



安全理事会

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2023 年 2 月 21 日也门问题专家小组给安全理事会主席的信

也门问题专家小组成员谨随信转递专家小组根据第 2624(2022)号决议第 16 段编写的最后报告。

已于 2022 年 12 月 30 日将报告提交安全理事会第 2140(2014)号决议所设委员会，委员会于 2023 年 2 月 20 日审议了报告。

请提请安全理事会成员注意本信和报告并将其作为安理会文件分发给荷。

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安全理事会第 2140(2014)号决议所设也门问题专家小组的最后报告

摘要

也门正面临一场棘手的政治和经济危机。从军事角度看，在 2021 年 12 月至 2022 年 3 月本报告所述期间第一阶段，胡塞武装不仅加紧在也门境内发动袭击，而且加强了对沙特阿拉伯和阿拉伯联合酋长国的袭击，使用弹道导弹、巡航导弹以及携带爆炸物的“自杀式”无人驾驶飞行器进行攻击。1 月 17 日，胡塞武装对阿布扎比发动前所未有的袭击，造成平民伤亡。2 月 28 日，安全理事会通过决议，以最强烈的措辞谴责针对沙特阿拉伯和阿拉伯联合酋长国发动的令人发指的恐怖主义袭击。胡塞武装声称对这些袭击负责，进而导致“在也门支持合法性联盟”作出军事回应，对胡塞武装目标发动一系列攻击，同样造成平民伤亡。

联合国促成的休战于 4 月 2 日开始生效，在长达 6 个月的第二阶段，局势相对平静。从荷台达港进口石油的活动恢复，而且从萨那起飞的有限商业航班已运载超过 42 500 名乘客，从而使胡塞武装控制区居民的人道主义状况得到改善。也门政府利用这一相对和平的环境，采取了若干措施促进经济改革，包括努力增加原油出口。9 月，胡塞武装在荷台达和萨那举行了大型阅兵式，展示新型导弹、无人驾驶飞行器、水雷和其他武器。不过，休战并未持续多久。胡塞武装不但提出支付其军事人员薪金的无理要求，而且拒绝解除对塔伊兹的围困，因此 10 月 2 日之后没有延长休战。

国际社会显然愿意对胡塞武装的要求让步，尽管主要目的是维持休战，但却使胡塞武装更加大胆，改变了战略。在休战之后的第三阶段，胡塞武装不仅继续要求支付薪金，而且试图拒绝也门政府从原油出口中获得收入。胡塞武装的战略是打击合法政府的经济能力，使政府控制区的经济陷入不稳定状态。胡塞武装在这方面采取的一些措施包括：禁止使用亚丁的也门中央银行发行的纸币；采取分裂银行和经济部门的政策；攻击总部设在亚丁的电信公司的资产；威胁、袭击港口、石油码头和从事石油出口的船只；批准一项禁止银行和商业交易利息的新法律。也门一直存在双重货币、实施双重汇率、对货物内部流动施加限制、进行双重征税，并以非法征收税费的形式开展寻租活动。这些经济障碍以及胡塞武装的军事袭击对也门的和平、安全与稳定构成严重威胁。

据报，与政府结盟的部队和胡塞武装在夏卜瓦、马里卜、荷台达、贝达、达利、焦夫、萨达和塔伊兹发生冲突。2022 年，与政府结盟的部队在阿比扬和夏卜瓦发动了打击阿拉伯半岛基地组织的反恐怖主义行动。*Safer* 号船只继续对也门和该区域构成潜在的环境和人道主义威胁。联合国采取了几项措施实施救助计划，不过，*Safer* 号的销售收入和所储石油的所有权问题仍未解决。

在本报告所述期间，向胡塞武装供应武器的模式基本未变：大多数武器、弹药和相关物项利用传统帆船(三角帆船)和较小船只在阿拉伯海上进行走私。专家小组正在调查 7 起新的海上走私案件，其中一些涉及贩运化肥和其他化学品，这

些物项可能用作制造爆炸物的前体，也可能用作固体燃料推进剂的氧化剂。与通常运往也门东南部政府名义控制区海滩的武器和弹药不同，这些化学品经由吉布提走私到胡塞武装控制的红海港口。专家小组还在调查将反坦克制导弹发射箱藏在商用卡车内穿越与阿曼接壤的陆地边界进行走私的事件。专家小组在也门和阿曼发现了一个胡塞武装关联分子网络，该网络招募船员，协助他们穿越政府控制的领土，并为他们安排车辆和船只。专家小组表示注意到，一些会员国指控有三角帆船在伊朗港口装载货物。专家小组从导航装置以及一艘船上发现的无人驾驶飞行器中取得全球导航卫星系统坐标，这些坐标显示了伊朗伊斯兰共和国境内或附近地点。虽然专家小组无法独立核实指控的所有细节，但注意到，一些被扣三角帆船船员提供的情况似乎支持这一说法。专家小组还坚持其长期立场，认为一些缴获武器(如在阿曼边境缴获的反坦克制导弹)的技术特征和标识与伊朗伊斯兰共和国制造的武器一致，而像 2021 年 12 月缴获的突击步枪和弹药等其他武器，很可能最初由其他会员国向伊朗伊斯兰共和国境内实体提供。

在国内政治方面，也门政府在休战后立即接受了新的集体治理机制，即总统领导委员会。委员会虽然没有真正的凝聚力，但似乎更具包容性和代表性。然而，委员会成员有着不同的政治愿望和议程，一些成员在捐助者的财政支助和其他支持下，拥有自己的武装部队，并对领土实施实际控制。另一项挑战是将这些武装部队纳入统一指挥之下，为此成立了联合安全和军事委员会。总统领导委员会的凝聚力仍然薄弱。在过去几个月内，一些武装团体之间发生了冲突。如果不阻止胡塞武装发动袭击，总统领导委员会作为民族阵线的继续存在可能在未来受到严重挑战。

关于金融制裁，被指认的个人、代表此类个人或按其指示行事者以及由其拥有或控制的实体继续违反安全理事会第 2140(2014)号决议规定的制裁制度，直接或间接接收、拥有或控制资金、其他金融资产和经济资源。胡塞武装继续控制合法和非法收入来源，即关税、税收、天课、非税收收入和非法费用。他们对矿产、碳氢化合物、水和渔业等部门的许多经济活动征收胡姆斯(五分之一)税，这一新税的受益者包括胡塞家族及其若干效忠者。房地产是为胡塞武装创造大量收入的又一部门。在本报告所述期间，胡塞武装强行没收了大片土地和建筑物。胡塞武装还利用各种电信公司发送数百万条信息，为其战争活动寻求支助和财政捐助。休战协定签署后，通过荷台达港进口的石油大幅增加。4 月 1 日至 11 月 30 日，共有 69 艘船只抵达港口，装载石油衍生物 1 810 498 吨。相比之下，2021 年 1 月至 12 月期间，有 30 艘船只进口了 535 069 吨燃料衍生物。这使胡塞武装在 2022 年 4 月至 11 月期间获得约 2 719.35 亿也门里亚尔的关税收入。胡塞武装没有将这笔收入用于支付公务员薪金，这违反了斯德哥尔摩协议。尽管胡塞武装获得这些税收收入，但却继续通过其经销商网络赚取非法费用，有时制造人为的燃料短缺，以便为其贸易商创造在黑市出售石油的机会，并从这种销售中收取非法费用。船只的清关时间显著缩短。2022 年 11 月，联合国核查和视察机制的最短清关时间仅为 1 小时，平均清关时间为 3 小时。11 月，联盟控制区的平均清关时间为 5.3 天，而休战前某些月份的最长平均清关时间为 50.3 天。

冲突各方，特别是胡塞武装，继续严重违反国际人道法和国际人权法，包括无差别或针对平民和民用基础设施发动军事袭击。胡塞武装还继续对平民实施任意拘留、酷刑、强迫失踪和其他严重侵权行为，既没有问责机制，也没有向幸存者提供支助，或向受害者家属提供救济。此外，胡塞武装继续向儿童灌输思想，在部队中招募和使用儿童，包括把儿童作为战斗人员，这违反了胡塞武装的法律义务以及 2022 年 4 月与联合国签署的防止和终止招募儿童和其他严重侵犯儿童行为的行动计划。

针对人道主义人员的暴力行为、对人道主义工作者和行动施加的行动限制以及胡塞武装和政府附属团体对人道主义活动的干扰，继续阻碍向数百万急需援助或保护的平民提供和分发人道主义援助。地雷和未爆弹药广泛无差别的使用，主要是在前线地区的使用，继续对平民(主要是妇女和儿童)造成大量伤亡，限制了人道主义准入，阻碍了援助行动。

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* 附件仅以来件所用语文分发，未经正式编辑。

一. 导言

1. 本报告根据 2624(2022)号决议第 16 段向安全理事会提交，所述期间为 2021 年 12 月 6 日至 2022 年 11 月 30 日，¹ 其中介绍了 S/2022/50 号文件所载也门问题专家小组 2022 年 1 月 26 日最后报告所述调查工作的最新结果。
2. 专家小组遵守了第 2624(2022)号决议第 22 段的规定，该段涉及安全理事会制裁的一般性问题非正式工作组建议的最佳做法和方法(S/2006/997)。专家小组着力遵守关于透明度、客观性和信息来源、书面证据、对可核实的独立消息来源进行确证以及提供答辩机会的标准。² 根据第 2624(2022)号决议第 17 段，专家小组与分析支助和制裁监测组及索马里问题专家小组保持了合作。
3. 秘书长于 2022 年 5 月 17 日任命了专家小组三名成员，即武器、金融和国际人道法专家(见 S/2022/411)。武器和金融专家的合同于 5 月 23 日生效，国际人道法专家的合同于 6 月 1 日生效。秘书长于 2022 年 10 月 5 日任命了武装团体问题专家(见 S/2022/773)，她的合同于 10 月 12 日开始。在上一报告期内，专家小组区域问题专家于 2021 年 7 月 31 日辞职。尽管秘书处作出努力，但截至本报告编写时尚未任命继任者。由于专家任命较晚，专家小组没有足够时间更详细地述及其任务授权的所有领域。
4. 在本报告所述期间，专家小组访问了巴林、吉布提、埃及、沙特阿拉伯、阿拉伯联合酋长国、大不列颠及北爱尔兰联合王国和也门(穆卡拉、盖代、尼什屯、亚丁和 Shahn 边防哨所)。³ 专家小组还收到访问伊朗伊斯兰共和国和阿曼的邀请，但由于不可控的情况而无法在拟议期间前往。不过，专家小组于 2023 年 1 月访问了阿曼。专家小组在沙特阿拉伯、阿拉伯联合酋长国、联合王国和也门对武器、导弹部件和相关物项以及导弹和无人驾驶飞行器的碎片进行了检查。专家小组会见了也门总理和其他政府部长和官员。
5. 专家小组已发出 95 封正式信函，其中 77 封发给 24 个会员国，18 封发给 10 个组织、实体和公司。截至 2022 年 12 月 9 日，37 封信函仍待答复(见附件 3)。

二. 影响和平、安全与稳定的事态发展

6. 本报告所述期间的军事发展大致可分为三个阶段。2022 年第一季度，胡塞武装发动的跨境袭击加剧，随后“在也门支持合法性联盟”作出军事回应。第二阶段是持续 6 个月的脆弱休战期，休战由联合国促成，于 10 月 2 日结束。在休战后的第三阶段，和平再次遭到破坏，延长休战的谈判十分艰难。这在很大程度上是由于胡塞武装提出支付军事人员和安全人员薪金的无理要求，并拒绝解除对塔伊兹的围困。

¹ 专家小组 2022 年 1 月 26 日的最后报告(S/2022/50)反映了截至 2021 年 12 月 5 日发生的事件。本报告反映了截至 2022 年 11 月 30 日的实地事件，并考虑到截至 2022 年 12 月 9 日收到的对专家小组问题的答复。

² 关于专家小组的方法和答辩机会的更多信息载于附件 1。

³ 也门境内各主要地点的拼写均遵循附件 2 中的联合国地理信息系统地图所用拼写。

7. 2022 年第一季度，胡塞武装继续使用弹道导弹和巡航导弹组合以及携带爆炸物的“自杀式”无人驾驶飞行器，对沙特阿拉伯和阿拉伯联合酋长国的目标进行空袭。1 月 17 日，胡塞武装对阿布扎比一个燃料库和阿布扎比国际机场一座未使用的客运大楼发动前所未有的袭击，造成 3 名平民死亡，8 人受伤(见第 17 段)。2 月 28 日，安全理事会通过第 2624(2022)号决议，以最强烈的措辞谴责对沙特阿拉伯和阿拉伯联合酋长国发动的令人发指的恐怖主义袭击。1 月 20 日和 21 日，联盟作出回应，对也门胡塞武装控制区的目标发动一系列空袭(见第 103 段)。

8. 休战取得了积极成果，包括恢复从荷台达港进口石油和石油衍生物，以满足胡塞武装控制区人民的需要，以及恢复从萨那起飞的数量有限的商业航班。最初在向乘客发放护照方面遇到的障碍得到解决，政府同意持胡塞武装签发护照的个人进行国际旅行。这极大便利了为人道主义需求而设法出国旅行的个人。5 月 16 日至 11 月底，萨那和安曼之间开设了几次航班，有 21 879 名乘客从萨那飞往安曼，20 652 名乘客从安曼飞往萨那。萨那和开罗之间仅在 6 月 1 日进行了一次往返飞行。

9. 关于休战的让步主要由政府和联盟作出，满足了胡塞武装的两项关键要求。尽管当地冲突各方之间没有发生重大军事冲突或转移，但胡塞武装并未撤到《斯德哥尔摩协议》商定的阵地。他们既不同意重新开放被围困的塔伊兹市与其他省份之间的公路，也不同意用从荷台达进口石油所得的收入支付公务员薪金。

10. 胡塞武装提出支付薪金的要求，作为进一步延长休战的先决条件，是因为政府在战前的石油收入占国家预算的 70%。然而，政府称，虽然 2014 年石油收入超过 50 亿美元，但由于战争，在本报告编写时这项收入已降至不足 10 亿美元。政府告知专家小组，由于资源短缺，它在支付雇员薪金方面面临困难，并表示，薪金问题必须在全面处理公共收入的框架内得到解决，包括处理来自荷台达港的收入和胡塞武装征收的其他税收。政府要求国际社会发挥明确作用，为也门所有地区的薪金赤字提供资金，并解决胡塞武装制造的货币分裂问题。

11. 冲突各方还利用休战期作为战略间歇，重新集结和补充部队，以应对新一轮敌对行动。10 月 1 日，胡塞武装发表声明，威胁石油公司称，从次日下午 6 时起，将发布一项指令，禁止石油公司进入政府控制的港口出口石油。胡塞武装还向油轮发出警告(见第 24 段)，并使用无人驾驶飞行器对港口、石油码头和油轮发动多次袭击(见第 23 段)。胡塞武装在各条战线的军事行动升级，特别是马里卜、塔伊兹、达利、阿比扬、拉赫季、焦夫、贝达和荷台达战线，政府部队也对袭击作出回应。许多袭击违反国际人道法，导致平民丧生、民用基础设施受损。由于石油设施遭到袭击，也门政府国防委员会于 10 月 22 日发布 2022 年第 1 号决议，将胡塞武装指认为恐怖主义组织(见附件 4)。政府还敦促国际社会将胡塞武装指认为恐怖主义组织，并要求联合国冻结根据《斯德哥尔摩协议》开展的工作。政府告知专家小组，它承诺尽量减少指认胡塞武装为恐怖主义组织所产生的商业和人道主义影响，但计划采取后续行动，如冻结某些个人和实体的资产。

12. 国内政治格局出现转变。休战开始几天后，政府接受了新的集体治理机制。也门总统阿卜杜拉布·曼苏尔·哈迪被总统领导委员会取代。该委员会虽然没有真正的凝聚力，但似乎更具包容性和代表性，既包括来自南北两方和来自军队团体的领导人，又包括地方和省级领导人。总统领导委员会成员有不同的政治议程，有些成员拥有自己的武装部队，并对领土实施实际控制。目前还有待观察这些成

员能否搁置分歧、作为有代表性的集体治理机构成员而共同努力，帮助促进也门的利益，为该国带来真正持久的和平。过去几个月内，一些地方一级的冲突已浮出水面。将不同的武装部队纳入统一指挥之下仍是一项挑战。为了根据权力移交宣言第 5 条的规定改组武装部队和安全部队，成立了联合安全和军事委员会。胡塞武装采取咄咄逼人的姿态，公开挑战国际社会，并再度强势实施威胁和发动袭击。如果不阻止他们继续发动袭击，总统领导委员会作为有凝聚力的全国性统一阵线的继续存在今后可能会受到严重挑战。

三. 威胁和平、安全和稳定的武装团体活动


13. 根据安全理事会第 2140(2014)号决议第 17 段，并经安理会第 2216(2015)号决议重申，专家小组继续调查可能参与或支持与威胁也门和平、安全或稳定的武装团体有关联的个人和实体。

A. 胡塞武装对沙特阿拉伯和阿拉伯联合酋长国的袭击

14. 专家小组继续监测对沙特阿拉伯和阿拉伯联合酋长国发动的空袭。2022 年第一季度发生了大量袭击事件，随着休战开始，⁴ 袭击几乎完全停止，2022 年 10 月休战期结束后没有恢复袭击。地图 1 显示了袭击的概况。

地图 1

2021 年 12 月以来对沙特阿拉伯和阿拉伯联合酋长国发动的导弹和无人驾驶飞行器袭击



资料来源：专家小组。

⁴ 专家小组注意到，有报告称，6 月 30 日，胡塞武装对沙特 Khamis Mushayt 空军基地发动了一次导弹袭击，但联盟从未证实这一消息。见 <https://crisis24.garda.com/alerts/2022/06/saudi-arabia-air-defense-forces-intercept-al-houthi-launched-missile-targeting-khamis-mushait-june-30>。

15. 2021 年 12 月 7 日，胡塞武装发动了“12 月 7 日”军事行动。据胡塞武装发言人 Yahya Sare'e 称，此次行动涉及使用弹道导弹和无人驾驶飞行器对利雅得、吉达、吉赞、纳季兰和阿西尔等地的军事目标发动袭击，⁵ 其中一些导弹和飞行器被沙特部队拦截。联盟部队同天对萨那、马里卜和焦夫省的目标进行了“精确轰炸”。⁶

16. 2022 年 1 月 1 日，巨人旅在也门政府授权下，在夏卜瓦省发起“南方旋风”行动，重新控制了 Usaylan 和 Bayhan 两个区的中心地带。巨人旅发言人 1 月 10 日发表声明宣布，该旅在行动第三阶段将胡塞武装赶出艾因，并控制了夏卜瓦。他还感谢沙特阿拉伯领导的联盟和阿拉伯联合酋长国的支持。⁷

17. 阿拉伯联合酋长国对“南方旋风”行动的支持引发胡塞武装发动“也门旋风”行动，⁸ 对沙特阿拉伯和阿拉伯联合酋长国境内目标发动一系列袭击。1 月 17 日对两国目标的一系列袭击是政治上最重要的事态发展。上午 9 时 49 分(当地时间)，一枚巡航导弹击中阿布扎比国际机场尚未使用的新客运大楼，两分钟后，第二枚巡航导弹击中同一大楼。袭击造成两名平民工人受伤。上午 10 时(当地时间)，第三枚巡航导弹在阿布扎比 Musaffah 工业区的阿布扎比国家石油公司燃料库爆炸，造成 3 名平民死亡，6 人受伤(见图一)。第二轮袭击于同日上午 11 时 24 分至下午 5 时 34 分(当地时间)发生，共有 10 架无人驾驶飞行器攻击沙特阿拉伯和阿拉伯联合酋长国境内若干目标。其中 7 架被防空部队拦截，2 架撞向 Najran 机场，使一个机库受损，第 10 架在沙漠中坠毁。第三轮攻击包括下午 8 时 56 分(当地时间)发射的三枚弹道导弹，这些导弹被全部拦截。专家小组于 2022 年 3 月检查了导弹和无人驾驶飞行器的碎片(见附件 5)，并注意到巡航导弹具有与 Quds 2 型导弹一致的特征，无人驾驶飞行器具有与 Sammad 3 型一致的特征，弹道导弹具有与 Zulfiqar 导弹一致的特征，所有这些都是已知胡塞武装使用的武器系统。胡塞武装发言人代表胡塞武装声称对袭击负责，还威胁将袭击扩大到包括“外国公司、阿拉伯联合酋长国公民和居民”等目标。⁹ 专家小组注意到，胡塞武装控制区与阿布扎比之间相距约 1 400 公里，超出 Quds -2 型导弹的已知射程(处于无人驾驶飞行器和弹道导弹射程的最远端)，这增加了至少一些导弹是从政府名义控制的领土上发射的可能性。

⁵ 见 https://twitter.com/Yahya_Saree/status/1468134936561561604。

⁶ 见 www.thenationalnews.com/gulf-news/saudi-arabia/2021/12/07/photos-show-charred-wreckage-of-drone-after-missile-shot-down-over-riyadh。

⁷ 见 www.alwatan.net/news/181735。

⁸ 见 https://twitter.com/Yahya_Saree/status/1483174258150977542。

⁹ 见 https://twitter.com/Yahya_Saree/status/1483170723938115591?ext=HHt%20wWjoC52cn6o5UpAAAA。

图一

2022 年 1 月 17 日阿布扎比国家石油公司设施遇袭



资料来源：机密。

18. 1 月 24 日再次发生袭击事件。防空部队拦截了两枚以阿布扎比为目标的弹道导弹，还有数目不详的无人驾驶飞行器据称以迪拜为目标。胡塞武装发言人称，导弹的目标是 Dhafra 空军基地。¹⁰ 没有关于人员伤亡或民用设施受损的报告。对阿拉伯联合酋长国的第三次袭击发生在 1 月 31 日，防空系统拦截了至少一枚弹道导弹。胡塞武装声称袭击目标是阿布扎比和迪拜。¹¹ 此外，2 月 2 日拂晓，防空部队拦截了 3 架“怀有敌意”进入该国领空的无人驾驶飞行器。¹² 一个隐秘的伊拉克民兵组织¹³ Alwiyyat al-Wa‘d al-Haqq (真实誓言旅)¹⁴ 声称对此次袭击负责。¹⁵ 无人驾驶飞行器的技术特征与胡塞武装自 2019 年以来使用的 Sammad 型无人驾驶飞行器一致(见附件 5)。虽然此次袭击本身没有造成任何损害，但值得注意的是，这显示胡塞武装与 Alwiyyat al-Wa‘d al-Haqq 使用的是设计相同的武器系统，而且也再次显示胡塞武装与伊拉克境内武装团体之间的政治和军事合作程度。

¹⁰ 见 <https://twitter.com/AlMayadeenNews/status/1485514027451224065>。

¹¹ 见 www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/31/uae-intercepts-houthi-missile-as-israeli-president-visits。

¹² 见 https://twitter.com/modgovae/status/1488959624913072132?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1488959624913072132%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Esl_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.aljazeera.com%2Fnews%2F2022%2F2%2F2Fuae-destroys-three-drones-with-hostile-intent-ministry。

¹³ 见 www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-alwiyyat-al-waad-al-haq。

¹⁴ 见 <https://twitter.com/HamdiAMalik/status/1488908963068272642>。

¹⁵ 见 <https://t.me/sabreenS1/17955>。

19. 3 月 10 日至 26 日，胡塞武装分三个阶段¹⁶ 对沙特阿拉伯发动“打破包围”行动，旨在回应胡塞武装所称对其人民不公正的包围和对进口石油衍生物的阻挠。沙特阿美公司在利雅得的炼油厂以及艾卜哈、Khamis Mushayt、吉赞、Samtah 和 Dhahran al-Janub 的目标据称也遭到袭击。

20. 与前几年一样，胡塞武装的大多数目标是靠近也门边境的民用设施，这些设施遭到短程 Qasef 2 型无人驾驶飞行器 and Badr 型火箭弹的袭击。这种袭击模式的例子还有 2 月 10 日一架无人驾驶飞行器在艾卜哈国际机场上空爆炸，造成 12 名平民受伤。¹⁷ 不过，胡塞武装还继续对沙特阿拉伯境内纵深的目标采取行动，如 3 月 25 日发动的袭击。¹⁸ 这种惯用手段包括使用单个无人驾驶飞行器或火箭频繁袭击也门边境附近的目标，有时每天发动袭击。与此种手段相结合的是使用多种更先进的武器系统对多个目标发动罕见的“大规模”袭击。这也可能表明胡塞武装的武器供应网络有限，因为 Quds 2 型巡航导弹无疑是胡塞武装最有效的武器系统，但却需要从国外走私部件(见第 51 段)。

B. 胡塞武装对也门政府的袭击

21. 2022 年 1 月初，与阿拉伯联合酋长国结盟的巨人旅将胡塞武装赶出夏卜瓦，逆转了胡塞武装的优势，并推进到马里卜南部。5 月，马里卜和塔伊兹的局势仍然高度紧张。8 月，胡塞武装试图控制最后一条由政府控制的通往塔伊兹市的主要道路。¹⁹

22. 休战期间，马里卜、荷台达、贝达和达利阿等省偶尔发生冲突。休战结束后，前线没有发动重大军事进攻，但在塔伊兹、拉赫季和荷台达前线发生了激烈冲突。随着胡塞武装向马里卜南部和贝达东北部增派部队，巨人旅将几个营部署到马里卜-夏卜瓦边界。11 月，据报在夏卜瓦、马里卜、贝达、达利阿和阿比扬也发生了冲突。²⁰

C. 胡塞武装对石油工业的袭击

23. 10 月 2 日，胡塞武装任命的交通部长发布通知，威胁油轮不得从也门政府控制的港口或码头运输石油(见附件 6)。自那时起，胡塞武装在哈德拉毛的 Dubbah 和夏卜瓦的 Balhaf 和加纳对油轮发动了袭击。

24. 胡塞武装在袭击前从电子邮件地址 ycg@yemen.net.ye 和 operations@maa.gov.ye 向船旗国、航运公司和船长发出威胁信息，警告他们停止

¹⁶ 见 https://twitter.com/Yahya_Saree/status/1502365588110327820;
https://twitter.com/Yahya_Saree/status/1505508989924225025;
https://twitter.com/Yahya_Saree/status/1505637253653139466。

¹⁷ 见 www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-led-coalition-says-destroyed-drone-launched-towards-abha-airport-4-injured-2022-02-10。

¹⁸ 见 www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/25/houthi-escalate-attacks-saudi-arabia-strike-oil-facility。

¹⁹ 见 <https://sanaacenter.org>。

²⁰ 见 <https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/november-2022/19203>。

从也门“油田、码头和港口”运输石油。还使用推特账号@Yahya_Saree 和 @army21ye 发出类似威胁(见附件 6)。这一行动增加了联盟作出军事反应的风险, 对国际航运和航行自由构成威胁。

D. 打击阿拉伯半岛基地组织的行动

25. 阿拉伯半岛基地组织通过绑架勒索、抢掠、抢劫和海外汇款增加收入。²¹ 2 月 10 日, 5 名联合国人员在返回亚丁途中在阿比扬省被绑架。被绑架者中有 4 人是也门国民, 另外 1 人是孟加拉国国民。

26. 阿拉伯半岛基地组织还涉嫌于 3 月 6 日在马里卜-哈德拉毛边界附近绑架了无国界医生组织的两名外国人员, 但却没有声称对绑架事件负责。无国界医生组织最初暂停了 5 个中心之一的工作, 但其业务受影响长达 6 个月, 而且由于无法使用事件发生地的道路, 其外雇人员的行动自由继续受到影响。²² 6 月初, 阿拉伯半岛基地组织好战分子在阿比扬绑架并处决了安全地带部队一名后勤干事,²³ 该团体还涉嫌在阿比扬和达利阿使用简易爆炸装置发动袭击, 包括 3 月 15 日在津吉巴尔市袭击安全地带部队领导人。²⁴

27. 阿拉伯半岛基地组织在阿比扬省和夏卜瓦省设有据点。8 月 22 日, 在阿比扬和夏卜瓦对该团体发起了一次名为“东方之箭”的反恐怖主义行动。南方过渡委员会代表告知专家小组, 该行动由南方过渡委员会和政府安全部队开展, 目的是清除阿拉伯半岛基地组织在阿姆兰河谷的传统据点(见附件 7)。根据该委员会主席 Aidarous Zubaidi 的声明, 此次行动的目的还包括“保护连接南部各省的道路, 制止武器越过阿比扬省海岸走私到胡塞武装控制区, 并打击基地组织”。²⁵

28. 阿拉伯半岛基地组织声称, 9 月 11 日和 12 日在夏卜瓦和阿比扬开展了名为“真理之箭”的反击行动, 包括设置路边炸弹、突袭军营和用摩托车发动袭击(见附件 7)。

E. *FSO Safer* 号

29. 如果浮式储油和卸油船只 *FSO Safer* 号进一步腐蚀, 就可能导致重大漏油事故, 从而对也门和该区域构成严重的环境和人道主义威胁。潜在的泄漏后清理费用估计为 200 亿美元。

30. 据估计, 停泊在红海荷台达附近的 *Safer* 号装载了 114 万桶轻质原油。该船建于 1976 年, 1987 年被改装为用于出口原油的浮式储油和卸油船。*Safer* 号通过一条 430 公里长的管道与马里卜油田相连, 发挥着拉斯伊萨海运码头的作用。2015 年, 胡塞武装控制该船, 此后一直未投入使用。²⁶

²¹ 见 <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N22/394/29/PDF/N2239429.pdf?OpenElement>。

²² 2022 年 12 月, 与无国界医生组织的小组讨论。

²³ 2022 年 11 月, 在亚丁与安全地带高级指挥官的小组讨论。

²⁴ 同上。

²⁵ 见 <https://al-ain.com/article/1661194108>。

²⁶ 见 www.shipspotting.com/photos/3262533。

31. 2021 年 9 月，联合国指示也门驻地兼人道主义协调员与所有相关利益攸关方协商制定一项计划，以减轻环境灾难的威胁。也门政府和胡塞武装都同意，必须解决 *Safer* 号的问题。2022 年 7 月 5 日，也门政府石油和矿产部同意联合国应急计划第一阶段工作，即将石油从 *Safer* 号转移至另一艘船，9 月 4 日同意该计划第二阶段工作，即以安全的方式长期更换该船。²⁷

32. 3 月 5 日，胡塞武装与联合国签署谅解备忘录，建立了合作框架。11 月 18 日，该团体与联合国达成协议，同意寻找一艘同等船只，将原油从 *Safer* 号运至该船。²⁸

33. 执行这项行动的费用总额估计为 1.13 亿美元，其中已认捐 8 200 万美元。²⁹ 预计将于 2022 年 12 月最后敲定与救助公司签订合同、完成作业计划的工作。联合国开发计划署已与一海运经纪人签订合同，研究合适的船只进行采购。在采购超大型原油油船并在干坞对其进行小规模改装之后，将开始进行救助作业。³⁰ 然而，与 *FSO Safer* 号销售收入和所储石油所有权有关的问题仍未解决。

四. 海事安全

34. 本报告所述期间，也门沿海共发生 6 起涉及商船的严重海事安全事件。地图 2 显示事件的分布情况。


²⁷ 2022 年 11 月，与也门政府石油和矿产部的小组讨论。

²⁸ 见 www.masirah.tv.net/post/223589。

²⁹ 联合国开发计划署提供的文件。

³⁰ 与也门驻地和人道主义协调员的讨论。

地图 2
2022 年海事安全事件



资料来源：专家小组。

35. 1月2日晚11时57分(当地时间), 悬挂阿拉伯联合酋长国国旗的 *Rwabee* 号登陆艇(国际海事组织(海事组织): 9834351)在也门领水拉斯伊萨海运码头以西约23海里处遭到胡塞武装袭击。该船改道驶往荷台达, 与船员一同被扣。据联盟称, *Rwabee* 号在一次“海盗行为”中遭到袭击, 当时该船正从索科特拉群岛一家被拆除的野战医院向沙特阿拉伯的吉赞港运送设备。³¹ 1月14日, 安全理事会讨论了这起事件, 并向新闻界发表谈话, 要求“立即释放该船及其船员”。³² 胡塞武装立即拒绝了此项要求, 称该船是在代表联盟运送军事资产。³³ 1月4日, 胡塞武装公布了据称显示船只货物的图像(见附件8), 其中有几辆军车和两艘硬式充气船, 此外还有一些突击步枪、弹夹、头盔和其他部件。³⁴ 专家小组获得了 *Rwabee* 号货物清单(见附件8, 图8.5), 其中记录了车辆和船只, 但没有武器, 从而增加了胡塞武装故意放置武器的可能性。*Rwabee* 号船员于4月底获释,³⁵ 但在本报告编写时, 该船及其货物仍被扣留。

³¹ 见 www.spa.gov.sa/viewfullstory.php?lang=en&newsid=2317819。

³² 见 <https://press.un.org/en/2022/sc14765.doc.htm>。

³³ 见 www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/16/houthi-reject-un-call-to-free-uac-flagged-ship。

³⁴ 见 https://twitter.com/Fath_ol_Mobin/status/1478115007325949968。

³⁵ 见 www.arabnews.com/node/2070416/middle-east。

36. 5月19日上午10时46分(当地时间), *Lakota* 号赛艇报告称, 该艇在也门领水哈尼什群岛附近向北行驶时, 遭到两艘小艇“袭击”, 每艘小艇载有4名携带突击步枪的人员, 可能还载有一个火箭榴弹发射器。*Lakota* 号船长称, 袭击者开了数枪, 随后一名武装人员登上赛艇, 要求船员发出自动识别信号并展示国旗(见图二)。登船行为发生后, *Lakota* 号得以继续航行。与本报告详述的其他袭击事件不同, 胡塞武装没有声称对此事件负责。然而, 专家小组注意到, 这并非民用船只在红海这片水域首次遭到身份不明者袭击。2018年6月3日, 世界粮食计划署租用的一艘平台补给船 *Vos Theia*(海事组织: 9585743)在前往荷台达港时, 在同一水域遭到三艘载有武装人员的小艇袭击(S/2019/83, 第45段)。

图二

登上 *Lakota* 号的武装人员



资料来源: 机密。

37. 在休战后阶段, 胡塞武装开始对夏卜瓦和哈德拉毛的海上石油设施发动空袭, 试图阻止油轮运营者在也门政府控制的港口装载原油。首次袭击发生在10月18日, 遇袭原油油轮 *Hana* 号(海事组织: 9162916)当时正在 Bi'r Ali 码头装载原油。³⁶ 专家小组了解到, 一架无人驾驶飞行器飞近该船, 然后在陆地坠毁。事件发生前, *Hana* 号船长和航运公司一名当地代理人收到胡塞武装的书面警告, 要求他们不要进港。三天后发生第二次袭击, 下午7时30分(当地时间), 3架无人驾驶飞行器袭击了正在 Shihr 港附近 Dubbah 停泊点装载原油的 *Nissos Kea* 号原油油

³⁶ 见 <https://debrief.net/news-31369.html>。

轮(海事组织: 9920758)。第一架无人驾驶飞行器撞上系泊浮标并爆炸, 第二架 15 分钟后飞越该船, 落在距油轮约 28 米的水中, 造成第二次爆炸。第三架无人驾驶飞行器在陆地坠毁。油轮没有受损, 并立即驶往公海。胡塞武装发言人声称对此次袭击负责。³⁷ 第三次袭击发生在加纳港, 11 月 9 日上午 9 时 20 分(当地时间), 一架无人驾驶飞行器在卸载柴油货物的 *Aram* 号化学油轮(海事组织: 9211664)甲板上爆炸。袭击产生的弹片使两名印度船员受伤, 并对船只造成轻微损坏。最后, 11 月 21 日下午 5 时 30 分(当地时间), *Pratika* 号原油油轮(海事组织: 9288875)在 *Dubbah* 遇袭。闭路电视录像显示了导弹击中单一系泊点浮标并造成很大程度破坏的过程(见图三)。专家小组对石油码头管理人员进行了访谈, 并审查了从海底回收的导弹碎片的图像。这些图像显示, 在此次事件中使用了一枚 *Quds* 型对地攻击巡航导弹(见附件 9)。尽管这 4 起袭击所用武器系统不同, 但手法相同: 均使用全球导航卫星系统制导武器, 在发生撞击时爆炸。专家小组审查的证据显示, 至少两起袭击所用目标坐标是可从公共领域获得的单一系泊点浮标的坐标。

图三

闭路电视摄像机静止画面显示 2022 年 11 月 21 日巡航导弹击中浮标



资料来源: 机密。

38. 9 月 1 日, 在休战期间, 胡塞武装在荷台达的讲台剧场组织了一次大型阅兵式, 表面上是为了庆祝新战士毕业。³⁸ 胡塞武装借此机会展示了 4 种不同类型的反舰导弹, 以及无人驾驶飞行器和其他武器系统。这次活动以及 9 月 21 日在萨那举行的更大规模的游行旨在展示胡塞军队的实力及其威胁航行自由的能力。有些武器系统可能无法使用, 例如, 1950 年代以来在苏维埃社会主义共和国联盟和

³⁷ 见 https://twitter.com/Yahya_Saree/status/1583553292504018945。

³⁸ 专家小组注意到, 举行阅兵式违反了 2018 年 12 月《荷台达市及荷台达、萨利夫和拉斯伊萨港协议》, 其中各方承诺“从该市消除任何军事示威”。见 <https://osesgy.unmissions.org/hudaydah-agreement> 以及 https://twitter.com/un_hudaydah/status/1565366955560865792。

俄罗斯联邦制造的 P-15 白蚁导弹。然而，阅兵式上还展示了射程达 300 公里的现代化 Mandeb-1 和 Mandeb-2 型反舰艇巡航导弹。尽管胡塞武装声称这些导弹“百分之百产自也门”，但其外部特征与伊朗伊斯兰共和国制造的反舰艇导弹相似(见附件 10)。³⁹ 在上述 11 月 21 日袭击发生前，胡塞武装最近一次用导弹成功袭击商船事件发生在 2018 年 5 月 10 日(S/2019/83，第 80 至 82 段)。不过，据美国海军匿名消息来源称，胡塞武装于 2022 年 3 月 5 日向海上发射了至少一枚导弹，⁴⁰ 而也门政府发言人称，2022 年 11 月 17 日又发射了第二枚导弹。⁴¹ 尽管专家小组无法独立核实这些发射，但现有证据显示，胡塞武装的导弹对红海和亚丁湾航行自由再次构成威胁。

五. 军火以及定向军火禁运的执行情况


39. 专家小组正在调查 9 起可能违反定向军火禁运的案件，其中 7 起涉及从三角帆船和小船上缴获的武器、弹药、导弹部件和化学品。其余案件中有一起涉及从一辆运载商业货物卡车上缴获藏在其中的反坦克导弹，另一起涉及一架无人驾驶飞行器在阿曼沙漠中坠毁的事件，该飞行器可能是在向也门转场飞行途中坠毁。地图 3 显示事件发生的日期和大致地点。

³⁹ 专家小组注意到，美国海军于 2019 年 11 月 25 日在阿曼湾从一艘无国籍三角帆船上缴获了具有类似特征的反舰艇巡航导弹部件(见 S/2020/326，第 52 段和附件 20，图 20.9)。

⁴⁰ 见 www.washingtontimes.com/news/2022/mar/7/us-navy-says-yemen-rebels-fired-missile-into-busy-。

⁴¹ 见 <https://almasdaronline.com/articles/263896>。

地图 3
2021 年 12 月以来军火及相关物项的缴获情况



资料来源：机密。

A. 海上走私小武器和弹药

40. 2021 年 12 月 20 日上午 7 时 49 分(当地时间)，一艘载有大量武器弹药的无国籍三角帆船(见图四)在阿拉伯海被美利坚合众国拦截。美国政府称，卫星图像显示，该三角帆船于 12 月 17 日下午 4 时 41 分(当地时间)从伊朗伊斯兰共和国贾斯克港附近一个小港口出发，而从据称在该船上发现的导航装置中获取的航迹点似乎证实了这一航线(见附件 11，图 11.6)。美国海军没有按照先前惯例，⁴²而是击沉了这艘三角帆船，并将 5 名船员移交也门海岸警卫队。船上发现的文件显示，该三角帆船名为 *Al-Ghazal 1* 号(见附件 11，图 11.7)。

⁴² 与大多数阿拉伯海上的国际海事部队一样，美国海军以前实行“抓了就放”的政策，即拦截运载非法货物的船只，扣押货物，释放船只和船员。这项政策的目的是避免承担起诉船员的法律责任，严重妨碍了对走私案件的调查。

图四

被拦截的 *Al-Ghazal 1* 号，甲板上装有突击步枪的绿色帆布袋清晰可见



资料来源：机密。

41. 专家小组约谈了被拘留的三角帆船船员，船员称，他们是被胡塞武装负责海上走私行动高级领导人 Ahmed Halas Mohamed Bishara 招募(见附件 12)。专家小组此前曾报告，此人于 2015 年 9 月经阿曼前往伊朗伊斯兰共和国，两个月后与涉嫌参与海上走私的 3 人一起返回，其中 1 人于 2022 年 5 月 7 日在红海被也门海岸警卫队逮捕(S/2021/79，附件 17)。Halas 向 *Al-Ghazal 1* 号船长提供了一本新的也门护照，并向每名船员提供 30 000 沙特里亚尔(约 8 000 美元)，令其执行任务。他还向船长提供了名叫“Bakr”的人的详细联系方式，此人协调了在马哈拉的走私行动。船员们随后经陆路前往盖代，在那里遇到“Bakr”。“Bakr”交给他们一部“欧星”卫星电话，并协助他们前往与阿曼接壤的 Hawf 区。船员们于 2021 年 11 月 24 日在 Hawf 登上 *Al-Ghazal 1* 号。这些船员称，他们乘坐这艘空船从 Hawf 驶往伊朗伊斯兰共和国的阿巴斯港，历时 6 天。随后，他们被带到“安全屋”，在那里停留 15 天，然后带着 350 个绿色帆布袋和 500 个箱子的货物从贾斯克港附近一个小港口离开。据船长称，有人向他们提供了靠近也门海岸亚丁湾某一位置的全球导航卫星系统坐标，他们本应在那里与转运货物的小型船只汇合。

专家小组注意到，这一作案手法与专家小组先前观察到的海上走私武器和弹药的模式相符(S/2021/79，第 72 至 76 段和 S/2022/50，第 62 至 67 段)。伊朗伊斯兰共和国告知专家小组，该国拒绝承认“伊朗伊斯兰共和国当局与这些船只和设备”之间有任何联系。

42. 由于后勤方面的挑战，专家小组未能参加 2022 年 3 月对缴获货物的检查。不过，索马里问题专家小组检查了这些武器和弹药，并同意本报告使用其调查结果。绿色帆布袋装有共计 1 406 支 7.62x39 毫米口径的 56-1 式突击步枪，其标识和技术特征与中国重庆第 26 工厂(“建设机床厂”)制造的步枪一致。观察到的 16-CN 和 17-CN 标记可能表明这些武器是在 2016 年和 2017 年制造。专家小组注意到，自 2018 年以来，多次记录到收缴了具有类似技术特征和标识的突击步枪(S/2022/50，表 1)。500 个金属箱中每个装有 440 个 7.62x54 毫米口径的弹药筒，共计 220 000 个弹药筒。494 箱(弹药罐)的标记与中国第 71 国营厂生产的弹药筒一致(见附件 10，图 10.12)。弹药筒上的钢印还显示，这些弹药筒由中国第 71 国营工厂生产，生产日期可能是 1973 年(见附件 11，图 11.14)。专家小组注意到，澳大利亚皇家海军此前曾于 2019 年 6 月 25 日在阿曼湾一艘伊朗三角帆船上缴获带有类似标记的弹药，该案的船员表示，他们从阿巴斯港的“Sepah 海军”(即伊斯兰革命卫队的海军分部)收到这些弹药(S/2021/79，第 75 段和附件 16)。其余 6 个金属箱共装有 2 640 个弹药筒，其标记与保加利亚军械制造厂“10 号工厂”制造的弹药一致(见附件 11，图 11.15)，该厂目前以“Arsenal”的名义经营。⁴³ 索马里问题专家小组提供的图像显示两个不同的批号(15-86 和 16-86)。专家小组注意到，弹药筒的口径与观察到的胡塞武装所用 PK 型轻机枪的口径相符，自 2020 年以来多次从阿拉伯海的三角帆船上缴获此类轻机枪(S/2022/50，表 1)。中国政府告知专家小组，记录在案的标识与中国制造的武器弹药上的标识不一致，因此很可能是“复制品”。同时，保加利亚政府证实，这些标记与“10 号工厂”1986 年生产的弹药标记相符，但该公司没有保留自那时以来的记录。

43. 专家小组正在调查 1 月 28 日在索科特拉群岛(见附件 13)和 9 月 24 日在红海(见附件 14)发生的另外两起缴获轻小武器案件。对于这两起案件，专家小组正在等待也门和苏丹政府分别作出答复。然而，对公开信息的分析表明，这两起案件的武器都是运往黑市，而不是胡塞武装。

B. 海上走私化肥和其他化学品

44. 2022 年 1 月 18 日，美国在阿曼湾拦截了一艘无国籍三角帆船，缴获尿素化肥 40 吨(见附件 15)。这是此前于 2021 年 2 月 11 日在索马里沿海缴获的载有轻小武器的同一只帆船(S/2022/50，第 62 和 63 段及附件 19)。美国海军将船只、货

⁴³ 见 www.arsenal-bg.com。

物和 5 名也门船员移交也门海岸警卫队。船上发现的文件中有一份伪造的斯里兰卡船舶登记证书，这些文件显示这艘帆船名为 *Al-Etiihad*。

45. 2022 年 3 月，专家小组得以在尼什屯港检查这艘三角帆船。尽管化肥已被销毁，但专家小组获得了袋子的图像，一些标签上写有“Handan 石化公司”，另一些则显示化肥是在土库曼斯坦制造。专家小组与 *Al-Etiihad* 号船员进行了访谈，这些船员自称在荷台达被 Ahmed Halas 招募，此人也招募了 *Al-Ghazal 1* 号的船员(见第 41 段)。Halas 向他们提供了新护照、一部“欧星”卫星电话和全球导航卫星系统导航装置，以及“Bakr”的阿曼电话号码。船员称，他们于 2021 年 9 月乘坐小船离开荷台达，前往吉布提的奥博克；在那里与名叫“Shina”的人会面，此人告诉他们乘坐 *Al-Etiihad* 号三角帆船前往阿曼的 Sohar 装载化肥货物。

46. 专家小组与三角帆船船长和其他船员分别进行了访谈。虽然他们的陈述一致称是从奥博克离开，但船长说，他们前往 Sohar，与“Bakr”取得联系，在“安全屋”停留约 20 天，然后从阿拉伯联合酋长国一个“较大港口”返回，但他声称无法辨认这个港口。船员们表示，他们前往某一大城市的“未知港口”，那里的人不说阿拉伯语。专家小组注意到，部分作案手法(前往某一港口、在“安全屋”停留、从另一港口离开)与 2021 年 12 月 20 日截获的载有武器的船只船员提供的信息相符(见第 41 段)，也符合 2020 年 5 月 7 日也门海岸警卫队在红海扣押的胡塞武装走私网络涉嫌成员访谈时提供的信息(S/2021/79，第 76 段和附件 17)。据阿曼当局称，没有该三角帆船或船员进入该国任何港口的记录。

47. 船员们表示，已于 2021 年 9 月和 10 月顺利完成一次在“不明港口”和吉布提之间运送化肥的行程。他们返回奥博克后，“Shina”安排将货物转运至另一艘三角帆船。专家小组不知道化肥的最终目的地，但据以前观察的情况，很可能是荷台达或萨利夫。⁴⁴ 船员称，第二次旅途前往的是与之前相同的“未知港口”，但他们在“安全屋”再度停留后，乘车约两个小时，之后从另一港口离开。当船员返回 *Al-Etiihad* 号时，三角帆船已经满载，并配备了食物、水和柴油。他们于 2022 年 1 月 14 日左右出发前往吉布提，4 天后被美国海军拦截。船上发现的文件复印件显示，尿素货物于 2021 年 12 月 24 日在迪拜装船(见附件 15，图 15.9 至 15.11)，但阿拉伯联合酋长国当局称，复印件为伪造。专家小组注意到，沙特阿拉伯于 2020 年 6 月 24 日在索马里沿海拦截了载有大量武器的 *Bari-2* 号三角帆船，该船也携带伪造的阿拉伯联合酋长国港口文件和伪造的斯里兰卡船舶登记文件(S/2021/79，第 74 段和附件 15)。

48. 2022 年 11 月 7 日晚 11 时(当地时间)，美国在阿曼湾拦截了另一艘无国籍三角帆船。船上有 4 名也门国民，后来被移交也门海岸警卫队。船上发现的文件显示，该船载有 170 吨尿素化肥，用每 50 公斤一个的袋子分装。专家小组获得的

⁴⁴ 专家小组指出，与 100 吨以上的大型船只不同，停靠胡塞武装控制港口的三角帆船不受联合国核查和视察机制的强制性检查。

图像显示, 这些袋子与 *Al-Etihad* 号运载物品的袋子相同, 但随后的实验室分析结果显示, 约三分之一的袋子(65 吨)装有高氯酸铵, 其成分(粉末而非颗粒)和内包装与尿素不同(见图五)。另据其他消息来源报告, 船员自称于 2022 年 9 月在穆哈被招募, 然后乘巴士经亚丁和马哈拉前往阿曼的塞拉莱, 再由此飞往马斯喀特。船员还说, 他们从马斯喀特飞往德黑兰, 于 10 月 4 日抵达, 在距机场约 90 分钟的一间公寓内停留 9 天, 然后前往阿巴斯港, 在那里的“安全屋”又停留两个星期。随后, 他们前往某“军港”, 登上三角帆船, 航行至某一更大的商港, 在那里直接将肥料袋从拖车搬上三角帆船。第二天上午, 大概是 11 月 4 日, 船员们离开港口, 得到一部“欧星”卫星电话和一个导航装置。专家小组无法独立核实这一信息。然而, 专家小组得到的船员所持护照复印件显示, 他们于 10 月 2 日进入阿曼, 两天后离开该国(见附件 16, 图 16.4)。专家小组还获得一份 10 月 13 日从德黑兰飞往阿巴斯港航班的登机牌复印件, 上有其中一名船员姓名(见附件 16, 图 16.5)。据美国称, 从三角帆船上发现的全球导航卫星系统装置获取的坐标(见附件 16, 图 16.3)显示, 该船从阿巴斯港以南一个港口离开。专家小组联系了阿曼和伊朗伊斯兰共和国, 要求提供有关船员行动的信息, 目前仍在等待答复。

图五

在标有“尿素化肥”的袋子(上图)中发现高氯酸铵粉末(下图)



资料来源：机密。

49. 专家小组正在调查尿素化肥和高氯酸铵走私与向胡塞武装分子走私武器的个人网络之间的关系。向也门输入高氮含量尿素化肥是非法行为，可能是因为在国际上，这是简易爆炸装置的常见前体。10 月 17 日至 26 日，一个人道主义排雷非政府组织在荷台达省和塔伊兹省 4 个不同的胡塞武装雷区发现简易爆炸装置，并对所用炸药进行了分析。结果显示存在硝酸盐和氯酸盐或溴酸盐，但没有尿素迹象(见附件 17)。专家小组不知道任何关于阿拉伯半岛基地组织等也门境内其他团体使用硝酸脲制造爆炸物的报告。与尿素不同，高氯酸铵对胡塞武装而言有明确的军事用途，可以作为氧化剂，被该团体用于制造火箭和导弹所需固体燃料推进剂。鉴于很少对缴获的化肥进行实验室检测，因此，以往缴获的化肥，如第 44 段所述化肥或 2019 年 6 月 25 日缴获的化肥(S/2021/79，第 75 段和附件 16)，也可能含有尿素以外的化学品。

C. 海上走私导弹部件

50. 1 月 28 日清晨，联合王国在阿曼湾拦截了一艘载有导弹部件的无国籍小船(见图六)。2 月 25 日同样是清晨，在几乎相同的位置拦截了第二艘小船(见地图 3)。据报两艘小船都以极快的速度从伊朗海岸线驶向阿曼。专家小组获悉，两艘小船都载有 3 名自称伊朗公民的船员。

图六

2022 年 1 月 28 日一艘无国籍小船被英国皇家海军扣押



资料来源：机密。

51. 这些小船载有用塑料包裹的巡航导弹和地对空导弹的部件及其他设备。第一只小船载有 10 捆物项，第二只载有 32 捆。专家小组对缴获物项进行了两次检查(见附件 18)。货物包括胡塞武装自 2019 年以来使用的 5 枚 Quds 型对地攻击巡航

导弹的部件，⁴⁵ 其中包括微型涡轮喷气发动机(S/2020/326，第 58 至 60 段和附件 16)。还包括胡塞武装据报在也门部署的 10 枚“358”型地对空导弹或巡飞弹的部件(S/2022/50，第 61 段)。专家小组注意到，美国海军此前曾于 2019 年 11 月 25 日和 2020 年 2 月 9 日在亚丁湾缴获这两种武器系统的部件(S/2021/79，第 73 段和附件 13；S/2020/326，第 52 段和附件 20)。

52. 2022 年 2 月 25 日缴获的货物包括一架中国大疆企业制造的 Matrice 300 RTK 无人驾驶飞行器(见图七)。⁴⁶ 这是一架小型商用四轴飞行器，据制造商称，飞行时间可达 55 分钟，并配备高分辨率摄像头。专家小组记录了无人驾驶飞行器的序列号(见附件 18，图 18.21)，并致函中国，要求提供有关其监管链的信息；目前正在等待答复。联合王国称，从智能控制器检索到的飞行日志显示，2021 年 11 月 8 日，无人驾驶飞行器进行了几次短途飞行，可能是为了测试或训练目的。专家小组获得了这几次飞行的坐标(见附件 18，图 18.24)，并注意到这些坐标与德黑兰西部 Chitgar 森林公园附近的地点相吻合，包括公开来源确认为“Dastvareh Garrison”的建筑群(见附件 18，地图 18.1)。⁴⁷ 该建筑群据称是伊斯兰革命卫队航空航天部队和无人驾驶飞行器司令部的所在地。⁴⁸ 专家小组无法独立核实这些坐标是否确实来自飞行控制器，也无法核实这些建筑物内是否有伊斯兰革命卫队的设施。专家小组与伊朗伊斯兰共和国联系，要求提供关于缴获的导弹部件和据称来自飞行控制器的坐标的资料。伊朗伊斯兰共和国通知专家小组，该国拒绝承认“伊朗伊斯兰共和国当局与这些船只和设备”之间的任何联系。

⁴⁵ 在国际上，这种导弹通常被称为“351”对地攻击巡航导弹，以其部件上发现的名称命名。

⁴⁶ 见 <https://enterprise.dji.com>。

⁴⁷ 见 www.openstreetmap.org/search?query=teheran#map=14/35.7432/51.2257。

⁴⁸ 见 www.ncrius.org/iran-the-role-of-drones-in-the-quds-forces-incitement-of-regional-war-and-terrorism.html。

图七

2022 年 2 月 25 日缴获的 Matrice 300 RTK 无人驾驶飞行器



资料来源：专家小组。

53. 专家小组正在调查伊朗伊斯兰共和国和阿曼⁴⁹ 境内个人或实体在转让导弹部件方面可能发挥的作用，以及这些部件是否如联合王国指控的那样运往胡塞武装，因为这将构成违反定向军火禁运的行为。⁵⁰ 胡塞武装此前曾声称 Quds 型导弹是国内产品，它是唯一承认在对沙特阿拉伯和阿拉伯联合酋长国的袭击中使用这些导弹的武装团体。⁵¹ 英国皇家海军缴获的 Quds 型导弹部件支持专家小组的评估，即这些导弹继续以零部件形式从国外走私，最后在胡塞武装控制区进行组装。伊拉克最近也有记录显示出现“358”型导弹，⁵² 但考虑到拦截地点和小船航向，看来几乎可以肯定，英国皇家海军缴获的是运往胡塞武装的部件。

D. 通过阿曼走私反坦克制导导弹

54. 3 月 10 日，也门当局在 Shahn 过境点缴获 52 个 9M133 Kornet 反坦克制导导弹发射箱(见附件 19)。发射箱藏在 4 台大型发电机(109 厘米 x187 厘米 x116 厘米)

⁴⁹ 专家小组获得的信息显示，这些小船正驶往阿曼海岸线上的地点，以便经陆路前往也门。小船的航程和有限的适航条件决定了它们无法用于长途航行。

⁵⁰ 见 www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/7/7/uk-warship-seized-advanced-iranian-missiles-bound-for-yemen。

⁵¹ 然而，专家小组坚持其评估意见，即胡塞武装声称的 2019 年 9 月 14 日对沙特阿美石油公司设施的袭击并非源自也门(S/2020/326，附件 14)。

⁵² 见 <https://twitter.com/arawnsley/status/1451282954995515398>。

内，这些发电机是为走私非法货物而专门制造(见图八)。⁵³ 在缴获这些物项 4 天后，专家小组检查了发射箱和发电机，并与两名被拘留者进行访谈，一名是运载发电机的卡车司机，另一名是提交货运文件的海关人员。运载发电机的卡车使用也门牌照，号码为 05-40993，该车于 3 月 8 日从阿曼抵达边界。

55. 卡车司机说，他从位于阿曼 Mazyunah 免税区的 Rabia 公司仓库中提取了发电机和 4 000 箱牛奶，要将其运往位于萨那的卡车所属 Wadi al-Kabir 公司仓库。专家小组收到的信息显示，Wadi al-Kabir 公司在也门拥有一些仓库和卡车，该公司以前曾参与胡塞武装的走私活动。Rabia 公司由居住在阿曼的两名也门国民拥有和管理，⁵⁴ 其中一人指示司机将发电机装上卡车。专家小组与阿曼取得联系，要求提供有关 Rabia 公司和发电机监管链的信息。阿曼答复说，没有资料可以提供。

图八

在 Shahn 过境点缴获的载有反坦克制导弹发射箱的假发电机



资料来源：机密。

⁵³ 所有 4 台发电机都有一个大空腔，藏有反坦克制导弹发射箱(3 台发电机装有 12 个此类导弹发射箱，另一台装有 16 个)。不过，它们还装有一台中国制造的小型真发电机，能够发电，这样，当“假”发电机发动时，就会产生电力。

⁵⁴ 专家小组获悉，阿曼的 Rabia 公司和也门的 Wadi al-Kabir 公司的部分所有权属于同一批人。

56. 专家小组检查了反坦克制导导弹发射箱，注意到其技术特征和标记与伊朗 Dehlavieh 版本 9M133 Kornet 反坦克制导导弹一致，而不同于俄罗斯联邦制造的原始版本。专家小组还注意到，胡塞武装分子经常使用此类反坦克制导导弹，并多次在亚丁湾被拦截(S/2022/50，表 1)。专家小组记录了发射箱的序列号(见附件 19，图 19.6)，并与伊朗伊斯兰共和国联系，要求提供有关监管链的信息。伊朗伊斯兰共和国告知专家小组，这些反坦克制导导弹“与伊朗产品不符，也不是源自伊朗”，并表示一些国家正在生产类似版本的导弹。专家小组先前曾调查过走私弹药和军事装备的情况(S/2022/50，第 67 段)，也调查过用于制造无人驾驶飞行器和杀伤人员地雷的商业部件情况(S/2020/326，第 62 段和 S/2021/79，第 77 段和附件 18)，阿曼的 Shahn 边境哨所和公司都曾接受调查。然而，据专家小组所知，这是首次在边界缴获尖端武器系统。

E. 在阿曼坠毁的无人驾驶飞行器

57. 1 月 28 日，一架三角翼无人驾驶飞行器在阿曼东部地区坠毁。⁵⁵ 虽然最初报告称，这是对阿拉伯联合酋长国攻击浪潮的一部分，但阿曼告知专家小组，这架飞行器“从北向南”飞行，“没有用于攻击或侦察目的的装备”。专家小组注意到，这架无人驾驶飞行器的技术特点与 2021 年 3 月 11 日首次在胡塞武装附属媒体上展示的 Wa'id 型三角翼无人驾驶飞行器相似(S/2022/50，第 60 段)。与 2019 年沙特阿拉伯遇袭时记录的无人驾驶飞行器(S/2020/326，第 57 段和附件 15)相比，Wa'id 型是其更大、技术更先进的版本。虽然 Wa'id 型无人驾驶飞行器与 2021 年 7 月 29 日在阿曼湾对 *Mercer Street* 油轮的袭击(S/2020/326，第 51 和 52 段)和 2022 年 11 月 15 日对 *Pacific Zirkon* 油轮的袭击有关联，但专家小组并不知晓胡塞武装使用该飞行器开展袭击的情况。⁵⁶ 然而，专家小组检查了也门政府部队 2020 年 9 月在马里卜前线发现的一架 Wa'id 型无人驾驶飞行器的不完整碎片，表明这一武器系统曾在也门运作(见图九)。⁵⁷ 阿曼沙漠中发现的无人驾驶飞行器可能是在飞往胡塞武装控制领土的“转场飞行”途中坠毁，其航线可能构成一条新补给线。⁵⁸ 专家小组要求检查这架无人驾驶飞行器的残骸，但阿曼告知专家小组，残骸已被阿曼当局销毁。

⁵⁵ 见 <https://twitter.com/mohsenreyhani01/status/1487491295178375169>。

⁵⁶ 见 www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3220598/statement-regarding-iranian-shahed-series-uav-strikes-civilian-commercial-tanker。

⁵⁷ 见 <https://twitter.com/almasdaronline/status/1308769942007943168>。

⁵⁸ 专家小组以前从一个会员国收到的信息表明，无人驾驶飞行器飞到胡塞武装控制区，借助降落伞降落(图九似乎显示的是降落伞)。对在阿曼发现的无人驾驶飞行器进行技术检查可以核实这一信息。

图九

在马里卜(左)和阿曼(右)发现的 Wa'id 型无人驾驶飞行器



资料来源：专家小组(左)和机密来源(右)。

六. 经济和金融问题

A. 经济问题

1. 概览

58. 虽然长达六个月的休战为实施经济改革提供了前所未有的契机，但也门似乎难以实现经济稳定。也门年通货膨胀率估计为 45%，食品通货膨胀率为 58%。⁵⁹ 人道主义援助仍然不足，粮食不安全状况不断加剧，⁶⁰ 1 700 万人面临重度粮食不安全。⁶¹ 在 2020 年人类发展指数方面，也门在 189 个国家和地区中排名第 179 位。⁶² 该国是世界上妇女和儿童营养不良比率最高的国家之一。⁶³ 总体而言，也门的经济形势和前景不容乐观。

2. 对和平、安全和稳定构成潜在威胁的经济问题

59. 胡塞武装通过了一项战略计划，旨在攻击合法政府的经济能力，使也门政府控制区的经济陷入不稳定状态。胡塞武装在这方面采取的一些措施包括：禁止使用亚丁也门中央银行印发的纸币；采取分裂银行和经济部门的政策；攻击总部设在亚丁的电信公司的资产；威胁和攻击港口、石油码头和从事石油出口的船只；批准一项禁止银行和商业交易利息的新法律。这些经济障碍以及胡塞武装的军事袭击，对也门的和平、安全与稳定构成严重威胁，需要国际社会紧急干预。

⁵⁹ 亚丁的也门中央银行行长向专家小组报告的情况。

⁶⁰ 见 www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2022/10/05/pr22336-yemen-imf-staff-concludes-visit-to-yemen。

⁶¹ 见 https://api.godocs.wfp.org/api/documents/d49df3e62c3b4dfcac1138006c100ab5/download/?_ga=2.268535729.1541462938.1669043401-1748938442.1626277562。

⁶² 见 <https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/specific-country-data/#/countries/YEM>。

⁶³ 见 www.icrc.org/en/document/economic-security-situation-yemen。

60. 胡塞武装采取的分裂、不透明和政治或意识形态驱动的政策对也门各地都产生了影响。该国一直实行双重货币制度、适用双重汇率、限制进口、对货物进行双重征税，通过非法征收税费的形式进行寻租。⁶⁴ 政府控制区的汇率比胡塞武装控制区低一半。亚丁的也门中央银行外汇储备总额从 2021 年 12 月的 16.8 亿美元降至 2022 年 10 月的 10.9 亿美元(见附件 20)。这对也门维持以合理价格进口必需品的能力构成挑战，从而使粮食不安全问题发展到令人震惊的地步。

61. 也门政府采用复杂的燃料衍生物进口和分销机制，增加了成本，损害了零售买家的利益。最近几年采取的一些关键政策改革尽管取得了积极成果，但却被种种问题所抵消，例如外部资金短缺，通过进口燃料以补贴价格维持电力供应造成负担，向总统领导委员会成员之一的部队支付薪金也构成额外负担，以及通货膨胀率上升。经济正在经历异常困难的局面，预算不足以支付薪金，也不足以进口充足的燃料以确保电力供应。⁶⁵ 政府每年支付的薪金约为 8 350 亿也门里亚尔，其中大部分(61%)拨给国防部和内政部，这是战争造成的直接后果。⁶⁶ 另一个令人关注的领域是战争风险保险。在冲突之前，海事保险费率按船舶总价值的 0.025% 计算，但由于战争给停靠也门港口的船舶带来额外风险，也门被列为“高风险”或“升高的风险”。⁶⁷ 这推高了战争险保费，按照停靠也门港口的任何船只的价值计算：亚丁港和穆卡拉港的保费为船只价值的 0.4%，荷台达港和萨利夫港的保费为船只价值的 0.62%。⁶⁸ 也门每年的战争险保险费用估计为 2.18 亿美元。⁶⁹ 就货物而言，额外费用约为货物价值的 0.1%。⁷⁰ 货物在也门港口清关的延误也造成滞期费，增加了进口货物的成本。目前滞期费在 2% 至 3% 之间，取决于清关延误的天数。⁷¹ 额外的运输和保险成本会随价格上涨而沿供应链传递给消费者。政府报告称，正在努力减轻战争风险保险的负担，以便减少额外费用。

62. 胡塞武装最近对港口和船只的威胁和袭击可能会破坏政府通过出口原油创造更多外汇收入的努力。袭击发生后，原油生产和出口大幅下降。⁷² 海上战争风险保险费率的任何减免措施也可能推迟。船只清关时间也可能进一步延迟，从而增加进口货物的成本。

⁶⁴ 专家小组收到的资料显示，政府控制区内的各个检查站都收取非法费用。每个集装箱的费用如下：从亚丁到阿比扬 700 000 也门里亚尔，从亚丁到哈德拉毛 100 万也门里亚尔(两年前来为 300 000 也门里亚尔)，从亚丁到萨那 200 万也门里亚尔，从亚丁到塔伊兹 100 万也门里亚尔。

⁶⁵ 亚丁的也门中央银行向专家小组报告的情况。

⁶⁶ 也门政府向专家小组报告的情况。

⁶⁷ 同上。

⁶⁸ 同上。

⁶⁹ 同上。

⁷⁰ 同上。

⁷¹ 同上。

⁷² 专家小组的信息来源。

3. 银行和金融系统分裂

63. 胡塞武装和也门政府采取了一系列不协调的政策，造成并加剧了金融机构的分裂，对也门的经济稳定产生了不利影响。

禁止纸币流通

64. 胡塞武装和萨那的也门中央银行禁止人们使用亚丁也门中央银行印制的新纸币，宣布这些纸币为伪造。这一行为加剧了金融部门的分裂。因此，这些货币只能在政府控制区作为法定货币使用，导致通货膨胀失控。尽管如此，亚丁的也门中央银行还是在 2021 年 12 月发行了价值 308 亿也门里亚尔的本币。⁷³ 2022 年 1 月，政府决定不再发行任何新币，但在胡塞武装控制区认可新币之前，仅靠这一措施无法缓解通货膨胀。国内贸易主要以沙特里亚尔或美元进行。由于汇率差异，亚丁和萨那之间的汇款费用急剧增加，某些时期超过汇款额的 100%。⁷⁴

禁止各种利息的法律

65. 专家小组从其消息来源收到的相关文件副本显示，9 月 5 日，胡塞武装在萨那任命的内阁批准了《禁止高利贷交易法》。这是一项禁止对存款、贷款、信用证和担保书收取任何利息的新法律，有待胡塞议会批准。专家小组向胡塞武装发出两封信函，目前正在等待答复。然而，各利益攸关方报告说，新法律将导致也门银行和金融部门完全分裂。也门政府告知专家小组，它没有计划颁布或实施任何此类法律。也门银行协会和商会也强烈反对颁布该法。也门某家银行一位高级官员告知专家小组，尽管该行是一家伊斯兰银行，但根据新法，其 90% 的现有交易将不被允许。两个中央银行的金融机构都将承担严重的合规负担，萨那的也门中央银行将承担执行禁止高利贷交易规定的负担，而亚丁的也门中央银行将承担继续执行利息规定的负担。

66. 各家银行已将存款的 65% 投资于萨那也门中央银行的短期国库债券。⁷⁵ 胡塞武装已将国库债券利率从 16.5% 降至 12%。⁷⁶ 自也门中央银行分裂以来，商业银行没有从萨那的也门中央银行获得任何利息，尽管各银行还在缴税。⁷⁷ 2019 年，亚丁的也门中央银行宣布，如果任何银行想在该行登记国库债券，就必须将总部迁往亚丁。⁷⁸ 根据新法，存款不产生利息，而只有银行投资才能带来收益，因此客户预期从银行获得的回报存在不确定性。经济转型需要逐步降低利率，并在各部门同时创造投资环境。然而，也门目前的气候几乎没有为新的企业或投资创造任何机会。因此，银行将无法为商业活动提供信贷服务。数百万人民靠银行存款的月息生活，特别是退休金领取者。任何仓卒取消利息的做法都会打击人民的信

⁷³ 亚丁的也门中央银行向专家小组报告的情况。

⁷⁴ 同上。

⁷⁵ 同上。

⁷⁶ 同上。

⁷⁷ 专家小组的信息来源。

⁷⁸ 亚丁也门中央银行。

心。由于担心存款价值进一步缩水，客户可能会提取现金存款，从而引发恐慌，并突然对银行提出要求。商业银行由于缺乏流动性将无法应对突如其来的需求，并将面临破产和关闭的风险。

67. 商界也反对颁布这项法律，理由是该法将对国内贸易和进口产生不利影响，因为银行没有必要资本用于签发进口信用证。也门有 95% 的粮食需求靠进口满足，任何对进口产生不利影响的情况都将使该国陷入严重的经济危机。

68. 银行界人士向专家小组报告说，这项法律的目的是确保利用所有银行存款为胡塞武装的新项目供资，包括为其在也门建立股票市场的计划供资。该法规定，商业和银行交易由一名拥有广泛酌处权法官裁定，其酌处权包括处以最高 300 万也门里亚尔的罚款和最高两年的监禁。所有日常商业交易都可能受到当局审查。鉴于此类交易的复杂性和技术性特征，任何商业或银行交易的当事方都可能遭到骚扰和招致惩罚行动。胡塞武装可能利用这些处罚规定牟取利益(见附件 21)。

B. 被指认的个人及其网络的财政资源情况

69. 安全理事会第 2140(2014)号决议所设制裁制度指认的个人、代表此类个人或按其指示行事者以及由被指认个人拥有或控制的实体继续违反第 2140(2014)号决议及其后所有相关决议，直接或间接接收、拥有或控制资金、其他金融资产和经济资源。

70. 专家小组的调查显示，胡塞武装的资金来源如下：

- (a) 关税和其他税收；
- (b) 非税收收入和天课；
- (c) 没收土地和其他财产；
- (d) 从燃料黑市业务中收取费用；
- (e) 来自燃料进口、国内贸易和其他商业活动的非法费用；
- (f) 没收银行存款；
- (g) 来自外国的资金。

71. 下文将详细审查其中一些资金来源。

1. 关税和其他税收

72. 包括关税在内的也门税收总额约 70% 来自胡塞武装控制区。银行、各类基金(包括退休基金)、外汇公司、电信公司、进口商、主要企业和其他商业实体的主要活动都在萨那进行。大多数工业公司设在塔伊兹的霍班地区以及荷台达、伊卜和扎马尔省。

2. 天课

73. 多年来，天课一直由地方机构管理，但胡塞武装采取了更加集中的做法，并于 2018 年发布第 53 号总统令，设立了天课总局。⁷⁹ 目前，胡塞武装对天课的征收、使用和管理行使有效控制，包括将天课用于战争活动，剥夺了地方当局这一收入来源。

74. 在过去几年中，胡塞武装通过对许多新活动征收天课，创造了大量财政资源，据也门政府估计，每年达 450 亿也门里亚尔。也门几乎每一个人和实体都在斋月期间支付天课，金额约为 2.5 亿也门里亚尔。2021 年斋月期间，胡塞武装派代表向店主、贸易商和商业实体征收天课。然而，天课的使用一直很不透明。据天课总局称，天课资金被用于各种人道主义活动。然而，其中一些活动似乎与胡塞武装的战争活动有关。

75. 2022 年 11 月 27 日，天课总局启动了一个项目，向萨那和胡塞武装控制省份的伤员和战争致残者发放现金礼物，耗资 2.92 亿也门里亚尔。⁸⁰ 该项目正在阿卜杜勒马利克·胡塞(YEi.004)和政治委员会主席马赫迪·马沙特元帅的指示下实施。⁸¹ 同样，天课总局于 11 月 26 日启动了向所有敌方俘虏分发现金和实物天课的项目，耗资 1.5 亿也门里亚尔(见附件 22)。⁸²

3. 胡姆斯税

76. 2020 年 6 月，胡塞武装对矿产、碳氢化合物、水和渔业部门等许多经济活动征收胡姆斯税(五分之一，即 20%)。⁸³ 新税的受益者包括胡塞家族及其若干效忠者。

4. 双重征税和非法收费

77. 进口到政府控制区的货物经常卖给胡塞武装控制区的买家。尽管也门政府在第一个进口港对此类货物征收关税和其他税款，但胡塞武装在实际陆地边界⁸⁴ 非法设立陆地海关和检查站，对进口货物和国内货物征收关税、税款和其他非法费用。

5. 其他税款

78. 专家小组获悉，胡塞武装有选择地向几家私立医院和药店征税并收取非法费用，甚至下令关闭多家药店。首都市政税务部发布的一份文件(见附件 23)显示，

⁷⁹ 见 www.ypagency.net/42380。

⁸⁰ 见 www.zakatyemen.net。

⁸¹ 同上。

⁸² 同上。

⁸³ 见 <https://al-masdaronline.net/national/894> 和其他各种来源。

⁸⁴ 根据专家小组掌握的资料，在贝达的 Dhi Na'i 和 A'far、伊卜的 Maytam、焦夫的 Hazm、阿姆兰的 Harf Sufyan、塔伊兹的 Saqam 地区、荷台达的 Jabal Ra's、塔伊兹的 Al-Rahda 和萨那的 Shawaba 都设有海关检查站。

对萨那 13 家特定医院征收了额外税款。对于在医院进行的每一次外科手术，如果医院工作人员有税号，则按 4% 的比率征税，如果没有税号，则按 15% 的比率征税。这些税款将从医院账户和做手术医生的薪金中扣除。专家小组收到的指控称，胡塞武装主要领导人拥有的其他私立医院并未被列入名单。这种有选择地针对私人保健设施的做法可能对民众健康产生严重影响。这一点尤其重要，因为保健设施已经不足，目前出国就医目的地仅限于安曼。专家小组已致函胡塞武装，目前正在等待答复。

6. 电信部门的收入

79. 电信部门一直是胡塞武装收入的主要来源(S/2022/50, 第 84 段)。胡塞武装在取得对总部设在萨那的一些私营电信公司的所有权和控制权后，将这些来源的收入部分用于其战争活动。专家小组收到的信息显示，胡塞武装利用各种电信公司发送数百万条信息，为其战争活动寻求支持和财政捐助(见附件 24, 图 24.1 至 24.3)。此外，胡塞武装向一些公司发出指示(2022 年 6 月 4 日第 3848 号文件)，要求将电信收费的 1% 划拨并存入烈士家属福利基金账户(见附件 24, 图 24.2)。

80. 为了继续垄断全国市场份额，胡塞武装不允许总部设在亚丁的竞争对手电信公司发展。一些报告称，总部在亚丁的私营电信公司 Sabafon 的电信资产(电塔和电缆)遭到破坏(见附件 24, 图 24.5 和 24.6)。

7. 燃料部门收入

81. 胡塞武装在燃料部门保持平行经济。休战之前，主要是通过政府控制的港口经陆路越过前线运送石油，以满足消费者的需求。然而，胡塞武装除了在检查站征收其他税款和非法费用外，还再次收取关税。4 月以来，通过荷台达港进口的石油大幅增加。

82. 根据联合国核查和视察机制提供的信息，2022 年 4 月 1 日至 11 月 30 日期间，共有 69 艘船只抵达荷台达港，载有 1 810 498 吨石油衍生物。⁸⁵ 相比之下，2021 年 1 月至 12 月，有 30 艘船只进口了 535 069 吨燃料衍生物。在 2022 年 1 月至 3 月休战前期间，平均每月约有两艘船只运载 39 315 吨石油和石油衍生物，而在 2022 年 4 月至 11 月休战后期间，平均每月约有 9 艘船只运载 226 312.25 吨石油和石油衍生物，显示通过荷台达港和萨利夫港的进口大幅增长，比率为 475.63% (见附件 25)。

83. 胡塞武装抓住了这一盈利机会。根据专家小组收到的资料，黑市出售的汽油价格为每 20 升 22 000 至 24 000 也门里亚尔，造成人为短缺。根据《斯德哥尔摩协议》，胡塞武装将对经由荷台达港进口的石油征收关税，条件是须支付公务员薪金。然而，专家小组获悉，在编写本报告之时尚未支付任何薪金。除了胡塞武装收取的关税外，不合理的燃料价格上涨也使胡塞武装的财政资源增加。据也门

⁸⁵ 据也门政府称，在本报告所述期间，共有 72 艘船运载了 1 947 131 吨燃料和衍生物，价值 20.9 亿美元。

政府称，2022 年 4 月至 11 月期间，政府损失了约 2 719.35 亿也门里亚尔的海关收入，相当于胡塞武装获得的相应收益。

8. 没收土地和其他财产

84. 房地产为胡塞武装带来了可观的收入。专家小组收到的信息显示，胡塞武装强行没收大片土地和建筑物(见附件 26)。他们还对房地产的销售、购买、转让和建造施加限制(见附件 27)。据也门政府称，胡塞武装在 Bayt al-Faqih 区的 Qasrah 地区没收了约 3 000 马阿德(*ma'ads*)的土地(1 马阿德相当于 4 248 平方米)，价值约 150 亿也门里亚尔。专家小组还获悉，胡塞武装在荷台达省图海塔区夺取了估计价值为 800 亿也门里亚尔的大片土地，借口是这些土地是宗教基金(捐赠)土地，尽管当地公民声称对这些土地拥有所有权。还有报告称，其他地区的土地和建筑物也被没收，导致数百个平民家庭遭到驱逐，失去生计。

9. 走私毒品和其他物项作为胡塞武装的资金来源

85. 专家小组正在监测走私麻醉药品和精神药物以及走私贵金属和纸币等其他物项的案件，以确定被指认个人是否直接或间接参与可能用于战争活动的筹资活动。

86. 专家小组收到的信息显示，也门走私和贩运麻醉药品的事件日益增多，一些货物被当局缴获，还有报告称胡塞武装参与其中。⁸⁶ 专家小组在访问利雅得期间获悉，沙特当局缴获了几批货物，特别是在瓦迪阿、卡德拉、Ulab、Tuwal 和吉赞港。沙特当局称，胡塞武装正在协助和怂恿走私贩运这些货物，作为支持其战争活动筹资的手段。有几份关于定期拦截运载麻醉药品的三角帆船的报告，但由于缺乏明确的法律授权，没有任何会员国对这些船只进行调查。会员国有必要考虑通过适当的法律文书，以便对国际海军和海岸警卫队在国际水域发现的麻醉药品走私案件进行适当调查，从而使有关当局能够将罪犯绳之以法，并能适当监测根据安全理事会第 2140(2014)号决议所设制裁制度实施的经济制裁(见附件 28)。

C. 监测旅行禁令和资产冻结措施

87. 专家小组根据安全理事会第 2624(2022)号决议第 4 段，继续监测会员国执行第 2140(2014)号决议第 11 段和第 15 段分别规定的资产冻结和旅行禁令措施的情况，这些措施针对迄今被列名的个人，其中包括 2022 年 9 月 26 日列名的 2 人和 10 月 4 日列名的 1 人。关于 2021 年 2 月 28 日指认的苏丹·扎宾(YEi.006)，专家小组仍未收到任何正式确认其死亡的信息。

七. 违反国际人道法和国际人权法的行为

88. 安全理事会第 2140(2014)号决议第 9 段促请所有各方履行国际法、包括有关国际人道法和国际人权法规定的义务。第 2140(2014)号决议第 17、18 和 21 段，连同第 2216(2015)号决议第 19 段和第 2511(2020)号决议第 6 段，进一步澄清了

⁸⁶ 见 https://almashareq.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_am/features/2022/03/22/feature-01。

专家小组在调查违反国际人道法和国际人权法、侵犯人权、武装冲突中的性暴力、武装冲突中招募或使用儿童以及阻碍在也门运送和分发人道主义援助方面的责任。

89. 尽管国际人权法主要对国家有约束力，但法律学者和联合国人权系统的实践普遍认为，当非国家武装团体行使类似政府职能或实际控制特定领土或民众时，在其行为影响到处于其控制下的个人的人权时，应尊重和捍卫基本人权原则和标准。⁸⁷ 因此，胡塞武装以及其他对也门领土和民众行使有效控制的非国家武装团体必须尊重国际人权法规范。专家小组负责监测违反这些规范的情况。

90. 专家小组发现，在本报告所述期间，违反国际人道法和国际人权法的行为仍然普遍而且系统化。专家小组记录的违法行为包括无差别攻击平民和民用基础设施、任意拘留、虐待和酷刑、法外处决、与冲突有关的性暴力、在武装冲突中招募和使用儿童以及阻碍人道主义援助的运送和分发。

A. 归咎于胡塞武装的侵权和虐待行为

1. 袭击平民和民用物体

91. 胡塞武装继续违反国际人道法，对平民和民用物体发动无差别攻击。此外，胡塞武装对行动施加限制，包括封锁塔伊兹和其他省份之间的重要道路，这对平民获得基本服务和人道主义援助产生了不利影响。

92. 专家小组调查了胡塞武装对也门(塔伊兹、马里卜和夏卜瓦)平民和民用物体以及对阿拉伯联合酋长国目标发动的 5 次袭击。这些袭击造成 13 名平民死亡，43 人受伤，详情如下：

(a) 1 月 17 日，胡塞武装对阿拉伯联合酋长国发动巡航导弹袭击，造成 3 名平民死亡，8 人受伤，民用基础设施受损。胡塞武装声称对袭击负责，但不承认这些事件造成平民伤亡(见第 17 段)；

(b) 1 月 27 日，胡塞武装可能对马里卜市居民区发动火箭袭击，造成 5 名平民死亡，23 人受伤，其中包括妇女和儿童；

(c) 5 月 13 日下午 6 时左右(当地时间)，胡塞武装炮击塔伊兹省 Sabir al-Mawadim 区的平民住宅区，打死一名 5 岁男童，打伤另外两名平民(该儿童的父母)；

(d) 11 月 7 日，胡塞武装袭击了马里卜省一个军火库，造成 4 名平民死亡，其中包括 2 名儿童，另有 8 人受伤。受害者是也门政府军事基地附近 Jafnah 难民营的流离失所者；

(e) 11 月 9 日，胡塞武装用无人驾驶飞行器对夏卜瓦省加纳港发动袭击，造成两名船员受伤，民用基础设施受损(见第 37 段)。

⁸⁷ 见 www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2021/02/joint-statement-independent-united-nations-human-rights-experts-human-rights；<https://pilac.law.harvard.edu/ansas>；A/HRC/38/44。

93. 专家小组开展了调查，包括与受害者、目击者和维权人士进行面谈和远程访谈，审查当地和国际实体的调查报告和陈述。专家小组致函胡塞武装，询问其遵守国际人道法的措施，但未得到答复。

94. 专家小组完成了对这 5 起事件的调查，得出结论认为，胡塞武装违反了国际人道法规定的预防、区分和相称原则。⁸⁸

2. 在武装冲突中招募和使用儿童

95. 专家小组回顾，在 S/2022/50 号文件第 42、43 和 123 段及附件 10 以及 S/2020/326 号文件第 120 段中，专家小组告知安全理事会，胡塞武装正在开展一场有系统的思想灌输运动，以确保民众信奉其仇恨和暴力意识形态，并确保民众支持其事业和军事活动。这场活动包括为儿童和成人组织夏令营和文化课程，使用胡塞武装强加的课程设置，让年仅 10 岁的儿童接受军事训练和参加敌对行动。

96. 在本报告所述期间，专家小组发现，胡塞武装继续在夏令营对儿童进行思想灌输和招募，有时还进行军事训练，萨那省和荷台达省的情况尤为如此，而且还使用儿童作为战斗人员。尽管胡塞武装于 2022 年 4 月 18 日与联合国签署了行动计划，规定除其他外，终止和防止其部队招募和使用儿童，但违反行为仍在发生。⁸⁹

97. 专家小组的调查显示，胡塞武装招募儿童的趋势和方法与以往报告 (S/2022/50 和 S/2020/326) 所述情况相同。胡塞武装在社区一级的监督员负责招募儿童，主要针对 13 至 17 岁年龄组的儿童，手段包括胁迫和威胁家长和教师，向儿童提供物质诱惑和殉难承诺，并让他们参加以胡塞意识形态为基础的文化和宗教课程。

98. 专家小组与受害者及其家庭成员进行了面谈和远程访谈，还与记录这一严重侵害儿童行为的非政府组织举行会议，从这些渠道收集了信息和证据。专家小组还查看了胡塞武装在网上发布的照片和视频内容，其中一些显示儿童在胡塞领导人的指挥下在夏令营中操作武器和从事其他类型的军事活动。⁹⁰ 此外，专家小组还收到一份列有 1 201 名儿童的名单，这些儿童据报在 2021 年 7 月 1 日至 2022 年 8 月 31 日期间被胡塞武装招募并接受训练。

3. 对平民实施任意拘留、酷刑和强迫失踪

99. 专家小组调查了关于胡塞武装在萨那、荷台达、贝达和其他地点继续对数千名平民实施任意拘留的报告，这些平民大多被关押在秘密拘留所。胡塞武装侵犯

⁸⁸ 禁止将平民和民用物体作为攻击目标的依据是国际人道法，包括条约法和习惯法，包括《1949 年日内瓦四公约第一附加议定书》第四十八条、第五十一条第二款和第五十二条第二款、《1949 年日内瓦四公约第二附加议定书》第十三条第二款以及习惯国际人道法规则 1 和规则 7。

⁸⁹ 见 <https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/2022/04/new-action-plan-to-strengthen-the-protection-of-children-affected-by-armed-conflict-in-yemen-signed-with-the-houthis>。

⁹⁰ 见 <https://youtu.be/ZBxoRDUcbfI>；<https://youtube.com/shorts/gcT3TOmpfMA?feature=share>。

基本人权，对被拘留者实施虐待、暴力(包括性暴力)、酷刑和其他形式有辱人格和不人道的待遇或处罚。

100. 专家小组对 12 名受害者进行了访谈，他们详述了在胡塞监狱中遭受的不人道和有辱人格的待遇和酷刑。受害者中有一名青年妇女，她在萨那、荷台达和其他地点的多个胡塞武装拘留所被关押超过 17 个月，遭受了酷刑和性暴力。两名记者报告说，由于他们的工作和政治派别，胡塞武装对他们施加了酷刑(见附件 29)。

101. 专家小组还收到地方倡导者和组织提供的资料，记录了胡塞武装对平民实施绑架、任意拘留和强迫失踪的案件。其中一个倡导团体要求释放 526 名平民，包括被胡塞武装绑架的 4 名记者(S/2022/50, 附件 34)，他们处于监禁中，正面临死刑。⁹¹

102. 根据受害者的证词以及家庭成员和非政府组织来源提供的信息，专家小组得出结论认为，胡塞武装分子继续对包括妇女在内的平民实施强迫失踪、任意拘留和酷刑，严重违反了国际法。

B. 归咎于联盟的行为和事件

103. 专家小组调查了 2022 年 1 月和 3 月联盟对萨那、荷台达和萨达省胡塞武装控制区内地点发动的 4 次空袭事件，这些事件造成 267 名平民伤亡。⁹² 情况如下：(a) 1 月 17 日，对萨那居民区建筑物发动空袭，造成 9 名平民死亡，其中包括 2 名妇女，9 人受伤；⁹³ (b) 1 月 20 日，对荷台达一处电信设施发动空袭，造成 5 名平民死亡，其中包括 3 名儿童，20 人受伤，其中包括 2 名儿童；⁹⁴ (c) 1 月 21 日，对萨达省一处设有拘留设施的营地发动空袭，造成 82 名被拘留者死亡，163 人受伤；⁹⁵ (d) 3 月 25 日，对萨那居民区建筑物发动空袭，造成 8 名平民死亡，其中包括 5 名儿童和 2 名妇女。⁹⁶ 在萨达发生的事件中，66 人因空袭死亡，16 人因胡塞武装向逃跑的被拘留者射击而死亡。⁹⁷

104. 专家小组开展了调查，包括与受害者、目击者和维权人士进行面谈和远程访谈，检查照片材料，审查当地和国际实体以及涉案各方的调查报告和陈述。专

⁹¹ 见 www.ama-ye.org/?no=1936&ln=En。

⁹² 关于平民伤亡的说法各不相同。在萨达的袭击中，据报平民死亡人数在 60 人到 100 人之间。本报告所述数字由目击者和调查该事件的当地组织向专家小组提供。

⁹³ 见 <https://mwatana.org/en/latest-round>。

⁹⁴ 同上。

⁹⁵ 见 www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/21/several-killed-in-airstrike-on-yemen-prison;
<https://mwatana.org/en/latest-round>。

⁹⁶ 见 www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2022-03-26/statement-the-spokesperson-of-the-secretary-general-attacks-civilian-facilities-saudi-arabia-and-yemen。

⁹⁷ 见 www.thenationalnews.com/gulf-news/saudi-arabia/2021/12/07/photos-show-charred-wreckage-of-drone-after-missile-shot-down-over-riyadh。

家小组未能访问事件现场。专家小组致函联盟，询问空袭情况以及联盟为避免或尽量减少平民伤亡可能已采取的措施，但没有得到答复。不过，联盟联合部队指挥部向专家小组通报了其遵守国际人道法的各项规程，⁹⁸ 并表示，联盟 1 月 21 日的空袭精确瞄准了胡塞武装用于发射无人驾驶飞行器的安全营地，而发射飞行器的行为使该营地成为合法的军事目标。

105. 专家小组完成了对 4 起事件中 3 起事件的调查，即 1 月 17 日、20 日和 21 日的事件。⁹⁹ 根据现有证据，专家小组得出结论认为，在这些军事行动中，联盟部队很可能没有遵守国际人道法规定的义务，即：(a) 区分平民和战斗人员，区分民用物体和军事目标，只针对军事目标；(b) 采取一切可行的预防措施，避免或尽量减少对平民的伤害；(c) 不对军事目标进行与预期的具体和直接军事利益相比损害过分的攻击。¹⁰⁰

106. 这 3 起事件的详情和专家小组的调查结果见附件 30。

C. 归咎于也门政府和附属团体的侵权行为

107. 专家小组收到了归咎于也门政府及其附属团体的任意拘留、强迫失踪、法外处决和其他侵权行为的资料。侵权行为包括本报告所述期间记录的新行为和关于失踪案件的最新数据。当地一个倡导团体称，许多被国家安全部队绑架和遭到强迫失踪的平民(有些早在 2016 年就被绑架和强迫失踪)仍然失踪或被拘留，其中包括被安全地带部队带走的 118 名平民、被政府安全部门带走的 18 名平民和被联合部队带走的 7 名平民。¹⁰¹

108. 专家小组正在调查以下 4 起涉及强迫失踪、任意拘留、酷刑和法外处决指控的案件：

(a) 8 月 6 日，自由职业记者、Marsad Aden 新闻网站前编辑 Ahmed Maher 及其兄弟 Maher 据称在亚丁达尔萨德居民区家中被安全地带部队绑架。专家小组收到的资料显示，自被捕以来，Ahmed Maher 一直遭到任意拘留，被安全地带部队拘禁在 Bi'r Ahmad 监狱，据称他在狱中受到可能构成酷刑的虐待，并在死亡威胁下被迫“供认”犯有与恐怖主义有关的罪行；

(b) 3 月 27 日，安全地带部队据称在亚丁国际机场逮捕了来自扎马尔省 Ans 区的 7 人。4 人据称被拘留一个月后获释。而其他 3 人据报仍被关押在 Bi'r Ahmad 监狱，未经起诉，也不准探视或与家人联系；

⁹⁸ 联合部队指挥部在专家小组 2022 年 10 月访问利雅得期间向专家小组作了介绍。

⁹⁹ 专家小组正在继续调查 2022 年 3 月 25 日在萨那发生的事件。

¹⁰⁰ 见 www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2021/02/joint-statement-independent-united-nations-human-rights-experts-human-rights; <https://pilac.law.harvard.edu/ansas>; A/HRC/38/44。

¹⁰¹ 见 www.ama-ye.org/?no=1936&ln=En。

(c) 1月24日下午3时左右(当地时间), Crater 警察局两名警官前往亚丁省 Crater 区 Shi'b Al-Aydarus 居民区, 据称在平民 Khaled Ali Salem Ba Hakeem 拒绝被任意逮捕后开枪将其射杀;

(d) 9月10日, 来自拉赫季省 Tawr al-Bahah Jabalayn 安全检查站的安全人员(隶属南部过渡委员会第九突击部队旅)据称在亚丁检查站逮捕了也门公民 Abdulmalik Anwar Ahmed Al-Sanabani, 将其带到亚丁第九突击部队旅驻地, 据称此人那里遭到殴打和谋杀。

109. 专家小组开展了调查, 包括对受害者家属和记录所报告侵权行为的人权活动人士进行访谈, 以及审查非政府组织的报告和公开资料。专家小组就所报告的侵权行为致函也门政府, 目前正在等待答复。专家小组正在调查政府是否履行了国际法规定的义务, 即保护所有人免遭任意拘留、酷刑和其他侵权行为, 迅速开展彻底调查, 并将施害者绳之以法。

D. 地雷和未爆弹药造成的平民伤亡


110. 武装冲突继续造成大量平民伤亡。据联合国人道主义事务协调厅称, 自2022年4月休战协议签署以来, 地雷和未爆弹药造成的平民伤亡比例最高。随着战斗平息, 平民可以更自由地行动, 许多人目前正在设法进入自己的农田和家园。这增加了他们接触地雷和战争遗留爆炸物的风险。2022年4月至9月, 涉及地雷和未爆弹药的事件导致343名平民伤亡, 其中95人死亡, 248人受伤, 这些事件主要发生在荷台达省和焦夫省的前线地区。相比之下, 在休战前的6个月内, 平民伤亡较少, 为248人, 其中101人死亡, 147人受伤。¹⁰²

111. 专家小组收到的信息显示, 胡塞武装继续制造杀伤人员地雷, 主要是在前线地区的农田、公路沿线和民用基础设施(学校、清真寺和供水点)附近埋设地雷。杀伤人员地雷意外爆炸已造成数百名平民伤亡(见图十)。专家小组记录了荷台达、马里卜、塔伊兹和贝达发生的11名平民因地雷爆炸而伤亡的案件(见附件31)。

¹⁰² 见 <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-humanitarian-update-issue-9-september-2022> ; <https://twitter.com/ochayemen/status/1587850904560099328?s=46&t=kUo4xQxzhB4XmBwFF2Xecg>。

图十

2021 年 10 月至 2022 年 9 月地雷和未爆弹药造成的伤亡与伤亡总数的比较



资料来源：人道主义事务协调厅/快速反应机制分组。

八. 阻碍人道主义援助物资的运送和分发

112. 人道主义局势依然严峻，估计有 2 340 万人需要某种形式的援助或保护。人道主义行为体在向迫切需要援助的民众运送和分发人道主义援助时，面临也门政府、胡塞武装和其他行为体施加的众多障碍。主要障碍是针对人道主义人员和资产的暴力行为、对人道主义人员和行动施加行动限制，以及对人道主义活动的干扰。地雷和未爆弹药也对进入数百万人需要援助的许多前线地区构成限制。人道主义事务协调厅报告称，2022 年 7 月至 9 月，在 19 个省 103 个地区发生了 673 起影响准入的事件，比上一季度大幅增加，使 580 万人受到影响(见图十一)。¹⁰³

¹⁰³ 见 <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-access-snapshot-july-september-2022-30-september-2022>。

图十一

2022 年 7 月至 9 月准入情况概览

关键数字

673

人道主义伙伴报告
的事件总数

0

被绑架的工作
人员人数

6

在16起事件中遭劫持
的人道主义车辆数

1

被拘留的人道主义
工作人员人数

2

因暴力行为受伤
的工作人员人数


495

造成延误的官僚
限制数量

最多可达 5 809 229

在该季度某些时刻因援助延
误或中断而受到影响的人数

最多可达 2 347 583

因行动准入限制和次级协定
审批延误而受到影响的人数

资料来源：人道主义事务协调厅。

九. 建议

113. 专家小组建议安全理事会：

(a) 促请胡塞武装不要对船上人员或船只本身使用可能危及船只航行安全的恐吓或暴力；

(b) 促请胡塞武装和也门政府与联合国及其他利益攸关方合作，对 *FSO Safer* 号实施安全救助，以防止红海、也门和该区域发生潜在的环境和人道主义灾难；

(c) 促请《斯德哥尔摩协议》缔约方避免采取任何可能破坏《协议》的行为，并表示打算对任何此类行为的实施者实施制裁；

(d) 促请冲突各方不要采取可能导致也门经济不稳定的措施；

(e) 促请会员国加紧努力，打击可被胡塞武装用作爆炸物前体、固体燃料推进剂氧化剂或其他军事用途的化肥和其他化学品的走私和贩运；

(f) 促请会员国加紧努力，打击麻醉药品和精神药物的走私和贩运，以确保实施金融制裁，并考虑通过适当的法律文书，以便对国际海军和海岸警卫队在国际水域发现的案件进行适当调查，从而使有关当局能够将犯罪人绳之以法；

(g) 促请会员国加强信息共享，与也门政府、在阿拉伯海和红海行动的国际海上部队以及联合国毒品和犯罪问题办公室等其他相关各方分享关于海上缴获军火、弹药和相关物项的信息，以便对也门境内拘留的走私者提起法律诉讼；

(h) 促请该区域会员国与也门政府加强信息共享，分享关于缴获军火、弹药和相关物项的信息，以及本国境内参与向胡塞武装走私和贩运的个人和实体的信息，以便对也门境内拘留的走私者提起法律诉讼；

(i) 促请各方考虑采取措施，加强在亚丁和萨那运作的两个中央银行之间的协调，包括在也门全境加强双方监管机制和银行业务之间的协调；

(j) 促请胡塞武装接受被其视为伪币而禁止的亚丁也门中央银行发行的纸币，将其作为也门全国的法定货币；

(k) 促请胡塞武装避免不经正当法律程序，任意和使用武力没收个人和实体的土地、建筑物和其他财产，并表示打算对采取此种行为者实施制裁；

(l) 促请胡塞武装采取措施，根据《斯德哥尔摩协议》，将荷台达港、萨利夫港和拉斯伊萨港的收入汇入也门中央银行，作为支付荷台达省和也门全国薪金的缴款；

(m) 促请胡塞武装在未与所有利益攸关方适当协商的情况下，不要仓促执行任何禁止银行或商业交易利息的法律；

(m) 促请胡塞武装不要向民众发出任何为其战争活动寻求支持的信息，也不要指示电信公司或任何其他个人或实体为其战争活动提供任何资金，并表示打算对此类行为的责任人实施制裁；

(o) 回顾安理会第 [2624 \(2022\)](#) 号决议第 12 段，促请冲突各方不要在武装冲突中招募和使用儿童，也不要采取其他严重违反国际法的行为，并表示打算对此类行为的责任人实施制裁；

(p) 以最强烈的措辞谴责国际人道法禁止的一切针对平民和民用基础设施的袭击，重申冲突各方必须遵守国际法规定的义务；

(q) 促请冲突各方采取措施，停止无差别使用地雷，记录地雷埋设情况，在各自控制的平民区内清除现有地雷，并鼓励会员国加强对也门人道主义排雷工作的支持；

(r) 促请冲突各方确保追究其部队违反国际人道法和国际人权法行为的责任，并立即向受害者提供补救和支持。

114. 专家小组建议委员会考虑：

(a) 在新闻稿中以最强烈的措辞谴责冲突各方继续违反国际人道法和国际人权法以及侵犯人权的行为，包括对也门和邻国平民和民用基础设施实施有针对性或无差别的攻击；

(b) 在新闻稿中以最强烈的措辞谴责胡塞武装对红海和亚丁湾商船实施威胁和军事袭击，包括但不限于威胁袭击也门政府控制的石油码头的油轮；

(c) 在委员会内组织一次焦点讨论，讨论专家小组根据以往任务授权提交并经委员会审查和接受的建议的执行情况；

(d) 鼓励冲突各方和其他相关利益攸关方，包括国际调解人，在和平进程中纳入以下措施：

(一) 防止也门经济出现不稳定状况；

(二) 促进加强在亚丁和萨那运作的两个中央银行之间协调，包括加强双方监管机制和银行业务之间的协调；

(三) 允许接受被胡塞武装视为伪币而禁止的亚丁也门中央银行发行的纸币，将其作为也门全国的法定货币；

(四) 取消对也门政府控制区和胡塞武装控制区之间的国内贸易进行双重征税；

(五) 建立符合也门人民最佳利益的适当的收入征收、分享和使用机制。

Annex 1 Methodology

1. The Panel uses satellite imagery of Yemen procured by the United Nations from private providers to support investigations. It also uses commercial databases recording maritime and aviation data and mobile phone records. Public statements by officials through their official media channels are accepted as factual unless contrary facts are established. While it has been as transparent as possible, in situations in which identifying sources would expose these sources or others to unacceptable safety risks, the Panel does not include identifying information.
2. The Panel reviews social media, but no information gathered is used as evidence unless it could be corroborated using multiple independent or technical sources, including eyewitnesses, to appropriately meet the highest achievable standard of proof.
3. The spelling of toponyms within Yemen often depends on the ethnicity of the source or the quality of transliteration. The Panel has adopted a consistent approach in the present update.
4. The Panel places importance on the rule of consensus among the Panel members and agrees that, if differences and/or reservations arise during the development of reports, it would only adopt the text, conclusions and recommendations by a majority of the members. In the event of a recommendation for designation of an individual or a group, such recommendation would be done based on unanimity.
5. The Panel has offered the opportunity to reply to Member States, entities and individuals involved in most incidents that are covered in this report. Their response has been taken into consideration in the Panel's findings. The methodology for this is provided in appendix A.

Appendix A ‘The opportunity to reply’ methodology used by the Panel

1. Although sanctions are meant to be preventative not punitive, it should be recognized that the mere naming of an individual or entity¹ in a Panel’s public report, could have adverse effects on the individual. As such, where possible, individuals concerned should be provided with an opportunity to provide their account of events and to provide concrete and specific information/material in support. Through this interaction, the individual is given the opportunity to demonstrate that their alleged conduct does not fall within the relevant listing criteria. This is called the ‘opportunity to reply’.
2. The Panel’s methodology on the opportunity to reply is as follows:
 - (a) Providing an individual with an ‘opportunity to reply’ should be the norm;
 - (b) The Panel may decide not to offer an opportunity of reply if there is credible evidence that it would unduly prejudice its investigations, including if it would:
 - (i) Result in the individual moving assets if they get warning of a possible recommendation for designation;
 - (ii) Restrict further access of the Panel to vital sources;
 - (iii) Endanger Panel sources or their relatives or Panel members;
 - (iv) Adversely and gravely impact humanitarian access for humanitarian actors in the field;
 - (v) For any other reason that can be clearly demonstrated as reasonable and justifiable in the prevailing circumstances.
3. If the circumstances set forth in 2 (b) do not apply, then the Panel should be able to provide an individual an opportunity to reply.
4. The individual should be able to communicate directly with the Panel to convey their personal determination as to the level and nature of their interaction with the Panel.
5. Interactions between the Panel and the individual should be direct, unless in exceptional circumstances.
6. In no circumstances the third parties, without the knowledge of the individual, can determine for the individual its level of interaction with the Panel.
7. The individuals, on the other hand, in making their determination of the level and nature of interaction with the Panel, may consult third parties or allow third parties (for example, legal representative or their government) to communicate on their behalf on subsequent interactions with the Panel.

¹ Hereinafter, the term individual will be used to reflect both individuals and entities.

Appendix B Investigations methodology on violations relating to IHL, IHRL, and acts that constitute human rights abuses

1. The Panel adopts the following stringent methodology to ensure that its investigations meet the highest possible evidentiary standards, despite it being prevented from visiting places in Yemen. In doing so it pays particular attention to the “Informal Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions Reports”, ([S/2006/997](#)), on best practices and methods, including paragraphs 21, 22 and 23, as per paragraph 14 of resolution 2564 (2021).

2. The Panel’s methodology, in relation to its investigations concerning alleged IHL, IHRL and human rights abuses, is as set out below:

(a) All Panel investigations are initiated based on verifiable information being made available to the Panel, either directly from sources or from media reports.

(b) In carrying out its investigations on the use of explosive ordnance, the Panel relies on at least three or more of the following sources of information:

- (i) At least two eyewitnesses or victims;
- (ii) At least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident;
- (iii) If there are casualties associated with the incident, and if the casualties are less than ten in number, the Panel will endeavour to obtain copies of death certificates and medical certificates. In incidents relating to mass casualties, the Panel relies on published information from the United Nations and other organizations;
- (iv) Technical evidence, which includes imagery of the impact damage, blast effects, and recovered fragmentation. In all cases, the Panel collects imagery from at least two different and unrelated sources. In the rare cases where the Panel has had to rely on open source imagery, the Panel verifies that imagery by referring it to eyewitnesses or by checking for pixilation distortion:
 - a. In relation to air strikes, the Panel often identifies the responsible party through crater analysis or by the identification of components from imagery of fragmentation; and
 - b. The Panel also analyses imagery of the ground splatter pattern at the point of impact from mortar, artillery, or free flight rocket fire to identify the direction from which the incoming ordnance originated. This is one indicator to assist in the identification of the perpetrator for ground fire when combined with other sources of information.
- (v) The utilization of open source or purchased satellite imagery, wherever possible, to identify the exact location of an incident, and to support analysis of the type and extent of destruction. Such imagery may also assist in the confirmation of timelines of the incident;
- (vi) Access to investigation reports and other documentation of local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident;
- (vii) Other documentation that supports the narrative of sources, for example, factory manuals that may prove that the said factory is technically incapable of producing weapons of the type it is alleged to have produced;
- (viii) In rare instances where the Panel has doubt as to the veracity of available facts from other sources, local sources are relied on to collect specific and verifiable information from the ground, for example, if the Panel wished to confirm the presence of an armed group in a particular area;
- (ix) Statements issued by or on behalf of a party to the conflict responsible for the incident;
- (x) Open source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel’s findings.

(c) In carrying out its investigations on deprivation of liberty and associated violations, the Panel relies on the following sources of information:

- (i) The victims, where they are able and willing to speak to the Panel, and where medical and security conditions are conducive to such an interview;
- (ii) The relatives of victims and others who had access to the victims while in custody. This is particularly relevant in instances where the victim dies in custody;
- (iii) Interviews with at least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident;
- (iv) Medical documentation and, where applicable, death certificates;
- (v) Documentation issued by prison authorities;
- (vi) Interviews with medical personnel who treated the victim, wherever possible;
- (vii) Investigation and other documentation from local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident. The Panel may also seek access to court documents if the detainee is on trial or other documentation that proves or disproves the narrative of the victim;
- (viii) Where relevant, the Panel uses local sources to collect specific and verifiable information from the ground, for example, medical certificates;
- (ix) Statements issued by the party to the conflict responsible for the incident;
- (x) Open-source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel's findings;
- (xi) Detainees do not have always access to medical care, nor is it always possible to obtain medical reports, especially in cases of prolonged detention. Therefore, the Panel accepts testimonies received from detainees alleging that violence was used against them during detention by the detaining parties as *prima facie* evidence of torture;
- (xii) For the same reasons, medical and police reports are not required by the Panel to conclude that rape or sexual violence took place.

(d) In carrying out its investigations on other violations, including forced displacement human rights violations and abuses against migrants, or threats against medical workers, the Panel relies on information that includes:

- (i) Interviews with victims, eyewitnesses, and direct reports where they are able and willing to speak to the Panel, and where conditions are conducive to such an interview;
- (ii) Interviews with at least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident;
- (iii) Documentation relevant to verify information obtained;
- (iv) Statements issued by the party to the conflict responsible for the incident;
- (v) Open-source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel's findings.

(e) In carrying out its investigation in respect to the recruitment of children by parties to the conflict, the Panel is particularly mindful of the risk posed by its investigations for the children and their family. The Panel also refrains from interviewing directly the victim, unless it is sure that this will not have a negative impact on them. Therefore, the Panel often relies on sources such as:

- (i) Investigations and other documentation from local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident;
- (ii) Interviews with people and organizations providing assistance to these children;
- (iii) Interviews with other people with knowledge of the violations such as family members, community leaders, teachers, and social workers.

(f) The standard of proof is met when the Panel has reasonable grounds to believe that the incidents had occurred as described and, based on multiple corroboratory sources, that the responsibility for the incident lies with the identified perpetrator. The standard of proof is "beyond a reasonable doubt".

(g) Upon completion of its investigation, wherever possible, the Panel provides those responsible with an opportunity to respond to the Panel's findings in so far as it relates to the attribution of responsibility. This is undertaken in accordance with the Panel's standard methodology on the opportunity to reply. Generally, the Panel would provide detailed information in any opportunity to respond, including geo-locations. However, detailed information on incidents are not provided when there is a credible threat that it would threaten Panel's sources,

for example, in violations related to deprivation of liberty, violations associated with ground strikes on a civilian home, or in violations associated with children.

(h) If a party does not provide the Panel with the information requested, the Panel will consider whether this is of sufficient gravity to be considered as non-compliance with paragraph 18 of resolution 2624 (2022) and thus consideration for reporting to the Committee.

3. The Panel does not include information in its reports that may identify or endanger its sources. Where it is necessary to bring such information to the attention of the Council or the Committee, the Panel deposits such information in the custody of the Secretariat for viewing by members of the Committee.

4. The Panel does not divulge any information that may lead to the identification of victims, witnesses, and other particularly vulnerable sources, except: 1) with the specific permission of the sources; and 2) where the Panel is, based on its own assessment, certain that these individuals would not suffer any danger as a result of such disclosure of information. The Panel stands ready to provide the Council or the Committee, on request, with any additional imagery and documentation to support the Panel's findings beyond that included in its reports. Appropriate precautions will, however, be taken to protect the anonymity of its sources.

Annex 2

UN Geographic Information Systems (GIS) Map



Annex 3 Summary of Panel correspondence (up to 9 December 2022)**Table 3.**

Correspondence with Member States

| <i>Member State</i> | <i>Number of letters sent by the Panel</i> | <i>Number of unanswered letters by Member State</i> | <i>Number of letters where the deadline is after 9 December 2022</i> |
|----------------------------|--|---|--|
| Kingdom of Bahrain | 3 | | |
| Republic of Bulgaria | 1 | | |
| People's Republic of China | 3 | 1 | |
| Republic of Djibouti | 2 | 2 | |
| Arab Republic of Egypt | 1 | | |
| Republic of Ethiopia | 1 | | |
| France | 2 | | |
| Islamic Republic of Iran | 5 | 2 | |
| Italy | 1 | | |
| Jordan | 1 | | |
| State of Kuwait | 1 | | |
| Sultanate of Oman | 9 | 2 | |
| Kingdom of Saudi Arabia | 4 | 1 | |
| Singapore | 1 | | |
| Sri Lanka | 1 | | |
| Republic of Sudan | 1 | | |
| Switzerland | 1 | | |
| Türkiye | 3 | | |
| Turkmenistan | 2 | 2 | |
| Republic of Uganda | 1 | | |
| United Arab Emirates | 8 | 2 | |
| United Kingdom | 2 | | 1 |
| United States of America | 7 | | |
| Yemen | 16 | 8 | |
| <i>Total</i> | <i>77</i> | <i>20</i> | <i>1</i> |

Table 3.2

Correspondence with armed groups and other non-governmental entities

| <i>Entity</i> | <i>Number of letters sent by the Panel</i> | <i>Number of unanswered letters by entity</i> | <i>Number of letters where the deadline is after 9 December 2022</i> |
|--|--|---|--|
| Sana'a-based ministry of foreign affairs | 10 | 8 | 2 |
| Sana'a-based Central Bank of Yemen | 1 | 1 | |
| Southern Transitional Council | 3 | 3 | |
| <i>Total</i> | 11 | 12 | 2 |

Table 3.3

Correspondence with commercial companies/government entities

| <i>Commercial Company/ Government Entity</i> | <i>Number of letters sent by the Panel</i> | <i>Number of unanswered letters by commercial company</i> | <i>Number of letters where the deadline is after 9 December 2022</i> |
|--|--|---|--|
| CMA CGM | 1 | | |
| Commander of Joint Forces | 1 | 1 | |
| Hapag Lloyd | 1 | | |
| Maran Tankers Management Athens, Greece | 1 | 1 | |
| Okeanis Eco Tankers, Greece | 1 | 1 | |
| Shraddha Maritime Services Pvt. Ltd. India | 1 | 1 | |
| Thadamon Bank | 1 | 1 | |
| <i>Total</i> | 7 | 4 | |

Annex 4 National Defence Council Resolution No. (1) of 2022 AD designating the Houthis as a Terrorist Organisation

Figure 4.1

Copy of National Defence Council Resolution No. (1) of 2022 AD designating the Houthis as a Terrorist Organisation





قرار مجلس الدفاع الوطني رقم (١) لعام ٢٠٢٢ م

بشأن

حشد الجهد السياسي والدبلوماسي إقليمياً ودولياً

أستمع المجلس الى تقرير شفهي مقدم من وزير الخارجية وشؤون المغتربين حول نتائج لقاءاته مع المبعوث الدولي للأمم المتحدة والأمريكي والأمين العام للأمم المتحدة و أقر الآتي:-

- ١- يوافق المجلس على تصنيف الحوثيين جماعة ارهابية.
- ٢- تشكيل لجنة برئاسة الدكتور/ عبدالله العليبي عضو مجلس القيادة الرئاسي وعضوية كل من :-
 - وزير الخارجية وشؤون المغتربين.
 - وزير الشؤون القانونية وحقوق الإنسان.
 - رئيس هيئة التشاور والمصالحة.
- ٣- تتولى اللجنة المهام الآتية :-
 - أ- إعداد خطة للتحرك السياسي والدبلوماسي بالتنسيق مع قيادة التحالف والدول دائمة العضوية في مجلس الأمن حول تصنيف الحوثيين جماعة ارهابية وتجميد اتفاق استوكهولم.
 - ب- مراجعة الرسالة المعدة من مكتب رئاسة الجمهورية والموجبة للأمين العام للأمم المتحدة المتعلقة بتجميد العمل باتفاق استوكهولم والتنسيق مع التحالف.
 - ج- رفع نتائج التنفيذ أول بأول لفخامة رئيس مجلس القيادة الرئاسي رئيس مجلس الدفاع الوطني.
- ٤- ينفذ القرار بالوسائل الإدارية المناسبة.
- ٥- يبدأ تنفيذ القرار من تاريخ ٢٠٢٢/١٠/٢٢ م وينتهي بتنفيذ أحكامه.

| المتحفظون | المتنعون | المنفذون | |
|-----------|----------|--|-------|
| لا يوجد | لا يوجد | رئيسي | مشارك |
| | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - د.عبدالله العليبي عضو مجلس القيادة الرئاسي. - وزير الخارجية وشؤون المغتربين - وزير الشؤون القانونية وحقوق الإنسان - رئيس هيئة التشاور والمصالحة | |

مدة القرار: مؤقت.
مضمون القرار: إقليمي /خارجي/ حشد الجهد السياسي والدبلوماسي إقليمياً ودولياً
شكل القرار: حكم عام.
جهة التنفيذ: مشترك.

Source:

Government of Yemen

Appendix A Unofficial Translation of National Defence Council Resolution No. (1) of 2022 AD designating the Houthis as a Terrorist Organisation

Republic of Yemen

Presidential Leadership Council

National Defence Council Resolution No. (1) of 2022 AD

About Mobilizing political and diplomatic efforts regionally and internationally

The Council listened to an oral report submitted by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriate Affairs on the results of meetings with the international envoy of the United Nations, the United States, and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, approved the following:

1. The council agrees to designate the Houthis as a terrorist group.
2. Formation of Committee with Presidency of Dr. Abdullah Al-Ali~~mi~~, member of the Presidential Leadership Council, and the membership of:
 - Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriate Affairs
 - Minister of Legal Affairs and Human Rights
 - Chairman of the Consultation and Reconciliation Authority
3. The Committee undertakes the following tasks:
 - A. Preparing a plan for political and diplomatic action, in coordination with the leadership of the coalition and the permanent members of the Security Council, regarding designating the Houthis as a terrorist group and freezing the Stockholm Agreement.
 - B. Refer to the letter prepared by the Presidential Office of the Republic and directed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations related to the freezing of work under the Stockholm Agreement and coordination with the coalition.
 - C. Presenting the implementation results first to His Excellency the President of the Presidential Leadership Council, President of the National Defence Council.
4. The decision is implemented by appropriate administrative means.
5. The implementation of the decision starts from 22/10/2022 and ends with the implementation of its provisions.

| Conservatives | Abstainers | Executioners | |
|---------------|------------|--|-------------|
| Not found | Not found | Head | Participant |
| | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Dr. Abdullah Al-Alimi, a member of the Presidential Leadership Council - Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriate Affairs - Minister of Legal Affairs and Human Rights - Chairman of the Consultation and Reconciliation Authority | |

Duration of the resolution: Temporary

Content of the resolution: service / external / mobilizing political and diplomatic efforts regionally and internationally

Form of resolution: general judgment

Body of Implementation: Joint

Minutes of Defence Council Session No. (1) dated 10/22/20022 number of pages (10) (preliminary wording)


Annex 5 Debris of missiles and UAVs used in the attacks on the UAE in January and February 2022

Figure 5.1
“Zulfiqar” ballistic missile debris used in the attack on Dubai International Airport



Source: Panel

Figure 5.2
Connection element between warhead and the rest of the missile



Source: Panel

Figure 5.3
Detail showing the diameter of the missile (88 centimetres)



Source: Panel

Figure 5.4
Marking on missile component



Source: Panel

Figure 5.5
Marking on missile component



Source: Panel

Figure 5.6
Marking on missile component



Source: Panel

Figure 5.7
Marking on missile component



Source: Panel

Figure 5.8
Debris of the jet vane




Source: Panel

Figure 5.9
Carbon-fibre pressurised gas bottle



Source: Panel

Figure 5.10
Debris of the guidance section



Source: Panel


Figure 5.11
Debris of the two “Quds-2” cruise missiles used in the attack on Abu Dhabi International Airport



Source: Panel

Figure 5.12

Serial number on the Exciter Ignition System of one of the cruise missiles



Source: Panel

Figure 5.13

Markings on the fuselage of one of the cruise missiles




Source: Panel

Figure 5.14
“Quds” marking on the debris of one of the cruise missiles




Source: Panel

Figure 5.15
Marking on the debris of the control surface of one of the cruise missiles



Source: Panel

Figure 5.16
Serial number on the debris of the turbojet engine




Source: Panel

Figure 5.17
Debris of the "Quds-2" cruise missile used in the attack on the ADNOC fuel depot



Source: Panel

Figure 5.18
Serial number of the turbojet engine



Source: Panel

Figure 5.19
Serial number on the Exciter Ignition System of the cruise missile used in the ADNOC attack



Source: Panel

Figure 5.20

Model V10 Gyroscope from one of the “Sammad” UAVs used in the attack on 2 February 2022



Source: Panel

Figure 5.21

Serial number of the battery box from one of the “Sammad” UAVs used in the attack on 2 February 2022



Source: Panel

Figure 5.22

Battery box from one of the “Sammad” UAVs used in the attack on 2 February 2022



Source: Panel

Figure 5.23

Battery inside of the box from one of the “Sammad” UAVs used in the attack on 2 February 2022



Source: Panel

Figure 5.24

Fuselage, tail section, and engine of one of the “Sammad” UAVs used in the attack on 2 February 2022



Source: Panel

Figure 5.25

Marking on the tail section of the “Sammad” UAVs used in the attack on 2 February 2022



Source: Panel

Figure 5.26

DLE 170 engine of one of the “Sammad” UAVs used in the attack on 2 February 2022



Source: Panel

Figure 5.27

DLE Electric Ignition box for the engine



Source: Panel

Annex 6 Houthi Press Release and correspondence threatening oil companies not to transport oil from Yemen

Background

1. On 1 October 2022, the Houthi-appointed Minister of Transport (MoT), Abdul-Wahab Yahya Al-Durra issued a statement, threatening tankers not to transport oil from ports or terminals under GoY-control from 1800 hours LT on 2 October 2022. The Houthis also issued separate circulars from the MoT and Maritime Affairs Authority (MAA) on 2 October 2022 to international energy companies and shipping agents, warning against the transportation of crude oil from Yemen. Since then, the Houthis carried out four attacks at Al-Dabba, Balhaf and Qena (paragraph XX of this report).

2. Prior to the attacks the Houthis had send threatening letters to flag states, shipping companies and ship masters against oil and gas from Yemen, from email address ycg@yemen.net. identifying as the Yemen Coast Guards (YCG) and operations@maa.gov.ye identifying as the Maritime Affairs Authority, Ministry of Transport, Republic of Yemen. Similar threats were made on the twitter handle of the spokesperson of Houthi spokesperson, Yahya Sare'e (@Yahya_Saree) and the corresponding Arabic twitter handle @army21ye.

Figure 6.1

Statement from Houthi Supreme Economic Committee, warning companies against oil exports

رئيس الجمهورية



بتوجيهات من الرئيس المشاط. الاقتصادية العليا تخاطب الشركات بالتوقف عن نهب ثروات اليمن

السبت، 05 ربيع الأول 1444هـ الموافق 01 أكتوبر 2022
صنعاء - سبأ :

أصدر فخامة المشير الركن مهدي المشاط رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى، توجيهات لتحرير المخاطبات الرسمية النهائية لكل الشركات والكيانات ذات العلاقة بنهب الثروات السيادية اليمنية، للتوقف الكامل عن عمليات النهب.

وأوضح بيان صادر عن اللجنة الاقتصادية العليا تلقته وكالة الأنباء اليمنية (سبأ) أن اللجنة تكف حالياً بالتنسيق مع الجهات المختصة، على تحرير تلك المخاطبات التي تتضمن إشعار كل الشركات والكيانات، بأن عليها التوقف بشكل نهائي عن نهب الثروات اليمنية السيادية، ابتداء من الساعة السادسة من مساء غد الأحد بتوقيت العاصمة صنعاء، السادس من شهر ربيع الأول 1444هـ الموافق 2 أكتوبر 2022م، على أن تتحمل الشركات أو الكيانات المسؤولة الكاملة في حال عدم الالتزام.

وأشارت اللجنة إلى أن المخاطبات التي ستوجه للشركات والكيانات المتورطة بنهب الثروة اليمنية، ستستند إلى النصوص الدستورية والقوانين اليمنية النافذة، ومواثيق ومعاهدات الأمم المتحدة، وعلى رأسها المادة رقم 19 من الدستور اليمني، التي تلزم الدولة وجميع أفراد المجتمع بحماية وصون الثروات الوطنية.

وأكدت الاقتصادية العليا أن الجمهورية اليمنية تحتفظ بحقها القانوني للتعامل مع كل عمليات النهب للثروة اليمنية التي تمت قبل السادس من ربيع الأول 1444هـ الموافق 2 أكتوبر 2022، والتي تم رصدها بدقة خلال الفترات الماضية.

Appendix A Unofficial Translation of Statement from Houthi Supreme Economic Committee warning companies against oil exports

Under the directives of President Al-Mashat, the Supreme Economic Council addresses companies to stop plundering Yemen's wealth

Saturday, 05 Rabi` al-Awwal 1444 AH corresponding to October 01, 2022

Sana'a - Saba: His Excellency Field Marshal Mahdi Al-Mashat, Chairman of the Supreme Political Council, issued directives to issue final official correspondence to all companies and entities related to the looting of Yemeni sovereign wealth, to completely stop looting.

A statement issued by the Supreme Economic Committee, which was received by the Yemeni News Agency (Saba), indicated that the committee is currently working, in coordination with the competent authorities, to issue those correspondences that include notifying all companies and entities that they must stop once and for all the looting of Yemeni sovereign wealth, starting at six o'clock in the afternoon. Tomorrow evening, Sunday, capital Sana'a time, the sixth of the month of Rabi' al-Awwal 1444 AH corresponding to October 2, 2022 AD, provided that companies or entities bear full responsibility in the event of non-compliance.

The committee indicated that the communications that will be addressed to the companies and entities involved in the plundering of Yemeni wealth will be based on constitutional texts, Yemeni laws in force, and United Nations charters and treaties, foremost of which is Article No. 19 of the Yemeni constitution, which obliges the state and all members of society to protect and preserve national wealth.

And the Supreme Economic confirmed that the Republic of Yemen reserves its legal right to deal with all the looting of Yemeni wealth that took place before the sixth of Rabi` al-Awwal 1444 AH corresponding to October 2, 2022, which was carefully monitored during the past periods

Source: <https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3205115.htm>.

Figure 6.2

Circular issued by Houthi run MAA to companies against transportation of oil

Republic of Yemen
 Ministry of Transport
 Maritime Affairs Authority
 Hodeidah Branch

الجمهورية اليمنية
 وزارة النقل
 الهيئة العامة للشؤون البحرية
 فرع الحديدة

Ref: ٥٤٤/٣/٦
 Date: ٢٠٢٢/١٠/٢٥
 المراسل: ٥٤٤/٣/٦

هام وعاجل

الأخوة / الشركات الملاحية
 تحية طيبة وبعد...

الموضوع / منع عمليات النقل الملاحي التي تقوم بنهب ثروات البلاد

بالإشارة إلى الموضوع أعلاه، وإلى مذكرة معالي وزير النقل رقم (م. و/١٤٤٤/٣/٦) بتاريخ 2022/10/2م (مرفق)، وإلى مذكرة معالي وزير النفط والمعادن رقم 629 بتاريخ 1444/3/5هـ والمتضمنة حق الشعب والدولة اليمنية في السيادة الدائمة على مواردها وثرواتها الطبيعية والحق في حملتها وردع وإيقاف أي عمليات فساد أو نهب تطل تلك الموارد والثروات، ووفقاً لنصوص وأحكام اتفاقيات المشاركة في الإنتاج PSA الموقعة مع وزارة النفط والمعادن والمصادق عليها من قبل البرلمان والمتضمنة إلزام الشركات المشغلة أو المشاركة في عمليات الاستكشاف والإنتاج بالتنسيق الكامل مع الوزارة والخضوع للأنظمة والتعاميم الصادرة عنها والالتزام بالقوانين اليمنية النافذة. ونظراً لإخلال تلك الشركات بنصوص الاتفاقيات وتورطها في عمليات الفساد والنهب للموارد والثروات السيادية وحرمان الشعب اليمني من الانتفاع بها.

وعطية، يلزم منكم إيقاف التعامل ومنع أي عمليات نقل ملاحي لأي شركات تقوم بعمليات نهب وتهريب ثروات وممتلكات ومقدرات الوطن من النفط والغاز والمعادن، اعتباراً من الساعة السادسة من مساء يوم الأحد الموافق 2022/10/2م، ونحملكم المسؤولية الكاملة خلاف ذلك.

وتقبلوا خالص التحايا...

الدكتور إبراهيم شرف الموشكي
 مدير عام الهيئة العامة للشؤون البحرية
 فرع الحديدة

نسخة مع التحية:
 - معالي وزير النقل
 - نائب وزير النقل
 - مدير جهاز الأمن والمخابرات بسبأ الحديدة

Hodeidah Branch
 P.O.Box: 4628 - Hodeidah
 Fax: + 967 3 222094
 Tel: 222092 / 3 / 5
 Email: maa.hodeidah@yemen.net.ye

Head Office: Aden
 P.O.Box: 1133 - Aden
 Fax: + 967 2 221448
 Tel: + 967 2 221581 / 221582
 E-mail: maa-headoffice@y.net.ye

فرع الحديدة
 من ب: 4628 - الحديدة
 الفاكس: + 967 3 222094
 تليفون: + 967 3 222092 / 3 / 5
 البريد الإلكتروني: maa.hodeidah@yemen.net.ye

Source:

Confidential

Figure 6.3

Circular issued by Houthi run MoT to companies against transportation of oil

[illegible]

Source: Confidential

Figure 6.4

Email to shipping company not to take on oilFrom: ygc@yemen.net.ye

Date: [REDACTED]

Subject: [REDACTED]

To: [REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED]

From: Yemen Coast Guards (YCG)

To: [REDACTED]

Based on Article No. (19/2/g), Article No. (21/3) and Article No. (25/3) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), as well as Article No. (7/2/e/g) and Article No. (10) of Law No. (37) regarding the territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf, we inform you of the due declaration in accordance with the above-mentioned laws that the shipping and transport operations of oil and gas from Yemeni oil and gas export fields, terminals and ports is prohibited in accordance with the decision and circulation of the Minister of Transport of the Republic of Yemen dated October 2, 2022.

Accordingly, the passage of your vessel in Yemeni waters for the purpose of shipping or transport operations of oil or gas from oil and gas export fields, terminals and ports will be considered as non-innocent passage.

We are confident that you have a clear understanding of the situation and that you wish to maintain a good relationship with the Yemeni authorities and Yemeni nation.

Please if you have any further inquiries, do not hesitate contact us via email.
Best regards,,

Yemen Coast Guard
Ministry of Interior
Republic of Yemen

Source: Confidential

Figure 6.5

Email to flag state addressed to shipping companyFrom: operations@maa.gov.ye <operations@maa.gov.ye>

Sent: [REDACTED]

Amsterdam, Berlin, Bern, Rome, Stockholm, Vienna

To: [REDACTED]

Subject: We considered the Your passage in Yemeni waters
a not innocent passageway

From: Maritime Affairs Authority (MAA).

To: [REDACTED]

As you did not respond to the due notice that we sent
you on the date of [REDACTED]

Therefore, and based on Article No. (21/1,4), and Article No. (25/1,2) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), as well as Articles No. (10, 11, 20) of Law No. (37) regarding the territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf.

We inform you that your passage in Yemeni water has been considered as non-innocent passage..

Please if you have any further inquiries, do not hesitate contact us via email.

Maritime Affairs Authority
Ministry of Transport
Republic of Yemen

Source: Confidential

Figure 6.6

Twitter messages by Houthi spokesperson to oil companies on 1 October 2022

Source: https://twitter.com/Yahya_Saree/status/1576299663028015106.

Figure 6.7

Twitter messages by Houthi spokesperson after the UAV attack on the tanker NISSOS KEA at Al-Dabba on 21 October 2022

Source: https://twitter.com/Yahya_Saree/status/1583553292504018945.

Figure 6.8


Twitter messages by Houthi spokesperson after UAV attack on tanker ARAM at Qena port on 9 November 2022




Source: <https://twitter.com/army21ye/status/1590525436635009024>.

Figure 6.9

Twitter messages by Houthi spokesperson corresponding with the attack on the tanker PRATIKA at Al-Dabba on 21 November 2022





Source: https://twitter.com/Yahya_Saree/status/1594787905066639360.

Annex 7 Counter Terrorism Operations against Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and attacks claimed by AQAP

Background

1. In August 2022 the STC announced the launch of a counter-terrorist campaign, “Arrows of the East” against AQAP in Abyan and Shabwa Governorates. AQAP in return, claimed a counter-operation, named, “Arrows of the Truth” in Shabwa and Abyan in September 2022. AQAP claimed responsibility for an attack on a checkpoint manned by Security Belt Forces in Abyan on 6 September 2022 where 21 members of the Security Belt Forces were killed.² They also confirmed that seven AQAP fighters were killed.³ This was one of several attacks claimed in a series of media products including videos of which only a few listed below.

Figure 7.1

Southern forces operation “Arrows of the East” in Abyan

... "سهام الشرق" .. عملية للقوات الجنوبية لمكافحة الإرهاب
في أبين

اليوم الثاني 2022/8/22 10:49 م بتوقيت أبوظبي

العين الإخبارية - عدن



القوات الجنوبية في أبين

أطلقت القوات الجنوبية في اليمن، الإثنين، عملية "سهام الشرق" العسكرية لتطهير محافظة أبين من الجماعات الإرهابية بشقيها القاعدة والإخوان.

وأصدرت القوات الجنوبية بياناً بثه التلفزيون الرسمي للمجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي جاء فيه، "إن رئيس المجلس الانتقالي القائد الأعلى للقوات الجنوبية وجه بإطلاق عملية عسكرية لتحرير محافظة أبين من الجماعات الإرهابية والعناصر الخارجة عن القانون".

وطبقاً للبيان فإن "العملية العسكرية تهدف إلى حماية الطرقات الرابطة بين المحافظات الجنوبية وإيقاف تهريب الأسلحة عبر الشريط الساحلي في محافظة أبين إلى مناطق مليشيات الحوثي، ومكافحة تنظيم القاعدة".

• بعد تهوي دفاعات الإخوان.. القوات الجنوبية تحرر مناطق نفطية بشبوة

² https://almashareq.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_am/features/2022/09/07/feature-02.

³ <https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-Threat-Statements/aqap-issues-claim-for-raid-on-sbf-position-killing-21-in-abyan.html>.

وجاء إطلاق العملية العسكرية في أبين بعد إعلان القوات الجنوبية في محور أبين اللاتين، استعدادها لتوحيد الجهود ورمص الصفوف والوقوف بجانب الإخوة الجنوبيين في الجيش والأمن بشقرة والمنطقة الوسطى بأبين لمواجهة العدو الحقيقي المشترك الذي يهدد أمن واستقرار أبين والجنوب عامة والمتمثل بمليشيات الحوثي والتنظيمات الإرهابية.

ودعت القوات، كافة الإخوة الجنوبيين من منتسبي الجيش والأمن في شقرة والمنطقة الوسطى بأبين إلى تجاوز كافة التباينات السياسية والحزبية والبدء في صفحة جديدة تسمو فيها المصلحة العليا للوطن وشعب الجنوب ومحافظة أبين على أي مصالح حزبية أو شخصية أو مناطقية ضيقة.

• القوات الجنوبية تتصدى لتفجير إرهابي في عدن.. تفكيك شاحنة مفخخة

ودعت القوات الجنوبية، جميع الجنوبيين إلى سرعة الالتحاق بصفوف إخوانهم الجنوبيين للوقوف جميعاً في خندق الدفاع عن أرض الجنوب وأمنه واستقراره وشعبه وهويته وتاريخه وحاضره ومستقبله.

ويغلق مكافحة الإرهاب وفرض الأمن في أبين التي ظلت على هامش ثقلها لسنوات الأبواب على مليشيات الحوثي الذين حاولوا مؤخرًا زراعة خلايا إرهابية في المحافظة فيما يحاول تنظيم القاعدة إبقائها بؤرة لاستهداف جنوب اليمن لا سيما العاصمة عدن....

Source: <https://al-ain.com/article/1661194108>.

Appendix A Unofficial Translation of Southern forces operation “Arrows of the East” in Abyan

Arrows of the East... an operation by the southern forces to combat terrorism in Abyan

Al Ain News - Aden

Monday 8/22/2022

The southern forces in Yemen launched, on Monday, the military operation "Arrows of the East" to purify the Abyan Governorate of terrorist groups, both al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood.

The southern forces issued a statement broadcast on the official TV of the Southern Transitional Council, stating, "The President of the Transitional Council, the Supreme Commander of the Southern Forces, directed the launch of a military operation to liberate Abyan Governorate from terrorist groups and outlaw elements."

According to the statement, "the military operation aims to protect the roads linking the southern governorates, stop the smuggling of weapons across the coastal strip in Abyan Governorate to the areas of the Houthi militia, and combat al-Qaeda."

After the Brotherhood's defences collapsed, the southern forces liberated oil areas in Shabwa

The launch of the military operation in Abyan came after the southern forces in the Abyan axis declared on Monday their readiness to unify efforts, close ranks, and stand by the southern brothers in the army and security in Shuqra and the central region of Abyan to confront the common real enemy that threatens the security and stability of Abyan and the south in general, represented by the Houthi militia and terrorist organizations.


The forces called on all southern brothers, members of the army and security in Shuqra and the central region of Abyan, to overcome all political and partisan differences and start a new page in which the supreme interest of the homeland, the people of the south, and Abyan Governorate transcends any partisan, personal, or narrow regional interests

The southern forces called on all southerners to quickly join the ranks of their southern brothers to stand together in the trench to defend the land, security, stability, people, identity, history, present and future of the south.

The fight against terrorism and the imposition of security in Abyan, which has remained on the sidelines for years, closes the doors to the Houthi militia, who have recently tried to plant terrorist cells in the governorate, while al-Qaeda is trying to keep it as a focal point for targeting southern Yemen, especially the capital, Aden

Figure 7.2


AQAP claims of attacks against the Security Belt Forces in Abyan in September 2022 as part of the “Arrows of the Truth” operation



Source: <https://twitter.com/G88Daniele/status/1570897272657047553>

Figure 7.3

In October 2022, AQAP claimed several attacks against the Security Belt Forces, and the al-Saqour (Falcon) Brigade, in Omaran and al-Mahfad, in Abyan.



Source: <https://twitter.com/G88Daniele/status/1580318129783463937>.

Figure 7.4

AQAP claimed an IED attack against the “Shabwa Defence Forces” in the Al-Masnaa area in Shabwa in October 2022



Source: <https://twitter.com/G88Daniele/status/1580948409716191232>.

Figure 7.5

AQAP claiming an attack in Wadi al-Khayala in the al-Mahfad area, Abyan, as part of the “Arrows of the Truth” operation in November 2022.




Source: <https://twitter.com/G88Daniele/status/1589256038670536704>.

Annex 8 Seizure of the RWABEE by Houthi forces on 4 January 2022

Figure 8.1

Map showing the position of the RWABEE at the time of the attack



Source: Confidential

Figure 8.2

Tweet from UNMHA showing the RWABEE and its crew members in Al Salif port



UN Mission to support the Hudaydah Agreement
@UN_Hudaydah

...

1. As part of its routine weekly patrol, UNMHA visited As-Salif port and neighbouring areas this afternoon. The patrol team saw the RWABEE vessel from a distance and spoke to its crew members



9:24 PM · Jan 12, 2022

Source: https://twitter.com/un_hudaydah/status/1481361543145078792?lang=en.

Figure 8.3

Images released in Houthi-affiliated media showing the alleged cargo of the RWABEE



Source: https://twitter.com/Fath_ol_Mobin/status/1478115022240894979.

Figure 8.4

Images released in Houthi-affiliated media showing the alleged cargo of the RWABEE



Source: https://twitter.com/Fath_ol_Mobin/status/1478115140738371589.

Figure 8.5

Cargo manifest of the RWABEE obtained by the Panel

KHALID FARAJ SHIPPING INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT SYSTEM MANUAL
VESSEL'S CARGO MANIFEST

Job Reference No.:

VESSEL'S CARGO MANIFEST

| | | | |
|----------------------|--|-------|-----------------|
| Vessel Name: | Lct Rwabee | Date: | 28 DEC 2021 |
| Voyage No.: | 04 SOCOTRA TO JIZAN | ETD: | HRS/29 DEC 2021 |
| Shipper / Consignee: | Joint Forces Command, Socotra / Joint Forces Command, Saudi Arabia | ETA: | HRS/04 JAN 2022 |

| Sl No. | Cargo Description | L | W | H | QTY | CBM | WL | Remarks |
|--------|--|------|------|------|-----|--------|-------|----------|
| 1 | SHELTER BOX | 2 | 2 | 2 | 26 | 208 | 13 | |
| 2 | RUBBER TASKBOAT AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS | 11 | 2 | 1.5 | 2 | 66 | 3 | NOT WORK |
| 3 | TOYOTA JEEP SHAS | 5.23 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 37.9 | 3.9 | NOT WORK |
| 4 | FIELD WASHER | 12 | 2.6 | 3.5 | 1 | 109.2 | 5 | NOT WORK |
| 5 | JEEP SHAS | 5.23 | 1.78 | 2 | 1 | 18.1 | 2 | WORK |
| 6 | WINCH HAMET | 8.8 | 2.5 | 3.2 | 1 | 70.4 | 13 | WORK |
| 7 | WHITE BURNERS (PETROL) MERCEDES | 10.7 | 2.9 | 3 | 1 | 93.1 | 13 | NOT WORK |
| 8 | SHELTER MAINTENANCE VEHICLE | 7 | 2.5 | 4 | 1 | 70 | 13 | WORK |
| 9 | FIELD KITCHEN | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 54 | 3 | WORK |
| 10 | JEEP AMBULANCE | 3.5 | 2.1 | 2.3 | 2 | 33.8 | 4 | WORK |
| 11 | FIELD HOSPITAL | 8 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 128 | 5 | WORK |
| 12 | HUMMER SATELLITE JEEP | 11 | 2.4 | 3 | 1 | 79.2 | 8 | NOT WORK |
| 13 | THELLA HEAD HEMET | 7 | 2.47 | 3 | 1 | 51.9 | 7 | WORK |
| 14 | MERCEDES HEAD LP | 6.8 | 2.49 | 3.56 | 1 | 60.3 | 7 | NOT WORK |
| 15 | 20 FT CONTAINER | 6 | 2.4 | 2.6 | 1 | 37.5 | 4 | |
| | TOTAL | 45 | | | | 1117.4 | 103.9 | |

Note: 1. Provide MSDS for all hazardous cargo. 2. Check after loading and arrival at destination about the condition of cargo and sign for acknowledgement that cargo received in complete and in good condition. Please do not accept the cargo if the podlock or seal or lashing arrangement is found broken.

Shipper Representative (Name and Signature): *[Signature]* Master (Name and Signature): *[Signature]* Chief Officer (Name and Signature): *[Signature]* Consigner Representative (Name and Signature): *[Signature]*

Joint Forces Command, Socotra *[Signature]* Capt Carlos P De *[Signature]* M.V. "RWABEE" *[Signature]* Sunya Hidayat Pratama *[Signature]* Joint Forces Command, Saudi Arabia

Cc: Operations Manager/Charterer or Shipper / General Manager

Document No: JF/MS/SCM/02/ Vessel's Cargo Manifest

Period: 02/ Issue Date: 15-September-2015

Page 1 of 1

Source: Confidential

Figure 8.6

Image showing a Houthi-organised mass wedding onboard the RWABEE on 8 November 2022

Source: <https://twitter.com/Syribelle/status/1590088917835198464>.

Annex 9 Attack on the crude oil tanker PRATIKA on 21 November 2022

Figure 9.1

Still from CCTV footage showing the cruise missile in-flight**Source:** Confidential

Figure 9.2

Still from CCTV footage showing the cruise missile close to the PRATIKA, shortly before impact**Source:** Confidential

Figure 9.3


Image showing the single mooring point buoy after the attack



Source: Confidential

Figure 9.4

Drawing showing the position of the PRATIKA and the direction of the attack



Source: Confidential

Figure 9.5

Fuselage debris of a Quds-type cruise missile recovered from the seabed after the attack



Source: Confidential

Figure 9.6

Fuselage debris of a Quds-type cruise missile recovered from the seabed after the attack



Source: Confidential

Figure 9.7


Debris of a servo actuator recovered from the seabed after the attack



Source: Confidential

Figure 9.8

Debris of a servo actuator recovered from the seabed after the attack



Source: Confidential

Annex 10 Weapons shown during the Houthi parades in September 2022

1. During the reporting period, the Houthis organized two large military parades – one took place at the Podium Theater in Hudaydah on 1 September 2022, while the second took place in Sana'a on 21 September 2022. Both events were used to display “new” weapon systems and to show that the Houthi forces have the capability to threaten vessels in the Red Sea and to strike land targets at middle- and long distances. The focus of this annex is on previously undocumented weapon systems shown during the parade. The Panel cannot confirm whether all weapon systems shown are actually operational. The Panel notes Houthi claims that the “new” weapon systems were developed and manufactured in Yemen, however a number of them show external similarities with weapon systems manufactured in other countries. This does not necessarily imply that they were provided to the Houthis in violation of the targeted arms embargo. In order to make such an assessment, additional investigations, including an inspection of the weapon systems, would be necessary.
2. The Houthis have displayed four different types of anti-ship missiles during the parades. These include the “Al-Mandab 1” and “Al-Mandab 2” anti-ship cruise missiles. “Al-Mandab 1” missiles were previously shown during an exhibition in Hudaydah in November 2017.⁴ According to the Houthi-affiliated media, the “Al-Mandab 1” is solid fuel missile and has a length of 5.81 metres and a diameter of 0.36 centimetres, while the “Al-Mandab 2” has a similar diameter, a length of seven metres and a range of 300 kilometres and is powered by a micro-turbojet engine. It is also claimed that the “Al-Mandab 1” is based on the Chinese “C-801” missile, which had been exported to Yemen prior to the conflict, while the “Al-Mandab 2” is “100% made in Yemen”.⁵ The Panel notes there are significant external similarities between those two missiles and the “C-801” and “C-802” anti-ship cruise missiles manufactured in China, which also have a similar diameter; as well as with the “Ghader” and “Ghadir” anti-ship cruise missiles, which were unveiled by Iran in 2011 and 2015 respectively, and which are based on the “C-802” missile. Other less sophisticated anti-ship missiles shown include the “Rubezh” which is a “P-15 Termit” coastal anti-ship missile developed in the Soviet Union in 1950s, which has been known to have been exported to Yemen prior to the conflict; as well as the “Falaq-1” anti-ship ballistic missile, which seems to be a naval version of the “Badr-1P”, a guided version of artillery rocket, which has been in use by the Houthis since at least 2017.

Figure 10.1

Information regarding the “Al-Mandab 1” in the Houthi-affiliated media



Source: <https://english.almayadeen.net/news/politics/prominent-characteristics-of-missiles-unveiled-by-yemeni-arm>

⁴ <https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2017/11/08/1567835/yemen-displays-new-naval-missile-in-hudaydah-photos>.

⁵ <https://english.almayadeen.net/news/politics/prominent-characteristics-of-missiles-unveiled-by-yemeni-arm>.

Figure 10.2

“Al-Mandeb 1” anti-ship cruise missile shown in Sana’a on 21 September 2022



Source: <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220922-yemen-pro-houthi-army-unveils-new-weapons-at-parade-marking-revolutions-8th-anniversary/>.

Figure 10.3

“Ghader” anti-ship cruise missile shown in the Iranian media



Source: <https://iranpress.com/content/48889/qader-anti-ship-missile-capable-against-coastal-targets-boats#images-6>.

Figure 10.4
“C-802” anti-ship cruise missile



Source: <https://i0.wp.com/www.defensemideanetwork.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/C802-Missile.jpg?ssl=1>.

Figure 10.5
Information regarding the “Al-Mandab 2” in the Houthi-affiliated media

| صاروخ المندب 2 | |
|--------------------|-------------------------------|
| النوع | صاروخ بحري نوع (كروز) |
| الطول | 7.00 م |
| القطر | 0.36 م |
| نوع الوقود | سائل |
| المدى | أكثر من 300 كم |
| القدرات | رصد وإصابة الأهداف بدقة عالية |
| صناعة يمنية (100%) | |

الإعلام الحربي اليمني
www.mmy.ye

Source: <https://english.almayadeen.net/news/politics/prominent-characteristics-of-missiles-unveiled-by-yemeni-arm>.

Figure 10.6

“Al-Mandeb 2” anti-ship cruise missile shown in Sana’a on 21 September 2022



Source: <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220922-yemen-pro-houthi-army-unveils-new-weapons-at-parade-marking-revolutions-8th-anniversary/>.

Figure 10.7

“Ghadir” anti-ship cruise missile shown in the Iranian media



Source: <https://web.archive.org/web/20200510173516/https://en.mehrnews.com/news/112393/Navy-equipped-with-long-range-cruise-missile-Ghadir>.

Figure 10.8

“Rubezh” anti-ship cruise missile shown in Hudaydah on 1 September 2022



Source: <https://twitter.com/TacticalReport/status/1571884327666794496>.

Figure 10.9

“Falaq-1” anti-ship ballistic missile shown in Hudaydah on 1 September 2022



Source: <https://www.saba.ye/en/news3201309.htm>.

Annex 11 Interdiction of the dhow AL-GHAZAL 1 on 20 December 2021

Figure 11.1
Intercept of the dhow by U.S. warships



Source: Confidential

Figure 11.2
Arms and ammunition boxes found on the dhow



Source: Confidential

Figure 11.3

Green canvas bags containing assault rifles found on the dhow



Source: Confidential

Figure 11.4

White canvas bags containing boxes of ammunition found on the dhow



Source: Confidential

Figure 11.5

Garmin eTrex 10 GPS navigational device found on the dhow



Source: Confidential

Figure 11.6

Trackpoints allegedly retrieved from Garmin eTrex 10 GPS shown in Figure 10.5



Source: Confidential

Figure 11.7
Yemeni boat registration document of the seized dhow (front side)

الجمهورية اليمنية
وزارة الداخلية
مصلحة خفر السواحل
الإدارة العامة للأمن البحري
وحراسة السواحل

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

إدارة الأمن البحري

كرت تسجيل / ترقيم قارب صيد 13028

اسم المالك: [REDACTED]
نوع القارب: عيوي
الطول: 24 العرض: 7 اللون: بني
عدد البحارة: 15
تاريخ الإصدار: 2021/10/16 تاريخ الانتهاء: 2022/10/16
التوقيع: [Signature]
مدير الأمن البحري
مقدم / يوسف عبيد الله علي هاشم
انغزال-1

Source: Confidential

Figure 11.8
Yemeni boat registration document of the seized dhow (rear side)

ص 2 | 13028

إرشادات

- 1- تؤكد هذه البطاقة أنه قد تم تسجيل وترقيم القارب في مصلحة خفر السواحل.
- 2- لا يجوز استخدام أو استبدال هذه البطاقة لأي قارب آخر.
- 3- لا تعتبر هذه البطاقة تصريح بمزاولة مهنة الاصطياد.
- 4- في حالة فقدان البطاقة يبلغ عنها فوراً .. وعلى من يجدها إيصالها إلى أقرب فرع.

رقم المحرك: 03511 قوته: 480 خيل نوعه: يانمار - ديزل

Source: Confidential

Figure 11.9

Type 56-1 assault rifle inspected by PoE Somalia

**Source:** PoE Somalia

Figure 11.10

Detail of marking on Type 56-1 assault rifle inspected by PoE Somalia

**Source:** PoE Somalia

Figure 11.11

Sample of serial numbers inspected by PoE Somalia (highlighted in the tables below)

| | | |
|---|---|--|
|  |  |  |
| 16- 61089552 | 16 - 61104554 | 16- 6110747 |
|  |  |  |
| 17 - 62039574 | 17 - 62107561 | 17 - 62118520 |

Source: PoE Somalia

Table 11.1

Serial numbers between 61000281 and 61095088

| | | | | | | | | | |
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| 61000281 | 61069857 | 61080410 | 61083815 | 61085043 | 61086169 | 61087239 | 61088540 | 61089708 | 61092957 |
| 61000312 | 61069929 | 61080494 | 61083834 | 61085051 | 61086191 | 61087247 | 61088553 | 61089712 | 61092961 |
| 61000329 | 61070065 | 61080603 | 61083868 | 61085055 | 61086218 | 61087264 | 61088557 | 61089759 | 61093098 |
| 61000532 | 61070096 | 61080605 | 61083955 | 61085120 | 61086231 | 61087302 | 61088598 | 61089762 | 61093257 |
| 61003234 | 61070115 | 61080696 | 61083995 | 61085138 | 61086255 | 61087341 | 61088607 | 61089788 | 61093258 |
| 61003990 | 61070459 | 61080700 | 61083995 | 61085146 | 61086256 | 61087390 | 61088620 | 61089789 | 61093293 |
| 61006237 | 61070739 | 61080701 | 61084073 | 61085159 | 61086303 | 61087401 | 61088623 | 61089834 | 61093342 |
| 61008996 | 61070987 | 61080702 | 61084102 | 61085171 | 61086354 | 61087612 | 61088647 | 61089851 | 61093364 |
| 61008997 | 61071206 | 61080706 | 61084118 | 61085197 | 61086360 | 61087718 | 61088678 | 61089854 | 61093487 |
| 61017588 | 61071235 | 61080729 | 61084145 | 61085224 | 61086373 | 61087720 | 61088687 | 61089907 | 61093520 |
| 61038339 | 61071356 | 61080735 | 61084154 | 61085324 | 61086389 | 61087733 | 61088766 | 61089919 | 61093545 |
| 61040462 | 61071380 | 61080800 | 61084157 | 61085338 | 61086435 | 61087764 | 61088773 | 61089923 | 61093564 |
| 61044380 | 61071429 | 61080983 | 61084158 | 61085341 | 61086441 | 61087779 | 61088790 | 61090161 | 61093583 |
| 61047341 | 61071528 | 61081219 | 61084160 | 61085367 | 61086449 | 61087810 | 61088793 | 61090272 | 61093595 |
| 61048624 | 61071574 | 61081227 | 61084195 | 61085383 | 61086450 | 61087833 | 61088815 | 61090305 | 61093678 |
| 61054712 | 61071661 | 61081429 | 61084197 | 61085399 | 61086513 | 61087847 | 61088830 | 61090375 | 61093732 |
| 61056959 | 61071710 | 61081520 | 61084227 | 61085412 | 61086519 | 61087866 | 61088839 | 61090402 | 61093734 |
| 61057023 | 61071778 | 61081740 | 61084232 | 61085438 | 61086520 | 61087878 | 61088874 | 61090421 | 61093756 |
| 61058956 | 61071842 | 61081745 | 61084259 | 61085442 | 61086530 | 61087882 | 61088877 | 61090423 | 61093770 |
| 61058993 | 61071883 | 61082092 | 61084290 | 61085457 | 61086574 | 61087888 | 61088884 | 61090426 | 61093900 |
| 61059684 | 61071921 | 61082501 | 61084367 | 61085471 | 61086579 | 61087901 | 61088909 | 61090432 | 61093901 |
| 61059750 | 61071941 | 61082512 | 61084370 | 61085485 | 61086583 | 61087918 | 61088939 | 61090470 | 61093907 |
| 61059843 | 61076830 | 61082644 | 61084387 | 61085489 | 61086608 | 61087923 | 61088952 | 61090660 | 61094000 |
| 61060000 | 61077703 | 61082658 | 61084394 | 61085498 | 61086652 | 61087994 | 61088966 | 61090747 | 61094004 |
| 61064156 | 61077743 | 61082672 | 61084396 | 61085505 | 61086676 | 61087995 | 61088980 | 61090776 | 61094127 |
| 61064654 | 61077920 | 61082701 | 61084502 | 61085531 | 61086759 | 61088009 | 61088991 | 61090854 | 61094237 |
| 61064776 | 61078217 | 61082836 | 61084557 | 61085545 | 61086776 | 61088076 | 61088994 | 61090909 | 61094290 |
| 61064793 | 61078580 | 61082940 | 61084590 | 61085555 | 61086787 | 61088086 | 61088999 | 61090932 | 61094364 |
| 61064932 | 61078599 | 61082950 | 61084593 | 61085565 | 61086863 | 61088155 | 61089042 | 61091130 | 61094484 |
| 61064940 | 61078706 | 61083018 | 61084603 | 61085631 | 61086888 | 61088165 | 61089078 | 61091189 | 61094515 |
| 61065027 | 61078717 | 61083155 | 61084649 | 61085644 | 61086903 | 61088222 | 61089081 | 61091225 | 61094545 |
| 61065028 | 61078831 | 61083203 | 61084675 | 61085695 | 61086908 | 61088232 | 61089126 | 61091255 | 61094562 |
| 61065056 | 61079022 | 61083338 | 61084694 | 61085704 | 61086963 | 61088235 | 61089188 | 61091409 | 61094650 |
| 61065073 | 61079227 | 61083339 | 61084709 | 61085713 | 61086997 | 61088245 | 61089419 | 61091542 | 61094702 |
| 61066799 | 61079238 | 61083345 | 61084727 | 61085744 | 61087011 | 61088250 | 61089433 | 61091611 | 61094705 |
| 61066924 | 61079255 | 61083381 | 61084737 | 61085751 | 61087015 | 61088256 | 61089440 | 61091765 | 61094712 |
| 61066959 | 61079331 | 61083434 | 61084747 | 61085752 | 61087016 | 61088267 | 61089496 | 61091950 | 61094745 |
| 61067478 | 61079400 | 61083484 | 61084756 | 61085782 | 61087018 | 61088356 | 61089537 | 61091952 | 61094784 |
| 61067752 | 61079412 | 61083516 | 61084798 | 61085829 | 61087029 | 61088360 | 61089552 | 61091958 | 61094804 |
| 61068078 | 61079422 | 61083529 | 61084801 | 61085864 | 61087047 | 61088415 | 61089554 | 61092150 | 61094813 |
| 61068251 | 61079463 | 61083562 | 61084827 | 61085937 | 61087075 | 61088417 | 61089565 | 61092155 | 61094831 |
| 61068335 | 61079567 | 61083582 | 61084833 | 61085942 | 61087090 | 61088437 | 61089566 | 61092239 | 61094912 |
| 61068422 | 61079627 | 61083586 | 61084907 | 61085943 | 61087093 | 61088461 | 61089585 | 61092248 | 61094978 |
| 61068914 | 61079979 | 61083611 | 61084938 | 61085992 | 61087116 | 61088462 | 61089592 | 61092392 | 61094980 |
| 61069419 | 61080066 | 61083656 | 61084956 | 61086008 | 61087127 | 61088463 | 61089616 | 61092429 | 61094987 |
| 61069424 | 61080118 | 61083688 | 61084971 | 61086032 | 61087145 | 61088468 | 61089663 | 61092515 | 61095048 |
| 61069613 | 61080186 | 61083749 | 61084991 | 61086064 | 61087169 | 61088475 | 61089666 | 61092531 | 61095050 |
| 61069704 | 61080237 | 61083777 | 61085010 | 61086097 | 61087189 | 61088479 | 61089694 | 61092617 | 61095073 |
| 61069718 | 61080361 | 61083781 | 61085026 | 61086156 | 61087229 | 61088510 | 61089695 | 61092688 | 61095081 |
| 61069749 | 61080395 | 61083785 | 61085034 | 61086156 | 61087237 | 61088521 | 61089703 | 61092896 | 61095088 |

Source: Confidential and PoE Somalia

Table 11.2

Serial numbers between 61095093 and 61111176

| | | | | | | | | | |
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| 61095093 | 61096704 | 61098189 | 61099640 | 61101086 | 61102986 | 61104190 | 61105212 | 61106729 | 61108825 |
| 61095106 | 61096726 | 61098201 | 61099641 | 61101089 | 61103025 | 61104241 | 61105222 | 61106809 | 61108864 |
| 61095140 | 61096727 | 61098264 | 61099665 | 61101103 | 61103040 | 61104246 | 61105258 | 61106810 | 61108873 |
| 61095200 | 61096740 | 61098325 | 61099688 | 61101117 | 61103148 | 61104259 | 61105278 | 61106811 | 61108940 |
| 61095224 | 61096755 | 61098327 | 61099741 | 61101121 | 61103184 | 61104287 | 61105294 | 61107040 | 61108965 |
| 61095226 | 61096762 | 61098341 | 61099746 | 61101160 | 61103201 | 61104305 | 61105295 | 61107049 | 61108967 |
| 61095276 | 61096768 | 61098486 | 61099764 | 61101164 | 61103211 | 61104332 | 61105388 | 61107067 | 61108995 |
| 61095279 | 61096796 | 61098553 | 61099798 | 61101172 | 61103216 | 61104333 | 61105450 | 61107072 | 61109003 |
| 61095442 | 61096801 | 61098565 | 61099811 | 61101182 | 61103217 | 61104336 | 61105452 | 61107073 | 61109004 |
| 61095514 | 61096803 | 61098566 | 61099829 | 61101270 | 61103221 | 61104350 | 61105466 | 61107118 | 61109062 |
| 61095516 | 61096866 | 61098587 | 61099884 | 61101347 | 61103254 | 61104357 | 61105507 | 61107119 | 61109255 |
| 61095538 | 61096869 | 61098598 | 61099894 | 61101493 | 61103271 | 61104375 | 61105551 | 61107129 | 61109343 |
| 61095571 | 61096911 | 61098604 | 61099903 | 61101552 | 61103282 | 61104380 | 61105554 | 61107131 | 61109401 |
| 61095627 | 61096926 | 61098620 | 61100026 | 61101573 | 61103289 | 61104385 | 61105560 | 61107194 | 61109423 |
| 61095628 | 61096941 | 61098692 | 61100032 | 61101586 | 61103339 | 61104475 | 61105569 | 61107225 | 61109426 |
| 61095632 | 61097009 | 61098715 | 61100033 | 61101602 | 61103440 | 61104485 | 61105570 | 61107267 | 61109472 |
| 61095711 | 61097019 | 61098770 | 61100074 | 61101617 | 61103446 | 61104487 | 61105572 | 61107282 | 61109579 |
| 61095758 | 61097027 | 61098807 | 61100180 | 61101661 | 61103458 | 61104494 | 61105575 | 61107317 | 61109590 |
| 61095770 | 61097050 | 61098819 | 61100259 | 61101670 | 61103467 | 61104502 | 61105593 | 61107364 | 61109591 |
| 61095773 | 61097067 | 61098832 | 61100272 | 61101747 | 61103518 | 61104529 | 61105684 | 61107470 | 61109621 |
| 61095804 | 61097072 | 61098850 | 61100311 | 61101758 | 61103546 | 61104550 | 61105694 | 61107540 | 61109630 |
| 61095847 | 61097096 | 61098946 | 61100361 | 61101882 | 61103557 | 61104554 | 61105725 | 61107590 | 61109770 |
| 61095904 | 61097114 | 61098972 | 61100432 | 61101890 | 61103568 | 61104558 | 61105731 | 61107611 | 61109906 |
| 61095915 | 61097164 | 61099017 | 61100437 | 61101909 | 61103587 | 61104571 | 61105774 | 61107613 | 61109989 |
| 61095916 | 61097167 | 61099037 | 61100481 | 61102027 | 61103605 | 61104573 | 61105778 | 61107619 | 61110053 |
| 61095958 | 61097169 | 61099097 | 61100528 | 61102029 | 61103631 | 61104624 | 61105788 | 61107656 | 61110121 |
| 61096093 | 61097172 | 61099133 | 61100591 | 61102039 | 61103637 | 61104632 | 61105793 | 61107809 | 61110235 |
| 61096110 | 61097183 | 61099144 | 61100616 | 61102060 | 61103640 | 61104670 | 61105880 | 61107820 | 61110239 |
| 61096147 | 61097245 | 61099210 | 61100636 | 61102082 | 61103712 | 61104675 | 61105885 | 61107836 | 61110244 |
| 61096154 | 61097249 | 61099215 | 61100650 | 61102114 | 61103722 | 61104677 | 61105890 | 61107852 | 61110253 |
| 61096157 | 61097285 | 61099222 | 61100669 | 61102122 | 61103733 | 61104733 | 61105897 | 61107855 | 61110288 |
| 61096161 | 61097314 | 61099259 | 61100672 | 61102150 | 61103734 | 61104762 | 61105972 | 61107856 | 61110292 |
| 61096188 | 61097333 | 61099338 | 61100680 | 61102182 | 61103738 | 61104768 | 61106000 | 61107871 | 61110311 |
| 61096227 | 61097335 | 61099382 | 61100703 | 61102191 | 61103794 | 61104770 | 61106065 | 61107887 | 61110363 |
| 61096322 | 61097338 | 61099389 | 61100751 | 61102200 | 61103857 | 61104780 | 61106075 | 61107903 | 61110378 |
| 61096351 | 61097384 | 61099431 | 61100756 | 61102207 | 61103894 | 61104781 | 61106097 | 61107920 | 61110492 |
| 61096392 | 61097450 | 61099449 | 61100774 | 61102213 | 61103920 | 61104843 | 61106177 | 61107932 | 61110547 |
| 61096407 | 61097647 | 61099496 | 61100776 | 61102217 | 61103955 | 61104869 | 61106181 | 61108070 | 61110595 |
| 61096417 | 61097648 | 61099500 | 61100801 | 61102227 | 61103965 | 61104910 | 61106185 | 61108133 | 61110726 |
| 61096447 | 61097672 | 61099521 | 61100809 | 61102325 | 61103989 | 61104918 | 61106199 | 61108145 | 61110822 |
| 61096450 | 61097703 | 61099534 | 61100934 | 61102483 | 61104035 | 61104997 | 61106205 | 61108443 | 61110840 |
| 61096451 | 61097746 | 61099536 | 61100939 | 61102502 | 61104038 | 61105007 | 61106225 | 61108454 | 61110842 |
| 61096522 | 61097884 | 61099557 | 61100971 | 61102533 | 61104040 | 61105010 | 61106233 | 61108461 | 61110867 |
| 61096529 | 61097888 | 61099578 | 61100975 | 61102543 | 61104041 | 61105037 | 61106241 | 61108476 | 61110870 |
| 61096553 | 61097905 | 61099579 | 61100977 | 61102581 | 61104042 | 61105053 | 61106368 | 61108491 | 61110879 |
| 61096556 | 61097931 | 61099588 | 61100991 | 61102600 | 61104102 | 61105175 | 61106372 | 61108593 | 61110883 |
| 61096570 | 61097972 | 61099591 | 61100997 | 61102641 | 61104106 | 61105180 | 61106402 | 61108594 | 61111041 |
| 61096571 | 61098092 | 61099608 | 61101006 | 61102666 | 61104111 | 61105200 | 61106490 | 61108599 | 61111092 |
| 61096597 | 61098104 | 61099614 | 61101027 | 61102730 | 61104120 | 61105202 | 61106654 | 61108643 | 61111102 |
| 61096617 | 61098109 | 61099618 | 61101073 | 61102785 | 61104173 | 61105205 | 61106708 | 61108801 | 61111176 |

Source: Confidential and PoE Somalia

| |
|----------|
| 61111233 |
| 61111458 |
| 61111515 |
| 61111549 |
| 61111574 |
| 61111654 |
| 61111715 |
| 61111721 |
| 61111729 |
| 61111733 |
| 61111746 |
| 61111887 |
| 61111897 |
| 61111898 |
| 61111901 |
| 61111924 |
| 61111950 |
| 61111958 |
| 61111960 |
| 61111962 |
| 61112049 |
| 61112092 |
| 61120049 |
| 61120256 |
| 61120275 |
| 61120369 |
| 61120374 |
| 61120482 |
| 61120500 |
| 61120509 |
| 61120536 |
| 61120556 |
| 61120557 |
| 61120576 |
| 61120668 |
| 61120677 |
| 61120753 |
| 61120754 |
| 61127101 |
| 61129726 |
| 61129872 |
| 61130877 |
| 61131427 |
| 61131568 |
| 61131596 |
| 61132070 |
| 61132296 |
| 61132473 |

Source: Confidential and PoE Somalia

Table 11.4

Serial numbers between 62000168 and 62132135

| | | | | | | | |
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| 62000168 | 62017344 | 62027089 | 62036967 | 62041683 | 62094557 | 62115493 | 62129506 |
| 62000267 | 62017435 | 62027208 | 62037160 | 62041752 | 62094573 | 62115622 | 62129645 |
| 62000281 | 62017673 | 62027470 | 62037166 | 62041786 | 62094721 | 62115635 | 62129842 |
| 62000328 | 62018213 | 62027643 | 62037172 | 62041802 | 62094839 | 62115669 | 62129856 |
| 62000424 | 62018214 | 62027689 | 62037357 | 62041878 | 62094861 | 62115996 | 62130195 |
| 62000430 | 62018247 | 62027719 | 62037397 | 62041943 | 62094890 | 62116728 | 62130688 |
| 62000431 | 62018296 | 62027956 | 62037535 | 62041951 | 62095105 | 62117216 | 62131184 |
| 62000492 | 62018563 | 62028020 | 62037558 | 62042080 | 62096748 | 62117528 | 62132135 |
| 62000569 | 62018802 | 62028061 | 62037789 | 62042192 | 62100651 | 62117930 | |
| 62000717 | 62019013 | 62028083 | 62037862 | 62042213 | 62101188 | 62117973 | |
| 62000965 | 62019157 | 62028517 | 62038077 | 62042226 | 62101741 | 62118035 | |
| 62000971 | 62019229 | 62028613 | 62038130 | 62042493 | 62101747 | 62118042 | |
| 62001226 | 62019302 | 62028675 | 62038167 | 62042603 | 62101961 | 62118122 | |
| 62001282 | 62019320 | 62028847 | 62038190 | 62042819 | 62102108 | 62118258 | |
| 62001490 | 62019332 | 62028918 | 62038272 | 62043030 | 62102136 | 62118263 | |
| 62001519 | 62019354 | 62028927 | 62038486 | 62043098 | 62102343 | 62118389 | |
| 62001538 | 62019446 | 62029309 | 62038514 | 62043115 | 62102531 | 62118520 | |
| 62001635 | 62019538 | 62029427 | 62038793 | 62043137 | 62102532 | 62118632 | |
| 62001660 | 62019540 | 62029501 | 62038818 | 62043147 | 62102587 | 62118649 | |
| 62002159 | 62019549 | 62029597 | 62038864 | 62043168 | 62102593 | 62118831 | |
| 62002421 | 62019567 | 62029599 | 62038991 | 62043319 | 62102633 | 62118899 | |
| 62002474 | 62019599 | 62029665 | 62039198 | 62043591 | 62102692 | 62119060 | |
| 62006044 | 62019665 | 62029760 | 62039261 | 62044073 | 62102711 | 62119085 | |
| 62006097 | 62019678 | 62029917 | 62039312 | 62044207 | 62102719 | 62119237 | |
| 62006106 | 62019698 | 62030476 | 62039574 | 62046797 | 62103343 | 62119370 | |
| 62006122 | 62019728 | 62031151 | 62039757 | 62047742 | 62103427 | 62119381 | |
| 62006152 | 62019770 | 62031295 | 62039766 | 62064746 | 62107561 | 62122100 | |
| 62006164 | 62019842 | 62031516 | 62039793 | 62068225 | 62109763 | 62123208 | |
| 62006175 | 62019966 | 62031595 | 62040028 | 62068417 | 62110053 | 62123672 | |
| 62006179 | 62020053 | 62031601 | 62040040 | 62068497 | 62110170 | 62123674 | |
| 62006217 | 62020242 | 62032046 | 62040041 | 62068506 | 62110192 | 62123694 | |
| 62006253 | 62020273 | 62032107 | 62040164 | 62068529 | 62110198 | 62123723 | |
| 62006318 | 62020551 | 62032570 | 62040190 | 62068826 | 62110216 | 62123738 | |
| 62007914 | 62020642 | 62032943 | 62040345 | 62068970 | 62110236 | 62123834 | |
| 62008220 | 62020787 | 62033097 | 62040385 | 62069138 | 62110322 | 62123848 | |
| 62008368 | 62020826 | 62033141 | 62040386 | 62069773 | 62110424 | 62124006 | |
| 62009420 | 62020840 | 62033876 | 62040560 | 62079440 | 62110437 | 62126045 | |
| 62010092 | 62020985 | 62034639 | 62040569 | 62082117 | 62110513 | 62126757 | |
| 62010893 | 62023538 | 62035391 | 62040719 | 62085790 | 62110529 | 62127387 | |
| 62011121 | 62023659 | 62035848 | 62040728 | 62089528 | 62110594 | 62127628 | |
| 62011850 | 62023801 | 62035948 | 62040781 | 62090745 | 62110863 | 62127835 | |
| 62011890 | 62025004 | 62036074 | 62040838 | 62092334 | 62110893 | 62128055 | |
| 62012925 | 62025221 | 62036081 | 62040852 | 62093141 | 62111124 | 62128063 | |
| 62014240 | 62025477 | 62036124 | 62041004 | 62093513 | 62111698 | 62128096 | |
| 62016955 | 62025775 | 62036189 | 62041017 | 62093862 | 62112450 | 62128590 | |
| 62017001 | 62026034 | 62036274 | 62041046 | 62093958 | 62112609 | 62128636 | |
| 62017041 | 62026106 | 62036337 | 62041051 | 62094016 | 62115287 | 62128912 | |
| 62017241 | 62026109 | 62036425 | 62041084 | 62094333 | 62115290 | 62129032 | |
| 62017269 | 62026112 | 62036716 | 62041235 | 62094382 | 62115458 | 62129101 | |
| 62017270 | 62026290 | 62036942 | 62041371 | 62094492 | 62115490 | 62129282 | |

Source: Confidential and PoE Somalia

Figure 11.12

Markings on ammunition box indicating manufacture at State Factory 71



Source: PoE Somalia

Figure 11.13

Partially obliterated markings on ammunition box



Source: PoE Somalia

Figure 11.14

Headstamp on cartridge showing manufacture by State Factory 71, likely in 1973



Source: PoE Somalia

Figure 11.15

Markings on ammunition box indicating manufacture at Factory 10 in Bulgaria



Source: PoE Somalia

Figure 11.16

Detail of control number (5449) on the box with the lot number 16-86



Source: PoE Somalia

Figure 11.17

Headstamp on cartridge showing manufacture by Factory 10 in 1986



Source: PoE Somalia

**Annex 12
chemicals**

**Network of individuals involved in the maritime smuggling of arms, ammunition, and
Confidential**

Annex 13 Seizure of SALW from a dhow on Socotra Island on 28 January 2022

The Panel has noted media reports that the Yemeni police seized 53 weapons in the vicinity of Qulansiyah on the island of Socotra on 28 January 2022 from a “weapon smuggling cell”. According to local news reports, the weapons were found on a dhow and the smugglers were detained.⁶ The single available image of the seized weapons shows a collection of assault rifles from different manufacturers, magazines and at least one light machine gun (see figure 12.1 below). The Panel notes that the mix of weapons as well as their condition is significantly different from those in previous maritime seizures, which raises the possibility that they were destined for the black market, for example in Somalia, rather than for the Houthi forces, as alleged in the media article. The Panel has contacted the Government of Yemen, requesting an opportunity to inspect the weapons and to interview the smugglers; a response is pending.

Figure 13.1
SALW seized on Socotra on 28 January 2022



Source: <https://adengad.net/posts/594807>.

⁶ <https://adengad.net/posts/594807>

Annex 14 Seizure of arms and ammunition from a dhow in the Red Sea on 24 September 2022

The Panel noted media reports that, on 24 September 2022, the Sudanese Navy interdicted, in the Red Sea, a dhow crewed by four Yemenis with a cargo of 90 assault rifles, several hundred boxes of SALW ammunition as well as detonating cords and fuses. Information regarding this seizure remains limited and contradictory: according to a spokesperson of the Sudanese Navy, the dhow was interdicted “near the al-Sabaat islands inside of Sudanese territorial waters”.⁷ While initial news reports claimed that the boat was headed for Hudaydah,⁸ later reports suggested that the weapons were smuggled out of Yemen. The Panel notes that a seizure inside of Sudanese territorial waters would only make sense if the destination of the dhow was either Sudan or some place in the Northern Red Sea. The Panel contacted Sudan requesting more information on the seizure, as well as an opportunity to inspect the cargo, and to interview the smugglers. A response is pending.

Figure 14.1

Seized weapons and related items displayed in Sudan



Source: <https://sudantribune.com/article264571/>.

Figure 14.2

Seized SALW ammunition displayed in Sudan



Source: https://twitter.com/SudanTribune_EN/status/1574304316630142976/photo/2.

⁷ <https://sudantribune.com/article264571/>.

⁸ <https://www.khabaragency.net/news177934.html>.

Figure 14.3
Seized SALW ammunition displayed in Sudan



Source: https://twitter.com/SudanTribune_EN/status/1574304316630142976/photo/3

Figure 14.4
Seized detonating cord displayed in Sudan



Source: https://twitter.com/SudanTribune_EN/status/1574304316630142976/photo/4

Annex 15 Seizure of urea fertilizer from the dhow AL-ETIHAD on 18 January 2022

Figure 15.1

Intercept of the dhow by U.S. warships



Source: Confidential

Figure 15.2


Registration number of the dhow - 3347



Source: Confidential

Figure 15.3

Label on the bag of urea fertilizer indicating that they were produced in Turkmenistan⁹




Source: Confidential

⁹ The Panel has contacted Turkmenistan requesting information regarding the fertilizer, a response in pending.

Figure 15.4

Label on the bag of urea fertilizer indicating that they were produced by “Handan petrochemical Company”¹⁰



Source: Confidential

Figure 15.5

Port document for AL ETIHAD indicating departure to “Sahar” on 28 September 2021¹¹

MINISTRE DE L'INTERIEUR
POLICE NATIONALE

P.F.I.D'OBOCK

REPUBLIQUE DE DJIBOUTI
UNITE EGALITE PAIX

OBOCK LE 28/09/21

MANIFESTE De sortie

Pavillon/yéménite al Etihad

Propriéter/ destination

SAHAR

| Name | No de Carte | nakhouda | naturalité |
|------------|-------------|----------|------------|
| [Redacted] | sd | marine | yem yem |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
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| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| VITE | VITE | VITE | VITE |

NAKHOUDA

Source: Confidential

¹⁰ The Panel has tried to verify whether the urea fertilizer was indeed manufactured by “Handan petrochemical company”. While companies with similar names exist, it is unclear whether they manufacture urea and/or whether they have production facilities in Turkmenistan.

¹¹ The Panel has contacted Djibouti requesting confirmation whether the documents from Oboch port are authentic, a response is pending.

Source: Confidential

Source: Confidential

Figure 15.8
Forged Sri Lankan Ship Registration document found on the AL-ETIHAD

REG FORM NO. 2

CAPT. 10000-SL/2024

**CERTIFICATE OF SRI LANKA REGISTRY
PARTICULAR OF SHIP**

| | | | |
|---|--------------|--|---|
| Official number | Name of ship | No. Year and Port of Registry | No. year and port of previous registry (if any) |
| 1003586 | ETIHAD | COLOMBO | SRI LANKA |
| Whether A Building Steamer Or Motor Ship If Steamer Or Motor, Name Propelled | Where Built | When Built | Name And Address Of Builders |
| DIESEL | INDIA | 2018 | HYDRAMAUJT - YEMEN |
| Number Of Decks | ONE | Length | Feet |
| Number Of Masts | ONE | (Article 123, 175 Tonnage Convention 1923) | 30 |
| Rigged | FIBER GLASS | Main (Hull 123, 175 Tonnage Convention 1923) | 20 |
| Steer | WINDMILL | Depth to Main Mast From Tonnage Mark To Ceiling of Main Mast | 10 |
| Beam | WINDMILL | Depth to Main Mast From Tonnage Mark To Ceiling of Main Mast | 10 |
| Build | WINDMILL | Depth to Main Mast From Tonnage Mark To Ceiling of Main Mast | 10 |
| Frame and description of vessel | COMMERCIAL | Length of Engine Room (if any) | |
| Number of bulk heads | FIBER GLASS | | |

PARTICULARS OF PROPELLING ENGINES, E.C. (IF ANY), As Supplied By Builders, Owners Engine Makers

| No. of Engines | Description Of Engines | When Made | Name and address of makers | Revolutions per minute | Rotary engine | S.H.P. (Horse Power) |
|----------------|------------------------|-----------|----------------------------|------------------------|---------------|----------------------|
| 1 | Engines | | | | | |
| No. Of | YANMAR | | YANMAR JAPAN | 68 | 130MM | 450 H.P. |
| Stroke | Particulars of details | 2018 | | Length Of Stroke | | |

Particulars Of Tonnage

This Ship is Assigned With A Tonnage Mark On Each Side Of The Ship Which Is _____ Inches Below The Upper Deck Line And When This Mark is Submerged The Above Tonnage Are Applicable.

When Tonnage Mark is Not Submerged The Following Tonnage Are Applicable

| | | | | |
|------------------|--------|------|--------|--------------|
| GROSS TONNAGE | 255.00 | Tons | 780.18 | Cubic Meters |
| REGISTER TONNAGE | 235.00 | Tons | 750.32 | Cubic Meters |

The number of persons and apprentices for whom accommodation is certified _____ 15 Crew

I, the undersigned, Registry Sri Lanka Ship At The Port Of COLOMBO hereby certify that the ship, the description of which is prefixed to this is my S. V. certificate, has been duly surveyed, and the above description is in accordance with the Register Book, that _____ is the master of the said ship, and _____ is the resident and description of the owner 100%, and number of shares held by _____ are as follows

Name, Residence And Occupation Of The Owner 100%
FAISAL ALI HASAN QUBAISI

YEMEN

dated at COLOMBO the 11/09/2021 two thousand twenty one
This certificate expires on 10/09/2022 two thousand twenty two register of sri lanka

**REGISTRAR OF SRI LANKA
COLOMBO SHIPS**

Notice - A Certificate of Registry is Not A Document Of Title. It Does Not Necessarily Entail Of All Changes Of Ownership. And It Cannot Be Officially Used In Any Manner Affecting The Ship, In Case Of Any Change Of Ownership It Is Important For The Protection Of The Interests Of All Parties That The Change Should Be Registered According To Law. Change Of Ownership Address - Other Registered Particulars Should Be Notified To The Registrar In The Port Of Registry Should The Vessel Be Lost, Sold To Foreigners, Or Broken Up Before, Then, Together With The Certificate Registry It Is Evidence Should Immediately Be Given To The Registrar

Source: Confidential

Source: Confidential

Figure 15.10
 Forged UAE Vessel Exit Permit for ETIHAD (second page)

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
 MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
 GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF RESIDENCY
 FOREIGNERS AFFAIRS-DUBAI

دولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة
 وزارة الداخلية
 الإدارة العامة للتأشيرة والسجلات الأجنبية - دبي

VESSEL EXIT PERMIT - تصريح خروج سفينة بحرية

السفينة: 20110
 نوع السفينة: 20110

Entry Permit Number: 2011000000000000000
 Exit Permit Number: 2011000000000000000
 Exit Date: 2022.01.12
 Classification: International
 Port Name: DUBAI
 Subsequent Number: 20110
 Vessel Type: 20110

رقم تصريح الخروج: 2011000000000000000
 رقم تصريح الخروج: 2011000000000000000
 تاريخ الخروج: 2022.01.12
 التصنيف: دولي
 اسم الميناء: دبي
 الرقم التتابع: 20110
 نوع السفينة: 20110

Passport Holders Sailors List : قائمة المسافرين والسفراء

| الرقم التتابع | الاسم | الجنسية | رقم جواز السفر | الجنس | تاريخ الميلاد | تاريخ انتهاء | ملاحظات |
|---------------|--------------------------------|---------|----------------|-------|---------------|--------------|---------|
| 1 | MR. MOHAMMED MOHAMMED MOHAMMED | مصري | 2011000000 | ذكر | 2011000000 | 2011000000 | |
| 2 | MR. MOHAMMED MOHAMMED MOHAMMED | مصري | 2011000000 | ذكر | 2011000000 | 2011000000 | |
| 3 | MR. MOHAMMED MOHAMMED MOHAMMED | مصري | 2011000000 | ذكر | 2011000000 | 2011000000 | |
| 4 | MR. MOHAMMED MOHAMMED MOHAMMED | مصري | 2011000000 | ذكر | 2011000000 | 2011000000 | |
| 5 | MR. MOHAMMED MOHAMMED MOHAMMED | مصري | 2011000000 | ذكر | 2011000000 | 2011000000 | |

APPROVED
 2022.01.12

موقع: 20110

تاريخ: 2022.01.12

Source: Confidential

Annex 16 Seizure of urea fertilizer and other chemicals from a dhow on 7 November 2022

Figure 16.1

Dhow carrying 100 tons of urea fertilizer and 65 tons of ammonium perchlorate after the intercept**Source:** Confidential

Figure 16.2


Urea fertilizer in pellet form (left), ammonium perchlorate in powder/sugar form (right)**Source:** Confidential

Figure 16.3
GPS coordinates on a handheld navigational device found on dhow showing a waypoint close to Iran



Source: Confidential

Figure 16.4
Yemeni passport of the master of the dhow, as well as Omani visa and exit/immigration stamps¹²



Source: Confidential

¹² The Panel has obtained copies of the passports and Yemeni ID cards of all four crew members. It notes that all four passports have Omani visa and exit/immigration stamps with the same dates. The Panel has written to Oman requesting information whether the travel dates can be verified through immigration data. A response is pending.

Figure 16.5

Boarding pass for a flight on 13 October from Teheran's Mehrabad Airport to Bandar Abbas issued in the name of one of the crew members of the dhow¹³



Source: Confidential

¹³ The Panel has contacted Iran to verify whether this document is authentic, a response is pending.

Annex 17 Sampling of home-made explosives used in Houthi IEDs and landmines

1. The Panel is investigating the use of urea fertilizer smuggled by Houthi-affiliated networks to Yemen in order to determine whether it is used by the Houthi forces to manufacture IEDs and landmines, which would potentially constitute a violation of the targeted arms embargo. The Houthis have been deploying very significant quantities of explosive devices, numbering in the hundreds of thousands, which require large numbers of explosive precursor materials. To indicate the scale of this supply, a single Houthi improvised anti-vehicle landmine contains about 3.5 kilograms of home-made explosives. On 25 November 2019, the U.S. Navy seized 13,700 plain No 8 detonators (figure 20.12 in annex 20 of [S/2020/326](#)), along with a large number of anti-tank guided missiles and other components, from a dhow in the Gulf of Aden, which the Panel was able to inspect. 13,700 improvised anti-vehicle landmines would require already require almost 48 tons of explosive precursor material.¹⁴ In order to analyse which explosive precursor materials are used by the Houthis, a humanitarian demining NGO with a long track record of operating in Yemen, has conducted chemical sampling of four explosive devices from Houthi minefields.

Table 17.1

Houthi explosive devices selected for sampling and testing

| Houthi serial number | Coordinates | Location | Date of recovery |
|----------------------|------------------------------|--|------------------|
| 1R7A | N13°55'38.9" E43°26'15.5" | Within 50 metres of Al-Kifah School | 26 October 2022 |
| 787 | N13°14'28.5" E43°28'31.1" | Al-Mawzaah agricultural area | 17 October 2022 |
| 1 125R (A-9) | N13°56'02.8" E43°24'56.2" | Agricultural area on northern side of Wadi Nakhlah | 25 October 2022 |
| 1R7A | N13°56'20.1" E43°24'49.9" | Agricultural area on the southern side of Wadi Nakhlah | 26 October 2022 |

Source: Confidential

Figure 17.1

Improvised Houthi anti-vehicle landmine selected for sampling and testing



Source: Confidential

¹⁴ The Panel has received reports that the Coalition seized a cargo of 1.5 million No 8 detonators in Western Yemen in June 2021, however, the Panel has not been able to inspect them as they were destroyed. 1.5 million anti-vehicle landmines would require 5,250 tons of explosive precursor materials, showing the scale of the required supply.

Figure 17.2

Markings on improvised Houthi anti-vehicle landmine selected for sampling and testing



Source: Confidential

Figure 17.3

Explosive opening of the anti-vehicle landmine selected for sampling using detonation cord



Source: Confidential

Figure 17.4

Home-made explosives visible inside of the improvised anti-vehicle landmine



Source: Confidential

Figure 17.5

Testing of the home-made explosives using EXRAY and DROPEX test reagents



Source: Confidential

Figure 17.6

Results of the testing with reagents**Source:** Confidential

Table 17.2

Results of the testing of the four selected explosive devices

| Houthi serial number | TNT | DNT | Picric & Styphnic acid | Tetryl | Nitroesters/ Nitroamines | Nitrate salts | Chlorates/ Bromates | Urea Nitrate | Pechlorates |
|----------------------|-----|-----|------------------------|--------|--------------------------|---------------|---------------------|--------------|-------------|
| 1R7A | | | | | | X | X | | |
| 787 | | | | | | X | X | | |
| 1 125R (A-9) | | | | | | X | X | | |
| 1R7A | | | | | | X | X | | |

Source: Confidential

2. All four samples gave the same strong colour reaction with the specific reagents that detect the presence of Nitrate Salts and Chlorates/Bromates respectively, however no trace reactions were observed for any of the other explosive groups tested, including for Urea Nitrate. This leads to the conclusion that urea fertilizer might be used as a decoy to hide the presence of other chemicals, as in the case of the ammonium perchlorate discovered on 7 November 2022. The Panel will continue to investigate the supply of the chemicals used by the Houthis for the manufacturing of improvised IEDs and landmines.

Annex 18 Seizure of missile components and other items by the UK Navy

Figure 18.1
Interdiction of a skiff by HMS MONTROSE on 28 January 2022



Source: Confidential

Figure 18.2
Boarding party onboard the skiff; white bags containing cargo are visible



Source: Confidential

Figure 18.3
Cargo of the skiff onboard HMS MONTROSE



Source: Confidential


Figure 18.4
Turbojet Engines of the “Quds” land attack cruise missile



Source: Panel

Figure 18.5

Plaque showing the model, serial number and manufacturing date of the engine



Source: Panel


Figure 18.6

Stencilled serial number on the engine




Source: Panel

Figure 18.7
Engraved serial number on the engine




Source: Panel

Figure 18.8
Serial number on the engine




Source: Panel

Figure 18.9
Serial number of the pressure switch of the turbojet engine



Source: Panel

Figure 18.10
Gas-turbine engine of the “358” surface-to-air missile



Source: Panel

Figure 18.11
Fuel tank and control surfaces of the “358” surface-to-air missile



Source: Panel

Figure 18.12


Seeker, air data computer, fuse and warhead of the “358” surface-to-air missile



Source: Panel

Figure 18.13

Detail of marking



Source: Panel

Figure 18.14
Detail of marking on the laser fuse




Source: Panel

Figure 18.15
Detail of marking on the flight computer




Source: Panel

Figure 18.16
Detail of marking



Source: Panel

Figure 18.17
Detail of marking on the printed circuit board of the Engine Control Unit



Source: Panel

Figure 18.18

Additional '358' surface-to-air missile components still in evidence bags



Source: Panel

Figure 18.19

Matrice 300 RTK smart flight controller and other components



Source: Panel

Figure 18.20

Serial numbers of the two smart flight controllers



Source: Confidential

Figure 18.21

Serial number of the Matrice 300 RTK UAV



Source: Panel

Figure 18.22
Sample of flight summary information from controller A

| Time | Distance | Duration | Max Alt | Capture |
|------------|----------|----------|---------|---------|
| 2021-11-08 | 5,860m | 15Min | 202m | 0 |
| 2021-11-08 | 1,459m | 4Min | 121m | 0 |
| 2021-11-08 | 1,249m | 7Min | 137m | 0 |
| 2021-11-08 | 548m | 3Min | 171m | 0 |
| 2021-11-08 | 2,212m | 13Min | 150m | 0 |

Source: Confidential

Figure 18.23
Sample of flight summary information from controller B

| Time | Distance | Duration | Max Alt | Capture |
|------------|----------|----------|---------|---------|
| 2021-11-08 | 554m | 3Min | 172m | 0 |
| 2021-11-08 | 1,294m | 5Min | 172m | 0 |
| 2021-11-08 | 2,212m | 13Min | 151m | 0 |

Source: Confidential


Figure 18.24

Flight data (geo-locations) allegedly recovered from the controllers

| Controller | Date | Location Details |
|------------|-----------|----------------------|
| A | 08-Nov-21 | 35.734044, 51.222559 |
| A | 08-Nov-21 | 35.729978, 51.220672 |
| A | 08-Nov-21 | 35.741329, 51.211185 |
| B | 08-Nov-21 | 35.732264, 51.231767 |
| B | 08-Nov-21 | 35.729977, 51.220679 |
| B | 08-Nov-21 | 35.741326, 51.211184 |
| B | 08-Nov-21 | 35.748798, 51.199949 |
| B | 08-Nov-21 | 35.748523, 51.200132 |
| B | 08-Nov-21 | 35.746328, 51.204314 |
| B | 08-Nov-21 | 35.734010, 51.222490 |

Source: Confidential

Map 18.1



Annex 19 Seizure of launch containers of 9M133 anti-tank guided missiles

Figure 19.1
Seized launch containers of 9M133 anti-tank guided missiles



Source: Confidential

Figure 19.2
Seized launch containers of 9M133 anti-tank guided missiles



Source: Panel

Figure 19.3


Detail of marking on the ATGM launch container showing manufacture in 2021



Source: Panel

Figure 19.4

Detail of marking on the ATGM launch container showing manufacture in 2021



Source: Panel

Figure 19.5

Omani "Certificate of Origin" for the four generators concealing the ATGMs, stating that the generators are originally from China¹⁵

Oman Chamber of Commerce & Industry
P.O. Box: 1400
Postal Code: 113, Muscat
Sultanate of Oman
Tel.: 24763700
Fax: 24708497
Email: occc@chamberoman.com

شهادة منشأ
Certificate of Origin

من ١٤٤٤ هـ
الرقم البريدي
سلطنة عمان
٢٤٧٦٣٧٠
فاكس: ٢٤٧٠٨٤٩٧

No. 482476

Re-Export ☐ إعادة تصدير
Export ☐ تصدير

Name of Exporter :
Address of Exporter :
Name of Importer :
Address of Importer :
Port of Loading :
Port of Discharge :

اسم المصدر : مؤسسة التفليس السريع الشاملة للتجارة
عنوان المصدر : سلطنة عمان
اسم المستورد : عمر سلطان محمد قايد
عنوان المستورد : الجمهورية اليمنية
ميناء التصدير : المنطقة الحرة بالمزبونة
ميناء التفريغ : اليمن / ميناء شحن البري

| Invoice No. | الفاقورة الرقم | القيمة Amount | وسيلة الشحن Means of Transport | عدد الطرود No. of PKGs | العلامات التجارية Trade Marks | الوزن (كجم) Weight (K.G) | بلد المنشأ Country of Origin | نوع البضاعة Description of Goods |
|-------------|-------------------|------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| MT0094 | | 1,000 | برا | 4 | | 1,000 | الصين | مولفات كهرباء صغير |
| | | 1,000 دولار | | 4 | | 1,000 كجم | | الاجماليات |

I hereby declare that details mentioned above are true and under my responsibility

أقر بأن البيانات المدونة أعلاه صحيحة وعلى مسؤوليتي.

Signature & Stamp of Exporter

توقيع وختم المصدر

For Official Use للاستعمال الرسمي

This Signature and Stamp in the above column have been attested without the chamber bearing any responsibility on the contents of the certificate

تم التصديق على التوقيع والختم المدون أعلاه دون تحمل الغرفة أي مسؤولية عن محتويات الشهادة

Registration No. البوابة
Grade
Signature & Authorized Person

التسجيل 2653399
الفئة
توقيع الموظف المختص

Date: ٢٠٢٢ / ٣ / ٦ التاريخ 71834

Source: Confidential

¹⁵ The Panel has contacted Oman requesting information regarding the chain of custody of the generators, a response is pending.

Figure 19.6

Serial numbers of the ATGM launch containers

| # | Marking | Lot # | Year # | Serial # |
|----|---------------------|-------|--------|----------|
| 1 | 9M133-1 A.T Missile | 81 | 2018 | 45?? |
| 2 | 9M133-1 A.T Missile | 8 | 2021 | 2263 |
| 3 | 9M133-1 A.T Missile | 12 | 2021 | 2267 |
| 4 | 9M133-1 A.T Missile | 26 | 2021 | 2281 |
| 5 | 9M133-1 A.T Missile | 20 | 2018 | 4443 |
| 6 | 9M133-1 A.T Missile | 24 | 2018 | 4447 |
| 7 | 9M133-1 A.T Missile | 39 | 2018 | 4462 |
| 8 | 9M133-1 A.T Missile | 51 | 2018 | 4474 |
| 9 | 9M133-1 A.T Missile | 57 | 2018 | 4480 |
| 10 | 9M133-1 A.T Missile | 80 | 2018 | 4503 |
| 11 | 9M133-1 A.T Missile | 95 | 2018 | 4518 |
| 12 | 9M133-1 A.T Missile | 2 | 2018 | 4705 |
| 13 | 9M133-1 A.T Missile | 5 | 2018 | 4708 |
| 14 | 9M133-1 A.T Missile | 7 | 2018 | 4710 |
| 15 | 9M133-1 A.T Missile | 18 | 2018 | 4721 |
| 16 | 9M133-1 A.T Missile | 30 | 2018 | 4733 |
| 17 | 9M133-1 A.T Missile | 84 | 2018 | 4787 |
| 18 | 9M133-1 A.T Missile | 43 | 2021 | 8956 |
| 19 | 9M133-1 A.T Missile | 4 | 2021 | 9259 |
| 20 | 9M133-1 A.T Missile | 6 | 2021 | 9261 |
| 21 | 9M133-1 A.T Missile | 7 | 2021 | 9262 |
| 22 | 9M133-1 A.T Missile | 9 | 2021 | 9264 |
| 23 | 9M133-1 A.T Missile | 10 | 2021 | 9265 |
| 24 | 9M133-1 A.T Missile | 11 | 2021 | 9266 |
| 25 | 9M133-1 A.T Missile | 14 | 2021 | 9269 |
| 26 | 9M133-1 A.T Missile | 23 | 2021 | 9278 |
| 27 | 9M133-1 A.T Missile | 27 | 2021 | 9282 |
| 28 | 9M133-1 A.T Missile | 29 | 2021 | 9284 |
| 29 | 9M133-1 A.T Missile | 30 | 2021 | 9285 |
| 30 | 9M133-1 A.T Missile | 31 | 2021 | 9286 |
| 31 | 9M133-1 A.T Missile | 32 | 2021 | 9287 |
| 32 | 9M133-1 A.T Missile | 33 | 2021 | 9288 |
| 33 | 9M133-1 A.T Missile | 34 | 2021 | 9289 |
| 34 | 9M133-1 A.T Missile | 36 | 2021 | 9291 |
| 35 | 9M133-1 A.T Missile | 37 | 2021 | 9292 |
| 36 | 9M133-1 A.T Missile | 43 | 2021 | 9298 |
| 37 | 9M133-1 A.T Missile | 44 | 2021 | 9299 |
| 38 | 9M133-1 A.T Missile | 13 | 2021 | 9538 |
| 39 | 9M133-1 A.T Missile | 14 | 2021 | 9539 |
| 40 | 9M133-1 A.T Missile | 17 | 2021 | 9542 |
| 41 | 9M133-1 A.T Missile | 18 | 2021 | 9543 |
| 42 | 9M133-1 A.T Missile | 19 | 2021 | 9544 |
| 43 | 9M133-1 A.T Missile | 20 | 2021 | 9545 |
| 44 | 9M133-1 A.T Missile | 21 | 2021 | 9546 |
| 45 | 9M133-1 A.T Missile | 22 | 2021 | 9547 |

Source: Panel

Annex 20 Economic issues that pose a potential threat to peace, security and stability

1. The economic situation and outlook for Yemen offers little cause for optimism. The following economic issues pose a potential threat to peace, security and stability.

I. Exchange Rate of the Yemeni rial (YR) and Forex Reserves

2. The stark difference in the exchange rate of YR between the GoY-controlled areas and the Houthi-controlled areas continues to be a major cause of concern for both policy makers and the population (paragraph 3 of annex 26 of [S/2022/50](#)). The exchange rate, which was YR 591 per USD at the end of 2019, reached about YR 700 per USD at the end of 2020. In November 2021, it crossed the 1,700 mark, in areas under the control of GoY. Although the exchange rate was mostly stable in the past few months, the rate in the GoY-controlled areas, most of the time, is almost double that in the Houthi-controlled areas (Table 19.1). This has challenged Yemen's ability to sustain imports of essential goods at reasonable prices, thereby pushing the problem of food insecurity to alarming proportions.

3. The following are the monthly averages of exchange rates in Aden and Sana'a from January 2021 to November 2022:

Table 20.1

Comparison of monthly averages of the exchange rates (YR/USD) in Sana'a and in Aden from January 2021 to November 2022

| <i>Year</i> | <i>Month</i> | <i>Average Exchange Rate in Sana'a</i> | <i>Average Exchange Rate in Aden</i> |
|-------------|--------------|--|--------------------------------------|
| 2021 | January | 592 | 864 |
| | February | 595 | 868 |
| | March | 600 | 853 |
| | April | 596 | 890 |
| | May | 594 | 934 |
| | June | 596 | 946 |
| | July | 597 | 1,005 |
| | August | 598 | 1,024 |
| | September | 600 | 1,184 |
| | October | 600 | 1,354 |
| | November | 600 | 1,617 |
| | December | 600 | 857 |
| 2022 | January | 602 | 1,089 |
| | February | 603 | 1,220 |
| | March | 605 | 1,250 |
| | April | 563 | 975 |

| | | |
|-----------|------------------|------|
| May | 559 | 1008 |
| June | 558 | 1090 |
| July | NA ¹⁶ | 1137 |
| August | NA | 1154 |
| September | NA | 1135 |
| October | NA | 1147 |
| November | NA | 1151 |

Source: Central Bank of Yemen (Aden)

II. Forex Reserves

4. The total foreign exchange reserves of CBY (Aden) have fallen from USD 1.68 billion in December 2021 to USD 1.08 billion in October 2022, most of which is also not liquid. There has been a downward trend since July 2022. However, with the receipt of foreign aid, the reserves as of 30 November have gone up to USD 1.34 billion, as can be seen from Table XX below.

Table 20.2

Forex Reserves from July to September 2022

| <i>As on</i> | <i>Amount</i> |
|-------------------|------------------|
| 31 July 2022 | 1,529,693,382.94 |
| 31 August 2022 | 1,315,275,548.55 |
| 29 September 2022 | 1,245,423,747.55 |
| 31 October 2022 | 1,088,945,990.03 |
| 30 November | 1,340,186,040.88 |

Source: Central Bank of Yemen (Aden)

¹⁶ Although CBY (Aden) did not furnish average exchange rate prevailing in Sana'a from July to November 2022, information received by the Panel from other sources indicated that the average exchange rate during this period mostly remained around 550.

Annex 21 Prohibition of Usurious Transactions Act

1. Representatives from the banking sector informed the Panel that banks in Yemen face many difficulties, obstacles, and challenges due to the war and the consequential divisive policies being adopted by the Houthis, and the dual regulatory mechanism of two central banks. The Panel found them to be critical of the new law which is based on Islamic juridical, legal, and economic considerations. They contend that it would be impossible to implement and enforce this law under normal circumstances, let alone the difficult conditions that the country is currently experiencing because of the war. The bankers argue that in the current market situation, it is wrong to consider bank interest as usury, and that in some countries, where similar or even more diluted versions of similar law was introduced, either the law was not adopted by their legislatures, or it had to be withdrawn. They further argue that this law conflicts with the rulings of the Constitutional Court of Yemen which held that bank interest did not constitute usury, and it also contravenes many provisions of the Code of Procedure, which established different procedures and time periods for litigation.

2. The representatives from the banking and the trading community further informed the Panel that they have warned the CBY (Sana'a) that promulgation of this law would cause a major economic disaster as the state will lose the most important economic tool to control inflation; the value of the national currency will decline; the banks will be reluctant to lend to the industrial, commercial, and service sectors; and make investors reluctant to invest capital in the country, thereby increasing unemployment and poverty. There is no clarity on the fate of interest accrued on the treasury bills worth billions of YRs deposited with CBY (Sana'a). Banks had previously invested about 65 percent of their deposits in treasury bills with CBY, Sana'a.¹⁷ The Houthis have reduced the interest rate on treasury bills from 16.5 percent to 12 percent.¹⁸ But since the division in the central bank, the interest amount is only calculated in the system and the commercial banks do not receive any interest amount from CBY (Sana'a), although taxes are collected from the banks.¹⁹ Since the deposits of the commercial banks at CBY (Sana'a) includes the customers' deposits, some commercial banks pay interest to the customers, and others either do not pay any interest or pay at reduced rates. Old deposits have lost more than 70 percent of their value due to the depreciation of the exchange rate and their inability to be cashed out. In 2019, CBY (Aden) announced that if any bank wants to register their treasury bills with CBY (Aden), it must shift its headquarters to Aden. Since, under the new law, no interest is to be paid on the deposits, and benefits can only be generated from the investments to be made by the banks, there would be uncertainty about the returns that the customers would expect from the banks. Similarly, if the banks cannot charge interest on the loan and credit facilities, they would be under pressure to look for appropriate investment opportunities to earn profits. Transformation of the economy requires a gradual reduction in the interest rate and the creation of a parallel investment environment in various sectors, but neither of these banks have any prior experience with such business endeavours, and the current climate in Yemen hardly provides any opportunity for new business and investments. Since banks would not find alternative means for investing their funds, they would be unable to provide credit facilities for commercial activities until an appropriate savings and investment mechanism is available. Their inability to do so would result in major upheaval in the banking sector. Millions of people, especially the pensioners, live on the monthly interest that they gain from their bank deposits, which is about 15 percent per year on savings accounts and more in case of some other fixed deposits.²⁰ Any step taken to hastily abolish interest would seriously undermine the confidence of the people. Customers would be reluctant to deposit their funds in banks because banks would be unable to offer a rewarding return. Apprehending further erosion of its value, the customers may withdraw their cash deposits, creating panic and sudden demands on the banks. Commercial banks, in such an eventuality, would be unable to respond to the sudden demand due to lack of liquidity and would face the risk of bankruptcy and closure of their operations.

3. The representatives of the business community in Yemen, the Panel interacted with, oppose the promulgation of the new law on the ground that it would adversely impact domestic trade as well as imports into Yemen, as the banks in Yemen would not have the requisite deposit base to issue letters of credit to cover the

¹⁷ CBY (Aden) informed the Panel during meeting in Aden

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

imports. Since Yemen imports about 95 percent of its food requirements, any such situation that has adverse impact on imports would push the country to a severe economic crisis.

4. The Panel was informed that the GoY and CBY (Aden) have no plans to enact or implement any such law in their areas of control. According to CBY (Aden), the new law would destroy the banking sector in Yemen. Because of the fragmentation of the banking and financial sector in Yemen, such law would lead to severe compliance burden on the banks from both the central banks, with CBY (Sana'a) implementing prohibition of usurious transactions and CBY (Aden) continuing with their existing hybrid system of allowing commercial banks to provide interest and Islamic banks to operate without interest. Some bankers argue that the enactment of the new law may lead to capital flight from Sana'a, as investors seek newer opportunities, including to Aden. This would cause further fragmentation and imbalance in the economic development in the two areas of Yemen.

5. Based on the scrutiny of the documents, received by the Panel from multiple sources, the various provisions of this new law are discussed below:

a) It prohibits usurious transactions and invalidates all forms of usurious loans, such as the interest that banks or others require for a loan, regardless of its form, including a sum that is given to the borrower or is credited to his/her current account, or the issuance of a letter of credit or documentary credit. It also invalidates interest that banks, institutions, companies, and post offices may pay on deposits and investment certificates, including interest-bearing bonds, regardless of their source. Thus, all forms of usury are prohibited in all civil and commercial transactions, and interest agreed upon, in order to receive a sum of money or to defer satisfaction of an obligation, is abolished absolutely.

b) It invalidates any contract, agreement or condition that entails or conceals usurious interest, for example, by calling it a commission or profit when the borrower does not receive a tangible benefit in return for such commission or profit or through the imposition by the buyer of an increase in exchange for deferral, known as a *murabahah* sale (resale with a stated profit), and also an instalment sale.

c) The right-holder may agree to a commission not exceeding 5 percent, if he provides a tangible, legitimate and proportionate corresponding benefit to the debtor upon payment. For example, when a bank grants a loan, apart from administrative services, it also, sometimes, provides additional services by acting on behalf of the borrower, as is the case with documentary credits and letters of credit. While commissions for provision of such services are permitted under this law up to 5 percent, there is a condition that this service must be tangible, legitimate, and commensurate with the agreed upon commission. The judge is empowered to scrutinize such commissions and if he/she finds that no tangible service is being provided in exchange for the commission, he/she may reduce the commission to an amount that is considered appropriate to him/her or may even refuse payment of the commission.

d) It provides for penalty for any person, whether as a debtor or a creditor, who is proven to have committed the offence of engaging in usurious practices. The violator can be imprisoned for a period of not less than six months and not more than one year, and fined not less than YR 500,000, and not more than YR 1 million. In case of persons who lend with interest to exploit the borrower's need or habitually lend with interest, the imprisonment shall not be less than one year, and no more than two years, and the fine shall not be less than YR 1 million, and no more than YR 3 million.

e) All provisions regarding usurious interest in laws that are currently in force shall be repealed and the relevant authorities shall regulate all civil, commercial, and banking transactions in full in accordance with the provisions of the Islamic Sharia.

f) This Act shall not apply to civil and commercial transactions that were concluded and completed before the date on which the Act is promulgated.

6. The Panel received copies of the following documents from several sources:

Figure 21.1

Documents concerning Prohibition of Usurious Transactions Act received by the Panel





مشروع قانون رقم () لسنة ٢٠١٤ بمنع المعاملات الربوية

رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى

بعد الاطلاع على دستور الجمهورية البعثية،

وعلى الاتفاق السياسي الموقع بتاريخ ٢٨/٩/٢٠١٦ م بين أئمة وحلفائهم والمؤتمر الشعبي العام وحلفائه،
وعلى الإعلان الصادر بتاريخ ٢٠١٦/٨/٦ م بتشكيل المجلس السياسي الأعلى،
وعلى قرار المجلس السياسي الأعلى رقم (١) لسنة ٢٠١٦ م بشأن تحديد مهام المجلس واختصاصاته،
وبعد موافقة مجلس النواب.

أصدرنا القانون الآتي نصه:

- مادة (١) - تمنع المعاملات الربوية بكل صورها في جميع المعاملات المدنية والتجارية التي يجري بين الأشخاص الطبيعيين والاعتباريين، وتبطل بطلاناً مطلقاً جميع الفوائد التي يتم الاتفاق عليها مقابل اقتطاع مبلغ من القود في مقابل التأخير في الوفاء بالإلتزام.
- ب- كل عقد أو اتفاق أو شرط يظهر له بنطوي أو يستر لفائدة ربوية باطل لا عمل عليه والمضمر كالتأخير في الوفاء، ويعتبر من قبل الفوائد المستترة كل عوالة لا مفعلة - بشرطها الدائن (المضمر) لا يقابلها منفعة حقيقية مشروعة، والزيادة التي يفرضها (بشرطها) البائع (مرايعة أو بالتخصيص) في قيمة السلعة لأجل التسا.
- مادة (٢) - يجوز لصاحب الحق الشرط عوالة بما لا تزيد على نسبة (٥%) بشرط أن يقابلها منفعة حقيقية ومشروعة بقسمها المرفوض للمدين بالوفاء، وللناقص الحكم باطلتها كلياً أو جزئياً إذا لم يحقق الشفعة المذكورة أو كانت غير متناسبة مع قدر العوالة.
- مادة (٣) - يطبق بخصوص البيوع الربوية - رياء النسيأ - رياء النسيأ - المواد من (٥٤٣-١٠٥) من القانون المدني.
- مادة (٤) - لا يعد من الربا الآتي:-

- ١- الحكم على البيع ومن في حكمه عند استحقاق البيع للتأخير أو نحو ذلك بفرق سعر المعلة.
- ٢- الحكم على الغائب بضمأن لعين المضروبة ونظائرها بأوفر القيم من تاريخ التقصيص حتى تسريح الوفاء وضمن نفس سعر ولفاً بأحكام المواد (٥٤٥، ١١٤٠) من القانون المدني.
- مادة (٥) - إذا لم يتم المدين بالوفاء بالدين عند حلول الأجل مع قدرته عليه، جاز للدائن أن يرفع الأمر للمحكمة المختصة، فإذا ثبت ذلك للمحكمة المختصة حكم أن لها أن تسهل المدين مدة لا تزيد على ثلاثة أشهر مع أمره بالتأداء، فإذا مضت المدة ولم يؤد ما عليه أبرت المحكمة بحجسه حتى يؤدي الدين الذي عليه.
- ٢- لا يطل الحكم للمضمر عليه في الفترة (١) من هذه المادة بما للدائن من حق في التقاضي على أسوال المدين لاستيفاء الدين وحقه في الحصول على تعويض عند إذا ثبت له لحقه ضرر محقق بسبب التأخير عن الوفاء.

٢ - ١



مادة (٦) - يجوز الاتفاق خارج العقد على مقدار التعويض في حالة التأخير عن الوفاء بالدين على أن يراعى الحد (٢٤٨، ٣٥٤، ٣٥٥) من القانون المدني.

مادة (٧) - يُعاقب بالحبس مدة لا تقل عن ستة أشهر ولا تزيد على سنة، وبغرامة لا تقل عن خمسمائة ألف ريال ولا فر على مليون ريال كل من خالف أحكام المادة (١) من هذا القانون، وتكون العقوبة الحبس لمدة لا تقل عن سنته ولا تزيد على سنتين، وبغرامة لا تقل عن مليون ريال ولا تزيد على ثلاثة ملايين ريال إذا استغل الدائن حاجة الدين أو حوى نفسه أو كان معاداً على الإفراض بآثراً.

مادة (٨) - ينشأ بموجب أحكام هذا القانون صندوق يُسمى (صندوق الإفراض الحسن) يتمتع بالشخصية الاعتبارية أو عارة تشتر إلى القادة الربوية إنما ورفت في تلك الفواتير، ويجب على الجهات ذات العلاقة تنظيم كافة المعاملات المدنية والتجارية والمصرفية بما يتوافق كلياً مع أحكام الشريعة الإسلامية.

مادة (٩) - لا يسري هذا القانون على المعاملات المدنية والتجارية التي تم إبرامها قبل تاريخ صدور هذا القانون التي استكملت أثارها.

مادة (١٠) - يُحل بهذا القانون من تاريخ صدوره ويُنشر في الجريدة الرسمية.

صدر برئاسة الجمهورية - بالتأليف صنفاء

بتاريخ / / ١٤٤٤
الوافق / / ٢٠٢٢

مهند محمد المشاط رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى

٢ - ٢

المذكرة التوضيحية لمشروع قانون رقم () لسنة ٢٠٢٢ بشأن منع المعاملات الربوية

فقطاً أن يكسبون هذا القانون خاص بالمعاملات الربوية أياً كانت في المعاملات التجارية أو المدنية رغم علمنا أن القانون المدني يمنع المعاملات الربوية في مجال المعاملات وذلك لتوحيد الأحكام المتعلقة بالربا وكذلك لأهمية الإشارة إلى حكمه بعض الصور التي قد توهم أنها من قبيل الصورة الربوية حتى لا يشتمل البطلان حكماً أن منع المعاملات الربوية في المعاملات التجارية إلى جانب المعاملات المدنية أقتضى التعديل في بعض الصور التي تمثل حلولاً لا تستيرت على منع الربا من مشكلات تتعلق بالتخصيص على القروض غير الربوية من حيث وضع الضوابط التي من شأنها الحد من معاملة المدين وفقاً لتأشيرة ومطابق الغنى طلم.

مادة (١) - أتمتع المعاملات الربوية بشكل صوريها في جميع المعاملات المدنية والتجارية التي تجري بين الأشخاص الطبيعيين والاعتباريين، وتبطل بطلاناً مطلقاً جميع الفوائد التي يتم الاتفاق عليها مقابل اقتطاع مبلغ من القود في مقابل التأخير في الوفاء بالإلتزام.

ب- كل عقد أو اتفاق أو شرط يظهر أنه بنطوي أو يستر لفائدة ربوية باطل لا عمل عليه والمضمر كالتأخير في الوفاء، ويعتبر من قبل الفوائد المستترة كل عوالة لا مفعلة - بشرطها الدائن (المضمر) لا يقابلها منفعة حقيقية مشروعة، والزيادة التي يفرضها (بشرطها) البائع (مرايعة أو بالتخصيص) في قيمة السلعة لأجل التسا.

مادة (٢) - يجوز لصاحب الحق الشرط عوالة بما لا تزيد على نسبة (٥%) بشرط أن يقابلها منفعة حقيقية ومشروعة بقسمها المرفوض للمدين بالوفاء، وللناقص الحكم باطلتها كلياً أو جزئياً إذا لم يحقق الشفعة المذكورة أو كانت غير متناسبة مع قدر العوالة.

مادة (٣) - يطبق بخصوص البيوع الربوية - رياء النسيأ - رياء النسيأ - المواد من (٥٤٣-١٠٥) من القانون المدني.

مادة (٤) - لا يعد من الربا الآتي:-

- ١- الحكم على البيع ومن في حكمه عند استحقاق البيع للتأخير أو نحو ذلك بفرق سعر المعلة.
- ٢- الحكم على الغائب بضمأن لعين المضروبة ونظائرها بأوفر القيم من تاريخ التقصيص حتى تسريح الوفاء وضمن نفس سعر ولفاً بأحكام المواد (٥٤٥، ١١٤٠) من القانون المدني.

مادة (٥) - إذا لم يتم المدين بالوفاء بالدين عند حلول الأجل مع قدرته عليه، جاز للدائن أن يرفع الأمر للمحكمة المختصة، فإذا ثبت ذلك للمحكمة المختصة حكم أن لها أن تسهل المدين مدة لا تزيد على ثلاثة أشهر مع أمره بالتأداء، فإذا مضت المدة ولم يؤد ما عليه أبرت المحكمة بحجسه حتى يؤدي الدين الذي عليه.

٢- لا يطل الحكم للمضمر عليه في الفترة (١) من هذه المادة بما للدائن من حق في التقاضي على أسوال المدين لاستيفاء الدين وحقه في الحصول على تعويض عند إذا ثبت له لحقه ضرر محقق بسبب التأخير عن الوفاء.

٢- لا يطل الحكم للمضمر عليه في الفترة (١) من هذه المادة بما للدائن من حق في التقاضي على أسوال المدين لاستيفاء الدين وحقه في الحصول على تعويض عند إذا ثبت له لحقه ضرر محقق بسبب التأخير عن الوفاء.

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٢- لا يطل الحكم للمضمر عليه في الفترة (١) من هذه المادة بما للدائن من حق في التقاضي على أسوال المدين لاستيفاء الدين وحقه في الحصول على تعويض عند إذا ثبت له لحقه ضرر محقق بسبب التأخير عن الوفاء.

مادة (٦) - يجوز لصاحب الحق الاتفاق على معاملة بما لا تزيد على نسبة (٥%) بشرط أن يقابلها منفعة حقيقية ومشروعة بتقديمها للتخصيص للمدين بالوفاء، على أنه يجوز للتخصيص عدم الحكم حكماً أو جزئياً بهذه المعاملة إذا لم يمكن ذلك معاملة حقيقية مشروعة مقابل هذه المعاملة أو أنها لا تتناسب مع مقدار المعاملة.

مادة (٧) - يطبق بخصوص البيوع الربوية - رياء النسيأ - رياء النسيأ - المواد من (٥٤٣-١٠٥) من القانون المدني.

مادة (٨) - لا يعد من الربا الآتي:-

- ١- الحكم على البيع ومن في حكمه عند استحقاق البيع للتأخير أو نحو ذلك بفرق سعر المعلة.
- ٢- الحكم على الغائب بضمأن لعين المضروبة ونظائرها بأوفر القيم من تاريخ التقصيص حتى تسريح الوفاء وضمن نفس السعر وفقاً لأحكام المواد (٥٤٥، ١١٤٠) من القانون المدني.

مادة (٩) - لا يسري هذا القانون على المعاملات المدنية والتجارية التي تم إبرامها قبل تاريخ صدور هذا القانون التي استكملت أثارها.

مادة (١٠) - يُحل بهذا القانون من تاريخ صدوره ويُنشر في الجريدة الرسمية.

صدر برئاسة الجمهورية - بالتأليف صنفاء

بتاريخ / / ١٤٤٤
الوافق / / ٢٠٢٢

| | |
|--|---|
| <p>التي وأصبح يمكنه وهو مسؤول على شكل من حيث أنه الأطراف يوم التعامل اليوم مديا مكان أو قسما وقد شدة في العقود في حق التفويض والفائدة عندما يمكنه قد استغل ما يتلخص في مكانه بعدد الأراضي بالفائدة.</p> | <p>تعاليف الجسب مدة لا تقل عن ستة أشهر ولا تزيد على سنة، ويعطى لا تقل عن نصف من خمس سنوات الفد روال ولا تزيد على مليون ريال كحد من خالف أحكام القانون (١١) من هذا القانون وتكون العقوبة الحبس وبغرامة لا تقل عن مليون ريال ولا تزيد على ثلاث مليون ريال إذا استغل الدائن حاجة الدين أو دوى نفسه أو مكانا معشرا على الأراضي بالبر.</p> |
| <p>هذا النص يحيل لرئيس الجمهورية إنشاء صندوق القرض الحسن يخصص للقروض الحسن على أن يكون من ضمن -وإنه لا يتعدى -معدلات الأرباح والوفاء ووضاحتها والتسليم من الرضعة والأرباح والوفاء لهذا القرض وقد حرصنا على النص بوجوب أن تشمل الدولة لشركات التشغيل حتى لا تضطر في أن تقرر القرض ما يضمن بالمستوفى في وقت.</p> | <p>ينشأ بموجب أحكام هذا القانون صندوق يسمى صندوق الإقراض الحسن ويتمتع بالشخصية الاعتبارية والاستقلال المالي والإداري، ويخصص لشؤون رئيس الجمهورية، ويصدر بتشكيله الصندوق ونظامه المالي والأدبي قرار من رئيس الجمهورية على أن يكون من ضمن مسؤوله القرض حسنات الدولة ومؤسساتها والتسليم للقروض من القرضة والأرباح والوفاء لهذا القرض وقد حرصنا على النص بوجوب أن تشمل الدولة لشركات التشغيل حتى لا تضطر في أن تقرر القرض ما يضمن بالمستوفى في وقت.</p> |
| <p>نظر لتكوينه لا يحكم ذات العلاقة بإدارة الاتفاق على الدولة القرضة لم تكن في خصوص منفرد وإنما تم النص عليها في سياق عدد من الترسوس لتبسيط التعاملات في عدة قوانين مكان من الأوامر النص فتمت على هذه الأحكام الخاصة بالموافقة التي هي كفاية القوانين والأوامر في صفة تشر إلى الفائدة الربوية.</p> | <p>لغنى كفاية الأحكام الخاصة بالقوانين الربوية للتصوير عليها في القوانين الفاد، كفاية بالقبلي أي لفظ أو عبارة تشير إلى الفائدة الربوية أيضا ورت في تلك القوانين، ويجب على الجهات ذات العلاقة تنظيم كفاية التعاملات لفائدة والتجارية والصرفية بما يتوافق كفاية مع أحكام الشريعة الإسلامية.</p> |
| <p>على النص بوجوب عدم مروجين القوانين ولا سيما على الاتفاق الربوية التي تربط بين الربح واستثماره في الاقتصاد.</p> | <p>لا يصر هذا القانون على التعاملات لفائدة والتجارية التي تم إبرامها قبل شرايع صدور هذا القانون.</p> |
| <p>الصفحة ١ من ١</p> | <p>يتم عمل هذا القانون من تاريخ صدوره وينشر في الجريدة الرسمية.</p> |

نواحي ومبررات مشروع قانون منع التعاملات الربوية

التعامل الربوي أي مكان صورته عمل محرم في المعسور البحتي كمن أن القانون للذي البحتي الذي يمثل تقييداً لأحكام الشريعة الإسلامية قام به مجموعة من علماء الدين المتعبد من نص صراحة على عدم جواز التعاملات الربوية حيث نصت المادة ٢٥٦ (٢) على أنه يحل إقراض على فائدة وروية باطل ولا يعمل به، ويحل إقراض ثمن أنه يستأجر روية غير صحيح كحلال ولا يعمل به. ومع ذلك يجوز لمصاحب الحق أن يتفق على معاملة في مقابل أي عمل يقوم به بمنعته الدين بالوفاء ولا يجوز أن تزيد النسبة لتفق عليها في مقابل الأجر للتصوير عليها في الفقرة السابقة عن (٢) من حيث الحق، ويجوز للقاضي أن يرفض الحكم بمقابل لتفق عليه إذا ثبت أنه لا يمثل إقراضاً حقيقياً من قبل صاحب الحق، أو أن يرفضه بنسبة ما ثبت أن نقص من الاتفاق الحقيقي عن النسبة لتفق عليها مع مراعاة الفرق التجاري فيما لا يخالف شرعاً.

بالإضافة إلى أنه تدعم التعاملات الربوية ومنها البيوع الربوية في الفرع الأول من الفصل الرابع من الباب الأول من المصنوع الثالث. وأعطى شكل صور البيوع الربوية سواء بالنسبة لربا الفحل وربا اليد وربي التبا وربي القرض. حكماً أنه أعطى شكل صور البيوع والشروط التي يتم استخدامها للتعامل على الربا.

ولكن هناك عدد من القوانين الخاصة مثل القانون التجاري والقانون ذات العلاقة بعمل البنوك وقانون الزوية وغيرها من القوانين أجازت التعاملات الربوية وعلى رأسها ربا القرض وكذلك قانون البنوك الإسلامية أجازت صور مختلفات من التعاملات التي لا تختلف عما تقوم به البنوك الأخرى إلا أنها عمت إلى إغفاء التعاملات الربوية تحت صور من التعاملات أشرعها بيع القرضة والشراكعة للهيئ بالتمليك وعقد الاستمساخ.

وبما يبدو ملاحظته أن التعاملات الربوية التي تعارضها البنوك في بلادنا تتجاوز الحدود التي تمارس فيها في إشراكها في قوانين الغرب فهي تتلخص أربع صور الربا الفاد بمكثرت من صور الفحل والتصنيف وبيان ذلك كالتالي:

١. أن أغلب التصور التي أجازت التعامل بالربا لم تكن صريحة بما يحل حتى يتم الحكم من قبل القضاء.
٢. تحكيم الحكام التجاري بالفائدة المربكة رغم عدم وجود نص يجرمها وإنما استناداً إلى عرف ولم تشاها مع تصور شرعي وتصور أمرك.
٣. أن التصور القانوني وعلى خلاف السائد في أغلب دول العالم لم تشع عد أقسى لفائدة التلق عليها وقتنص ذلك جواز الاتفاق على الفائدة مهما كانت نسبتها.

ك في غياب التصور ولكن بمباركة من القضاء التجاري تمارس البنوك إلى جانب إقرار جريمة الربا المتكررات التالية:

- لا تقوم بأي نشاط استثماري حقيقي بل يقتصر نشاطها على تلقي الودائع وإعادة إقراضها وحصولها على الفرق بين الفائدة المدينة والدائنة.
- بالإضافة إلى أن البنوك لا تقوم بتوظيف حقيقي لأموالها فأغلب نشاطها في منح القروض التجارية للاستثمار في الأوراق التجارية.
- وكنتيجة طبيعية فالعمل بالنسبة لها دائن أو مدين فقط لذلك تقتصر دراساتهما الإئتمانية على الاعتماد بالضمانات وليس المال والقدرة الإئتمانية دون النظر إلى هـ والبنوك الإسلامية وإن كان المفترض أنها تتعامل بسعر الفائدة الربوية وإنما تتعامل على أساس المشاركة في الربح والخسارة فيكون وديها ناتج عن الاستثمار الفعلي لأموال المودعين والبنك في كفاية القطاعات على أساس عقد المشاركة الشرعي.
- ولكن حصل تحويل لكافة صيغ التمويل الإسلامية تحت مصوغات مختلفة حتى أقرب نشاطها من أنشطة البنوك التقليدية بل تمحور عملها في نوع واحد من الصيغ وهي صيغة البيع مريحة.



Source:

Confidential

Appendix A Unofficial translation of documents relating to the Prohibition of Usurious Transactions Act

Republic of Yemen
The Cabinet

In the name of God, the
Merciful, the Compassionate

No.: waw/2/333
Date: 16 Safar A.H. 1444
Corresponding to: 12
September A.D. 2022

Mr. Yahya Ali Al-Ra'ï
Speaker of the House of Representatives

Sir,

I transmit to you herewith the Prohibition of Usurious Transactions Act, which the Cabinet endorsed by its Decision No. 2 of A.H. 1444 at its second meeting on 9 Safar A.H. 1444 (5 September A.D. 2022), along with a copy of the observations of the Central Bank.

We trust that the required legal steps will be taken.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Abdulaziz Salih bin Habtur
Prime Minister

cc:

Director of the Office of the Presidency of the Republic
Secretary-General of the Cabinet
Secretary-General of the Cabinet

Republic of Yemen**The Cabinet****Secretariat****Cabinet Decision No. 2 of A.H. 1444 AH concerning the Prohibition of Usurious Transactions Act**

The Cabinet, having reviewed communication No. 1/*min.waw*, dated 7 Muharram A.H. 1444 (3 August 2022) from the Minister of Legal Affairs, concerning the draft act on the prohibition of usurious transactions, which was amended following its withdrawal from the House of Representatives, decides to:

1. Approve the Prohibition of Usurious Transactions Act.
2. Instruct the Supreme Economic Committee to conduct an economic study of the Act and submit its observations, if any, to the House of Representatives within a week from today's date.
3. The Minister for House of Representatives and Shura Council Affairs and the Minister of Legal Affairs shall complete the legal steps following the one-week period granted to the [Supreme] Economic Committee.
4. This Decision shall enter into force on 9 Safar A.H. 1444 AH (5 September A.D. 2022).
5. This Decision shall be implemented by means of appropriate administrative measures.



| Against | Abstaining | Implementing parties | |
|---------|------------|--|-----------|
| None | None | Primary | Secondary |
| | | Minister of State for House of Representatives and Shura Council Affairs | |
| | | Minister of Legal Affairs | |
| | | Acting Chair of the Supreme Economic Committee | |

Duration: Permanent

Session No. 2, held on 9 Safar A.H. 1441 (5 September A.D. 2022), No. of pages: 14 (preliminary draft), National Salvation Government (8)



Republic of Yemen
Ministry of Legal Affairs

In the name of God, the
Merciful, the Compassionate

Number: 76/*kaf qaf mim*
waw

Date: 16 Safar A.H. 1444

Corresponding to: 12
September A.D. 2022

Mr. Ali Abu Haligah

Minister of State for House of Representatives and Shura Council Affairs

Sir,

Subject: Draft act concerning the prohibition of usurious transactions

The Ministry of Legal Affairs presents its compliments to you and wishes you success in your duties.

With regard to the above-mentioned subject, the Cabinet, at its session 9 Safar A.H. 1444 (9 May A.D. 2022), adopted a decision regarding the draft act on the prohibition of usurious transactions. Attached herewith you will find the draft act, stamped "For review", and the related explanatory note.

Please review the draft act and then present it to the House of Representatives, with a view to completing the relevant constitutional procedures.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Isma'il Muhammad al-Muhagiri

Minister of Legal Affairs

Republic of Yemen

For review

16 Safar A.H. 1444

Ministry of Legal Affairs

Draft Act No. of A.H. 1444 on the prohibition of usurious transactions

The President of the Supreme Political Council,

Having reviewed the Constitution of the Republic of Yemen,

The Political Agreement signed on 28 July 2016 between Ansarallah and its allies, and the General People's Congress and its allies; the declaration issued on 6 August 2016 concerning the establishment of the Supreme Political Council; and Supreme Political Council resolution No. 1 (2016) establishing the functions and competencies of the Council,

Has promulgated the following Act:

Article 1 (a) Usurious transactions of any kind are prohibited in all civil and commercial transactions that are conducted between natural and legal persons, and all interest agreed upon in order to receive a sum of money or to defer satisfaction of an obligation shall be abolished absolutely.

(b) Any contract, agreement or condition that entails or conceals usurious interest is null and void, inasmuch as that which is implied is tantamount to that which is stated with regard to usury. Any commission or profit stipulated by the creditor (lender) where there is no tangible and legitimate corresponding benefit and any increase in the value of the goods (whether in the form of *murabahah* [resale with a stated profit] or instalments) stipulated by the seller in exchange for deferral of payment are considered forms of hidden interest.

Article 2 The right holder may agree to a commission not exceeding 5 per cent provided that he provides a tangible, legitimate and proportionate corresponding benefit to the debtor upon payment. A judge has the discretion not to order payment, whether in whole or in part, of a commission if no tangible or legitimate benefit is provided or if such benefit is not proportional to the amount of the commission.

Article 3 Articles 563 to 605 of the Civil Code shall apply to usurious sales (*fadl* [unjustified enrichment] and *naṣa'* [delayed payment]).

Article 4 The following are not considered usurious practices:

1. The seller and those with a similar status, when collecting the amount owed for a third party or someone with a similar status, are required to take into account the exchange rate differential.
2. A usurper is required to guarantee the usurped property and its yield at the highest value, from the date of the usurpation until the date of payment, and to cover any decrease in price in accordance with the provisions of articles 545 and 1140 of the Civil Code.

Article 5 1. If the debtor fails to pay at the appointed time, although he/she is able to do so, the creditor has the right to refer the matter to the competent court. If the competent court is satisfied, it may grant the debtor a grace period not exceeding three months in which to perform his/her obligation. If he/she nonetheless fails to perform, the court shall order that he/she be imprisoned until he/she satisfies the debt.

2. The provisions set out in paragraph 1 of this article shall be without prejudice to the creditor's right to execute against the debtor's assets in order to satisfy the debt or his right to obtain fair compensation, in the manner prescribed by law, if it established that he has been harmed as a result of the delay in payment.

Article 6 An agreement may be reached outside the scope of the contract regarding the amount of compensation that must be paid when repayment of debt is delayed, provided that such is in accordance with the provisions of articles 348, 354 and 355 of the Civil Code.

Article 7 Any person who violates the provisions of article 1 of this Act shall be imprisoned for a period of not less than six months and not more than one year, and fined not less than 500,000 riyals and not more than 1 million riyals. The term of imprisonment shall be not less than one year and no more than two years, and the fine shall not be less than 1 million riyals and no more than 3 million riyals if the creditor exploits the situation of the debtor, acts arbitrarily or customarily lends at usurious rates.

Article 8 Pursuant to the provisions of this Act, there shall be established a fund named the “Interest-Free Lending Fund”. It shall have a legal personality and financial and administrative independence, and shall be under the supervision of the President of the Republic. The President of the Republic shall issue a decision concerning the structure of the Fund and its financial and administrative regulations, provided that its financial resources shall include contributions from the State and its institutions, the proportion of zakat allocated for it and the funds set aside for this purpose. The State shall bear the operational costs of the Fund.

Article 9 All provisions regarding usurious interest in laws that are currently in force shall be repealed, and any term or phrase referring to usurious interest wherever it appears in those laws shall be repealed. The relevant authorities shall regulate all civil, commercial and banking transactions in full accordance with the provisions of the Islamic sharia.

Article 10 This Act shall not apply to civil and commercial transactions that were concluded and completed before the date on which the Act is promulgated.

Article 11 This Act shall enter into force from the date of its promulgation and shall be published in the *Official Gazette*.

Promulgated at the Presidency of the Republic, in the capital, Sana’a

On A.H. 1444 Corresponding to A.D. 2022

Mahdi Muhammad ~~al-Mashat~~

President of the Supreme Political Council

Explanatory note relating to draft Act No. (2022) on the prohibition of usurious transactions

Although we are aware that the Civil Code prohibits usurious transactions, we chose to develop an act that specifically addresses usurious transactions, whether commercial or civil transactions, of any kind in order to unify the provisions related to usury and owing to the importance of highlighting certain forms [of transactions] that may be misconstrued as being usurious, so that they are not covered by the prohibition. In addition, the prohibition of usury in commercial and civil transactions required the introduction of refinements in relation to certain types [of transactions] because they offer solutions to the problems that will arise from the prohibition of usury. The intention is to encourage non-usurious loans by putting in place controls that are designed to limit procrastination by debtors, in accordance with the rule “procrastination in the repayment of a debt by a rich person is injustice”.

Grounds and justification for the Prohibition of Usurious Transactions Act

Usurious transactions, whatever their form, are prohibited under the Constitution of Yemen and Civil Code, of which the latter constitutes a codification of the provisions of Islamic sharia that was carried out by a group of Yemeni Islamic scholars. Usurious agreements are expressly prohibited under the Civil Code, article 356 of which provides that any agreement that calls for usurious interest is invalid and unenforceable, and any agreement that conceals usurious interest is also invalid and unenforceable. However, the right holder may agree to a commission in exchange for any work that he/she carries out for the benefit of the debtor. The agreed upon percentage in exchange for the performance of that which is stipulated in the preceding paragraph shall not exceed 5 per cent of the right's value. The judge may reject the judgment for the agreed consideration if it is found that it does not represent a real agreement by the right holder, or if it decreases it in proportion to what is found to be a lack of real agreement from the agreed percentage, taking into account commercial custom in a manner that is not contrary to Sharia. A judge may reject the stipulation relating to the agreed upon consideration if it is found that it does not represent a genuine agreement by the right holder, or he/she may order a proportionate reduction in the amount agreed upon if it is determined that there is a negative differential between the actual agreement and the agreed upon percentage, while taking into account customary business practice but without contradict the sharia.

In addition, the Code regulates usurious transactions, including usurious sales, in its Title III, Part I, Chapter IV, Section I. It abolishes all forms of usury, including unjustified enrichment, taking possession reciprocally, deferred payment and interest-based lending, as well as forms of sales and conditions that are used to circumvent [the prohibition against] usury.

However, there are several special laws, such as the Commercial Code, banking laws, the Postal Code and other laws that allowed usurious transactions, in particular usurious lending. In addition, the laws relating to Islamic banks sanctioned various forms of transactions that are no different than those performed by [regular] banks, except in that they deliberately concealed usury under various guises, the most well-known of which are *murabahah* [resale with a stated profit] sales, partnership ending in ownership and the contract for manufacture.

It is worth noting that the usurious transactions conducted by banks in our country the forms of usury practiced under the laws of the West. They engage in the most heinous forms of usury, including fraud and arbitrary conduct.

1. Most of the provision that permitted usury were not sufficiently explicit so as to allow the judiciary to hand down judgments.
2. Commercial courts have ruled in favour of compound interest, despite the fact that there is no provision that sanctions such interest. Their rulings have been based custom, although that custom contradicts the provisions of the sharia and peremptory laws.

β. Contrary to the situation in most countries, [our laws] did not set a maximum limit for the agreed upon interest. This means that it is permissible to agree upon any rate of interest, regardless of its percentage.

4. Regardless of the fact that there are no relevant legal provisions, but with the blessing of the commercial courts, banks, in addition to the crime of usury, engage in the following practices:

- They do not engage in any genuine investment activity. All they do is take deposits and use them to make interest-bearing loans.
- In addition, banks do not make real use of their funds. Their principal activity is commercial lending for investment in commercial papers.
- As a result, the customer, to the banks, is either a creditor or debtor. Their credit assessments are limited to collateral, capital and credit worthiness, without consideration for [text cut off].

5. Islamic banks are not supposed to offer interest-bearing loans. Instead, their business is based on sharing in profit and loss. Their profits are derived from investing the funds of both depositors and the bank in various sectors through mudarabah [silent partnership] contracts. However, all forms of Islamic financing have been skewed to such an extent, their activities are now almost identical to those of conventional banks. Indeed, their activities are now primarily centred on murabahah sales [resale with a stated profit].

إنفو جرافيك

لأبرز مشاريع الهيئة العامة للزكاة خلال عامين من إنشائها

9 مليار و745 مليون ريال
مشروع خصومات ألف أسرة
أسرة 620.000

417 مليون ريال
مشروع الحديقة
أسرة 41.000

5 مليار و254 مليون ريال
مشروع زكاة الفطر
أسرة 350.000

مشروع وثائق دفع يوم حصاده
80.000 أسرة
قدح 100.000

المساعدات المالية والتعليمية
46.000 حالة
ريال 777.000.000

كثافة الزيادة 5000 يوم
50.000.000 ريال شهرين
600.000.000 ريال سنويا

مشروع دعم دور الأيتام
31.000.000 ريال

كسوة العيد والشاة
50.000 مستفيد
544.000.000 ريال

مشروع الخطب الغدائية بمرکز الجرح الصحي
10.000 عذائية
160.000.000 ريال

الرعاية العامة للزكاة
GENERAL AUTHORITY OF ZAKAT

مشروع الفارمين
2.250.000.000 ريال

مشروع دعم أسر الشهداء وأسر المراجعين وأسر المبرورين والتفوقيين
3.900.000.000 ريال

مشروع دعم الجرحى
1.800.000.000 ريال

مشروع دعم البرر المحرومين
326.000.000 ريال

دعم الطلبة وطالب العلم والمرآكر الصلبة والسكان الجامعية
1.000.000.000 ريال

مشروع دعم المهنيين الخيرية والفران ومولد الحسنان
600.000.000 ريال

المساعدات الزوجية والعائرية والجتماعية
6.500 عريس وعروس
1 مليار و630 مليون ريال

المكفوفين والمعاقين ودوي اللجان الخاصة
5.157 شخص
100.000.000 ريال

الهعدات العلاجية
2.600 شخص
490.000.000 ريال

مشروع دعم المستشفيات العامة بالأجهزة الطبية
2.000.000.000 ريال

مشروع الخدمات الطبية
24000 مستفيد
12 مدينا طبيا

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Appendix A Unofficial Translation of Zakat Infographics

Infographic of the most key projects of the General Authority of Zakat during two years

انفوجرافيك أبرز مشاريع الهيئة العامة للزكاة خلال سنتين

مليار و 745 مليون ريال يمني 9 - YR 9 billion and 745 million

Project of 500, 000 families

مشروع 500 ألف أسرة

أسرة 620.000 - 620,000 families

مليون ريال 417 - YR417 million

Hodeidah Project

مشروع الحديدة

41,000 families - 41000 أسرة

Zakat Al Fitr Project

مشروع زكاة الفطر

Harvest Project

مشروع وجبة يوم جمعة

60,000 families - 60 ألف أسرة

100,000 Kedah (cups) - 100 ألف كوب

Orphans Guardianship: 5000 orphans

كافة الأيتام: 5000 طفل

YR 50 million per month - 50 مليون ريال شهريا

YR 600 million per month - 600 مليون ريال شهريا

Orphanage Support Project

مشروع دعم دور الأيتام

YR 31 million - 31 مليون ريال

Eid and Winter Clothing

كفيرة العيد والشتاء

50,000 beneficiaries - 50 ألف مستفيد

YR 544 million 544 مليون ريال

Food Baskets' Project for Quarantine Centers

مشروع الحقائب الغذائية لمراكز الحجر الصحي

10,000 food Baskets - 10 ألف حقيبة غذائية

YR160 million 160 مليون ريال

Emergency and Relief Aid

المساعدات الطارئة والإغاثة

46,000 cases - 46 حالة

YR 777 million - 777 مليون ريال

Medical Camps Project

مشروع المخيمات الطبية

24,000 beneficiaries - 24 ألف مستفيد

12 Medical Camps - 12 مخيم طبي

Project to support hospitals operating with medical devices

مشروع دعم المستشفيات العاملة بالأجهزة الطبية

YR 2 billion - 2 مليار ريال

Project of Debtors

مشروع الدائنين

YR 2 billion and 250 million - 2 مليار و250 مليون ريال

Project to support the families of the martyrs and the families of the war prisoners

مشروع دعم أسر الشهداء والأسرى والمعتقلين

YR 3 billion and 900 million - 3 مليار و900 مليون ريال

Medical Assistance

المساعدات الطبية

2,600 people - 2600 شخص

YR 490 million - 490 مليون ريال

Wounded Support Project

مشروع دعم الجرحى

One billion and 800 million

بillion و800 مليون ريال

Project to support the released prisoners

مشروع دعم الأسرى المحررين

YR 326 million - 326 مليون ريال

Supporting scholars, students, summer camps, and university campus

..... دعم العلماء والطلاب والطلبة والمراكز الصيفية

One billion

بillion ريال

Persons with psychosocial disabilities and persons with special needs

المعاقين والمعتلين وذوي الاحتياجات الخاصة

5157 persons - 5157 شخص

YR100 million - 100 مليون ريال

Marriage and Mass Weddings Assistance

المساعدات للزواج والاحتفالات الجماعية

Project to support charitable kitchens, **ovens** and charity tables

مشروع دعم المطابخ الخيرية والأفران وموائد الإحسان

YR600 million - 600 مليون ريال

Figure 22.2
Distribution cash to enemy prisoners

26/11/2022, 23:58

The inauguration of the distribution of cash and in-kind zakat to enemy prisoners at a cost of 150 million riyals – the General Authority for...

[Press here](#) To download the zakat declaration



< news < Home



The Inauguration Of The Distribution Of Cash And In-Kind Zakat To
Enemy Prisoners At A Cost Of 150 Million Riyals

<https://www.zakatyemen.net/2022/05/01/التدشين-توزيع-الزكاة-النقدية-والعينية-ل/>

1/4

26/11/2022, 23:58

The inauguration of the distribution of cash and in-kind zakat to enemy prisoners at a cost of 150 million riyals – the General Authority for...

Press here To download the zakat declaration

Zakat | Saba

The General Authority for Zakat, in coordination with the National Committee for Prisoners Affairs, launched today a project to distribute cash and in-kind zakat to enemy prisoners at a cost of 150 million riyals.

At the inauguration, the head of the General Authority for Zakat, Sheikh Shamsan Abu Nashtan, explained that the distribution of monetary and in-kind gifts to enemy prisoners in army prisons and popular committees comes in compliance with the Almighty's saying: "And they feed food out of love for it, the poor, the orphan, and the captive"

He pointed out that the projects directed at enemy prisoners embody the principles and greatness of Islam, which urges and recommends good for the prisoner, and reflects the morals, values and customs of the Yemeni people. The Yemeni people transcend their wounds, and the prisoners are treated with dignity

Abu Nashtan pointed out that the file of the prisoners is humanitarian, which requires that there be serious steps by the other side in response to the initiative launched by the revolutionary leadership and the Supreme Political Council to release all prisoners, all for all

For his part, the advisor to the President of the Supreme Political Council, Allama Muhammad Muftah, praised the Zakat Authority's initiative to aid the enemy's prisoners with a cash and in-kind project embodying the principles of the Islamic religion of respecting and caring for the prisoner

He said: "We hope that we do not have prisoners left and that our prisoners are released from the prisons of the enemy, because had it not been for our prisoners with the enemy, we would not have needed their prisoners to remain with us, but the enemy is the one who caused the suffering of everyone, especially the suffering of our prisoners, killing and torturing them in their prisons"

In turn, Ali al-Saqqaf, the representative of the Zakat Authority, indicated that the authority launched the project at a cost of 150 million riyals for all enemy prisoners, embodying the principles of Islam and delivering a message to the world in dealing with prisoners during wars

He stressed the authority's keenness to embody the culture of the Qur'an. He said, "The prisoner, whoever he is, has become a prisoner with rights and duties, despite the suffering of the prisoners of the army and the popular committees in the prisons of the enemy and his treatment and torture of them"

At the inauguration, in the presence of the two representatives of the Zakat Authority for the Resources Sector, Dr. Ali Al-Ahnoumi, and the Awareness and Rehabilitation Sector, Ahmed Majali, a member of the National Committee for Prisoners' Affairs, Ahmed Abu Hamra, confirmed that the prisoners' file is human and the affected are the families of the prisoners from both sides. As a human being and not to involve him in political files

<https://www.zakatyemen.net/2022/05/01/التدشين-توزيع-الزكاة-المقدية-والعينية-ل/>

2/4

26/11/2022, 23:58

The inauguration of the distribution of cash and in-kind zakat to enemy prisoners at a cost of 150 million riyals – the General Authority for...


<https://www.zakatyemen.net/2022/05/01/التدشين-توزيع-الزكاة-الغذائية-والعينية-ل->

3/4

Source: <https://www.zakatyemen.net/2022/05/02/>.

Figure 22.3

Distribution of cash gift to the wounded and war disabled

27/11/2022, 00:00

The General Authority for Zakat launches a project for distributing cash gifts to the wounded and the war-disabled – The General Authorit...

[Press here](#) To download the zakat declaration[news](#) [Home](#)

The General Authority For Zakat Launches A Project To Distribute Cash Gifts To The Wounded And War-Disabled

Zakat | Today, the General Authority for Zakat launched a project to distribute cash gifts to the wounded and war-disabled in hospitals and care centers in the capital Sana'a and the governorates, in coordination with the Wounded Foundation and the Yemen

<https://www.zakatyemen.net/2022/05/02/الهيئة العامة للزكاة تدشن مشروع توزيع>

1/3

27/11/2022, 00:00

The General Authority for Zakat launches a project for distributing cash gifts to the wounded and the war-disabled – The General Authorit...

Future Association for the Care and Rehabilitation of the Disabled, at a cost of 292 million and 330 thousand riyals, under the slogan "Loyalty to the People of Loyalty"

At the inauguration, the Undersecretary of the Zakat Authority, Ali Al-Saqqaf, the Undersecretary of the Resources Sector, Dr. Ali Al-Ahnoumi, the Secretary-General of the Future of Yemen Society, Eng. Cash and in-kind gifts

The visiting delegation of those in charge of the care centers listened to an explanation about the services and care provided to the wounded and the handicapped

During the inauguration, the representative of the commission, Ali al-Saqqaf, confirmed that the project, which targets the most important segment, namely the wounded and the war-disabled on the blessed Eid al-Fitr, is a continuation of the activities of the Ramadan Zakat Authority as a duty for the Zakat Authority and the state to take care of this segment and exchange loyalty with loyalty

He emphasized the keenness of the Zakat Authority to support the Foundation for the Wounded and the Society for the Future of Yemen in their tasks and obligations towards the wounded and the war-disabled and other stationed and the families of the great martyrs as a translation of the directives of the revolutionary and political leadership

For his part, the Undersecretary of the Resources Sector, Dr. Ali Al-Ahnoumi, pointed out the importance of the project, which targets the wounded, the war-disabled, and the living martyrs, which comes in implementation of the directives of the Leader of the Revolution, Mr. Abdul-Malik Badr Al-Din Al-Houthi, and the President of the Political Council, His Excellency Field Marshal Mahdi Al-Mashat

He emphasized that the wounded, with their great sacrifices and their remains, achieved steadfastness and great victory. He pointed out that whatever is presented and will be presented to this important and great segment, it will not fulfill their right

بدوره أوضح الأمين العام لجمعية مستقبل اليمن، بندر الحمزي، أن هيئة الزكاة قدمت هدايا مالية لأكثر من 7 آلاف معاق وكسوة أبناء ألفين و 134 أسرة من أسر المعاقين وكذا هدايا نقدية للمرضى من الحالات النفسية لأكثر من ألف و 500 حالة إلى جانب العديد من المشاريع التي كان لها الأثر الإيجابي.

وثن دور هيئة الزكاة لاهتمامها بجميع فئات المجتمع والتي تعتبر نموذجا رائداً يتخذى به وأصبحت الملجأ للفقراء والمساكين والمحتاجين وحطمت أهداف العدوان الذي سعى لتأجيج الوضع الإنساني.

وأكد سعي الجمعية إلى تنفيذ مشاريع في مجال التمكين الاقتصادي والزراعي كون هناك نماذج رائدة لم تمنعهم الإعاقة من الإبداع والمنافسة وأن يصبحوا قدوة كما كانوا نموذج وقدوة في التضحية والدفاع عن الوطن.

فيما أشار المدير التنفيذي لمؤسسة الجرحى، علي الضحاني، إلى أن مشروع توزيع الهدايا النقدية للجرحى الأوفياء في المستشفيات ومراكز الرعاية بالأمانة والمحافظات لأكثر من ألف و 200 جريح يأتي ضمن برامج تحسين رعاية الجرحى يتمويل هيئة الزكاة بقيمة 31 مليون و 875 ألف ريال.

بدورهم ثمن الجرحى ومعاقى الحرب هذه الزيارة الكريمة لهيئة الزكاة والتي تدل على اهتمام القيادة الثورية والسياسية وقيادة الهيئة بجرحى الجيش واللاجان الشعبية .. مؤكدين عزمهم مواصلة الذود عن حياض الوطن وأمنه واستقراره وسيادته واستقلاله .

الهيئة العامة للزكاة -مشاريع توزيع/ 2022/05/02/ <https://www.zakatyemen.net>

2/3

27/11/2022, 00:00

The General Authority for Zakat launches a project for distributing cash gifts to the wounded and the war-disabled – The General Authorit...

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Website Design: IT Zakat Team

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Source: <https://www.zakatyemen.net/2022/05/02/>.

Annex 23 Tax on Hospitals

Ministry Of Finance
Capital Tax Office

وزارة المالية / مصلحة الضرائب
مكتب ضرائب أمانة العاصمة
إدارة الخصم والإضافة لضرائب الدخل

تكاليف إداري (لمدة اسبوعين)

الأخ / حسين محمد عباس
الأخ / محمد ياسين الشافط

بعد التعمية: ١١

تنفيذاً لأحكام قانون ضرائب الدخل رقم (١٧) لسنة ٢٠١٠م والأختة التنفيذية الصادرة بموجب قرار وزير المالية رقم (٥٠٨) لسنة ٢٠١٠م وتنفيذاً لقرار وزير المالية رقم (٢٣) لسنة ٢٠١٧م بشأن تعديل جداول نظام الخصم والإضافة تحت حساب ضرائب الدخل (نظام الخصم والإضافة) تقرر تكليفكم بالتزول إلى المنشآت التالية:

| | | | |
|---|-----------------------------|----|--------------------------|
| ١ | مستشفى الأم | ٨ | المستشفى اليمني الفرنسي |
| ٢ | المستشفى اليمني الألماني | ٩ | مستشفى عز الدين الشيباني |
| ٣ | المستشفى الاستشاري | ١٠ | المستشفى الأهلي |
| ٤ | مستشفى المودة | ١١ | مستشفى المدينة |
| ٥ | المستشفى الأوروبي | ١٢ | المستشفى الألماني الحديث |
| ٦ | مستشفى الدكتور هاشم العراقي | ١٣ | مستشفى الوسام |
| ٧ | مستشفى لبنان | - | --- |

وتلك لتابعة مدة تنفيذ وتطبيق قرار وزير المالية رقم ٢٣ لسنة ٢٠١٧م للبلد التالية:

- ١- خصم الضريبة بنسبة (٤%) عن كل عملية يجريها المستشفى عند استدعاء أي دكتور من خارج كادر المستشفى إذا كان يوجد لديه رقم ضريبي أو بنسبة ١٥% في حالة عدم وجود رقم ضريبي لديه تنفيذاً لتوجيهات رئاسة المصلحة رقم (٤٦١٥) بتاريخ ٢٤ / ١١ / ٢٠١٩م وتنفيذاً لنص البند رقم (٣٠) من قرار وزير المالية ألف الذكر.
- ٢- خصم الضريبة بنسبة (٤%) عن أي عملية يجريها أي دكتور بموعدة ولو كان من كادر المستشفى ولديه رقم ضريبي أو بنسبة ١٥% في حالة عدم وجود رقم ضريبي لديه تنفيذاً لتوجيهات رئاسة المصلحة رقم (٤٦١٥) بتاريخ ٢٤ / ١١ / ٢٠١٩م وتنفيذاً لنص البند رقم (٣٠) من قرار وزير المالية ألف الذكر، وتجدر الإشارة إلى أن نسبة الخصم سابقة الذكر تتم على أي مبلغ مستحق للطبيب الذي قام بإجراء العملية وإنما المستشفى يقوم بدور الوسيط في عملية خصم وتوريدها تنفيذاً لقرار وزير المالية رقم (٢٣) لسنة ٢٠١٧م كون المستشفيات من الجهات الملزمة بتنفيذ القرار.

تقرر تكليفكم بالتزول إلى المكلفين المذكورين أعلاه للقيام بالآتي:

- التحري والتأكد من مدى تنفيذ وتطبيق قرار وزير المالية وجمع أي بيانات أو المعلومات للمكلفين أعلاه.
- الاطلاع على النظام الآلي المحاسبي الخاص بالمستشفى وسحب كشوفات رسمية معدة من قبل المستشفى من واقع النظام.
- ارفع إلينا بما تم التوصل إليه ونحملكم مسؤولية التقصير والتهاون في عملكم.
- عمل المحاضر والإجراءات اللازمة (محضر موافقة- رفض- غيرها)
- مع إلغاء أي تكليف سابق.

وتقبلوا تحياتنا...!!

مدير إدارة الخصم والإضافة
عبدالله المنقذ

مراجعة الإدارة
عبد السلام حسين طاهر

مكتب ضرائب أمانة العاصمة
مكتب ضرائب أمانة العاصمة

Source: Confidential

Appendix A Unofficial Translation of the order for tax on Hospitals

Administrative assignment (for two weeks)

Mr/ Hussein Muhammad ~~Abbad~~

Mr/ Muhammad Yassin

After greeting

In implementation of the provisions of the Income Tax Law No. (17) of 2010 and its executive regulations issued pursuant to the Minister of Finance's Decision No. (508) of 2010 AD, and in implementation of the Minister of Finance's Decision No. (23) of 2017 AD regarding amending the schedules of the deduction and addition system under the income tax account (the deduction and addition system) Therefore, it was decided to assign you to the following facilities:

1. Mother's hospital
2. Yemeni German Hospital
3. Consulting Hospital
4. Al Mawaddah Hospital
5. European hospital
6. Dr. Hashem Al-Iraqi Hospital
7. Lebanon Hospital
8. Yemeni French Hospital
9. Izz al-Din al-Shaibani Hospital
10. Al-Ahly Hospital
11. City hospital
12. Modern German Hospital
13. Wissam Hospital

This is to follow up the period of implementation and application of the Minister of Finance's Decision No. 23 of 2017 AD for the following items:

1. Tax deduction by (4%) for each operation conducted by the hospital when summoning or hosting any doctor from outside the hospital staff if he has a tax number, or by 15% in the event that he does not have a tax number himself, according to the directives of the Presidency of the Authority No. (4615) dated 11/24/2019 AD and in implementation of the text of Clause No. (30) of the aforementioned Minister's decision.

2. Tax deduction at the rate of (4%) for any operation performed by any doctor with a commission, even if he is a hospital staff member and has a tax number, or by 15% in the event that he does not have a tax number, in implementation of the directives of the Presidency of the Tax Authority No. (4615) dated 11/24/2019 and implementation For the text of Clause No. (30) of the aforementioned decision of the Minister of Finance, and it should be noted that the aforementioned deduction is based on any amount due to the doctor

who performed the operation, but the hospital plays the role of mediator in the deduction and supply process in implementation of the decision of the Minister of Finance No. (23) of 2017 And the fact that hospitals are obligated to implement the decision.

It was decided to assign you to go to the above-mentioned taxpayers to do the following:

- Investigating and ascertaining the extent to which the decision of the Minister of Finance is implemented and collecting any data or information for the above-mentioned taxpayers.
- View the hospital's automated accounting system and withdraw official statements approved by the hospital from the reality of the system.
- Upload to us what has been reached, and we hold you responsible for negligence and negligence in your work.
- Making the necessary records and procedures (records of approval, refusal, etc.).
- With the cancellation of any previous assignment.

And accept our greetings

Management references

Mahdi Al-Suwaidi

Director of the Discount and Addition Department,

Abdul Salam Hussein Taher

Deputy for Executive Affairs

Abdullah the rescuer

Director General of the Capital Municipality Tax Office

Samir Abdel Hamid Al-Hijri

Annex 24 Telecom Sector

1. The telecommunications industry in Yemen has been a major source of revenue for the Houthis since the conflict started (paragraph 84 of [S/2022/50](#)).

2. After taking over the ownership and control over some of these Sana'a-based private telecom companies, the Houthi authorities use some part of the revenues from these companies for their war efforts. The Panel has received information that two Sana'a-based telecom companies, operating under the control of the Houthi authorities, have recently upgraded their systems, and have made available 4G services to the subscribers across Yemen. This will help these companies to potentially increase their subscriber base and revenue earnings as well.

3. The Panel has received information that the Houthis are using the telecom services in sending millions of messages to the subscribers soliciting support and financial contributions for their war efforts (fig. 23.1 to fig. 23.3).

Figure 24.1

Message soliciting support



Source: Confidential

Appendix A Unofficial translation of Messages soliciting support


180

Text

Mon, Jan 31, 11:31 AM

To support strategic choices
(Forces, Missile and Air Force)
Call 180

Figure 24.2
Messages soliciting support



Source: Confidential sources and “Telecommunication: A Tool of War”, Fifth Report of Regain Yemen, <https://www.regainye.org/2022/06/30/regain-yemen-issues-its-fifth-report-telecommunication-is-a-tool-of-war/>.

Figure 24.3

Unofficial translations of some other messages received by the Panel

5555

Thurs, 16 Dec 2021, 8.02 PM

To contribute for supporting the families of the martyrs

Call or text 5555 for 100 riyals

2121

Thurs, 4 Mar 2021, 2.09 PM

9 pm Download tweets to relieve the suffering of the Yemeni patients

Fri, 26 Mar 2021, 6.15 PM

9:00 PM Participate in the widest possible campaign of tweets on the #National Day of Resilience

Sun, 12 Dec 2021, 5.31 PM

To donate for the war effort, send or call 2121 for 100 Riyals

Wed, 9 Feb 2022 11.15 PM

To donate for the war effort, send or call 2121 for 100 Riyals

4545

Tue, 7 Dec 2021, 3.23 PM

To contribute the stability of the posted (army) for supporting their families, send 100 Riyals to 4545

Sat, 8 Jan 2022, 5.10 PM

To contribute the stability of the posted (army) for supporting their families, send 100 Riyals to 4545

Sat, 5 Feb 2022, 8.18 PM

To contribute the stability of the posted (army) for supporting their families, send 100 Riyals to 4545

Thurs, 17 Feb 2022, 2.30 AM

To contribute the stability of the posted (army) for supporting their families, send 100 Riyals to 4545

Sun, 20 Mar 2022, 3.55 PM

To contribute the stability of the posted (army) for supporting their families, send 100 Riyals to 4545

Source: Confidential

4. Further, the Houthi authorities have issued directions to some of the telecom companies vide Ref. No. 3848 dated 4 June 2022 to allocate and deposit one per cent of telecommunications bills (landline, mobile, international, internet) and prepaid cards in the account of the Fund for the Welfare of Martyrs' Families, in terms of Decree No. 22 (2022), and article 13 of the Welfare of Martyrs' Families Act (No. 2 of 2022) (Fig 23.4).

Figure 24.4

Directions to telecom companies to deposit one per cent of telecommunications bills**Source:** Confidential

Appendix B Unofficial translation of Directions to deposit one per cent of telecom bills

Republic of Yemen

Ministry of Telecommunications and
Information Technology

The Minister

Date: 5 Dhu'lqa'dah A.H. 1443

Annex:

Ref.: 3848

Date: 4 June A.D. 2022

To: Chief Executive Officer of Sabafon
Chief Executive Officer of the Yemen Oman United telecommunications company
Chief Executive Officer of Yemen Mobile
Chair of the General Holding Company for Real Estate Development

Sirs,

Subject: Allocation of 1 per cent of telecommunications bills and prepaid cards for the Fund for the Welfare of
Martyrs' Families

The Ministry of Telecommunications and Information Technology presents its best compliments and wishes you success in your work.

With regard to the aforementioned subject, I should like to draw your attention to communication No. 43-11 of 28 Shawwal A.H. 1443 (29 May A.D. 2022) from the Chair of the Board of Directors of the General Authority for the Welfare of Martyrs' Families concerning the Welfare of Martyrs' Families Act (No. 2 of 2022) and its implementing regulations, which were promulgated by Presidential Decree No. 22 (2022) (copy attached), as well as article 13, paragraph 6, of that Act, which provides that the resources of the Fund shall consist of 1 per cent of all telecommunications bills (landline, mobile, international, Internet) and prepaid cards.

Accordingly, the Ministry calls upon you to implement the Act and divert the required percentage to the account of the Fund for the Welfare of Martyrs' Families.

Accept, Sirs, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Musfir Abdullah al-Namir

Minister of Telecommunications and Information Technology

5. The GoY informed the Panel that they have seized many telecom equipment consignments, which were being smuggled into Yemen without obtaining a licence or approval from the GoY's Ministry of Telecommunications and Information Technology. The Panel has been informed by its sources that some of the Sana'a-based telecom companies have recently changed their mode of procurement of equipment. Instead of directly importing the equipment, they have started buying equipment through some approved list of suppliers, who smuggle the equipment mostly through land borders in the GoY-controlled areas and then transfer the same to Sana'a. This modus operandi is being adopted to avoid being directly implicated in any case of smuggling when any consignment is seized by the Customs authorities of the GoY. The Panel has received information that such shipments regularly reach the Houthi-controlled telecom companies through smuggling networks.

6. Following the takeover of telecom companies by the Houthis, new telecom companies were established in Aden. The telecom sector, like the banking sector, has also been divided between the GoY and the Houthi-controlled areas. The Houthis, however, exercise complete control over the internet in Yemen through the national top-level domain, ".ye" (paragraph 85 of [S/2022/50](#)). The Panel has been informed that since the telecom industry is growing very fast, from a purely financial perspective, the Houthis have been putting up numerous obstacles for the operations, capacity expansion and technological upgradation of the Aden-based telecom companies, who are considered as competitors to the telecom companies operating in territories under the control of the Houthis. In order to continue its monopolistic market share in entire Yemen, Houthis do not allow the growth of its rival telecom companies based in Aden. The Panel has received information from multiple sources about the destruction of the telecom assets (towers and cables) of Sabafon, an Aden-based private telecom company.

7. During its visit to Aden, the Panel received information that in November 2021, two important telecom link sites of the Aden-based Sabafon company at Al-Balaq and Al-Hudbaa stations in Ma'rib Governorate were allegedly attacked by missiles launched by the Houthi forces. The sites connected the Sabafon network to their

main data centre in Aden. It was alleged that as a result of these attacks, the sites were severely damaged (see fig. 23.6), and Sabafon customers lost all network connectivity for several weeks until Sabafon restored the service. Further, on 11 May 2022, the Houthis allegedly attacked another Sabafon telecom link site at Al-Sabayhah. As a result of the attack, the communication tower collapsed (see fig. 23.6). Since this was an important link site connecting Ta'izz City with the Sabafon network, customers of Sabafon in the area have lost network connectivity. The Panel has written to the Houthis about these attacks, and their reply is pending.

Figure 24.5


Location of the Sabafon Site

Figure 24.6

Damaged Sabafon Site

A photograph showing the interior of a collapsed structure, likely a tunnel or underground facility. Debris is scattered on the floor, and a large, curved, metallic structure is visible in the foreground. A yellow container and a red circular object are also present.

8. Telecommunication services are critical for the day-to-day socioeconomic requirements of everyone, and any measures taken in this respect should not result in any adverse consequences for the civilian population.

Annex 25 Income from Oil and Oil Derivatives


1. The Hudaydah port, through which up to 48 percent of oil was imported prior to June 2019, saw only 8 percent of oil imports in the first quarter of 2021. There were complaints regarding shortage of fuel, arising out of alleged oil embargo by the GoY. The requirements of customers in Houthi-controlled areas were met by bringing oil from GoY-controlled ports overland across the front lines. The Houthis were also collecting customs revenue again, apart from other taxes, and illegal fees at their checkpoints. However, with the announcement of the truce in April 2022, significant quantities of oil imports have been allowed through Hudaydah port again (table 24.1 below). Although the Houthis did not renew the truce after 2 October 2022, and have been attacking the oil terminals, ports and vessels, the GoY sources informed the Panel that they did not have any proposal to re-impose any embargo on the import of fuel through the Hudaydah port.

Figure 25.1

Fuel discharged at Hudaydah and Saleef Ports (January 2021 to November 2022)

| Fuel discharged in Hodeidah and Saleef ports of Yemen (January 2021 to November 2022) | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|-------|-------------|--------------|--------------|---------------------|-----------------------------------|----------|-----------------------|-----------|-------------------|
| Year | Month | Gas Oil (t) | Gasoline (t) | Fuel Oil (t) | Gasoline 92 Ron (t) | LPG (Liquefied Petroleum Gas) (t) | Coal (t) | Gasoline Unleaded (t) | Total (t) | Number of Vessels |
| 2021 | Jan | 28,061 | - | 29,992 | - | 8,501 | - | 14,299 | 80,854 | 4 |
| 2021 | Feb | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 2021 | Mar | 33,309 | - | - | - | 5,001 | - | - | 38,309 | 3 |
| 2021 | Apr | 49,078 | - | 22,702 | - | 11,809 | - | - | 83,589 | 5 |
| 2021 | May | 11,799 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 11,799 | 2 |
| 2021 | Jun | 28,378 | 27,893 | 23,960 | - | 8,458 | - | - | 88,689 | 4 |
| 2021 | Jul | 33,466 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 33,466 | 2 |
| 2021 | Aug | - | - | 14,286 | - | - | - | - | 14,286 | 1 |
| 2021 | Sep | 3,130 | - | - | - | - | 47,880 | - | 51,010 | 2 |
| 2021 | Oct | 40,920 | - | - | 29,979 | 17,305 | - | - | 88,204 | 4 |
| 2021 | Nov | 3,540 | - | 11,777 | - | - | - | - | 15,317 | 2 |
| 2021 | Dec | 29,546 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 29,546 | 1 |
| 2022 | Jan | 23,416 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 23,416 | 2 |
| 2022 | Feb | 21,282 | 29,480 | - | - | - | - | - | 50,762 | 2 |
| 2022 | Mar | 4,223 | - | 30,057 | - | 9,488 | - | - | 43,767 | 3 |
| 2022 | Apr | 49,974 | 64,631 | 24,189 | 32,528 | - | - | - | 1,71,323 | 6 |
| 2022 | May | 1,22,019 | 27,590 | - | 58,048 | 8,242 | - | - | 2,15,900 | 8 |
| 2022 | Jun | 87,350 | 90,272 | - | - | 8,232 | - | 30,149 | 2,16,003 | 8 |
| 2022 | Jul | 57,735 | 55,689 | 7,460 | - | 33,630 | - | - | 1,54,514 | 6 |
| 2022 | Aug | 1,15,954 | 1,18,746 | - | - | 8,295 | - | - | 2,42,994 | 9 |
| 2022 | Sep | 1,71,197 | 1,17,162 | 29,457 | - | 9,333 | - | - | 3,27,148 | 15 |
| 2022 | Oct | 1,49,078 | 88,473 | 29,987 | - | - | - | - | 2,67,538 | 9 |
| 2022 | Nov | 1,18,417 | 57,412 | - | - | 9,249 | - | 30,000 | 2,15,078 | 8 |
| Total | | 11,81,871 | 6,77,348 | 2,23,868 | 1,20,555 | 1,37,542 | 47,880 | 74,448 | 24,63,510 | 106 |

Source: UNVIM



Source: Panel based on UNVIM data

2. The Houthis often complain that the clearance process takes too long, adding to the cost of freight, insurance, and demurrage.²¹ However, information received by the Panel shows that the average time required for UNVIM's pre-clearance ranged between 3 to 24 hours during the period from January to November 2022; in the month of November, the minimum processing time was one hour and the average was just three hours (table 24.2 below). On the other hand, the average time spent at the CHA ranges between 4.9 to 50.3 days and in some cases the minimum time has been half a day and the maximum 167 days. Since the announcement of the truce, the waiting time in the CHA has been significantly reduced. Even in October 2022, when truce had just ended, both the minimum and average time spent at the CHA came down to half a day and 4.9 days respectively, and in November, the average time was 5.3 days (table 24.3 below). The reasons for those waiting times include delays in obtaining the necessary clearances from the Coalition, as well as various other factors, including capacity constraints at the ports.

Table 25.2

Pre-Clearance Processing Time taken by UNVIM (January to November 2022)

| <i>Time Taken by UNVIM to Clear Vessels (hours)</i> | | | |
|---|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| <i>Month</i> | <i>Minimum</i> | <i>Maximum</i> | <i>Average</i> |
| Jan | 1 | 65 | 17 |
| Feb | 4 | 25 | 12 |
| Mar | 4 | 74 | 13 |
| Apr | 1 | 30 | 8 |
| May | 1 | 25 | 11 |
| Jun | 1 | 52 | 10 |
| Jul | 1 | 30 | 8 |
| Aug | 1 | 50 | 18 |
| Sep | 1 | 146 | 6 |
| Oct | 1 | 77 | 24 |
| Nov | 1 | 36 | 3 |

Source: UNVIM

Table 25.3

Post-Clearance Time taken at CHA (January to November 2022)

| <i>Fuel Vessels Time Spent in CHA (Days)</i> | | | |
|--|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| <i>Month</i> | <i>Minimum</i> | <i>Maximum</i> | <i>Average</i> |
| Jan | 2.4 | 167.0 | 45.2 |
| Feb | 20.2 | 69.3 | 50.3 |
| Mar | 2.7 | 88.7 | 37.4 |
| Apr | 2.0 | 31.9 | 22.1 |
| May | 0.9 | 23.0 | 9.0 |
| Jun | 1.5 | 19.5 | 6.0 |
| Jul | 2.9 | 17.5 | 10.0 |
| Aug | 1.8 | 22.1 | 8.2 |
| Sep | 1.5 | 10.1 | 8.9 |
| Oct | 0.5 | 17.5 | 4.9 |
| Nov | 1.8 | 10.1 | 5.3 |

Source: UNVIM

²¹ Charges paid for delays in loading or discharging cargo within the stipulated time.

3. Although oil shipments were allowed to arrive at Hudaydah to tide over the shortage of fuel in Houthi-controlled areas, the Houthis seized the opportunity to make money. GoY informed the Panel that under the Stockholm Agreement, the Houthis were to collect customs duties on the import of oil through the Hudaydah port on the condition that they would be paying salaries of public employees. However, the Panel has been informed that no salaries have been paid so far. Thus, apart from the customs duties collected by the Houthis, the unjustified hike in the prices of fuel has added to their financial resources. The customs authorities in Aden have calculated the loss of customs revenue for the GoY to approximate YR 271.935 billion for the period between April to November 2022. This loss to GoY equates to a corresponding gain by the Houthis during this period, as the said amount is not being spent for paying salary to the public service employees.

4. The Panel mentioned in paragraph 88 of its final report of 2021 ([S/2022/50](#)), how the Houthis had created an artificial scarcity of fuel in areas under their control in order to force traders to sell oil in the black market operated by them and collected illegal fees from such sales. As per the information received by the Panel, petrol was being sold in the black market in the range of YR 18,000 – 26,000 per 20 litres, depending on the shortage. Figure 24.1 below demonstrates how oil was being sold openly and illegally through local traders and makeshift petrol bunks. Panel has been further informed by its sources that when fresh shipments are expected, in order to create space in its warehouses in Hudaydah and Sana'a, Houthis make announcements about the closure of the outlets of the Sana'a-based Yemen Petroleum Company (YPC) citing shortage of fuel as the reason, leading to panic buying of petrol. A few outlets of YPC remain open for a limited time. The black markets, controlled by the Houthis, resurface and the petrol prices suddenly go up. It serves twin purpose; space is created in the warehouses for the fresh shipments to be stored, and the Houthis collect illegal profits by selling fuel through the black market. The Panel has been informed that black markets were operating in full swing for a limited period in July and again in September 2022, selling petrol at prices ranging between YR 22000-24000 per 20-litre cans.

Figure 25.1

Illegal makeshift fuel pumps in Sana'a



Source: Confidential

Annex 26 Confiscation of land and other properties

1. Real estate is another sector that generates huge amount of revenues for the Houthis. The Panel received information that the Houthis forcibly confiscated large swathes of land and buildings in Tihama and other regions under their control. Information received by the Panel revealed that Houthi forces had assigned some of its members to the village mosques to deliver Friday sermons to persuade citizens to give up their lands. On 30 August 2022, the Houthi forces began a campaign to force the citizens, with threats and intimidation, to sign documents that they were not the owners of the land that they were cultivating and to voluntarily surrender their rights in favour of the state. It was alleged that one supervisor in the southern area (Zubaid, Beit Al-Faqih and Al-Jarrahi districts) had summoned the legal secretaries (“Amin Sharaai”) and instructed them to hand over the land agreements/ownership deeds that were in their possession. On 9 September 2022, the Houthi forces went to these villages in about 30 military vehicles, along with bulldozers and tractors, fired shots, indiscriminately, and beat women with rifle butts, injuring several of them from the villages of Al-Khodarya, Al-Maarif and Bani Al-Sabahi in the Al-Qasra area and arrested about 76 citizens, who were put in the prisons. The Panel has received the names of three women who were beaten up as well as the names of 15 persons who have been arrested. The Panel has also received the names and contact details of 27 victims and eyewitnesses and interviewed a few of them. However, the Panel could not personally contact all of them as they fear that they would be killed if they reveal anything to the Panel. The Houthis allegedly used forces and took possession of their lands, removed all recognized boundary markers, created new subdivisions, and dug several artesian wells on the plundered land. On 28 September 2022, the Houthi leaders summoned many sheikhs from the Al-Qasra region to Sana’a to force them to persuade the citizens to hand over their lands. However, the Panel met some sheikhs but could not personally contact the persons, who were later released after signing the documents disowning their rights over their lands. The Panel was informed that they were afraid to come out in the open to reveal anything against the Houthis.

2. The Panel received a copy of the investigation report written by the Director of Beit al-Faqih and Tuhayta districts; held discussions with the GoY-appointed Governor of Hudaydah; and interviewed local officials during its visit to Aden. It also interviewed victims and their relatives living in Aden and Cairo. They produced documents claiming ownership over or inheritance of confiscated lands, photographs, and videos of the incidents and their imprisonment. The Panel, however, cannot independently verify the authenticity of the same. A letter has been sent to the Houthis about the incident and their response is awaited.

3. As per information received by the Panel, in September 2022, the Houthi forces confiscated about 10 square kilometres of land belonging to about 5,000 farmers in the Tihama region, especially in some districts of Hudaydah Governorate (Beit al-Faqih, Al-Tahita and Al-Zaydiya).

4. As per GoY, the Houthis have confiscated about 3,000 ma’ads of land (one ma’ad is 4,248 sq.ms), valued at approximately YR 15 billion in Al-Qasra area of Beit al-Faqih district. The Panel also received information that the Houthis seized vast lands in Al-Tuhaita district of Hudaydah Governorate on the pretext that these were ‘Awqaf’ (endowment) lands, despite claims of ownership by local citizens. The area of plundered land is estimated to be about 16,000 ma’ads, valued at YR 80 billion. There are further reports of seizure of lands and buildings in other areas, resulting in the eviction of hundreds of civilian families and loss of their livelihoods.

Figure 26.1
Confiscation of land



Source: Confidential

5. Information received from various sources including some of the relatives of the victims revealed that under the supervision of eight Houthi leaders,²² citizens' lands in the Al-Qasra area were forcibly confiscated.

6. There are further reports of seizure of lands and buildings in the following areas, resulting in the displacement and eviction of hundreds of civilian families and the loss of their livelihoods and homes:

- a) South of the capital of Tuhaita district in the Al-Suwaiq area (one citizen is reported to have suffered a stroke when he learned that his property had been plundered);
- b) On 4 June 2022, land was seized in Manthar district;
- c) Several villages in Al-Hussainiya and Al-Juruba districts, in Attoor, and in al Qasra areas;
- d) Bani Matar area, west of Sana'a, Wadi al-Ja'ab, Bait Nama, Wadi al-Masjid and Bani Hatim in the same district.²³

7. The Panel has received information that the Houthi forces have taken over certain lands which were earlier given to the defence forces on ownership basis, and have imposed restrictions on any sale, purchase, transfer, or construction thereon. For this purpose, a committee has been set up under one Judge²⁴ to undertake survey of defence land and then to utilise them for setting up different projects, and for other commercial investments so that the profits can be utilised for military purposes. A few such instances have been brought to the notice of the Panel:

- a) Land on the western side of the West Coast Road from Hudaydah to Aden, without permission from the security and intelligence offices.
- b) In the city of Sawan in Sana'a (about 7041 plots of land and 800 housing units). The Panel has received information that the residents of the city of Sawan in Sana'a are demanding the lifting of the siege on their properties comprising 7,041 plots, and about 800 housing units that belonged to about 5,000 people; cessation of attacks by the Houthi forces; and lifting of the armed force of the Houthi leader,²⁵ who is trying to control thousands of homes.

²² The names of these persons are with the Panel but the same are not being disclosed pending further verification.

²³ The name of the leader under whose supervision the land was confiscated is with the Panel but the same is not being disclosed pending further verification.

²⁴ The name of the person is with the Panel but the same is not being disclosed pending further verification.

²⁵ The name of the person is with the Panel but the same is not being disclosed pending further verification.

Annex 27 Letter imposing restrictions on land

Figure 27.1

Letter imposing restrictions on land



Source:

Confidential

Appendix A Unofficial Translation of the letter imposing restrictions on land

Brothers / legal secretaries of the Directorate of Sanhan and Bani Bahloul

Gentlemen

Peace, mercy and blessings of God

In implementation of the directives of the leadership of the Sana'a Governorate in the memorandum No. (1749) and dated 15.02.1443 AH regarding the sale and purchase of real estate except after referring to the competent authority in the governorate (security and intelligence)

Therefore:

It is forbidden to buy and sell real estate except after referring to the competent authority in Sana'a Governorate (Security and Intelligence).

sent for execution

Please accept our sincere greetings

Date 19 October 2021

Annex 28 Smuggling of Drugs and Other Items as a source of funding for the Houthis

1. The Panel has been investigating cases of smuggling of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and other items to ascertain whether the designated individuals are directly or indirectly involved to generate funds for potential use in their war efforts.

2. The Panel received information about increasing incidents of smuggling and trafficking of narcotic drugs in Yemen and seizure of some consignments by the authorities and unconfirmed reports about the involvement of Houthis.²⁶ In one case, 250 kilograms (kgs) of cocaine were found concealed in a sea container carrying sugar consignments and was seized by the authorities at the Aden port. In another case, 201 kgs of cocaine were found in similar consignments of sugar imported by the same importer and shipped from the same country Brazil. During discussions with the investigating officials, the Panel was informed about the linkage of these consignments with Hezbollah in Lebanon, and with the Houthis. The Panel is investigating these cases.

3. During its visit to Riyadh, the Panel was informed about seizures of narcotic drugs and other items by the KSA authorities at the borders, especially at Al Wadiah, Al Khadra, Alb, Al Twal, and Jizan Port. The KSA authorities stated that the trafficking and smuggling of these consignments are being aided and abetted by the Houthis as a means of generating funds for their war activities. The Panel was informed that smuggling has become a major business for the Houthis and the Raqqo market in Munabbih district in the north-western part of Saa'da Governorate in the Bani Ayyash tribe area is the starting point for smuggling and infiltrating into KSA. This market is a hub for selling weapons and drugs of all kinds by unknown Ethiopian migrants, and Yemenis. It has several rest houses, money exchange, and money transfer shops.

Table 28.1

Information on Seizure of smuggled items across the Saudi-Yemeni borders during the period (1 January 2016) to 10 October 2022)

| <i>Seizures</i> | <i>Quantity</i> |
|--------------------------------|-----------------|
| Cannabis (Hashish) in Kgs | 128,022,988 |
| Catha edulis (Khat/Qat) in Kgs | 11,526,749 |
| Prohibited medical drugs | 4,166,513 |
| Drugs | 1,936,074 |
| Heroin in Kgs | 42 |
| Methamphetamine in Kgs | 11,369 |
| Alcohol in Bottles | 81 |
| Alcohol in Litres | 34,903 |
| Other Intoxicants in Litres | 2,415 |
| Other Intoxicants | 27,216 |
| Cigarettes in Kgs | 682,902 |
| Chewing tobacco in Kgs | 230,426 |
| Betel chewing in Kgs | 358,836 |
| Cattle in Numbers | 235,627 |

²⁶ https://almashareq.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_am/features/2022/03/22/feature-01.

Table 28.2

Items seized at Saudi borders (Al Wadiah, Al Khadra, Alb, Al Twal, and Jizan Port) from 2015 to 2022

| <i>Seized Items</i> | <i>Quantity Seized in 2015-2019</i> | <i>Quantity Seized in 2020</i> | <i>Quantity Seized in 2021</i> | <i>Quantity Seized in 2022</i> |
|---------------------------------|---|--|--|--|
| Narcotics Pills (In Numbers) | 580,686 | 9,884 | 105,986 | 3,874,844 |
| Drugs (in MTs) | 3011.33 | 29,053.85 | 39,778.24 | 65,517.25 |

Table 28.3

Items seized in the Jizan maritime region from 9 September 2021 to 10 October 2022

| <i>No</i> | <i>Date of seizure</i> | <i>Location</i> | <i>Coordinates</i> | <i>Seized item</i> | <i>Quantity</i> |
|-----------|----------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------|----------------------|-----------------|
| 1 | 21/08/2021 | Jazan Port | 16 53 39 42 32 23 | Captagon drug | 130,530 pills |
| 2 | 26/09/2021 | Jazan Port | 16 53 39 42 32 23 | Paan (Betel Chewing) | 12 Kgs. |
| 3 | 27/10/2021 | Jazan Port | 16 53 39 42 32 23 | Qat | 3,120 Kgs. |
| 4 | 31/10/2021 | Jazan Port | 16 53 39 42 32 23 | Qat | 5,600 Kgs. |
| 5 | 18/02/2022 | Jazan Port | 16 53 39 42 32 23 | Qat | 800 grams |
| 6 | 24/02/2022 | Jazan Port | 16 53 39 42 32 23 | Qat | 1,380 Kgs. |
| 7 | 12/03/2022 | Jazan Port | 16 53 39 42 32 23 | Qat | 3,240 Kgs. |
| 8 | 20/03/2022 | Jazan Port | 16 53 39 42 32 23 | Qat | 3,360 Kgs. |
| 9 | 23/05/2022 | Jazan Port | 16 53 39 42 32 23 | Qat | 2,016 Kgs. |
| 10 | 09/06/2022 | Jazan Port | 16 53 39 42 32 23 | Cannabis | 5,320 Kgs. |
| 11 | 24/06/2022 | Jazan Port | 16 53 39 42 32 23 | Qat | 4 Kgs. |
| 12 | 27/06/2022 | Jazan Port | 16 53 39 42 32 23 | Qat | 100 grams |
| 13 | 08/07/2022 | Jazan Port | 16 53 39 42 32 23 | Qat | 1,480 Kgs. |
| 14 | 29/07/2022 | Jazan Port | 16 53 39 42 32 23 | Qat | 308 grams |
| 15 | 08/08/2022 | Jazan Port | 16 53 39 42 32 23 | Paan | 2,500 Kgs. |
| | | | | Cigarettes | 5 Kgs. |
| 16 | 28/08/2022 | Jazan Port | 16 53 39 42 32 23 | Qat | 8 Kgs. |
| 17 | 07/09/2022 | Jazan Port | 16 53 39 42 32 23 | Qat | 5 Kgs. |
| 18 | 30/09/2022 | Jazan Port | 16 53 39 42 32 23 | Qat | 4,500 Kgs. |
| 19 | 18/09/2022 | Jazan Port | 16 53 39 42 32 23 | Cigarettes | 3,800 Kgs. |
| 20 | 05/10/2021 | Al Mihraq Port Center | 17 14 39 42 42 12 | Qat | 99 Grams |

| | | | | | |
|----|------------|---------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|
| 21 | 08/04/2022 | East Bisha Center | 17 23 00 42 23 03 | Captagone drug | 50 pills |
| 22 | 28/02/2022 | South of the Jafri Island | 16 36 936 43 39 159 | Cannabis | 482.435 Kgs. |
| 23 | 29/09/2021 | Abu Ahmed Island | 17 03 577 41 45 831 | Cannabis | 3,600 Kgs. |
| 24 | 24/10/2021 | Al Fursan Port | 16 42 13 42 18 08 | Cannabis | 51,500 Kgs. |
| 25 | 29/11/2021 | Southern border | 16 24 7 42 20 4 | Qat | 35 Grams |
| 26 | 16/01/2022 | Northern Border | 17 01 7 42 30 4 | Qat | 104 Kgs. |
| 27 | 14/02/2022 | Deraqa Island | 16 51 37 42 19 09 | Cannabis and Captagon | 323 Kgs. 463,001 pills |
| 28 | 16/02/2022 | North of Um Raq Center | 16 26 07 41 54 04 | Qat | 8,900 Kgs. |
| 29 | 29/03/2022 | West Ramin Center | 16 25 4 42 13 05 | Qat | 970 Kgs. |
| 30 | 04/04/2022 | Al Shabeen Island | 16 40 2 41 31 04 | Cannabis Captagon | 219 Kgs. 1,865 pills |

Table 28.4

Other items (Jewellery, valuable metals, and paper money) seized at the Saudi borders (Al Wadihah, Al Khadra, Alb, Al Twall, and Jizan Port)

| <i>Seized Items</i> | <i>Quantity Seized in 2015-2019</i> | <i>Quantity Seized in 2020</i> | <i>Quantity Seized in 2021</i> | <i>Quantity Seized in 2022</i> |
|--|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Jewellery and Valuable metals (In Grammes) | 89,380.1 | 5000 | 437.4 | - |
| Paper Money (In Saudi Rial) | 11,916,646 | 254,800 | 3,219,720 | 1,933,859 |

Source: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

4. The Panel received information of regular interceptions of dhows in the Gulf of Oman, carrying huge consignments of narcotics drugs, by the naval and coast guard forces of the US, the UK and France. During the discussions with some officials, the Panel was informed that some of the narcotics consignments intercepted by them from the dhows in the Gulf of Oman were found to be destined towards Yemen. Since these consignments have been destroyed and no country has taken up investigations, in the absence of any clear legal mandates, the

Panel could not investigate these cases. Although no direct evidence has been found linking the smuggled narcotics consignments to the individuals designated under the 2140 sanctions regime, the Yemeni officials suspect that these activities are being undertaken for providing financial benefits to some groups involved in the conflict. The Panel continues to monitor the seizure of narcotics in the region. There is a need for the Member States to consider adopting appropriate legal instruments that would allow proper investigations of cases of smuggling of narcotics drugs detected in the international waters by international naval and coastguard forces so that the offenders are brought to justice by appropriate authorities and the financial sanctions under the 2140 regime are properly monitored.

Annex 29 Arbitrary detention, degrading treatment, torture, and sexual violence in Houthi prisons

1. The Panel continues to investigate and document violations by the Houthis in the context of detention. The Panel interviewed 12 former detainees (11 men, 1 woman) who gave accounts of the harrowing experiences they endured while incarcerated in prisons, detention places in Houthi-controlled areas. All the respondents reported to the Panel that they were abducted by the Houthis, held for several months or years in different locations, and subjected to torture, and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. This included inflicting severe beatings on detainees using batons and wires; applying electric shocks to their bodies; hanging them upside down for long hours; repeatedly spraying them with icy-cold water; and other cruel methods to inflict pain and suffering on the detainees, to humiliate them, or to extract “confessions” from them during interrogations.

2. The Panel notes that five of the victims, including one woman and a journalist, experienced these human rights violations during this reporting period. The other seven victims interviewed by the Panel were individuals, who suffered the violations in earlier years, some as far back as 2015, and were released between 2017 and 2021, through the prisoner exchange process facilitated by the ICRC. The former detainees of Houthi prisons informed the Panel that, although they have regained their liberty, they continue to suffer from trauma, receive threats from Houthi operatives, or face social rejection, as well as lack of psychosocial support, employment or other livelihood opportunities. The former detainees expressed concern about their personal security.

I. Emblematic Case: 20-year-old woman arbitrarily detained for more than 17 months by the Houthis

3. The Panel finds that this case is emblematic of the widespread use of arbitrary detention, torture, degrading treatment, and sexual violence that the Houthis have inflicted on civilians in their custody:

4. This 20-year-old woman was abducted by the Houthis in February 2021 in Sana’a. She was blindfolded, tied up and bundled into a vehicle that took her, and several other girls to a secret location, where she was kept for 11 days with no contact with her family or access to legal counsel, then they were transferred to the Central Prison. After two months, she got a lawyer and was brought before a Houthi judge on the charge of engaging in adulterous conduct through her modelling profession. The Houthis accused her of working against the Islamic religion and serving the interests of foreign powers, including the Coalition, to defeat their war effort. In July 2021, the woman was given a five-year prison sentence by the court in Sana’a, but she was temporarily released on health grounds.

5. When the woman was in the secret detention, a Houthi official attempted to rape her but she resisted, and her loud screams drew the attention and intervention of other people, including a friend in the same detention centre. Also, she and other detainees were subjected to severe beatings during interrogation. At the Central Prison in Sana’a, she received verbal threats and insults from prison officials. She was kept for long hours in solitary confinement as punishment for refusing to listen to lectures on the Houthi ideology and to recite their slogans. She was frequently physically assaulted by prison guards. Getting frustrated with the terrible prison conditions, she once attempted to commit suicide. The Houthi prison authorities denied her access to prompt medical treatment.

6. In August 2022, the woman escaped from Houthi custody. The victim recalls that there were about 300 other women and girls, including minors as young as 12 years, who were abducted by the Houthis from different locations and arbitrarily detained at the Central Prison in Sana’a. According to the respondent, most of these female detainees in the prison are held on trumped-up adultery or other “honour” related charges. They have no access to justice. The interviewee added that the Houthis routinely placed detainees in solitary confinement for days or weeks and used the threat of publishing compromising images of female detainees and their family members.

II. Alleged torture of four journalists detained by the Houthis and facing the death penalty

7. The Panel continues to investigate the arbitrary detention by the Houthis of nine journalist, including the four journalists facing death penalty, who remain detained at the Central Security Prison in Sana’a, wherein the Houthis have been trying to use the journalists’ situation as leverage for prisoner exchange with the GoY ([S/2021/79](#), para. 147; [S/2022/50](#), para. 122). The Panel has been informed by family members of one of the four

journalists and has seen public statements indicating that the Houthis are subjecting the four journalists to ill-treatment, torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment in violation of international law.²⁷ In a letter shared with the Panel, the family of Tawfeeq Al Mansouri, one of the four journalists, alleged that, in August 2022, Al Mansouri and two others were moved to solitary confinement at the prison and tortured, over a period of 45 days, resulting in serious head injury to Al Mansouri. This claim was supported in a Twitter post²⁸ by the GoY's information minister but denied, also on Twitter,²⁹ by the Houthi official the family implicated in the commission of the torture. The Panel is seeking to verify the alleged torture of the journalists by the Houthis. The Panel notes that the prohibition against torture is absolute and binding, at all times, and under all circumstances.³⁰

²⁷ <https://rsf.org/en/yemen-s-houthis-carry-out-journalists-death-sentences-slowly-torturing-them>.

²⁸ <https://twitter.com/ERYANIM/status/1599121623600156677>.

²⁹ <https://twitter.com/abdulqadmortd/status/1599115074723287041>

³⁰ The Convention against Torture (CAT), the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols I & II of 1977, and the rules of customary international law contain specific provisions prohibiting torture and other cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment. The 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) deems torture as a war crime.

Annex 30 Investigations into incidents of Coalition airstrikes resulting in civilian casualties

1. The Panel presents the findings of its investigations into three incidents involving Coalition airstrikes on targets in Houthi-controlled areas that resulted in loss of civilian lives. These cases are emblematic and the Panel's focus on them does not suggest the absence of other incidents. The Panel's investigations involved in-person and remote interviews with some victims, eyewitnesses, and representatives of nongovernmental organizations; examination of photographic material; and review of investigation reports and statements of local and international entities. Among the witnesses were three individuals who escaped from Houthi custody during Coalition airstrikes on a camp in Sa'dah that included a detention centre hosting hundreds of Yemenis and migrants.

I. Airstrikes on targets in a residential area of Sana'a

2. On 17 January 2022, at approximately 2130 hours LT, the Coalition conducted airstrikes in the Libyan district, north of Sana'a city, in Sana'a Governorate. The airstrikes destroyed the residence of a prominent Houthi official, Brigadier General Abdullah Qassem al-Junaid, who is a former director of their aviation and air defence college in Sana'a, and damaged several adjacent residential buildings (figure 30.1). Eyewitnesses and other sources informed the Panel that the airstrikes killed al-Junaid and nine other people, including two women. The Panel was also informed that the attack resulted in injuries to nine civilians. Five of those killed were al-Junaid's family members, including his wife and a son.³¹ The individuals wounded were taken to Azal and Al-Jumhuri hospitals. According to the sources, a Houthi military camp was located 16 metres from the targeted residential building of the al-Junaid family. The Houthis issued a statement claiming that 14 people were killed and 11 others wounded in the attack; they accused the Coalition forces of targeting civilians.³² The Panel sent letters to the Coalition concerning this incident but did not receive a reply.

3. In its investigation, the Panel found that the Coalition airstrikes of 17 January 2022 on targets in the Libyan district of Sana'a, which may have been conducted in pursuit of legitimate military objectives, resulted in the killing of nine civilians, including two women. The Panel was informed by local sources, including eyewitnesses, that the attack was conducted in a crowded civilian residential neighbourhood, without any advance warnings to the civilian residents, and it resulted in avoidable loss of civilian lives and damage to civilian infrastructure.

4. The Coalition has not provided verifiable information to the Panel, or in public statements, demonstrating that it took all feasible precautions to avoid or minimize harm to civilians and civilian objects, as required by international humanitarian law (IHL). The Panel concludes that the principles of precaution, and distinction were likely not respected.³³

Figure 30.1

Scene of the Coalition airstrikes on buildings in Libyan area of Sana'a on 17 January 2022



Source: Confidential

³¹ <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/18/yemen-latest-round-saudi-uae-led-attacks-targets-civilians>; <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-01-19/saudi-led-strike-on-yemen-kills-20/100765374>. The Panel conducted confidential interviews with two eyewitnesses and other sources.

³² <https://en.ypagency.net/250687>.

³³ Articles 48, 51 (2) and 52 (2) of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, Article 13 (2) of Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and rule 1 and 7 of CHIL.

II. Airstrikes on telecommunications facility in a residential area of Hudaydah

5. On 20 January 2022, at approximately 2230 hours LT, Coalition forces conducted airstrikes on a building belonging to PTC, a telecommunications company, in Hudaydah Governorate. The airstrikes severely damaged the PTC building and five adjacent residential buildings, and killed five civilians, including three children, and injured 20 other civilians, including two children (figure 30.2).

6. The non-governmental organization, Save the Children, reported in a statement of 21 January 2022 that the three children killed in the airstrikes in Hudaydah were reportedly playing football in a yard close to the telecommunications facility, when they were hit.³⁴ The Coalition confirmed that it launched airstrikes on targets in Hudaydah on 20 January to weaken the capabilities of the Houthis, who they claim were using civilian infrastructure for military purposes.³⁵ However, it did not specifically mention the attack on the telecommunication facility or any incidental loss of civilian lives from its airstrikes. The Panel sent letters to the Coalition concerning this incident but did not receive a reply.

7. In its investigation, the Panel found that the PTC building was in a civilian residential neighbourhood, and the attacks destroyed the building, internet equipment and other assets of the telecommunications company, and resulted in five casualties. The Panel did not find evidence that, in the attack on the facility, which may have been a legitimate military target under IHL, the Coalition forces took all feasible precautions to avoid or minimize civilian harm. All sources, including the eyewitnesses, informed the Panel that no warnings were given to the civilians before the attack.

8. The Panel concludes that the principles of precaution and distinction were likely not respected.³⁶

Figure 30.2

The PTC building in Hudaydah after it was hit and damaged by the Coalition airstrikes on 20 January 2022



Source: Confidential

III. Airstrikes on a camp containing a detention centre/prison in Sa'dah

9. On 21 January 2022, at approximately 0240 hours LT, Coalition forces conducted three airstrikes on a camp which contained a detention centre in Al-Sahn area of Sa'dah Governorate. At that time, about 2,000 individuals, including hundreds of migrants, were detained at the centre.³⁷ Three eyewitnesses

³⁴ <https://www.savethechildren.net/news/yemen-least-three-children-among-more-60-killed-airstrikes-down-internet-across-country>.

³⁵ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/21/several-killed-in-airstrike-on-yemen-prison>.

³⁶ Articles 48, 51 (2) and 52 (2) of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, Article 13 (2) of Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and rule 1 and 7 of CHIL.

³⁷ <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-briefing-notes/2022/01/press-briefing-notes-yemen-airstrikes>.

(detainees who managed to escape) and two staff of local NGOs informed the Panel that the airstrikes occurred in quick succession and hit three sections of the facility, including a hangar where 200 detainees were held in the basement.³⁸ The airstrikes caused a partial collapse of the detention facility (figure 30.3), killing 66 detainees and injuring 113 others, including four boys between the ages of 15 and 17. During the airstrikes, Houthi fighters fired at fleeing detainees. The Houthis killed 16 detainees and injured 50 others, bringing the total number of casualties from the Sa'dah incident to 82 killed and 163 injured.³⁹

Figure 30.3

Rescue workers remove rubble covering victims of the Coalition airstrikes that hit a detention centre in Sa'dah on 21 January 2022.



Source: Mwatana for Human Rights, and Human Rights Watch (<https://www.hrw.org/modal/95568>)

10. The Panel did not receive reply to a letter it addressed to the Coalition inquiring into the reported violations and the specific measures the Coalition forces took before, during and after the airstrikes, in compliance with their IHL obligation, to prevent or minimize civilian harm. The Houthis also did not respond to the Panel's letter inquiring into their reported killing of fleeing detainees.

11. In a meeting with the Panel on 9 October 2022, the Coalition Joint Forces Command (JFC) asserted that the airstrikes of 21 January 2022 on Sa'dah precisely targeted a camp used by the Houthis to manufacture and launch UAVs, and that therefore the facility was a legitimate military target under IHL. The JFC also displayed maps and images purporting to show the location of military facility(ies), close to the detention centre, that were targeted. However, the Panel received information from NGO sources that the facility was formerly a security camp, but at the time of the attack it was used as a detention centre. Hence, the Coalition should have avoided any attack on that facility. The Coalition has not shared with the Panel specific details it requested regarding the incident.

12. The Coalition spokesperson refuted the allegation that Coalition forces targeted civilians in Sa'dah, and further stated that there was no detention centre in Sa'dah on the "No Strike List (NSL)" that was agreed with humanitarian actors in Yemen.⁴⁰ The Joint Incidents Assessment Team (JIAT), established by the Coalition to investigate IHL violations attributed to their forces, also reported on 8 February 2022 that its investigation found that the Coalition airstrikes on Sa'dah precisely targeted a Houthi "special security camp", which is a legitimate military target under IHL.⁴¹

13. The NSL is an index of humanitarian static sites managed by OCHA Yemen, as part of a humanitarian notification system developed by the UN Country Team in April 2015 through which agencies

³⁸ The Panel received information that, on 6 January 2022, more than two weeks prior to the Coalition airstrikes, ICRC personnel visited the Sa'dah detention centre and distributed dignity kits and winter clothes to the detainees.

³⁹ Information gathered by the Panel from interviews with eyewitnesses and reports of NGOs and agencies on the incident.

⁴⁰ <https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewfullstory.php?lang=ar&newsid=2324781>.

⁴¹ <https://english.alarabiya.net/News/gulf/2022/01/28/Arab-Coalition-says-it-did-not-target-prison-in-Yemen-s-Saada-Initial-findings>.

voluntarily share with the Coalition, through OCHA, information on the locations of humanitarian sites and humanitarian movements, aiming to ensure the safety and security of humanitarian premises, personnel, equipment and activities in areas of active military operations. The Panel notes that the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for the notification mechanism recognizes that notification is not a prerequisite for protection under IHL, and, conversely, the absence of notification or the removal from the notification list of any given object or movement does not change its protection status.⁴² The Panel finds no correlation between the absence of the Sa'dah detention centre from the NSL, a non-exclusive list of humanitarian sites in Yemen, to the Coalition forces not fulfilling their IHL obligations.

14. The Panel's investigation revealed that the Coalition airstrikes did hit a facility that was primarily a civilian infrastructure (detention centre) holding hundreds of civilians, including migrants, women and children, detained by the Houthis.⁴³ The obligation to ascertain the civilian or military character of the facility, to assess the anticipated incidental loss of civilian lives and damage to civilian objects from any attack, and to take all feasible precautions to avoid or minimize civilian harm, rested with the Coalition. In the attack of 21 January 2022 in Sa'dah, this obligation needed to be fulfilled.

15. The Panel concludes that the principles of precaution and distinction were likely not respected.⁴⁴

IV. Airstrikes on buildings in residential neighbourhood of Sana'a

16. The Panel received information that, on 25 March 2022, Coalition airstrikes on a residential neighbourhood in Sana'a Governorate reportedly killed eight civilians, including five children and two women, as well as damaging the UN residential staff compound in Sana'a.⁴⁵

17. The Panel is continuing its investigation.

⁴² <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/yemen/deconfliction>.

⁴³ In a statement issued on 28 January 2022, the Secretary-General condemned the attack (<https://press.un.org/en/2022/sgsm21114.doc.htm>) and reminded all parties to respect IHL. Also, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) noted that the facility in Sa'dah held about 1,300 detainees, including 700 migrants, before the incident. It stated that 91 detainees may have been killed and 236 injured, and called for "a transparent, independent and impartial investigation." (<https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-briefing-notes/2022/01/press-briefing-notes-yemen-airstrikes>).

⁴⁴ Articles 48, 51 (2) and 52 (2) of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, Article 13 (2) of Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and rule 1 and 7 of CHIL.

⁴⁵ <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2022-03-26/statement-the-spokesperson-of-the-secretary-general-attacks-civilian-facilities-saudi-arabia-and-yemen>.

Annex 31 Civilian casualties from landmines and other explosive devices allegedly planted by the Houthis

1. The Panel continues to receive information and documents relating to indiscriminate and systematic use of landmines and other explosive devices mainly by the Houthis. Since 2016, the Panel has been documenting the impact of landmines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other explosive devices on civilians (S/2021/79, paras 140-142; S/2020/326, paras 115-117; [S/2018/193S/2018/193](#), annexes 43 and 44; and [S/2022/50](#) paras 188-119, and annex 36).

2. The indiscriminate use of landmines is prohibited by international humanitarian law. Whenever landmines are used, the parties to an armed conflict must take particular care to minimize their effects. They also must record their placement to the extent possible.⁴⁶ The Houthis and other parties continue to disregard this obligation. Between October 2021 and September 2022, landmine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) incidents resulted in 591 civilian casualties, including 196 deaths and 395 injuries, according to humanitarian agencies. The incidents reportedly occurred mostly in the frontline areas of Hudaydah and Al-Jawf governorates.⁴⁷

3. Through interviews with victims and family members, meetings with humanitarian personnel, and review of confidential information shared by local sources, the Panel documented some incidents, which occurred during the reporting period, involving civilian casualties from landmine and other explosive devices.

4. The incidents documented by the Panel indicative of the serious threat posed to civilians by landmines and other explosive devices, allegedly planted by the Houthis, in frontline areas and locations under their control:

a) On 16 April 2022, at approximately 0600 hours LT, a private vehicle travelling with three civilians, on a road northeast of Khab and Al Shaaf District in Al-Jawf Governorate, hit a landmine, killing two men, aged 30 and 25 years, and injuring a 14-year-old boy. The child suffered bruises from shrapnel.

b) On 22 May 2022, at approximately 1000 hours LT, a landmine explosion in Al-Hagi District of Hudaydah Governorate injured two men, aged 20 and 25 years, as they were working on their farm.

c) On 1 March 2022, a civilian herding sheep near the main road of Al-Akbar village in Hays District, Hudaydah Governorate, triggered an explosive device, allegedly a Houthi-improvised antipersonnel landmine. He sustained severe injuries from the explosion, leading to the amputation of both legs.

d) On 29 August 2022, a civilian was passing through an area in Al-Manaam neighbourhood of Jabal Habshi district in Tai'zz Governorate, close to the frontline, when he stepped on an explosive device, allegedly a Houthi-improvised antipersonnel landmine. He sustained severe injuries from the explosion of the device, leading to the amputation of both legs. He also suffered injuries to both hands.

e) On 24 September 2022, three children were riding on a donkey-drawn cart in the Al-Lhomainiah area of Hays District in Hudaydah Governorate, when the donkey triggered an explosive device, allegedly a fragmentation device planted by the Houthis. One child was killed, and two others injured.

f) On 21 October 2022, a civilian walking near his home in Nata' district of Al Bayda Governorate was killed when he accidentally triggered an explosive device, allegedly planted by the Houthis.

5. The Panel notes that, while international law requires States and all parties to an armed conflict to limit the production and use of landmines and other explosive devices to legitimate military purposes, international law imposes a total ban⁴⁸ on antipersonnel mines. The Ottawa Convention (Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty) of

⁴⁶ The Geneva Conventions of 1949, the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and various rules of customary international humanitarian law seek to reduce the harm to civilians in armed conflict, including from landmines.

⁴⁷ <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-humanitarian-update-issue-9-september-2022>;

<https://twitter.com/ochayemen/status/1587850904560099328?s=46&t=kUo4xQxzhB4XmBwFF2Xecg>.

⁴⁸ Article 3 of the Ottawa Convention provides that, as an exception, the retention or transfer of a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques is permitted.

1997, in particular, prohibits the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of antipersonnel mines and on their destruction.⁴⁹ Yemen ratified the treaty on 1 September 1998 and is bound by its provisions. Also, IHL norms place an obligation on States and non-state armed groups to take measures to avoid or minimize civilian harm.

Figure 31.1

Victim of a landmine explosion in Hays, Hudaydah (left); mines and IEDs found on the scene (right)



Source: Project Masam

⁴⁹ <https://www.un.org/disarmament/anti-personnel-landmines-convention/>

List of acronyms

| | |
|-------|--|
| ADNOC | Abu Dhabi National Oil Company |
| AIS | Automatic Identification Signal |
| AQAP | Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula |
| ATGM | Anti-Tank Guided Missile |
| AWH | Alwiyat al-Waad al-Haq (True Pledge Brigades) |
| CBY | Central Bank of Yemen |
| CCTV | Closed-Circuit Television |
| CHA | Coalition Holding Area |
| FSO | Floating Storage and Offloading vessel |
| GAZ | General Authority for Zakat |
| GoY | Government of Yemen |
| GPS | Global Positioning System |
| IED | Improvised Explosive Device |
| IHL | International Humanitarian Law |
| IHRL | International Human Rights Law |
| IMO | International Maritime Organization |
| IRGC | Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps |
| JIAT | Joint Incident Assessment Team |
| KSA | Kingdom of Saudi Arabia |
| LCs | Letters of Credit |
| LT | Local Time |
| MAA | Houthi-appointed Maritime Affairs Authority |
| MoT | Houthi-appointed Minister of Transport |
| NGO | Non-governmental organization |
| PLC | Presidential Leadership Council |
| RPG | Rocket-propelled grenade |
| SALW | Small Arms and Light Weapons |
| SAR | Saudi Riyal |
| STC | Southern Transitional Council |
| UAE | United Arab Emirates |
| UAV | Uncrewed Aerial Vehicle |
| UK | United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNMHA | United Nations Mission to support the Hudaydah Agreement |

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|-------|--|
| UNVIM | United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism |
| USA | United States of America |
| USD | United States Dollars |
| UXO | Unexploded Ordnance |
| VLCC | Very Large Crude Carrier |
| WBIED | Water-borne improvised explosive device |
| WFP | World Food Programme |
| WRI | War Risk Insurance |
| YR | Yemeni Rial |
