Shuney, Nimrin, Karameh and so forth, which are the last points before entering Israel. These points are also outposts of the Jordanian army.

82. In Ein Huzair there is a roadblock manned by the terrorist squads at which travellers from the West Bank are stopped for control, questioning and instruction. The roadblock is quite open and is certainly a matter of common knowledge and has been crossed by foreign newspaper correspondents. It is one of the roadblocks which was set up following the agreement between the Jordanian Government and the terror organizations in November 1968.

83. In these terror bases there are also canteens and recreational facilities. These are the cafes and these are the civilians in them to which the Permanent Representative of Jordan has referred. By those so-called cafes many vehicles belonging to terrorists are always parked. Some of those vehicles have the markings of El-Fatah or of the Palestine Liberation Front, or no registration number at all.

84. The commander of the central sector of El-Fatah, to which those bases belong, is a former major of the Jordanian Arab Legion named Badi Awad, whose code name in the Fatah is Abu Jamal.

85. Those centres of attack against Israel, those bases for operations of terror and murder against Israeli citizens were the targets of yesterday's action.

86. The Jordanian representative's discomfort with the known facts about terror bases in the Ein Huzair is understandable. Indeed, facts and truth sometimes seem to be his most inveterate enemies. They speak louder, however, than the Jordanian words aimed at concealing them. It is not the first time that the representative of Jordan has made an attempt to conceal the truth about the nature of terror bases. On 15 March Israel took air action against such bases in the vicinity of Amman. The next day Ambassador El-Farra submitted a letter to the President of the Security Council [S/9083], alleging that Israel had attacked civilian targets. It is unfortunate for him that on the same day the terror organizations issued communiqués informing that the Israeli action was directed against their bases, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine announced that one of its leaders, Major Faiz Jorad, was killed in the action.

87. Mr. President, yesterday's Israeli action was an act of self-defence. Where there is aggression there is defence. When there is attack there is also counter-attack. Those that openly wage war against Israel cannot complain that Israel turns the point of their own sword against them. Israel has shown utmost restraint in the face of uninterrupted attack. It cannot, however, forgo completely its right to defend itself. *Salus populi suprema lex esto*: let the welfare of the people be the supreme law. When an end is put to Arab terror warfare and the Arab States scrupulously maintain the cease-fire to which they pledge themselves, there will no longer be need for Israeli defence actions. Until then, however, Israel's right to self-defence remains inalienable. It

cannot be questioned or curtailed by labelling Israeli counter actions as reprisals, a concept which has no application to the present situation in the Middle East.

88. The war against Israel is pursued today in particular by the method of terror warfare. If meaning can be martyred and truth tortured, that is what happens when the Arab Governments try to shed responsibility for this type of warfare and to present it as resistance to the consequences of the June 1967 hostilities.

89. Arab warfare by terror has been employed continuously in Arab aggression against Israel. Months before Israel's independence and its invasion by the regular armies of seven Arab States, para-military units and other irregular forces were sent across the border to attack Jewish villages, throw bombs at Jewish buses, murder Jewish civilians. The most notorious of these forces were those from Syria under the command of the Nazi agent Fawzi el Kawukji, and those from Jordan under the Husseinis, whose leader Haj Amin el Husseini spent the Second World War years, together with Kawukji, in Berlin as adviser to Hitler and Eichmann. Husseini was considered by the Allies a war criminal.

90. There was no mistaking the spiritual parentage of these para-military terror forces. These Nazi sympathizers and collaborators were bent on completing the Nazi "final solution"—the annihilation of the Jewish people. This objective became clearer when Arab regular forces joined in the aggression and the Secretary-General of the Arab League announced on 15 May 1948 that this would be "a war of extermination which will be spoken of like the Mongolian massacres".

91. Thwarted in their invasion, the Arab States signed Armistice Agreements with Israel, but after a short interval, they resumed their aggression by means of terror acts. There was nothing new in their methods. Again, Israeli farmers were killed in outlying village houses; civilian buses were ambushed and their passengers shot in cold blood; grenades were thrown into classrooms and small children at study were killed. In the Arab capitals, the perpetrators of these acts were called Fedayeen, as they are today, and, as today, they were hailed as heroes. The Arab press gleefully reported their exploits; the Arab radio stations broadcast war communiqués about their attacks.

92. Then, as today, the Arab Governments played a two-faced game.

93. While organizing, directing and inspiring terror warfare and glorifying it at home, the Arab Governments tried to disclaim responsibility for it abroad. These were Palestinian refugees acting on their own, they argued in the United Nations with tongue in cheek. Even those who were ready to ignore the obvious and the direct involvement of the Arab Governments and the use of their territory for launching attacks against Israel, found it impossible to explain how individuals could acquire land mines, machine guns and grenades and how their exploits could be carried out without professional military training and direction.

94. The fact is that the United Nations has never accepted the contention of the Arab Governments that they bear no responsibility for warfare by terror.

95. As early as 1948, the Security Council established the principle that Governments are responsible for acts of violence committed by individuals, groups of individuals and irregular forces. In its resolution 56 (1948) of 19 August 1948, adopted after a discussion on this very point, the Security Council spelled out the meaning of cease-fire. It decided that:

“(a) Each party is responsible for the actions of both regular and irregular forces operating under its authority or in territory under its control;

“(b) Each party has the obligation to use all means at its disposal to prevent action violating the truce by individuals or groups who are subject to its authority on and who are in territory under its control.”

96. These provisions are basic United Nations doctrine on Arab terror warfare. This was forcefully brought to the attention of the Security Council by the United States representative at the Council meeting of 24 March 1968. He said:

“We oppose acts of terrorism, which are in violation of the cease-fire resolutions of the Council, and we are not blind to the additional problems they create.

“We have long believed, as I also stated to the Council on 21 March, that the rule which should guide all the parties in these situations was first and wisely expressed many years ago in Security Council resolution 56 (1948) of 19 August 1948 . . .

“We deem these principles to be applicable to the cease-fire resolutions of June 1967 . . .” [1407th meeting, paras. 7, 8 and 9].

97. At the Council meeting of 5 September 1968, the representative of the United States declared:

“ . . . it is elementary that every Government is responsible for the control of its own population. And that responsibility is not limited merely to the action of its official armed forces. . . .

“A few weeks ago, when faced with an air attack launched by the Government of Israel against Jordan, several of the Governments which addressed this Council admonished us that we should not be even-handed. They contended” and he continued “that since Israeli forces were still in control of Arab territories, we should condone any terrorist activities against Israel. This was not, however, what this Council contemplated when it established a cease-fire last June, nor was it what it contemplated in adopting the resolution of 22 November 1967. What this Council did have in mind was that all parties should observe the cease-fire while at the same time seeking a permanent settlement of the conflict that could result in the retirement of the Israeli forces from occupied territories.

“My Government must therefore, insist that the Council treat the violations of the cease-fire even-handedly and not pursue a double standard”—he stressed—“that would call into question both our integrity and our objectivity, and that would erode that quality of fairness which is the quintessential spirit of the Charter for if we do not deal on a basis of impartiality, we will only inflame and exacerbate an already highly dangerous situation.” [1447th meeting, paras. 38, 40 and 41.]

98. As years went by it became more and more difficult for the Arab States to conceal their responsibility for the terror warfare. Starting in 1955, Egypt began to publish official communiqués about terror operations, and since then the other Arab States have been doing the same, or placing their Government-controlled public information media at the disposal of the terror organizations. Jordan was no exception.

99. When in 1956 Israeli forces seized and published the archives of the Fedayeen headquarters in Khan Yunis in the Gaza area, there was no further doubt not only of the legal responsibility of Egypt and other Arab States, including Jordan, for the continuation of terror warfare from territory under their control, but also of their direct responsibility in fact. Documents which came into the possession of Israel in the hostilities of 1967, and again at Karame a year ago, give further proof of the direct responsibility of the different Arab Governments, including the Jordanian Government, for the terror warfare activities from their different territories.

100. From the experience that has been gained since 1956, it has been clear to all that terror warfare is waged when the Arab Governments decide to wage it, and it stops when they so decide. Egypt took such a decision to wage terror warfare in the early fifties. Terror warfare from its territory stopped only in 1956 after Israel had destroyed the Fedayeen bases in Gaza and Sinai. Terror warfare continued intermittently from Jordanian territory so long as the Jordanian authorities took no action against it. The world witnessed a dangerous upsurge in terror warfare when a new régime in Syria in the mid-sixties decided to resort to this method of aggression to increase tension on the border. The usual disclaimers of responsibility were heard. As before, the terrorists were glamourized as freedom-fighters in a so-called “people’s war”. Again, the Security Council rejected these arguments. It tried to call on Syria to put an end to this campaign of aggression, but it was thwarted by the veto. The formal outcome of a vote whether as a result of the veto or of the other voting disabilities which Israel faces in the Council, cannot, however, derogate from the validity of international principles that are part of United Nations doctrine. Terror attacks are violations of the cease-fire. Governments from whose territory these attacks are launched are responsible, regardless of the extent of their direct involvement in the terrorist operations. This is true even more of Governments directly engaged in sponsoring, organizing and assisting such warfare. And this is what the Arab Governments have in fact been doing since June 1967.

101. Their armies thrown back by Israel, the Arab States have turned again to the tried method of warfare by terror.

A decision to this effect was taken at the Khartoum Conference of the Heads of Arab States in September 1967. This decision was confirmed in other official meetings including the meeting of the Arab Foreign Ministers in Cairo in September 1968. This all-Arab decision was reiterated by the Under-Secretary-General of the Arab League Said Naofal on 24 February 1969.

102. In previous Security Council debates and in official letters to the President of the Security Council I have described the active participation of the Arab Governments in terror warfare. This has also been extensively reported by the world press and by other public information media. Jordan, Egypt and Syria have set up training camps for terror units. Instruction is given by officers of the regular Jordanian, Egyptian and Syrian armies. Training bases exist also in Algeria. Officers and soldiers of the regular armed forces of Jordan, United Arab Republic and Syria are assigned for commando training and transferred to the terror organizations. Moreover, recruitment of terrorists is conducted openly in headquarters in Amman, Cairo, Beirut, Baghdad and Damascus. Financial resources and arms are supplied directly by the Arab Governments. The governmental radio stations in Arab States have established special broadcasts actually run by the terror organizations.

103. The slogans under which these organizations operate and their avowed objectives are the same as they were ten and twenty years ago: Kill all Jews, destroy Israel.

104. Yassir Arafat, the El-Fatah leader and head of the Council of all terror organizations stated in an interview with the Middle East News Agency: "El-Fatah started its activities in 1956 and its armed struggle in 1965. Its aim—the liquidation of Zionist, i.e. Israeli existence."

105. Such is the organization openly sponsored and supported by the Arab Governments. President Nasser in a speech before the Egyptian National Assembly on 20 January 1969 proclaimed: "The UAR places all its resources at the disposal of these organizations." King Hussein welcomed Arafat on his return to Jordan and announced his Government's full support.

106. Mr. President, today, as in the past, the most gruesome aspect of warfare by terror is that it is directed for the greater part against civilians. Bombs exploded in crowded stations and markets, grenades thrown into crowds of worshippers, explosive charges placed in school buses, button-shaped mines and other booby-traps scattered in school yards, cowardly attacks on civil aircraft with passengers and crew aboard, these are the characteristic exploits of the terrorists. To compare thugs who murder indiscriminately innocent men, women and children to resistance fighters is blasphemy of the name of resistance. The resistance fighters of Europe have expressed their utter repugnance for the Arab terrorists.

107. In a resolution adopted at the plenary session in Brussels in April 1968, in which delegations of World War II resistance fighters from Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States took

part, the International Union of Resistance and Deportee Movements declared:

"No one can compare the spirit of resistance with terrorist activities and odious and blind crimes intended to provoke fear and insecurity, to give rise to violence, when all possibilities are openly offered for an open discussion, or, try to compare with the resistance against nazism the fanatics surrounded by former Nazi criminals who merely prolong the Hitler genocide and thereby offer an insult which is felt deeply not only by the citizens of Israel who courageously fight for their right to life but by all those who resisted and who remain true to themselves."

108. This total rejection by the anti-Nazi resistance fighters is particularly understandable when one bears in mind that Arab terror warfare against the Jewish people of Israel has been in reality permeated by Nazi doctrine, organized by Nazi war criminals like Haj Amin el Husseini and is directly assisted by Nazi German instructors. The following facts are ominous. Among those who have been training the terror units are Erich Atlen alias Ali Bella, one-time head of the Jewish Department of the Gestapo in Nazi-occupied Galicia; Willy Berner, alias Ben Kashir, an SS veteran from the Mathausen concentration camp; and Colonel Baumann alias Ali ben Khader, one of the exterminators of the Warsaw Ghetto. Hitler's *Mein Kampf* translated into Arabic and printed and distributed by the Egyptian and Syrian Governments is standard reading for the members of all the terror organizations.

109. Lieut-General Burns, the Canadian head of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, by no means uncritical of Israeli policy, wrote in his book, *Between Arab and Israeli*:

"... I felt what Egyptians were doing in sending these men, whom they dignified with the name of fedayeen, or commandos, into another country with the mission to attack men, women and children indiscriminately, was a war crime. It was essentially of the same character... as the offences for which the Nazi leaders had been tried in Nuremberg, to cite the most recent example."²

110. The venerable René Cassin, Nobel peace prize winner of 1968 has again raised his voice against the sophistry inherent in the Arab position. On 10 February 1969 he wrote in *Ici Paris*:

"Since 1967, injustice, I note with sorrow, has continued under various forms, consisting on the one hand in causing the Security Council to adopt decisions which are contrary to international law, and on the other in devising these decisions in a manner that deprives Israel of the juridical benefits which it could legitimately expect.

"Israel remains bound to respect the 'cease-fire', but its adversaries are never condemned when having violated it they incur reprisals. Even more than that, they are acting through irregular forces, in this case the Palestinians who

² Clarke, Irwin and Company Ltd., Toronto, Vancouver 1962, p. 88.

are assimilated for the sake of argument, with our resistance fighters.

“Do they seek in New York the triumph of the doctrine of the destruction of a State admitted in 1948 as a Member of the United Nations?”

“I, on my part,”—he continues—“desire a just peace and am far from ignoring the interests of the Moslem populations of Palestine. However, are not the greatest enemies of these poor people those who make of them, as of the Jewish individuals themselves, the instruments of a policy of aggression, in utter disregard of the real interests of the refugees and those in occupied territories?”

111. Indeed, whether juridically or morally, Arab warfare by terror is a loathsome, criminal policy. It violates the cease-fire; it undermines the peace-making efforts; it is directed against Israelis and harms the Arabs; its victims are innocent civilians. It is inspired by unmitigated Nazi-like hatred toward the remnants of a people victimized by the Nazis in history's most horrifying genocide.

112. Whatever one may think or say about Arab terror against Israel, in whatever form this warfare is wrapped up by the Arab Governments for presentation to the United Nations, its real test for Israel is one, and one only: Is it or is it not directed against Israeli lives? Does it or does it not aim at the murder of innocent Israeli men, women and children?

113. Whatever pretexts the Arab Governments offer for continuing terror warfare and refusing to suppress it, Israel, like any other State, cannot acquiesce to the organized, premeditated murder of its citizens. If the Arab Governments are unwilling to stop it, Israel itself must take, all necessary measures to put an end to it. Enough Jews have been barbarously murdered in this century; Jewish mothers have wept enough for their dead. This must stop; this cannot go on, and we shall not allow it to go on.

114. The United Nations has called on the parties to the Middle East conflict to terminate the fighting, to reach agreement, to talk—not to kill. It is high time that the Arab Governments abandoned their sanguinary designs and ceased warfare by terror and started to talk peace. Surely they must realize by now that terror and sabotage and the killing and maiming of civilians will not weaken Israel's determination to attain a just and lasting peace. It has not weakened Israel during the last twenty years; it will not make Israel falter now. Peace and security are the fundamental rights of all nations. The Arab Governments must understand and accept that Israel, too, has this right to real peace and real security.

115. The PRESIDENT: I now call on the representative of Jordan to speak in exercise of his right of reply.

116. Mr. EL-FARRA (Jordan): I realize the hour is late; I shall have more time to answer the many distortions we have heard this afternoon when the so-called counter-complaint of Israel comes before the Council. I shall then have more time to analyse the motives and expose the intention. I simply should like to refer to certain points

which call for an immediate answer. I beg the Council to concentrate on the complaints of Jordan and to permit no irrelevant accusations and allegations and distortions to confuse the issue.

117. It is simple. We are used to Israel's practice of making a complaint and requesting a hearing immediately after its aggression and after we come before the Council. This has become a routine with which the Council is familiar.

118. Mr. Tekoah, in his reference to my complaint, spoke about bases for the Fedayeen. I think his statement is belied by the eye-witnesses who visited the area yesterday and who went to the scene this morning. Realizing the hour is late I shall refer to only one quotation. This is the report from Amman at 9 o'clock this morning, of Mr. Richard Sullivan of CBS, and this was heard, I am sure, by all those who were listening to the news at that hour: Correspondent Sullivan of CBS denied the Israeli allegation that they—the Israelis—attacked military positions. Sullivan emphasized that the Israeli attack was directed against cafés and resorts and against Jordanian farmers and their means of livelihood. This was reported at 9 o'clock this morning; it belies all the allegations and the distortions of Mr. Tekoah.

119. Mr. Tekoah again turned to falsehood when he quoted my Prime Minister, imputing to the new Prime Minister of Jordan—who is well known to all members around this table—the statement that terror operations would be intensified. There is no terrorism in Jordan or coming from Jordan. This “terrorism” is a term coined by the masters of terrorism, who used terrorism to expel and to occupy, who used murder and all kinds of acts of terrorism in order to have “a land without people for a people without a land”.

120. The time is late; I cannot deal now with all of the acts committed by Israel to bring about this result, but I shall come to them later.

121. Terrorism is not used by my Prime Minister. We believe in the God-given right of a people—any people—to resist foreign occupation, regardless of where that foreign occupation is, be it in Palestine or anywhere else in this world. Occupation imposes a duty on the people occupied to resist. Therefore, occupation and resistance go together. This is history, and no distortion can rewrite history.

122. Mr. Tekoah spoke about terrorism from outside; he spoke about terrorist groups. He did not mention a thing about resistance from within. He speaks about people coming from Jordan. How about the people in Gaza? Gaza is an island now, in an ocean of Zionist occupation, surrounded by Israeli-occupied lands; you have attacks and resistance almost every single day in Gaza. What do you call this? Is this not resistance from within? Is this not the same as the situation in the West Bank? Is this not like the cases of Sinai and Golan recently? These are measures of resistance of a people that has faith in its God-given right.

123. Mr. Tekoah spoke about the resistance and referred to the cease-fire. Yes, there is a cease-fire. It is no agreement; he keeps trying to paint it as an agreement to be the substitute for the Armistice Agreement. There is the

Armistice Agreement which is still valid, legal and binding; and there is the cease-fire resolution. But this cease-fire resolution was also followed by another resolution—and that was resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967—which did emphasize the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just solution. This resolution called for the withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces.

124. Did you, the members of the Council, intend to have a cease-fire to freeze this resolution and its implementation? Was it the intention of this Council to bring about a “cease-fire line” as a substitute for the “Armistice Demarcation Lines”? And if it was your intention that this cease-fire should be of a very temporary nature, is not the answer complete and immediate withdrawal from occupied territories? If a cease-fire was intended to be an accommodation for Israeli aggression—and I know this is not the case in this Council, the organ of peace—then the Israelis cannot raise this question of resistance because their presence invites resistance, their occupation calls for resistance. We are not responsible for this resistance; we are not there to protect Israeli aggression; nor are we there to facilitate the continued occupation by Israel of almost half of Jordan. The answer—and I hope the Council will give the answer—is immediate withdrawal. It is about time that the Council should take more effective steps to bring about withdrawal.

125. Mr. Tekoah keeps defining resistance as terrorism. I do not have to bring to Mr. Tekoah scholars from outside his people who have their definition of what is going on. Here, before me, I have an interview published by the Israeli paper *Yediot Ahronoth*. The Israeli lawyer, Dr. Yacov Yeridor, who was himself a member of the Stern gang, a terrorist organization, objected to terming the Palestine resistance groups as terrorists and infiltrators. Instead, Dr. Yeridor called them loyal Palestinian fighters—these are his words—“... who are resisting occupation and fighting for the liberation of their country from an alien and oppressive régime”. He very kindly offered to go and defend the El-Fatah people, because he has a good understanding of their cause and what they are doing.

126. Mr. Tekoah spoke about nazism. I wanted to avoid bringing the question of nazism before the Council at this late hour. But when Mr. Tekoah refers to respectable leaders who have a place in the minds and hearts of the Palestinians, and when he says that they are Nazis, I think that Mr. Tekoah and I should compare notes as to who is practising nazism now. Let us see what Justice Jackson, the chief prosecutor for the United States at the Nuremberg Trials had to say about nazism. In presenting the case for the United States before the Nuremberg Trials he said this about nazism. The Nazis: “... wanted things which they knew they could not get without war. They wanted their neighbours’ lands and goods”. Compare this with the Zionists now in our area. Justice Jackson continued: “Their philosophy seems to be that if the neighbours would not acquiesce then they are the aggressors and are to blame for the war.” This is how Justice Jackson analysed nazism.

127. I appeal to every member around this table to apply this criterion to what the Israelis are doing on the West Bank of Jordan, their annexation of Jerusalem and the

other areas. Is not this pure and simple nazism? We will go further.

128. Mr. Tekoah said that *Mein Kampf* was published in the Arab areas. I should like to quote a paragraph to Mr. Tekoah from the book which we condemn, Hitler’s *Mein Kampf*, as to how things should be for nazism. Hitler said: “Circumstances must be adapted to aims”—the same thing that we are having now in our area. “This is impossible without invasion.” What happened in our area was invasion. Sinai, the West Bank, the Golan Heights. “This is impossible without invasion”, said Hitler. Invasion of what? “Invasion of foreign States or attacks upon foreign property. Further successes cannot be attained without expanding our living space in the East . . .”.

129. The Israelis, in applying this criteria, invaded in the East, Jordan, in the South, the UAR, and in the North, Syria. If this nazism is not Zionism in different form, I do not know what nazism is. Finally, Hitler thought he had won the war so he had plans for Europe. What did he say after occupying most of Europe? He said: “We now have to face the task of cutting up [*out of Europe*] the giant’s cake according to our needs in order to be able first to dominate it”—that is what they want now in the East Bank and Jerusalem—“and second to administer it”—that is what Mr. Dayan is saying and what Mr. Tekoah has repeated—“and thirdly to exploit it”.

130. Those are the words of Hitler, so I think Mr. Tekoah should be the last one to remind us of nazism because Israel is practising it in our area against our people in our land. So much for nazism. I will have more to say later on if Mr. Tekoah chooses to raise the question again.

131. Again, in connexion with terrorism, he mentioned Khan Yunis and Gaza. I was hoping he would not mention this because to do so is to remind the Council of what happened in Khan Yunis in 1956. In 1956, on the pretext which he cited today, every single young man was killed by the Israelis in Khan Yunis. What is more, I will not mention the details, but merely say that in June 1967 some young students, labourers, mechanics and old ladies, because they belonged to a certain family, familiar to this Council, were killed—twenty-one of them. I have their names and occupations listed right here.

132. I need not dwell on this, but I would like to say that terrorism was practised in Palestine to bring about what is now Israel. Mr. I. F. Stone, a well-known American writer of the Jewish faith, said the following about terrorism:

“Jewish terrorism, not only by the Irgun, in such savage massacres as Deir Yassin, but in milder form by the Haganah itself, encouraged Arabs to leave areas the Jews wished to take over for strategic or demographic reasons. They tried to make as much of Israel as free of Arabs as possible.”

133. One final remark, however, is in order, with reference to co-operating with other ideologies for a purpose. I do not think Mr. Tekoah is well advised to raise this question, because all the Israeli gangs before the creation of Israel

were co-operating with destructive movements for a sinister purpose. One of the members of the Irgun said:

“Our company commander, an architect whom we admire and imitated joined Stern,”—the Stern Gang—“the extremist leader who believed that we should make common cause even with the Nazis and fascists in order to overthrow British imperialism”.

I wish my good colleague and friend the representative of the United Kingdom would give the Council the benefit of their experience in 1936 and 1937, 1945 and 1946. I wish that he would find it possible to enlighten members of the Council and give them an idea about terrorism in the area at that time. That would be difficult for him, I know. With this I end my answer at this stage.

134. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Israel in exercise of his right of reply.

135. Mr. TEKOAH (Israel): I have taken note of the fact that the Jordanian representative has reserved his right to study my statement and to react fully to it at a later stage. This is indeed a commendable desire, for it is necessary once and for all to place the terror warfare in its true historic perspective and in its grim philosophical parentage.

136. As for the reference to terms like “resistance” and “terrorism”, I should only like to point out that the use by our Arab neighbours of concepts which do not reflect reality and the application of terms which are foreign to fact, has been one of the causes of the continuation of the Middle East conflict.

137. The representative of Jordan, in support of his arguments about the present situation in terror warfare, quotes from Hitler’s *Mein Kampf*. I preferred to quote from the decisions of the associations of anti-Nazi freedom fighters and from words of the Nobel Prize winner René Cassin. I hope the representative of Jordan realizes that what really matters is not the rhetorical exchange we are engaged in, but whether his Government will at long last awaken to the urgent necessity of ending the terror warfare that is being waged against Israel from Jordanian territory—whatever the name he or his Government chooses to apply to that type of warfare.

138. The situation requires plain talk. Jordan invaded Israel in 1948 in defiance of the United Nations, and then proceeded to call Israel the aggressor. Jordan has pursued war against Israel ever since and has refused to make peace. But it has never stopped complaining that Israel dares to strike back in self-defence. Jordan attacked Israel on 5 June 1967 despite Israel’s exhortations that it refrain from doing so, and then—as now—cried wolf. Jordan has been openly harbouring and supporting terror operations from its territory against Israel and, at the same time, disclaiming all responsibility for them.

139. It may therefore be too much to expect that Jordan recognize formally the long-standing United Nations jurisprudence that attacks by irregular forces are no less violations of the cease-fire than attacks carried out by regular forces. However, whatever Jordan’s views on this

matter may be, it is confronted with the simple fact that Israel will not acquiesce in the murder of its citizens by attackers from Jordanian territory. Whatever belief the Jordan Government may hold about the nature of such murders, Israel’s refusal to permit the wanton killing of Israeli men, women and children is irrevocable. The Jordan Government may wish to take cognizance of this fact and itself take measures to terminate the terror operations from its territory. Failing that, however, it must understand that Israel is compelled to act in its own self-defence. The Jordan Government may influence the choice of method for ending terror warfare; it cannot, however, affect the immutability of the objective: the termination of such warfare. The Jordanian side of the cease-fire line cannot serve as a sanctuary for forces which persistently violate the cease-fire. To the Jordanian representative and to his Government I would therefore commend the old Arabic proverb: “*Yajari, inta bi darak, wa ana bi dari*”—“Neighbour, stay in your house and I will stay in mine.”

140. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Jordan to exercise his right of reply.

141. Mr. EL-FARRA (Jordan): I should like to know how the representative of Israel would define his house. Where are its limits? Does it now cover the East Bank of the Jordan? Is it the Sinai and Gaza and the Golan? Is it going to be extended to the Euphrates and the Nile? I want him to define his house. When he tells me about Israel—if he means by his “house”, Israel—which Israel does he mean? Is it No. 1, of 1947? Is it No. 2, expanded in 1948 with one third more than was allotted to it by the United Nations? Is it No. 3, of 1967? Or No. 4, the one now in the making? Can he define this now? If he can, perhaps we can have peace today, if he can also tell me where he is going.

142. He refers to the United Nations jurisprudence. Would he, here and now, abide by the United Nations jurisprudence? If so, we will have peace, and then the task of the Security Council will be simple. Will Mr. Tekoah come before the Council now and say that he will accept implementation of all the United Nations jurisprudence, so he can be in his house and I can be in mine? The “house” was defined by the United Nations, and I challenge him to accept that definition by the United Nations.

143. The PRESIDENT: The representative of Israel wishes to speak, and I call on him.

144. Mr. TEKOAH (Israel): For all we know, we may be making some progress here in this debate. I assume that the desire of the Permanent Representative of Jordan to hear a definition of the limits of Israel’s house corresponds to the November resolution, which calls for the establishment of secure and recognized boundaries. I think it is high time that Jordan and Israel should begin discussions on this central matter, which will undoubtedly be the basis for peace. It is high time for peace between Israel and Jordan.

145. The PRESIDENT: I wish to request the kind co-operation of the representatives, in view of the lateness of the hour, and ask them to defer their statements, if they can possibly do so, to the afternoon meeting.

146. I call on the representative of Jordan.

147. Mr. EL-FARRA (Jordan): I have asked to speak not in order to make a statement but simply in order to put on record again the distortions and the policy of bluff and deceit of Israel. With regard to his house, when he was asked to define that house the representative of Israel said nothing. Nineteen sixty-seven is part and parcel of other

United Nations decisions on the problem constituting United Nations jurisprudence. It is Mr. Tekoah who referred to United Nations jurisprudence. It is also Mr. Tekoah who called the Security Council morally, politically and juridically bankrupt. I wish that he would abide by the jurisprudence of this Council.

The meeting rose at 1.35 p.m.