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Carta de fecha 28 de noviembre de 2022 dirigida a la Presidencia del Consejo de Seguridad por el Grupo de Expertos sobre Sudán del Sur establecido en virtud de la resolución [2206 \(2015\)](#) del Consejo de Seguridad

Los miembros del Grupo de Expertos establecido en virtud de la resolución [2633 \(2022\)](#) del Consejo de Seguridad tienen el honor de transmitir adjunto el informe provisional, preparado en cumplimiento de lo dispuesto en el párrafo 18 de la resolución.

El informe fue proporcionado al Comité del Consejo de Seguridad establecido en virtud de la resolución [2206 \(2015\)](#), relativa a Sudán del Sur, el 4 de noviembre de 2022, y el Comité lo examinó el 18 de noviembre.

El Grupo agradecería que la presente carta y el informe provisional se señalaran a la atención de los miembros del Consejo de Seguridad y se publicaran como documento del Consejo.

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Informe provisional del Grupo de Expertos sobre Sudán del Sur presentado de conformidad con la resolución 2633 (2022)

Resumen

En agosto de 2022, el Gobierno de Sudán del Sur prorrogó por dos años el período de transición establecido en virtud del acuerdo de paz de 2018, con lo que de hecho aplazó las elecciones al menos hasta diciembre de 2024.

Esa decisión suscitó reacciones encontradas. Existe un comprensible alivio ante el hecho de que, a pesar de las profundas tensiones políticas y la profunda desconfianza que imperan en el seno del Gobierno de Transición de Unidad Nacional Revitalizado, siga habiendo un proceso político que preservar y ampliar. Hay consternación por el hecho de que, incluso después de cuatro años, gran parte del acuerdo de paz aún no se ha hecho realidad. Y existe la sospecha de que la prórroga tiene como único objetivo afianzar los intereses políticos y económicos de las élites que hasta la fecha han sido las principales beneficiarias del acuerdo.

El proceso político iniciado a partir del acuerdo de paz de 2018, que se vio fortalecido con la formación del Gobierno de Transición de Unidad Nacional Revitalizado en febrero de 2020, ha sorteado varias crisis políticas potencialmente traicioneras. Se acordó una estructura de mando superior unificada para los servicios de seguridad del país, se resolvió un boicot de la oposición al Parlamento que había puesto en peligro a un pilar clave del gobierno y, a partir de agosto de 2022, finalmente se graduó la primera promoción de las fuerzas unificadas necesarias.

Sin embargo, la supervivencia de este proceso político se explica principalmente por la falta de alternativas que resulten atractivas para las élites que forman parte de él, cuyos intereses políticos y económicos están en gran medida ligados a esa supervivencia.

Incluso en el contexto de la tumultuosa historia de Sudán del Sur, la mera supervivencia de un proceso de paz no es sinónimo de progreso. El valor del proceso político depende de su capacidad para resolver las numerosas crisis económicas, de seguridad y humanitarias a que se enfrenta la gran mayoría de la población. Y en ese sentido, está fallando. La política de Yuba se desarrolla en un contexto de violencia subnacional generalizada, abusos generalizados contra los derechos humanos, incluida la violencia sexual endémica y sistémica relacionada con el conflicto, y una combinación de crisis humanitarias y económicas que ha dejado tambaleante a la mayoría de la población como consecuencia de las sucesivas perturbaciones que se han ido acumulando. Hay millones de desplazados, y muchos indicadores humanitarios clave, especialmente la seguridad alimentaria, están en sus peores niveles desde que se logró la independencia.

El proceso político y de consolidación de la paz con sede en Yuba se ha centrado en gran medida en sobrevivir, más que en gobernar para aliviar esas crisis. Como consecuencia de ello, la violencia subnacional politizada se ha propagado por gran parte del interior del país, incluso en zonas que antes estaban bajo el firme control del Gobierno. Mientras tanto, continúan los enfrentamientos entre las fuerzas del Gobierno, las de la oposición, los desertores y los grupos armados no signatarios, aun cuando el Gobierno fomenta la paz.

Si bien se han graduado algunos efectivos de las fuerzas unificadas necesarias, no existe un plan claro para su despliegue, ni un acuerdo acerca de los mandos intermedios de su estructura de mando integrada. En la actualidad, aparentemente son

una adición marginada dentro del ya complejo panorama de la seguridad, más que una fuerza nacional de combate única y viable.

Por lo tanto, a pesar de la presencia del Gobierno de Transición de Unidad Nacional Revitalizado en Yuba, el tejido social y político del país se sigue erosionando. Fuera de Yuba, la fuerza predominante no tiende hacia la unificación, sino hacia una mayor fragmentación.

Índice

	<i>Página</i>
I. Antecedentes	5
A. Mandato y viajes	5
B. Cooperación con organizaciones internacionales y otras partes interesadas	5
C. Metodología	6
II. Dos años más de transición	6
A. Reacciones encontradas ante la prórroga del período de transición	6
B. Los no signatarios rechazan la prórroga pero siguen fragmentados	7
C. Las fuerzas unificadas necesarias se graduaron, pero no se desplegaron	8
III. Violencia subnacional generalizada	10
A. Violencia en Tonj Norte	10
B. Ejecuciones extrajudiciales en Mayom	11
C. Violencia e inestabilidad en el Alto Nilo	13
IV. Agravamiento de las crisis humanitarias	14
A. Inundaciones e inseguridad alimentaria	14
B. La violencia subnacional socava la seguridad alimentaria	16
C. Adquisición de alimentos para las fuerzas armadas	16
V. La rendición de cuentas por abusos graves sigue siendo limitada	17
A. Asesinatos en Kayo Kayi	18
B. Tribunal militar en Yei	19
VI. Colaboración a nivel regional e internacional	19
A. Cooperación y capacitación en materia de seguridad regional	19
B. Colaboración a nivel internacional	21
VII. Fragmentación de las finanzas públicas	21
VIII. Conclusión	23
IX. Recomendaciones	23
Anexos*	25

* Los anexos se distribuyen únicamente en el idioma en que fueron presentados y sin revisión editorial.

I. Antecedentes

A. Mandato y viajes

1. En su resolución [2206 \(2015\)](#), el Consejo de Seguridad impuso un régimen de sanciones que se aplicarían a las personas y entidades que contribuyesen al conflicto en Sudán del Sur y creó un comité de sanciones, el Comité del Consejo de Seguridad establecido en virtud de la resolución [2206 \(2015\)](#), relativa a Sudán del Sur. El 1 de julio de 2015, el Comité designó a seis personas que serían objeto de sanciones selectivas. Con la aprobación de su resolución [2428 \(2018\)](#), el Consejo impuso un embargo de armas en el territorio de Sudán del Sur y añadió dos personas a la lista de personas designadas. El 28 de mayo de 2022, el Consejo aprobó su resolución [2633 \(2022\)](#), por la que prorrogó el régimen de sanciones hasta el 31 de mayo de 2023.
2. Mediante su resolución [2633 \(2022\)](#), el Consejo de Seguridad prorrogó el mandato del Grupo de Expertos sobre Sudán del Sur hasta el 1 de julio de 2023 para que pudiera proporcionar información y análisis en apoyo de la labor del Comité, entre otras cosas en lo que respecta a la posible designación de personas y entidades que podrían estar participando en las actividades descritas en el párrafo 11 de la resolución [2206 \(2015\)](#).
3. El 22 de junio de 2022, el Secretario General, en consulta con el Comité, designó a los cinco miembros del Grupo de Expertos (véase [S/2022/508](#)).
4. Durante el período que abarca el informe, el Grupo viajó dos veces a Sudán del Sur, y también viajó a Kenya, Uganda y los Emiratos Árabes Unidos.

B. Cooperación con organizaciones internacionales y otras partes interesadas

5. Si bien funciona en forma independiente respecto de los organismos y entidades de las Naciones Unidas, el Grupo de Expertos desea expresar su agradecimiento al personal de la Misión de las Naciones Unidas en Sudán del Sur (UNMISS) y a otros funcionarios de las Naciones Unidas, en particular a quienes prestan servicios en Nueva York.
6. Durante su visita a Sudán del Sur, el Grupo solicitó reuniones con ocho instituciones y ministerios del Gobierno de Sudán del Sur, pero solo recibió una respuesta. El Grupo mantuvo conversaciones con la Misión Permanente de Sudán del Sur ante las Naciones Unidas y con el Ministerio de Defensa y Asuntos de los Veteranos, y también conversaciones informales con altos cargos de las Fuerzas de Defensa del Pueblo de Sudán del Sur, miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa Nacional de Transición Revitalizada y otros funcionarios gubernamentales.
7. En el párrafo 17 de su resolución [2633 \(2022\)](#), el Consejo de Seguridad puso de relieve la importancia de que el Grupo de Expertos celebrara consultas con los Estados Miembros interesados, las organizaciones internacionales, regionales y subregionales pertinentes y la UNMISS.
8. El Grupo tuvo la oportunidad de celebrar extensas consultas con órganos y organismos de las Naciones Unidas en Sudán del Sur y otros lugares. También celebró consultas con la mayoría de los mecanismos de seguridad establecidos en virtud del Acuerdo Revitalizado para la Solución del Conflicto en la República de Sudán del Sur.

9. El Grupo envió múltiples solicitudes de reunión a Estados Miembros de la región y a otros Estados Miembros y pudo reunirse con representantes de los Gobiernos de Uganda y de los Emiratos Árabes Unidos en sus respectivas capitales.

10. El Grupo también envió 27 cartas oficiales al Gobierno de Sudán del Sur, a Estados Miembros de la región y a otras personas y entidades y recibió 15 respuestas sustantivas antes de redactar el presente informe provisional. Las respuestas que el Grupo recibió con posterioridad figuran en los anexos del presente informe.

C. Metodología

11. El presente informe se elaboró sobre la base de la investigación que llevó a cabo el Grupo de Expertos. El Grupo realizó numerosas entrevistas para compilar un corpus de información creíble, obtenida de una amplia gama de fuentes, y examinó la documentación facilitada por particulares, entidades comerciales, fuentes confidenciales y el Gobierno. Asimismo, el Grupo se basó en su trabajo anterior, en particular en sus anteriores informes al Consejo de Seguridad y al Comité, tanto públicos como confidenciales.

12. El Grupo de Expertos siguió las pautas recomendadas por el Grupo de Trabajo Oficioso del Consejo de Seguridad sobre Cuestiones Generales relativas a las Sanciones en su informe de diciembre de 2006 (S/2006/997). El Grupo ha corroborado la información que figura en el presente informe con ayuda de múltiples fuentes independientes, a fin de ajustarse a los criterios probatorios apropiados.

13. El Grupo de Expertos llevó a cabo su investigación con la mayor transparencia posible, a la vez que acordó carácter prioritario a la confidencialidad cada vez que fue necesario.

II. Dos años más de transición

14. En un contexto en que las elecciones y el final del período de transición se acercaban rápidamente, la prórroga de dos años ha preservado el proceso político en curso, al tiempo que ha planteado interrogantes acerca de la capacidad y la voluntad del Gobierno de acelerar la implementación del acuerdo de paz.

A. Reacciones encontradas ante la prórroga del período de transición

15. El 4 de agosto de 2022, el Presidente, Salva Kiir Mayardit, anunció una prórroga de dos años del período de transición establecido en virtud del acuerdo de paz de 2018¹ y presentó una hoja de ruta adjunta en la que se esbozaba un nuevo calendario para la implementación de sus numerosas disposiciones pendientes².

16. La prórroga fue respaldada por todas las partes en el acuerdo, aunque algunas voces discrepantes, como el Movimiento Democrático Nacional, calificaron la prórroga de “cínica”³. Otros grupos de la oposición y coaliciones de la sociedad civil

¹ El Acuerdo Revitalizado para la Solución del Conflicto en la República de Sudán del Sur, firmado en septiembre de 2018, incluía originalmente disposiciones para un período previo a la transición de 8 meses que iría seguido de un período de transición de 36 meses (cap. 1.1.2). El período de transición se inició finalmente en febrero de 2020, con la formación del Gobierno de Transición de Unidad Nacional Revitalizado.

² Véase el anexo 1.

³ Véase el anexo 2.

se quejaron de que las consultas habían sido insuficientes⁴, en tanto que una encuesta de percepción pública realizada en tres estados reveló dudas en cuanto a la capacidad y la voluntad del Gobierno de lograr avances adicionales durante el período adicional de dos años⁵.

17. Sin embargo, tras la prórroga se han producido algunos avances en materia procesal. Por ejemplo, el 24 de octubre de 2022 el Parlamento aprobó el proyecto de ley sobre el proceso constituyente, que proporcionará un marco jurídico para guiar la elaboración de una constitución permanente⁶.

18. Por otra parte, los funcionarios que participan en el proceso político tienen incentivos financieros para prorrogar el acuerdo actual. El país dedica una proporción cada vez mayor de sus finanzas a la gestión del Gobierno, más que a la prestación de servicios. Durante el primer semestre del ejercicio económico 2021/22, aproximadamente el 80 % del gasto presupuestario estuvo dedicado a la administración pública y al sector de la seguridad⁷. El pago que recibe cada Miembro del Parlamento es unas 300 veces superior al que recibe un soldado medio⁸. El costo total de una prestación anual adicional de 15.000 dólares para cada Miembro del Parlamento en concepto de atención sanitaria equivale al doble del monto que se gastó en el Ministerio de Sanidad durante el primer semestre del ejercicio económico 2021/22⁹.

B. Los no signatarios rechazan la prórroga pero siguen fragmentados

19. Los grupos armados no signatarios rechazaron unánimemente la prórroga del período de transición. El Frente de Salvación Nacional describió la prórroga como un intento “ilegal” de mantener el poder y el *statu quo*¹⁰, en tanto que las “partes interesadas de ideas afines para una nueva estructura política en Sudán del Sur”, entre las que se encuentra el General Paul Malong Awan Anei (SSi.008), una persona sancionada perteneciente al Frente/Ejército Unido de Sudán del Sur, rechazaron “categórica e inequívocamente” la prórroga¹¹.

20. A pesar de los llamamientos en favor de la paz, los combates entre el Frente de Salvación Nacional y las fuerzas gubernamentales han continuado en el sur de Ecuatoria Central, en tanto que en varias operaciones llevadas a cabo desde junio de 2022 las fuerzas gubernamentales han detenido a supuestos partidarios de Malong en Bahr el-Ghazal Occidental y Septentrional¹².

21. Desde el anuncio de la prórroga, los grupos armados no signatarios han intensificado sus gestiones para forjar una alianza más amplia y mantener su relevancia, entre otras cosas mediante la celebración de reuniones con otras figuras

⁴ Véanse los anexos 3 y 4. Véase también Eye Radio, “Peace parties implement 27% of R-ARCSS in 3 years, will 70% be in 2 years?”, 12 de agosto de 2022. Puede consultarse en www.eyeradio.org/peace-parties-implemented-27-of-r-arcss-in-3-years-will-70-be-in-2-years.

⁵ Informes obtenidos de observadores internacionales en los estados de Warrap, Lagos y Ecuatoria Oriental.

⁶ Entrevistas a miembros del Parlamento, septiembre y octubre de 2022.

⁷ Informes de gastos elaborados por el Ministerio de Finanzas y Planificación, correspondientes al período comprendido entre julio y diciembre de 2021, que obran en poder del Grupo de Expertos. La cifra anterior combina los gastos correspondientes a seguridad, estado de derecho (incluida la policía), funciones económicas y administración pública.

⁸ Presupuesto aprobado para el ejercicio económico 2022/23.

⁹ Informes de gastos elaborados por el Ministerio de Finanzas y Planificación que obran en poder del Grupo de Expertos.

¹⁰ Véase el anexo 5.

¹¹ Véase el anexo 6.

¹² Informes de observadores internacionales obtenidos por el Grupo de Expertos.

de la oposición, como el líder del Movimiento/Ejército del Pueblo de Sudán del Sur, Stephen Buay Rolnyang, y Simon Gatwech Dual (SSi.002), del grupo Kit-Gwang, que figura en la lista de personas sancionadas¹³. Un foro de consenso nacional ha propuesto nuevas mesas redondas¹⁴, en tanto que el Frente de Salvación Nacional ha rechazado una propuesta formulada por el Sr. Buay para formar un frente militar y una estructura de mando unificados¹⁵.

22. Con posterioridad a las conversaciones organizadas por la Comunidad de Sant'Egidio en Roma en octubre de 2022, seis grupos de la oposición se reorganizaron como Grupos de la Oposición de Sudán del Sur No Signatarios¹⁶ y celebraron consultas con los enviados de la Troika, así como con representantes de la Unión Europea y con dirigentes del Vaticano y de Sant'Egidio¹⁷.

C. Las fuerzas unificadas necesarias se graduaron, pero no se desplegaron

23. Tras varios retrasos, el 30 de agosto de 2022 se graduó en Yuba un primer contingente de las fuerzas unificadas necesarias. Posteriormente también se graduaron contingentes adicionales en Torit, Maridi, Wau y Bor¹⁸.

24. La verificación independiente de las cifras oficiales ha sido mínima, pero a noviembre de 2022 se habían graduado entre 37.000 y 40.000 efectivos de las fuerzas unificadas necesarias procedentes de 13 de los 17 centros de formación, predominantemente de las Ecuatorias y de la región de Bahr el-Ghazal¹⁹. Se espera que los restantes centros de formación, situados en su mayoría en la región del Alto Nilo, aporten fuerzas adicionales, pero se han visto gravemente afectados por el conflicto, las inundaciones y otros problemas logísticos²⁰.

25. Si bien según los informes algunos de los efectivos que recibieron formación se graduaron con palos en lugar de armas, varios funcionarios del Gobierno transmitieron en privado al Grupo que eso había tenido por objeto protestar contra el embargo de armas y no reflejaba una verdadera escasez de armas, sino que daba a entender la imposibilidad de armar a las fuerzas unificadas necesarias²¹. También es posible que refleje la intención de mantener a las fuerzas integradas en una posición de debilidad en comparación con sus homólogos de las Fuerzas de Defensa del Pueblo de Sudán del Sur y otros servicios de seguridad.

26. En muchos casos, las investigaciones del Grupo indican que los graduados fueron reunidos apresuradamente o incluso acababan de ser reclutados. Algunos efectivos fueron trasladados de un centro de formación a otro para facilitar la

¹³ Declaraciones que obran en poder del Grupo de Expertos.

¹⁴ Sudans Post, "Gen. Cirilo, Gen. Malong and Gen. Pagan reunites under one umbrella", 26 de octubre de 2022. Puede consultarse en www.sudanspost.com/gen-cirilo-gen-malong-gen-pagan-reunites-under-one-umbrella.

¹⁵ Véanse los anexos 7, 8 y 9.

¹⁶ El Movimiento/Ejército Revolucionario Democrático Unido, el Movimiento Democrático Nacional-Frente Patriótico, el Frente de Salvación Nacional, el Frente/Ejército Unido de Sudán del Sur, el Movimiento Nacional del Sudán para el Cambio y el Verdadero Movimiento de Liberación del Pueblo del Sudán.

¹⁷ Entrevistas a altos representantes de grupos no signatarios, octubre de 2022; véanse los anexos 10 y 11. Paul Malong (SSi.008), que figura en la lista de personas sancionadas, solicitó, y obtuvo, una exención para viajes a fin de participar en esas entrevistas.

¹⁸ Entrevistas a mecanismos de seguridad y altos funcionarios gubernamentales, septiembre y octubre de 2022.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* Al 4 de noviembre de 2022. Véase también el anexo 12.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ Entrevistas a funcionarios gubernamentales y oficiales militares, septiembre y octubre de 2022.

graduación, lo que generó confusión en cuanto al número de efectivos y a sus respectivas identidades²². El Ministro de Información del estado de Ecuatoria Oriental señaló, por ejemplo, que “en el centro de formación había personas listas para graduarse que habían completado la formación, pero ahora están llegando otros efectivos que ni siquiera estaban en el centro de formación y necesitaban graduarse”²³.

27. Los grupos de la oposición esperan que las fuerzas unificadas necesarias tengan éxito, ya que consideran que la creación de un único ejército nacional unificado es crucial para proteger sus intereses e influencia, y subrayaron ante el Grupo que “técnicamente” todos los soldados de las Fuerzas se habían graduado en virtud del decreto presidencial de 30 de agosto de 2022²⁴.

28. Sin embargo, no está claro si el Gobierno comparte esa visión para las fuerzas unificadas necesarias. No existe un plan de despliegue sustancial para los efectivos que se han graduado. A muchos soldados se les ordenó simplemente que regresaran a sus comunidades después de la graduación²⁵. Un antiguo oficial del Ejército de Liberación del Pueblo del Sudán en la Oposición le dijo al Grupo que “la graduación no ha implicado ningún cambio en mi vida. He vuelto a mis actividades habituales para sobrevivir, a hacer carbón para vender”²⁶. A octubre de 2022, solo se había desplegado en el estado de Warrap un contingente de unos 2.000 soldados graduados de las fuerzas unificadas necesarias, aunque no como parte de un plan de despliegue formal²⁷.

29. En la práctica, las fuerzas unificadas necesarias solo constituyen una fuerza paralela mal equipada y pobremente entrenada. Tanto las Fuerzas de Defensa del Pueblo de Sudán del Sur como el Servicio Nacional de Seguridad siguen llevando a cabo su propio reclutamiento²⁸, incluso de niños²⁹, en tanto que algunos de los elementos más poderosos de las Fuerzas de Defensa del Pueblo de Sudán del Sur, especialmente el Batallón Tigre, permanecen totalmente al margen del proceso³⁰.

30. Las dificultades vinculadas con la reforma del sector de la seguridad son evidentes en los datos de las nóminas. Según las cifras del Gobierno, alrededor de

²² Entrevistas a altos funcionarios del Gobierno, octubre de 2022. Véase también Radio Tamazuj, “Torit: Graduation of unified forces postponed again”, 13 de septiembre de 2022. Puede consultarse en <https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/torit-graduation-of-unified-forces-postponed-again>.

²³ Sudans Post, “Watchdog ‘disappointed’ as Eastern Equatoria postpones graduation of peace forces for third time”, septiembre de 2022. Puede consultarse en www.sudanspost.com/watchdog-disappointed-as-eastern-equatoria-postpones-graduation-of-peace-forces-for-third-time.

²⁴ Entrevistas a altos funcionarios de la oposición, octubre de 2022.

²⁵ Entrevistas a personal del sector de la seguridad, funcionarios del Gobierno y observadores internacionales, septiembre y octubre de 2022.

²⁶ Entrevistas telefónicas a graduados en Torit, octubre de 2022.

²⁷ Entrevistas a personal del sector de la seguridad, funcionarios del Gobierno y observadores internacionales, septiembre y octubre de 2022.

²⁸ Véanse, por ejemplo, los informes del Mecanismo de Vigilancia y Verificación del Alto el Fuego y los Arreglos Transitorios de Seguridad titulados “Illegal recruitment and training by National Security Service in Tambura County, Western Equatoria State, 26 July 2022” y “Violations of the R-ARCSS and ACoH in Nasir County, Upper Nile State by party signatories, 26 July 2022”. Pueden consultarse en <https://ctsamvm.org/ctsamvm-violation-reports>.

²⁹ El reclutamiento de niños en Sudán del Sur ha sido ampliamente documentado y denunciado por organizaciones internacionales y por la sociedad civil nacional e internacional. Véase también el informe anual del Secretario General sobre los niños y los conflictos armados (A/76/871-S/2022/493).

³⁰ Entrevistas a funcionarios gubernamentales y oficiales militares, octubre de 2022.

420.000 personas figuran en la nómina del sector de la seguridad³¹. Lejos de prever la reducción de esta cifra, en su discurso sobre el presupuesto el Ministro de Finanzas y Planificación subrayó que la unificación de las fuerzas armadas aumentaría en dos tercios los gastos en sueldos del sector de la seguridad³².

III. Violencia subnacional generalizada

31. La violencia subnacional entre las fuerzas gubernamentales y las fuerzas de la oposición ha persistido, en particular en los estados de Unidad y Alto Nilo. En los últimos meses, varios incidentes graves han puesto de manifiesto hasta qué punto el Gobierno tiene dificultades para mantener la seguridad dentro de las zonas que tradicionalmente están bajo su control.

A. Violencia en Tonj Norte

32. El 25 de junio de 2022, en Rualbet (Tonj Norte, estado de Warrap), se produjeron enfrentamientos entre jóvenes dinkas armados y fuerzas de seguridad gubernamentales en los que murieron decenas de soldados, entre ellos al menos 18 oficiales militares de alto rango³³. Más de 8.000 personas resultaron desplazadas³⁴. Estos hechos tuvieron una importancia adicional, ya que en Tonj viven muchos de los integrantes de las élites políticas y de seguridad más destacadas de Sudán del Sur e históricamente ha permanecido siempre bajo el control del Gobierno.

33. Un observador local señaló que en los últimos años se ha registrado en la zona una creciente “reacción negativa a la presencia del Estado”, que refleja las crecientes tensiones que existen dentro de los principales distritos electorales del Gobierno fuera de Yuba³⁵. En una conferencia de paz organizada a nivel local y celebrada en abril de 2022, los representantes de la comunidad expresaron su preocupación ante el hecho de que las tensiones comunales en Tonj se estaban “descontrolando tras la firma del Acuerdo Revitalizado para la Solución del Conflicto en la República de Sudán del Sur” y ante la ulterior imposibilidad de llegar a un “consenso sobre ... [la] selección de personas para ocupar puestos en los distintos niveles de gobierno”³⁶. También expresaron su preocupación por la “participación de ... algunos funcionarios del Gobierno y oficiales de seguridad que atizan el conflicto intercomunal mediante la incitación y el suministro de armas letales”³⁷.

³¹ Ministerio de Finanzas y Planificación, “Preliminary Narrative Report on Utilization of RCF Funds”, 12 de marzo de 2021. Puede consultarse en www.mofep-grss.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/LD.-Report-on-Use-of-RCF-Funds-Revised-version-March-27-2-.pdf.

³² Ministerio de Finanzas y Planificación, discurso sobre el presupuesto para el ejercicio económico 2022/23, julio de 2022. Puede consultarse en <https://3309b9.n3cdn1.secureserver.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Budget-Speech-Latest-02-08-2022-1.pdf>.

³³ Véase el anexo 13. Véase también Eye Radio, “Armed civilians kill dozens of soldiers in Warrap State”, 27 de junio de 2022. Puede consultarse en www.eyeradio.org/armed-armed-civilians-kill-dozens-of-soldiers-in-warrap-statecivilians-kill-eighteen-soldiers-in-warrap-state.

³⁴ Number One Citizen, “Over 8,000 people displaced in Tonj”, 29 de julio de 2022. Puede consultarse en <https://onecitizendaily.com/index.php/2022/07/29/over-8000-people-displaced-in-tonj>.

³⁵ Entrevista telefónica a un destacado observador local de Warrap, octubre de 2022.

³⁶ Resumen oficial de la conferencia que obra en poder del Grupo de Expertos.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

34. En mayo de 2022 se puso en marcha un ejercicio de desarme, que pronto se vio socavado por las tensiones y la desconfianza³⁸. Se acusó a las fuerzas de desarme, incluido el Servicio Nacional de Seguridad, de tener una actitud sesgada hacia determinadas comunidades³⁹, y en particular de tomar como blanco a la de Awan Parek, y surgieron informes sobre coacciones y detenciones de jefes locales⁴⁰.

35. Mientras crecían las tensiones, se produjeron violentos robos de ganado que culminaron en un ataque a las fuerzas gubernamentales, y el 25 de junio de 2022 el Presidente, Sr. Kiir, ordenó que se llevara a cabo una gran operación militar en Rualbet⁴¹. Se desplegaron cientos de efectivos militares de las divisiones 3, 5 y 11, así como de Ecuatoria Central⁴². Asimismo, se informó de que se había observado un helicóptero armado en la zona⁴³.

36. A pesar de las garantías de que el Gobierno no aplicaría “castigos colectivos”⁴⁴, los informes indican que el despliegue dio lugar a numerosas detenciones arbitrarias, asesinatos y violaciones, incluidas violaciones en grupo de mujeres y menores de Awan Parek. Las fuerzas de seguridad tomaron las instalaciones sanitarias locales y se negó el acceso humanitario en todas las carreteras que conducen a Rualbet⁴⁵. Como consecuencia de ello, no se recogieron las cosechas, lo que genera preocupación ante la posibilidad de que la inseguridad alimentaria en Tonj Norte continúe en 2023.

37. Tras el conflicto de Rualbet el Sr. Kiir anunció la creación de dos comisiones de investigación. La primera, en agosto de 2022, no cumplió el plazo de tres semanas para presentar un informe⁴⁶. La segunda, integrada por un equipo de seguridad de alto nivel procedente de Yuba, fue enviada para que “se ocupase personalmente de la situación” y elaboró un informe que no se ha hecho público⁴⁷.

B. Ejecuciones extrajudiciales en Mayom

38. El 8 de agosto de 2022, cuatro aliados del comandante de la oposición Stephen Buay Rolnyang fueron ejecutados en Kaikang, cerca de Mayom (estado de Unidad). Las ejecuciones fueron llevadas a cabo por fuerzas de seguridad del Gobierno en

³⁸ Radio Tamazuj, “Tonj East community surrenders over 900 illegal guns in disarmament exercise”, 27 de mayo de 2022. Puede consultarse en <https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/tonj-east-county-community-surrender-over-900-illegal-guns-in-disarmament-exercise>.

³⁹ Entrevistas telefónicas a observadores nacionales e internacionales, junio a octubre de 2022.

⁴⁰ *Ibid*; corroborado por informes obtenidos por el Grupo de Expertos. Véanse también los anexos 14, 15 y 16.

⁴¹ Sudans Post, “Kiir to ‘punish’ killers of high-ranking military officers, civilians in Tonj”, junio de 2022. Puede consultarse en www.sudanspost.com/kiir-to-punish-killers-of-high-ranking-military-officers-civilians-in-tonj.

⁴² Entrevistas telefónicas a observadores nacionales e internacionales, junio a octubre de 2022; corroborado por informes obtenidos por el Grupo de Expertos. Véase también Eye Radio, “Top security chiefs vow to restore security in Tonj North”, 3 de julio de 2022. Puede consultarse en www.eyeradio.org/top-security-chiefs-vow-to-restore-security-in-tonj-north.

⁴³ Entrevistas a observadores nacionales e internacionales, septiembre y octubre de 2022.

⁴⁴ Observaciones formuladas por el Presidente, Salva Kiir Mayardit, con ocasión del día de la independencia en Sudán del Sur, 9 de julio de 2022.

⁴⁵ Entrevistas telefónicas a observadores nacionales e internacionales, junio a octubre de 2022; corroborado por informes obtenidos por el Grupo de Expertos.

⁴⁶ City Review, “President Kiir forms committee to probe Warrap conflicts”, 4 de agosto de 2022. Puede consultarse en <https://cityreviewss.com/president-kiir-forms-committee-to-probe-warrap-conflicts>.

⁴⁷ A octubre de 2022. Entrevista a un oficial superior de las Fuerzas de Defensa del Pueblo de Sudán del Sur, octubre de 2022. Declaraciones del Gobierno que obran en poder del Grupo de Expertos.

colaboración con altos funcionarios del gobierno estatal y nacional. Se tomaron videos y fotografías de las ejecuciones, y las imágenes se difundieron ampliamente⁴⁸.

39. Mayom es un enclave mayoritariamente nuer en el estado de Unidad que ha estado históricamente bajo el control del Gobierno. Al igual que el Sr. Buay, los hombres ejecutados eran de Mayom y habían desertado de las fuerzas gubernamentales para formar el Movimiento/Ejército del Pueblo de Sudán del Sur⁴⁹.

40. El 22 de julio de 2022, en represalia por las operaciones de las Fuerzas de Defensa del Pueblo de Sudán del Sur contra el Movimiento/Ejército del Pueblo de Sudán del Sur, fuerzas bajo el mando del Sr. Buay atacaron e incendiaron la oficina del Comisionado del Condado de Mayom y asesinaron al Comisionado del Condado, James Chuol Gatluak Manime, y a casi una docena de efectivos gubernamentales⁵⁰. Se informó ampliamente de que el Comisionado del Condado era hermano del Asesor de Seguridad Nacional, Tut Kew Gatluak Manime⁵¹.

41. En los días posteriores, altos funcionarios sudaneses se reunieron con la familia de la víctima en Jartum y, según los testigos, prometieron capturar a los responsables de su asesinato. Una delegación sudanesa también viajó a Sudán del Sur para discutir el incidente, y se reunió con el Sr. Kiir y el Sr. Gatluak⁵².

42. Mientras tanto, el Gobernador del estado de Unidad, Joseph Nguen Monytil, y varios miembros de su gobierno estatal viajaron a Mayom⁵³ y ante una reunión muy concurrida prometieron un “rápido y duro castigo” para cualquier persona vinculada con el Movimiento/Ejército del Pueblo de Sudán del Sur⁵⁴. En una declaración de fecha 29 de julio de 2022, un portavoz de las Fuerzas de Defensa del Pueblo de Sudán del Sur en Yuba describió la participación de la Infantería Móvil de las Fuerzas de Defensa del Pueblo de Sudán del Sur en varias operaciones contra el Movimiento/Ejército del Pueblo de Sudán del Sur que se llevaron a cabo en Mayom⁵⁵. Al día siguiente, combatientes del Movimiento/Ejército del Pueblo de Sudán del Sur emboscaron y destruyeron un convoy militar que transportaba equipo militar a Mayom, asesinando a varios soldados del Gobierno⁵⁶.

43. Al mismo tiempo, oficiales de las Fuerzas de Apoyo Rápido del Sudán localizaron a 11 soldados del Movimiento/Ejército del Pueblo de Sudán del Sur que estaban ocultos en el Sudán⁵⁷. Siete fueron abatidos⁵⁸, y los cuatro oficiales restantes,

⁴⁸ Videos y fotografías que obran en poder del Grupo de Expertos.

⁴⁹ Entrevistas telefónicas a miembros de alto nivel del Movimiento/Ejército del Pueblo de Sudán del Sur, miembros de la comunidad y funcionarios gubernamentales, mayo a agosto de 2022. Documentos adicionales sobre el caso que obran en poder del Grupo de Expertos.

⁵⁰ Véanse los anexos 17 y 18.

⁵¹ Eye Radio, “‘There will be no revenge’, says grieving Tut Gatluak”, 15 de julio de 2022. Puede consultarse en www.eyeradio.org/there-will-be-no-revenge-says-grieving-tut-gatluak.

⁵² Declaración de la Oficina del Presidente de Sudán del Sur, 27 de julio de 2022.

⁵³ Declaración de la Unidad de Prensa de la Oficina del Gobernador del estado de Unidad.

⁵⁴ Video y declaraciones publicados por la Unidad de Prensa de la Oficina del Gobernador del estado de Unidad.

⁵⁵ Véanse los anexos 18 y 19.

⁵⁶ Videos e informes que obran en poder del Grupo de Expertos. Véase también Sudans Post, “Fighting erupts as gunmen attack army convoy heading to Mayom”, 26 de julio de 2022. Puede consultarse en www.sudanspost.com/fighting-erupts-as-gunmen-attack-army-convoy-heading-to-mayom.

⁵⁷ Entrevistas realizadas a observadores y a observadores de los derechos humanos, e informes y videos obtenidos por el Grupo de Expertos. Véase el anexo 20.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

Gatluok Majiok, Nyuon Garang Kuol, Pur Ruop Kuol y Dhoal Barpuoh Tap, fueron entregados a las autoridades de Sudán del Sur en la frontera⁵⁹.

44. Posteriormente, tres de los cuatro hombres fueron ejecutados por un pelotón de fusilamiento en presencia de oficiales de las Fuerzas de Defensa del Pueblo de Sudán del Sur y funcionarios del Gobierno en Kaikang, cerca de Mayom, el 8 de agosto de 2022⁶⁰. El Sr. Majiok fue quemado vivo dentro de una cabaña de paja cercana.

45. Tras las ejecuciones, el Gobierno de Sudán del Sur abrió una investigación sobre el incidente⁶¹. Sin embargo, el 25 de agosto el Presidente rechazó una recomendación del Consejo de los Estados para que se relevara al Sr. Monyтуil de su cargo de Gobernador⁶². El Sr. Monyтуil dijo al Grupo de Expertos que la recomendación del Consejo no estaba relacionada con las ejecuciones en Mayom⁶³.

46. Desde entonces, los familiares de los soldados ejecutados han sufrido acoso e intimidación tanto en Sudán del Sur como en el Sudán⁶⁴. El Grupo de Expertos ha recibido y corroborado pruebas de que el gobierno y el personal de seguridad del estado de Unidad maltrataron y detuvieron a decenas de personas, entre ellas al menos dos trabajadores humanitarios de Sudán del Sur y un activista de Sudán del Sur a quienes se percibía como críticos del Sr. Monyтуil⁶⁵. Al menos un activista local se vio obligado a abandonar el país tras recibir amenazas de muerte e intimidaciones⁶⁶. El Sr. Monyтуil negó cualquier tipo de implicación en esos incidentes⁶⁷.

C. Violencia e inestabilidad en el Alto Nilo

47. El Alto Nilo ha seguido siendo escenario de algunos de los combates más intensos. La violencia ilustra la manera en que los avances hacia la unificación que se registran en Yuba suelen ocultar una fragmentación más profunda de las agrupaciones y comunidades en el interior del país.

48. El Gobierno utilizó eficazmente a la facción Kit-Gwang, que se formó como consecuencia de las deserciones de Johnson Olony y Simon Gatwech (SSi.002), para debilitar al Vicepresidente primero, Riek Machar, y al Ejército de Liberación del Pueblo del Sudán en la Oposición en el Alto Nilo⁶⁸. Sin embargo, poco después la facción Kit-Gwang se fragmentó cuando el Sr. Olony y el Sr. Gatwech se separaron después de que el Gobierno incumplió su promesa de integrar sus fuerzas⁶⁹.

⁵⁹ Véase el anexo 20. Véase también Sudan Tribune, “Sudan arrests key rebel officers, hands them to South Sudan”, 8 de agosto de 2022. Puede consultarse en <https://sudantribune.com/article262493>.

⁶⁰ Vídeos y fotografías que obran en poder del Grupo de Expertos. Véase el anexo 21.

⁶¹ Entrevista al portavoz de las Fuerzas de Defensa del Pueblo de Sudán del Sur emitida por la South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation, 10 de agosto de 2022. Video que obra en poder del Grupo de Expertos.

⁶² Carta del Ministerio de Asuntos Presidenciales de fecha 25 de agosto de 2022 que obra en poder del Grupo de Expertos.

⁶³ Véase el anexo 28 para la respuesta completa del Sr. Monyтуil a las preguntas del Grupo de Expertos.

⁶⁴ Entrevistas telefónicas a fuentes confidenciales en el estado de Unidad, agosto de 2022.

⁶⁵ Entrevistas telefónicas a víctimas y a observadores de los derechos humanos, así como a funcionarios estatales, agosto y septiembre de 2022. Corroborado por declaraciones y documentos obtenidas por el Grupo de Expertos.

⁶⁶ Entrevistas a un activista por los derechos humanos, septiembre y octubre de 2022.

⁶⁷ Véase el anexo 28.

⁶⁸ Véase el informe final del Grupo de Expertos para 2022 (S/2022/359).

⁶⁹ Entrevistas a representantes del Gobierno y de la oposición y a observadores internacionales, agosto a octubre de 2022.

49. Desde entonces, la violencia ha asumido la forma de conflictos múltiples y estratificados en los que participan el Ejército de Liberación del Pueblo del Sudán en la Oposición, fuerzas shilluk agwelek alineadas con el Sr. Olony, fuerzas partidarias del Sr. Gatwech, el Ejército Blanco y otros grupos armados nuer, en particular procedentes de los estados de Unidad y Yonglei⁷⁰. Es probable que esta situación de fragmentación y debilitamiento de las distintas partes resulte beneficiosa para los intereses de largo plazo del Gobierno y le ayude a fortalecer su control de la región.

50. Han continuado los ataques indiscriminados contra civiles, entre ellos un ataque que tuvo lugar en septiembre de 2022 durante el cual se prendió fuego a Adidiang, una isla del Nilo que alberga a un gran número de desplazados, provocando la destrucción de estructuras humanitarias y la muerte de varias personas⁷¹. Las milicias rivales se han acusado mutuamente por el ataque, y Gatwech ha indicado al Grupo de Expertos que no tuvo ninguna responsabilidad en el hecho⁷².

51. Además, en octubre de 2022 la violencia se propagó al condado de Fashoda, y los imprevisibles combates y los cambios en el control de los puertos y puestos de control han hecho que el corredor que bordea el río Nilo sea muy inestable⁷³. Entretanto, en las aldeas shilluk situadas junto al corredor Atar-Malakal-Kodok se han intensificado las medidas de seguridad, lo que amenaza aún más la relación entre las comunidades shilluk y nuer⁷⁴.

52. Desde el inicio del conflicto en el Alto Nilo y el norte de Yonglei, decenas de miles de personas se han visto desplazadas⁷⁵. La situación humanitaria en el emplazamiento de protección de civiles de Malakal se ha deteriorado considerablemente desde principios de agosto de 2022, como consecuencia de la llegada de miles de personas desplazadas⁷⁶.

IV. Agravamiento de las crisis humanitarias

A. Inundaciones e inseguridad alimentaria

53. Sudán del Sur enfrenta actualmente una de las crisis humanitarias más graves desde su independencia. En agosto de 2022, el Programa Mundial de Alimentos determinó que alrededor de 9 millones de personas necesitaban asistencia humanitaria y 8,3 millones, alrededor del 72 % de la población, padecían “inseguridad alimentaria grave”, la peor cifra registrada desde la independencia⁷⁷. Se calcula que

⁷⁰ Entrevistas telefónicas a personal de seguridad, líderes comunitarios, líderes de la oposición y fuentes confidenciales, septiembre de 2022.

⁷¹ Entrevistas telefónicas a personal de seguridad, observadores de los derechos humanos y grupos comunitarios del estado del Alto Nilo, septiembre de 2022.

⁷² Entrevista telefónica a Simon Gatwech, octubre de 2022.

⁷³ Entrevistas telefónicas a personal de seguridad, observadores de los derechos humanos y grupos comunitarios del estado del Alto Nilo, septiembre de 2022.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ Véase, por ejemplo, Oficina de Coordinación de Asuntos Humanitarios, “South Sudan: Flash update on developments in Kodok, Upper Nile”, 11 de octubre de 2022. Puede consultarse en www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/south-sudan/document/south-sudan-flash-update-developments-kodok-upper-nile-11-october.

⁷⁶ Entrevistas telefónicas a personal de seguridad, observadores de los derechos humanos y grupos comunitarios del estado del Alto Nilo, septiembre de 2022.

⁷⁷ Programa Mundial de Alimentos (PMA), nota informativa sobre Sudán del Sur, julio de 2022. Véase también PMA, “South Sudan: Food assistance suspended as funding dries up and nation faces hungriest year since independence”, 14 de junio de 2022, puede consultarse en www.wfp.org/stories/south-sudan-food-assistance-suspended-funding-dries-and-nation-faces-hungriest-year, y Eye Radio, “UN data: South Sudan’s population falters around 11 million”,

aproximadamente 1,4 millones de niños padecen malnutrición aguda, y las internaciones hospitalarias de niños con malnutrición aguda también han aumentado desde 2021⁷⁸.

54. El personal humanitario entrevistado por el Grupo de Expertos subrayó que se trataba de una emergencia causada por múltiples factores concomitantes que han hecho que la situación humanitaria se deteriorase progresivamente a lo largo de muchos años⁷⁹. Por lo general, las mismas poblaciones se han visto afectadas en múltiples ocasiones por múltiples crisis. El personal humanitario habló de profundos niveles de trauma y de lugares de desplazamiento abarrotados “en los que casi no se oye ningún sonido humano”⁸⁰.

55. Las inundaciones han causado devastación en todo el país, y los organismos de asistencia han calculado que más de 900.000 personas se han visto afectadas en nueve de los diez estados del país⁸¹. Las inundaciones también han provocado desplazamientos generalizados, han sumergido tierras agrícolas y de pastoreo y han agravado las ya considerables dificultades logísticas asociadas a la entrega de asistencia.

56. La violencia subnacional ha reducido el acceso humanitario y ha tenido como objetivo al personal humanitario. Sudán del Sur sigue siendo el lugar más peligroso del mundo para el personal humanitario, y hasta septiembre de 2022 el número de trabajadores humanitarios asesinados durante el año en curso mientras cumplían sus tareas —ocho— ya supera el total de cinco que perdieron la vida en 2021⁸². En un incidente, elementos armados asociados al Frente de Salvación Nacional secuestraron a 12 trabajadores sanitarios locales en la región de Yei, en Ecuatoria Central⁸³. El Frente acusó a los trabajadores sanitarios, que participaban en la administración de una campaña de vacunación, de estar llevando a cabo un censo de población en nombre del Gobierno⁸⁴.

57. Por otra parte, la libra sursudanesa se ha depreciado en más de un 50 % desde mayo de 2022, lo que ha afectado gravemente al poder adquisitivo de la población⁸⁵ y ha encarecido el costo de las importaciones. Desde mayo de 2022, el costo de los

13 de julio de 2022, puede consultarse en www.eyeradio.org/un-data-south-sudans-population-falters-around-11-million.

⁷⁸ Ibid. Véase también Oficina de Coordinación de Asuntos Humanitarios, “South Sudan Humanitarian Snapshot – September 2022”, 11 de octubre de 2022. Puede consultarse en www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/south-sudan/infographic/south-sudan-humanitarian-snapshot-september-2022.

⁷⁹ Entrevistas a personal humanitario, octubre de 2022.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ Oficina de Coordinación de Asuntos Humanitarios, “South Sudan Flooding snapshot No. 2”, 11 de octubre de 2022. Puede consultarse en www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/south-sudan/infographic/south-sudan-flooding-snapshot-2-october-11-2022. Véase también International Crisis Group, “Floods, Displacement, and Violence in South Sudan”, octubre de 2022. Puede consultarse en <https://southsudan.crisisgroup.org>.

⁸² Oficina de Coordinación de Asuntos Humanitarios, “Amidst deteriorating humanitarian situation in South Sudan, violence against civilians and humanitarian workers rises”, comunicado de prensa, 30 de septiembre de 2022. Puede consultarse en www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/south-sudan/document/press-release-hc-statement-ingo-whh-staff-killed-2022-september-30.

⁸³ Entrevistas a observadores internacionales, activistas por los derechos humanos y representantes de la sociedad civil, e informes obtenidos por el Grupo de Expertos, septiembre y octubre de 2022.

⁸⁴ Informes obtenidos por el Grupo de Expertos.

⁸⁵ Comparación de los tipos oficiales de cambio entre mayo y octubre de 2022.

alimentos ha aumentado a un ritmo históricamente elevado en gran parte del país⁸⁶. Además, como los sueldos de la administración pública y de las fuerzas armadas no se han pagado, han proliferado los puestos de control y otros impedimentos para el acceso humanitario, lo que dificulta aún más la entrega de la asistencia⁸⁷.

B. La violencia subnacional socava la seguridad alimentaria

58. La violencia subnacional continúa causando el desplazamiento de decenas de miles de civiles, y algunas fuentes sugieren que los ataques contra la población civil han sido programados en forma deliberada con el fin de que tengan el máximo impacto en la seguridad alimentaria, por ejemplo, haciendo que las poblaciones deban desplazarse durante las cruciales temporadas de siembra o de cosecha⁸⁸.

59. Por ejemplo, en abril de 2022 el Gobierno emprendió una campaña militar contra civiles en zonas controladas por el Ejército de Liberación del Pueblo del Sudán en la Oposición en el condado de Leer (estado de Unidad), lugar de origen del Vicepresidente primero, Riek Machar. Los comisionados de los condados locales y sus adjuntos utilizaron ampliamente a las milicias juveniles nuer de los condados de Koch y Mayendit, con el apoyo de las Fuerzas de Defensa del Pueblo de Sudán del Sur, para atacar y desplazar a civiles⁸⁹.

60. Como la violencia y el desplazamiento se produjeron a principios de la temporada de siembra, las poblaciones locales perdieron todo un ciclo de cultivo, lo cual, combinado con las posteriores inundaciones, creó en Leer focos de la fase 5 (hambruna) que se calcula que durarán al menos hasta mediados de 2023⁹⁰.

C. Adquisición de alimentos para las fuerzas armadas

61. Sin embargo, el Gobierno ha adquirido cantidades considerables de alimentos para las fuerzas armadas.

62. En septiembre de 2022, las Fuerzas de Defensa del Pueblo de Sudán del Sur recibieron un gran cargamento de alimentos de “Amo Investment Company Limited”⁹¹. En la ceremonia de entrega estuvo presente Kur Ajing Ater, identificado como Presidente de la empresa⁹². En su informe final para 2022 (S/2022/359), el

⁸⁶ Entrevistas a agentes humanitarios, junio de 2022. Véase también Oficina de Coordinación de Asuntos Humanitarios, “South Sudan Humanitarian Snapshot”, mayo de 2022, puede consultarse en www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/south-sudan/infographic/south-sudan-humanitarian-access-snapshot-may-2022, y “Cash Working Group”, Joint Market Monitoring Initiative Findings, 9-15 May 2022, 22 de junio de 2022, puede consultarse en www.impact-repository.org/document/reach/117f6c2f/SSD-JMMI_Factsheet-May-2022-final2.pdf.

⁸⁷ Entrevistas a agentes humanitarios, junio a octubre de 2022.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹ Informes, imágenes y audio obtenidos por el Grupo de Expertos. Entrevistas a políticos locales y nacionales, observadores nacionales e internacionales, personal humanitario y organizaciones de la sociedad civil. Abril a agosto de 2022. Declaración del Presidente del Mecanismo de Vigilancia y Verificación del Alto el Fuego y los Arreglos Transitorios de Seguridad en una reunión del comité técnico, 25 de abril de 2022.

⁹⁰ Entrevistas telefónicas a personal humanitario, agosto a octubre de 2022.

⁹¹ Véase el anexo 22.

⁹² Grabación de la noticia difundida por la South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation que obra en poder del Grupo de Expertos. La empresa se presenta de diversas maneras, como Amo, Amou, Amok o Amuk Trading and Investment Company. Los documentos obtenidos por el Grupo de Expertos sugieren que la empresa se constituyó en noviembre de 2019, poco después de que Kur Ajing Ater y Lou for Trading and Investment Company Limited fueran sancionados por el Departamento del Tesoro de los Estados Unidos por corrupción relacionada con sobornos y

Grupo de Expertos informó sobre las gestiones del Gobierno para financiar un acuerdo extrapresupuestario con la empresa “Amuk Trading and Investment Company Limited”, del Sr. Ater, para la adquisición de alimentos para las fuerzas armadas a través de un préstamo de 650 millones de dólares respaldado por petróleo, que superó ampliamente los 39 millones de dólares presupuestados para bienes y servicios para el sector de la seguridad para todo el año. El personal de las Fuerzas de Defensa del Pueblo de Sudán del Sur confirmó al Grupo que estos suministros de alimentos eran para los efectivos de las Fuerzas de Defensa del Pueblo de Sudán del Sur, y no para las fuerzas unificadas necesarias⁹³.

63. Las prácticas del ejército en materia de adquisiciones siguen estando sujetas a una supervisión limitada. Si bien aparentemente las adquisiciones son efectuadas por el Ministerio de Defensa y Asuntos de los Veteranos, durante la unificación de la estructura de mando superior el Sr. Kiir creó unilateralmente dentro de las Fuerzas de Defensa del Pueblo de Sudán del Sur el puesto de Director de Adquisiciones Militares, lo que permite que las Fuerzas sigan teniendo su propio proceso de adquisiciones independiente⁹⁴.

V. La rendición de cuentas por abusos graves sigue siendo limitada

64. El 5 de abril de 2022, el Sr. Kiir anunció la creación de la Comisión de la Verdad, la Reconciliación y la Regeneración, de conformidad con la sección 5.2 del acuerdo de paz⁹⁵. En los meses siguientes, el Gobierno también anunció la formación de comisiones de investigación tras los incidentes de gran repercusión ocurridos en Mayom⁹⁶, Rualbet⁹⁷, Kayo Kayi⁹⁸, Leer⁹⁹ y el estado de Ecuatoria Oriental¹⁰⁰.

65. A noviembre de 2022, los resultados de esas investigaciones no se han hecho públicos, y se ha avanzado poco hacia la creación del Tribunal Híbrido para Sudán del Sur previsto en el capítulo 5 del acuerdo de paz. Varios funcionarios y observadores han subrayado que es probable que el objetivo principal de esas iniciativas de rendición de cuentas consista en rehabilitar la imagen de las Fuerzas de Defensa del Pueblo de Sudán del Sur¹⁰¹. Varios presuntos perpetradores que

adquisiciones. Una emisión de la South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation y las entrevistas realizadas por el Grupo de Expertos también confirman que Kur Ajing Ater es el principal representante de Amo/Amou/Amok/Amuk Trading. Véase también The Sentry, “Sanctioned South Sudanese Businessmen Are Skirting US Sanctions”, octubre de 2021. Puede consultarse en <https://thesentry.org/reports/south-sudanese-skirting-sanctions>.

⁹³ Entrevista a oficial de las fuerzas armadas, octubre de 2022.

⁹⁴ Documento que obra en poder del Grupo de Expertos.

⁹⁵ Declaración del Presidente, pronunciada el 5 de abril de 2022, que obra en poder del Grupo de Expertos.

⁹⁶ Declaración de la Oficina del Presidente de fecha 12 de septiembre de 2022.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸ The Radio Community, “Committee formed to investigate killing of three civilians in Kajo-Keji”, 30 de mayo de 2022, puede consultarse en <https://theradiocommunity.org/committee-forms-to-investigate-killing-of-three-civilians-in-kajo-keji>, y Eye Radio, “Gov. Adil forms committee to investigate Kajo-Keji incident”, 2 de junio de 2022, puede consultarse en www.eyeradio.org/gov-adil-forms-committee-to-investigate-kajo-keji-incident.

⁹⁹ Declaración de la Oficina del Presidente de fecha 15 de septiembre de 2022. El Consejo de los Estados creó una comisión adicional de determinación de los hechos el 14 de octubre de 2022.

¹⁰⁰ Eye Radio, “Kiir to form committee to probe Magwi violence, summons Lobong and others”, 14 de mayo de 2022. Puede consultarse en www.eyeradio.org/kiir-to-form-committee-to-probe-magwi-violence-summons-lobong-and-others.

¹⁰¹ Entrevistas a un oficial de las Fuerzas de Defensa del Pueblo de Sudán del Sur, un funcionario del Gobierno y observadores internacionales, octubre de 2022.

pertenecen a las fuerzas armadas han recibido licencias médicas o han sido trasladados a otros destinos¹⁰².

A. Asesinatos en Kayo Kayi

66. El 26 de mayo de 2022, efectivos de las Fuerzas de Defensa del Pueblo de Sudán del Sur acorralaron a tres civiles de la aldea de Kiri, cerca de Kayo Kayi (Ecuatoria Central), los trasladaron a pie una corta distancia y los ejecutaron sin juicio ni interrogatorio¹⁰³. Los asesinatos fueron probablemente una represalia por la muerte de un soldado ocurrida en la zona¹⁰⁴. En las horas siguientes, los soldados regresaron a la aldea, donde golpearon a los habitantes, confiscaron teléfonos móviles y detuvieron a más civiles¹⁰⁵.

67. Inicialmente las Fuerzas de Defensa del Pueblo de Sudán del Sur negaron tener conocimiento del incidente¹⁰⁶. No obstante, tras la aparición de pruebas fotográficas, el Gobierno anunció la creación de una comisión de determinación de los hechos integrada por miembros de diversos órganos de seguridad, todos ellos estrechamente vinculados al Gobierno¹⁰⁷.

68. Los civiles locales que hablaron con periodistas en calidad de testigos presenciales fueron acosados por los soldados, y algunos de ellos posteriormente huyeron de sus hogares¹⁰⁸. Al menos un testigo y su familia fueron perseguidos por agentes de seguridad sursudaneses en Uganda después de que el Gobierno anunciara la creación de la comisión de determinación de los hechos¹⁰⁹. En al menos un caso, agentes sursudaneses sacaron por la fuerza al testigo de una vivienda en Kampala y amenazaron con ejecutarlo¹¹⁰.

69. En septiembre de 2022, un comandante local implicado en los asesinatos fue trasladado de Kayo Kayi a otro destino¹¹¹.

¹⁰² Entrevistas a funcionarios gubernamentales y oficiales militares de alto nivel y a miembros de la sociedad civil, octubre de 2022.

¹⁰³ Entrevistas a civiles locales y observadores nacionales e internacionales, junio de 2022. Véase también Human Rights Watch, “Execution-Style Killings Emblematic of Impunity by South Sudan Army”, 1 de junio de 2022. Puede consultarse en www.hrw.org/news/2022/06/01/execution-style-killings-emblematic-impunity-south-sudan-army. Véanse los anexos 23, 24, 25 y 26.

¹⁰⁴ Sudans Post, “South Sudan army soldiers murder 3 civilians in gruesome killing in Kajo-Keji”, 27 de mayo de 2022. Puede consultarse en www.sudanspost.com/south-sudan-army-soldiers-murder-3-civilians-in-gruesome-killing-in-kajo-keji.

¹⁰⁵ Entrevistas a civiles locales y observadores nacionales e internacionales, junio de 2022. Véase también Human Rights Watch, “Execution-Style Killings Emblematic of Impunity by South Sudan Army”, 1 de junio de 2022. Puede consultarse en www.hrw.org/news/2022/06/01/execution-style-killings-emblematic-impunity-south-sudan-army.

¹⁰⁶ The City Review, “SSPDF ‘yet to receive reports on Kajo Keji killings’”, 29 de mayo de 2022. Puede consultarse en <https://cityreviewss.com/sspdf-yet-to-receive-reports-on-kajo-keji-killings>.

¹⁰⁷ Eye Radio, “SSPDF chief seeks probe over Kajo-Keji killings”, 1 de junio de 2022. Puede consultarse en www.eyeradio.org/sspdf-chief-seeks-probe-over-kajo-keji-killings.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, “‘We are hunted for speaking to media,’ Kajo-Keji residents”, 4 de junio de 2022. Puede consultarse en www.eyeradio.org/we-are-hunted-for-speaking-to-media-kejo-keji-residents.

¹⁰⁹ Entrevista a personas afectadas y otros observadores en Uganda, septiembre y octubre de 2022. Informe oficial de la investigación efectuada por las autoridades ugandesas que obra en poder del Grupo de Expertos.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹¹ Informes obtenidos por el Grupo de Expertos. Véase también, Western Equatoria News, “Government installs new garrison commander for Kajo Keji County”, 29 de septiembre de 2022.

B. Tribunal militar en Yei

70. En marzo de 2022, dos soldados de las Fuerzas de Defensa del Pueblo de Sudán del Sur fueron asesinados cerca de Abegi, al oeste de la ciudad de Yei (Ecuatoria Central), durante los enfrentamientos del Gobierno con el Frente de Salvación Nacional. Poco después, un grupo de soldados cometió asesinatos por venganza, saqueos, y violaciones y torturas contra civiles en aldeas vecinas, lo que provocó importantes desplazamientos¹¹². En respuesta, el Gobierno convocó a más de una decena de soldados a los cuarteles de la ciudad de Yei y anunció la detención de 16 soldados que serían juzgados por un consejo de guerra militar en Yei¹¹³.

71. En abril de 2022, las Fuerzas de Defensa del Pueblo de Sudán del Sur anunciaron retrasos en los juicios y sugirieron que ampliarían el proceso del consejo de guerra e incluirían una larga lista de casos adicionales pendientes en Yei¹¹⁴. Entretanto, se convocó apresuradamente un proceso de reconciliación entre la comunidad y las Fuerzas de Defensa del Pueblo de Sudán del Sur que, según algunos observadores, incluyó la coacción de civiles¹¹⁵.

72. En mayo de 2022, el Gobierno anunció que 45 casos que se remontaban a 2016 e incluían a 55 perpetradores, algunos de ellos civiles, serían juzgados por consejos de guerra¹¹⁶. Los juicios comenzaron en junio de 2022 y concluyeron el mismo mes, y se denunciaron varios problemas, como el enjuiciamiento de varios civiles en consejos de guerra, la ausencia de representación legal y de traducción, y la falta de privacidad y protección para las víctimas¹¹⁷.

73. Pocos soldados fueron condenados por los hechos de violencia ocurridos en Abegi, y no se realizó ninguna investigación con respecto a la responsabilidad de mando¹¹⁸. Todos los soldados condenados eran de bajo rango, y varios fueron trasladados posteriormente de Yei a otros destinos¹¹⁹.

VI. Colaboración a nivel regional e internacional

A. Cooperación y capacitación en materia de seguridad regional

74. Una serie de acuerdos regionales de cooperación en materia de seguridad han estrechado los lazos del país con los Estados vecinos. El Grupo de Expertos ha

¹¹² Entrevistas a miembros de la sociedad civil e informes de observadores internacionales, marzo a junio de 2022.

¹¹³ *Ibid.* Véase también The City Review, “16 SSPDF officers detained over lootings, killings”, 30 de marzo de 2022, puede consultarse en <https://cityreviewss.com/16-sspdp-officers-detained-over-looting-killings>, y Radio Tamazuj, “About 16 SSPDF officers to face trial over atrocities in Yei”, 11 de abril de 2022, puede consultarse en www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/about-16-sspdp-officers-to-face-trial-over-atrocities-in-yei.

¹¹⁴ Number One Citizen, “Yei locals urged to report offences committed by soldiers”, 26 de abril de 2022, puede consultarse en <https://onecitizendaily.com/index.php/2022/04/26/yei-locals-urged-to-report-offences-committed-by-soldiers>; *ibid.*, “Military court adjourned amidst Iftar festival, official”, 30 de abril de 2022, puede consultarse en <https://onecitizendaily.com/index.php/2022/04/30/military-court-adjourned-amidst-iftar-festival-official>.

¹¹⁵ Entrevistas a observadores de la sociedad civil, abril de 2022.

¹¹⁶ Number One Citizen, “Over 40 to appear before military court martial”, 11 de mayo de 2022. Puede consultarse en <https://onecitizendaily.com/index.php/2022/05/11/over-40-to-appear-before-military-court-martial>.

¹¹⁷ Entrevistas a observadores nacionales e internacionales, junio a octubre de 2022; corroborado por documentos obtenidos por el Grupo de Expertos.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*

documentado la existencia de varios programas regionales de capacitación, así como el suministro de equipo militar no letal a las fuerzas de seguridad de Sudán del Sur. En la mayoría de los casos, la capacitación parece haber beneficiado a las Fuerzas de Defensa del Pueblo de Sudán del Sur, al Servicio Nacional de Seguridad y a las fuerzas policiales que no se han integrado en las fuerzas unificadas necesarias.

75. En marzo de 2022 la Policía Nacional de Rwanda anunció un curso de un año de duración para mandos superiores y personal de la policía, en el que se incluiría a agentes de policía de Sudán del Sur¹²⁰.

76. Según el Ministerio de Defensa de Kenya, varios miembros de los servicios de seguridad de Sudán del Sur se graduaron de un curso de formación para cadetes militares de servicios generales organizado en la Academia Militar de Kenya en el condado de Nakuru en marzo de 2022¹²¹.

77. Asimismo, fuerzas sursudanesas fueron incluidas en el entrenamiento de una fuerza de reserva de la Comunidad de África Oriental organizado por Uganda que tuvo lugar en Jinja del 27 de mayo al 16 de junio de 2022. El objetivo del programa consistía en formar fuerzas para operaciones de apoyo, gestión de desastres, lucha contra el terrorismo y lucha contra la piratería¹²². Sudán del Sur también contribuirá con un batallón de las Fuerzas de Defensa del Pueblo de Sudán del Sur al despliegue de la fuerza regional de la Comunidad de África Oriental en el este de la República Democrática del Congo¹²³.

78. En agosto de 2022, una delegación de altos funcionarios de seguridad de Sudán del Sur viajó a Addis Abeba y firmó un acuerdo de cooperación en materia de seguridad con sus homólogos etíopes¹²⁴. El 12 de agosto, James Koang Chuol (SSi.003), que figura en la lista de personas que son objeto de sanciones, se reunió en Yuba con altos representantes de las Fuerzas de Defensa Nacional de Etiopía y, en una entrevista con los medios de comunicación que tuvo lugar después de la reunión, confirmó que “cientos de oficiales y funcionarios sursudaneses” serían entrenados por las fuerzas armadas etíopes¹²⁵.

79. Las entrevistas realizadas por el Grupo de Expertos y los programas de noticias sursudaneses también han confirmado la entrega de dos envíos de equipo militar procedente del Sudán en agosto de 2022¹²⁶. Según se ha informado, el envío incluía uniformes y otro equipo no letal destinados a apoyar la graduación de las fuerzas unificadas necesarias¹²⁷.

¹²⁰ Sitio web de la Policía Nacional de Rwanda, “Police senior command and staff course students start study tour”, 14 de marzo de 2022. Puede consultarse en www.police.gov.rw/media-archives/news-detail/news/police-senior-command-and-staff-course-students-start-study-tour.

¹²¹ Kenya Broadcasting Corporation, “President Kenyatta lauds modernization of Kenya’s military training”, 31 de marzo de 2022, puede consultarse en www.kbc.co.ke/president-kenyatta-lauds-modernization-of-kenyas-military-training. Sitio web del Ministerio de Defensa de Kenya, “President Uhuru commissions first batch of graduate general service officers”, 1 de abril de 2022, puede consultarse en <https://mod.go.ke/news/president-uhuru-commissions-first-batch-of-graduate-general-service-officers>.

¹²² Transmisión de Urban TV Uganda que obra en poder del Grupo de Expertos.

¹²³ Entrevistas del Grupo a funcionarios del Gobierno, octubre de 2022; corroborado por varias emisiones que obran en poder del Grupo de Expertos.

¹²⁴ Programas de noticias de la South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation, 14 de agosto y 16 de agosto de 2022.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 12 de agosto de 2022. Véase también S/2022/359.

¹²⁶ Entrevistas realizadas por el Grupo de Expertos, agosto de 2022. Véase también Eye Radio, “Unified peace forces receive combat wears”, 26 de agosto de 2022, puede consultarse en www.eyeradio.org/unified-peace-forces-receive-combat-wears.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*; y entrevista de la South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation que obra en poder del Grupo de Expertos.

B. Colaboración a nivel internacional

80. El Gobierno de Sudán del Sur también ha aumentado su colaboración con la Arabia Saudita, los Emiratos Árabes Unidos y otros Estados del Golfo. Las empresas que operan desde el Golfo se encuentran entre los principales compradores de petróleo crudo sursudanés y entre los principales prestamistas del Gobierno¹²⁸. Hasta la fecha, en 2022 el Sr. Kiir ha visitado los Emiratos Árabes Unidos en al menos cinco ocasiones, y otras delegaciones comerciales y gubernamentales también han visitado Yuba¹²⁹. En 2022 también hubo cinco reuniones de alto nivel en Yuba y en Riad entre Sudán del Sur y el Gobierno de la Arabia Saudita¹³⁰.

VII. Fragmentación de las finanzas públicas

81. Para acumular y conservar el poder a nivel nacional y subnacional es necesario generar y distribuir ingresos¹³¹. Esto ha creado una competencia por el acceso a los puestos de poder a nivel nacional y local, como ilustran las tensiones en Tonj descritas previamente.

82. Asimismo, esta situación fomenta la fragmentación de las finanzas de Sudán del Sur en presupuestos y cuentas sobre los que distintas personas pueden ejercer un control individual, lo que socava los esfuerzos paralelos destinados a centralizar los ingresos del país y someterlos a una supervisión productiva.

83. Esto queda ejemplificado por el continuo desvío de fondos públicos, y en particular de ingresos procedentes del petróleo, hacia cuentas y proyectos que se gestionan al margen del proceso presupuestario. Esos desvíos amenazan con menoscabar el efecto de las reformas de la gestión de las finanzas públicas del país, muchas de las cuales se centran en el proceso presupuestario

84. El primer semestre del ejercicio económico 2021/22 proporciona un claro ejemplo. Aunque durante ese período el Gobierno recibió más de 535 millones de dólares en ingresos procedentes del petróleo¹³², las cuentas del Tesoro con las que se pagan los sueldos y se financian los presupuestos ministeriales no recibieron los fondos correspondientes a esos ingresos¹³³.

85. Más del 50 % de los ingresos procedentes del petróleo, a saber, 268 millones de dólares, fueron asignados al programa petróleo por carreteras, detallado en anteriores informes del Grupo¹³⁴. Otras asignaciones adicionales van directamente al Ministerio del Petróleo (3 %) y a la Nile Petroleum Corporation¹³⁵, que sigue estando bajo el control de la Oficina del Presidente, a pesar de los llamamientos formulados por el

¹²⁸ Véase [S/2022/359](#).

¹²⁹ Varias declaraciones de la Oficina del Presidente que obran en poder del Grupo de Expertos.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

¹³¹ Entrevistas a funcionarios gubernamentales y observadores internacionales, julio a octubre de 2022; corroborado por documentos elaborados por el Ministerio de Finanzas y Planificación que obran en poder del Grupo de Expertos.

¹³² El período abarca de julio a diciembre de 2021. Entrevistas y correspondencia con comerciantes que compran petróleo crudo de Sudán del Sur y documentos del Gobierno que obran en poder del Grupo de Expertos.

¹³³ Documentos elaborados por el Ministerio de Finanzas y Planificación que obran en poder del Grupo de Expertos.

¹³⁴ Véanse [S/2021/365](#) y [S/2020/1141](#).

¹³⁵ Documentos que obran en poder del Grupo de Expertos. Entrevistas a funcionarios gubernamentales, agosto a octubre de 2022.

Parlamento y por el Ministerio del Petróleo para que se la coloque bajo el control de dicho Ministerio¹³⁶.

86. Por otra parte, las cifras revelan hasta qué punto Sudán del Sur sigue dependiendo de los préstamos comerciales para colmar las brechas en sus finanzas¹³⁷. Durante la primera mitad del ejercicio económico 2021/2022 se destinaron unos 200 millones de dólares a la devolución de préstamos no declarados anteriormente del Banco Nacional de Inversión y Desarrollo de Sudán del Sur, que proporciona créditos a corto plazo al Gobierno desde octubre de 2020¹³⁸. Los préstamos, que se han ido reembolsando de forma continua, ascienden a un total de más de 675 millones de dólares, de los cuales 540 millones fueron prestados durante el ejercicio económico 2021/22¹³⁹. Asimismo, se obtuvieron 150 millones de dólares del Fondo Monetario Internacional¹⁴⁰.

87. Los informes de gastos disponibles no aclaran cómo se utilizaron esos préstamos, ni por qué se han solicitado créditos a corto plazo desde octubre de 2020. Los documentos elaborados por el Ministerio de Finanzas y Planificación solo dan cuenta de 107.000 millones de libras sursudanesas (unos 237 millones de dólares) de gasto presupuestario durante ese período¹⁴¹.

88. Además del programa petróleo por carreteras, la brecha ayuda a explicar por qué los gastos extrapresupuestarios *ad hoc*, por ejemplo, la adquisición de vehículos y alimentos para las fuerzas armadas, siguen siendo posibles a pesar de las presiones financieras que afectan al presupuesto del país.

89. El presupuesto para el ejercicio 2022/23 muestra un déficit de alrededor de 560.000 millones de libras sursudanesas, lo que genera presión para solicitar préstamos adicionales o para reducir el gasto en sueldos y otras partidas presupuestarias. Ya se han tomado prestados otros 135 millones de dólares del Banco Nacional de Inversión y Desarrollo, y las cifras que ha visto el Grupo de Expertos revelan también importantes préstamos del Banco Central de Sudán del Sur, que imprimió más de 270.000 millones de libras sursudanesas (423 millones de dólares) entre marzo y agosto de 2022¹⁴², un período en el que se registró también una importante depreciación del valor de la libra sursudanesa.

90. Por otra parte, los testimonios recibidos por el Grupo de Expertos indican que Sudán del Sur ha seguido manteniendo las transferencias de petróleo en especie al Sudán a razón de entre 19.000 y 25.000 barriles diarios, a pesar de que el acuerdo

¹³⁶ Tercera lectura del presupuesto 2022/23 por parte de la Asamblea Legislativa Nacional de Transición Revitalizada, documento que obra en poder del Grupo de Expertos.

¹³⁷ El informe final del Grupo para 2022 (S/2022/359) detalla un préstamo de 539 millones de dólares en 2019 que no se había consignado anteriormente. Véase también el anexo 27.

¹³⁸ Documentos confidenciales que obran en poder del Grupo de Expertos, corroborados por documentos elaborados por el Ministerio de Finanzas y Planificación de Sudán del Sur y entrevistas a fuentes confidenciales, septiembre a noviembre de 2022.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁰ Fondo Monetario Internacional, Country Report No. 22/266, “2022 Article IV Consultation And Second Review of the Staff Monitored Program”, julio de 2022. Puede consultarse en www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/CR/2022/English/1SSDEA2022001.ashx.

¹⁴¹ Documentos elaborados por el Ministerio de Finanzas y Planificación que obran en poder del Grupo de Expertos.

¹⁴² Un documento que obra en poder del Grupo de Expertos y que ha sido preparado por el Banco Central de Sudán del Sur detalla préstamos por valor de 271.813.538.906,32 libras sursudanesas que fueron tomados por el Gobierno entre el 9 de marzo y el 12 de agosto de 2022. El boletín estadístico del Banco para agosto de 2022 detalla préstamos por alrededor de 305.000 millones de libras sursudanesas entre marzo y agosto de 2022. Según el Banco de Sudán del Sur, a finales de agosto de 2022 un dólar estadounidense equivalía a unas 634 libras sursudanesas.

financiero de transición finalizó aproximadamente en febrero de 2022¹⁴³. Aunque Sudán del Sur sigue pagando tasas al Sudán por el transporte de petróleo a través de sus oleoductos, el monto adeudado al Sudán es ahora considerablemente menor y es muy probable que como consecuencia de ello el Sudán haya acumulado deudas con Sudán del Sur por más de 300 millones de dólares¹⁴⁴. La limitada contabilización de las transferencias las torna vulnerables a desvíos y malversaciones.

VIII. Conclusión

91. En octubre de 2022, el Obispo Santo Loku Pio Doggale, Obispo Auxiliar de Yuba, sostuvo que “no puede haber paz para una sola persona, no es posible; si todos los rincones de Sudán del Sur no están en paz, no hay paz”¹⁴⁵. Para la mayoría de la población de Sudán del Sur, esas observaciones son ciertas. Se necesitará mucha voluntad del Gobierno, muchos recursos y un gran apoyo internacional cuidadosamente orientado para garantizar que los próximos dos años de transición sirvan para lograr lo que no se pudo lograr durante los primeros cuatro.

IX. Recomendaciones

92. El Grupo de Expertos recomienda que el Gobierno de Sudán del Sur:

a) Publique las conclusiones de los informes oficiales de determinación de los hechos y las investigaciones sobre los principales incidentes de violencia subnacional, incluidos los de Mayom, Rualbet, Kayo Kayi y Leer;

b) Gestione el programa petróleo por carreteras a través del proceso presupuestario ordinario a fin de garantizar una mayor transparencia y supervisión con respecto a la manera en que se asignan y se gastan los fondos públicos asociados.

93. El Grupo de Expertos recomienda que el Comité del Consejo de Seguridad establecido en virtud de la resolución 2206 (2015), relativa a Sudán del Sur:

a) Reitere al Gobierno de Sudán del Sur los requisitos de exención y notificación detallados en los párrafos 4 y 5 de la resolución 2428 (2018) y revisados en el párrafo 2 de la resolución 2633 (2022);

b) Reitere a los Estados miembros de la Comunidad de África Oriental y a todos los Estados Miembros que limitan con Sudán del Sur que la prestación de asistencia técnica, adiestramiento, asistencia financiera u otro tipo de asistencia relacionada con actividades militares está comprendida en el embargo de armas impuesto en virtud de los párrafos 4 y 5 de la resolución 2428 (2018);

c) Considere la posibilidad de elaborar un modelo de solicitud de exención para actividades de formación en que se especifique si la formación se habrá de impartir a las fuerzas unificadas necesarias de Sudán del Sur o a otras ramas del sector de la seguridad;

d) Reitere a los Estados Miembros que, de conformidad con la sección 12 d) de las directrices del Comité para la realización de su labor, todas las notificaciones o solicitudes de exención que se presenten de conformidad con el párrafo 5 de la

¹⁴³ Entrevistas a funcionarios gubernamentales y observadores internacionales, julio a octubre de 2022; corroborado por documentos que obran en poder del Grupo de Expertos.

¹⁴⁴ Fondo Monetario Internacional, Country Report No. 22/266.

¹⁴⁵ Eye Radio, “‘They lie to you, peace only benefits politicians’, says Bishop Santo”, 11 de octubre de 2022. Puede consultarse en www.eyeradio.org/they-lie-to-you-peace-only-benefits-politicians-says-bishop-santo.

resolución [2428 \(2018\)](#) y el párrafo 2 de la resolución [2633 \(2022\)](#) deberán contener, entre otras cosas, el nombre del usuario final, y deberán indicar si ese usuario forma parte o no de las fuerzas unificadas necesarias.

Anexos

Índice

	<i>Page</i>
Annex 1: Speech by President Salva Kiir on the extension of transitional period	26
Annex 2: Statement National Democratic Movement on the extension of the transitional period.	29
Annex 3: Statement by South Sudan Women on the extension of the transitional period.	32
Annex 4: Statement by The Voluntary Civil Society Taskforce on Implementation of the Peace Agreement on the extension of the transitional period	33
Annex 5: Statement by the National Salvation Front (NAS) on the extension of the transitional period	34
Annex 6: Statement by the Like-minded stakeholders for a New Political Dispensation in South Sudan on the extension of the transitional period.	36
Annex 7: Proposal for Unified Military Front circulated by Stephen Buay Rolnyang	37
Annex 8: SSUF/A Response to proposal for Unified Military Front.	39
Annex 9: NAS Response to Gen. Stephen Buay Rolnyang’s Proposals for Joint Military Command.	40
Annex 10: Call for stakeholders consultative meeting that launched the National Consensus Forum	41
Annex 11: Press Statement on Non-Signatories South Sudan Opposition Groups consultations with Troika, the European Union, the Vatican Secretariat and Sant’Egidio	43
Annex 12: General overview of reported NUF graduation ceremonies as of November 2022	44
Annex 13: List of SSPDF officers killed in Rualbet, Tonj North	45
Annex 14: Letter from the Awan Parek community to the Governor of Warrap State.	46
Annex 15: Letter from the Awan Parek community to the Governor of Warrap State.	48
Annex 16: Statement by the Majak Youth Association	51
Annex 17: Statement by SSPM/A, dated 22 July 2022, concerning operations in Mayom	52
Annex 18: Statement by the SSPDF on attack on Mayom town	55
Annex 19: List of casualties from SSPM/A attacks on Mayom.	57
Annex 20: Involvement of Sudanese Rapid Support Forces in arrest of SSPM/A members in Sudan	58
Annex 21: Still from a video showing execution of three SSPM/A officers near Mayom	59
Annex 22: SSBC Broadcast detailing food delivery to SSPDF forces on 23 September 2022	60
Annex 23: Press statement by Central Equatoria State’s Youth Union in response to killings in Kajo Keji.	61
Annex 24: Statement on killings in Kajo Keji by Central Equatorian Member of Parliament.	62
Annex 25: Statement by the Pojulu community on killings in Kajo Keji	66
Annex 26: Photograph of civilians killed in Kajo Keji	67
Annex 27: Overview of South Sudan’s outstanding disclosed debts as of June 2022	68
Annex 28: Response from Dr Joseph Monytil Wejang, Governor of Unity State, dated 17 November 2022	69

Annex 1: Speech by President Salva Kiir on the extension of transitional period, dated 4 August 2022

The Republic of South Sudan
Speech by His Excellency, the President on the extension of R-ARCSS

August 4, 2022

- Your Excellency, Dr. Riek Machar, First Vice President of the Republic
- Your Excellences, Vice Presidents of the Republic
- Right Honorable, Jemma Nunu Kumba, Speaker of R-TNLA
- Honorable ministers of R-TgoNU
- Members of National Legislature
- Members of diplomatic Corps
- Representatives of Civil Society present
- Invited guests.

Ladies and gentlemen

Today, I am informing the people of South Sudan that the political parties who signed the Revitalized Agreement on Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) have unanimously agreed to a 24-month extension of the interim period. I want you to understand why we reached this decision.

As seen in the unanimous decision across political parties, we are not extending the transition because I want to stay in the government longer. We don't want to rush you into an election that will take us back to war. I have been fighting since I was a teenager when I joined the first Anyanya, and I spent 50 years in the armed struggle so that

you could feel the same dignity that many others worldwide feel. Nothing compares to the happiness I felt as the SPLM/A delivered your independence.

When we founded the Government of the Republic of South Sudan, we had the opportunity to build a country we would all cherish and defend. But, as your leaders, we lost focus after independence. Instead of building an effective state and cohesive nation, we began fighting among ourselves for power. As a result, we took you back to an even more bitter war where brothers fought themselves for seats.

The revitalized agreement was our chance to correct our mistakes, and I do not underestimate or dismiss what we have achieved already through this agreement. We have stabilized the country and established a framework to transform the state by building effective institutions. Due to unforeseen circumstances, we had to finance the agreement alone amid other serious priorities, like a bloated government and catastrophic flooding. As a result, significant issues remain unimplemented. Among these, we must prioritize some to succeed as a country.

I consider the reunification of the army, constitution-making, and the conduct of a census necessary to implement elections and establish a new government without reverting to war. Reunifying the army means we would protect the outcomes of the elections against spoilers who would use it as an occasion for violence. The constitution-making process will determine what type of government we need - decentralized, centralized, federal, parliamentary, presidential, etc. These choices, if wisely decided, will set South Sudan on a course of progress for centuries to come. The census will provide

the evidence upon which we will determine the details of voting, state formation, and nation-building. We will redouble our efforts to complete these to lead you to a successful election and build an effective government.

While Article 8.4 says that two-thirds of the parties can amend the agreement, Riek Machar and others unanimously decided to extend the transition period. Our shared intention is to take you to a peaceful election. While we want to implement the agreement entirely, we must be realistic. We did not even implement the mighty CPA fully, yet it remains a historic accomplishment that none will deny or reverse. Therefore, we have decided to prepare the soil over the next 24 months to plant the seeds of South Sudan's elections with a unified army, visionary constitution, and firm understanding of our country upon which to build a government that can complete the war on poverty, ignorance, and hopelessness.

While we deliver this message with heavy hearts, we nonetheless have clear minds. We know this transitional government is not what you deserve, but it is better than war. So, we extend the transition period as a pragmatic and realistic choice for 24 months of healing and consolidating.

Others, like myself, spent their entire lives struggling for the dignity of the South Sudanese people. I close this message by calling on two of them, in particular, to come back to South Sudan and collaborate with us in creating conditions for a complete political transition from war to lasting peace. Comrades Pagan Amum and Thomas Cirilo should come back home and join hands with us in Juba, like some of their comrades have. We were together in the liberation, and while we have deferred, we need them to join us now to set history on a correct course.

Thank you

Annex 2: Statement National Democratic Movement on the extension of the transitional period, dated 4 August 2022



Chairman

Date: 4 August 2022

Statement on the extension of the transitional period of R-ARCSS

We followed today, the 4th of August, the function organized by the President of the Republic for the extension of the transitional period beyond 22 February 2023. The NDM would like to make its position clear on this matter.

- 1- All along the implementation process we have all observed deliberate stalling, obstruction and selective implementation of some provisions of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). There were even cases of clear violations of the agreement by the major Party in it. Today, four (4) years since the R-ARCSS was signed on 12 September 2018, the Parties have not completed implementing the activities earmarked for the Pre-Transitional Period which was to be for 8 months only, such as the unification of the forces and completing the formation of government structures which remain outstanding. Nothing was done regarding the activities of the Transitional Period which started on 22 February 2020. It was clear that these deliberate obstructions of the agreement were driving at the extension of the transitional period for the regime to buy more time in power.
- 2- Driven by its total commitment to R-ARCSS, the NDM has been consistent in pointing out moves meant to stonewall the implementation of the peace agreement and has been putting forward practical suggestions to the Parties and Guarantors on how to accelerate the implementation process, even to forego some provisions, so that the elections are conducted on time. This was necessary not only to end the vicious cycle of transitional governments the country has been reeling under since 2005, but most importantly to avail the opportunity for the South Sudanese to vote for the first time since the country became independent eleven (11) years ago so as to elect a government that can truly represent them. All these suggestions went unheeded.

- 3- We are cynically told today that because the necessary prerequisites for conducting a free, fair and credible election have not been implemented, it was necessary to extend the transitional period under the same administration that has been responsible for the failure and deliberate obstruction of implementing the same for the last four (4) years. For sure, this extension has nothing to do with the implementation of R-ARCSS but more to do with staying in power for as long as possible. No number of extensions will ever change the equation.
- 4- Sadly, some of those who have been on the receiving end all this time have joined the bandwagon wanting to believe in the specious argument that the alternative to extension is the unravelling of the agreement or what they called Square One! It is an empty scare tactics. It is also a flawed argument and the NDM did present a plan to RJMEC on 19 June 2022 titled "A roadmap for the general elections in South Sudan" suggesting the way forward which was neither blanket extension nor for sure suggesting going to Square One.
- 5- Our roadmap was based on the realization that the prerequisites for conducting credible elections were not fulfilled, and hence it wouldn't be possible to carry out free, fair and credible elections by 22 December 2022 as planned. Based on this reality what was required was to work out a new timetable for elections based on the implementation of the prerequisites. If that timetable goes beyond 22 February 2023, then a new transitional period is to be worked out to cover that extra time needed to conduct the elections. Both the timetable and the new setup beyond February 2023 have to be agreed in an inclusive conference of all the active forces in South Sudan: the Parties and Stakeholders to R-ARCSS, the civil society organizations and the holdout groups who are now in negotiations with the government. Since the President had a special mention of some of the hold out groups, why exclude them from discussing the way forward? That conference was to be held outside South Sudan and mediated/facilitated by IGAD, AU or UN (this trio is carrying out a similar role in Sudan) and witnessed by the Troika, EU and other friends of South Sudan. The government whose mandate and legitimacy expires on 22 February 2023 cannot arrogate to itself a matter which concerns the future of the whole country. The South Sudanese needed to be consulted to find out if they can trust a government that has failed to take them to elections in four years and still counting to do so in two more years. Those in government should have even been conscious enough about the conflict of interests in the decision they have taken.

6- The roadmap which was unveiled today, is conspicuously silent on any explanation regarding why it was not possible to keep to the timetable of R-ARCSS, contains no guarantees as to how the two years will be different from the previous four, the extension is not tied to the elections timetable nor to the implementation of the outstanding activities, and no mention at all of an all-inclusive conference for the South Sudanese to discuss and agree on the way forward beyond 22 February 2023. It is that conference that would decide on the transitional administration that can be trusted to carry out the elections.

On the basis of the above the NDM, as a signatory to R-ARCSS, distances itself from the roadmap rolled out today as it is just nothing but increasing the time of stay of the current government in power. We advise our colleagues in government to revisit their stand and present what they signed today as their position in a round table conference of all the active political and civil society forces in South Sudan. That is the only legitimacy the South Sudanese will trust. There is still enough time for them to do so.

Our people are still suffering as the insecurity surges, the economy plummets, our refugees continue to languish in millions under difficult conditions in the refugees' camps and those remaining in the country face extreme humanitarian difficulties including hunger, disease, violations of human rights and floods. We should be mindful of them more than clinging to power that does not serve the very people we claim to represent. True leaders are those who put the interests of the people above their own.


Dr Lam Akol,
Chairman of NDM



Annex 3: Statement by South Sudan Women on the extension of the transitional period, dated 5 August 2022

South Sudanese Women

PRESS STATEMENT FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Rejection of the Extension of the Revitalized Peace Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS)

August 5th, 2022

South Sudanese women leaders and their constituencies express their extreme concerns about the extension of the transitional period for twenty-four months after February 2023.

We note that women and girls have suffered the most in South Sudan's internal conflict since 2013. They have been subjected to systematic sexual violence, including rape, and their access to socioeconomic justice and political participation have greatly diminished. Three years after the signing of the Revitalized Peace Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), the agreement on power-sharing has neither ended the violence nor delivered the basic services to the suffering citizens.

The current government has failed the people of South Sudan several times in the last eleven years. It has failed to carry out its mandate, including implementing the peace agreement and protecting the civilians. Therefore, the extension of the transitional period under the current leadership would neither produce a real democracy nor end the suffering of the people.

Thus, there is a need for convening an inclusive conference that brings together various South Sudanese stakeholders, including representatives of the government, political parties, opposition groups, civil society, people with disabilities, women, and youth groups, traditional chiefs, the diaspora, faith-based groups, and friends of South Sudan, among others. The goal of the proposed conference is to discuss the way forward and to agree on an inclusive roadmap that leads to the formation of a new transitional administration, with a specific mandate and timelines, led by technocrats to stabilize the country and transition it to democracy.

South Sudanese Women include civil society organizations, academia, entrepreneurs, faith-based, women with disabilities, and youth groups, among others.

Email Contact: ssudanesewomen@gmail.com

Annex 4: Statement by The Voluntary Civil Society Taskforce on Implementation of the Peace Agreement on the extension of the transitional period, dated 4 August 2022



The Voluntary Civil Society Taskforce on Implementation of the Peace Agreement

PRESS STATEMENT

Call for Inclusive and Consultative Process for Discussions of Road-Map on Implementation of Outstanding Provisions of the R-ARCSS

4th August 2022

We the Civil Society groups, express our concerns and outmost disappointment in the recent turn of events and especially how R-TNoGU has chosen to handle the process for developing a Road-Map on the implementation of outstanding provisions of R-ARCSS.

Acknowledging the continues lamentation from key actors within R-TGoNU trying to convince the public and friends of South Sudan that the Agreement is difficult to be implemented or rather not implementable. How would they alone develop a Road-Map for the same agreement without widely consulting the stakeholders?

After signing of R-ARCSS and following its incorporation into the Transitional Constitution of Republic of South Sudan (TCRSS) 2011 as amended, R-ARCSS become part of the social contract between the People and the Government and there are clear procedures outlined for any amendment to be introduce to the agreement by the parties or any person. Therefore, in our opinion the current processes of developing Road-Map, be it for implementation of outstanding provisions of the R-ARCSS within the remaining seven months or an extension, must be done through a credible, legitimate, inclusive and People Driven Processes. Therefore we wish to state the following:

- We consider the ongoing conversation on the purported developed Road-Map, as intra and inter parties' conversation, hence, we urge the parties to build consensus and convince the people of South Sudan that they indeed will honor their own Road-Map.
- The alleged "civil society consultations" as rightfully attributed to one entity within the civil society, is not enough. We wish to categorically state that this is not sufficient consultations and defeat the meaning and spirit of inclusivity as outlined in R-ARCSS.
- As representative of Civil Society groups and in an effort to echo the concerns of the public including the forces that have remained in the training centers and cantonment areas for way longer that one could humanly bear, we would wish to hear the parties clearly articulate what will they do different to realize the implementation of the remaining provision of the R-ARCSS in the next seven months.
- Any discourses pertaining renewal, remolding and rethinking of post February 2023 governance arrangement and political dispensation must include the participation of all stakeholders for realization of Inclusive People Driven Process.

End

It is worth noting that the Voluntary Civil Society Taskforce on Implementation of Peace Agreement (The Taskforce) is a network of over 30 diverse and impartial civil society organizations (CSOs) with wider grassroots presence in 10 States and 3 Administrative Areas. The Taskforce works to ensure that there is genuine implementation of the peace agreement that paves way to peace and stability in South Sudan. For

Annex 5: Statement by the National Salvation Front (NAS) on the extension of the transitional period, dated 8 August 2022



SOUTH SUDAN
Restoring Unity & Dignity of the People
National Salvation Front/ Army
OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON
General Headquarters

Ref: NAS/OSM/15

8th August 2022.

STATEMENT ON THE EXTENSION OF THE INTERIM PERIOD

On 4th August 2022, the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU) under President Salva Kiir and First Vice President Dr. Riek Machar illegally extended the interim period giving themselves another twenty-four (24) months in power after February 2023. This illegal decision of the SPLM political elites in Juba has not come as a surprise to the National Salvation Front (NAS) as NAS has been monitoring and alerted the public of the secret political and diplomatic machinations that culminated into this decision.

NAS from the onset of the conception of the Revitalized Agreement on Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) and its subsequent signing, rejected this agreement because it does not address the root causes of the conflict in the country. The extension of the life-span of R-ARCSS until 2025 means renewing the same futile agreement that has prolonged the suffering of the people of South Sudan and now taking the country to total collapse and disintegration.

The Leadership of NAS would like to state the following to the people of South Sudan and the International Community:

1. NAS Condemns in the strongest possible terms the illegal action of President Kiir and his peace partner the First Vice President Dr. Riek Macher on extending their period in office under the pretext of implementing the flawed R-ARCSS. Their sole aim is being in power and maintaining the status-quo.
2. NAS maintains its position that R-ARCSS is a flawed agreement and will not bring about sustainable peace and transformation in the country. The R-ARCSS has never addressed the root causes of the conflict in the country; hence, the extension of the interim period for another 24 months is prolonging the suffering of the people of South Sudan and thwarting sustainable peace.

Email: samuelsuba@yahoo.co.uk

3. The extension of the life-span of the R-TGoNU until 2025 means the extension of impunity, corruption, insecurity, inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic violence, obstruction of civil space and stifling of freedom of expression.
4. President Salva Kiir is on record on several occasions complaining that the R-ARCSS is designed not to be implemented because it is non-implementable. There is therefore no logic in the extension of something that is unimplementable.
5. NAS reiterates its strong conviction and commitment that durable peace can prevail in South Sudan only if the root causes of the conflict in South Sudan are addressed through all-inclusive and credible political process.
6. The call of President Salva Kiir on NAS Chairman and Commander-in-Chief, Gen. Thomas Cirillo Sawka to go to Juba to participate in peace building is futile attempt by President Kiir to distract the people of South Sudan from holding him to account for illegally clinging on to power and avoiding the root causes of the conflict that must be addressed to bring about sustainable peace. NAS calls on President Kiir to make a patriotic gesture to immediately step down and allow the people of South Sudan to chart their destiny towards sustainable peace and prosperity.
7. NAS urges IGAD, AU, TROIKA and the International Community to stand with the people of South Sudan in the rejection of the extension of the interim period of the R-ARCSS and support the people of South Sudan to chart a new way forward to end the war and achieve sustainable peace.
8. NAS calls on the people of South Sudan, political parties, civil society groups, faith-based groups, professionals, Women and Youth to reject and resist this illegal decision by Salva Kiir and Riek Machar and chart a way forward for the country.

Suba Samuel Manase

NAS Spokesperson



Email: samuelsuba@yahoo.co.uk

Annex 6: Statement by the Like-minded stakeholders for a New Political Dispensation in South Sudan on the extension of the transitional period

Statement of the Like-Minded Stakeholders for a New Political Dispensation in South Sudan on the unilateral extension of the Transitional Period by R-TGONU

The Like-Minded Stakeholders for a New Political Dispensation in South Sudan met on Saturday, 6th August 2022, convened by NSSOG and PCCA, to deliberate on the unilateral extension of the transitional period by the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU). The participants in the meeting consisted of the Non-Signatory South Sudanese Opposition groups (NSSOG) to the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), other opposition movements, the People's Coalition for Civil Action (PCCA), other civil society organizations, women groups, youth associations, religious leaders, prominent personalities and issued the following statements:

1. We categorically and unequivocally reject another extension of the Transitional Period by R-TGoNU beyond its current expiry of February 2023. The R-ARCSS has already been extended twice in the Pre-Transitional Period and R-TGoNU has failed to achieve sustainable peace. President Salva Kiir has repeatedly said that "this agreement was designed not to be implemented." He made similar remarks about the initial ARCSS signed in August 2015 that it was "not a Bible nor a Koran", meaning it was open to violations.
2. We reiterate our position that the R-ARCSS is a flawed agreement that has not addressed the root causes of the conflict in the country and hence will not lead to sustainable peace. The agreement has only exacerbated the suffering of the people of South Sudan.
3. We call upon the people of South Sudan, in all their diversities, to unite and embark on broad-based consultative processes that would culminate in an inclusive political dialogue by all the South Sudanese stakeholders in a round table conference, in a neutral place, to agree on a new viable transitional arrangement

Finally we recognize and applaud the material and diplomatic support of regional and international partners for peace in our country and seize this opportunity to extend an open invitation to EAC, IGAD, AU, UN, TROIKA and indeed all other friends of South Sudan to help the people of South Sudan in their desire to unite and shape the future of their country through an inclusive national political process.

General Thomas Cirillo: NAS



General Paul Malong
Awan: SSUF/A



Ambassador Emmanuel
Ajawin: NDM-PF



Mr Alex Yatta
Lukadi: SSNMC



Ustaz Thomas Tut Doap:
UDRM/A



Hon Pagan Amum
Okiech: Real SPLM



Mr. Abraham Awolich:
PCCA




Mr. Wol Deng Atak: UPDP



Mr. Abraham Lado Lolik: SSPR *Abraham lolik*


Ms Suzanne Jambo: STEPS



Ms Angela Tuna SAA



Dr Henry Lejukole, Academic & Professionals



Annex 7: Proposal for Unified Military Front circulated by Stephen Buay Rolnyang, dated 19 October 2022



**SOUTH SUDAN PEOPLE'S MOVEMENT / ARMY
(SSPM / A)**



OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN & COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF



SSPM/A/10/015/2022 **19 October 2022**

To: General Paul Malong Awan -Chairman and commander-in-chief, SSUF/A
 R: General Thomas Cirilo Swaka -Chairman and commander-in-Chief, NAS
 R: General Simon Gatwech Dual -Chairman and Commander-in-Chief, SPLM/A-IO (Kitgwang)

Re- Unified Front

Dear Comrades,

I am writing to your comradeship requesting for the formation of a unified military front to challenge the regime physically in a joint military front to liberate the people of South Sudan from the dictatorship rule in Juba.

Formation of Joint military High Command Council (JMHCC)

S/N	Rank	Name in full	Position
1.	General	Paul Malong Awan	Commander -in-Chief of the Unified forces
2.	General	Thomas Cirilo Swaka	Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Unified Forces
3.	General	Simon Gatwech Dual	Chief of General staff of Unified Forces
4.	General	Stephen Buay Rolnyang	Deputy Chief of General staff for Operations and Security
5.	General	From NAS	Deputy Chief of General staff for Admin and finance
6.	General	From SSUF/A	Deputy Chief of General staff for Logistics and Procurement
7.	General	From IO-Kitgwang	Deputy Chief of General Staff for Military Orientation

Office of the chairman and commander-in-Chief

1

2. Formation of the Unified Fronts.

1. **1st Front** – Equatoria region to be commanded by a General officer from the NAS.
2. **2nd Front**- Upper Nile region to be commanded by a General officer from the IO Kitgwan.
3. **3rd Front**- Bhar El Ghazal region to be commanded by a General officer from the SSUF/A.

3. Formation of Infantry Divisions

1st Front infantry Divisions (Equatoria Region)

1. **1st Infantry Division- Central Equatoria**
2. **2nd Infantry Division- Eastern Equatoria**
3. **3rd Infantry Division- Western Equatoria**


2nd Front infantry Divisions (Upper Nile Region)

1. **4th Infantry Division- Unity state**
2. **5th Infantry Division- Upper Nile state**
3. **6th Infantry Division – Jonglei state**

3rd Front infantry Divisions (Bhar El Ghazal Region)

1. **7th Infantry Division-Northern Bhar El Ghazal, Wau and Raja**
2. **8th Infantry Division- Warrap**
3. **9th Infantry Division- Lakes**

4. Your c/ship positive respond will be highly appreciated.



General Stephen Buay Rolnyang
Chairman and Commander-in-Chief, SSPM/A
SSPM/A GHQ DAJO, UPPER NILE REGION

Office of the chairman and commander-in-Chief

Annex 8: SSUF/A Response to proposal for Unified Military Front, dated 21 October 2022



SOUTH SUDAN UNITED FRONT/ARMY

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN AND C-IN-C OF SSUF/A

Date: October, 21, 2022

No: SSUF/A/ OoC/ C.I.C/ 5-A-1

To: Gen. Stephen Buay Rolnyang,
Chairman and C-IN-C SSPM/A

R: Gen Thomas Cirillo Swaka Chairman and C-IN-C of NAS

R: Gen. Simon Gatwech Dual, Chairman and C-IN-C of SPLM/A - IO Kitgwang

Re: Establishment of Joint Military High Command Council (JMHCC) and Unified Forces.

In reference to your letter dated 19 October, 2022, vide number SSPM/A/10/015/2022. In which you come up with a proposal to challenge the regime by fighting collectively under one leadership and launch offensive fronts to save our country from the brutality of the Salva Kiir government.

We would like to assure you that, your proposal has been accepted by this end. We will work together until this proposal finds its way to implementation.

In order to restore the current situation imposed against the people of South Sudan, from the dominance of this tyrannical regime, we ought to unite as leaders, and launch a full-scale military operation against the Juba regime.

The only solution to save the country from the hands of the dwarves, is an organized military campaign from all directions, we lack this strategy and the government of Salva Kiir has found ways to prolong the suffering of our people. Let's unite for the dignity of the people of South Sudan.

Please accept my assurances of highest consideration.



Gen. Paul Malong Awan
Chairman and C-IN-C of South Sudan United Front/Army.

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garangkuot287@gmail.com

Annex 9: NAS Response to Gen. Stephen Buay Rolnyang's Proposals for Joint Military Command

Email: samuelsuba@yahoo.co.uk



SOUTH SUDAN
Restoring Unity & Dignity of the People
National Salvation Front/ Army
OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON
General Headquarters

Ref: NAS/OSM/22

25th October 2022.

Statement on the Proposal of Formation of a Unified Military Front

The Leadership of the National Salvation Front (NAS) has come across a letter circulating online in form of a proposal signed by Gen. Stephen Buay Rolnyang, the Chairman and Commander-in-Chief of South Sudan People's Movement/Army (SSPM/A). In the letter, dated 19th October with reference SSPM/A/10/015/2022, and subject: **United Front**, Gen. Stephen Buay Rolnyang proposes the formation of what he terms a **United Force** and proposes the Chairman and Commander-in-Chief of NAS, Gen. Thomas Cirillo Swaka, to be the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the proposed United Forces.

The Leadership of NAS would therefore like to state the following:

1. NAS has taken note of the content of the letter of Gen. Stephen Buay Rolnyang, the C-in-C of SSPM/A expressing his opinion on the need of having a military alliance.
2. NAS Leadership has neither been consulted nor has it discussed anything with Gen. Stephen Buay Rolnyang about his proposal. NAS therefore is not a party to his proposal.
3. NAS is committed to the new Road-map by the National Consensus Forum (NCF) towards convening a Round-table Conference of all South Sudanese Stakeholders: political parties, civil society groups, faith-based groups, women groups and youth groups to address the root causes of the conflict in the country and chart a way forward to sustainable peace.
4. NAS is a movement with structures such as the Salvation Council (SC) and Military Command (MC). These structures perform different functions and roles including provision of guidance and direction to NAS Leadership on strategic issues like working together with other opposition groups and making alliances.
5. NAS Leadership urges its members supporters to treat this proposal for the establishment of a united military force as an individual's opinion.

Suba Samuel Manase
NAS Spokesperson.



Email: samuelsuba@yahoo.co.uk

Annex 10: Call for stakeholders consultative meeting that launched the National Consensus Forum



The People's Coalition for Civil Action

Juba, South Sudan

Email: thecivilactionssd@gmail.com

23rd July 2022

For Immediate Release

The Call for Stakeholders Consultative Meeting

The People's Coalition for Civil Action (PCCA) wishes to invite all civil society, political parties/movements, faith-based organizations, and political groups to prepare for stakeholders consultative meeting. This invitation is a direct response to recent calls by stakeholders for a national political dialogue or a roundtable to decide on the future of South Sudan prior to the end of the Transitional Period of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS).

The PCCA is a pro-democracy non-violent movement committed to pursuing political change in South Sudan through non-violent actions and discourses, which it deems are the most appropriate means for reversing the slow decay and steady breakdown of the South Sudanese nation. The PCCA strongly believes that South Sudan is redeemable when its people can unite to challenge the status quo, which is defined by lack of strategic vision, deviation from peace and democratic paths, growing authoritarian rule, extreme violence, ethnic divisions, ubiquitous insecurity, deep rooted impunity, and widespread menace of corruption and economic mismanagement.

Confronting this situation is not a task of any special genius loner, it requires a formidable unity of purpose among the people and among the civil and political forces in South Sudan to rescue and avert the inevitable disintegration of the country if it is allowed to continue its present path.

Driven by the desire to unite the people of South Sudan, the PCCA, in collaboration with South Sudan opposition political forces, civil society organizations, and the faith-based groups, plans to convene a virtual solidarity meeting for all the stakeholders in South Sudan. The meeting aims at building consensus among the stakeholders on urgent matters around the impending expiration of the transitional period in South Sudan and to consider recent calls for a roundtable. As a corollary, the meeting hopes to consolidate unity and consensus on matters critical to and pertaining to peace and stability in South Sudan.

Specifically, the meeting has the following objectives:

- 1. Getting to know one another

2. Exploring collective response to the impending expiration of the R-ARCSS Transitional Period and the term of the RTGoNU.
3. Presenting a viable alternative route to peace beyond the R-ARCSS—the roundtable.
4. Consolidating unity among South Sudan stakeholders, including agreeing on a model and structure of future engagements.
5. Issue a joint communique.


The PCCA believes in the following as guiding its engagement with the stakeholders:

1. We believe that the fundamental problem in South Sudan is rooted in the failure of political leadership and so seeking a solution that addresses the leadership issue is critical.
2. The 8 years of joint Kiir—Riek administration (2005—2013), plus the 2015 and 2018 agreements, show clearly that Salva Kiir and Riek Machar cannot work together because of deep-seated mistrust and sheer incompetence, but they are holding the country to ransom as every peace agreement brings them back to lead the country. It is this mistrust between them that is the cause of the failure of the two peace agreements to deliver on the desired results. The people of South Sudan in the National Dialogue Conference were unanimous that the two must step aside if the country is to enjoy peace and stability. It is our considered opinion that the two must not be part of any transitional set-up after 22 February 2023.
3. The people of South Sudan have spoken through the South Sudan National Dialogue, its resolutions must therefore be considered part of a puzzle in building national consensus, with an eye to subject controversial provisions to further debates as a measure to include those who were excluded.
4. We believe that one way to avoid more crises in the country is to convene a national political dialogue that will culminate in a new administration of public trust, led by people of consensus and technocrats. We also believe in the need to build a new, credible, inclusive professional national army and security with the support of international military panel of experts.
5. We do not consider the current security, political, and economic conditions conducive for the conduct credible, free, and fair elections, though we believe strongly in the exercise of democratic elections as the basis for attaining a legitimate government.
6. The PCCA believes that South Sudan has seen more than enough violence, so we seek change in South Sudan non-violently.

If you seek inclusion in this consultative meeting, please contact the PCCA at thecivilactionssd@gmail.com.

The People Shall Prevail!

Strel Juelich



...The End...



Annex 11: Press Statement on Non-Signatories South Sudan Opposition Groups consultations with Troika, the European Union, the Vatican Secretariat and Sant'Egidio, October 2022


NONE SIGNATORIES SOUTH SUDANESE OPPOSITION GROUPS (NSSOG)

Press Statement on Rome Meetings

The leaders of the Non-Signatory South Sudan Opposition Group (NSSOG) held consultative meetings from 10th -14th October 2022 in Rome, Italy. The meetings were convened to explain and seek support for a New Political Dispensation in South Sudan in light of the failure of the Reconstituted Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU) to implement the flawed Revitalized Agreement to Resolve the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) .

During the five- day period, the Non-Signatory Opposition Groups held separate meetings with the Special Envoys of the TROIKA countries (USA, UK, NORWAY) to South Sudan and EU Representatives; the Vatican Secretary of Relations with States; the leadership of the Community of Sant'Egidio; and Diplomatic Missions. The NSSOG leaders explained the urgent need to rescue the country through the building of a National Consensus for a New Political Dispensation for South Sudan that will culminate in a Roundtable Conference. The Roundtable Conference will bring together South Sudanese Political Groups, Civil Society Organizations, Faith-based groups and religious leaders, and women and youth groups to discuss and address the root causes of the conflict in the country and chart the way forward towards achieving permanent peace and sustainable democracy in the country.

The leaders of NSSOG urge all South Sudanese to be vigilant against misrepresentations and distortions of the meetings by some media outlets and individuals. These Rome meetings were planned and conducted to find the most appropriate ways of how to rescue the country from the violent vicious cycles of failed transitions and illegitimate extensions of the failed transitional governments and prevent South Sudan from total disintegration and collapse.



Pa'gan Amum Okiech

NSSOG SPOKESPERSON

October 21st, 2022.

Annex 12: General overview of reported NUF graduation ceremonies as of November 2022

Panel interviews with government officials, military officers, security mechanisms, and international observers, corroborated by press reporting and government statements, indicate the graduation of Necessary Unified Forces has proceeded broadly along the following lines, as of 4 November 2022.

Training centre	Graduation ceremony	Graduation date	
Greater Equatoria region			
1	Gorom	Juba	30 August 2022
2	Maridi	Maridi	17 September 2022
3	Morota	Juba / Bor	27 September 2022
4	Owinykibul	Torit	19 September 2022
5	Muni	Juba	30 August 2022
6	Rajaf	Juba	30 August 2022
7	Lologo	Juba	30 August 2022
8	Rambur	Juba	30 August 2022
9	Agut-Makur	Juba	30 August 2022
Grater Upper Nile region			
10	Alel		
11	Twofogia		
12	Panyier	Bor	27 September 2022
13	Muom		
14	Kaljak		
Greater Bahr el Ghazel region			
15	Mapel	Wau	4 November 2022
16	Pantit	Wau	4 November 2022
17	Masanabira	Wau	4 November 2022

As the Panel has detailed in this Interim Report, however, there has also been considerable uncertainty over the number and identities of many graduates. Not all forces from a given training centre have been included in the relevant graduation ceremony and some training centres have been renamed and/or relocated. Additional ad hoc training centres, including centres associated with existing SSPDF facilities, have also been used to train some Necessary Unified Forces, though it remains unclear how these have been integrated into graduation ceremonies to date. With little verification of numbers and identities available, this table is only intended as a broad overview of the pattern of reported graduations to date.

Annex 13: List of SSPDF officers killed in Rualbet, Tonj North

RUALBET PAYAM OF TONJ NORTH
DATE 25/06/2022

1/no	RANK	NAMES IN FULL	DEAD
1.	COL.	AMOL DAU DENG	DEAD
2.	COL.	DAU LUAI BOL	DEAD
3.	LY-OL	AKETCH CHIMAN PACH	DEAD
4.	MAJ.	DENG MATHIANG ACHIR	DEAD
5.	MAJ.	SANTINO KUOT KUOT	DEAD
6.	MAJ.	MATOCHE DENG MAGOK	DEAD
7.	MAJ.	MUORTER MADHIEU	DEAD
8.	CAPT.	KUOL AGOK KUC	DEAD
9.	CAPT.	ABIEL LANG NYANG	DEAD
10.	CAPT.	DENG AGOK MAWIEN	DEAD
11.	CAPT.	KUOT GONG MADOL	DEAD
12.	CAPT.	ANOL NGONG	DEAD
13.	CAPT.	MADHIEU DENG YOR	DEAD
14.	1 st LY.	TONG AKOON AKOT	DEAD
15.	1 st LY.	WIEU AKON DENG	DEAD
16.	1 st LY.	MANYOR THIAK GON	DEAD
17.	1 st LY.	WILLIAM CHIRUONG	DEAD
18.	RLSM.	BOL REECH MADOL	DEAD
19.	RLSM.	MARIAK GUM AKECH	DEAD
20.	RLSM.	JOK MADUT KIIR	DEAD
21.	S/M.	MANUT LUAI CHAN	DEAD
22.	S/M.	MACHAR AGUER MAWIEN	DEAD
23.	SGT.	MANYANG CHOL MAJOOK	DEAD
24.	SGT.	THON GUET MANGOK	DEAD
25.	SGT.	MAJAK AGOK	DEAD
26.	SGT.	KUC KUC BAK	DEAD
27.	CPL.	BAK GARANG BAK	DEAD
28.	CPL.	RUMBOK MANGONG YAK	DEAD
29.	CPL.	BOL	DEAD
30.	CPL.	WOL THONY AKOL	DEAD
31.	CPL.	MANUT GUANG	DEAD
32.	CPL.	AKOON CHOL MARINO	DEAD

RUALBET MAYANG OF TONJ NORTH
DATE: 25/06/2022

1/no	RANK	NAMES IN FULL	DEAD ONE
1	COL.	AMOL DAU DENG	DEAD
2	COL.	DAU LUAI BOL	DEAD
3	LY-O.L	AKETCH CHIMAN PACH	DEAD
4	MAJ.	DENG MATHIANG ACHIR	DEAD
5	MAJ.	SANTINO KUOT KUOT	DEAD
6	MAJ.	MATOCHE DENG MAGOK	DEAD
7	MAJ.	MUORTER MADHIEU	DEAD
8	CAPT.	KUOL AGOK KUC	DEAD
9	CAPT.	ABIEL LANG NYANG	DEAD
10	CAPT.	DENG AGOK MAWIEN	DEAD
11	CAPT.	KUOT GONG MADOL	DEAD
12	CAPT.	ANOL NGONG	DEAD
13	CAPT.	MADHIEU DENG YOR	DEAD
14	1 st LY.	TONG AKOON AKOT	DEAD
15	1 st LY.	WIEU AKONG DIEN	DEAD
16	1 st LY.	MANYOR THIAK GON	DEAD
17	1 st LY.	WILLIAM CHIRUONG	DEAD
18	RLSM.	BOL REECH MADOL	DEAD
19	RLSM.	MARIAK GUM AKECH	DEAD
20	RLSM.	JOK MADUT KIIR	DEAD
21	S/M.	MANUT LUAI CHAN	DEAD
22	S/M.	MACHAR AGUER MAWIEN	DEAD
23	SGT.	MANYANG CHOL MAJOOK	DEAD
24	SGT.	THON GUET MANGOK	DEAD
25	SGT.	MAJAK AGOK	DEAD
26	SGT.	KUC KUC BAK	DEAD
27	CPL.	BAK GARANG BAK	DEAD
28	CPL.	RUMBOK MANGONG YAK	DEAD
29	CPL.	BOL	DEAD
30	CPL.	WOL THONY AKOL	DEAD
31	CPL.	MANUT GUANG	DEAD
32	CPL.	AKOON CHOL MARINO	DEAD

Annex 14: Letter from the Awan Parek community to the Governor of Warrap State

Hon. Aleu Ayieny Aleu
Governor, Warrap State
Kuajok, South Sudan

June 1st, 2022

REF: Appeal for Urgent Intervention to address the growing insecurity in Tonj North County

Honorable Governor,

We are writing to you as representatives of the people and leaders from Awan Parek Community to raise this urgent appeal. We are compelled by the recent deterioration in the security situation in our area to register our deepest concern to you as the leader of our state and the sole authority mandated to resolve threats to our common welfare as people.

The ongoing series of attacks against innocent and defenseless civilians in our area have severely damaged the harmony that has historically prevailed among our various communities. The sense of impunity that prevails in our area is reaching unprecedented levels. People who have maimed, injured and killed people are continuing to roam freely, even when their involvement is public knowledge.

We would like to specifically note the following recent attacks that led to the death of civilians to illustrate the scale of this problem:

1. On 12th March, 2022, a group of armed youth from Gongoor launched an attack on a group of residents gathered at marriage ceremony in Anyibuth (Lian Ayii Section of Awan Parek). This attack led to the death of Akec Wol Mayen, a male of 27 years and seven wounded people are: - Wut Manyual Akec, a male of 41 years, he is a Sub – Chief in Lian Ayii section, Gum Majok Mayiik 53 years old, Manguak Mayen Mayen, a male of 35 years, Mangong Madut Mayen 43 years, Akec Mangong Madut, 50 years, Ayol Mayom Mawien a young girl of 12 years.
 2. On 3rd May, 2022, another group of armed youth from Gongoor launched an attack at Ngapdengnoon and killed in cold blood Mrs. Anger Gook Mawien, a mother of five children approximately 60 years old and Mabior Majok Aneithii, a male of 54 years old, and wounded person Ayii Majok Deng Ayii (Majok- Alek).
- On 4th April, 2022, a group of armed youth launched a night attack at Apor Village that extremely resulted to the serious wound of Mrs. Akuol Athian Anci, a mother of 8 children, 66 years old.
- On 13th May, 2022, a group of armed youth raided a peaceful cattle camp resulting to the killing of Nhialic Chol Dhel in cold blood and took away hundred herds of cattle which remain at large.
- On 30th April, 2022, a group of armed youth raided 53 cows of Mayiik Ayii and Bol at Ayilor village which remains at large too. In the same raid, two old women were inhumanely driven away with cows and later released back and their health is under threat.

6. On 16th March, 2022, a group of armed youth from Gongoor subsequently raided Machuet Village that resulted to the looting of 130 of goats and sheep of Manut Mabok Angong.
7. On 11th April, 2022, another looting occurred in the village of Gak area in which 11 cows of Matueny Noon were ransacked and not recover up to date
8. On 4th April, 2022, a group of armed youth launched a ransack on the herds of cattle of Paan Bol to which 53 cows were all taken and later Tonj North County authorities successfully managed to recover the 53 cows to rightful owners.
9. On 15th May, 2022, a group of armed youth came and driven away 12 cows of Lual Maduot Kuot in Agoor Village.
10. On 25th April, 2022, a group of armed youth robbed four oxen in Lian Ayii section
11. On 3rd April, 2022, a force came and arrested Akec Arop Makerdit without warrant of arrest from county and Payam authorities and taken to unknown location in which the family does not know his whereabouts up to date
12. On 4th May, 2022, an unknown force from Awul Payam came to Lian section without the knowledge of Rualbet Payam authorities, arrested and detained Wol Malueth Ngong at unidentified location.
13. On 3rd May, 2022, a road – ambushed occurred at Akol – Awet to which a public transport car was looted.
14. On 17th May, 2022, a group of armed youth from Awul Payam went and raided a village in Awan Parek and driven away 50 heads of cattle.

The above-mentioned incidents are just illustrations of the scale and severity of this problem, and we strongly believe that your intervention is urgently needed along the following tracks:

- We call on your government to expeditiously investigate this attacks, arrest the suspects and ensure their trial to assure families of victims that there is rule of law that will hold criminals accountable.
- We call on your government to finalize the comprehensive civilian disarmament campaign across all counties of Greater Tonj, because uneven disarmament has emboldened some criminal elements to target some vulnerable communities with their illegally acquired arms.
- We call on your government to implement the resolutions of the Greater Tonj Peace Conference, which specifically called for the declaration of the state of emergency among other urgent steps. This will allow your government and other national institutions to comprehensively address the persistent challenges of insecurity in Warrap State.

Sincerely,

Signed:



Chairman, Awan Parek Community Association in Juba

cc: Chiefs of Awan Parek

cc: File

Annex 15: Statement by Awan Parek community

Statement For Immediate Release

SN01-2022-0625 - Office of Awan Parek Diaspora Community

Email: awanparekdiasporacommunity@gmail.com

Tel: +1814-703-4358. Cell: +6147-062-8228

June 26, 2022

Re: APDC's statement on civilian's killing, looting, the burning of villages and unlawful detentions of local chiefs by South Sudan's security forces in Rualbet payam.

Washington-Ottawa- Melbourne: The esteemed office of Awan Parek Diaspora community has issued the following statement regarding the killing, looting of property, burning of villages and unlawful detentions of chiefs by National Security forces based in Awul Payam.

First and foremost, the Awan Parek Diaspora Community would like to express our heartfelt condolences to the families and friends that have lost their lives, both civilians and security officers, in this senseless, ongoing violence. We unreservedly condemn the fighting or any continuation of the violence and urge that it be brought to stop immediately!

Timelines of events leading to current security situation

On April 3, 2022, National Security forces came to Awan and arrested Akec Arop Makerdit without the knowledge of the county and payam authorities and taken to an unknown location in which his whereabouts is not known up to date.

On April 4, 2022, a group of armed youth dressed in military uniforms looted a village called Gak and a property of a civilian man called Matueny Noon were ransacked.

On April 25, 2022, another group of armed youth claiming to be from National Security forces raided four oxen in Lian Ayii section of Awan Parek and took the oxen to Awul Payam instead of Warrap town which is the county headquarters.

On May 4, 2022, unknown security forces came from Awul Payam to Lian again without the knowledge of Rualbet Payam administrators, arrested and detained a civilian called Wol Malueth Ngong at an unknown location up to date.

On May 17, 2022, a group of armed youth from Awul Payam went and raided a village in Awan Parek and drove away 50 heads of cattle. All these cows have not yet been recovered and returned to rightful owners, yet the army is stationed in Awul where the alleged armed youth came from.

On June 10, 2022, a group of armed youth from Awul Payam came to Rualbet and Killed a 7ft 20-year-old brilliant young man by the name Parek Bol Awengdit and ran back to Awul, where the security forces are stationed. The government of Warrap state led by Aleu Ayieny Aleu deliberately or ineptly failed to arrest the culprits.

On June 10, 2022, a group of armed forces was sent to Rualbet to arrest youth claimed to be wanted by the army. This happened to be the same day that Parek Bol Awengdit was killed.

On June 19, 2022, the acting commissioner and Governor went to Rualbet with huge armed forces and arrested all the three chiefs of Awan Parek community. The chiefs are currently in detention in the National Security prison whereby they are being subjected to insurmountable human rights abuses every day. They are denied access to food and medical attention. This should not happen in 2022.

On June 25, 2022, National Security forces from Awul Payam, deliberately attacked three sections (Awan, Jurlian & Jurbol) of Rualbet payam from different directions. The army armed with heavy artillery and modern machine guns started shooting unarmed civilians deliberately which resulted in 38 deaths, 82 wounded and immeasurable destruction of property worth. The deliberate targeting of civilian populations based on their ethnic identity by means of killings, burning of 130 huts, raiding of over 200 herds of cattle by the soldiers, unlawful detention of Paramount Chief Mabiore Parek, Sultan Ayii Majok and Sultan Maduot Wunkuel Noon by National Security Service, provoked civilians to fight back in self defense.

Human rights abuses

So far, there is crystal clear evidence that the army has committed human rights abuses, and even though the situation is still fluid, it is going to be beyond dire. We in the diaspora strongly condemn the human rights abuses meted on the vulnerable civil population by South Sudan Defence forces that is meant to protect lives and property of its people.

Immediate steps needed to contain this evolving security situation

This group would like nothing but an end to an armed conflict. As such, we beseech the authorities in charge to:

1. Order restraint and protect human rights by ensuring accountability for abuses committed by soldiers and the National Security forces.
2. Release all the chiefs from Awan Parek Community that were detained in placed in deplorable prison conditions without cause. Their continued detention without trial is degenerating the situation.
3. Allow humanitarian aid into the area to help more than 760 displaced civilians of which majority arin Jur-Lian Ayii, Awan-Noon and Jur-Bol areas.
4. Ensure the protection of civilians against deliberate killing, the destruction of their homes.
5. Declare a state of emergency as per recommendation by the resolution of Greater Tonj Peace Conference of 2022.
6. Review the need for the presence of the National Security forces in Awul - if the forces stationed in Awul cannot impartially keep peace among feuding communities, then they need to be removed. There is no national border needing protection by the National armed forces in Awul. If they are stationed there to keep peace among feuding neighboring communities, then they have failed and failed miserably.
7. The state government needs to immediately engage community chiefs and other local leaders to help put this conflict to an end. Begin this process by forming a task force that is composed of individuals representing stakeholders from feuding communities.

8. In addition to the above immediate steps being taken, we urge the President of the Republic of South Sudan, the Chief of General Staff and the National Government to also consider relieving the state Governor, General ALeu Ayieny, of his duties. He has exhibited an inability to maintain peace in the state - that's his number one role, and if he can't do that, then someone else capable of protecting lives of not just the civilians but also of the national security and armed forces present in Warrap state. The state is in bad need of a Governor who can provide innovative solutions to current security|problems in the state.

-The End-

Approve by Awan Parek Diaspora Community members:

1. Akoon Mabuoc Deng
2. Ayii Machar Madut
3. Bol Aweng Machar
4. Bol Maluach Kuot
5. Kuot Parek Machar
6. Maduot Mabior Parek
7. Machar Maduot Madut
8. Manyang Kuot Maduot
9. Majak Maluach Kuot
10. Parek Athian Anei
11. Wol Akech Wol

**For media inquiries, please direct them to awanparekdiasporacommunity@gmail.com
Tel: +1814-703-4358. Cell: +6147-062-8228.**

Cc Tonj Community in Juba chairman: Ustaz Lewis Anei Madut
Cc Warrap State Acting Governor:Ustaz Diing Wek
Cc IGP- Gen. Majak Akech Malok
Cc Minister for internal security: Gen. Obuto Mamur
Cc Chief of General staff: Gen. Satino Deng Wol
Cc President of South Sudan: H.E. Salva Kiir Mayardit
Cc U.S. Embassy in South Sudan
Cc Embassy of Canada to South Sudan
Cc United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
Cc Amnesty International.

Annex 16: Statement by the Majak Youth Association, dated 5 June 2022



MAJAK YOUTH ASSOCIATION FOR DEVELOPMENT
"United in Diversity"

5th Jun, 2022

From the office of the chairperson.

Condemnation of the Arrest and torture of Ajak Aliel Ajak, Mapiny Chok Mapiny, Arol Chol Marou and Mangong Juac in Tonj North county by National security General, Mawien-magol.

We had received with sadness and disturbances from within us, the illegal arrest, torture and detention of the above mentioned young people from both Majak and Alabek Payams of Lou Mawien community. The young men were arrested this morning of Sunday the 5th of June. They were seen being driven to unknown location in a national security's pick up land cruiser. The motif of the arrest, torture and detention is attributed to the fact that the young men refused to participate in the faked community peace conference which is being forced on the community by Gen. Mawien-magol Mawien, Abur Achol Chol, Hon. Mawien Dhee, Athuai Athuai and commissioner Kuol Akoon of Tonj North county. It is really very bad that the members of the group are using their resources and positions to oppress and blackmail the innocent civilians in order to tune them towards their self-interests.

We strongly condemned as Majak Payam youth leadership in Juba that illegal arrest, torture and detention of the youths and urge both National and the state governments to immediately intervene and release these young people while they hold account those perpetrators behind the arrest. What we know is that the act committed by these youths in refusing to go to participate in the so called peace conference is not a national security threat neither is it of state or local security threat. It is just their individual right to do so.

we call upon the National security leadership in Juba to immediately pay keen attention to the activities of General Mawien-magol in Lou Mawien community. It is not the first time this particular General acted like this, the first was in 2018 when he tied one of the community youth by the name Malual Lual known as Malual Auling behind the military tank and pulled him anguishly on the ground just to blackmail him to not accept the creation of a new county in the community by then and in the end nothing was done. National security is a very credible institution which South Sudanese have faith in. It shouldn't be allowed to be abused and made unpopular by one person. We know the president ordered the Generals in active service like Gen. Magol not practice politics and stir up communities but Gen. Magol had defied this order and indulges himself in stirring up communities in Lou Mawien for his own interests. Very unfortunate!

In our humble opinion, we believe Peace shouldn't be blackmailing. It should be voluntary. It is not individual but a common belonging. If one owns it and forces people to it, then there must be something wrong with it and so Forcing people to participate in the peace-making may in doubt the credibility of Gen. Magol's peace in the first place.

Sign 

Nelson Wol Machin Abalgak,
Chairperson of Majak Youth Association for Development (MYAD)



Annex 17: Statement by SSPM/A, dated 22 July 2022, concerning operations in Mayom



SOUTH SUDAN PEOPLE'S MOVEMENT (SSPM)
SOUTH SUDAN PEOPLE'S ARMY (SSPA)
SSPM/SSPA GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
DAJO, UPPER NILE REGION



SSPM/SSPA/7/025/2022

22nd July 2022

Re- SSPM/A Press release

Major General Kerubino Ruay Tap, the SSPDF Commander of 4th infantry Division came to Mayom town, unity state last week with intention to clear Mayom area of the SSPM/A forces and launched an attack on SSPM/A forces at Bong on 21/7/2022, killing one SSPA soldier. The SSPM/A forces retaliated immediately by attacking and capturing Mayom this morning on 22/7/2022, around 0300 Hours AM.

The SSPM/SSPA high command has directed the SSPM/A forces to withdraw from Mayom town to nearby villages where they shall be re-organized and conduct similar operations against military objectives, regime pro-militias and regime installations in Western Upper Nile **(Unity state)** and part of Warrap, Northern Bhar El Ghazal and Raja.

As part of our rule of engagement, the SSPM/SSPA shall be committed to minimize unnecessary suffering of civilians and other non - combatants including religious people, correspondents, local and international NGOs and foreign nationals.

1

Chairman and Commander-in-Chief



The SSPM/SSPA is hereby cautioning the international oil workers in Western Upper Nile and Upper Nile regions to be evacuated immediately within one week time to avoid being caught in crossfire because the regime could not guarantee their safety.

The SSPM/SSPA is committed to liberate the people of South Sudan from the dictatorship's policy of divide -and -rule along tribal lines setting tribes against tribes, institutionalized corruption and creating more territorial militias impeding formation of the national and professional army in the country for them to remain in power for the rest of their life. Our People have been tribalized by the regime. They are unable to work together to achieve justice and freedom to confide in each other or even to do much of anything at their imitative.

Therefore, It is an optional for the SSPM/SSPA to choose violent means because all forms of peaceful and non-violent means have failed, and we are left only with an armed resistance to liberate our people by unseating this despotic regime in the shortest time possible and install a democratic system of governance in the Republic of South Sudan to allow our citizens to choose their leaders in a free and fair elections and decide on our laws.

Finally, the SSPM/SSPA urges all the SSPDF officers and local armed youths to join the revolutionary army to rescue our country from disintegrating into tribal factions.



No foreign saviours that shall come to our help. Some foreign states will even assist the regime to advance their own economic or political interests and some foreign states will act against a regime only to gain their own economic, political, or military control over the country.

The foreign states may become actively involved for positive purpose only when the internal resistance movement has already began shaking the regime, it will therefore, focus international attention on brutal nature on the regime. Therefore, international pressure will be very useful when they are supporting a powerful internal Resistance Movement like the SSPM/SSPA. However, in the absence of a strong internal resistance movement, such actions by foreign states are unlikely to happen. Let us help ourselves by standing together so that we must unseat this repressive regime so that we enjoy Permanent peace, justice, and freedom in our beloved nation.

The Chairman and Commander -in-Chief of the SSPM/SSPA congratulates the SSPM/A gallant forces for capturing Mayom town, unity state.

SSPM/SSPA- Oriaah!! Victory is ours!!!




General Stephen Buay Rolnyang
Chairman and Commander-in-Chief
SSPM/SSPA

3

Chairman and Commander-in-Chief



Annex 18: Statement by the SSPDF on attack on Mayom town, dated 29 July 2022


In conclusion, the leadership of SSPDF would like to make the following assurances:

1. That surgical offensive operations will continue in order to bring to justice bandits' field commanders that include, Spiritual Leader Lt. Gen. Gai Machaek, Maj. Gen. Gatluak Majok and their subordinates.

2. That Commercial flights should continue with their normal operations since rebels operating in and around Mayom do not have capacity to showdown aircrafts.

3. Finally, allegations that Maj. Gen. Keribeno Ruai Tap, Commander of 4th Infantry Division, Brig. Gen. Kugar Yar, Military Intelligence Chief and Brig. Gen. Chabak Machiek Gatpan, Commander of 11th, Infantry Brigade were arrested in Mayom and flown to Juba is un true. To the contrary, they came to Juba to submit situational report and for further consultations with the command.

Regards



Maj. Gen. Lul Ruai Koang "psc"(ET)
Director for Media & Press and SSPDF Spokesman,
SSPDF GHQs-Bilpam

Annex 19: List of casualties from SSPM/A attacks on Mayom, dated 22 July 2022



REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
UNITY STATE - BENTIU
MAYOM COUNTY
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR'S OFFICE



Ref: RSS/USB/MC

Date: 22/07/2022

Mayom attack casualties at 2: 30 AM

Names of Deceased people

S/No	Rank	Name in full	Unit	Title
1.	Maj. Gen.	James Chuol Gatluak Manime	County	Commissioner
2.	Brig. Gen.	Simon Wayah Ruai	Wildlife Service	Chief Inspector
3.	2 nd Lt.	Mawum Matur	SSPDF	Soldier
4.	2 nd Lt.	Joklena Bakuony	Wildlife Service	Police
5.	R/SM	Reyhok Wicyiey Chuol	Police Service	Policeman
6.	PVT	Yien Tap Badeng	SSOA	Soldier
7.	PVT	Gatpan Dor Madiet	SSPDF	M.I Personnel
8.	PVT	Tiem Nyok Muon	SSPDF	M.I Personnel
9.	SGT	Gatduel Jany Koh	SSPDF	Soldier
10.	PVT	Majiek Bol	Police Service	Policeman
11.	PVT	Gatzlay Tetleh Leak	Police Service	Policeman
12.	PVT	Gatdet Malieth	Police Service	Policeman

Names of Wounded People

S/No	Rank	Name in full	Unit	Title
1.	Capt	Zoal Juoy Duop	SSPDF	Officer
2.	Capt.	Chipak Rok Deng	SSPDF	Officer
3.	2 nd Lt	Deng Gatjiek Patal	Police service	Policeman
4.	SGT	Mun Yoach	Police Service	Policeman
5.	PVT	Puok Kuol Gatjiek	Police service	Policeman
6.	PVT	Lam Mead Gatwech	Police service	Policeman
7.	PVT	Wadar Lual Wuor	Police service	Policeman
8.	PYT	Kuahr Mut Kernyang	Police Service	Policeman
9.	PVT	Riak Matung Bieth	Police service	Policeman
10.	PVT	Both Machuop Mathoat	Police service	Policeman
11.	Girl	Nyekuola Kotek Maliah	Civilian	Girl
12.	Woman	Nyepch Nyuon Dak	Civilian	Woman
13.	PVT	Bol Mawich Dak	SSPDF	Soldier

Sign:

Gatdet Gany Madut Dirngu
Executive Director of Mayom County

Tel: +211917728800 / 211915688199

Annex 20: Images showing involvement of Sudanese Rapid Support Forces in arrest of SSPM/A members in Sudan



Killing of Gatluak Majiok in Kaikang, near Mayom, in South Sudan



Annex 21: Still from a video showing execution of three SSPM/A officers near Mayom



Annex 22: SSBC Broadcast detailing food delivery to SSPDF forces on 23 September 2022



Front row centre are the SSPDF's Deputy Chief of General Staff for Logistics and Mr. Kur Ajing Ater

Annex 23: Press statement by Central Equatoria State's Youth Union in response to killings in Kajo Keji, dated 29 May 2022



REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
CENTRAL EQUATORIA STATE
YOUTH UNION
United Youth for Sustainable Development



PRESS STATEMENT

29th May 2022

CONDEMNATION LETTER ON THE GRUESOME KILLINGS OF INNOCENT SOULS IN KAJO-KEJI BY SSPDF AND IN GEMEIZA AND MANGALLA PAYAMS BY MURLE YOUTH AND IN KISARO CATTLE CAMPS BY DINKA BOR.

The Youth Of Central Equatoria State had learnt with regret about the barbaric and heinous acts of killings to the innocent civilians in Kajo-Keji county Kangapo (II) Kiri Boma.

1. On the 26th May 2022, where three young men were brutally killed by South Sudan Peoples Defense Forces (SSPDF) as their pictures are circulating on the social media. The victims of these unprovoked killings are Savior Yamba (18years old), Justin Lisok (17years old) and Taka Ika Wani (38 years old).
2. On 16th May 2022 another young man was killed in Nyepo Payam in which the perpetrators who are heartless took a photo over the dead body stepping on the late.
3. On 21st, May 2022, the Murle youth attacked Pokor Village of Kanyawai Boma, Gemeiza killing three innocent souls, one woman and two old men who were cultivating in their farms and were forced to leave their children as orphans on no account at all. Their names are: Cecilia Twori, Aquilino Wani and Angelo Kinyong.
4. On the same date 26th May 2022, while the people were still mourning the deceased, the Murle youths attacked a kraal in Kworojik village of Yeki Boma, Mangaia Payam which claimed two lives of young men called Lodu Kenyi and Gore Mario while Kenyi Gal and Lukenyi have sustained serious injuries and they are in critical condition at Giada military hospital in Juba.
5. On 26th May 2022 at 5:00 am, the Dinka Bor attacked the Mundari at Kisaro cattle Camp and they killed three innocent persons and wounding one person now at Giada military hospital. The names of the deceased are: Luko Wani Makej, Malie Gulou and Loku Jesh.

The youth of Central Equatoria State strongly condemn these evil behaviors against our people in their localities and those who are still recovering from the stigma of being forced as refugees in the neighboring countries.

The CESYU leadership calls upon the national Government in Juba to intervene and urge the government of Central Equatoria State and the Pibor Administrative Area to urgently cooperate to resolve this issue once and for all.


And we call for the immediate replacement of Col. Kamilo the area commander of SSPDF in Kajo-Keji for failing to apprehend the culprits as this act will build mistrust with the SSPDF.

#END#

Address: Youth Training Center - Nimara Talata – Juba, South Sudan
Email: cesyouthunion@gmail.com



Annex 24: Statement on killings in Kajo Keji by Central Equatorian Member of Parliament, dated 27 May 2022



The three civilians shot dead by the SSPDF are:

S/No	Name	Age	Remark
1.	Mr. Sevious Yambe Lomuresuk	18 years	Killed
2.	Mr. Justin Lisok Lomuresuk	16 years	Killed
3.	Mr. Taha Yiga Wani	38 years	Killed

All the deceased are from itorgwe village of Kiri Boma, Kangepo Two payam.

Rt. Hon. Speaker

These gruesome intentional killing of my people has been happening without prevention to the next victim nor attempt of stopping it from reoccurrences.

As I write, justice for the deceased has not been served. With such, making the people very vulnerable and deterring, depriving and preventing all efforts for the return of the displaced and the refugees to their ancestral land in Central Equatoria State and negatively impacting the lives of kajo-keji people.

Find herein attached picture from the scene of the heinous crime



Rt. Hon. Speaker

On May 21, 2022 at 2:00 Pm, some Murle Armed Civilians attacked village called Pokoro of Kanyara Boma, Gqmeiza killing three people of whom one is a woman while the deceased were cultivating farmland.

S/No	Name	Age	Remark
1.	Akuilino Wani	62 years	Killed
2.	Yohana Kinyong	52	Killed
3.	Cicilia Twori	Unknown	killed

Again on May 25, 2022, some Dinka Bor armed cattle keepers attacked Kisaro Cattle Camp and they killed three people and wounded a person who is currently nursing serious wounds at Giada Military Hospital.

S/No	Name	Remark
1.	Malie Gulou	Killed
2.	Loku Jesh	Killed
3.	Luko Wani Makej	Killed

Also on May 26, 2022 some Murle Youth attacked a kraal in Kworojik village of Mangala Payam which two people were killed and one injured from Mundari and one person from Murle also got killed.

S/No	Name	Remark
1.	Lodu Kenyi	Killed
2.	Kenyi Gai	Killed
3.	Lukenyi	Seriously injured
4.	Unkown Murle Youth	Killed

Rt. Hon. Speaker

As you are aware about the plan launched by the Government of Central Equatoria through Juba County as published in so many media outlets during the launching of Juba County Modern Maternity (Modern hospital for women), the project is ongoing with exceptional cases and challenges.

But on May 19, 2022, to our surprise, the SSPDF fence the large portion of the land including the main road leading to the facility and the facility itself. This has negatively impact the ongoing project which situated on the northern Juba, South of Bilpam. This is second to that one of Garbu where both the Governor and his officials escaped death narrowly.

The mentioned facility is aimed to serve the biggest population of Juba if given chance to be completed by the State Government as health is wealth, calm and restrain has to be maintained through rule of law rather than intimidation and threats.

Hon- PLD

Rt. Hon. Speaker


In lieu of all the aforementioned citations I jotted, read together with the above mentioned provisions as cited herein, I am hereby humbly moving the motion to summon the undermentioned constitutional post holders to appear before the august house in shortest time possible to give accurate and comprehensive statements regarding their mandates in protecting the people and their properties.

1. The Hon. Minister of Defence should be summoned to answer some questions related to her Ministry.
2. The Hon. Governor of Central Equatoria should be summoned on the same issues raise hereinabove.
3. The Hon. Chief Administrator of Pibor Administrator Area should be summoned on the same.

In conclusion, I will appreciate on behalf of my people if the August house shall adopt my recommendations as mentioned hereunder:

1. Immediate investigation of the barbaric and heinous act in Kajo-keji County.
2. Immediate reconsideration and replacement of the army Commander in Kajo-keji by any other civilian friendly Commander.
3. The Council of States to initiate Commissioners Forum to enhance coordination and cooperation between Commissioners in all the 10 States and 3 Administrative Areas.
4. Central Equatoria State Government must disburse Security and Development Funds to all its Counties.
5. The Council of States must consider punitive measures over serious persistence administrative and security failures.

Signed



Hon. Paulino Lukudu Obede
Central Equatoria State
Member, Decentralized Governance and States Affairs Committee

Hon - PLD

Annex 25: Statement by the Pojulu community on killings in Kajo Keji



Pojulu Information Desk (PID)

pojuluinfordisk@gmail.com

No. # 20220530-3A

Subject: Condemnation
Reference: SSPDF-Massacre

On behalf of Pojulu Communities worldwide, we condemn in the strongest possible terms the recent egregious and uncouth killing of three youth in Kari Boma, Kajo Keji County of Central Equatoria State by some ill-disciplined members of the SSPDF.

The arbitrary killing of these unarmed youth is a flagrant violation of humanitarian principles enshrined in the International Human Rights Law, International Humanitarian Law, and International Jurisprudence whereof, conflict parties must protect children (youth) from being killed, maimed, or injured.

No justification whatsoever would warrant the killing and display of the victims as if they were some animal trophies. Whichever reasons may have prompted the members of the SSPDF to carry out such a barbaric act, South Sudan is a country governed by the rule of law and the victims would have to be brought to a court of justice.

We, therefore, demand from the Government of Central Equatoria State, the Chief of Staff of Defense Forces of the SSPDF, the immediate arrest of the SSPDF members and their subsequent trial in a court of law.


We also want to extend our heartfelt condolences to the bereaving family, friends, and relatives of the victims and pray that God rests their souls in peace.

Sincerely,
Pojulu Information Desk (PID), Admin

Signature: _____

Annex 26: Photograph of civilians killed in Kajo Keji

Several photographs of the victims of the killings in Kajo Keji were widely shared on social media in South Sudan. Several were also obtained and verified independently by the Panel. One of the photographs, depicting the same scene at a slightly different time, was also included in the Statement on killings in Kajo Keji by Central Equatorial Member of Parliament, dated 27 May 2022, included as annex 23, lending further corroboration to the images.



Annex 27: Overview of South Sudan's outstanding disclosed debts as of June 2022

Republic of South Sudan external Debt												
Loan codes	Creditor Name	Currency	Principal	Disbursed Amount	Undisbursed Amount	Interest Rate	Interest Charged repaid	Principal repaid	Outstanding Debt	Start Date	Grace Period	Maturity / Payment Dates
WORLD BANK LOANS												
IBADP220	Statistical Capacity Building Project	USD	8,000,000	8,282,298.84	717,401.06	15% 2%	32,811.87	132,630.18	8,145,669.89	15 Jan 2021	2Yrs	11 Jan 2021 15 Jan 11 June
IDA 54010	Health Rapid Response project	USD	10,000,000	9,047,211.71	912,748.29	15% 2%	42,380.87	-	9,047,211.71	13 April 2024	0 Yrs	13 April 21 13 April 13 Oct
IBADP216	Health rapid needs	USD	71,000,000	21,000,000.00	3,000,000.00	15% 2%	339,860.00	-	27,000,000.00	13 April 2024	2Yrs	13 April 21 13 April 13 Oct
IDA 51840	Subey Net	USD	21,000,000	18,753,267.91	2,246,732.09	15% 2%	144,521.28	-	18,753,267.91	01 Dec 2021	0Yrs	01 Dec 20 01 June 01 Dec
IDA 51630	E.A Regional Center	USD	80,000,000	1,770,207.69	78,229,792.31	15% 2%	23,721.28	-	1,770,207.69	01 June 2021	0Yrs	01 June 20 01 June 01 Dec
IDA 51130	Local Government Service Delivery	USD	50,000,000	44,493,048.68	5,506,951.32	15% 2%	207,866.30	-	44,493,048.68	13 April 2021	0Yrs	13 April 2021 13 Oct 2021
	DFI Loans	USD	270,904,170	270,904,170					270,904,170			
	DFI CRF 1	USD	32,300,000	32,300,000.00					32,300,000.00			
	DFI CRF 2	USD	174,904,170	174,904,170.00					174,904,170.00			
	African Development Bank		27,518,800	18,545,177	8,991,628	0	128,310	-	18,545,177			
Loan codes	Financial Institutions Development Bank Loans	Currency	11,170,000	7,600,000	3,570,000.00	0.00%	41,618.58	0	7,600,000.00	22 May 2017	10 Yrs	22 May 2017 February 3 July
	NORMA 55	USD	1,725,000	816,628	908,372.28	0.00%	33,821.07	0	816,627.71	22 May 2017	10 Yrs	22 May 2017 February 3 July
	Info power distribution and expansion	USD	14,641,800	39,128,344	4,383,215.72	0.00%	47,130.31	0	39,128,344.29	22 May 2017	10 Yrs	22 May 2017 February 3 July
	Other creditors		8,077,000,000	8,077,000,000			0	1,671,521,610	6,532,136,510	1,701,871,300		
	Subsea Energy	USD	800,000,000	660,000,000			28,874,516.16	471,241,290.01	318,717,111.11	Apr-17		Dec-18
	Treasury Energy	USD	300,000,000	300,000,000				0	300,000,000			
	Abrarom	USD	400,000,000	400,000,000					211,254,737.42	May 2018	1YR	March 2021 (4YRS)
	Abrarom	USD	250,000,000	250,000,000					250,000,000	Oct 2018	1YR	April 2021 (3 YRS)
	China Export-Import Bank	USD	150,000,000	150,000,000		2.00%	2,991,374.93	10,999,987.67	377,000,617	21 January 2018	5Yrs	21 Jan 2021 January and 11 July
	Qatar National Bank	USD	300,000,000	300,000,000			0		114,190,641.90			June 17 2018 June 17 2027
	TFA	USD	3,028,000,000	3,028,000,000			0	0	3,028,000,000			
	NAASDEC	USD	330,000,000	330,000,000			130,655,710.11	117,608,181.20	411,301,811			
Grand Total in USD			8,478,848,979	8,570,798,218	99,844,713	0	103,881,493	6,537,468,218	2,031,515,981			

Source: Ministry of Finance and Planning

Annex 28: Response from Dr Joseph Monytil Wejang, Governor of Unity State, dated 17 November 2022



Your letter makes one broad factual claim, namely, **that I commanded and controlled the armed and civilian forces that sought, captured and executed the four men and that I was, more damningly, physically present at the killing of the four at Kaikang in Unity State on the 8th of August 2022.**

The evidence offered in support of this claim is a series of photographs, some video clips of unknown provenance and witness testimony referred to but not attributed to any particular person. The rest of the 'evidence' is largely inferential.

First, it is inferred that I must have been involved in the killings because I was summoned by H.E. the President of the Republic to explain to him the situation in Unity State. The implication seems to be that H.E. would not have issued such summons if he thought that I was not involved.

Second, my complicity is also inferred from a letter written by the South Sudan Council of State to H.E. the President asking that I be fired.

Third, the other inferences make no links to the extra-judicial killings. Instead, they accuse me or my allies of a host of other violations: they have been intimidating civilians in IDP camps and, in one specific instance, they threatened an individual, a youth leader, who has since fled Unity State in fear for his life.

My response to the claims in your letter is in two parts. In the first part, following immediately below, I have summarised my rebuttal to the Panel's four principal claims. In the second part, I furnish the Panel with more detail, providing factual background to each of my responses and- where necessary- adding an analysis of the South Sudan legal context to buttress the facts.

Part 1: Summary Rebuttal of the Panel's Claims

I wish to make five statements in rebuttal to the Panel's four principal claims.

- a) The most damaging claim – which also seems to serve as the prop of the case against me - is that I had 'command' and 'control' of the forces and civilians who perpetrated the killings. This claim is given credence, the letter implies, by the further claim that I was physically present at the execution of the men on the 8th of August 2022.

This claim is **patently false**. It can only be one of two things: **a cruel case of mistaken identity or an egregious fabrication made by people who are recklessly indifferent to the damage their lies have the potential to cause.** I spent the 8th of August with chiefs

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and administrators in Mankien Payam, more than 60 kilometres away. There is a press release issued by my press unit reporting the proceedings in Mankien (See the attached press statement) and a video-recording of the proceedings made by an official videographer showing me physically present. (An official recording is herewith attached)

- b) The second claim is that H.E. the President summoned me to explain to him the situation in Mayom. The inference seems to be that H.E.'s summons to me were accusatory, implying that somehow I was involved in the killings.

If this is the meaning of the claim in your letter, it is both erroneous and unfortunate. Both constitutionally and politically, State Governors are the eyes of President in the States. When threats to peace and security sprout in a State, the President's first call is to his most important security apparatus in the State. The apex security co-ordinating institution in each State in the Republic is the State Security Committee. That Committee is chaired by the Governor. Who would you and the Panel have the President call first when there are serious lapses of security if not the Governor?

- c) A third claim is that the Council of State had written to H.E. the President requesting him to fire me. The inference seems to suggest that the Council of State made this request arising from its concern over my personal involvement in the killings.

Again, **if that was your inference, it is deeply mistaken.** In fact, the Council of State had first summoned me to discuss the general state of security in both Mayom and Leer Counties of Unity State. Arising from that discussion and the Council's broader concerns about rising insecurity in the two counties, the Council had asked me to fire the County Commissioners for the two counties of Koch and Mayendit. I had then pointed out to the members that whereas before the Revitalised Peace Agreement Governors could – and often did fire county commissioners, that power had since been removed from them and vested in the President of the Republic. My refusal to act outside the scope of the powers of the Governor was the trigger for the Council's request to H.E. to fire me. As it is, the response from the Presidency to the Council of State rejected the request to fire me and confirmed that my reading of the law was correct. (Attached please find the response from the Office of the President)

- d) **The evidence adduced by the Panel to support the various allegations against me is thin and fragmentary** and much of what is laid out to anchor points a), b) & c above is heavily drawn from press accounts and video clips taken by amateurs or participants

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in the events surrounding the killings. Of particular concern to me is the fact that though your letter and the Panel's Monthly Update to the Security Council for August 2022 indicates that there are also documents and interviews that buttress these press accounts and video-clips, I am unable to find a single fact or claim in the letter or the Monthly Update that is footnoted to an interview or a document.

- e) In addition to these claims, **your letter has conflated state and national responsibilities**. The result is that the Panel would have me perform functions that are vested by the laws in the national government and South Sudan people Defence Forces (SSPDF) whilst at the same time implying that I should not perform duties that the law obliges me to. Thus, the letter charges that I had command and control of the SSPDF—which would be a bold usurpation of the mandate of the national government's functions. The same letter then condemns me for turning up on the 22nd of July at the site where Commissioner Gatluak and the accompanying 12 others were murdered even though my appearance there was consistent with my role as Governor and Chair of the State Security Committee. In those two capacities, it was my job to co-ordinate, but not command responses to the breakdowns of security.

My answer to the Panel's principal claims can then be summarised as follows: **The allegation that I was complicit in the extra-judicial killing of the four men at Kaikang is meritless and wholly lacking a factual and legal basis.**

PART 2: DETAILED RESPONSE TO THE PANEL'S VARIOUS CLAIMS.

In this part I wish to organise my responses in nine (9) sub-headings as follows:

- 1. The Core Allegations Against me**
- 2. The Sources of the Panel's Evidence against me**
- 3. The Political and Military Context of the Violence in Unity State**
- 4. The Allegations about My role in the Extra-judicial Killings**
 - a. Rallying Soldiers and Civilians**
 - b. The Governor's Role in the Security of the State**
 - c. Presence at the Executions in Kaikang**
- 5. The Law on Command and Control of Military Operations**
- 6. The Council of State's Request to H.E. the President to Fire Me**
- 7. The Youth who fled on Account of Threats**
- 8. Intimidation of civilians in IDP camps**
- 9. Conclusion**

1. The Core Allegations Against me

Handwritten signature

Your letter's central claim is that "forces and civilian authorities" under my command "participated in the extrajudicial execution of four individuals affiliated with the SSPM/A opposition armed group in the Mayom region of Unity State in July 2022." The letter says that my culpability is founded on five discrete claims, namely, 1) that I was personally present at the execution of three of those men at Kaikang; 2) that I was summoned by H.E. the President to explain the killings; 3) that an unnamed youth leader—whose party affiliation is not identified—has fled Unity State after asking me to resign in the wake of the killings; 4) that the Council of State has written to H.E. asking him to fire me and 5) that some people—allegedly associated with me or my office—have threatened civilians in IDP camps if they criticise the Unity State government. According to the letter, these killings were either reprisals or revenge killings carried out following SSPM/A operations that had targetted government forces and killed the Mayom County Commissioner by burning him and twelve other people alive in his house.

This letter is a detailed response to each of these claims. However, before I make a substantive response to each discrete allegation, I would like to begin with two general comments, that is to say, 1) a comment on the sources of the Panel's evidence against me and 2) a discussion of the political context of these killings which is critical to the matter but has been ignored by the Panel.

2. The Sources of the Panel's Evidence against Me

According to your letter, the Panel of Experts relied on evidence drawn from documents unidentified and interviews with unnamed persons conducted by the Panel. However, these are the documents footnoted in your letter: a report from Eye Radio for the 24 August 2022, titled "Council of States writes to President Kiir to fire Monytuil"¹; a report from Number One Citizen Daily dated the 19 August 2022, titled "Unity governor clarifies suspected killing to President Kiir"; a report in Sudan's Post, titled "Kiir summons Governor Monytuil over Mayom extrajudicial killings"², a report in Sudan's Post titled, "Youth leader flees into hiding in Unity State after asking Governor Manytuil to resign" dated the 11 of September 2022; a report in the Sudan Tribune, titled "Sudan arrests key rebel officers, hands them to South Sudan" dated the 8 of August 2022; and a report from Eye Radio, Bentiu protestor: "I can't walk or urinate" dated the 8 of September 2022.³

¹ <https://www.eyeradio.org/council-of-states-writes-to-president-kiir-to-fire-monytuil/>

² <https://www.sudanspost.com/kiir-summons-governor-manytuil-over-mayom-extrajudicial-killings/>

³ <https://www.eyeradio.org/bentiuprotector-i-cant-walk-or-urinate>

The rest of the footnoted evidence is basically a collection of still photos and videos downloaded by or given to the Panel by those that they met.

I am deeply concerned about the Panel's heavy reliance on media accounts and amateur videos to ground the serious and injurious allegations against me. As the UN Security Council itself noted in one of the recitals in the 2015 Resolution, the Media in South Sudan has not always played a positive role or acted in the best tradition of independent media. The Resolution itself noted the inherent biases that are, unfortunately rife in South Sudan Media, lamenting that South Sudan media had been used to broadcast hate speech and transmit messages instigating sexual and ethnic violence. Most critical for this letter, the Resolution had even called on the Government of the Republic of South Sudan "to take appropriate measures to address such activity." With the greatest respect, then, I submit that the Panel's uncritical reliance on media stories and self-promoting videos by private militias to buttress the serious allegations in the letter does not—even on a lenient and most sympathetic reading—constitute a full, fair and impartial investigation. I will return to this point later in this response.

3. The Political and Military Context of the Violence in Unity State

I am also puzzled by the lack of any discussion of the political context of the events in the letter. I offer that context not as an excuse for the violence but to point out that by treating as straight-forward what is complex and deeply political, the Panel's approach may end up complicating rather than resolving the wider problems of South Sudan in general and of Unity State in particular. The broad-brush analysis in the Panel's Monthly Updates to the Security Council, the sources of and the nature of the evidence adduced, the rush to judgment whilst various local processes are still underway ([see discussion elsewhere in this letter](#)) has resulted in an unfortunate, extremely misleading and heavily one-sided characterisation of the unfortunate events of July 2022 in Mayom County in Unity State

Let me draw your attention to the extremely polarised and inflamed context in which these events happened. Unity State, like other parts of South Sudan is going through a difficult and fraught transition. We must frame all the issues in this larger political context.

Unity State has been, historically, one of the major sticking points between the Government and Sudan People's Liberation Movement-IO headed by Dr. Riek Machar. Dr. Machar hail from the Unity State and have long fought and resented the fact that I am Governor of Unity State. Particularly worthy of note but mentioned neither in your letter nor in any of Panel's Monthly Updates is that the person whose actions triggered these unfortunate events, the SSPM/A army Commander, Gen. Stephen Buay Rolnyang, a



My own role also evolved in that highly charged context where I faced the draining task of maintaining law and order in the face of imminent disorder, even anarchy. Your letter accuses me of "rallying soldiers and inciting military action against civilians" adding that on the 26th of July I was "seen in military attire directing a counter insurgency force" during which I also promised "swift and tough punishment" against anyone linked with the SSPM/A.

My response to this is short: My primary duty was to hold fort against the incipient forces of breakdown and anarchy. I have neither the military nor the political mandate to direct counter-insurgency measures. I did not issue and could not issue directions to the military. The soldiers of the South Sudan People Defence Forces have neither a moral nor a command responsibility to comply with anything that I might direct them to do.

I want to begin by responding to these claims before answering the question of military attire.

a) Rallying Soldiers and Civilians

The evidence adduced for this claim is a still photo showing me standing amongst soldiers of the SSPDF. Quite apart from showing me dressed in military fatigues (a matter addressed below) there is nothing to say what is happening in the photo. It is not clear whether I am speaking at all let alone whether the speech is a rallying call or something else.

Unfortunately, no factual claim of evidential value can be derived from the fact that I was dressed in military fatigues. And the reason for my kitting out in jungle camouflage is straight-forward. I was a civilian in an area of active military operations. If I had turned out in civilian clothes I would have stood out like a sore thumb, easy target for a shooter. I had already been threatened by SSPM/A in the wake of the murder of Commissioner Gatluak. The threat was specific to me and unambiguous: my funeral would be next. I am a former soldier and I have learnt to take such threats seriously. That is why I turned up appropriately camouflaged, to blend in with the soldiers on site.

b) The Governor's Role in the Security of the State

I am puzzled by statements in your letter seemingly implying that it was illegitimate for me to go to the killing site and meet with the soldiers of the SSPDF. That totally ignores my mandate as Governor and my co-ordinating role and political responsibility for the security and welfare of Unity State as the Chair of the State Security Committee. As the Transitional Constitution of Unity State makes clear, the Governor⁴ is

⁴ The Governor's office is established under Chapter 1 of Part Six of the Transitional Constitution of the Unity State (The State Executive)

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the head of the government of the state⁵. In that capacity the Governor represents "the will of the people."⁶ One specific function under that broad grant of power is the duty to "preserve the security of the state." The legal machinery for security at the state level includes the State Police Service⁷ and the State Security Committee.⁸

The composition and mandate of the State Security Committee is set out in the South Sudan National Security Service Act of 2014. Under section 25 of the Act, the State Security Committee is a committee of nine (9) members consisting of the Governor and Deputy Governor as Chair and Deputy Chair respectively; the Security Advisor (if any) as a member; the State Ministers for Local Government and Finance as members; the Head of Legal Administration as a member; the Commander of the SPLA Forces in the State as a member; the State Commissioner of Police as member; and the Director of Internal Security Bureau as Secretary.

The functions of the State Security Committee are to (a) maintain and keep security in the State; (b) co-ordinate among security agencies at State level; (c) receive reports from security committees in counties; (d) submit periodical reports to the Council; and (e) carry out any assignment delegated by the Council or Technical Committee.⁹

As the Constitution, read together with the National Security Services Act, clearly shows, the Governor and the Deputy Governor- who in this case happens to be from the SPLM- IO have very important co-ordinating - but not commanding - responsibilities for security at the state level. It is in this context - as the Chair of the State Security Committee - that I called for and addressed an urgent gathering of the various forces, emphasizing, in firm terms, that the fragile peace in Unity State could not hold unless the culprits - clearly identified and known, by the recorded admission of General Stephen Buay to be members of the SSPM/A - were brought to book. (in audio-clip attached above) I mentioned the SSPM/A as culprits by name. They, too, have named themselves as such. Given this, I am not clear **why my identifying SSPM/A as the culprits by name** should ineluctably lead your Panel to infer that I thereby condoned or was complicit in the extra-judicial killing of the four.

⁵ See article 99(1) of the Transitional Constitution of Unity State

⁶ See id.

⁷ Established under part eight, chapter 1 from article 129 of the Transitional Constitution of Unity State.

⁸ Established under part eight, chapter 1 under article 133(1) of the Transitional Constitution of Unity State.

⁹ See section 26 of the South Sudan National Security Service Act of 2014

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I admit that I addressed the security forces: it was part of my job. Not to have done so after such wicked destructiveness in an environment of charged emotions would have been a serious dereliction of my duties as laid down in both national and state constitutions and the laws of South Sudan. Indeed, that is the constitutional and legal context in which H.E. the President summoned me to brief him on the events in Mayom County and to outline to him the steps my government had taken to restore normalcy and deal with threats to peace. I find the notion—implicit in your letter—that the presidential summon was somehow political or moral censure as wholly unwarranted and, frankly, risible. Governors are the eyes of the President on the ground. Who, if not the Governor, should the President call on for explanations when threats to law and order sprout and spread within a state?

That said, and as I explain below, in matters of restoring security in which military operations are involved, the Office of Governor—my office—may lead but it does not rule: the Governor has no constitutional, legal, political or moral mandate, or capacity, to command and execute military operations.

c) Presence at the Executions in Kaikang

The claim that I was present at executions at Kaikang is, supposedly, the *coup de grace* of the Panel's case against me. It is unfortunately the proof—if such were needed of the dangers of relying on media's 'pictorial' evidence.

Let me start with a brief background: Those responsible for the murder of Commissioner Gatluak and the 12 people immolated along with him were sought, found and arrested on the 6th of August, 2022. On the 8th of August they were executed at Kaikang. Your letter claims that I was present during their execution and a still photo, supposedly showing me mingling with the soldiers, is attached to your 'bundle of evidence.' That claim is patently false and the person in the picture that you attached is certainly not me.

As it happens, on the day of the executions, Tuesday, August the 8th 2022, I was more than 60 kilometres away in Mankien Payam where I chaired a one-day conference of traditional chiefs and administrators from the eleven payams of Mayom county. There is both an official account of this event and a video-recording of the proceedings made by an official videographer (See attached press statement and accompanying video above).

Though—as the evidence shows—I was not at the scene of the execution, I was subsequently briefed about the situation in Kaikang. Once again, I think that it is important that the Panel understand the

context. According to my information, Kaikang was a scene of utter chaos on the day of the killings. The crowd was emotionally charged and acted disorderly and the mood was generally foul and tempestuous. As narrated to me, the officers on site lost control in the ensuing disorder. The relatives of the assassinated Commissioner and of the men murdered with him were on the scene and grief and anger were expressed equally and loudly. The combined mix of soldiers, armed local youth and an angry public wrought an atmosphere of 'nobody-in-charge' which left it unclear who was making orders, including—crucially—who made the order to execute the culprits. In my view, context calls for a judicious investigation and a measured response. Peace and justice should be achieved together.

I believe that this would be a complete answer to the allegation that I was—in effect—an accomplice in extra-judicial killings. Even so, I would like to highlight a number of legal issues and actions regarding the command and control of the operation that led to the executions that have been overlooked in your letter. Let me begin with the legal framework for command and force accountability during operations.

5. The Legal Framework for the Command and Control of Military Operations

The assassination of Commissioner Gatluak and the 12 others killed with him was a military operation by SSPM/A. Consequently, the operation to search for and apprehend the killers involved was also a military rather than a police operation. Had it been a state police operation, it would have been under my command. However, as a military operation, it was fully under the SSPDF chain of command. All the operations undertaken to apprehend the culprits were managed under the framework established by Sudan People's Liberation Army Act 2009 (as amended). That act is comprehensive: it sets out the parameters of command; defines the chain of command and accountability and provides for the punishment of military and civil offences committed during operations.

The claim that forces and civilians under my command conducted both the operations and carried out the execution is speculative and fallacious. The Sudan People's Liberation Army Act 2009 defines what both "command" and "commanding officer" mean in the context of operations.¹⁰ Provisions on command and control of military operations are then detailed in chapter 3. Section 13 of the act vests overall command in the President, who is also the Commander-in-Chief.

¹⁰ See section 5 Interpretation, "Command means authority exercised by Sudan People's Liberation Army commander over his or her sub-ordinates by virtue of rank and, or assignment." A commanding officer on the other hand "means an officer in charge of Sudan People's Liberation Army combat and service support units."

In that capacity, the President sets the political and military objectives of the SPLA. He issues directives for the deployment of the forces. He frames and issues military orders to the Chief of Defence Forces. In performing some of his functions, the President is aided by the Command Council established under section 15. From the Commander-in-Chief, the chain of command flows down to the Deputy Commander-in-Chief and from him or her to the Chief of the Defence Forces and the Deputies of the Chief of Defence Forces.

As I have said elsewhere in this letter, on the 22nd of July 2022 when I arrived at the site of where Commissioner Gatluak and the 12 others were burnt alive, I found that a Deputy Chief of the Defence Forces in Charge of Operations already had arrived from Juba and taken charge of the military side of the affairs. This underlined to me that the national government understood how dangerous these killings were to South Sudan's delicately poised peace process. At no point from that day, did command ever shift from the South Sudan Defences Forces to me.

Whilst I am distraught by the claims your letter alleges about me, I am anxious that the truth about who ordered the executions on the 8th and why be established. As you probably know, South Sudan has a comprehensive legal framework for dealing with wrongdoing—including wrongful killings—by members of the South Sudan People's Defence Forces. The main legal provisions are to be found in both the Sudan People's Liberation Army Act of 2009 and the South Sudan Penal Code Act of 2008—especially Chapters XVI (covering offences related to death) and XVII (covering offences related to bodily injury and Intimidation).

In my view, the fact that the Mayom killings are cognisable offences under the laws of South Sudan means that there are local mechanisms for investigating and punishing such conduct. I am convinced that this is in fact the reason why H.E. the President Salva Kiir took action, on the 8th of September 2022, to establish a high-level Investigation Committee with ample powers to investigate the killings and the factors that may have led to them. The Committee has a four-fold mandate, namely: 1) to investigate cases of insecurity including reported cases of extra-judicial killings, rape and destruction of property; 2) to summon and interrogate any suspect(s) implicated in the incident, including those in custody; 3) to apprehend and interrogate any suspects at large where appropriate and 4) to identify, summon and interview any witness or witnesses. The Investigation Committee was initially given a very tight deadline but this has been subsequently extended to enable them conduct a fair, full and impartial investigation. That process is now actively underway.

Given the on-going national processes, my immediate concern is that the Panel has prejudged matters. Your letter draws definitive conclusions about



my alleged culpability without referencing the efforts of the South Sudan Government to get to the bottom of the matter. It looks to any disinterested by-stander that in this matter, the UN is acting in parallel to—and preempting rather than supporting and reinforcing—the efforts of Government of South Sudan.

It is my firm belief that an incomplete or partial investigation that isolates and condemns some actors but not others before all facts are publicly established is inimical to the peace efforts in South Sudan. In truth, any investigation that is not legally and politically even-handed would only inflame the combustible realities on the ground in Unity State and in the Republic of South Sudan more generally.

6. The Council of State Request to H.E. the President to Fire Me

I have to say that I don't quite understand how this relates to the extra-judicial killings. I assume that the Panel presupposes that the immediate reason for the Council of State's letter to the President requesting that I be fired—(See attached letter)—is my alleged culpability in the extra judicial killings. If that is the claim, then it is another patently skewed misreading of the facts. It is also an extremely partial interpretation of the political context. That context is defined by two summons that the Council of State had issued to me.

In its summons, the Council had asked me to explain two violent incidents, one in the Mayom County—covered in your letter—and another in Leer County—not mentioned in your letter. The incident in Leer involved a violent confrontation between SPLM-IO and community youth militia. The immediate trigger were grievances by the local youth that SPLM-IO cadres were rustling and selling cattle in order to fund conflict. The notoriety of cattle rustling is a matter of public record and has been noted by the UN itself.

This, then, was the background against which the Council of State asked me to fire two County Commissioners whom the SPLM-IO had accused—in a series of social media uploads and postings—of being complicit in the violence in both Leer and Mayom Counties. The gravamen of the Council of State's complaint to the President was that I had failed to sack the two Commissioners, which they saw as a dereliction of duty on my part. I explained to them that since the Revitalised Peace Agreement in 2018, Governors could no longer fire County Commissioners. That power now vested in the President.

In rejecting the request from the Council of State, the Office of the President correctly pointed out that if a Governor fired a County Commissioner such a Governor would be acting *ultra vires* the relevant laws.

7. The Claim that Some Unnamed Youth was forced to flee on Account of Threats

I am unsure how to respond to this claim since the youth leader was neither named nor his political affiliation identified. I do not even know when and where he called for my resignation. The truth is that in the fluid political environment in South Sudan and in Unity State, in particular, the society is suspicious and polarised both in terms of identity and politics. There is a multitude of armed people. Chaos can arise spontaneously or it can arise because it has been planned by those who don't want peace. That means that at, any time, both the reality and perception of threat are widespread. I have myself received an explicit threat to my life. I know many more people who have received such threats and quite a few who have been killed. I am also aware that in a charged political environment, people will make reckless comments to score political points.

Given all this, I do not know what to make of the claim around this youth leader: Who threatened him? Where? How was the threat framed? How is that linked to me or my administration? Was the threat ever reported to the authorities? Where is the record or log of that report?

8. Intimidation of civilians in IDP camps

I am unaware of any people associated with me or my government walking around IDP camps intimidating civilians. Most importantly, these IDP camps are ran by the UN. I have not received any reports from the UN Camp Administrators that members of my government are threatening the civilians in these camps. I have not seen any complaints sent to the national government in Juba. I, therefore, have no basis for official action as State Governor.

Even though both the national government and state governments are aware that IDP camps have been used—in South Sudan and elsewhere in Africa—as recruiting grounds for rebels and insurgents, the government has left these camps well alone.


9. Conclusion

In concluding my response to your letter, I wish to reiterate my commitment to peace and reconciliation in South Sudan, a country I love and have served and sacrificed for over the years.

My plea is that all well-wishers—including the UN and the Panel of Experts—do everything they can to stabilise and strengthen the political order in South Sudan in general and in Unity State in particular. Only when such order is restored and stabilised can we avoid the deadly actions that are at the heart of your letter and my response to it.

I wish you well in your work.

Yours Sincerely,



**DR JOSEPH MONYTUIL WEJANG
GOVERNOR OF UNITY STATE,
THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN**

