

**Security Council**

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**Letter dated 30 June 2022 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council**

I have the honour to transmit herewith the 105th monthly report of the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), submitted pursuant to paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#).

The report, in which the activities of the OPCW in implementing Security Council resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#) and the relevant provisions of the OPCW Executive Council decisions in relation to the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme are set out, covers the period from 24 May to 23 June 2022.

As I have stated previously, the use of chemical weapons anywhere by anyone, and under any circumstances, is intolerable. Impunity for their use is equally unacceptable. It is imperative that those who have used chemical weapons are identified and held accountable. Unity in the Security Council is essential to achieve this urgent objective.

*(Signed)* António **Guterres**



## **Annex**

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish]

I have the honour to transmit to you my report entitled “Progress in the Elimination of the Syrian Chemical Weapons Programme” prepared in accordance with the relevant provisions of the OPCW Executive Council Decision EC-M-33/DEC.1, and the United Nations Security Council resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#), both dated 27 September 2013, for transmission to the Security Council. My report covers the period from 24 May 2022 to 23 June 2022 and also covers the reporting requirements of the Executive Council decision EC-M-34/DEC.1, dated 15 November 2013.

*(Signed)* Fernando **Arias**

**Enclosure**

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish]

**Report by the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons****Progress in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme**

1. In accordance with subparagraph 2(f) of the decision by the Executive Council (hereinafter “the Council”) at its Thirty-Third Meeting (EC-M-33/DEC.1, dated 27 September 2013), the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter “the Secretariat”) is to report to the Council on a monthly basis regarding the implementation of that decision. In accordance with paragraph 12 of United Nations Security Council resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#), the report by the Secretariat is also to be submitted to the Security Council through the Secretary-General.
2. The Council, at its Thirty-Fourth Meeting, adopted a decision entitled “Detailed Requirements for the Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons and Syrian Chemical Weapons Production Facilities” (EC-M-34/DEC.1, dated 15 November 2013). In paragraph 22 of that decision, the Council decided that the Secretariat should report on its implementation “in conjunction with its reporting required by subparagraph 2(f) of Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1”.
3. The Council, at its Forty-Eighth Meeting, adopted a decision entitled “Reports of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria” (EC-M-48/DEC.1, dated 4 February 2015), noting the Director-General’s intent to include reports of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria (FFM), along with information on the Council’s discussion thereof, as part of the monthly reporting pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#). Similarly, the Council, at its Eighty-First Session, adopted a decision entitled “Report by the Director-General Regarding the Declaration and Related Submissions by the Syrian Arab Republic” (EC-81/DEC.4, dated 23 March 2016), noting the Director-General’s intent to provide information on the implementation of that decision.
4. The Council, at its Eighty-Third Session, adopted a decision entitled “OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism Reports on Chemical Weapons Use in the Syrian Arab Republic” (EC-83/DEC.5, dated 11 November 2016). In subparagraph 12(a) of that decision, the Council decided that the Director-General shall “regularly inform the Council on the implementation of this decision and incorporate information regarding the implementation of this decision into his monthly reporting to the United Nations Security Council, through the United Nations Secretary-General, regarding EC-M-33/DEC.1”.
5. The Council, at its Ninety-Fourth Session, adopted a decision entitled “Addressing the Possession and Use of Chemical Weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic” (EC-94/DEC.2, dated 9 July 2020). In paragraph 12 of that decision, the Council decided that the Director-General shall “regularly report to the Council on the implementation of this decision and decide[d] also that the Director-General shall provide a copy of this decision and its associated reports by the Secretariat to all States Parties and to the United Nations Security Council and the United Nations General Assembly through the United Nations Secretary-General”.
6. The Conference of the States Parties (hereinafter “the Conference”) at its Twenty-Fifth Session adopted a decision entitled “Addressing the Possession and Use of Chemical Weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic” (C-25/DEC.9, dated 21 April

2021). In paragraph 8 of this decision, the Conference decided that the Director-General shall regularly report to the Council and States Parties on whether the Syrian Arab Republic has completed all of the measures contained in paragraph 5 of Council decision EC-94/DEC.2.

7. This, the 105th monthly report, is therefore submitted in accordance with the aforementioned Council and Conference decisions and includes information relevant to the period from 24 May to 23 June 2022.

**Progress achieved by the Syrian Arab Republic in meeting the requirements of Executive Council decisions EC-M-33/DEC.1 and EC-M-34/DEC.1**

8. Progress by the Syrian Arab Republic is as follows:

(a) As stated in previous reports, the Secretariat has verified the destruction of all 27 chemical weapons production facilities (CWPFs) declared by the Syrian Arab Republic.

(b) On 15 June 2022, the Syrian Arab Republic submitted to the Council its 103rd monthly report (EC-100/P/NAT.4, dated 15 June 2022) regarding activities on its territory related to the destruction of its chemical weapons and CWPFs, as required by paragraph 19 of EC-M-34/DEC.1.

**Progress in the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons by States Parties hosting destruction activities**

9. As stated in previous reports, all of the chemicals declared by the Syrian Arab Republic that were removed from its territory in 2014 have been destroyed.

**Activities carried out by the Technical Secretariat with respect to Executive Council decisions EC-81/DEC.4 and EC-83/DEC.5**

10. The Secretariat, through the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT), continues its efforts to clarify all outstanding issues regarding the initial and subsequent declarations submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter “the Convention”), paragraph 1 of Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1, paragraph 3 of Council decision EC-81/DEC.4, paragraph 6 of Council decision EC-83/DEC.5, and paragraph 5 of Council decision EC-94/DEC.2.

11. The Secretariat is still waiting to receive the declaration from the Syrian Arab Republic, requested on 21 October 2020, of all undeclared types and quantities of nerve agents produced and/or weaponised at one former CWPF that was declared as never having been used to produce and/or weaponise chemical warfare agents. The Secretariat is also expecting to receive further information and documentation from the Syrian Arab Republic, requested on 15 July 2021, regarding the damage caused to a military facility that housed a declared former CWPF reportedly attacked on 8 June 2021. As at the date of this report, the Secretariat had not received any reply from the Syrian Arab Republic to these requests.

12. As reported previously, since 30 April 2021 the Secretariat’s attempts to organise the twenty-fifth round of consultations between the DAT and the Syrian National Authority in Damascus have remained unsuccessful. This delay was initially caused by the absence of a response from the Syrian Arab Republic and subsequently by the repeated refusal by the Syrian Arab Republic to issue an entry visa to the DAT’s lead technical expert. Moreover, the Syrian National Authority set as a condition for its participation in a limited round of consultations in Beirut, Lebanon, proposed by the Secretariat, the exclusion from this meeting of the same DAT expert.

13. Through its note verbale dated 20 May 2022, the Secretariat proposed that, subject to a change in attitude by the Syrian Arab Republic, shortcomings in the Syrian Arab Republic's initial declaration be addressed through exchange of correspondence for the time being, even if such exchanges demonstrably bring fewer outcomes, as compared to the DAT's deployments to the Syrian Arab Republic. This was already the case during the period between June 2016 and April 2019 (see the report by the Director-General to the Eighty-Second Session of the Council, EC-82/HP/DG.2\*, dated 30 June 2016).

14. In response to the Secretariat's note verbale, H.E. Mr Faisal Mekdad, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of the Syrian Arab Republic, sent a letter to the Director-General dated 31 May 2022 agreeing to the exchange of correspondence. He acknowledged that such an exchange cannot replace consultations between the Syrian National Authority and the DAT, while at the same time continuing to set the exclusion of the DAT's lead technical expert as a condition for the holding of the twenty-fifth round of consultations.

15. The Secretariat continues to emphasise the obligation of all States Parties, including the Syrian Arab Republic, to cooperate with the Organisation and to provide assistance to the Secretariat, as set out in paragraph 7 of Article VII of the Convention. Furthermore, United Nations Security Council resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#) and the corresponding decisions of the OPCW policy-making organs require the Syrian Arab Republic to accept and provide immediate and unfettered access to the personnel designated by the OPCW.

16. The Secretariat remains fully committed to ensuring the full implementation by the Syrian Arab Republic of all its declaration requirements and to assisting the Syrian Arab Republic in fulfilling its obligations under the Convention, policy-making organs' decisions, and United Nations Security Council resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#).

17. Considering the identified gaps, inconsistencies, and discrepancies that remain unresolved, the Secretariat assesses that the declaration submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic still cannot be considered accurate and complete in accordance with the Convention, Council decisions EC-M-33/DEC.1 and EC-94/DEC.2, and United Nations Security Council resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#).

18. In accordance with paragraph 10 of Council decision EC-83/DEC.5, the Secretariat is continuing to assess conditions for the conduct of inspections at the sites identified by the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism in its third and fourth reports.

19. Pursuant to paragraph 11 of Council decision EC-83/DEC.5, the Secretariat is planning for the conduct of the next rounds of inspections of the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) in the course of 2022.

20. With regard to the detection of a Schedule 2.B.04 chemical during the third round of inspections at the Barzah facilities of the SSRC in November 2018, the Syrian Arab Republic has yet to provide sufficient technical information or explanations that would enable the Secretariat to close this issue.

#### **Other activities carried out by the Technical Secretariat with respect to the Syrian Arab Republic**

21. As previously reported, following an invitation extended on 24 June 2021 by the Director-General to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of the Syrian Arab Republic to an in-person meeting, both parties have appointed officials in charge of the preparations. An initial agenda has been negotiated and the Secretariat has been awaiting notification of the Syrian Arab Republic's position on the latest version of

the agenda, submitted to the Syrian Arab Republic on 20 December 2021. The Secretariat will keep the Council informed of further developments on this matter.

22. In its aforementioned note verbale to the Secretariat dated 9 July 2021, the Syrian National Authority also reported the destruction in the attack on the CWPF of, inter alia, two chlorine cylinders related to the chemical weapons incident that took place in Douma, the Syrian Arab Republic, on 7 April 2018. In its aforementioned reply dated 15 July 2021, the Secretariat additionally requested the Syrian Arab Republic to, inter alia, provide all relevant information regarding the unauthorised movement of the two cylinders and any remains of their destruction. As at the date of this report, the Secretariat had not received a response to this request. The Secretariat will keep the Council informed of further developments in this matter.

23. The United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) continues to provide support to the OPCW Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic in accordance with the Tripartite Agreement concluded between the OPCW, UNOPS, and the Syrian Arab Republic. This agreement facilitates the Secretariat's mandated activities in the Syrian Arab Republic pertaining to the full elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme, and to any subsequent decision or resolution of the relevant organs of the OPCW or the United Nations, as well as any bilateral agreements concluded between the OPCW and the Syrian Arab Republic.

24. The current extension of the Tripartite Agreement remains in force up to and including 30 June 2022. On 12 May 2022, an amendment to the agreement was signed by all three parties, extending its duration up to and including 31 December 2022.

25. As at the cut-off date of this report, one OPCW staff member was deployed as part of the OPCW Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic.

#### **Activities carried out with respect to the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria**

26. Guided by Council decisions EC-M-48/DEC.1 and EC-M-50/DEC.1 (dated 4 February 2015 and 23 November 2015, respectively), as well as by United Nations Security Council resolution [2209 \(2015\)](#), the FFM continues to study all available information relating to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic.

27. The FFM continues to fulfil its engagement with the Syrian Arab Republic and other States Parties with regard to a number of incidents.

28. The FFM is preparing upcoming deployments and will report to the Council on the results of its work in due course.

#### **Activities carried out by the Technical Secretariat with respect to decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 of the Conference of the States Parties at its Fourth Special Session related to the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic**

29. Decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 (dated 27 June 2018), adopted by the Conference at its Fourth Special Session, addresses, inter alia, the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic.

30. Pursuant to paragraph 10 of C-SS-4/DEC.3, the Secretariat established the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) to identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic by identifying and reporting on all information potentially relevant to the origin of those chemical weapons in those instances in which the FFM determines or has determined that use or likely use occurred, and cases for which the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism did not issue a report.

31. The IIT is continuing its investigations in accordance with the Note entitled “Work of the Investigation and Identification Team Established by Decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 (Dated 27 June 2018)” (EC-91/S/3, dated 28 June 2019) and will issue further reports in due course.

**Activities carried out by the Technical Secretariat with respect to Executive Council decision EC-94/DEC.2**

32. In paragraph 5 of decision EC-94/DEC.2, the Council decided:

to request, pursuant to paragraph 36 of Article VIII of the Convention, that the Syrian Arab Republic complete all of the following measures within 90 days of this decision in order to redress the situation:

(a) declare to the Secretariat the facilities where the chemical weapons, including precursors, munitions, and devices, used in the 24, 25, and 30 March 2017 attacks were developed, produced, stockpiled, and operationally stored for delivery;

(b) declare to the Secretariat all of the chemical weapons it currently possesses, including sarin, sarin precursors, and chlorine that is not intended for purposes not prohibited under the Convention, as well as chemical weapons production facilities and other related facilities; and

(c) resolve all of the outstanding issues regarding its initial declaration of its chemical weapons stockpile and programme.

33. At the end of the 90 days, the Syrian Arab Republic had not completed any of these measures.

34. With regard to the inspections mandated by paragraph 8 of EC-94/DEC.2, the Secretariat is monitoring the current security situation and will inform the Syrian Arab Republic when it is prepared to deploy for this purpose.

**Activities carried out by the Technical Secretariat with respect to Conference decision C-25/DEC.9**

35. In paragraph 7 of decision C-25/DEC.9, the Conference decided, after careful review, and without prejudice to the Syrian Arab Republic’s obligations under the Convention, pursuant to subparagraph 21(k) of Article VIII and paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Convention, to suspend several rights and privileges of the Syrian Arab Republic under the Convention.

36. In paragraph 8 of the decision, the Conference decided, inter alia, that the rights and privileges of the Syrian Arab Republic suspended in accordance with paragraph 7 of decision C-25/DEC.9 are reinstated by the Conference once the Director-General has reported to the Council that the Syrian Arab Republic has completed all of the measures stipulated in paragraph 5 of EC-94/DEC.2. As at the date of this report, the Syrian Arab Republic had not completed any of these measures.

37. The Secretariat will continue to engage with the Syrian Arab Republic with regard to their completion and will continue to report to the Council as mandated.

**Supplementary resources**

38. The Trust Fund for Syria Missions was established in November 2015 to support the FFM and other remaining activities, which presently include the work of the DAT and the IIT, as well as the biannual inspections of the SSRC and the two sites identified in paragraph 8 of EC-94/DEC.2. As at the cut-off date of this report, total contributions and pledges to this fund stood at EUR 37 million. Contribution

agreements had been concluded with Australia, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, and the European Union.

### **Conclusion**

39. The future activities of the OPCW Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic will focus on the work of the FFM; the implementation of Council decisions EC-83/DEC.5 and EC-81/DEC.4, including declaration-related issues; inspections at the Barzah and Jamrayah sites of the SSRC; the implementation of Conference decision C-SS-4/DEC.3; the implementation of Council decision EC-94/DEC.2; and the implementation of Conference decision C-25/DEC.9.

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