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**REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS
INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON**

(for the period 25 July 1990-22 January 1991)

Introduction

1. By its resolution 659 (1990) of 31 July 1990, the Security Council decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for a further interim period of six months, until 31 January 1991. The Council also reiterated its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries; re-emphasized the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978, approved by resolution 426 (1978), and called upon all parties concerned to co-operate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate; and reiterated that UNIFIL should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions. The Council requested the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned on the implementation of the resolution and to report to the Council thereon.

2. In informal consultations on 31 July 1990, the members of the Council agreed to request the Secretary-General that a review of the scale and deployment of UNIFIL be carried out by the Secretariat during the mandate period that was ending, in the light of the performance by the Force of its functions since its establishment in 1978 and with a view to implementing resolution 425 (1978) fully. This request was confirmed in a letter from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General dated 24 September 1990 (S/21833). The members of the Council were of the view that such a review would provide the Council with a basis on which to assess whether existing arrangements for UNIFIL should be maintained or changed. The results of the review, carried out by the Office for Special Political Affairs in co-operation with the Force Commander of UNIFIL, are contained in a report which is being circulated separately as an addendum to the present report.

Organization of the Force

3. As of January 1991, the composition of UNIFIL was as follows:

Military personnel

Fiji	HQ UNIFIL	32	
	Infantry battalion	650	
	Force Mobile Reserve	36	
	Military police	<u>8</u>	726
Finland	HQ UNIFIL	13	
	Infantry battalion	506	
	Force Mobile Reserve	16	
	Military police	<u>9</u>	544
France	HQ UNIFIL	11	
	Composite battalion (maintenance company, defence company, armoured escort company)	479	
	Military police	<u>10</u>	500
Ghana	HQ UNIFIL	36	
	Infantry battalion (including engineer company)	812	
	Force Mobile Reserve	36	
	Military police	<u>9</u>	893
Ireland	HQ UNIFIL	32	
	Infantry battalion	656	
	HQ Camp Command	34	
	Force Mobile Reserve	16	
	Military police	<u>12</u>	750
Italy	HQ UNIFIL	4	
	Helicopter unit	44	
	Military police	<u>4</u>	52

Nepal	HQ UNIFIL	12	
	Infantry battalion	802	
	Force Mobile Reserve	32	
	Military police	<u>5</u>	851
Norway	HQ UNIFIL	26	
	Infantry battalion	654	
	Maintenance company	171	
	Force Mobile Reserve	29	
	Military police	<u>14</u>	894
Sweden	HQ UNIFIL	20	
	Logistic battalion	610	
	Force Mobile Reserve	5	
	Military police	<u>8</u>	<u>643</u>
Total UNIFIL			<u>5 853</u> a/

a/ The total UNIFIL strength includes three officers (one Fijian, one Ghanaian and one Nepalese) who have temporarily been assigned to serve as military advisers to the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The deployment of UNIFIL as of January 1991 is shown on the map attached to the present report.

4. The command of UNIFIL continues to be exercised by Lieutenant-General Lars-Eric Wahlgren of Sweden.

5. In the period under review, 65 military observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) assisted UNIFIL in the performance of its tasks. These unarmed officers are organized as Observer Group Lebanon and are under the operational control of the Force Commander of UNIFIL. They man the five observation posts along the Lebanese side of the Israel-Lebanon armistice demarcation line. They also operate four mobile teams in that part of the area controlled by Israel which is within the UNIFIL area of operation. Two military observers are assigned to UNIFIL headquarters.

6. Logistic support for UNIFIL is provided by the Swedish logistic battalion, elements of the French composite battalion, the Norwegian maintenance company, the Ghanaian engineering company and the Italian helicopter unit and by some sections of the civilian staff, especially in the areas of communications and vehicle maintenance. UNIFIL employs 583 civilian staff.
7. The Force Mobile Reserve, a composite mechanized company, currently consisting of elements from seven contingents (Fiji, Finland, Ghana, Ireland, Nepal, Norway and Sweden) and organized as an integrated unit, has frequently been called upon to reinforce UNIFIL battalions.
8. The strength of the Lebanese Army unit assigned to the UNIFIL area of operation currently stands at 128, all ranks. The bulk of the unit is stationed at Tyre, while small elements are at Arzun, Al Yatun and Qana. In addition, some 380 Lebanese Army personnel of the 31st Battalion are stationed at Tyre.
9. I regret to report that during the current mandate period two Fijian and two Swedish members of the Force lost their lives, all from causes unrelated to the performance of their duties. Sixteen others suffered injuries as a result of accidents. Since the establishment of UNIFIL, 177 military and civilian members of the Force have died, 67 as a result of firing or mine or bomb explosions, 75 in accidents and 35 from other causes. Two hundred and fifty-nine have been wounded by firing or mine or bomb explosions.
10. UNIFIL has continued to improve the security of its personnel and positions. Work continued on a new compound near Ebel es Sagi for the headquarters of the Norwegian battalion, which is expected to be completed by 1992. The security and defence of the Naqoura Camp and of the headquarters of the Irish battalion have been improved and strengthened. Further protective work has been undertaken at positions throughout the UNIFIL area of deployment.
11. UNIFIL has continued to have difficulties in obtaining and using the land and buildings it requires for its operations, except those lands that have been made available by villages that have asked for UNIFIL protection. These difficulties emanated from the increased demand for land and dwellings resulting from the influx of population into the area, from arrears in the payment of rent by the Government of Lebanon to the landlords concerned and from the sharp depreciation of the real value of such rent payments as were made. This problem has been raised with the Lebanese authorities on numerous occasions.

Situation in the UNIFIL area of operation

12. Israel continues to control in southern Lebanon an area manned by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) and the de facto forces (DFF), the so-called "South Lebanon Army". The boundaries of the Israeli-controlled area (ICA) have not been clearly defined but are determined de facto by the forward positions of IDF and DFF. It includes territory adjacent to the armistice demarcation line, parts of the Fijian, Nepalese, Irish and Finnish battalion sectors and the entire Norwegian battalion sector, as well as sizeable areas to the north of the UNIFIL area of operation.

Within the area of operation, IDF and DFF have increased their military positions from 66 to 70. The parts of the Israeli-controlled area (ICA) that fall within UNIFIL's area of operation and the IDF and DFF positions are shown on the attached map. The map also indicates where the areas under Israeli control reach beyond the limits of the UNIFIL area of operation.

13. The Norwegian battalion sector is a special case as it has been entirely within the Israeli-controlled area (ICA) since the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. UNIFIL has nevertheless continued to do everything possible to ensure the peaceful character of this area, in accordance with its mandate. It was pointed out to the Israeli authorities that that policy required that IDF/DFF should not undertake military operations in the sector. For a number of years UNIFIL's position in this regard was respected and the inhabitants of the sector were able to lead comparatively peaceful lives. However the difficulties described in my last report (S/21406, para. 12) have continued during the current mandate period. Increased patrolling and the dangerous practice of reconnaissance by fire have added to these difficulties.

14. During the period under review, UNIFIL recorded 41 operations by resistance groups against IDF and DFF targets (6 in August, 4 in September, 10 in October, 2 in November, 17 in December 1990 and 2 in January 1991). These operations usually took the form of attacks with small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, rockets and mortars. One such operation took place on 28 December 1990, when a number of Katyusha rockets were fired from inside the Tyre pocket in a southerly direction. Mines and roadside bombs were also often used against IDF/DFF vehicles and foot patrols.

15. UNIFIL has continued to oppose attempts by armed elements to operate within its area of deployment. This has occasionally led to friction. At times, UNIFIL's insistence on searching vehicles and denying passage to armed elements through UNIFIL checkpoints has led to harassment and threats against UNIFIL personnel, attempts at forced entry or firings close to UNIFIL checkpoints, but such incidents were normally resolved after negotiation.

16. Firing from IDF/DFF positions or by IDF/DFF patrols, whether unprovoked or in retaliation for attacks by armed elements, occurred often and sometimes involved the use of heavy artillery, tanks and Israeli helicopter gunships. IDF/DFF in their positions or on patrol continued to fire close to, and on occasion at, UNIFIL positions. During the reporting period, however, there has been a decrease in unprovoked firings close to UNIFIL positions which have fallen to 39 from 109 recorded during the previous reporting period. A particularly serious incident occurred on 20 October 1990, when IDF personnel fired approximately 10,000 rounds of light machine-gun-fire at and close to UNIFIL position 4-7C, which is in the Norwegian battalion sector. Some rounds hit the windows of the tower of that position and other rounds caused damage to the generator house and gate. Another serious incident occurred on 26 November 1990, when four artillery rounds fired by IDF impacted 200 metres south-east of UNIFIL position 5-11 AB in the Nepalese battalion sector. These incidents were vigorously protested to the Israeli authorities. Indiscriminate fire has also been directed at villages from IDF/DFF positions when the latter have come under attack from armed elements. The villages

of Zibqin, Brashit, Tibnin, Safad al Batik and Qabrikha came under fire during the period under review. Five civilians were injured and severe damage was caused to a number of civilian houses. UNIFIL protested to IDF whenever such incidents occurred.

17. UNIFIL troops detonated mines, roadside bombs and unexploded remnants of war and dismantled ordnance of various types in the area of deployment. A total of 31 controlled explosions were carried out in the last six months.

18. UNIFIL continued to extend humanitarian assistance to the civilian population in its area, to the extent possible within available resources. Such assistance took the form of providing water, food, fuel, electricity and escort for farmers. In addition, medicines and equipment or services to schools were provided from resources made available by Governments of the troop-contributing countries. UNIFIL medical centres provided care to an average of 3,000 civilian patients per month and, at the UNIFIL hospital at Naqoura, some 775 civilian patients were treated per month, about 25 of them as in-patients. Two large water pumps weighing about 5,000 kilogrammes, donated by UNICEF, were transported by helicopter to a pumping station on the Litani River in the Finnish battalion area. Upon request from the Lebanese Government, UNIFIL assisted in the administration of the official Baccalaureat examination to 800 students living in the ICA. The Force co-operated closely on humanitarian matters with the Lebanese authorities, the United Nations agencies and programmes operating in Lebanon, the International Committee of the Red Cross and non-governmental organizations.

19. In my report of 24 July 1990, I referred (S/21406, para. 18) to the Lebanese authorities' complaint that a military road constructed by IDF on Lebanese territory adjacent to the Lebanese-Syrian border south of the Norwegian battalion sector had interrupted Lebanese civilians' access to their land in the area. I also referred to UNIFIL's efforts to confirm the facts. UNIFIL has continued to pursue this matter with the Israeli authorities and has urged IDF to minimize the hardship caused to the Lebanese civilians concerned by enabling them to pass to and fro through the proposed fence along the road as necessary.

20. Further to what was stated in paragraph 19 of my last report (S/21406), Israel has maintained its programme of road construction in the Israeli-controlled area (ICA), which has the effect of enhancing IDF's ability to deploy rapidly into Lebanese territory. The road from Marjayoun to Hasbaya has been improved and the main supply road from Naqoura to Marjayoun has been repaired and resurfaced. In addition, several secondary roads leading to villages in the northern part of the ICA have also been resurfaced.

21. My reports of 25 January 1990 (S/21102, paras. 25-30) and 24 July 1990 (S/21406, para. 20) described the measures taken by Israel to establish some aspects of a civil administration in the Israeli-controlled area (ICA). During the current reporting period, Israel continued its effort to establish and strengthen civil administrations in different locations in the ICA. Some major towns now have administrators and gendarmerie. The administrators, however, have no power other than to issue birth and death certificates, marriage licences and vehicle registrations. The General Security Service (GSS) of IDF and DFF keeps a close

watch on their activities. In certain other towns, such as Chebaa, Kafr Hammam and Kafr Chouba, residents have so far resisted attempt by IDF and DFF to establish civil administration offices, despite harassment and overt pressures exerted on the local leaders. In these three towns, for example, travel restrictions were imposed on citizens who wanted to leave the ICA. The mayor of Kafr Hammam was forced to leave the ICA when he refused the GSS demand that he bring one of his sons back from the Bekaa valley. The Lebanese Government sought UNIFIL's help in this case. UNIFIL took up the matter with IDF, which has given assurances for his safe and unconditional return to Kafr Hammam to resume his official functions, should he wish to return. In addition to the arrest of Lebanese citizens in the ICA, IDF/DFF have abducted a number of Lebanese people from Al Mansouri and Hebbariye in the UNIFIL area of deployment. All of these have now been released as a result of UNIFIL's efforts.

Financial aspects

22. By its resolution 45/244 of 21 December 1990, the General Assembly authorized the Secretary-General to enter into commitments for UNIFIL at a rate not to exceed \$12,789,000 gross (\$12,557,000 net) per month for the 12-month period beginning 1 February 1991, should the Security Council decide to continue the Force beyond the period of six months authorized under its resolution 659 (1990). In the event the Council decides to extend UNIFIL beyond its current mandate period, the costs to the United Nations for maintaining the Force during the extension period would be within the commitment authorized by the Assembly in its resolution 45/244, assuming an average maximum force strength of 5,850 troops and continuance of the Force's existing responsibilities.

23. As at the beginning of January 1991, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNIFIL Special Account for the mandate periods ending 31 January 1991 amounted to \$281.7 million. This reduction from the previous figure of \$307.4 million is largely due to a substantial payment of arrears by a major contributor.

Observations

24. The review that has been carried out by the Secretariat (see para. 2 above) concluded that UNIFIL's scale and deployment are determined by two main factors: the Security Council's commitment to resolution 425 (1978) as the correct solution to the problem of southern Lebanon; and the interim tasks that the Force has carried out with the Security Council's approval (controlling the level of hostilities in its present area of deployment and providing humanitarian support to the civilian population) until it is enabled to carry out its original tasks of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area.

25. The review took note of the fact that the Force faces certain difficulties and dangers owing to the anomaly that arises from the task of preventing its area from being used for hostile activities when those activities include resistance to an

occupation against which the Security Council has repeatedly pronounced itself. But it is clear that the solution to this anomaly must lie in the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory as originally required by resolution 425 (1978), accompanied by the process of the Lebanese Army progressively assuming responsibility for security in UNIFIL's present area of deployment. This will make it possible for UNIFIL to deploy down to the international border, a process which is likely, initially at least, to create a need for an increase in the Force's strength.

26. Finally, the review recommends certain measures for streamlining UNIFIL which would produce a saving of some 10 per cent in the Force's strength. I believe these recommendations to be on the right lines and I will be following them up with the troop-contributing Governments concerned.

27. Meanwhile, in a letter to me dated 14 January 1991 (S/22079) the Permanent Representative of Lebanon has informed me that the Lebanese Government has decided to request the Security Council to extend UNIFIL's mandate for a further period of six months. The Permanent Representative's letter goes on to refer to developments which have taken place since UNIFIL's mandate was last renewed, notably the formation of a Government of national unity, the assumption by the Lebanese Army of control of the Greater Beirut area and a decision by the Council of Ministers to deploy the army in certain regions in the southern part of the country. These are important steps forward.

28. In recent consultations, my representatives have discussed with the Lebanese authorities implementation of their decision relating to the deployment of the army to the south. I have always welcomed the idea of the progressive deployment of the army to southern Lebanon as a necessary first step in the restoration of the Government's effective authority there. UNIFIL stands ready to co-operate with the Lebanese Army when it reaches the UNIFIL area and to begin progressively transferring to it responsibility for security. As is recognized by the Lebanese Government, the feasibility of this step will depend on the Government's unhindered ability to deploy, rotate, supply and command the unit or units concerned and on those units' ability and willingness to act effectively to maintain security in the areas assigned to them. It is to be hoped that all those who have professed their wish to see again a strong and effective Government in Beirut will do all in their power to ensure that there is no impediment to the delicate process of deploying the Lebanese Army to the southern part of the country.

29. Meanwhile, Israel's attitude to the situation in southern Lebanon and to UNIFIL's mandate remains as described in previous reports. The Israeli authorities continue to state that they have no territorial ambitions in Lebanon, that the "security zone" is a temporary arrangement necessitated by the security of northern Israel so long as the Lebanese Government is not able to exercise effective authority and prevent its territory from being used to launch attacks against Israel. They do not consider that UNIFIL, as a peace-keeping force, can assume this responsibility. They continue to build up DFF and to improve their ability to reinforce IDF's strength inside Lebanon quickly. A consequence of this policy is that the Israeli-controlled area is becoming increasingly separated from the rest of Lebanon.

30. For its part, UNIFIL continues, to the best of its ability and in accordance with its mandate, to prevent its area from being used for hostile activities. Hostile incidents in the UNIFIL area again declined during the current mandate period, but IDF and DFF carried out many air and artillery attacks on targets to the north of the UNIFIL area. A high degree of calm and tranquillity prevailed in those parts of UNIFIL's area that lie outside the Israeli-controlled area and economic activity continued to increase there. In order to foster the confidence that is a necessary condition for such investment, UNIFIL has established further new positions close to the edge of the Israeli-controlled area (ICA). It has also continued to press the Israeli authorities to end the shelling of civilian targets and to withdraw DFF from certain positions that are most frequently responsible for such firing and that attract attacks by armed elements. The Norwegian battalion, being deployed wholly within the Israeli-controlled area (ICA), is in a particularly difficult situation. Its ability to prevent hostilities and promote normal civilian activities depends on the co-operation of IDF. It is important that this should be forthcoming.

31. In carrying out their duties in an area where, in spite of all its efforts, armed groups still abound and hostilities occur, UNIFIL's personnel are exposed to many dangers. I continue to attach the highest priority to the security of UNIFIL personnel and progress has again been made in improving the physical security of the Force's positions, including the newly established ones. But security for the Force can be achieved only if all the parties in this complicated situation co-operate with it, respect its international and neutral status and avoid exposing its members to danger. I reiterate my appeal to all the parties to act accordingly.

32. I believe that the Security Council will again judge that, although it has not yet been possible for UNIFIL to carry out in full the mandate given to it in 1978, the Force continues to make an important contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security in a volatile area. I accordingly recommend that the Council accept the Lebanese Government's request and extend UNIFIL's mandate for a further period of six months, that is until 31 July 1991.

33. In making this recommendation, I must, however, draw the Security Council's attention to the continuing gravity of the Force's financial situation. In spite of the receipt from a major contributor of \$44 million in payment of arrears, unpaid assessments remain at the unacceptably high level of \$281.7 million. This represents money owed by the United Nations to the Member States that have voluntarily contributed troops to serve in UNIFIL, often in conditions of danger and discomfort. It is difficult to understand why such a problem should afflict a United Nations peace-keeping operation that has such an important mission and whose mandate has repeatedly been renewed by unanimous vote of the Security Council. My concern is heightened by the fact that, after nearly 13 years in the field, UNIFIL faces a growing need to replace equipment that has become obsolete or unserviceable. This has been recognized by the General Assembly, which has increased the UNIFIL budget for the one year period beginning on 1 February 1991. It is thus all the more important that Member States should pay their assessments promptly and in full and that all remaining arrears should be cleared.

34. Finally, I wish to pay tribute to Lieutenant-General Lars-Eric Wahlgren, the Force Commander, and to all the men and women under his command and control, both military and civilian, for the courage and determination with which they have again faced a difficult mandate period. Their discipline and bearing have been of high order, reflecting credit on themselves, on their countries and on the United Nations.



