



安全理事会

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2021 年 10 月 5 日安全理事会关于索马里的第 751(1992)号决议所设委员会主席给安全理事会主席的信

我谨代表安全理事会关于索马里的第 751(1992)号决议所设委员会并根据安全理事会第 2551(2020)号决议第 34 段，随信转递索马里问题专家小组的最后报告。

在这方面，委员会谨请将本信和报告提醒安全理事会成员注意，并作为安理会文件分发为荷。

安全理事会关于索马里的
第 751(1992)号决议所设委员会

主席

杰拉尔丁·伯恩·内森(签名)



2021 年 9 月 16 日索马里问题专家小组给安全理事会关于索马里的第
[751\(1992\)](#)号决议所设委员会主席的信

谨根据安全理事会第 [2551\(2020\)](#)号决议第 34 段，随信转递索马里问题专家小组的最后报告。

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摘要

青年党仍然是索马里和平、安全与稳定的最直接威胁。尽管索马里和国际部队一直在努力遏制青年党的行动能力，该团体在索马里开展复杂、不对称袭击的能力却始终没有减弱。青年党利用 2021 年长期不确定和紧张关系加剧所展现出的深刻政治分歧，仍准备在中长期维持其在摩加迪沙和联邦成员州的行动步伐。

因此，索马里问题专家小组在赞扬索马里联邦政府和联邦成员州解决政治僵局的同时，仍然对其领导人之间的利益不对称将继续被青年党利用而感到关切。2021 年 5 月 27 日的协议是朝着举行选举迈出的一个积极步骤。然而，政治紧张关系仍未得到解决，导致该国陷入武装对抗，而且在 2021 年 4 月首都突发暴力事件后，几乎使索马里陷入瘫痪。

虽然国际社会努力消除政治裂痕，但政治精英之间潜在的、或许不可调和的部族和个人利益将继续被青年党利用。因此，该团体仍然是当前政治冲突的一个表象，而非根本起因，索马里所有各方都必须重新调整优先事项，推翻让青年党取得成功的当地条件。

索马里的政治困难出现在更广泛的区域不稳定和不和谐背景之下。厄立特里亚、埃塞俄比亚和索马里的结盟展现了重塑区域政治的战略。专家小组将继续调查对索马里和平与安全的影响，特别是厄立特里亚训练的索马里新兵的作用，其中大多仍留在厄立特里亚，但有些已返回索马里，提供未具体说明的安全职能。除了政治驱动的不稳定之外，该区域还继续面临环境和卫生突发事件的挑战，如干旱、洪水和冠状病毒病(COVID-19)，加剧了本已严峻的人道主义需求。

在本报告所述期间，青年党继续控制索马里中部和南部的大片地区，并对部署安全部队的地区施加影响，使安全部队难以清空和掌控青年党控制的城镇。通过这种方式，青年党继续拥有行动自由，得以开展伏击和安放简易爆炸装置，阻碍公共服务和行政机构的部署。索马里部队曾尝试阻止青年党在加尔穆杜格的扩张，但尚未在实地取得任何成果。

经修订的索马里过渡计划为在 2023 年年底前逐步将所有安全责任移交给索马里国家安全部队铺平了道路。然而，过渡计划的实施仍处于停滞状态，因为仍期待有更多的索马里警察和区域安全部队来取代索马里国民军部队，成为下谢贝利的掌控部队。

对青年党国内创收活动的调查继续显示，该团体创造的收入足以使其在可预见的将来维持叛乱状态。专家小组评估认为，青年党依然有良好的财务状况，而且甘冒风险获取利益。青年党通过一系列勒索手段获取收入，包括对农业、车辆、货物和牲畜非法征税。这种非法征税是通过青年党赖以积聚大部分收入的检查站网络进行。该团体继续声称有能力在整个索马里中部和南部、包括在摩加迪沙等不受其直接控制的地区收取保护费。

青年党利用国内银行系统存储资金，没有机构偏好，但现金货币是该团体调动资金的最主要方式，大部分存款和取款都是用现金进行。索马里联邦政府已采取步骤加强索马里金融部门，以便通过立法和监督，例如制定切断资助计划，打击资助恐怖主义的行为。然而，由于 2019 年《移动货币条例》没有得到执行，加上对青年党财务状况的报告和调查不足，该团体的创收系统仍然难以撼动。

关于武器和弹药管理，索马里联邦政府于 2020 年 11 月和 2021 年 2 月邀请专家小组协助对摩加迪沙的哈拉内军械库进行了联合技术评估，包括评估储存在那里的高爆弹药所带来的挑战。除了管理高爆弹药之外，索马里联邦政府还必须根据安全理事会第 2551(2020)号决议，对所有索马里安全部队实施可问责的武器和弹药追踪系统。

青年党、政治动荡和敌对部族之间的冲突继续严重影响索马里平民的安全。2021 年 1 月至 7 月，联合国索马里援助团(联索援助团)记录到 708 名平民伤亡，其中大多是青年党所致。到 2021 年 8 月 1 日，索马里已有近 300 万人在境内流离失所，其中仅 2021 年 1 月至 7 月就有 53.7 万人逃离家园，与冲突有关的流离失所占到 70%以上。青年党使用强迫流离失所对反抗其权威的民众进行集体惩罚。流离失所也是政治不稳定的结果，在盖多州和摩加迪沙及周边地区尤其如此。

频繁冲突、武器扩散和武装行为造成的不安全因素也影响到人道主义行动，包括通行受阻以及行动的方式和地点受限。虽然青年党对涉及针对平民的违反国际人道法行为仍然负有最大责任，但也有几份关于联邦和地区安全部队侵犯人权的报告。此外，部族民兵对一些侵权行为负有责任，包括杀害、绑架和毁坏平民财产。令人担忧的是，关于不同武装行为体实施与冲突有关的性暴力和招募儿童行为的报告有所增加。

索马里联邦政府、朱巴兰和国际社会的努力确保了木炭出口在本报告所述期间继续停滞。对进出口双方的政治压力、监测和监视，包括国际海军的监测和监视，联手提供了强大的威慑力量。但是，索马里木炭出口网络仍然存在，各种政治和安全行为体始终想通过未来任何潜在的销售获益。因此，基斯马尤周围现有批发价值约为 4 000 万美元的库存仍然对和平与安全构成威胁。

虽然木炭出口继续停滞，但木炭生产的影响已开始体现在更广泛的气候和环境安全挑战上。在一些情况下，青年党已经开始利用气候变化的影响，对社区进行防洪保护，向几乎没有得到政府支持的社区提供服务。这些事态发展可能会给如何处理索马里的不安全问题带来新的挑战。

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* 附件仅以原文分发，未经正式编辑。

一. 引言

A. 任务授权

1. 本报告载有索马里问题专家小组 2020 年 12 月 16 日至 2021 年 9 月 6 日期间的调查结果。附件 1 概述了索马里制裁制度、任务授权、专家小组的任命以及在报告所述期间访问的国家。

B. 工作方法

2. 专家小组努力确保符合安全理事会制裁的一般性问题非正式工作组在 2006 年 12 月的报告中建议的标准(见 S/2006/997)以及秘书长关于信息敏感性、分类和处理的公报(ST/SGB/2007/6)的各项规定。证据标准和核查流程包括：

- (a) 尽可能从多个来源收集关于事件和主题的信息；
- (b) 尽可能从对事件有第一手了解的来源收集信息；
- (c) 确定信息模式的一致性，并将现有知识与新信息和新趋势进行比较；
- (d) 获取实物、照片、音频、视频和/或文件证据，为收集的信息提供支持；
- (e) 酌情分析卫星图像。

3. 此外，根据非正式工作组的报告第 28 段，专家小组在报告起草过程中，视需要向所有各方提供了审阅、评论和回应的机会。

4. 专家小组承诺保持和促进与索马里联邦政府的关系，以确保在按照适用的方法标准框架履行调查任务时的合作和透明度。

二. 威胁索马里和平、安全和稳定的行为

A. 青年圣战运动(青年党)

概况

5. 青年党利用了索马里联邦政府无力有效治理其全部领土所留下的空白，仍然是索马里和平、安全和稳定的最大威胁。对青年党在本报告所述期间开展的行动进行分析表明，该团体保持着高度的适应性和机动性，有能力协调索马里不同地区的活动并在其直接控制的领土之外施加胁迫性影响。

6. 青年党继续在整个索马里中部和南部地区使用暴力极端主义战术，通过多种方法控制民众，影响政治结果，并散布恐惧气氛。其中一些方法包括：对大片地区实施行政控制；对驻有安全部队的城镇和军事阵地进行打了就跑的袭击；利用部族竞争，通过分治策略扩大影响力；以及通过阻截主要补给通道和封锁村庄，阻止资源抵达。青年党还继续在摩加迪沙、拜多阿、加尔卡约和乔哈尔等主要城镇通过暗杀以及使用简易爆炸装置和迫击炮袭击来制造恐惧。

青年党成员和结构的最新情况

7. 专家小组继续更新关于青年党结构的信息并查明潜在的领导层变动，以加深对该团体的了解。艾哈迈德·迪里耶，又名谢赫·艾哈迈德·乌马尔·阿布·乌拜达(SOi.014)，继续担任青年党埃米尔。在 2021 年 7 月 21 日宰牲节庆祝活动期间，青年党下属媒体发布了他的最新一条音频信息，他在其中讲述了该团体对索马里的愿景。¹

8. 在安全理事会关于索马里的第 751(1992)号决议所设委员会根据安理会第 1844(2008)号决议第 14 段列出的 18 名个人当中，有 8 人疑似仍活跃在青年党领导层。² 附件 2.1 列有青年党领导层和网络的最新情况以及专家小组查明的新成员。

9. 2021 年 2 月 26 日，委员会将阿布卡尔·阿里·阿丹(SOi.018)、马利姆·艾曼(SOi.019)和马哈德·卡拉特(SOi.020)列入名单。³ 专家小组还注意到，美利坚合众国已将三名符合第 1844(2008)号决议指认标准的个人列入《特别指认国民和被阻禁者名单》：(a) 穆罕默德·阿卜杜拉希·奥斯曼(又名工程师伊斯梅尔)；(b) 青年党发言人阿里·穆罕默德·拉格(又名阿里·迪尔)；(c) 青年党行动策划者、肯尼亚国民阿卜迪卡迪尔·穆罕默德·阿卜迪卡迪尔(又名伊克里马)。⁴

10. 在本报告所述期间，专家小组注意到，索马里国民军声称已逮捕或制服一些青年党高级特工。⁵ 专家小组还注意到青年党通过音频和视频媒介发布的宣传，其中的亮点是该团体决定处决一些从事间谍活动的成员(见附件 2.2)。⁶

青年党直接控制的地区

11. 在本任务期间，专家小组监测了关于青年党活动的报告，并查明了受其直接控制的地区，⁷ 包括下朱巴贾马姆区的大多数城镇，中朱巴的吉利卜、布阿勒和萨考，盖多的巴尔代雷部分地区，位于拜州丁索尔和布哈卡巴区南部的城镇，中谢贝利的阿代尔和阿丹亚巴尔，以及加尔穆杜格的德尔、布尔和哈拉尔代。专家小组还审查了视听证据，显示青年党在上述多个地点面向广大民众公开施行仪式。⁸ 除了美国在 2020 年 12 月 16 日至 2021 年 1 月下旬发动的多次空袭，⁹

¹ 他的讲话文稿，见 <https://shahadanews.com/?p=14077>。

² 见 <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/751/materials/summaries>。

³ 见 <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/751/materials>。

⁴ 见 <https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions>。

⁵ 索马里国家电视台报道了据称已叛逃或者已被逮捕或杀害的索马里国民军高级特工名单。专家小组于 2021 年 9 月 3 日致函索马里联邦政府，要求提供进一步信息。

⁶ 青年党法院 2020 年处决了 28 人，2021 年处决了 29 人，包括一名女性。

⁷ 对青年党媒体报道的分析，经机密安全报告证实。

⁸ 在吉利卜、萨考和库尼奥巴罗的处决是公开进行。2021 年 7 月 20 日在布阿勒、布尔和吉利卜面向广大民众的宰牲节祈祷有青年党在场；见 2021 年 7 月 20 日和 21 日的网页镜头片段 <https://calamada.com/category/sawirro/>。

⁹ 美国非洲司令部新闻稿，2020 年 12 月至 2021 年 1 月。

专家小组没有注意到索马里国民军或国际部队在青年党直接控制地区开展过任何地面行动。附件 2.3 列有青年党控制区的地图。

青年党在民兵抵抗地区的策略

12. 对于青年党未能直接控制或决定不寻求直接控制的地区，大多是因为这些地区部署了索马里或国际部队并且/或者遭遇到部族民兵的抵抗，但青年党通过在主要补给通道沿线开展阻截行动或者惩罚当地人和传统领导人，试图迫使他们支持其打击安全部队。

13. 在本报告所述期间，青年党继续在巴科勒州的胡杜尔和盖多州的卢克阻截货物流动，并多次伏击从埃塞俄比亚边境过来的货运卡车或摩托车。¹⁰

14. 2021 年 2 月 18 日至 28 日，青年党还对中谢贝利乔哈尔周围的商业卡车进行了阻截。继 15 名商人被绑架后，青年党在马哈迪东北 25 公里的菲多与商界达成了协议，并在随后撤销了阻截。¹¹

15. 当青年党在安全部队保护有限的各州遭到部族民兵的抵抗，例如在拜州和巴科勒州遭到里耶桑小部族以及在下谢贝利州遭到加勒杰尔小部族的抵抗之时，该团体绑架了长老并清空了多个村庄，迫使民众流离失所(见附件 5.1)。

16. 青年党有能力在中谢贝利东部和加尔穆杜格南部施加影响。2021 年 2 月，青年党还开始填补“先知的信徒”被遣散后留下的真空。¹² 在本报告所述期间，索马里联邦政府计划在中谢贝利编入安全部队的“先知的信徒”成员在有限几次机会中被用于打击青年党。青年党继续惩罚与“先知的信徒”及其长老有关联的村庄。

青年党在政府或国际部队控制地区的策略

直接或间接开火

17. 专家小组主要在朱巴兰、西南州、希尔谢贝利和加尔穆杜格记录到 1 047 次针对索马里国民军、联邦成员州和国际部队的袭击。¹³ 据报，所有针对安全部队基地的袭击都是打了就跑或使用迫击炮，针对军事车队的袭击则是伏击和使用简易爆炸装置。在本报告所述期间，青年党三次使用车载简易爆炸装置，分别于 2021 年 4 月 3 日在奥代格莱、6 月 9 日在代努奈和 6 月 27 日在维西勒对安全部队进行了短暂打击。索马里国民军常规部队在前沿行动基地缺少适当的部队保护基础设施和运输设备，因此很容易受到青年党的袭击。在遭到青年党的袭击和伏击之

¹⁰ 专家小组记录到 8 起从埃塞俄比亚边境前往胡杜尔和 4 起前往卢克的卡车和摩托车遭伏击事件。在大多数情况下，旅行者被杀害，货物被带到青年党的邻近据点。详情见秘书处存档的涵盖 2020 年 12 月 16 日至 2021 年 8 月 31 日的“事件数据库”。

¹¹ 安全报告通过约谈当地消息源证实。

¹² 2020 年 2 月，在关于加尔穆杜格总统选举的分歧引发冲突后，索马里国民军解除了“先知的信徒”成员的武装(见 www.voanews.com/africa/somalias-sufi-muslim-leaders-surrender-government)。埃及和土耳其两名“先知的信徒”宗教领袖于 2021 年 7 月告知专家小组，他们愿意与索马里联邦政府达成协议，使其民兵有能力打击青年党。

¹³ 详情见秘书处存档的涵盖 2020 年 12 月 16 日至 2021 年 8 月 31 日的“事件数据库”。

后，一些前沿行动基地的基本纵深防御措施和装备不良部队(既没有装甲车也没有爆炸物处理能力)的移动增加了死亡人数。附件 2.4 详述了青年党在本报告所述期间发动的袭击。此外，附件 2.5 着重提到了索马里国民军基地的一些弱点。

青年党试图扩大在加尔穆杜格的领土控制

18. 在本报告所述期间，专家小组注意到青年党在加尔穆杜格的霍比奥区及其周围扩大了地盘。该团体利用国家和区域两级脆弱的政治局势以及该地区的部族动荡，占据了巴德文，随后又试图控制维西勒。

19. 来自巴德文、维西勒、加尔卡约和摩加迪沙的消息源告诉专家小组，库拜斯小部族在 2021 年 4 月 14 日向青年党献出巴德文之前的一年多时间里，已经一直是青年党的目标。¹⁴ 这一天也标志着索马里国民军第 21 师撤出巴德文。¹⁵ 根据这些说法，由穆杜格州青年党首领阿布迪沙库尔·迪克(哈伯盖迪尔/萨阿德)领导的当地青年党分子“决心占领该地区，可能是为了给该团体扫清出海口”。¹⁶

20. 2021 年 7 月，索马里国民军和加尔穆杜格部队对青年党在凯阿德、巴德文和奥马德的据点发起了行动。2021 年 7 月 20 日，美国非洲司令部为支持这些索马里部队进行了自 2021 年 1 月 19 日以来的首次空袭。¹⁷ 青年党继续使用自杀式车载简易爆炸装置袭击在已解放的城镇建立的索马里国民军基地，并使用简易爆炸装置延缓和阻止增援行动。¹⁸

在主要补给通道沿线的阻截

21. 青年党持续使用简易爆炸装置和伏击，仍然是索马里中部和南部主要补给通道沿线行动自由的主要威胁。专家小组记录到主要补给通道沿线针对索马里国民军和国际部队的 99 起简易爆炸装置事件和 44 起伏击事件，特别是在贾纳莱和布洛马雷之间的马尔卡区附近以及巴拉德和贝莱德文之间的戈洛莱周围。一些简易爆炸装置被安装在由安全部队巡逻的主要补给通道沿线，目的是将卡车转向青年党控制的道路以便收税。2021 年 4 月 14 日，一辆载有 20 名乘客的小型巴士在巴拉德以北 10 公里的戈洛莱附近被一枚简易爆炸装置击中。专家小组还注意到多起伏击事件，其中一些伏击的目标是试图向巴科勒州胡杜尔等被封锁地区供应货物的贸易商。

青年党袭击人口集中地

22. 在贝纳迪尔、基斯马尤和拜多阿等人口集中地，青年党主要袭击软目标，寻求心理效应和耸人听闻的媒体效应，作为展示其能力、恐吓和迫使个人遵守其要求的必然之举。附件 2.4 表 2 显示了对人口集中地民用目标的袭击。

¹⁴ 2020 年 12 月至 2021 年 4 月的安全报告，以及 2021 年 5 月和 6 月与哈伯盖迪尔和库拜斯部族代表的约谈。

¹⁵ 2021 年 4 月的安全报告，以及 2021 年 4 月和 5 月与当地消息源的约谈。

¹⁶ 2021 年 5 月和 6 月与哈伯盖迪尔和库拜斯部族代表的约谈。

¹⁷ 美国非洲司令部于 2021 年 7 月 23 日和 8 月 1 日又进行了两次空袭(见 www.africom.mil/media-gallery/press-releases)。

¹⁸ 2021 年 8 月 24 日对阿马拉的袭击。

23. 专家小组记录到本报告所述期间在贝纳迪尔州 17 个区发生的 270 起青年党所肇事件，包括暗杀、对政府阵地打了就跑以及手榴弹、简易爆炸装置和迫击炮袭击。¹⁹ 其中最醒目的是在摩加迪沙和博萨索的两次复杂袭击。青年党展示了其策划和渗透安全线的能力，因为这些重大袭击都没有被情报和安全部队挫败。附件 2.4 表 3 列出了这些袭击事件。

非洲酒店袭击事件

24. 2021 年 1 月 31 日，青年党对位于摩加迪沙亚丁·阿德国际机场以北的非洲酒店发动了复杂袭击。非洲酒店袭击事件是自 2020 年 8 月 16 日精英酒店遇袭以来摩加迪沙发生的第一起复杂袭击事件。这一事件表明，青年党继续有能力使用车载简易爆炸装置在摩加迪沙发动袭击。

博萨索监狱袭击事件

25. 2021 年 3 月 4 日，青年党战斗人员为解救囚犯，对邦特兰的博萨索中央监狱发动了复杂袭击。青年党袭击的准备和复杂程度暴露了安全部队的装备和就绪情况。附件 2.6 提供了这次袭击的更多细节，以及邦特兰当局为消除安全缺陷而采取的措施。

跨境行动和区域影响

肯尼亚

26. 青年党继续对肯尼亚构成重大威胁，在与索马里接壤的边界地区对肯尼亚安全服务设施和平民实施打了就跑的袭击。自专家小组开始当前任务以来，青年党至少在边界沿线发动了六次袭击，其中大多针对肯尼亚安全部门人员。²⁰ 然而，平民也仍然受到威胁。具体而言，专家小组了解到，据报青年党正在收集牲畜作为一种天课付款形式，并已开始曼德拉镇内和周围测试其勒索当地企业的能力。²¹

吉布提

27. 2021 年 3 月 27 日，青年党向吉布提人民发布信息，称该国是“敌人阴谋的中心”，呼吁该国公民推翻政府，并号召攻击美国和法国的利益。²² 青年党埃米尔迪里耶在音频信息中诋毁吉布提总统伊斯梅尔·奥马尔·盖莱给该国造成的经济损失，并批评他允许外国军队，即美国和法国，驻扎在吉布提境内。此外，迪里耶还催促有同感的吉布提人发动独狼袭击。青年党的这一信息是在盖莱先生再次当选总统的两周前发出。²³

¹⁹ 对媒体报道的分析，经联合国机密安全报告证实。

²⁰ 2021 年 1 月至 8 月的联合国机密报告。

²¹ 2021 年 5 月和 7 月与曼德拉镇和瓦吉尔镇长老的电话约谈。

²² 可查阅 <https://ok.ru/video/2283995728443>。

²³ 吉布提当局于 2021 年 6 月 14 日向专家小组确认，青年党的这一威胁没有影响选举。

B. 索马里境内的伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯兰国派系

28. 索马里境内的伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯兰国(伊黎伊斯兰国)派系仍有意在索马里北部开展行动。不过,在本报告所述期间的大多数行动影响有限,而且发生在邦特兰的巴里州一个狭窄地区。虽然伊黎伊斯兰国于 2021 年 8 月中旬成功袭击了巴里州坎达拉区的巴利迪丁镇,并于 6 月和 7 月在戈利斯山附近对安全部队发动了一些袭击,但据报道,邦特兰安全部队针对该团体的行动遏制了该团体开展更有冲击力行动的能力。²⁴ 2021 年 5 月至 7 月,邦特兰安全部队主要在巴里州至少开展了四次打击伊黎伊斯兰国的行动,据称打死了 20 名伊黎伊斯兰国战斗人员,并摧毁了博萨索东南约 140 公里的蒂米什附近阿迈拉一个与伊黎伊斯兰国有关联的地点。²⁵ 专家小组在 2019 年的报告中评估认为,该团体可能由大约 340 名武装分子组成,但从最近据称的伤亡看,专家小组认为人数已进一步减少。²⁶

C. 索马里联邦政府与联邦成员州之间的关系

索马里联邦政府与朱巴兰行政当局

29. 在本报告所述期间,索马里联邦政府与联邦成员州之间的政治关系仍然不稳定。选举进程是紧张局势的主要根源。具体而言,2021 年 1 月以来在盖多与选举有关的冲突是过去几年困扰索马里政坛的中央-外围紧张局势的又一体现。2021 年发生在盖多的事件是 2020 年的翻版,带来了人员伤亡和境内流离失所、局部武装集结、军事资源从打击青年党的行动中转移以及为武装团体提供便于他们利用的空间等多重效应。²⁷ 联邦政府与联邦成员州之间的凝聚力非常重要,因为青年党仍然有能力利用联邦和各州当局之间的裂痕。

在盖多的武装对抗

30. 2021 年 1 月,索马里联邦政府和朱巴兰之间争夺盖多控制权的斗争在贝莱德哈沃升级,带来人道主义后果并导致选举日程推迟。2021 年 1 月 25 日,驻扎在贝莱德哈沃镇的索马里国民军部队与时任朱巴兰安全部长阿卜迪拉希德·贾南领导的朱巴兰部队发生暴力冲突,造成平民伤亡、民宅被毁和流离失所。²⁸ 联邦政府和贾南在 2021 年 3 月达成的协议缓和了紧张局势,但没有解决与朱巴兰领导层意见分歧的根源。联邦政府部队继续控制该州,²⁹ 因为总理穆罕默德·侯赛因·罗布莱宣布,他将在选举期间负责盖多的安全,同时成立一个由除了朱巴兰以外的所有联邦成员州组成的和解委员会。³⁰

²⁴ 见加洛韦在线,“伊黎伊斯兰国在战后夺取了索马里邦特兰的关键地区”,2021 年 8 月 19 日。

²⁵ 2021 年 8 月 2 日至 3 日的机密安全报告以及与邦特兰当局的约谈。

²⁶ S/2019/858 和 S/2019/858/Corr.1,第 56-59 段,以及可接触到该团体内普通成员的多个消息源。

²⁷ S/2020/949,第 73-76 段。

²⁸ 见希兰在线,“贝莱德哈沃爆发新的战斗,索马里称肯尼亚为幕后黑手”,2021 年 1 月 25 日。

²⁹ 目前,专家小组评估认为,盖多至少有 700 人部队忠于索马里联邦政府,主要由土耳其训练的“格尔格尔(鹰)”组成。

³⁰ 2021 年 6 月在基斯马尤与消息源的约谈。

D. 新的部族暴力带来不安全因素

31. 在本报告所述期间，专家小组注意到，与争夺资源和权力斗争密切相关的部族武装暴力日益增多，并且因为索马里多个州，特别是加尔古杜德、希兰、穆杜格、萨纳格和巴里州正在进行的选举进程而加剧。这些冲突给本已脆弱的地区增加了不稳定和不安全因素，并带来显著的人道主义后果，包括平民伤亡、民宅被毁、流离失所和人道主义援助受阻。青年党利用部族分裂为自身目的服务，特别是在穆杜格和希兰，支持特定的部族利益，并助长进一步的暴力。³¹ 在某些情况下，索马里国民军成员也因其部族归属而成为攻击目标。例如，2021 年 1 月 13 日，在加尔穆杜格的巴兰巴勒地区，来自哈伯盖迪尔/艾尔部族的 8 名索马里国民军士兵在一次伏击中被马雷汉民兵打死，这是对此前 2020 年 12 月 9 日哈伯盖迪尔/艾尔民兵在巴兰巴勒-古里尔公路上打死 7 名来自马雷汉部族的索马里国民军士兵的报复。³²

32. 2021 年 1 月至 8 月，专家小组记录到 118 起部族冲突事件，特别是报复性杀害和绑架事件，造成 80 人死亡，170 人受伤。³³ 专家小组注意到，有 22 起绑架事件是为了迫使对以前的杀害进行赔偿。³⁴ 在索勒州，来自杜尔巴哈特/贾马萨德和杜尔巴哈特/乌加代汉两个小部族的部族民兵为控制胡敦镇附近的达巴-达鲁勒水库而发生冲突，造成 15 人死亡，30 人受伤。³⁵ 在本报告编写之时，解决这一争端的谈判仍在进行中。

E. 安全部门

对索马里过渡计划的审查

33. 索马里联邦政府于 2021 年 2 月发布了经修订的索马里过渡计划，其中概述了直至 2023 年的过渡期安全优先事项。该过渡计划重申支持 2021 年后设立由非洲联盟领导的过渡特派团，使索马里国家安全部队能够在 2023 年底前逐步承担起对索马里安全的全部责任。

34. 巴德巴多第一阶段行动取得了一些成功，³⁶ 但第二阶段仍处于停滞状态。³⁷ 州警察部队预计仍将部署到下谢贝利，作为控制部队取代索马里国民军，并逐步实现民政管理。不过，只有少数几个州的安全部队(达拉维什)和西南州新招募的

³¹ 2021 年 3 月至 6 月专家小组存档的安全报告以及与加勒吉尔、马雷汉和哈伯盖迪尔部族成员的约谈。

³² 2021 年 1 月的安全报告。

³³ 2021 年 1 月至 8 月专家小组存档的媒体和安全报告，经与当地消息源的约谈证实。

³⁴ 2021 年 1 月至 3 月，有 19 人在贝莱德文-杜萨马雷卜公路上被绑架，两次共支付 10 万美元才确保获释。2021 年 4 月与贝莱德文消息源的约谈，以及安全报告。

³⁵ 2021 年 4 月在胡敦与消息源的约谈。

³⁶ S/2020/949，第 102 段。

³⁷ 巴德巴多行动的第二阶段旨在确保主要供应通道的安全，以进一步扩大索马里国家安全部队对中谢贝利的控制。

警察(州警察)接受了培训、装备和部署，以控制解放区，但从索马里国民军手中接管的人数并不多。³⁸

35. 根据安全理事会第 2568(2021)号决议，索马里联邦政府必须在 2021 年 10 月底之前报告索马里过渡计划的执行情况。

协调机制

36. 专家小组在 2020 年报告中建议索马里联邦政府通过与国际和区域伙伴的定期高级别会议，牵头开展战略协调，并表达对发展索马里国家安全部队的需求。³⁹

37. 根据经修订的索马里过渡计划，在索马里总统穆罕默德·阿卜杜拉希·穆罕默德·法马乔的领导下成立了战略指导委员会，作为监测进展和确保执行过渡计划的战略决策机构。此外，战略指导委员会将监督结合了军事、法治、稳定和预防/打击暴力极端主义等方面的安全部门改革综合概念。考虑到这一点，全面安全办法执行小组已更名为安全和司法委员会，仍由总理和负责索马里问题的秘书长特别代表共同主持，并置于战略指导委员会的监督之下。⁴⁰

38. 专家小组期望安全和司法委员会成为索马里联邦政府表达需求的适当论坛，使国际伙伴能够协调提供支持。专家小组还希望，该委员会将使联邦政府能够监督和管理为索马里国家安全部队的发展提供除军事装备和武器以外的支持。

安全部队支离破碎

39. 在本报告所述期间，专家小组注意到至少有两起与选举有关的事件激起了民兵动员，暴露了索马里国民军内部的裂痕。2021 年 2 月 19 日，与总统密切结盟的索马里联邦政府部队在一次示威中袭击了他的反对派。⁴¹ 2021 年 4 月 25 日，在摩加迪沙反对延长总统任期的抗议中，数百名与反对派结盟的索马里国民军成员和忠于政府的人员之间爆发了枪战。⁴² 后一事件还导致摩加迪沙约 6 万至 10 万人流离失所。⁴³ 虽然总理最终在 2021 年 5 月 6 日促成了平息紧张局势的协议，⁴⁴ 但这些事件暴露了安全部门内部更广泛的分歧，可能会造成今后被青年党利用的安全真空。

³⁸ 2021 年 8 月与联索特派团高级工作人员交换信息。

³⁹ S/2020/949，第 167 段。

⁴⁰ 2021 年 6 月与索马里联邦政府交换信息，2021 年 8 月与联索援助团高级工作人员交换信息。

⁴¹ 2021 年 2 月的联合国机密报告。

⁴² 2021 年 4 月 19 日至 29 日与多个直接了解摩加迪沙局势的安全消息源的约谈。

⁴³ 2021 年 2 月和 4 月的安全、媒体、人道主义和人权报告，经与当地消息源的约谈证实。另见 https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/HC%20statement_surge%20in%20displacement%20Mogadishu%2028%20April%202021%20Final.pdf and <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/apr/21/somalias-rival-factions-spread-across-mogadishu-as-they-jockey-for-power>。

⁴⁴ 见 Abdi Sheikh (Reuters), “Anti-president Somali soldiers to return to barracks after reaching deal - spokesman”, 2021 年 5 月 6 日。

40. 专家小组还收到报告称，国家情报和安全局官员以及各州警察官员试图阻止当前和以往政治反对派领导人对索马里联邦政府的批评并压制言论自由。⁴⁵ 此外，专家小组知道至少有一起案件涉及一名在可疑情况下失踪的该局官员(见下文)。

伊克兰·塔利尔·法拉

41. 专家小组正在调查 2021 年 6 月 26 日伊克兰·塔利尔·法拉失踪案，她是一名 25 岁的妇女，与摩加迪沙国家情报和安全局的领导层有着密切联系。根据与家属的约谈，塔利尔女士最后一次与家人联系是在与该局官员的一次会面之前。⁴⁶ 此外，家属告诉专家小组，塔利尔女士曾说她受到了该局官员的直接威胁。塔利尔女士的家人向武装部队总检察长和武装部队法院提出了正式申诉，2021 年 7 月 24 日为此汇编了一份报告。⁴⁷ 专家小组于 2021 年 8 月 13 日就这个问题致函索马里联邦政府。

42. 9 月 2 日，国家情报和安全局公开表示塔利尔女士是被青年党绑架，但该团体在 9 月 3 日的快速反驳中予以强烈否认。⁴⁸ 9 月 4 日，总理向国家情报和安全局局长法哈德·亚辛发出 48 小时最后通牒，要求他解释所报告的伊克兰·塔利尔死亡事件的相关情况。⁴⁹ 局长于 9 月 5 日答复，邀请总理出席索马里国家安全委员会会议，听取关于塔利尔女士案件的简报。⁵⁰ 同一天，总理解雇了法哈德·亚辛，并任命该局前局长巴希尔·穆罕默德·哈默少将为该局临时负责人。⁵¹ 9 月 6 日，总统出面表示，总理解雇法哈德·亚辛的决定是非法和违宪的，并允许法哈德·亚辛继续担任该局负责人。⁵²

穆克塔尔·罗博

43. 自 2018 年 12 月被埃塞俄比亚和索马里部队逮捕以来，穆克塔尔·罗博仍被摩加迪沙的国家情报和安全局软禁。⁵³ 专家小组收到了索马里政治和安全官员的多份报告，其中分享了关于罗博目前生活条件、对前西南州总统候选人的暗杀企图以及 2021 年 6 月他声称因被该局非法拘留而绝食的详情。

⁴⁵ 2021 年 1 月至 7 月与索马里记者工会成员的约谈和媒体公开报道。

⁴⁶ 专家小组获得的闭路电视画面显示，塔利尔女士于当地时间 20:03 在住所外进入一辆汽车。

⁴⁷ 见 <https://twitter.com/SomaliGuardian/status/1431655638388678667?s=20>。

⁴⁸ 2021 年 9 月 3 日青年党新闻办公室声明。另见 <https://calamada.com/xarakada-al-shabaab-oo-iska-fogeysay-dilka-ikraan-tahliil-warbixin/>。

⁴⁹ 2021 年 9 月 4 日总理的正式声明。

⁵⁰ 2021 年 9 月 5 日国家情报和安全局的正式声明。

⁵¹ 2021 年 9 月 5 日总理办公室的正式声明。

⁵² 2021 年 9 月 6 日索马里总统府公报。

⁵³ 见 Abdi Sheikh (Reuters), “Somalia arrests ex-Islamist militant running for regional presidency”, 2018 年 12 月 13 日。

44. 罗博是少数几个公开谴责青年党的前青年党成员之一。⁵⁴ 此外，在罗博被捕后，索马里联邦政府继续每月向其民兵支付约 2 万美元用于打击青年党，但这一付款已在 2019 年停止。⁵⁵

招募一支新的、与索马里联邦政府保持一致的安全部队

45. 自 2019 年以来，索马里联邦政府至少招募了 929 名索马里人，⁵⁶ 但可能多达 5 000 人，在厄立特里亚接受未具体说明的军事训练。⁵⁷ 一些新兵的家属和赞助人告诉专家小组，招募过程不透明，联邦政府还告诉一些家庭，新兵将在土耳其或卡塔尔受训。⁵⁸ 附件 2.7 (绝密)提供了经修订的新兵登记表的例子。⁵⁹ 这支部队报称为“Dufaan”的新部队⁶⁰ 仍然与索马里当前安全架构脱节，专家小组既没有发现关于该部队结构的信息，也没有发现政府根据 2021 年 2 月索马里过渡计划或政府定期报告将该部队纳入现有安全部门的计划。

46. 2021 年 6 月 12 日，总理罗布莱任命了一个五人委员会，负责调查声称有亲属失踪、而且可能是在厄立特里亚失踪的家庭的投诉。⁶¹ 附件 2.7 (绝密)有总理发出的宣布委员会成立的信。总理新任命的委员会和更广泛的索马里联邦政府都没有正式宣布这些士兵的身份。2021 年 8 月 9 日，专家小组就调查一事致函联邦政府，但尚未收到答复。

47. 专家小组约谈的三个消息源表示，派往厄立特里亚的新兵总人数中至少有 450 人已返回索马里，并在不透明的指挥和控制结构下开展行动，可能在 2021 年 4 月摩加迪沙选举冲突中扮演了不明角色。⁶² 专家小组没有关于这些新兵参加埃塞俄比亚提格雷战斗的确凿信息。⁶³

⁵⁴ Jeffrey Gettleman, “An ex-Shabaab leader surrenders in Somalia, officials say”, 《纽约时报》，2017 年 8 月 13 日。

⁵⁵ 2021 年 8 月 2 日在内罗毕与索马里联邦政府安全官员的约谈。

⁵⁶ 根据专家小组获得和审查的文件，以及 2021 年 5 月至 8 月与新兵家属和其他对成立这支部队有内部了解的安全官员的约谈。

⁵⁷ 2021 年 8 月 13 日，国家安全顾问阿布迪赛义德·阿里在接受达尔桑电视台采访时表示，索马里联邦政府向厄立特里亚派遣了 5 000 名新兵。

⁵⁸ 2021 年 8 月与至少 12 名新兵的家人进行的约谈。

⁵⁹ 929 名新兵的年龄、地址和所属部族以及每名新兵的担保人或推荐人的信息都已存于秘书处。

⁶⁰ Dufaan 在英语中翻译成“龙卷风”或“强风”。

⁶¹ 委员会成员包括国防部长哈桑·侯赛因·哈吉、内政部长穆克塔尔·侯赛因·阿弗拉赫、索马里驻埃塞俄比亚大使阿卜杜拉希·艾哈迈德·贾马·伊尔卡吉尔、国防部长奥多瓦·优素福·拉格和总理办公室发言人穆罕默德·易卜拉欣·穆阿利穆。

⁶² 2021 年 8 月 1 日至 8 日与索马里联邦政府现任和前任安全官员的约谈。

⁶³ 值得注意的是，2018 年，埃塞俄比亚、厄立特里亚和索马里签署了一项正式名称为《埃塞俄比亚、索马里和厄立特里亚全面合作联合宣言》的合作协议(见 <https://igad.int/press-release/1940-igad-welcomes-the-signing-of-the-joint-declaration-on-the-comprehensive-cooperation-between-ethiopia-eritrea-and-somalia>)。

F. 海上安全

48. 在本报告所述期间，专家小组注意到索马里沿海发生了一起经证实的海上安全事件。2021 年 8 月 13 日，中谢贝利沿海发生袭击，一艘小艇向驶往摩加迪沙的 Anatolian 号(海事组织编号 9005869，在土耳其注册)客运滚装船开火。该船到摩加迪沙后交付了用于索马里国民军的军事装备。附件 2.8 载有更多详情。

三. 青年党的资金和公共财政管理

A. 概述

49. 青年党继续从各种国内来源获得收入。非法征税网络仍然是该团体最大的收入来源，其次是该团体非法征收的天课、非法 *infaq*、⁶⁴ 绑架勒索和服务费。⁶⁵ 这种复杂的国内创收机制使该团体在支出上游刃有余，不必依赖索马里境外供资。

50. 非法征税和创收主要有四个领域：

- (a) 农业(*dalag beeraha*)：在产地、检查站和出口领域对农场和农产品非法征税；
- (b) 车辆(*gadiid*)：对过境车辆非法征税。过境税费取决于车型和行驶里程；此外，还征收车辆登记费；
- (c) 货物(*badeeco*)：对运输的货物非法征税。支付金额取决于货物种类和数量；在港口和过境点征收进出口费；
- (d) 牲畜(*xoolo*)：在当地市场对出售牲畜(主要是牛、骆驼和山羊)非法征税。

51. 专家小组对青年党金融系统的审查证实，该团体利用国内金融机构、银行账户和电子移动货币服务，为安全储存和随后转移所获收入提供便利。不过，该团体仍然非常依赖现金流动，存款和取款主要都是用现金进行。⁶⁶ 收款方法因征税类型而异，过境车辆主要使用现金支付，企业的大额付款则是将现金存入指定银行账户。⁶⁷ 对青年党和支付者而言，移动货币都是最快捷、最方便的转账形式。

52. 专家小组评估认为，由于创收系统有条不紊，加上在投资方面甘冒风险，青年党的财务状况依然良好。⁶⁸

53. 索马里仍在向正规金融系统过渡，因此所有金融运营商都有可能被青年党利用，该团体一贯采用灵活的商业模式，没有机构偏好。专家小组重点调查了青年党的运营手段和具体运作方式，以便更全面地了解该团体的非法创收活动。

⁶⁴ 支持战斗人员的自愿捐款。

⁶⁵ 专家小组目前正在调查青年党将非法税收扩大到摩加迪沙的专业人员，包括医生、教师 and 大学教授企图。

⁶⁶ 2021 年期间专家小组进行的调查。

⁶⁷ 2021 年期间与企业 and 司机的约谈。

⁶⁸ 2021 年 2 月和 4 月专家小组审查的机密报告。

B. 青年党的创收活动

在检查站非法“征税”

54. 青年党的主要收入来源之一是通过各个检查站对过境索马里的车辆和货物征税。专家小组估计，青年党在全国各地运营大约 100 个检查站。检查站网络由永久、半永久和流动设施组成，使青年党有能力根据当地实情调整征税办法。其中一些检查站，如吉利卜以南 30 公里的坎苏马大桥，是青年党的主要收入来源地。主要的收入积累中心往往与检查站的具体地点保持一致。例如，萨考的财务办公室就设在在市中心北面一点通往巴尔代雷方向的检查站。⁶⁹

55. 2021 年 3 月至 7 月，专家小组约谈了 6 名卡车司机，他们在索马里全境运输货物，但主要是在西南州、贝纳迪尔和朱巴兰。所有人都报告说，在青年党控制地区以及在该团体活跃的政府控制地区，青年党运作广泛的检查站网络。例如，从基斯马尤到多布里，司机要经过青年党的 3 个检查站。⁷⁰ 在第一个检查站交钱，拿到收据，以便安全通过青年党的地盘。该收据要保留，到下一个检查站检查，以免再次付款。如果车辆离开青年党管理地区，返回时就需要再次交费。在检查站付款主要使用移动货币转账或现金(美元)。车辆必须向青年党登记，并需要向该团体支付一次性款项才能收到登记文件，文件必须放在车内，供青年党检查。⁷¹ 专家小组注意到青年党的收据内容丰富，相当于车辆、货物和人员在青年党管理地区流动情况的一个大型数据库。⁷²

56. 受访者强调，不可能逃避青年党检查站征税，因为存在广泛的线人网络，线人为青年党收集信息，让民众心生恐惧。如果司机试图绕路以逃避付款，就会被举报并处以罚款，没有商量余地。⁷³

57. 检查站的安保状况各不相同，取决于青年党对检查站所在地区的控制程度。例如，中朱巴州布阿勒的检查站由填写收据的人把守，原因是青年党直接控制着该镇。但邻接政府控制地区或有争议地区的检查站会有更多的安全保障和人力。下谢贝利州巴士拉是有争议地区，控制权经常易手，据报这里的检查站有大约 30 名护法警察⁷⁴ 提供安全保障。

58. 专家小组调查了青年党在检查站征税方面的主要收入来源，发现下朱巴的坎苏马大桥、下谢贝利的费尤素福和拜州的伊达勒检查站因为位于主要补给沿线的

⁶⁹ 专家小组看到的机密报告，2021 年 2 月。

⁷⁰ 以下地点的检查站：(a) Yaaq Buulle、(b) Bibi 与 Berhani 之间、(c) Caglibax (流动)，大约北纬 0°15'11.7"，东经 41°59'00.4"。

⁷¹ 登记费视车型而定，从 100 美元到 500 美元不等。

⁷² 专家小组在本任务期间从索马里境内各种来源获得的收据。

⁷³ 罚款根据车型而定；卡车的罚款可能是通常对其装载货物征收税额的两倍。

⁷⁴ 青年党警察部门。

战略要地而收入最高。⁷⁵ 坎苏马大桥检查站平均 24 小时有 30 辆卡车通过。⁷⁶ 按每辆卡车平均征税 500 至 1 000 美元计算，青年党每天可从该检查站获得 1.5 万至 3 万美元。附件 3.1 (绝密)显示了在索马里境内运作的青年党检查站网络。

天课勒索

59. 天课(募集救济金)是伊斯兰教的五大支柱之一，是一项将一定比例的个人财富用于救济穷人的年度宗教义务。天课通常以个人或企业累积净财富 2.5%的年率征收。青年党继续利用天课这一宗教义务来进一步证明对民众“勒索”的正当性。专家小组注意到，青年党每年对农业征收两次天课，对商业和畜牧业每年征收一次天课。

60. 在本任务期间，专家小组约谈了索马里境内和国际上被迫向青年党支付天课的企业主。一名受访者称，青年党就应支付的天课打电话与他联系，命令他 2021 年 3 月参加下谢贝利州阿夫戈耶的一次会议。⁷⁷ 这名企业主前往阿夫戈耶与青年党成员会面，商谈待支付的金额；此次商谈历时 10 天，最终结果是向青年党支付 10 万美元的天课。分摊金额根据企业的年营业额和规模计算，表明青年党对企业的规模和资产作了评估。⁷⁸

61. 商谈结束后，该企业用现金分期向青年党的一个移动货币钱包付款，总额超过 12 万美元。青年党仅提供了付款所需的姓名和电话号码。⁷⁹ 专家小组审查了两张收据，显示向一个移动货币钱包转入共计 12 万美元，而移动货币在索马里仍是一个不受监管的业务领域。这标志着收款方式发生了变化，因为专家小组曾在 2020 年报告中指出，款项是汇入国内银行账户。⁸⁰

在索马里港口的勒索

62. 专家小组在 2020 年报告中强调，青年党对在摩加迪沙港开展业务的企业和个人进行勒索，渗透网络为此提供了便利，以便青年党能查阅载有企业进出口信息的单据。⁸¹ 专家小组提供了青年党在摩加迪沙港获取收入的案例研究，其中确定该团体用移动货币和国内银行账户相结合的方式收取并在随后转移勒索款项。各港口为青年党带来丰厚收入。青年党不仅对进出口货物进行勒索，而且还对货物通过进出港口的干线转运和在那里开展业务的企业进行勒索。

⁷⁵ 2021 年 1 月至 5 月与司机的电话约谈和审查的机密报告。

⁷⁶ 同上。

⁷⁷ 2021 年 1 月至 6 月与贸易公司的约谈。

⁷⁸ 同上。

⁷⁹ 移动货币允许没有银行账户的人将手机用作银行账户：使用手机存取款和转账，与银行账户不同，“了解客户”的规定目前不适用。

⁸⁰ S/2020/949，第 17-21 段。

⁸¹ 同上，第 12-16 段。

63. 专家小组 2021 年期间获得的证据显示，在摩加迪沙港对通过港口设施进出口和转运货物的勒索行为仍在继续。此外，青年党还设立了新的银行账户，用于收取非法税款。⁸²

64. 2021 年初，一家国际公司向摩加迪沙港进口了约 8 000 吨食品。货物进口 10 天后，青年党电话联系了摩加迪沙的这家公司，命令它为这批进口货物向青年党支付超过 3 万美元的非法税款，计算依据是每吨 4 美元，无论进口货物为何。青年党告知该公司，它掌握了该公司在摩加迪沙港的货物信息，并随后提出勒索要求。⁸³

65. 一家向摩加迪沙港进口的企业进口了 6 000 多吨家用物品，专家小组审查的相关收据显示，青年党以同样税率对该企业进行了类似的非法征税。因此，青年党索要金额超过 2.5 万美元，并将其存入同一账户。专家小组审查的两张收据显示，有两笔现金存入索马里国内一家银行的账户，总额超过 5.5 万美元。⁸⁴

66. 任务期间的调查显示，基斯马尤港有类似的勒索行动。该港口在朱巴兰，为索马里南部提供服务。青年党的军事力量于 2012 年被赶出基斯马尤，但仍有能力敲诈个人和企业。

67. 青年党在基斯马尤港的勒索按集装箱计算，20 英尺集装箱收费 80 美元，40 英尺集装箱收费 160 美元。专家小组注意到，2021 年 7 月，基斯马尤港有 4 艘船，其中一艘有 285 个集装箱。⁸⁵ 7 月有 285 个集装箱到港，以每个集装箱平均收费 120 美元计算，青年党将通过对集装箱征税获得 3.42 万美元收入。⁸⁶

68. 专家小组了解到，基斯马尤商界已要求朱巴兰当局采取行动，制止青年党获取企业信息并进行勒索。⁸⁷ 青年党仍然按照固定费率就集装箱内的货物进行勒索，专家小组将进一步调查确定在基斯马尤港对商品的征税比率。

69. 附件 3.2 (绝密)显示了青年党的所有文件和收据。

C. 青年党对移动货币的利用

70. 移动货币市场仍然是索马里最主要的资金转移方式，但仍然不受监管。⁸⁸ 移动货币平台的广泛使用对青年党的资金流动至关重要。目前，移动货币服务提供

⁸² 2021 年 1 月至 6 月与贸易公司的约谈。

⁸³ 同上。

⁸⁴ 2021 年 9 月与公司的约谈。

⁸⁵ 2021 年 3 月至 7 月与基斯马尤的企业的电话约谈。

⁸⁶ 不包括对集装箱内货物征税获得的收入。

⁸⁷ 2021 年 3 月至 7 月与基斯马尤的企业的电话约谈。

⁸⁸ 2018 年，世界银行报告称，索马里每月记录的移动货币交易约为 1.55 亿笔，价值 27 亿美元，在索马里移动货币已取代现金使用，70%以上的索马里成年人定期使用移动货币服务。

商没有义务向调查当局提供移动货币账户信息，突显了有效执行移动货币监管以打击青年党融资的重要性。⁸⁹

71. 2020 年 2 月 27 日，索马里中央银行向 Hormuud 电信公司发放第一张移动货币牌照，迈出了监管移动货币服务提供商的重要一步；2021 年 6 月，又向 Somtel 通信公司发放了第二张牌照。⁹⁰ 但专家小组了解到，尽管发放了牌照，索马里中央银行却允许移动货币服务提供商延后两年执行 2019 年《移动货币条例》，⁹¹ 并将这一宽缓期写入《移动货币条例》。具体而言，附表三第 6 条(v)款规定，移动货币服务提供商有两年时间遵守该条例，纠正目前感觉不合规的任何业务领域。⁹²

72. 不遵守现有反洗钱/打击资助恐怖主义行为法律和条例的任何规定，包括 2019 年《移动货币条例》附表六所载的反洗钱/打击资助恐怖主义行为报告要求以及与主管当局分享信息的规定，将被索马里中央银行处以 4 万美元罚款。⁹³

执行《移动货币条例》的障碍

73. 索马里人很少有身份证件，超过 77%的人口没有官方身份证明。⁹⁴ 身份识别是关键，证明身份的能力是有条不紊参与社会、政治和经济生活的必要条件。专家小组在 2020 年报告中着重提到青年党获取身份证件开设银行账户的能力。⁹⁵ 多名官员、索马里金融机构和企业向专家小组强调了推出强有力的索马里国民身份证件的重要性。⁹⁶ 首先，需要有个人的身份证明，对金融交易进行适当的“了解客户”验证。其次，对所有包含身份信息的 SIM 卡进行登记，对于通过核实手机用户打击资助恐怖主义行为至关重要。2020 年 11 月，索马里下议院通过了国民身份证件管理局法案，总统随后签署了该法案，这是朝着索马里国民身份证件迈出的第一步。⁹⁷

D. 索马里联邦政府和国际社会打击青年党筹资的措施

74. 安全理事会第 2551(2020)号决议第 1 段提到由索马里联邦政府、联合国毒品和犯罪问题办公室和专家小组牵头制定切断资助计划。这项工作的第一阶段现已

⁸⁹ S/2018/1002，附件 2.4；S/2020/949，第 29 和 38 段。

⁹⁰ 见 <https://twitter.com/CBSsomalila/status/1365686469613006854>。

⁹¹ 2021 年 3 月与索马里金融导师的电话约谈。

⁹² Hormuud 电信公司已启动全球移动通信系统协会移动货币合规框架。

⁹³ 2018 年，世界银行指出，每月报告的移动货币交易量为 1.55 亿笔，价值 27 亿美元。

⁹⁴ 见世界银行，Identification for Development (ID4D) Dataset。可查阅 <https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/identification-development-global-dataset>。

⁹⁵ S/2020/949，第 30 段。

⁹⁶ 一名安全方面的消息人士在约谈中指出，“我们不知道谁是青年党，我和某些人坐下来喝茶，不知道他们是不是青年党”。

⁹⁷ 2020 年 11 月，索马里人民院通过了国家身份证件管理局法案，总统随后签署了该法案。

完成，15 人参加了 2021 年 4 月至 7 月的 12 周培训课程，参加者主要来自金融报告中心。

75. 原定 2021 年 8 月举行的展示切断资助计划制定情况、既有成果、更广泛益处和未来路线图的高级别简报会已推迟至 2021 年底。

76. 在上述培训之后，毒品和犯罪问题办公室继续通过提供信息技术设备支持金融报告中心。⁹⁸ 下一步将包括在该中心的计算机上安装 i2 Analyst's Notebook 和 goAML 软件，以加强该中心的分析能力。

77. 索马里金融系统举措继续迈向实施阶段，通过提供索马里私营部门金融机构、索马里当局和国际社会之间的互动界面，支持索马里联邦政府。世界银行将实施该项目，目前正在等待索马里中央银行和财政部的批准，以便启动工作。该举措的目的是通过改善金融部门的诚信、公司治理标准、风险管理以及防范资助恐怖主义行为和非法资金流动的合规保障，解锁索马里的国际投资和代理银行关系。

78. 国家合规论坛由索马里金融报告中心主持，是一个旨在改善与相关对话者的协调、信息共享和趋势监测的机制。该论坛每季度召开会议，汇聚公共和私营部门实体，包括反腐败委员会、索马里银行家协会、索马里汇款协会、DADSOM(索马里身份证件管理局)、银行、转账机构和移动货币服务提供商。

E. 公共财政管理

79. 2020 年 3 月，索马里达到了重债穷国倡议的决策点。2021 年 3 月，国际货币基金组织根据该倡议向索马里提供了额外援助，涵盖该国在 2022 年 3 月之前一年对基金组织的偿债义务。⁹⁹

80. 2021 年 6 月 29 日，世界银行签署了 4 000 万美元的索马里教育促进人力资本开发项目协议，以支持索马里重建教育系统，重点是年轻女孩的教育。¹⁰⁰ 这是索马里财政部长与世界银行签署的项目赠款协议中超过 4.45 亿美元的更广泛投资的一部分。¹⁰¹

81. 中东和北非金融行动特别工作组将于 2024 年审查索马里的金融基础设施，包括反洗钱和打击资助恐怖主义行为各项标准的执行情况。

⁹⁸ 计算机和相关软件于 2021 年 7 月交付金融报告中心。

⁹⁹ 见 www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2021/04/01/Somalia-Enhanced-Heavily-Indebted-Poor-Countries-Initiative-Request-for-Additional-Interim-50330。

¹⁰⁰ 见 www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2021/06/29/girls-in-somalia-to-benefit-from-enhanced-access-to-education。

¹⁰¹ 见 <https://twitter.com/DrBeileh/status/1410217800535314434>。

四. 武器禁运

A. 青年党拥有的军事装备

82. 专家小组记录了在本任务期间青年党所使用的或从青年党缴获的武器、弹药和军事装备，包括青年党在博萨索监狱袭击事件中使用的军事装备，以及在青年党发布的视频中显示的军事装备。

83. 专家小组特别确认一枚 60 毫米迫击炮弹的特征与 2016 年在塞尔维亚制造并于同年出口至沙特阿拉伯的 60 毫米 M73 HE 一致。¹⁰² 青年党于 2020 年 2 月 17 日向亚丁·阿德国际机场内的联合国大院方向发射了同一类型的迫击炮弹。¹⁰³ 青年党使用的一些榴弹与 2018 年 3 月乌干达人民国防军从青年党缴获的榴弹以及青年党在 2018 年 11 月 9 日袭击萨哈菲酒店和 2020 年 1 月 5 日袭击肯尼亚曼达湾时使用的榴弹型号相同。

84. 专家小组还确认了一支 M4 突击步枪；据专家小组了解，这是第一次看到青年党手中有 M4 步枪(5.56×45 毫米)。专家小组还发现了此前交付给索马里联邦政府的军事装备(56-2 式突击步枪和装甲运兵车)。详细资料和图片载于附件 4.1。

85. 专家小组回顾索马里联邦政府在这一领域充分合作的重要性，期待联邦政府根据第 2551(2020)号决议第 32 段，为专家小组查看联邦政府和其他安全部队 2021 年从青年党手中缴获的军事装备提供便利。

B. 索马里联邦政府遵守部分解除武器禁运义务的情况

武器和弹药管理

86. 按照安全理事会第 2551(2020)号决议第 34 段的要求，专家小组向委员会提交了第一份专题报告，题为“支持索马里武器和弹药管理系统的发展：有关武器禁运制度执行情况的意见”。以下各段概述了该报告的要点。

87. 自 2018 年 8 月 25 日以来，专家小组一直无法检查哈拉内中央军械库的记录册，因此无法公平评估索马里联邦政府自那时以来在登记武器方面的进展情况。¹⁰⁴ 尽管如此，附件 4.2 概述了现有的武器弹药管理程序和予以改进的潜力。

88. 为消除哈拉内中央军械库储存的火箭推进榴弹高爆弹药构成的风险，¹⁰⁵ 索马里联邦政府于 2020 年 11 月和 2021 年 2 月邀请专家小组和其他国际伙伴，启动了对该军械库的联合技术评估。联合技术评估小组起草了一份全面评估报告。¹⁰⁶

¹⁰² 2021 年 6 月 10 日向沙特阿拉伯发出了请求援助的正式信函，以了解这些弹药在一系列保管程序中的哪个环节被转移到非法领域。在撰写本报告时尚未收到任何答复。

¹⁰³ S/2020/949，附件 4.1。

¹⁰⁴ 在 2021 年 2 月 10 日上一次访问哈拉内中央军械库时，指挥官告知专家小组，记录册存放在国防部。

¹⁰⁵ S/2020/949，第 102 段。

¹⁰⁶ 在秘书处存档。

秘书长特别代表于 2021 年 7 月 29 日致函索马里联邦政府，表示可以帮助将有效的火箭推进榴弹转移到对民众和关键基础设施构成最小风险的地点，并提供处置失效榴弹的技术知识。¹⁰⁷

89. 联合核查小组开发了实用的武器弹药管理原型数据库，供摩加迪沙的索马里警察部队首次使用；该数据库提供安全的在线检索能力，纳入了所交付的武器和弹药的通知详情和特征。这一数据库的实施仍需扩展到所有索马里国家安全部队，这对于索马里联邦政府根据第 2551(2020)号决议建立国家武器登记系统，包括建立显示哪些军事单位拥有哪些武器的电子登记册至关重要。附件 4.3 显示如何将此类武器弹药管理数据库纳入索马里拥有的武器和弹药管理系统。

关于武器和弹药交付的通知

90. 自专家小组于 2020 年 9 月 28 日提交 2020 年最后报告(S/2020/949)以来，从土耳其向索马里联邦政府运送了 7 批武器和弹药。附件 4.4 (绝密)显示了与这几批货物有关的通知详情。

91. 自 2013 年部分解除武器禁运以来，专家小组和联合核查小组继续更新索马里联邦政府正式进口的武器和弹药相关综合数据库。¹⁰⁸ 该数据库显示，自 2013 年以来，联邦政府正式接收了大约 2.6 万件武器和 8 000 万发弹药，其中包括约 7 万发 RPG-7 弹药。¹⁰⁹ 附件 4.5 (绝密)列出了所接收的武器和弹药细目。

保加利亚有关运送大批军事装备的通知

92. 2021 年 1 月 13 日向委员会分发了保加利亚 2020 年 12 月 30 日的通知，其中提及将于 2021 年 1 月中旬交付一批武器和弹药，包括高爆弹药和第 2551(2020)号决议附件 A 所列物项，但须经委员会批准。这批货物价值 2.7 亿美元。¹¹⁰

93. 索马里国家安全顾问在收到通知副本后，于 2021 年 1 月 19 日致函委员会，要求暂停交付。安全顾问向专家小组表示，这批货物的交付没有与安全顾问办公室沟通或协调，索马里联邦政府计划对采购进行审计。¹¹¹ 但专家小组获悉，保加利亚已于 2020 年 9 月向索马里常驻联合国代表团通报这批货物。¹¹²

¹⁰⁷ 在秘书处存档。

¹⁰⁸ S/2020/949，第 105 段。

¹⁰⁹ 依据是索马里联邦政府和会员国提交委员会的通知，以及联邦政府武器弹药管理联络人和联合核查小组提供的资料。

¹¹⁰ 2021 年 2 月 3 日，与设在保加利亚的 Kalandor 运输有限公司总经理的约谈。出于保密原因，保加利亚当局无法与专家小组分享合同副本。

¹¹¹ 2021 年 1 月 14 日与国家安全顾问的电话会议。

¹¹² 在通知委员会之前的 2020 年 9 月 11 日保加利亚常驻联合国代表团给索马里常驻联合国代表团的函件，在秘书处存档。

94. 专家小组收集的初步证据显示,关于此次采购的谈判于 2019 年底启动,由国防国务部长穆罕默德·阿里·哈加进行。¹¹³ 这一事件显示索马里联邦政府内部功能失调,提出了对武器和弹药进口进行监督的关键问题。专家小组希望联邦政府在最终完成对这批货物的审计后分享审计结果。

在未通知情况下交付一批军用卡车

95. 专家小组收到关于 MV Birden 号客运滚装船(海事组织编号 7305772)的信息,显示该船于 2021 年 4 月 30 日向摩加迪沙港交付了总共 44 辆 Kamaz 军用卡车。专家小组注意到,该船于 2021 年 4 月 15 日离开土耳其伊斯坦布尔,驶过苏伊士运河于 2021 年 4 月 19 日停靠沙特阿拉伯吉达,并于 2021 年 4 月 30 日至 5 月 1 日停靠摩加迪沙,然后前往巴基斯坦卡拉奇。专家小组于 2021 年 6 月 8 日正式致函设在土耳其的船运公司 İstanbullines Lojistik,以确定交付这批货物是否符合武器禁运要求(见附件 4.6 的图片)。

通知的标准化模板

96. 根据索马里联邦政府 2021 年 2 月 4 日定期报告所附联合核查小组报告提出的建议,武器、弹药和军事装备的通知应遵循商定的模板,以确保按照要求提供足够详细的信息。这些模板的目的是先由供应商填写,并协助联邦政府妥善管理所要求的军事装备(例如登记、储存和追踪)。附件 4.7 列有对标准化模板的建议。

索马里联邦政府根据第 2551(2020)号决议第 37 段提交定期报告

97. 安全理事会第 2551(2020)号决议第 37 段请索马里联邦政府向安理会报告安全部队的结构、组成、兵力和部署情况以及地区部队和民兵部队的状况,并纳入关于武器和弹药分发后索马里国家安全部队接收单位或军事装备储存地点的通知。

98. 2021 年 2 月 1 日,索马里联邦政府根据第 2551(2020)号决议第 37 段的要求向委员会发送了第一份定期报告。第二份定期报告应于 2021 年 8 月 1 日提交,但直至 2021 年 8 月 19 日才转交委员会。¹¹⁴ 这些报告包括与武器进口通知有关的信息、对索马里过渡计划的审查以及安全局势概览。此外,这些报告还包括关于武器弹药管理的一节和联合核查小组的报告。但是,这些报告没有包括有关进口武器和弹药接收单位和当前部队部署情况的强制性通知。

99. 根据专家小组的建议,委员会已邀请索马里联邦政府就联邦政府定期报告的现有要求,特别是与军事装备接收单位通知以及安全部队的结构、组成、兵力和部署有关的要求,提出关切和需要澄清之处。¹¹⁵ 联邦政府仍未回复主席的信。只

¹¹³ 最终用户证书由国务部长签署(在秘书处存档),并在 2021 年 2 月 10 日与国务部长的会议和 2021 年 2 月 11 日与其前总司长的电话约谈中确认。

¹¹⁴ 但据专家小组所知,索马里国家安全顾问办公室按时(2021 年 7 月 31 日)向外交与国际合作部发送了第二份报告。

¹¹⁵ 2020 年 12 月发出的信,在秘书处存档。

要联邦政府能够证明自己有能力维持对安全部队的指挥和控制，专家小组并不担心取消这些要求。

C. 会员国和国际组织遵守武器禁运的情况

邦特兰海事警察部队

100. 专家小组 2020 年报告指出，阿拉伯联合酋长国运营的一架军用运输机在没有任何通知的情况下，向驻扎在邦特兰博萨索的邦特兰海事警察部队运送了军事装备。¹¹⁶ 这种缺乏透明度的做法不利于警察部队的进一步发展和国际伙伴的潜在贡献，即使该部队在打击极端主义武装团体以及武器和弹药走私和海盗活动方面是重要的安保能力。

101. 为加强武器禁运的执行，专家小组于 2021 年 7 月 8 日前往阿拉伯联合酋长国，向政府官员做出一切必要澄清，说明在支持索马里联邦成员州安全部队方面，武器禁运制度规定的要求。专家小组还于 2021 年 8 月 2 日会见了邦特兰海事警察部队和邦特兰总统办公室的领导层，以更好地了解他们的运作需要，以及他们如何能根据制裁制度的要求向会员国提出请求。

102. 事实上，委员会于 2021 年 8 月 13 日收到一个会员国根据第 2551(2020)号决议第 12 段发出的向邦特兰海事警察部队提供武器和弹药的通知。专家小组希望，从现在起，将采取完全符合武器禁运制度要求的方式向联邦成员州提供军事装备。¹¹⁷

非洲联盟驻索马里特派团

103. 非洲联盟驻索马里特派团(非索特派团)和索马里联邦政府联合起草了关于追回的轻小武器的管理的标准作业程序，并在 2021 年 2 月 17 日的一次在线活动期间提交给国际社会。这一标准作业程序建立在现有的一套国际文件和文书基础上。¹¹⁸

104. 该标准作业程序力求提出与被扣押装备有关的必要数据收集和记录保存程序，以及与合作伙伴完全透明地分享信息的方法。追回的武器的所有记录均应列入索马里联邦政府提交安全理事会的定期报告和非索特派团提交非洲联盟和平与安全理事会的季度报告，后者也转交安全理事会供参考。所有记录都打算登记在非索特派团总部和索马里国家安全顾问办公室管理的中央数据库中。记录将复制到收缴武器和弹药的电子表格登记册，或使用索马里联邦政府的移动数据收集应用程序下载。¹¹⁹

¹¹⁶ S/2020/949，第 107-108 段。

¹¹⁷ 根据安全理事会第 2111(2013)号决议第 11(a)段发出的关于向索马里联邦政府指挥和控制之外的安全部队提供武器和弹药的通知非常少。S/2019/858 和 S/2019/858/Corr.1 号文件第 120-122 段报告了索马里各联邦州在至少十年期间是如何规避武器禁运收到武器弹药的。

¹¹⁸ 见题为“非索特派团/索马里联邦政府有关追回的轻小武器的管理的统一标准作业程序”，在秘书处存档。

¹¹⁹ 基于移动支点数据应用程序(见 S/2020/949，第 103 段)。

105. 该标准作业程序将使非索特派团有能力履行安全理事会第 2182(2014)号决议第 6 段规定的义务。¹²⁰ 如果索马里联邦政府与非索特派团之间的信息共享改进工作执行得当,将大大增强专家小组评估青年党武器、弹药和装备来源的机会。

D. 武器非法流入索马里

美国温斯顿·丘吉尔号驱逐舰实施的扣押

106. 2021 年 2 月 14 日,美国温斯顿·丘吉尔号驱逐舰(DDG 81)扣押了索马里东部海岸两艘道船上的武器。¹²¹ 为确定这批武器的产地和预定目的地,专家小组已请求美国政府提供协助。¹²² 专家小组向美国提出的请求尚未收到答复,但初步迹象显示,船员和道船已获释,武器已被处置(见附件 4.8 (绝密))。

美国蒙特利号导弹巡洋舰实施的扣押

107. 2021 年 5 月 6 日和 7 日,美国蒙特利号导弹巡洋舰(CG 61)扣押了阿拉伯海北部一艘无国籍道船上的武器。¹²³ 武器储藏处有几十枚反坦克制导导弹,数千支 56 型突击步枪和数百挺机枪、狙击步枪和火箭推进榴弹发射器。¹²⁴

108. 来自对船只进行检查的会员国海军的详细信息,对于专家小组和委员会更好地了解非法武器流入索马里的情况至关重要(见建议)。

也门-邦特兰武器走私网络

109. 邦特兰当局与专家小组分享了 2021 年 5 月和 7 月在索马里北部沿海从走私者手中缴获武器弹药的 4 起记录在案的案件。例如,2021 年 7 月 28 日,邦特兰海事警察部队设法缴获了从博萨索以东 10 公里 Marcero 地区的一艘道船上卸下的军事装备。据报,这批货物打算运给青年党,包括数千发弹药和几十件武器。一名涉嫌走私者被捕,他的全球定位系统显示了也门海岸和索马里北部海岸的各航路点。这些案件载于附件 4.8 (绝密)。

¹²⁰ 在该段中,安全理事会请索马里国民军和非索特派团记录和登记在进攻行动中或执行任务过程中缴获的所有军事装备,包括记录武器和/或弹药的类型和编号,对所有物项和相关标识进行拍照,在重新分配或销毁所有军事事项前协助专家小组对其进行检查。

¹²¹ 2021 年 2 月 16 日美国中央司令部新闻稿,可查阅 www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/News-Article-View/Article/2504027/winston-s-churchill-seizes-illicit-weapons-from-two-dhows-off-somalia/。

¹²² 2021 年 2 月 22 日的正式信函。

¹²³ 2021 年 5 月 8 日美国海军新闻办公室新闻稿。

¹²⁴ 2021 年 8 月与美国当局交流的信息。

五. 简易爆炸装置组件禁令

简易爆炸装置组件

110. 由于在本任务期间缺乏爆炸后分析，因此专家小组无法评估有关简易爆炸装置所用组件的任何新趋势。¹²⁵ 但目测调查继续表明，青年党正在使用一种自制的炸药混合物，将硝化甘油(高爆)、硝酸钾(氧化剂)和木炭(燃料)混合在一起。同样，据评估，定期使用收获的爆炸物的做法仍在继续。¹²⁶

111. 与前几年相比，2021 年大多数简易爆炸装置组件没有发现明显变化。所用雷管的类型仍然是商用电雷管，图像显示频繁使用 C-DET 公司的品牌雷管。¹²⁷ 简易爆炸装置容器(通常是专门制造)的设计与前几年相对一致，并且仍使用 12 伏摩托车电池和手机作为电源。有关简易爆炸装置开关的现有信息显示，2021 年全年，仍继续使用手机、学习代码接收器、摩托车警报器和压板。¹²⁸

向索马里出口安全理事会第 2498(2019)号决议附件 C 所列物项

112. 专家小组继续根据联合国商品贸易数据库评估附件 C 所列物项的出口情况，更具体而言，评估青年党用于生产自制炸药的成分：硝酸钾、硫酸和硝酸。¹²⁹ 根据联合国商品贸易数据库的最新记录，¹³⁰ 专家小组发现有大量硝酸和硫酸出口至索马里，证实了 2020 年观察到的趋势。¹³¹ 2019 年和 2020 年，向索马里出口了 2 000 多吨硫酸(商品代码 2807)和 230 多吨硝酸(商品代码 280800)。专家小组还注意到，2019 年和 2020 年向索马里出口了近 160 吨硝酸钾(商品代码 283421)；与前几年相比，这是一个新趋势。¹³² 专家小组目前正在会员国的支持下评估索马里对这些物项的工业需求，以便对获得简易爆炸装置组件的情况进行全面调查。

扣押一批硝酸钾并正在调查

113. 2021 年 8 月 26 日，委员会收到一个会员国的一封信，内容涉及 2020 年底扣押一批目的地为索马里的近 100 吨硝酸钾。这是委员会首次根据第 2551(2020)号决议第 28 段收到有关同一决议附件 C 所列物项的调查的通知。会员国向专家小组保证将提供合作，适时分享正在进行的调查的结果。

¹²⁵ 2021 年 8 月与恐怖爆炸装置分析中心的电子邮件往来：因冠状病毒病(COVID-19)大流行造成的限制，无法获取简易爆炸装置样本。

¹²⁶ 报告和 2021 年与联合国驻索马里地雷行动处的信息交流。

¹²⁷ S/2020/949，第 116-118 段。

¹²⁸ 驻索马里联合国地雷行动处的报告。

¹²⁹ S/2020/949，第 116-117 段。

¹³⁰ 可查阅 <https://comtrade.un.org/data/> (访问日期 2021 年 9 月 5 日)。

¹³¹ S/2020/949，第 121 段。

¹³² 同上。

军事法庭关于爆炸物可能组件进口的听审

114. 2021 年 6 月 6 日，索马里国民军军事法庭公布了一段与非法向索马里进口两用化学品案有关的听审视频。根据专家小组现阶段收集的资料，¹³³ 该案涉及几名索马里公民，据报是商人，他们被控参与进口可用于在索马里生产爆炸材料的设备和化学成分。在听审期间，出示了一份与一个 12 英尺的硝酸钾容器有关的文件，此外里面还有甘油、硫酸和丙酮等。这些都是两用化学品，可用来生产价值 3.2 万美元的自制炸药。现阶段，专家小组不清楚这些货物是否已运抵索马里。专家小组继续利用索马里联邦政府官员提供的资料对此案进行监测。

交付第二批硝铵燃油炸药

115. 2020 年，专家小组报告了向邦特兰交付的用于建造加拉卡德港的第一批 165 吨硝铵燃油炸药及其使用情况。¹³⁴ 邦特兰当局称，2020 年 12 月 24 日，设在土耳其的供应公司 TTN Group İnşaat 获得索马里联邦政府批准，可以向索马里出口第二批 165 吨硝铵燃油炸药。

116. 根据邦特兰当局关于硝铵燃油炸药使用情况的最新报告和运输文件，¹³⁵ 第二批 160 吨硝铵燃油炸药于 2021 年 3 月 12 日运抵博萨索港，并于 2021 年 3 月 17 日运抵在贾利班的储存地点。截至 2021 年 7 月，已使用第二批最初 160 吨硝铵燃油炸药中的大约 90 吨。根据专家小组收到的补充资料，一个泊位已经完成，第二个泊位的建设工作应于 9 月中旬启动，这将需要交付第三批硝铵燃油炸药。¹³⁶

117. 邦特兰当局向专家小组保证，仍在邦特兰安全部队 260 名警卫的支持下严格遵守安全程序和安全措施，以确保对仓储地点的保护。专家小组正在探讨与索马里联邦政府和联邦成员州当局以及联合国驻索马里地雷行动处进行现场检查的可行性。

六. 涉及以平民为目标的违反国际人道法行为

A. 青年党

民众继续被迫流离失所

118. 在编写本报告时，索马里有 296.8 万名境内流离失所者。仅 2021 年 1 月至 7 月间，就有共计 53.7 万人逃离家园，其中与冲突有关的流离失所者占 70% 以上

¹³³ 索马里国民军电台网站发布的审判节选视频，可查阅 <https://m.facebook.com/watch/?v=955313561903172>，媒体报道可查阅 https://horndispatch.com/five-in-somali-military-court-over-alleged-plot-to-use-fertiliser-explosives/?_thumbnail_id=21655。

¹³⁴ S/2020/949，第 122-123 段。

¹³⁵ 在秘书处存档。

¹³⁶ 与邦特兰总统办公室交流的信息，2021 年 8 月和 9 月。

(38.9 万人)。¹³⁷ 在本报告所述期间, 专家小组记录了青年党在西南州和加尔穆杜格制造的新一波¹³⁸ 强迫流离失所事件, 导致超过 1.1 万个家庭背井离乡。¹³⁹ 一些社区公然反对青年党的权威和行政管理, 从而触发流离失所事件。专家小组监测的 7 起强迫流离失所事件中也出现了类似情况, 青年党以这些社区的成员为打击目标, 并向所有人发出最后通牒, 要求他们撤离村庄。¹⁴⁰ 关于这些事件的更多信息见附件 5.1。

绑架、拘留、残酷刑罚和处决平民

119. 青年党继续绑架和拘留平民, 以此惩罚那些违抗其命令者, 或强迫人们效忠该团体。专家小组在本任务期间记录了青年党实施的 13 起绑架事件, 涉及 155 名平民, 其中包括社区长老、商人和青年。¹⁴¹

120. 青年党在进行经济封锁、实施禁止阿拉伯茶和木炭等违禁品商业化的指令、试图扩大其领土控制时, 以施行惩罚性绑架、拘留和处决为主要特征, 加尔穆杜格和希尔谢贝利发生的一切就是明证。例如, 2021 年 1 月 28 日, 在拜州, 28 名男子在丁索尔周围的农场遭绑架, 并被带到位于丁索尔以南约 60 公里的青年党据点雅克巴拉韦。他们违背了该团体禁止一切为丁索尔服务的商业和农业活动的命令。¹⁴² 专家小组注意到, 青年党于 2021 年 6 月 27 日、28 日、29 日和 30 日执行大规模处决, 处死了中朱巴州和拜州 24 名被指控的间谍和与政府合作者。¹⁴³ 而此前, 邦特兰于 2021 年 6 月 27 日处决了 21 名被定罪的青年党成员。¹⁴⁴

121. 青年党将绑架受害者拘禁在其拜州的两个据点布洛富莱和伊达勒。专家小组对受害者的约谈表明, 青年党对拘留的男女平民均实施了酷刑和其他残忍、不人道或有辱人格的待遇或处罚。¹⁴⁵

招募、绑架儿童及向儿童灌输思想

122. 在本报告所述期间, 专家小组注意到, 当发生激烈冲突时, 招募儿童案件也会相应增加, 如在中谢贝利、盖多和希兰等州所见的情况。这与联合国国家监测和报告任务组收集的数据一致, 显示与 2020 年相比, 招募儿童的情况总体上

¹³⁷ 联合国难民事务高级专员公署的数字, 可查阅“索马里人口看板——2021 年 7 月”(见 <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/88146>)。

¹³⁸ 专家小组在其 2020 年最后报告中描述了类似的强迫流离失所模式(见 S/2020/949, 附件 7.2)。

¹³⁹ 2021 年 1 月至 7 月与流离失所的 Galjel、Leysan 和 Rahanweyne 社区成员的约谈; 2021 年 2 月、3 月、4 月和 5 月与非政府组织和联合国机构的约谈; 2021 年 1 月、2 月、3 月和 4 月人道主义评估报告。

¹⁴⁰ 同上。

¹⁴¹ 2021 年 1 月至 8 月安全报告; 2021 年 1 月至 8 月与当地消息源的约谈。

¹⁴² 2021 年 1 月 29 日和 30 日与丁索尔两个消息源的约谈。

¹⁴³ 2021 年 6 月媒体和安全报告。

¹⁴⁴ 见 www.voanews.com/africa/somalia-executes-militants-amid-deadly-attack。

¹⁴⁵ 2021 年 6 月 7 日、8 日和 9 日在拜多阿进行的约谈。

有所增加。¹⁴⁶ 在该任务组核实的案件中，青年党是主要施害方，但专家小组也收到报告称部落民兵有牵连，这可能是由于部族冲突死灰复燃(特别是在贝莱德文区)，引发了社区武装动员。

123. 专家小组 2021 年 5 月和 6 月对来自巴科勒州胡杜尔周围 3 个村庄 Abal、Dondardiir 和 Faraatiyow 的流离失所社区成员进行的约谈突出表明，青年党要求他们自愿把 12 至 15 岁的儿童送去加入青年党。大约同一时期被迫搬离胡杜尔区 Mady-waraabi 村的其他人告诉专家小组，青年党在 2021 年 2 月左右强行招募了他们村里的几名儿童，并将这些儿童带到拜多阿附近 Labatanjirow 的军事训练营。¹⁴⁷

124. 专家小组还收到关于从伊斯兰学校集体绑架年轻人的报告。例如，青年党在希兰州和拜州袭击学校的过程中，实施了 2 起集体绑架儿童事件，共有 35 名男孩被绑架并强行招募。¹⁴⁸ 专家小组还收到报告说，青年党分子接近下谢贝利和朱巴兰农村地区的学校和伊斯兰学校的教师，并就课程安排下达指令。¹⁴⁹ 接受约谈的一些社区指出，青年党试图通过更换教师来影响和颠覆宗教学校。¹⁵⁰ 尽管这不是一个新的事态发展，但青年党对伊斯兰学校的兴趣突出表明，该团体利用教育中心为切入点，向青年灌输思想并使其加入该党。

B. 国际行为体

国际部队空中和地面行动以及无人声称负责的突袭造成的平民伤亡

125. 在本报告所述期间，专家小组记录了国际部队在朱巴兰和加尔穆杜格进行空袭的情况，并报告了 3 起平民伤亡事件。从 2020 年 12 月 16 日到 2021 年 9 月 6 日，美国非洲司令部公开承认进行了 14 次空袭。有报告称，美国非洲司令部分别于 2021 年 1 月 1 日在中朱巴的库尼奥巴罗、2021 年 1 月 19 日在下朱巴的贾马姆发动了 2 次空袭，造成平民伤亡。专家小组注意到，美国非洲司令部进行了定期平民伤亡评估，截至 2021 年 8 月 20 日，已完成所有待决案件的评估。美国非洲司令部的评估承认，2021 年 1 月 1 日的袭击造成了 3 名平民伤亡。但据其评估，关于 2021 年 1 月 19 日袭击的指控没有事实根据。¹⁵¹

126. 专家小组目前正在调查 2021 年 6 月 3 日至 4 日在朱巴兰盖多州 El Adde 和 Hisa-u-Gur 发生的空袭，空袭造成 6 人伤亡和民用物体受损。专家小组获得的摄

¹⁴⁶ 根据国家监测和报告任务组的记录，2021 年 1 月 1 日至 6 月 30 日，经核实的招募和使用儿童兵的情况比 2020 年同期有所增加。共有 631 名儿童被招募和使用，另有 348 名儿童遭绑架，据报告，绑架目的是为了招募。大多数案件(即 487 起(77%))由青年党实施。

¹⁴⁷ 2021 年 5 月与流离失所的社区领袖的约谈。

¹⁴⁸ 国家监测和报告任务组 2021 年 1 月至 6 月的数据。

¹⁴⁹ 2021 年 4 月、5 月和 6 月对盖多州、拜州和巴科勒州社区领袖的约谈。

¹⁵⁰ 2021 年 1 月与巴纳尼社区成员的约谈。

¹⁵¹ 见 www.africom.mil/pressrelease/33972/us-africa-command-civilian-casualty-assessment-quarterly-report-3rd-quarter-2021。

影证据显示，2 个空对地导弹制导部分的残留物特征与某会员国制造的空对地导弹类似。专家小组注意到索马里外交与国际合作部 2021 年 6 月 4 日向新闻界发表的谈话，其中指出空袭是肯尼亚国防军所为。¹⁵² 为查明袭击的责任方，专家小组向索马里、肯尼亚和可能的制造该导弹的会员国以及非索特派团发出了公函。肯尼亚否认拥有这种武器。更多信息见附件 5.2。

127. 专家小组注意到，据报告，2021 年 1 月 29 日至 2 月 17 日期间，在巴科勒、中谢贝利、中朱巴和下谢贝利又发生了 4 次无人机袭击事件，目前还没有任何一方公开声称对此负责。¹⁵³

128. 专家小组还记录了平民伤亡的报告，特别是非索特派团 2021 年 2 月 6 日在 Mushaani 村、2021 年 8 月 10 日在下谢贝利州戈勒文开展地面行动后造成 10 人死亡(包括 2 名儿童)、5 人受伤的事件。在编写本报告时，专家小组仍在收集关于该事件的信息，初步报告显示，这可能是为报复青年党对非索特派团巡逻队的伏击而进行的滥杀。专家小组注意到，非索特派团在 2021 年 8 月 11 日发布的新闻稿中宣布，已对戈勒文事件展开正式调查。¹⁵⁴ 同时，索马里国防部 2021 年 8 月 12 日承诺，对滥杀滥伤指控进行调查，并将肇事者绳之以法。¹⁵⁵ 2021 年 8 月 20 日，乌干达总统约韦里·卡古塔·穆塞韦尼公开承认这一事件，并提到责任人已被捕，并将受到起诉。¹⁵⁶ 专家小组就这 2 起事件向非索特派团发出了公函。在编写本报告时，尚未收到回复。

C. 性暴力和性别暴力

129. 专家小组注意到，几个消息来源报告的索马里性暴力和性别暴力事件每年都在增加。¹⁵⁷ 专家小组在任务期间进行的约谈突出表明，针对儿童的性暴力案件、幸存者获得医疗保健的机会、污名化和有罪不罚现象阻碍制止侵害行为的努力，这些是主要的关切。¹⁵⁸ 青年党的活动和女性保护情况通报¹⁵⁹ 的不足进一步影响了对幸存者的保护。2021 年 2 月 15 日记录的丁索尔的一起案件中，专家小组了解到，由于青年党施加行动限制，一名 12 岁的强奸幸存者未能获得医疗服务。¹⁶⁰

¹⁵² 见 www.mfa.gov.so/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Kenya.pdf。

¹⁵³ 见 https://airwars.org/civilian-casualties/page/2/?type_of_strike=air&start_date=2020-12-16&country=somalia&belligerent=us-forces&end_date=2021-08-26。

¹⁵⁴ 可查阅 <https://twitter.com/amisomsomalia/status/1425531317366759425?s=09>。

¹⁵⁵ 见 <https://twitter.com/ModFederal/status/1425604858887950344?s=09>。

¹⁵⁶ 见 <https://twitter.com/Mogdashi3/status/1428289579203899392?s=08>。

¹⁵⁷ 2021 年 1 月至 7 月与社区活动家和妇女权利组织的约谈；联合国国家监测和报告任务组、联索援助团以及营地协调和营地管理群组投诉和反馈机制提供的数据。

¹⁵⁸ 2021 年 1 月至 7 月与人道主义和妇女权利组织的约谈。

¹⁵⁹ 女性保护情况通报是性暴力和性别暴力预防和应对机制的一部分。

¹⁶⁰ 2021 年 2 月与丁索尔消息源的约谈。

130. 在索马里南部各州，即拜州、巴科勒州、盖多州和中朱巴州，各种武装团体随意游荡，特别是在农村地区；在希兰州，整个 2021 年期间，部族冲突愈演愈烈。这些州记录到的涉及儿童受害者的与冲突有关的性暴力案件数量最多。¹⁶¹ 专家小组注意到，尽管性暴力和性别暴力事件的施害者大多数仍然身份不明，但联邦和各州安全和警察部队对 23 起案件负有责任。¹⁶² 关于这一专题的其他考虑见附件 5.3。

七. 人道主义援助受到阻挠

131. 动荡的安全环境使索马里的人道主义局势持续恶化，该国 590 万人需要援助。¹⁶³ 以青年党为主的各种武装团体继续阻碍人道主义援助充分、安全、畅通无阻的运送，并阻挠人们获得援助，特别是在索马里南部和中部。除青年党活动造成的不安全外，部族间的暴力争斗也影响到人道主义行动，与挑选受益人和非政府组织工作人员有关的威胁、部族派系斗争引发的绑架和劫车事件等，使人道主义方案受到干扰和中断。¹⁶⁴

132. 一个积极的事态发展是，在本报告所述期间，专家小组没有青年党绑架人道主义工作人员的新记录，¹⁶⁵ 并注意到针对人道主义人员的袭击事件大幅减少。¹⁶⁶ 然而，准入限制和普遍的不安全继续影响人道主义行动，限制人道主义行为者的监督能力，并为包括挪用、盗用在内的滥用行为创造了有利条件。

133. 专家小组收到指控，称在青年党封锁下的丁索尔镇发生了改变和冒充受益人的事件。调查突出显示，营养援助和其他类型的援助继续在地方权力争斗的背景下受到操纵。专家小组还注意到，最近一份报告强调，索马里少数群体在获得援助方面面临困难，排斥、歧视和边缘化的做法长期存在。¹⁶⁷

¹⁶¹ 国家监测和报告任务组 2021 年 1 月至 6 月的数据。

¹⁶² 身份不明的武装人员占记录个案的 67%。

¹⁶³ 《2021 年索马里人道主义应急计划》。

¹⁶⁴ 在秘书处存档的专家小组任务期间所记录事件的汇总表。

¹⁶⁵ 仍有 2 起绑架案件悬而未决，分别涉及 2018 年在摩加迪沙遭绑架的 1 名红十字国际委员会国际工作人员和 2019 年在肯尼亚曼德拉遭绑架的 2 名古巴医生。

¹⁶⁶ 从 2021 年 1 月 1 日至 6 月 30 日，专家小组记录了 24 起涉及非政府组织的事件，而 2020 年同期为 28 起。但这 24 起事件中没有一起是重大事件或有针对性的袭击。

¹⁶⁷ Claire Thomas 和 George Otieno Opiyo, “Minority inclusion learning review of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland: Programmes in the Horn of Africa”, 2021 年 7 月。

八. 自然资源

A. 实施木炭禁令

134. 专家小组在本任务期间没有记录索马里有任何大规模木炭出口。记录的上一次大规模出口是在 2018 年 8 月。¹⁶⁸ 拥有木炭目的地市场的会员国采取有效措施、索马里联邦政府加强政治宣传以及朱巴兰当局在出口点实施限制，继续助力遏制木炭贸易。海上联合部队、欧洲联盟海军部队阿塔兰塔行动以及毒品和犯罪问题办公室等国际伙伴的积极监测，也对木炭贸易起到了威慑作用。

135. 然而，在下朱巴州，批发价值超过 4 000 万美元的库存已做好出口准备。虽然木炭出口暂时中断，但专家小组收到多份报告，称木炭贸易商面临兑现现有木炭库存经济价值的压力。这些库存构成直接风险，因为未来的出口将使大量资金流入一系列利益攸关方手中，并可能造成政治和安全后果，影响索马里联邦政府与朱巴兰行政当局之间的关系。附件 6 包括 2021 年 6 月以来的木炭库存图像，这是现有的最新图像。

库存分析

136. 存放在基斯马尤和布尔加博储存点准备出口的木炭数量在 60 万至 90 万袋(1.5 万至 2.25 万吨)之间。2021 年 2 月至 7 月进行的分析审查了在布尔加博和基斯马尤主要木炭储存点的现有卫星图像。分析发现，木炭储存量与 2020 年末相比没有显著变化，这一点得到了独立卫星分析的证实。¹⁶⁹

137. 然而，根据卫星图像，专家小组在 2021 年初观察到巴拉韦的木炭数量有所下降。¹⁷⁰ 大约 700-800 袋(约 1.05 万-1.2 万美元)库存在 1 月末消失。¹⁷¹ 向国际市场出口 700-800 袋木炭的经济意义不大，因为这一数量的木炭出口成本远远超过了木炭本身的价值。然而，木炭可能销往了专家小组目前不知道的国内市场。

出口

138. 虽然没有证据表明索马里近期曾出口木炭，但随着出口目的地的批发价格持续上涨，木炭贸易仍为贸易商提供了强大的经济激励。¹⁷² 专家小组获悉，木炭贸易商面临重新开始出口的压力。¹⁷³ 木炭的大量出口也可能导致木炭生产恢复，以补充出口库存。

¹⁶⁸ S/2019/858 和 S/2019/858/Corr.1，第 169 段。

¹⁶⁹ 毒品和犯罪问题办公室为专家小组进行的分析。

¹⁷⁰ 2021 年 6 月与直接接触巴拉韦和基斯马尤木炭贸易商的消息源的约谈。

¹⁷¹ 2020 年 11 月至 2021 年 2 月初在巴拉韦拍摄的机密航空图像。

¹⁷² 截至 2021 年 8 月，阿拉伯联合酋长国迪拜的木炭批发价为每袋 100 美元，而 2020 年为每袋 80 美元，2019 年为每袋 50 美元。

¹⁷³ 2021 年 6 月 18 日与迪拜业内人士的电话约谈。

B. 青年党利用气候变化影响的威胁日益增加

139. 为了更多地了解木炭生产对索马里面临的更广泛气候和环境安全挑战造成的影响，在本报告所述期间，专家小组约谈了一些人。从这些约谈中，专家小组了解到，由于依赖自然资源，索马里预计会越来越受到气候变化的影响。加上木炭生产造成自然资源人为退化，索马里更容易发生干旱和沙漠化，导致粮食安全每况愈下。¹⁷⁴ 据一位受访者报告，索马里森林覆盖率已下降 73%，引发了洪水和荒漠化。¹⁷⁵ 这些变化影响并加剧了农牧民之间的冲突，并使民众流离失所。此外，由于高温和干旱预期加剧，据一名参与环境安全工作的受访者预测，未来 20 到 30 年，索马里中部和南部的洪灾将大幅增加。¹⁷⁶

140. 在某些情况下，青年党已经开始利用气候变化的影响做文章，这可能会在解决索马里不安全问题方法方面给会员国带来挑战。专家小组了解到，青年党为谢贝利河北部沿岸社区提供了防洪保护，¹⁷⁷ 为几乎没有获得政府支持的社区提供了服务。¹⁷⁸

141. 专家小组将继续调查索马里面临的与气候变化有关的短期、中期和长期挑战，并向委员会提交报告。然而，下文所列建议开始涉及索马里可以立即采取的一些步骤，从而努力扭转木炭生产的不利影响。例如，作为优先事项，必须真正侧重于提高认识并迫使索马里寻找替代能源、使用节能型炉灶、支持替代生计和为目前依赖该国自然资源基础的人达成资源共享协议。

C. 报告的索马里黄金出口案件突显监管的缺失

142. 在审查全球最大的国际贸易数据储存库——联合国商品贸易数据库时，专家小组发现，2015 年至 2019 年期间，索马里向阿拉伯联合酋长国的黄金¹⁷⁹ 出口量大幅增加。¹⁸⁰ 通常，商品贸易数据库的贸易数据会显示出“报告国”和“伙伴国”之间的关联性。例如，在下表中，阿拉伯联合酋长国被列为报告国，因为它自愿向联合国报告了从索马里进口黄金的情况。然而，商品贸易数据库却没有显示同一时期索马里向阿拉伯联合酋长国出口黄金的记录。

¹⁷⁴ 2021 年 3 月至 5 月与联合国官员的约谈。

¹⁷⁵ 2021 年 3 月与联合国官员的约谈。

¹⁷⁶ 同上。

¹⁷⁷ 据当地一名部族长老说，青年党在中谢贝利州 Johwar 和 Balad 分发基本食品，帮助受灾家庭抵御洪灾。

¹⁷⁸ 见挪威国际事务研究所和斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所，“Climate, peace and security fact sheet: Somalia”，2021 年 2 月 3 日。可查阅 www.sipri.org/news/2021/sipri-and-nupi-form-cooperation-inform-un-security-council。

¹⁷⁹ 商品贸易数据库中使用的定义是金属；黄金，非货币，未锻造(但不是粉末)。

¹⁸⁰ 见商品贸易数据库。可查阅 <https://comtrade.un.org/data> (2021 年 8 月 2 日访问)。没有 2020 年或 2021 年的数据。

2015-2019 年报告的阿拉伯联合酋长国从索马里进口黄金的情况

年份	贸易流动	报告国	净重(千克)	价值(美元)
2015	进口	阿拉伯联合酋长国	1 097	37 761 873
2016	进口	阿拉伯联合酋长国	1 687	58 448 983
2017	进口	阿拉伯联合酋长国	2 782	100 075 261
2018	进口	阿拉伯联合酋长国	3 440	127 674 252
2019	进口	阿拉伯联合酋长国	4 257	173 862 500

资料来源：联合国商品贸易数据库。

143. 专家小组对索马里黄金出口的关注源于对区域级黄金交易商的几次约谈，当看到上表中的数字时，他们都表示，索马里没有正规的黄金采矿业，阿拉伯联合酋长国报告的进口量增加可能表明，鉴于阿拉伯联合酋长国没有黄金进口税，索马里人正在利用黄金将财富转移出索马里。¹⁸¹

144. 这些黄金交易商表示，从索马里出口的黄金大部分来自该区域其他目的地，然后被非法带入阿拉伯联合酋长国。此外，专家小组约谈的黄金交易商提到，索马里北部确实存在小规模手工黄金开采作业，但产量远未达到阿拉伯联合酋长国报告的进口水平，这几乎可以肯定，存在一个规模更大的区域级非法企业。

D. 海事争端

145. 肯尼亚和索马里的海事争端涉及 10 万多平方公里的印度洋海域。纠纷加剧了两国之间的紧张局势，为青年党提供了可乘之机。¹⁸² 2021 年 3 月中旬，肯尼亚退出国际法院审理的与索马里海洋边界案，称“法院明显存在偏见，不愿满足因 COVID-19 大流行而推迟听证的请求”。¹⁸³ 索马里拒绝了肯尼亚 2021 年 8 月初通过外交手段解决争端的尝试，指出国际法院必须对此案作出最终裁决。¹⁸⁴ 此案仍有待国际法院裁决。

九. 建议

A. 青年党

146. 专家小组建议安全理事会：

(a) 要求索马里联邦政府和在索马里开展行动的国际部队定期向委员会和专家小组通报名单所列人员的状况，包括在行动中被制服人员或叛逃人员的状况；

¹⁸¹ 见 Marcena Hunter 等人，*Illicit Gold Markets in East and Southern Africa* (2021 年 5 月，日内瓦，打击跨国组织犯罪全球倡议)。

¹⁸² S/2019/858 和 S/2019/858/Corr.1，第 106 段。

¹⁸³ 见半岛电视台，“Kenya-Somalia maritime boundary dispute explained”，2021 年 3 月 14 日。

¹⁸⁴ 见 Maritime Executive，“Somalia rejects diplomatic resolution of maritime dispute with Kenya”，2021 年 8 月 10 日。

(b) 要求索马里联邦政府在提交安理会的定期报告中列入在该报告所述期间被青年党完全控制的城镇名单和获得解放的城镇名单。

B. 青年党的融资

147. 专家小组建议安全理事会决定索马里联邦政府应在提交委员会的定期报告中列入最新资料，向委员会通报金融报告中心的进展情况，并酌情纳入汇总摘要，介绍国内金融机构提交的可疑活动报告、金融报告中心开展的调查以及为打击资助恐怖主义活动而采取的具体行动。

148. 专家小组建议委员会赞扬索马里联邦政府签署国家身份证件法案，并鼓励作为优先事项制作独特的索马里身份证件，使民众能够获得政府服务、金融服务和参与投票，并改善金融合规情况和打击资助恐怖主义行为。

C. 武器禁运

149. 专家小组建议安全理事会：

(a) 扩大第 2182(2014)号决议第 15 段的规定(已列入第 2551(2020)号决议第 23 段)，授权会员国海军检查有合理理由认为违反简易爆炸装置部件禁令向索马里运送简易爆炸装置部件的船只；

(b) 决定加强第 2182 (2014)号决议第 20 段先前的规定，补充说明提交委员会的书面报告必须包括所有缴获的军事装备或简易爆炸装置部件的适当文件和图片，并允许专家小组随时随地对缴获的军事装备进行目视检查。

150. 专家小组建议委员会：

(a) 在专家小组的协助下，更新 2019 年 5 月 8 日第 2 号执行援助通知，包括有关武器禁运制度和通知模板的最新要求；

(b) 鼓励国际和区域伙伴协调努力，支持加强索马里联邦政府负责执行武器禁运制度的机构，例如帮助国家安全顾问办公室和索马里常驻联合国代表团的顾问，以便联邦政府更好地管理与武器禁运制度有关的要求。

D. 侵犯人权和违反国际人道法

151. 专家小组建议安全理事会提醒索马里联邦政府和所有涉入索马里冲突的国际部队在索马里开展军事行动时遵循国际人道法，并敦促它们提高透明度和问责制，承认对在索马里开展的军事行动的责任，并在接到关于其行动造成平民伤亡的报告时立即进行全面调查。

152. 专家小组建议委员会：

(a) 鼓励索马里联邦政府通过一项国家政策，规定明确和具体的行动，履行在索马里遵守的《安全学校宣言》中概述的承诺，¹⁸⁵ 从而加强对教育的保护，使之免受袭击；

(b) 鼓励索马里联邦政府将与人权有关的培训扩大到对安全和警务人员的教育中，涵盖调查、逮捕和拘留及使用武力期间的人权、新闻自由以及性暴力和性别暴力等具体领域，并呼吁会员国相应支持这些努力。

E. 木炭禁令

153. 专家小组建议安全理事会维持现有的木炭禁令。

154. 专家小组建议委员会欢迎索马里联邦政府和朱巴兰当局采取步骤阻止大规模木炭出口，并鼓励联邦政府、朱巴兰当局和私营实体进一步对话，以降低朱巴兰出口点大量木炭库存带来的未来木炭出口风险。

F. 气候变化的影响

155. 专家小组建议安全理事会在下一份关于索马里的决议中列入相关措辞，强调青年党有能力利用气候变化的影响威胁和平与安全。

156. 专家小组建议委员会：

(a) 鼓励索马里联邦政府更加积极主动地在同时也容易发生洪水或其他环境变化的受冲突影响地区进行环境调解；¹⁸⁶

(b) 鼓励政府就气候变化的影响达成共同理解，包括制定冲突分析、风险管理和气候预测的办法。

¹⁸⁵ 《安全学校宣言》是一项政府间政治协议，概述了加强保护教育免受袭击的一系列承诺，并限制将学校和大学用于军事目的。该宣言力求确保武装冲突期间安全教育的连续性。见 <https://ssd.protectingeducation.org/>。

¹⁸⁶ 环境调解涉及自然资源的所有权、管理和使用。

Annex 1: Mandate and appointment of the Panel of Experts

The mandate of the Panel of Experts on Somalia (“the Panel”) is contained in paragraph 30 of Security Council resolution 2551 (2020). The Panel’s mandate includes the tasks as set out in paragraph 13 of resolution 2060 (2012) and updated in paragraph 41 of resolution 2093 (2013), paragraph 15 of resolution 2182 (2014), paragraph 23 of resolution 2036 (2012) and paragraph 29 of resolution 2444 (2018) as they relate to Somalia.

In accordance with paragraph 34 of resolution 2551 (2020), the Panel provided the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia with a midterm update on 14 May 2021. The Panel submitted its first thematic report to the Committee on 10 August 2021.

The Panel, composed of six experts, was appointed by the Secretary-General in his letter S/2020/1199, dated 11 December 2020. On 26 April 2021, the Panel’s Coordinator and maritime / regional expert, Ms. Natascha Hryckow, resigned from her position. On 28 April 2021, Mr. Richard Zabot, arms expert, was appointed Acting Coordinator for the remainder of the mandate.

The Covid-19 pandemic hampered the Panel’s ability to travel to Member States, including Somalia. However, the Panel managed to travel to Djibouti, Iraq, Kuwait, Somalia, Switzerland, Turkey and United Arab Emirates during the mandate.

In addition, General Assembly resolution A/RES/67/254 regarding the 16-day advance booking of tickets, has resulted in a Secretariat policy of requiring a prior notice of 25 calendar days for any Panel travel, with waivers to the rule granted under exceptional circumstances. Due to the unique nature of the Panel’s work within the UN system, which requires significant flexibility in meeting with existing sources as well as identifying new ones, satisfying this travel requirement is often challenging.

Annex 2.1: Mapping of Al-Shabaab network

1. Update on Al-Shabaab leaders listed by the Committee

The Panel is mandated to assist the Committee in compiling narrative summaries of reasons for listing individuals and entities designated by the Committee. Accordingly, the Panel gathered information on listed individuals to update their status. The 1844 Sanctions list currently contains the names of 18 individuals and one entity.¹ Of the 18 listed individuals, eight are reportedly still active within Al-Shabaab. The other 10 include:

- Fares Mohamed Mana'a (SOi.008) – this individual was listed for violation of the arms embargo on Somalia (no association with Al-Shabaab in the reasons for listing);
- Hassan Dahir Aweys (SOi.002) arrested in Somalia in 2013;
- Hassan Mahat Omar (SOi.009) arrested in Kenya in 2014.

Seven operatives are presumed dead, see table 1 below.

Table 1 List of individuals under sanctions presumed deceased

1. Serial	2. Name	3. Date of death, location
4. SOi.003	5. Hassan Abdullah Hersi Al Turki	6. May 2015, Somalia
7. SOi.004	8. Ahmed Abdi Aw Mohamed	9. May 2020, Somalia
10. SOi.006	11. Bashir Mohamed Mahamoud	12. Feb 2020, Somalia
13. SOi.010	14. Omar Hammami	15. Sep 2013, Somalia
16. SOi.011	17. Aboud Rogo Mohammed	18. Aug 2012, Kenya
19. SOi.012	20. Abubaker Shariff Ahmed	21. Apr 2014, Kenya
22. SOi.016	23. Ahmad Iman Ali	24. Mar 2019 Somalia

The Panel recommends the Committee update the list to reflect the status of the seven individuals presumed dead after confirmation by Somalia and Kenya.

2. Update on Al-Shabaab leaders identified during the reporting period

The Panel is mandated to compile, refine and update information on the draft list of those individuals and entities that potentially meet the listing criteria for possible future measures by the Security Council. The Panel has therefore gathered information on Al-Shabaab senior operatives that could meet the designation criteria under resolution 1844 (2008).² These include the three individuals below as well as senior leaders in table 2, in charge of administering areas under full or partial control as head of *Wilaya*, an administrative unit or region:

1. Hussein Ali Fiidow: head of political administration and regions (similar to a Ministry of Interior);
2. Ali Mohamed Rage Cali Dheer, spokesperson;
3. Abdulaziz Abu Musaab, military spokesperson.

¹ See <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/751/materials>.

² Designation criteria are defined in paragraph 8 of resolution 1844 (2008) and have been updated by paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of resolution 2002 (2011); paragraph 23 of resolution 2036 (2012); paragraph 3 of resolution 2060 (2012); paragraph 43 of resolution 2093(2013); and paragraph 50 of resolution 2444 (2018).

Table 2: List of Al-Shabaab wilaya governors

	Wilaya	Name of governor	Predecessor
1	Banadir	Muse Abdi Arrale	
2	Bay and Baqool	Abdullahi Moalim Gedow Aden Abukar	
3	Galgaduud	Abu Khalid	
4	Gedo	Adan Sahal Abu Turaab	Abdirahman Abu Mohamed Filow (before Feb 2020)
5	Hiran	Guled Abu Nabhan	
6	Juba	Mohamed Abu Abdalle	
7	Lower Shabelle	Mohamed Abu Usama	
8	Middle Shabelle	Abaas Abuu Muhamed Khaliif Ade	Sheikh Yusuf Kaba Kutukade (before Sep 2020)
9	Mudug	Sheikh Abu Adnan	

The Panel also identified a list of senior religious preachers used by Al-Shabaab for their propaganda and narrative for the use of violent extremism. The following individuals have participated in East Africa Jihad conference.³

- 1 Hassan Yaqub Ali;
- 2 Ismael Harun;
- 3 Ibrahim Sheikh Ali. Nur (Sha'irul Islam);
- 4 Sultan Ben Mohamed Al Mohamed;
- 5 Sheikh Mohieddine;
- 6 Nabadoon Mohamed Ahmed Guled (Fartag);
- 7 Mohamed Bashshar Abelkrim;
- 8 Sheikh Jamea Abdussalam Warsame;
- 9 Sheikh Ahmad Abdullahi Arab.

3. Clan elders' affiliation with Al-Shabaab

In order to ensure affiliation by force of some Somali clan elders to the group, Al-Shabaab organizes ceremonies for the appointment of 13 *Nabadoon*, *Sultans*, *Ugas* and *Wabar*.⁴ During these ceremonies Al-Shabaab provided the selected elder with a vehicle, an AK 47 rifle, a copy of the Quran and the group's flag to demonstrate the allegiance of the clan to the cause. The latest ceremonies occurred in Jamaame, Lower Juba, on 4 January 2021, and in Jalalaqsi, Hiran, on 24 January 2021 (see figures 1 and 2). Table 3 shows the dates of appointments by Al-Shabaab of the 13 clan elders during 2020 and 2021. Figure 3 shows *clan affiliation and localities of traditional elders appointed by Al-Shabaab during 2020 and 2021* as well as the clan they represent, and AS administrative authorities present during each ceremony.

Figure 1. Appointment of Abdirahman Ali Abdi as sultan of the Jareerweyne clan in Boriini, Jamaame, Lower Juba, on 4 January 2021

³ Conference that took place from 13 to 18 March 2020 with the presence of Al Shabaab leaders to discuss the principles and guidelines on Jihad in Somalia and East Africa. Five subjects were debated during the conference including the Constitution of FGS, elections in Somalia, operations against international forces in Somalia, the situation of Islam in East African and the non-Islamic laws applied by FGS. A communique comprising 14 points was issued on 18 Mars 2020. the video of the conference is available at <https://ok.ru/video/2320030042671>.

⁴ Traditional authority referring to elders playing the role of clan peace makers in charge of resolving disputes between individuals inside a clan or between communities from different clans. The elder is identified as *Nabadoon*, *Sultans*, *Ugas* or *Wabar* depending on the region.



Figure 2. Appointment of Omar Wabar Abdi Wabar Mohamed as Wabar of Baada Adde sub-clan in Jalalaqsi, on 24 January 2021




Source: <https://calamada.com/sawirro-beesha-baada-cadde-oo-wabar-cusub-caleyma-saaratay/>

Table 3. List of traditional elders appointed by Al-Shabaab during 2020 and 2021

Date	Clan	Name
Jan-20	Eelay	Abdulkadir Sheikh Abdiasis Sheikh Abdullahi
Jan-20	Luway clan	Sultan Abdiwahid Moalim Hassan
Jan-20	Habas-Guul sub-clan	Ugas Mohamed Ugas Ahmed Shide
Feb-20	Wacaysle clan	Daud Hassan Adan
Mar-20	Sheekhaal clan	Ali Osman Rorow
Aug-20	Owbakar Gabane sub-clan	Moalim Hussein Abdulle Hayow (Hussein Faraweyne)
Aug-20	Boqolhore clan	Not named
Aug-20	Geledle sub-clan	Maalim Hussein Madey Hassan
Sep-20	Hassan Muse sub-division	Sheikh Mumin Mohamed Qoorey
Sep-20	Mudulod clan	Abdifatah Hassan Mohamed
Oct-20	Sade Clan	Abdiweli Hassan Madobe
Jan-21	Jareerweyne	Abdirahman Ali Abdi
Jan-21	Baada Adde	Wabar Omar Wabar Abdi Wabar Mohamed

Source: Panel based on media associated with Al-Shabaab

Figure 3. Clan affiliation and localities of traditional elders appointed by Al-Shabaab during 2020 and 2021



Source: Panel using I2 analyst notebook.

4. Reported neutralised Al-Shabaab operatives

The Panel has gathered information on Al-Shabaab operatives identified as being neutralized by Somali forces or declared by Al-Shabaab as martyrs. Table 4 below includes the names of Al-Shabaab senior operatives arrested or killed by Somali security forces. The Panel sent an official communication to the FGS on 3 September 2021, requesting additional information on these individuals and the possibility to interview those that are in custody. Al-Shabaab, in one of its latest propaganda videos, showed the names and photos of 20 of its leaders and preachers dead or killed in operations, see table 5⁵. Figure 5 shows Al-Shabaab senior operatives network including listed individuals and those presumed deceased.

Table 4. Reported deceased Al-Shabaab operatives

Ser	Name	Date of neutralization	Status Location
1	Ibrahim Moalim Abdi <i>alias Ibrahim Ganey</i>	September 2020	Killed between Bardale and Awdnile
2	Mohamed Abdi Subiye <i>alias Toosow</i>	4 July 2021	Killed in Darussalam, Addale district
3	Nuh Dhagool	16 July 2021	Killed in Aliyow Barow, Balcad district
4	Dulaby Ismael	22 July 2021	Surrendered in Qaycad, Mudug
5	Ali Mohamed Aden	25 July 2021	Arrested in Janaale
6	Jibril Said Ali	3 August 2021	Arrested in Amara, Mudug
7	Idris Abdullahi Maalim <i>alias Food'ade</i>	11 August 2021	Surrendered in Daynunay, Baidoa
8	Asad Sharif Abukar	12 Aug 2021	Defected in Awdheegle, Lower Shabelle
9	Abdirizak Mohamed Abdi Jimale	22 August 2021	Sentenced by Somali military court

Source: Panel from media affiliated to FGS such as Somali national TV at <https://sntv.so/> and Somali National Armed Forces at <https://www.xds.gov.so/so/>.


Table 5. Al-Shabaab senior leaders declared as martyrs

Ser	Name
1	Abdulaziz Al Afghani
2	Abdulkadir Usman aka Komandos, killed in an airstrike between late 2020 early 2021
3	Abu Ilyas Abdulhamid
4	Abu Rawi Al Seyari
5	Abwan Yussef Dhegey
6	Ali Hareed; killed by US airstrike
7	Asaad Khan al Baluchi, killed in Afmadow battle in 2012
8	Faruq al Muhajir
9	Hassan Abshir Walalow
10	Ibrahim Adam Ibrahim
11	Ibrahim Hajiyo

⁵ See <https://ok.ru/video/2417603316443>.

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- | | |
|----|---|
| 12 | Jaber Abdullahi Diriye |
| 13 | Mohamed Ismail |
| 14 | Muhamad Dulyadeyn; |
| 15 | Muhssin al Muhajir |
| 16 | Said Al Muhajir |
| 17 | Salad Abdi Hassan, killed in an airstrike during 2019 or 2020 |
| 18 | Salah Nuh Ismail <i>alias Salah Badbado</i> |
| 19 | Sharif Abdinur |
| 20 | Sheikh Muhamad Maalim Hassan |
-

Figure 4: Status of Al-Shabaab listed individuals and senior operatives



Annex 2.2: Annex 2.2 - List of individuals executed by Al-Shabaab

The Panel noted that Al-Shabaab courts have continued to issue and implement its rulings in public, in areas under its administration in Central and Southern Somalia. Al-Shabaab punishments include flogging for alleged sexual conduct, hand amputation for stealing as well as execution for spying. There was no change in the trend of execution for spying between 2021 and 2020 with the execution of 29 individuals during the reporting period and 28 in the same period in 2020, see table 1 and 2 below. The Panel however noted mass executions on 27, 28, 29 and 30 June 2021 with the killing of 24 individuals in Sakow, Jilib, Buula Fulay and Kunyoo Barow, see table 1. This mass execution followed the execution by Puntland, on 27 June 2021, of 21 individuals convicted of being members al-Shabaab.⁶

Table 1 Individuals executed by Al-Shabaab courts in 2021 for spying

Date	Location	Ser	Name, age	Accused of spying for
03/03/2021	Jilib, Middle Juba ⁷	1	Abukar Hassan Mohamed	
		2	Mahad Abdi Qadir Adam Mahad Qadoole	
		3	Hassan Mohamud Mohamed Hassan Dheere	
		4	Ahmed Abdi Abdillaahi Salmaan	
		5	Maalim Abukar Mohamed Alasow	
27/06/2021	Sakow, Middle Juba ⁸	6	Umar Abdikader Hirale (Umar Kojo), 36	USA
		7	Abdi Hassan Ahmed, 29	USA
		8	Fatum Umar Abkow, Female 36	USA
		9	Ibrahim Umar Ali alias Ibro Bandi, 55	USA
		10	Saddam Usmaan Mahamed, 21	USA
		11	Aweys Hassan Haji Mahamed (Aweys Yao), 36	USA
28/06/2021	Jilib, Middle Juba ⁹	12	Abdarahman Ahmed Mahamed (Warsame), 35	UK and ISIS
		13	Sa'ad Musa Haji Dahir, 45	USA/FBI
		14	Abdo Mad Abo, 47	USA/CIA
		15	Abdulle Umar Mahamud (Farjito) ¹⁰ , 35	
		16	Abdilkader Adan Hassan, 49	
29/06/2021	Buula Fulaay, Bay ¹¹	17	Mohamed Ali Mohamed (Mad Nagaay), 39	USA
		18	Sanbur Ukurow Hassanow, 38	USA/CIA
		19	Hassan Abdulkadir Mohamed (Hassan Buuhow), 39	USA/CIA
		20	Ibrahim Hassan Mohamed, 27	Washington State
		21	Ahmed Mohamed Sheikh Ibrahim (Boorow), 26	USA/CIA
30/06/2021	Kunyoo Barow, Lower Shabelle ¹²	22	Alas Ali Abdulle, 51	USA/CIA
		23	Abdiwahid Abdullahi Diriye (Arabi), 25	Somalia
		24	Abdulkadir Mohamed Abbaw (Bombiste), 33	USA/CIA
		25	Abu Abdinur Fanaay (Weershe), 35	USA/CIA
		26	Omar Abdirahman (Omar Dooyow), 36	USA/CIA
		27	Hassan Abdulqadir Omar (Beerow), 37	USA/CIA
		28	Abukar Abdi Omar (Baseey), 31	USA
		29	Jeylani Mayow (Sheekhuna), 41	USA/CIA

⁶ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57630144>.

⁷ <https://calamada.com/dhageysomagacyo-jawaasiis-lagu-toogtay-fagaaraha-jilib/>.

⁸ <https://calamada.com/koox-jawaasiis-ah-oo-galabta-lagu-laayay-saakow-magacyada/>.

⁹ <https://calamada.com/jawaasiis-u-shaqeynayay-maraykanka-iyo-ingiriiska-oo-maanta-lagu-dilay-jilib/>.

¹⁰ Association with Abu Bakre Bissi and Bili Mahmud Ajli.

¹¹ <https://calamada.com/shabakad-jawaasiis-ah-oo-madaxyada-looga-guray-buula-fulaay/>.


¹² <https://shahadanews.com/?p=13753>.

Table 2 Individuals executed by Al-Shabaab courts in 2020 for spying

Date	Location	Ser	Name, age	Accused of spying for
04/01/2020	Buq'aqable, Hiran ¹³	1	Abdi Qadir Hassan Adam, 25	FGS
		2	Abdi Aziz Ahmed Mohamud, 28	FGS
		3	Farah Ali Jibril, 29	Mahas Militia
01/04/2020	Bu'ali, Middle Juba ¹⁴	4	Abdi Aziz Hasan Heybe, (Bensal)	USA
		5	Mohamed Daud Guliye (Jeey)	FGS
		6	Ismail Sheikh Mad Hassan (Mualim Bisbis)	USA
		7	Hasan Ibrahim Mohamed (Gidame)	FGS
		8	Hussein Mualim Hassan (GBS)	USA
		9	Shueyb Abdi Rashid Ibrahim (Dhagey)	Kenya
29/04/2020	El Buur, Galgaduud ¹⁵	10	Ahmed Nurow Mohamed Herow, 23	SW
		11	Bashir Mohamud Dhagool, 22	USA
		12	Bishar Ahmed Abdulle Holow, 50	USA
15/05/2020	Jamaame, Lower Juba ¹⁶	13	Mahamada Idow Adam (Tareeso),	FGS
		14	Adam Abdullahi Haji Adam Borow	FGS
		15	Osman Abdulle Afrah	FGS
		16	Hassan Hafow Saney	Jubaland
		17	Ali Madkeerow (Qoryooley)	South West
		18	Hilowle Bashir Adam	South West
22/08/2020	El Adde, Gedo ¹⁷	19	Dini Abdiqadir Mohamed	USA
		20	Issa Osman Guelleh	Ethiopia
		21	Adan Hassan Mohamed	FGS
		22	Abdiaziz Hassan Abdi	FGS
05/09/2020	Sakow, Middle Juba ¹⁸	23	Mohamed Aden Hassan (Mohamed Kheyr), 51	USA and UN
		24	Osman Farah Dhaqane, 27	
		25	Ali Abdirahman Abdi, 33	
		26	Abdi Sahal Dhabbar (Abdi Harqi), 57	
26/09/2020	Buq'aqable, Hiran ¹⁹	27	Abbas Mohamed Osman	Spying
		28	Ahmed Mohamed Abikar	SNA

¹³ <https://www.allbanaadir.org/?p=139621>.¹⁴ <https://calamada.com/jawaasiis-lagu-toogtay-goob-fagaara-ah/>.¹⁵ <https://calamada.com/dhageysomagacyo-jawaasiis-u-shaqeynayay-mareykanka-oo-lagu-dilay-magaalada-ceelbuur/>.¹⁶ <https://calamada.com/jawaasiis-lagu-toogtay-fagaaraha-degmada-jamaamemagacyo/>.¹⁷ <https://calamada.com/dhagayso-jawaasiis-u-shaqaynayay-maraykanka-oo-lagu-laayay-gedo-magacyada/>.¹⁸ <https://somalimemo.info/articles/13567/koox-jawaasiis-ah-oo-lagu-dilay-fagaare-kuyaal-degmada-Saakoow-Akhriso-xog>.¹⁹ <https://calamada.com/dhagayso-jawaasiis-iyo-askar-lagu-dilay-wilaayada-hiiraan-magacyada/>.

Annex 2.3: Areas administered and areas partially controlled by Al-Shabaab in Southern and Central Somalia



Annex 2.4: List of Al-Shabaab attacks

The panel recorded 1047 attacks attributed to Al-Shabaab during the reporting period using confidential UN security reports some of which corroborated by open sources and witnesses. Al-Shabaab associated media claimed a larger number of attacks and an exaggerated number of casualties. The Panel did not use the statistics of attacks to analyse trends over time but rather to identify areas of operations of Al-Shabaab and tactics used by the group. The geographic pattern of Al-Shabaab attacks was as follow:

- Attacks in Banadir districts: 270;
- Attacks on security forces outside Banadir: 678;
- Attacks on main supply routes (MSR): 44 ambushes and 99 IED attacks.

Al-Shabaab mainly used hit and run attacks on SNA and international bases which lasted few minutes and without casualties most likely seeking a psychological effect in order to demoralize troops. Some of these attacks used mortars and RPGs. The Panel noted only a limited number of operations used by al-Shabaab to hold or capture towns or overrun military bases. These operations were executed using suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) and fighters according to the table 1 below:

Table 1. Al-Shabaab operations to hold, capture or overrun military bases

Date	Location	Objective
21/1/21	Baadweyne, Mudug	Town controlled
4/3/21	Bossaso Prison, Puntland	Prisoners freed
3/4/21	Awdheegle, Lower Shabelle	To overrun base
9/6/21	Daynunay, Bay region	Base overrun
27/6/21	Wisil, Mudug	Town not controlled
24/8/21	Aamara, Mudug	Town retaken from SNA and Galmudug forces

The most effective tactics by al-Shabaab to target security forces and Government officials was through the use of Person-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (PBIED) and vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED). Most of these attacks occurred in civilian sites and produced a large number of civilian casualties. Table 2 provides a list of PBIED and VBIED attacks on civilian sites soft targets throughout Somalia.

Table 2. PBIED and VBIED attacks on civilian sites in Somalia

Ser.	Date	Location	Type	Target
1	18/12/20	Galkayo, Mudug	PBIED	Government officials at Stadium
2	2/1/21	Lafoole, Afgoye	PBIED	Turkish Engineers
3	31/1/21	Waberi, Mogadishu	SVBIED	Gen. Mohamad Nur Galal at Hotel Afrik
4	5/3/21	Hamarjajab, Mogadishu	SVBIED	Lul Yemeni Restaurant
5	5/3/21	Wajid, Bakool	PBIED	Khat Market

6	3/4/21	Shangaani, Mogadishu	PBIED	Coffee restaurant
7	10/4/21	Berdaale, Baidoa	PBIED	Governor (survives)
8	14/4/21	Gololey, Middle Shabelle	IED	Minibus (20 Passengers)
9	15/6/21	Wadajir, Mogadishu	PBIED	SNA recruits at Gen Dhagabadan base
10	2/7/21	Shibis, Mogadishu	PBIED	Restaurant
11	30/7/21	Kismayo, Jubbaland	MIED	Bus transporting soccer team
12	10/8/21	Baadweyne, Mudug	IED	Vehicle transporting IDP returnees
13	19/8/21	Shangani, Mogadishu	PBIED	Restaurant

Source: Panel

4. Within Banadir districts where Al-Shabaab presence is not visible, the group was able to conduct its covert operations through the use of assassination, IED attacks, few mortar attacks and low scale hit and run attacks at the periphery of the region. The Panel recorded 270 of such attacks in Banadir districts mostly on security forces and Government officials. Table 3 and figure 2 show that the concentration of attacks is larger in the outer districts where security presence is lower.

Table 3. Attacks in Banadir districts

Ser	District	Total	Assassination	IED	Grenade	Mortar	Attack	Remark
1	Abdiaziz	1		1				
2	Bondhere	1	1					
3	Daynile	63	28	11	15		9	
4	Dharkenley	19	9	4	5		1	
5	Hamar-Jajab	2		2				
6	Hamar-Weyne	1		1				
7	Hodan	32	10	11	11			
8	Howl-Wadag	21	10		9		2	
9	Huriwa	29	8	4	7		10	
10	Kahda	3	1	1			1	
11	Karan	29	13	4	9		3	
12	Shangani	2		2				
13	Shibis	4	1	3				
14	Waberi	1					1	Hotel Afrik
15	Wadajir	21	11	4	1	5		Mortar IAIA
16	Wardhigley	11	5		3	2	1	Mortar Villa Somalia

17	Yaqshid	30	10	8	9	3	
Total		270	107	56	69	7	31

Source: Panel

The Panel recorded during the reporting period, 678 attacks on Somali and international forces in 54 locations in Southern and Central Somalia outside Banadir, as shown in table 4 below. The Panel believes that the number actual attacks is very likely to be bigger due to the lack of reporting of incidents in some areas. The largest numbers of attacks occurred in Janaale in Lower Shabelle and Xudur in Bakool with 42 and 44 attacks respectively. Figure 1 and 2 show the repartition of these attacks in a map.

Table 4 Number of Al-Shabaab attacks on Somali and International forces outside Benadir (see figure 2)

Location	Nb of attacks	Location	Nb of attacks	Base Location	Nb of attacks
Afgoye	30	Buulow Colow	8	Km60	12
Afmadow	4	Buur Hakaba	8	Lafoole	18
Aqabduco	10	Buurduhuubo	5	Luuq	9
Arbacow	21	Ceel Dheere	5	Mahaday	19
19Awdheegle	24	Ceel Waaq	7	Makuudo	7
Awdiinle	6	Celasha Biyaha	26	Beled Hawa	3
Bacad	15	Danaow	13	Mashalaaye	4
Baidoa	28	Dhobley	3	Qansax Dheere	17
Barawe	11	Dhusamareb	7	Qoryoley	16
Bardhere	12	Dinsoor	20	Sabiid	14
Barrire	18	Dolow	2	shalambod	8
Barsanguni	20	Gololey	7	Tabta	6
Beledweyne	10	Golweyn	12	Ted	6
Bilis Qoqani	6	Halgan	3	Wajid	20
Biyo Cadde	4	Jalalqsi	15	Wanlweyne	3
Bulobarde	11	Janaale	42	Xaj Cali	3
Buufow	7	Jowhar	13	Xudur	44
Buulo Mareer	19	Kismayo	13	Yonton	4
Total	256	Total	209	Total	213

Source: Panel

Figure 1. Attacks on Somali and International bases in Southern and Central Somalia (map No 4617.9)





Figure 2. Attacks on Somali and International bases in Lower Shabelle and all attacks in Mogadishu districts (map No 4617.10)



Annex 2.5: Vulnerabilities of SNA bases

Annex 2.5: Vulnerabilities of SNA bases

The lack of adequate force protection for static security made SNA forces vulnerable to repetitive hit-and-run attacks on their bases by Al-Shabaab. The Panel gathered pictures showing force protection challenges faced by SNA in their Forward Operating Bases (FOBs). Figures 1 and 2 show the lack of compound security in Daynunay and Goof Gaduud FOB, 8 kilometres southeast and 30 kilometres northwest of Baidoa respectively.

Figure 1. Daynunay FOB, November 2020



Source: Confidential.

Figure 2. Goof Gaduud Burray FOB, November 2020



Source: Confidential.

Annex 2.6: Bosaso prison attack

Conduct of the attack

On 4 March 2021, at around 23:00 local time, Al-Shabaab launched a complex attack on the central prison in Bosaso, Puntland, to free prisoners from the facility.²⁰ The attack was supported by operations outside the prison to block road access to the facility and prevented prison officers from providing reinforcements (see figure 1).²¹ Al-Shabaab gained access to the prison by breaching the eastern wall (see figure 2) and, once inside, the group released prisoners associated with Al-Shabaab before releasing the remaining non-Al-Shabaab-affiliated prisoners.

According to the Puntland Custodial Corps, Al-Shabaab took prisoners who were former Somali Police and Somali Armed Force officers, as well as prisoners with links to the Islamic State, as hostages.²² Information received by the Panel indicates that 337 prisoners escaped, of which 83 were convicted Al-Shabaab operatives, including four high ranking officials.²³ At least one prisoner tied to Al-Shabaab was scheduled to be executed the following day.²⁴ Additionally, among the 337 escapees, were four prisoners, convicted by the Supreme Court of Seychelles in 2021 for having committed acts of piracy.²⁵

Twelve prisoners were subsequently recaptured in the following hours. The recapture of other fugitives was hampered by the fact that prisoners were dressed in civilian attire, making detection difficult.²⁶

Nine security forces—three prison officers, five Puntland Intelligence and Security Agency officers and one Puntland Maritime Police Force officer—died during the attack.²⁷

Figure 1: Extract of the Map showing where the roads were blocked by the attackers (in red squares).



Source: Confidential

²⁰ Confidential report from an international security company operating in Puntland, March 2021.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Confidential UN report, March 2021.

²³ List on file with the Panel.

²⁴ Confidential source.

²⁵ The four prisoners are: Abdirhaman Adam Abdirhaman, Abdullahi Ibrahim Roble, Farad Ahmed Jama and Mohamed Dahir Omar.

²⁶ Confidential report from a Puntland security institution, March 2021.

²⁷ Available at <https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Statements/shabaab-official-warsame-speaks-on-bosaso-central-prison-operation-vows-more-raids-to-come.html>.

Figure 2: Hole blasted into the eastern prison wall.



Source: Confidential

Measures taken by Puntland authorities to address the security deficiencies

The preparation and sophistication of the attack by Al-Shabaab exposed weaknesses in the security forces' equipment and readiness. For example, the prison lacked personal identification information, such as photographs or fingerprints, for each prisoner; had no defensive plan or sufficient weapons and ammunition to counter the attack or basic equipment to communicate during the attack; and the prison staff subsequently failed to properly implement crime scene management measures.²⁸

In response, the President of Puntland convened an emergency security meeting resulting in the immediate establishment of a Joint Operation Coordination Centre (JOCC) in Garowe intended to improve coordination between security elements. Puntland also established regional JOCCs in Bosaso and Galkayo.²⁹

The military equipment used by Al-Shabaab and retrieved in the aftermath of the attack is displayed in annex 4.1.

²⁸ "After-action review" from Puntland Security Forces report obtained by the Panel.

²⁹ The JOCC has been established on 31 March 2021. The JOCC operational design note is on file with the Secretariat

**Annex 2.7: Recruitment of a new, FGS-aligned, security unit
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)**

Annex 2.8: Maritime attack on a vessel off-shore from an Al-Shabaab controlled area

The Panel received information that the Passenger/Ro-Ro Anatolian vessel (IMO 9005869), registered in Turkey and operated by Mavi Deniz Tasimaciligi, was victim of an attack by a skiff off the coast of Somalia, on 13 August 2021, while on its way from Fethiye, Turkey to Mogadishu, Somalia. According to its captain the vessel was shot at from a skiff with RPGs and small arms (see figure 4).

The Panel noted that the vessel's automatic identification system (AIS) track showed that the vessel was almost stationary for about 24 hours less than 1,000 meters off the Somali coast in an area controlled by Al-Shabaab. That area is not patrolled by Somali security forces and Al-Shabaab has a stronghold 30 kilometres inland in a locality named Ali Gaudud (coordinates: 3°10'42"N, 46°26'9"E). The Panel sent an official correspondence to the vessel's operating company seeking clarification on the circumstances of the attack and the reasons behind its position close to an area controlled by Al-Shabaab.

Figure 1: Track between 2 and 17 August 2021.




Figure 2: Position of the vessel on 12 August 2021 at 6:31 UTC.




Figure 3: Position of the vessel on 12 August 2021 at 6:31 UTC and 13 August 2021 at 4.58 UTC.




Figure 4: RPG's impact on the vessel.



**Annex 3.1: Network of Al-Shabaab checkpoints within Somalia
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)**

**Annex 3.2: Al-Shabaab financial receipts and documents (STRICTLY
CONFIDENTIAL)**

Annex 4.1: Military equipment in the possession of Al-Shabaab

1. Military equipment used by Al-Shabaab during the Bosaso Prison attack

- Figure 1 displays a casing of a recoilless rifle ammunition, with characteristics consistent with an 84mm L-45 Carl-Gustaf ammunition, manufactured in Sweden in 1977. A tracing request has been sent to Sweden. Despite thorough investigation done by Swedish authorities, it has not been possible to determine whether the specific ammunition was manufactured in Sweden, or elsewhere under license.³⁰

Figure 1: Casing of a recoilless rifle ammunition.



Source: Security operators in Bosaso.

- Figure 2 displays a casing of a 60mm mortar round, with characteristics consistent with 60mm M73 HE manufactured in 2016 in Serbia by Krusik factory, lot number 08. The same type of mortar rounds was fired by Al-Shabaab on 17 February 2020 in the direction of the UN compound within AAIA.³¹ A tracing request has been sent to the Republic of Serbia. The Government of Serbia further informed the Panel that this round was exported in 2016 to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The end-user certificate associated with the export stipulates that the item would not be re-exported or transferred to any other party without the consent of the Serbian authorities. So far, no request for approval to re-export the above-mentioned mortar round has been addressed to the Serbian authorities.³²

The Panel has further sought the assistance of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in order to better understand the circumstances under which this ammunition ended up with Al-Shabaab.³³

³⁰ Official correspondence from Swedish authorities dated 4 May 2021.

³¹ See S/2020/949, annex 4.1.

³² Official correspondence from Serbian authorities, dated 6 May 2021.

³³ Official correspondence dated 10 June 2021. At the time of writing, response still pending.

Figure 2: Casing of 60mm mortar round



Source: Security operators in Bosaso.

- Figure 3 displays the ignitor cap of a hand grenade with characteristics consistent with UZRGM grenade manufactured by factory 583 in 1970 in Leningrad, USSR. The same type of grenades were captured from Al-Shabaab in March 2018 by the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) and used by Al-Shabaab during the Sahafi hotel attack on 9 November 2018 and during the Manda Bay attack on 5 January 2020.³⁴ The date of manufacture makes it too old to be traced.

Figure 3: Ignitor cap of a hand grenade.



Source: Security operators in Bosaso.

- Figure 4 shows a cartridge of a round calibre 5.56x45mm ammunition with characteristics similar to NATO calibre ammunition manufactured by LC (Lake City factory) in the US, dated 2010. This ammunition is used in assault rifles like M16 or M4. The unknown lot number makes it impossible to trace this item.

³⁴ See S/2019/858, annex 2.6 and S/2020/949, annex 4.1.

Figure 4: Round of NATO calibre 5.56x45mm ammunition.



Source: Security operators in Bosaso.

- Cartridge cases related to ammunition from different calibres (7.62x39mm, 7.62x54mm, and 14.5x114mm) were also found with headstamps markings that were, to the Panel's knowledge, never documented before in Somalia.
- Two AK-pattern assault rifles have also been retrieved, with none of the serial numbers matching any database available to the Panel.

2. Al-Shabaab-released videos showing military equipment

- On 29 January 2021, Al-Shabaab released a video documenting its preparation to attack Camp Simba in Manda Bay, Kenya.³⁵ The Panel has identified some military equipment that complement or confirm the identifications mentioned in last year's report.³⁶ Figure 5 shows a militant using an assault rifle M4.

³⁵ Available from <https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Statements/shabaab-video-documents-preparation-conduct-of-raid-on-u-s-naval-base-in-manda-bay.html>.

³⁶ See S/2020/949 annex 4.1.

Figure 5: Al-Shabaab militant using an assault rifle M4.



Source: Screen capture from the video.

- Figure 6 shows a type 56-2 rifle, bearing the FGS markings of the SNA weapons “SO XDS-2017”.

Figure 6: Type 56-2 rifle, bearing the FGS markings.



Source: Screen capture from the video.

- Figure 7 shows a light machine gun with characteristics consistent with Type 80 (PKM-type, 7.62x54mm) manufactured in 2017 by Factory 26, Jianshe Machine Tool Factory in Chongqing, PRC. Without a legible serial number, the Panel was not able to trace it.

Figure 7: Light machine gun.



Source: Screen capture from the video.

- On 12 April 2021, Al-Shabaab released a video highlighting its operations in Kenya and Somalia.³⁷ The Panel identified military equipment previously delivered to the FGS. Figure 8 shows an armoured Personnel carrier (APC) exposed to media by Al-Shabaab. This APC is part of the shipment of 68 APCs delivered by Qatar on 17 January 2019.³⁸

Figure 8: Armoured Personnel carrier.



Source: Screen capture from the video.

³⁷ Available from http://sitemultimedia.org/video/SITE_Shabaab_Frontiers_Glory6B.mp4.

³⁸ Official notification dated 29 January 2019.

Annex 4.2: Weapons and ammunition management

Weapons and ammunition management policy

National WAM Strategy

The national WAM strategy has been developed through a collaborative process between Somali government institutions. The change of Prime Minister and ongoing challenges in the electoral process have prevented the document from being formally signed. The aim of the national WAM strategy, which took into account inputs and comments from international partners, is to provide strategic guidance to implement an efficient WAM at the Federal and FMS levels. Management of storage sites and inventory control to an international standard will contribute to the foundations of an effective and efficient WAM system.

Coordination with FMS (Regional Security Offices)

Regional security offices (RSOs) were established in 2017 in the Federal Member States (FMS) to improve the coordination between FGS and FMS officials on security-related issues. The RSOs are an initiative of the FGS, with links to the Office of the National Security Advisor. The RSOs have already played an essential role in reviewing and ensuring FMS support of the Somali Transition Plan (STP).³⁹

WAM Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)

In addition to the nine SOPs in force at Halane Central Armoury,⁴⁰ the FGS has drafted an SOP related to weapons and ammunition management, codifying the procedures that the Somali National Army should follow from importation of weapons and ammunition to distribution to the units. This SOP was formally adopted in October 2020 by the Cabinet of Ministers but has not been officially translated into English at this stage. This SOP is structured around the main WAM pillars: procurement of weapons and ammunition, registration, and distribution.

WAM procedures and implementation

Implementation of the WAM system should encompass all its aspects, from registration to distribution to the Somali National Security Forces (SNSF) units and individuals. Some projects, detailed below, have been launched to allow an effective tracking mechanism, but some gaps remain. The setup of a full system will take time and require a strong willingness, at both political and SNSF units' levels.

Registration, record-keeping and tracing of weapons and ammunition

A digital weapons register based on a mobile phone data collection application called Fulcrum⁴¹ has been successfully deployed within the Somali Police Force (SPF) by the FGS Joint Verification Team (JVT). The system was piloted by the SPF in March 2020

³⁹ Meeting with the NSA on 24 June 2021 and exchange of information with UNSOM senior staff members, August 2021.

⁴⁰ In May 2018, the SNA issued a set of nine standard operating procedures for weapons and ammunition management at Halane Central Armoury. These SOPs deal with general procedures, procedures for weapons, procedures for ammunition and explosives, accounting of weapons and ammunition, marking of weapons, destruction of weapons and ammunition, transport of weapons and ammunition, reception and documentation procedures, and captured weapons.

⁴¹ See S/2020/949, annex 4.2 strictly confidential.

and then fully deployed in Mogadishu in November 2020 and in Galmudug in August 2021 . On 6 September 2021, 5,637 weapons from the SPF have been recorded (4,414 in Banadir and 1,223 in Galmudug).⁴² All information on these SPF-owned weapons have been added in the functional prototype WAM database developed by the JVT. The JVT assesses that this system has the potential to be used across the Somali security forces at both the National and Federal Member State levels

A complete WAM system would be composed of three elements: the data capture mechanism (Fulcrum), the national WAM database, and a dashboard for external reporting. The necessity of a central national database system established at the federal level for imports, stock records, and records of issue and receipt of weapons to the security forces has been clearly expressed in the draft Somali National WAM policy. The setup of such a database still requires significant development and resources to enable a robust sustainable tracing system.⁴³

The full implementation of Somalia's WAM system will feed a national database enabling inventory management, internal and external reporting, procurement planning, distribution, disposal planning and weapons tracing. Although still a pilot project, early engagement across the security sector would support a coherent and integrated approach, maximising both efficacy and return on investment. The implementation of such a system is key for monitoring the requirements of the current arms embargo regime and will also be instrumental in building the capacities of the FGS to control flows of weapons and ammunition in the aftermath of a possible lifting or further easing of the arms embargo regime.

Weapons marking

In 2014, the Security Council requested Member States to support the efforts of the Federal Government of Somalia to start a weapons marking process.⁴⁴ A total of eleven weapons marking machines have been donated to Somalia (November 2020 update), although the current functioning of all machines is not known to the Panel.⁴⁵ The three most recent machines (Schmidt Styliner Mk III model) were shipped to Somalia in October 2020. One marking machine was delivered to Garowe, while the other two have been assigned to other FMS.⁴⁶ Marking machines in the possession of FMSs will be useful to mark the weapons in the possession of the FMS security forces and of the clan communities.

The weapons marking process has been consistently implemented by the personnel at Halane. The FGS periodic report to the Security Council dated 2 October 2019 indicates that, as of June 2019, a total of 20,240 weapons had been marked, including imported weapons and weapons already present before the partial lifting of the arms embargo in 2013. All weapons legally arriving in Somalia must be marked, and information on marked weapons is to be entered into a marking database (information displayed in Halane Logbooks). Inter-agency marking teams have been established and trained since 2015 by JVT, UNMAS and Mines Advisory Group (MAG). A written standard operating procedure on marking was issued by the FGS in May 2018 (SOP 5: Marking of Weapons).

⁴² Direct information from the JVT.

⁴³ The JVT estimates a further \$200,000 dollars for database development and start-up costs. In addition, a commitment of staff from the Somali Security Forces and International Mentors are required.

⁴⁴ See S/PRST/2014/9.

⁴⁵ See S/2017/924, para. 136.

⁴⁶ The recipient FMS for the two machines remain to be determined by the ONS.

Safe storage and stockpile management

The enhancement of safe storage and stockpile management remains a priority for the FGS, as demonstrated by the setup of the Joint Technical Team in charge of the Joint Technical Assessment and the commitment to proceed to a proper refurbishment of Halane and the building of an alternate explosive storage site (see above).

This particular assessment of Halane must be extended to the whole of Somalia in order to assess current storage conditions and capacities; as well as future needs of the SNSF. An assessment of weapons and ammunition storage facilities at both FGS and FMS levels is underway. Obtaining a quantitative and qualitative assessment of all weapons and ammunition storage facilities across Somalia will allow the FGS to have a precise and complete mapping of storages and stockpiles used by SNSF. It will also enable the FGS to assess the SNSF's operational needs in line with the storage capacities, and subsequently the necessary support needed from international partners.

Distribution process

The distribution process follows official guidelines issued by the FGS (WAM SOPs and Halane SOPs) and practices.⁴⁷

In particular, the SOP "Reception and Documentation Procedures at Halane Armoury" stipulates that electronic detailed records must be maintained for each weapon entering the Halane facility. Such a distribution system, along with a tracing system, would constitute a solid pillar of the WAM foundations.

Disposal of weapons and ammunition

Halane SOP 6 sets out the procedures for destruction of SNSF weapons and ammunition.


Destruction of weapons is to take place at the Halane Armoury. The location and the status of the shearing machine in Halane remains unknown. For the disposal of ammunition, no destruction site has been specified in this SOP. The order to dispose of weapons and ammunition must emanate from the Chief of Defence Forces, and records are to be kept at Halane. The Panel has never seen a report regarding disposal of weapons or ammunition. Indication of disposal of weapons and ammunition should also be reported in the WAM national database.

⁴⁷ Any distribution of weapons and ammunition from Halane Central Armoury to SNSF units should follow an order from the Chief of Defence Staff, confirmed by voucher receipt from Halane Central Armoury and acknowledgment of receipt by the field units.

Annex 4.3: Integration of the WAM database into a Somali-owned WAM system

Once the WAM database prototype has been extended to all SNSF, it will aim at being integrated into a full Somali-owned WAM system as presented in figure 1. Such a system will give to the FGS a full oversight of its owned weapons and ammunition, in abidance with UN Security Council requirements.

Figure 1: Complete WAM system to be implemented



Source: JVT/FGS and Panel

**Annex 4.4: Notifications of weapons and ammunition (STRICTLY
CONFIDENTIAL)**

**Annex 4.5: Consignments of weapons and ammunition since 2013
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)**


Annex 4.6: Unnotified shipment of military trucks

Figure 1: Passenger/Ro-Ro ship MV Birden (IMO 7305772) at the port of Mogadishu on 30 April 2021. The detailed photo of the hull shows the remains of the painted name of the shipping company İstanbullines.



Source: Confidential

Figure 2: Unloading of military trucks in Mogadishu on 30 April 2021.



Source: Confidential

Annex 4.7: Suggested standardized templates for notifications of weapons, ammunition and military equipment

In order to ensure that all advance and post-delivery notifications are provided with sufficient level of details, the Joint Verification Team (JVT) recommended that notifications should follow a standardized template.⁴⁸

In collaboration with the JVT, the Panel further adapted this template to fulfil the requirements listed in the Guidelines of the Committee for the conduct of its work,⁴⁹ proposing additional entry fields of information. The three different lists displayed below indicate the mandatory contents that must appear in each notification: one for weapons, one for ammunition, and one for military equipment, as listed in annexes A and B of resolution 2551 (2020). These templates will initially be completed by the supplier, assisting the FGS in properly managing the requested military equipment (e.g., registration, storage, tracing, etc.). These templates aim at being included in the updated Implementation Assistance Notice No.2.

Table 1: Template for weapons

- ITEM TYPE
- MANUFACTURING COUNTRY
- MANUFACTURER
- YEAR OF MANUFACTURE
- CATEGORY
- MODEL
- CALIBRE
- FULL SERIAL NUMBER
- GOVERNMENT MARKING
- DESIGNATED END USER
- MEANS OF TRANSPORT FOR THE SUPPLY
- EXPECTED DATE OF DELIVERY TO SOMALIA (OR DATE OF EFFECTIVE DELIVERY)
- PLACE OF DELIVERY
- PLACE OF STORAGE

Table 2: Template for ammunition

- ITEM TYPE
- MANUFACTURING COUNTRY
- MANUFACTURER
- YEAR OF MANUFACTURE
- CATEGORY
- TYPE OF AMMUNITION
- CALIBRE
- LOT / BATCH NUMBER (AMMUNITION)
- QUANTITY IN BOX / CRATE
- BOX / CRATE NUMBER

⁴⁸ FGS periodic report dated 4 February 2021.

⁴⁹ Available at <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/751/guidelines>.

-
- EXPIRY DATE
 - DESIGNATED END USER
 - MEANS OF TRANSPORT FOR THE SUPPLY
 - EXPECTED DATE OF DELIVERY TO SOMALIA (OR DATE OF EFFECTIVE DELIVERY)
 - PLACE OF DELIVERY
 - PLACE OF STORAGE

Table 3: Template for military equipment other than weapons and ammunition

- ITEM DESCRIPTION
- MANUFACTURING COUNTRY
- MANUFACTURER
- YEAR OF MANUFACTURE
- MODEL
- QUANTITY
- UNIQUE IDENTIFYING NUMBER (SERIAL NUMBER)
- ITEM NUMBER (ORDINAL NUMBER)
- ADDITIONAL NOTES
- DESIGNATED END USER
- MEANS OF TRANSPORT FOR THE SUPPLY
- EXPECTED DATE OF DELIVERY TO SOMALIA (OR DATE OF EFFECTIVE DELIVERY)
- PLACE OF DELIVERY
- PLACE OF STORAGE

**Annex 4.8: Illicit flow of weapons and ammunition to Somalia
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)**

Annex 5.1: Forced displacement of population

As of July 2021, there were 2,968,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Somalia. 537,000 people had fled their homes between January and July 2021 alone, with conflict-related displacement accounting for over 70 per cent of the cases (389,000).⁵⁰

During the reporting period, the Panel documented new waves of forced displacement of populations in South West State and Galmudug, following ultimatums issued by Al-Shabaab, with over 11,000 families forced to leave their homes. The cases documented show an aggressive campaign of forced displacement inflicted by Al-Shabaab upon communities, at times as collective punishment. In the context of these attacks, the Panel also documented instances of destruction of civilian objects essential to the survival of the civilian population, including water wells and livestock. The circumstances triggering these attacks against entire communities can be grouped under four different categories:

- 1) Communities' perceived affiliation or collaboration with the Federal Government of Somalia and/or international forces;
- 2) Economic rivalry;
- 3) Community resistance to Al-Shabaab attempts to impose its authority and administration, including through mobilization of clan militia; and
- 4) Communities' defiance to Al-Shabaab's directives – such as those imposing blockades on certain enclaves;

Communities' perceived affiliation or collaboration with the Federal Government of Somalia and/or international forces – the case of populations living near “liberated areas”

Al-Shabaab compelled entire communities to displace in retaliation to military and territorial losses of the group. The order to displace was triggered by the perceived collaboration of these communities with Federal or Regional authorities or the facilitation of SNA and AMISOM military operations. For example, on 26 December 2020, the Al-Shabaab administration for Lower Shabelle based in Ugunji,⁵¹ gathered the elders of seven villages in Marka district and gave an ultimatum to the residents, to vacate their villages within 48 hours. Over 1,400 households (approximately 10,000 people from the Rahanweyn and Garre clans) were forced to abandon Buulo Dhuro, Daariyow, Falkooni, Farange, Gaarilow, Kamirow, and Shufeer (see figure 1 for a breakdown of displacement) and displace to Buufow Bacaad and Mogadishu.⁵² Sources within the affected communities told the Panel that Al-Shabaab accused these displaced communities of having collaborated with AMISOM and SNA forces after these recovered Marka in March 2020.⁵³

Even when communities moved to Government-controlled areas harassment by Al-Shabaab continued, highlighting the capacity of the group to exert its influence on

⁵⁰ See UNHCR data about displacement in Somalia, available from <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/88146>.

⁵¹ The regional Al-Shabaab administration for Lower Shabelle has moved from Janaale to Ugunji, 7 kilometres northeast of Janaale (coordinates 1°52'24"N, 44°43'21"E) following the SNA military operation to liberate Janaale.


⁵² Humanitarian reports, January 2021.

⁵³ Interviews with community leaders from the affected villages, humanitarian and security sources, January, February, March and April 2021.

communities beyond the territories it directly administers. The IDPs displaced in Buufow Bacaad were required during the month of April 2021 to provide financial “support ” to Al-Shabaab in Ugunji in the amount of 4.5 US\$ per 4,000 square meter of land owned.⁵⁴

Beside this instance of collective punishment, during the mandate the Panel noted several incidents where Al-Shabaab retaliated against the population in areas “liberated” but subsequently retaken by the group. These incidents underscore the urgent need to assess the impact of military operations on civilians beyond their immediate outcome, particularly where security, governance and stabilization efforts are not integrated with military operations.

Figure 1: Map of the displacement from Buulo Dhurow, Farange, Shufeerri, Daariyow, Kamirow, Falkooni, Gaarilow, with number of households impacted.



Source: Panel using Google Earth.

Economic rivalry – the case of Galjaeel militias challenging Al-Shabaab’s illegal taxation business on Main Supply Routes (MSRs)

Al-Shabaab retaliated against entire communities when the group’s economic interests and illicit revenue generation sources were challenged by competing clans. This took place at the beginning of January 2021, when the Al-Shabaab faction controlling Shoole Mareer; Jama'ada Dheenta and El Bashiir checkpoints north of Wanla Weyne, in Lower Shabelle, clashed with Galjaeel militias over the control of the lucrative illegal taxation of commercial traffic on the northern corridor of the Afgoye-Wanla Weyne MSR. The humanitarian consequences were notable, with civilians becoming victims of forced displacement and retaliatory attacks in Wanla Weyne district, and others suffering the impact of the temporary suspension of commercial traffic.⁵⁵

The clashes originated when passenger and commercial transports started avoiding the Galjaeel militia-controlled checkpoint near Bali Doogle SNA camp in Wanla Weyne, due

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ According to security reports obtained by Panel some 150 lorries suspended deliveries along the Afgoye- Wanla Weyne corridor

to the abusive and predatory behaviour of these militias.⁵⁶ Interviews conducted by the Panel with drivers of commercial and passenger vehicles indicate that civilians were subjected to repeated incidents of assault, robbery, extortion and SGBV.⁵⁷ When drivers opted to pass via the Afgoye-Toratoow road controlled by Al-Shabaab, Galjaeel militias retaliated. On 9 January 2021, Galjaeel militias in Yaaq Biri Weyne hijacked and set alight three commercial trucks as a punishment and warning for other commercial truck owners not to reroute the traffic to the Al-Shabaab-controlled checkpoints (see figure 2 and 3). Other accounts gathered by the Panel indicate that the commercial trucks were targeted as they were transporting goods intended to Al-Shabaab controlled areas.⁵⁸ The Panel could not independently verify these claims.

Figure 2 and 3: Commercial trucks burned by the Galjaeel militia in Yaq Bari Weyne



Source: Confidential

The conflict between Al-Shabaab and Galjaeel militias rapidly escalated when the Galjaeel clan elders refused to compensate the owners of the burned trucks. On 14 February 2021, Al-Shabaab forcibly displaced around 1,500 Galjaeel households from the villages of Yaaq Biri Weyne, Gobaanle, Yaaq Doomaar, Beyley, Saaweyn, Guullow, Madah-Madoobe, Kab-Harag, Afyuur, Belet Amiin, and Leego, giving them 24 hours notice to vacate their homes.⁵⁹ The majority of the displaced communities moved to Wanla Weyn, Afgooye and

⁵⁶ According to accounts that the Panel could not corroborate, the militias had established the checkpoint near Bali Dogle with the consent of the SNA and were used as a buffer against Al-Shabaab. These accounts are however consistent with claims gathered during interviews conducted by the Panel with Galjaeel militia members and commanders active in neighboring areas, such as Jowhar, Hirshabelle in May 2021.

⁵⁷ Interviews with three truck drivers and one commercial driver in Mogadishu, February and March 2021. The Panel corroborated one incident of rape perpetrated by Galjaeel militias in Bali Doogle area on 19 December 2020. Accounts of local sources interviewed between March and April 2021 further indicated that at least nine other cases of rape had taken place in the previous six months, with women from minority clans, notably from Elay and Shanta Alemood, targeted by armed men from the Galjaeel clan and in SNA uniform. The Panel was not able to corroborate these other nine cases.

⁵⁸ The trucks were loaded with charcoal and other goods and were allegedly directed to Bay, Bakool and Gedo. Confidential security report January 2021.

⁵⁹ Humanitarian reports, February 2021. Interviews with displaced communities as well as representatives of the Galjaeel community, February, April and May 2021.

Mogadishu.⁶⁰ In addition, Al-Shabaab killed a man and a woman in Yaaq Biri Weyne after suspecting them to have collaborated with the Galjaeel militias who set fire to the trucks, burned down some 50 pastoral dwellings (see figure 4 below) and looted around 100 camels belonging to the Galjaeel community.⁶¹ On 17 February 2021, Galjaeel militias shot and killed two men from the Rahanweyn clan in Jiir Kulow grazing area near Bali Doogle, blaming the victims' clan for supporting the expansion of Al-Shabaab in Yaaq Biri Weyne.

Figure 4: Galjaeel pastoral settlement burned by Al-Shabaab



Source: Confidential

The Panel noted further punitive displacement imposed by Al-Shabaab also to other communities in the area in connection to the conflict with the Galjaeel. On 4 February 2021, Al-Shabaab evicted approximately 500 Shanta Aleemood households from Eel Garaare, Shiidaad, Uuli Barbaar and Umar Degaaye after accusing them of allowing Galjaeel herders to water their livestock at their water points.⁶²

Community resistance to Al-Shabaab attempts to impose its authority and administration, including through mobilization of clan militia – the continued targeting of the Leysan

In its 2020 final report, the Panel described forced displacement as collective punishment of the community in Toosweyne, Bay region.⁶³ During the Panel's current mandate, a new

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Interview with members of the Galjaeel displaced community, February 2021

⁶² Security reports, February 2021.

⁶³ See S/2020/949, Annex 7.2

wave of IDPs from Toosweyne arrived in Berdale following the issuance of a deadline, on 5 April 2021, by Al-Shabab to completely vacate the village.

On 7 April 2021, Al-Shabaab entered Toosweyne, abducted an unconfirmed number of youths and beat women and elderly.⁶⁴ Humanitarian assessments conducted by NGOs in April 2021 recorded that over 6,500 households (39,630 individuals), 70 per cent of whom were women and children, had arrived in Berdale district from Toosweyne (see figure 5).⁶⁵ Consistent with the information gathered by the Panel from sources within the displaced community, humanitarian partners in Berdale identified 89 IDPs from Toosweyne with physical injuries following the crackdown and the use of force by Al-Shabaab, and 141 households who were not aware of the whereabouts of their children after the 7 April attack.⁶⁶

Figure 5: Toosweyne displaced communities



Source: Confidential

Local sources interviewed by the Panel identified the Al-Shabaab faction responsible for harassing the Leysan community in Toosweyne as being led by the Berdale District Commissioner for Al-Shabaab, Mohamed Omar Mohamed. Sources interviewed during the Panel's previous mandate had provided consistent information.⁶⁷

Sources from the Leysan community interviewed by the Panel, consistently reported that Al-Shabaab is targeting the Leysan community in several areas of South-West State, including Bay, Bakool and Lower Shabelle, because the clan is strongly associated to Muktar Robow⁶⁸, a former senior Al-Shabaab leader who defected from the group in 2012, and because the community has mobilized its clan militias in support of the Federal Government forces' fight against Al-Shabaab.

Accordingly, during its current mandate the Panel documented two other instances of forced displacement of villages inhabited by the Leysan community in Huddur district,

⁶⁴ Interviews with members of the Leysan community in Berdale, Baidoa and Mogadishu, April, May and June 2021.

⁶⁵ Humanitarian assessment report, April 2021.

⁶⁶ Ibidem.

⁶⁷ See S/2020/949, Annex 7.2

⁶⁸ After his defection from Al-Shabaab in 2012, Muktar Robow Ali reportedly remained hidden in Huddur area, where he originates from, together with his men who had also defected from Al-Shabaab. Muktar Robow surrendered to the government in 2017 after secret negotiations. He was arrested in December 2018 by Ethiopian and Somali forces after manifesting interest in running for the Presidential position in South-West State and remains under house arrest in Mogadishu.

Bakool region, namely Abal, Dondardiir, and Faraatiyow villages, and Qoryooley and Kunturwarey districts, in Lower Shabelle, namely Awjabe, and Majiido villages in April and May 2021.

Communities' defiance to Al-Shabaab's directives imposing blockades on government-controlled towns – the case of Huddur district

Al-Shabaab has imposed several blockades on towns under government control, including Diinsor, in Bay, and Huddur, in Bakool region, creating *de facto* enclaves. In these areas the Panel has consistently recorded incidents of abduction, destruction of civilian property, and executions.⁶⁹ During the Panel's current mandate, Al-Shabaab continued to restrict access to Huddur using punitive abductions and detention to enforce its economic blockade as well as its directives against the commercialization of prohibited goods, such as khat and charcoal. For example, along the corridor connecting Huddur, to the Ethiopian border, between March and June 2021 alone, Al-Shabaab ambushed eight khat dealers, killing three of them and injuring three others, and confiscated their merchandise.⁷⁰

On 2 June 2021, the Panel recorded the forced displacement of four villages around Huddur, namely Mady-waraabi and Gaabaany inhabited by the Hadame clan, and Sarag, and War Galoole, inhabited by the Luwaay clan.⁷¹ Sources within the displaced communities from Mady-waraabi told the Panel that, during the night of 1 June 2021, several Al-Shabaab members stormed the village and ordered the community to leave by the following morning. The reason for this eviction was that Al-Shabaab accused the two communities of the above-mentioned villages to repeatedly disregard the ban on commercial activities around Huddur. More than 900 households were displaced on 2 June 2021 to Huddur (see figure 6).⁷² However, there were reports warning of Al-Shabaab's threats of eviction and forced displacement already taking place in the area since the end of May 2021, with a total estimate of 1,488 households evicted from 14 villages by 2 June 2021.⁷³

Interviews with the displaced community from the Hadame clan highlighted how this community had been frequently harassed by Al-Shabaab with illegal taxation and child recruitment. For example, in February 2021 several children from their village were forcefully recruited by Al-Shabaab and taken to military training camps in Labantanjirow, near Baidoa, and Qeydar-eddy, on the way to El-Berde.

⁶⁹ See S/2020/949, Annex 7.1

⁷⁰ Security reports, March to June 2021

⁷¹ See <https://twitter.com/BaidoaU/status/1400087128864866311?s=19>, as well as interviews with members of the displaced community in Huddur, 10 June 2021.

⁷² Interviews with members of the displaced community in Huddur, 10 June 2021.

⁷³ Humanitarian alert report, 2 June 2021

Figure 6: Communities displacing to Huddur



Source: Confidential

Annex 5.2: Incidents in the Gedo region resulting in civilian casualties and damage to civilian objects

During the night of 3 to 4 June 2021, at around 23:30 Somalia local time, the town of El Adde, located in Gedo region, Jubbaland State, was allegedly hit by two explosive ordnances. In the immediate aftermaths of the explosion, social media reports of an airstrike resulting in six civilian casualties emerged. A 34-year-old woman died on the spot, while her four months old child succumbed to his injuries on 4 June 2021. Additionally, four other children of the victim, aged between 2 and 12 years, sustained various injuries and were evacuated on 4 June 2021, first to Belet Hawo and then flown to Mogadishu to receive medical assistance.

The same night of 3 to 4 June, at around 00:30 Somalia local time, Hisa-u-Gur, in Gedo region, was also allegedly hit by explosive ordnances. As a result, a telecommunication installation, was destroyed, causing the temporary disruption of telecommunication services in an area of around 30 square kilometres.

The Panel received audio-visual and photographic material, allegedly gathered from the sites of these incidents, and interviewed victims, relatives of the victims and witnesses of the incidents in El Adde and Hisa-u-Gur.

Photographic material examined by the Panel (see figure 6.2.2 below) show remnants of two guidance sections of air to surface missiles (ASM), with characteristics similar to ASM used with Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and produced by a Member State.

Figure 6.2.1: Remnants of guidance sections of air to surface missiles (ASM) allegedly found on the sites of the airstrikes in El Adde and Hisa-u-Gur



Source: confidential

The Panel took note of a press statement from the Somali Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Somalia, dated 4 June 2021, attributing the incidents of 3 June 2021 in El Adde and Hisa-u-Gur to Kenyan Defence Forces.⁷⁴ The Panel further noted a

⁷⁴ See <https://ms-my.facebook.com/MofaSomalia/posts/press-statement-for-immediate-releasemogadishu-somaliajune-04-2021the-federal-go/923440298234342/>.

press release, dated 5 June 2021, by AMISOM stating that it was conducting an investigation into the incident.⁷⁵

Accordingly, AMISOM replied to an official communication of the Panel on 17 June 2021, stating that no helicopter under AMISOM command and control was involved in the alleged airstrikes in El Adde and Hi-u-Gur.

On 17 July 2021, the FGS provided, via an official communication addressed to the Committee, additional evidence of the damage in the area.

The Panel sent two official communications to Kenya on 21 June and 9 August 2021 respectively. Kenya replied on 19 August 2021, denying possession of the type of ASM reportedly recovered in the areas of the strikes

On 14 July 2021, the Panel also sent a letter to a Member State, identified as the manufacturer of ASM with characteristics similar to those of the remnants recovered in the areas of the strikes, seeking its support to confirm the make of the ASM and potential users involved in operations in Somalia. The Member State denied having provided such a type of military asset to any of the troop contributing countries involved in the conflict in Somalia.

⁷⁵ See <https://amisom-au.org/2021/06/amisom-statement-on-reported-airstrikes-in-gedo-region/>

Annex 5.3: Considerations on sexual and gender-based violence related to the conflict in Somalia

The Panel noted an increase in reports of sexual and gender-based violence in Somalia as compared to 2020.⁷⁶ Interviews carried out by the Panel during its current mandate highlighted a number of concerns including the persistence of cases of sexual violence against children, lack of survivors' access to health care, as well as stigma and impunity hampering efforts to combat violations.⁷⁷ Humanitarian access restrictions due to insecurity and an insufficient number of female protection monitors⁷⁸ were also indicated as obstacles to the protection of survivors.

Prevalence of cases and under-reporting concerns

During its current mandate the Panel received 20 allegations of rape incidents, all involving women, from various locations in South-West State⁷⁹ and documented one case in Lower Shabelle and three in Bay. However, an accurate assessment of prevalence of cases remains difficult due to possible under-reporting, particularly linked to victims being discouraged by stigma attached to rape, and impunity. In one incident of rape perpetrated by Galjaeel militias near Bali Dogle on 19 December 2020, the victim, a 22-year-old woman from a minority clan, explained to the Panel: "Women from my clan cannot move safely in this area. There are checkpoints in Warmaxan, Tixsiile, Leego, Jiir Kulow, and women from my clan are targeted by other clans' militia and SNA from other clans. It is because of clan conflict and lack of justice that most of the cases in this area are not reported. There are no [justice] mechanisms that can support the victim".

Further interviews conducted by the Panel between March and April 2021 indicated that at least nine other cases of rape had taken place in the same area in the previous six months, with women from minority clans, notably Elay and Shanta Alemood, targeted by armed men from the Galjaeel clan or in SNA uniform.⁸⁰ The Panel was not able to independently corroborate these specific cases, because no official complaint was lodged by the victims and lack of medical reports. However, interviews with drivers of commercial passenger vehicles operating along the Afgoye-Wanlaweyne corridor confirmed that civilians were victims of repeated incidents of assault, robbery, extortion and SGBV perpetrated by militia manning illegal checkpoints along the road.⁸¹

According to data of the Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting (CTFMR), the southern regions of Somalia, namely Bay, Bakool, Gedo and Middle Juba, where a variety

⁷⁶ Data from the Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting on Children and Armed Conflict (CTFMR) for the period January-June 2020 and 2021, data from the Camp Coordination and Camp Management Complaint and Feedback mechanism January-August 2021, SG report on Somalia, interviews with community activists and women's rights organizations, January-July 2021. The CTFMR links this variation in reported cases to the increased number of monitors at the community level and strengthened linkages with service providers and community networks as compared to previous years.

⁷⁷ Interviews with humanitarian and women's rights organizations, January-July 2021.

⁷⁸ Protection monitors are part of the prevention and response mechanism on SGBV. As members of the community, they are the first entry point for data collection and monitoring of incidents and therefore represent an essential element of any community-based prevention and response intervention on SGBV.

⁷⁹ Interviews with local community elders in Baidoa, Marka, Wanla Weyne, Afgoye, Bufof Bacaad, January to April 2021, and analysis of humanitarian and media reports, January to August 2021.

⁸⁰ Interviews with local community elders in Wanlaweyne area, March and April 2021.

⁸¹ Interviews with three truck drivers and one commercial driver in Mogadishu, February and March 2021.

of armed actors operate, recorded the highest numbers of conflict-related sexual violence cases involving child victims.⁸²

That Panel notes that various efforts by the humanitarian community in Somalia are underway to facilitate reporting, although these might not be specific only to SGBV. For example, the Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) cluster established a standardized complaints feedback mechanism (CFM) in July 2020 with the objective of uniformly capturing key complaint data which can be analyzed by humanitarian partners. Their monthly reports highlight main IDP complaints for locations where CCCM partners are active, allowing follow-up. Among the data captured by the CFM are also complaints related to the occurrence of SGBV incidents. Also, the CTFMR has noted a positive correlation between the increasing number of protection monitors and the number of incidents verified by the CTFMR members. However, the number of female monitors remains low, mainly due to security and access concerns.⁸³ The monitoring work demands constant movement to monitor and document incidents, and men have more freedom of movement and are less exposed to certain security risks in Somalia, particularly in areas that are not controlled by the Government.

SGBV in areas controlled by Al-Shabaab

The CTFMR reported an increase in documented cases of forced and early marriage perpetrated by Al-Shabaab.⁸⁴ The occurrence of these violations in areas controlled by Al-Shabaab is consistent with information gathered by the Panel during interviews with sources in Marka and Janaale, Lower Shabelle.⁸⁵ Forced and early marriage and denial of education, according to these accounts, was prevalent in Janaale when Al-Shabaab was in control of the town. The Panel was also informed that women who lived in Janaale while their husbands lived in areas controlled by the Government were regularly harassed by the group.⁸⁶ A community and women's activist interviewed by the Panel further reported that, even after the liberation of Janaale by Government forces in March 2020, women were reticent to disclose accounts of incidents which occurred under Al-Shabaab administration, as they were afraid of retaliation from the group, highlighting that Al-Shabaab was still monitoring the town and retains some control over the territory.⁸⁷

Al-Shabaab affiliated media released occasional reports of corporal punishment inflicted on women for contravening the group's directives in terms of dressing and behaviour.⁸⁸ The corroboration of these cases remains extremely difficult due to access restrictions to the areas controlled by the group. However, Panel interviews with civilians who had been detained in Idale and Buulo Fulay, two Al-Shabaab strongholds in Bay region, evidenced the use of torture and other cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment against both female and male civilians detained by the group.⁸⁹

⁸² CTFMR for the period January to June 2021.

⁸³ CTFMR working group discussion, August 2021.

⁸⁴ Comparative data from cases verified by the Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting (CTFMR) for the period January-June 2020 and January-June 2021.

⁸⁵ Interviews with members of the communities affected by forced displacement and local sources in Baidoa and Marka district, January, February and March 2021.

⁸⁶ Ibidem.

⁸⁷ Interview with women's right activist, March 2021.

⁸⁸ See <http://www.amiirnuur.com/?p=10733>.

⁸⁹ Interviews conducted with sources in Baidoa on 7,8 and 9 June 2021.

Assistance to survivors

Response mechanisms⁹⁰ are in place to assist survivors of sexual violence cases, although there are gaps linked directly to insecurity and lack of access to certain areas of Somalia.⁹¹ In certain cases, victims were not able to access available services, especially where facilities were far or families were afraid of repercussions/stigmatization.⁹² According to the CTFMR, 77 per cent of the cases involving child victims verified between January and July 2021 received a response. However, the Panel is aware that some of the victims cannot receive adequate post rape response management as many of the health facilities, particularly in rural areas or where access and security restrictions exist, have inadequate Gender-Based Violence services.⁹³ These constraints were confirmed in a case corroborated by the Panel in Diinsor, an area under Al-Shabaab's blockade. On 15 February 2021, the Panel learned that specialized medical care for a rape survivor, a 12-year girl, was not available and travelling to the nearest medical centre was discarded by the family of the victim in order not to contravene Al-Shabaab's directives and avoid stigma.⁹⁴

Challenges to accountability

Accountability for rape and other SGBV incidents remains low. This is mainly due to the fact that in most cases perpetrators are not identified.⁹⁵ The CTFMR data for January-June 2021 for example, shows that in 67 per cent of the incidents verified, the perpetrator was unidentified. However, there are also other concerns that the Panel noted during its current mandate, notably cases where the attitude of police forces towards rape cases was dismissive and the resort to traditional mechanisms to solve these incidents at times without the victims or family of the victims' consent. In one incident monitored by the Panel, a journalist was arrested by the police in Abudwak town, Galgadud region, on 29 January 2021, for reporting on the case of a mother protesting the settlement of her daughter's rape and murder case through compensation.⁹⁶ While the elders of both clans had agreed to pay compensation, the mother demanded that the rapists be brought to justice. The journalist was freed later on the same day of his arrest without charge.⁹⁷ In another case in Baidoa, involving the rape and murder of two children on 7 April 2021, the father of the two victims reported to the Panel his frustrations at the repeated attempts by the police in Baidoa to dismiss the rape case, notwithstanding a death certificate clearly mentioning the crimes.⁹⁸

⁹⁰ These include medical assistance, Post Exposure Prophylaxis, transportation and/or Psycho-social support.

⁹¹ CTFMR working group discussion, August 2021, interviews with women's activists, March, April and June 2021.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ CTFMR working group discussion, August 2021, interviews with women's activists, March, April and June 2021.

⁹⁴ Interviews with sources in Dinsor, February 2021.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ See https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=750049465933269&id=204196037185284


⁹⁷ See <https://sjsyndicate.org/2021/02/11/sjs-condemns-recurring-violent-targeted-attacks-on-journalists-ingalmudug-puntland-hirshabelle-and-mogadishu/>

⁹⁸ Interviews with the father of the two victims, July and August 2021. Documentary evidence, including the death certificate issued by the Bay Regional Hospital, related to the case of Abdimuncim Sheikh Aweys Abdullahi, 9 years old, and Aamina Sheikh Aweys Abdullahi, 8 years old.

Annex 6: Charcoal stockpile analysis

Satellite Analysis: Kismayo

Figures 1 and 2: Satellite imagery revealed no fluctuations across all stockpile locations in Kismayo and Buur Gaabo. For example, the images below, from 29 December 2020 and 31 May 2021, respectively, show no changes to the Dalcadda Charcoal Site in Kismayo, Lower Juba, Somalia.



Source: Confidential.

Satellite Analysis: Barawe

Figures 3 and 4: Analysis revealed some fluctuation in Barawe in 'area 4', highlighted in yellow, between 22 May and 16 June 2021. However, the approximate number of bags removed is difficult to assess based on the quality of the images and the manner in which the bags are organized.



Source: Confidential.



Source: ©2021 DigitalGlobe