

**Security Council**

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**Letter dated 14 December 2023 from the Security Council
Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)
addressed to the President of the Security Council**

I have the honour to transmit herewith, as agreed among the representatives of the Security Council for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), my six-month report on the implementation of the resolution, which covers the period from 1 July 2023 to 14 December 2023.

I should be grateful if the present letter and the report could be issued as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Vanessa Frazier
Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of
resolution 2231 (2015)



Sixteenth six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

I. Introduction

1. The note by the President of the Security Council of 16 January 2016 (S/2016/44) sets forth the practical arrangements and procedures for the Council in carrying out tasks related to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), particularly with respect to the provisions specified in paragraphs 2 to 7 of annex B to that resolution.
2. According to the note, the Security Council should select, on an annual basis, one member to serve as its Facilitator for the functions specified therein. Pursuant to paragraph 3 of the note, and after consultations among the members of the Council, I was appointed as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) for the period ending 31 December 2023 (see S/2023/2/Rev.1).
3. It was also established in the note that the Facilitator should brief the other members of the Security Council on its work and the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) every six months, in parallel with the report submitted by the Secretary-General on the implementation of the resolution.
4. The present report covers the period from 1 July 2023 to 14 December 2023.

II. Summary of the activities of the Security Council in the “2231 format”

5. On 3 July 2023, the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations sent a letter addressed to the Secretary-General, the President of the Security Council and the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2023/496), in which he outlined the views of the Islamic Republic of Iran with regard to the fifteenth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2023/473), as described further in paragraph 9 of the present report.
6. On 6 July 2023, the Security Council was briefed (see S/PV.9367 and SC/15344) by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs on the fifteenth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2023/473), by me as Facilitator on the work of the Council and the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2023/488), and by the Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, on behalf of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in his capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Commission established in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, on the procurement channel (S/2023/479).
7. On 14 December 2023, the representatives of the Security Council for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) met in the “2231 format” and discussed the findings and recommendations of the sixteenth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the (S/2023/975).
8. During the reporting period, a total of 14 notes were circulated within the “2231 format”. In addition, a total of four official communications were sent to Member States and/or the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission, and a total of six communications from Member States and/or the Coordinator were received.

III. Monitoring the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

9. In the above-mentioned letter dated 3 July 2023 (S/2023/496), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran outlined the views and observations of his country regarding the fifteenth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). The letter contained nine points, in which the Permanent Representative noted, inter alia, that the report of the Secretary-General continued to “disregard the root causes of the current challenges of the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” which was “undeniably, the result of unilateral and illegal United States withdrawal” and “the ongoing effects of sanctions imposed and coercive measures”. Stating that the Islamic Republic of Iran had “engaged seriously and constructively” with the Plan of Action’s participants in “informal and formal talks”, he noted that the United States of America had “not been able to return to the full implementation of its commitments”. Further stating that his country had “continued its technical cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) constructively and in good faith” and that “progress has been made on safeguards issues”, he noted that “these results of constructive cooperation and file closure” had not been “duly acknowledged”. The letter also recalled that the Islamic Republic of Iran “categorically rejects the allegations, disinformation, and assessments reflected in the report” (S/2023/473, paras. 10, 14, 16, and 17).

10. During the reporting period, the Joint Commission did not convene. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action coordinator continued to consult with the Plan’s participants and the United States of America on addressing developments regarding the Plan of Action, towards the possible return by the United States to the Plan, and to ensure the full and effective implementation of the Plan by all.

11. In a letter dated 18 October 2023 (S/2023/786), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran conveyed a statement by his country, which noted that in accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), “all restrictions ... terminate[d] automatically” and that Member States were obligated to give “due regard” to these terminations. It also stated that any restrictions at the national or regional level, imposed and based on the resolution, “shall terminate, as of 18 October 2023” and that the Islamic Republic of Iran “reserve[d] its right to take appropriate response to any such measures and to secure its national interests in this respect.”

12. In a letter dated 23 October 2023 (S/2023/812), the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations conveyed a statement by his Ministry’s which noted that the requirements in the resolution had expired and “a series of practical steps” would need to be taken by specific countries in order to “lift the fundamentally illegal unilateral sanctions against Iran”. It also stated his country’s firm belief “in the need to rigorously comply with and execute to the letter” the Security Council’s resolutions in line with “the agreed parameters” and stated that it would continue to abide by its presidential executive order. It further stated that “attempts by Western countries to retrospectively rethink or to change the provisions contained in Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) and present this as an accomplished fact are illegal, detrimental and undermine the carefully crafted balance of interests which lies at the core of this resolution”.

13. In a letter dated 14 November 2023 (S/2023/875), the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations brought forth to the Security Council’s attention “violations” of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action by the Islamic

Republic of Iran as well as its decision “taken in full accordance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and with Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#)”. They noted the Islamic Republic of Iran’s “accumulated violations of its nuclear commitments”. They also underlined that “in full accordance with paragraph 36 of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the dispute resolution mechanism”, they have “exhausted all means at our disposal to bring Iran back to full compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action”. They also noted that “in a letter of 14 September 2023, the E3 Foreign Ministers duly notified the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Coordinator that (we) would treat this unresolved issue as grounds to recourse to provisions provided for under paragraph 36 of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” adding that “the E3 have, in good faith, strived to resolve the issues arising from Iran’s non-compliance through this procedure (dispute resolution mechanism) and beyond”. Regarding their “legitimate actions” taken on 18 October 2023, including not to take the steps specified in annex V, paragraph 20 to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, they explained that these were “serious but proportionate” and “reversible should Iran fully comply with its Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action commitments”.

14. In response to [S/2023/875](#), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in a letter dated 21 November 2023 ([S/2023/899](#)), underlined 10 points, noting, inter alia, that “the E3 falsely accused Iran of non-compliance with Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action commitments” and was “deliberately overlooking the root causes of the current Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action situation”. He also stated that “the E3 invocation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action dispute resolution mechanism ... in response to Iran’s remedial measures from May 2019 onward, [was] totally misleading and irrelevant”. Stating that his country’s decision and its objective was “to restore a balance in reciprocal commitments and benefits under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action”, he concluded that his country “stands prepared to resume the full implementation of its commitments” under the Plan “once all other participants fulfil their commitments in their entirety”.

15. In response to [S/2023/875](#), and further to their letter of 23 October 2023 ([S/2023/812](#), see para.12), the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, in a letter dated 5 December 2023 ([S/2023/965](#)), reiterated his country’s “principled position”. He stated that the “arguments” put forth by the Permanent Representatives “distort the facts” and “lack any legal or technical ground”. He also stated the “claims” regarding article 36 of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action “do not correspond to reality” and that the dispute resolution mechanism “has never been triggered due to considerable procedural gaps that were revealed in 2020” which “have not been addressed”. He urged the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom to “refrain from misleading the Security Council” and to “immediately return to the implementation of their obligations” under the resolution and to “recommit to joint efforts towards speedy restoration of the JCPOA”.

16. In line with paragraph 4 of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), in which the Security Council requested the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to provide regular updates to the Council on the implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and to report at any time on any issue of concern directly affecting the fulfilment of those commitments, the Director General submitted to the Agency’s Board of Governors, and to the Council, regular reports on 4 September 2023 ([S/2023/944](#)) (GOV/2023/39) and 15 November 2023 (GOV/2023/57) on the Agency’s verification and monitoring activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran in the light of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

17. Both reports again set out the Agency’s view that its Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action-related verification and monitoring has been “seriously affected” as a result

of the Islamic Republic of Iran's decision to stop implementing its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA (since 23 February 2021). They also noted that the situation was "exacerbated" by the country's "subsequent decision to remove all of the Agency's JCPOA-related surveillance and monitoring equipment" which had "detrimental implications" for the Agency's ability to "provide assurance of the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme". The reports further stated that "in the event of a full resumption of implementation by Iran of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA" the Agency would still "not be able to re-establish continuity of knowledge" and would "need to establish a new baseline", which would "pose major challenges". As such, "the development of specific arrangements" with the Islamic Republic of Iran would be "indispensable".

18. Regarding transparency measures, the September report stressed that the "de-designation of experienced Agency inspectors and denials of visas for Agency officials" was opposite to the cooperative relationship that should prevail mutually, while the November report stated that the Agency's Director General, in a letter dated 31 October 2023 to the Islamic Republic of Iran, requested that it "reconsider the withdrawal of the designations". In its response, the Islamic Republic of Iran reiterated its position and right to de-designate Agency inspectors and that it was "exploring possibilities to address the request ...". The November report concluded that the country's decision had "directly and seriously affected the Agency's ability to conduct its verification activities in Iran effectively, in particular at the enrichment facilities". Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran's total stockpile of enriched uranium, based on information as provided by the country and estimates as reflected in the September and November reports, the total increased from 3795.5 kg to 4486.8 kg (an increase of 691.3 kg), including an increase from 121.6 kg to 128.3 kg of uranium enriched up to 60 per cent U-235 (an increase of 6.7 kg).

19. Pursuant to annex B of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), the ballistic missile-related provisions on the Islamic Republic of Iran (paras. 3 and 4) and the assets freeze restrictions (para. 6 (c) and (d)) applied for eight years from the date of adoption of the Plan of Action, namely until 18 October 2023.

Ballistic missiles and launches¹

20. In a letter dated 9 October 2023 ([S/2023/747](#)), the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom stated that the 27 September 2023 flight test of the Qased space launch vehicle, which put the Noor-3 satellite into orbit, by the Islamic Republic of Iran was "inconsistent with paragraph 3 of annex B" of the resolution. Noting that the launch "was conducted by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, a military entity known to control Iran's strategic missile forces" and that the Qased space launch vehicle was also used previously "to place the Noor-1 and Noor-2 satellites into orbit in April 2020 and March 2022 respectively", they stated that "the development of this space launch vehicle [was] particularly significant due to its extensive cross-over of technologies with the development of long-range ballistic missiles". The representatives also referred to thirteen of their previous letters from 2018 to 2023, and stated that this launch "constitutes an enduring trend" by the Islamic Republic of Iran in "continuing to advance its ballistic missile capabilities despite the provisions in Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#)" and that the "launches of satellite vehicles provide Iran with empirical results that can be used to optimise capabilities ... of such (ballistic) systems". They also stated that "all

¹ Pursuant to annex B of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), the ballistic missile-related provisions on the Islamic Republic of Iran (paras. 3 and 4) and the assets freeze restrictions (para. 6 (c) and (d)) applied for eight years from the date of adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, namely until 18 October 2023.

of these missile launches and tests send a very destabilising message to the region and beyond”.

21. In response to the above-mentioned letter (S/2023/747), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in his letter dated 11 October 2023 (S/2023/753) stated that his country “categorically rejects unsubstantiated allegations made against it” and “has not conducted any activity inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015)”. Referring to its position as reflected in its previous letters (of 14 June 2023, 28 November, 24 October and 26 May 2022), he noted that his country “repeatedly has stated that its missile and space programs fall outside of the purview or competence of” the resolution and its annexes, and that it would continue such activities, which were “within its inherent rights under international law” and “necessary for the preservation of its security as well as economic interests”.

22. In response to the above-mentioned letter (S/2023/747), the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, in his letter dated 17 October 2023 (S/2023/785), noted that this letter contained “baseless accusations” against the Islamic Republic of Iran and emphasized his country’s “principled position” as reflected in its previous communications (of 13 July, 29 November, 6 and 7 December 2022; 23 May, 5 and 14 June 2023). He noted that there was no “credible basis” to state that the Islamic Republic of Iran undertook “any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons”, and further, “strongly reject[s] the false and timeserving logic ... that equates the development of space launch vehicles to the activities related to nuclear weapons and means of their delivery” which “questions legitimate rights of space-faring States for peacefully exploring outer space”. He further stated that his country “continues to proceed from its previous assessment that Iran is respecting in good faith” the call in paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231(2015).

23. In identical letters dated 21 November 2023 (S/2023/895), the Permanent Representative of Israel expressed his “deep concern” regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s “space launch vehicle launches with ballistic missile capabilities” in violation of resolution 2231 (2015). Referring to the 27 September 2023 flight test of the Qased space launch vehicle which “put the Noor-3 satellite into orbit”, he stated such was “a clear violation” of paragraph 3 of annex B to the resolution and called upon the Security Council “to condemn the Iranian regime for its recurring violations of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)”.

24. In response to S/2023/895, the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in his letter of 27 November 2023 (S/2023/917), stated that the letter’s claim was “completely unfounded”. He also noted that his country “has never taken any activity inconsistent with Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)”, and that “all its activities related to its missile and space programs” were “fully in compliance with its legitimate rights under international law” and “outside of the purview and competence” of the resolution and its annexes.

Transfers related to ballistic and cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (as defined in paragraph 4 of annex B)²

25. In a letter dated 4 August 2023 (S/2023/581), the Permanent Representative of the United States noted her country’s concern about “the continued transfer of hundreds of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) from Iran to Russia” in violation of resolution 2231 (2015). She stated that the Russian Federation was “procuring hundreds of additional Mohajer- and Shahed-series UAVs” from the Islamic Republic of Iran and receiving materials from and working with said country to “produce them

² Ibid.

inside Russia” – in violation of paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) and “without seeking approval from the Security Council”. She urged the Security Council “to insist on full implementation of all obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions” and for the Secretary-General to “order an investigation of Iran and Russia’s violations of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#)” and to “report back” to the Security Council.

26. In response to the above-mentioned letter ([S/2023/581](#)), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in his letter dated 17 August 2023 ([S/2023/610](#)), stated his “deep concern” regarding “ongoing politically motivated allegations” made against his country and stated that “all these bogus allegations [were] once again rejected”. Noting his country’s “unwavering commitment to impartiality in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine”, he stated that “a cynical effort” was being made to create “a false link” regarding “unsubstantiated claims about Iran”, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). He reiterated his country’s call upon the Secretariat to “dutifully accomplish its mandate” as articulated in the Note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2016/44](#)).

27. In response to the above-mentioned letter ([S/2023/581](#)), the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, in his letter dated 25 August 2023 ([S/2023/628](#)), reiterated his country’s principled position. He noted that the claims in the letter were “limited to some baseless allegations accompanied by speculative assumptions” and that his country had “already circulated detailed analysis regarding the groundless character of such allegations” in its previous communications. He noted that the mandate of the Secretariat, in the context of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), was outlined in the note by the President of the Security Council dated 16 January 2016 ([S/2016/44](#)) and that it was the Security Council that was “responsible for the monitoring of the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#)” and “should answer enquiries from Member States” regarding the implementation of the resolution as well as “respond appropriately to information regarding alleged actions inconsistent with the resolution”. He further stated that “attempts to give peremptory instructions to the Secretary-General and the Secretariat of the United Nations to conduct so called ‘investigations’” were “in direct violation of Article 100 of the Charter of the United Nations”.

28. In a letter dated 11 September 2023 ([S/2023/661](#)) with enclosures, the Permanent Representative of the United States conveyed her country’s “grave concern” regarding the Russian Federation’s “use of Iranian drones against Ukrainian cities and civilian infrastructure” and “cooperation with Iran ... to manufacture ‘thousands’ of attack drones” in violation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). She highlighted “recently declassified information” (enclosures) which “provide[d] additional clear evidence of Iran’s unauthorized supply of UAVs to Russia” and urged Member States and the Secretary-General to “closely review this new unclassified report” and to “assess the evidence and reach an independent conclusion”.

29. In response to the above-mentioned letter ([S/2023/661](#)), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in his letter dated 15 September 2023 ([S/2023/683](#)), noted the “repeated and baseless accusations and spread of misinformation” and “unsubstantiated claims” attempted to be levelled against his country, and stated that these “charges [were] once again rejected”. He also noted that the “so-called evidence” attached to the letter and presented was “utterly fabricated and devoid of any legal validity” and that the United States’ request to the Secretariat to conduct a “so-called investigation” into alleged violations of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) “lack[ed] a legal basis”.

30. In response to the above-mentioned letter ([S/2023/661](#)), the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, in his letter dated 4 October 2023

(S/2023/736), reiterated his country's position as mentioned in his previous letters of 23 May 2023 (S/2023/373), 14 June 2023 (S/2023/440), and 25 August 2023 (S/2023/628). Noting a "pattern of the groundless allegations spread previously in the Security Council", he stated that the "accusations" against the Islamic Republic of Iran were "not underpinned by any material evidence of the procedures established by resolution 2231 and its Annex B". He also stated that "neither it is possible to verify the genuine character of so-called 'evidence' brought by the United States nor to prove that it was collected in Ukraine". He also emphasized that the Secretariat's tasks vis-à-vis the resolution were "exhaustively enumerated" in the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2016/44) and that his country would regard "any non-mandated activity" as "deliberate provocations" with the aim of "undermining" the implementation of the resolution and the multilateral process of restoration of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

31. In identical letters dated 29 November 2023 (S/2023/928 and S/2023/929) and 4 December 2023 (S/2023/948), the Permanent Representative of Israel expressed his "deep concern" regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran's "proliferation of delivery systems – missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles" including "by supplying the Iranian-backed militias operating in Syria, before 18 October 2023" and "the Houthis, before 18 October 2023, with weapons and means to carry out the launches" towards Israel and "foster instability in the Middle East".

32. In response to the aforementioned letters (S/2023/928, S/2023/929 and S/2023/948), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in his letters dated 4 and 5 December 2023 (S/2023/951 and S/2023/959), stated that the "allegations" in these letters were "entirely groundless [and] baseless", and "categorically [and] unequivocally rejected". He also stated that the letters' claims lacked "both legal foundation and credibility". He emphasized that his country "remains steadfast in its commitment to upholding the provisions of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)" and cautioned against "any potential misuse" and "to manipulate" the format of resolution 2231 (2015) by "the Israeli regime".

33. In a letter dated 13 December 2023 (S/2023/986), the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation stated his country's principled position regarding the "so-called 'violations' of paragraph 4" and noted that "recent relevant claims circulated in the Security Council" were "not substantiated with any proofs" and "do not provide corroboration that alleged supplies took place prior to 18 October 2023". He also stated that his country rejects the "persistent attempts of some States to inflate ... with anti-Iranian accusations" the reports of the Secretary-General and the Facilitator, which was "detrimental to multilateral efforts aimed at speedy restoration of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action".

IV. Procurement channel approval, notifications and exemptions

34. During the reporting period, no new proposals for the supply of items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in document INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 were submitted to the Security Council.

35. Since Implementation Day, a total of 52 proposals to participate in or permit the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), have been submitted to the Security Council by five Member States from three different regional groups, including States that are not participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. To date, of the 52 proposals that have been processed, 37 have been approved, 5 were not approved and 10 were withdrawn. On average, the proposals were processed through the procurement channel in 50 calendar days. After the withdrawal of the

United States of America from the Plan of Action, the procurement channel continues to function, and the Joint Commission continues to stand ready to review proposals.

36. According to paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), certain nuclear-related activities do not require approval but do require a notification to the Security Council or to both the Council and the Joint Commission. In this regard, during the reporting period, three notifications were submitted to the Council in relation to the transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran of equipment and technology covered by annex B, section 1 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part 1, intended for light water reactors.

37. No notifications were submitted to the Security Council related to the necessary modification of the two cascades at the Fordow facility for stable isotope production, and [no] notifications were submitted to the Council related to the modernization of the Arak reactor based on the agreed conceptual design.

38. On 5 December 2023, the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group transmitted to me the Group's sixteenth six-month report of the Joint Commission ([S/2023/963](#)) in accordance with paragraph 6.10 of annex IV to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

V. Other approval and exemption requests³

39. During the reporting period, no proposal was submitted by Member States to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

40. Exemptions to the assets freeze provisions are contained in paragraph 6 (d) of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). No exemption requests were received or granted by the Security Council in relation to the 23 individuals and 61 entities on the list maintained pursuant to the resolution prior to 18 October 2023.

41. On 17 October 2023, the Secretariat informed the "2231 format" that it would undertake specific administrative actions on 19 October 2023, due to the eight-year period ending on 18 October 2023, pertaining to the restrictive measures in paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 (c and d) of annex B to the resolution. This included the removal of the 23 individuals and 61 entities maintained pursuant to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) (the 2231 List) from the Security Council website and corresponding changes to the Security Council Consolidated List.

VI. Transparency, outreach and guidance

42. As the Security Council's Facilitator, I am deeply committed to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action as endorsed by the Council in its resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). I will seek to further facilitate, strengthen, and promote the implementation of the resolution, as my predecessors did before me, and I firmly believe that dialogue, transparency and the utilization of the procurement channel remain critical for the present and the future. I welcome efforts by all Member States in engaging in dialogue and in acknowledging the importance of the Plan as a multilateral agreement in nuclear non-proliferation.

43. Outreach activities by the Secretariat, as mandated by the note mentioned in paragraph 1 of the present report ([S/2016/44](#)), continue to foster awareness of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). The website on the resolution, also managed and regularly updated by the Secretariat through the Security Council Affairs Division of the

³ Ibid.

Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, continues to provide relevant and updated information.

44. In drafting the present report, numerous bilateral consultations with Member States and their representatives were held, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, to discuss issues relevant to the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). In my role as Facilitator, I advocate for the Security Council's collective responses to international peace and security issues. I also encourage the international community to act in line with paragraph 2 of the resolution, which calls upon all Member States, regional organizations and international organizations to take such actions as may be appropriate to fully support the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
