



Security Council

Distr.: General
6 August 2021

Original: English

Letter dated 6 August 2021 from the Panel of Experts on Mali established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) addressed to the President of the Security Council

In my capacity as Coordinator of the Panel of Experts on Mali established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2374 (2017) and extended by Security Council resolution 2541 (2020), I have the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with paragraph 4 of resolution 2541 (2020), the final report on the Panel's work.

The attached report was submitted to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) concerning Mali on 15 July and was considered by the Committee on 23 July.

I should be grateful if the present letter and the report could be brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Albert **Barume**
Coordinator

Panel of Experts on Mali established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017)

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**Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to
Security Council resolution 2374 (2017) and renewed by resolution
2541 (2020) concerning Mali**

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* Circulated in the languages of submission only and without formal editing.

Summary

Following the forced resignation of the President of the transitional Government, Bah N'Daw, and the Prime Minister, Moctar Ouane, on 24 May 2021, military officers of the transitional Government now control all the institutional levers for the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali. Roles and responsibilities in that regard are divided between the President, the Prime Minister and relevant ministries, notably the renamed Ministry of Reconciliation, Peace and National Cohesion in Charge of the Peace Agreement and National Reconciliation.

Progress in the implementation of the Agreement remains limited. With only 448 elements demobilized and reintegrated, implementation still falls short of the targeted 3,000 elements by more than a third. The overall disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process is on hold because the Government and armed movements failed to reach an agreement over quotas for armed movements. Irregular Government payments continue to affect the work of the Technical Commission on Security. While constitutional reform is within reach, considering the consensus on a proposal presented in 2019, the Government's unilateral proposal on territorial reorganization triggered protests, including by compliant armed groups.

In addition to limited progress, implementation of the Agreement suffered an enormous loss after the murder of Sidi Brahim Ould Sidatti in Bamako. A dedicated representative of the Coordination des mouvements de l'Azawad (CMA) to the Agreement Monitoring Committee and founder of the Mouvement arabe de l'Azawad (MAA)-CMA, Ould Sidatti was instrumental in reaching decisions on which he would then sign off on behalf of CMA.

Compliant armed groups in northern Mali adapted to the coup d'état in May 2021, the second since August 2000, reconfiguring their alliances to remain relevant and influential in Bamako and abroad. Key leaders of compliant armed groups remain present in the transitional Government and the National Transition Council, alongside traditional and self-declared tribal representatives. At times overlapping, both actors make themselves indispensable through constant outreach to members of the junta and to the international community. Also, Ould Sidatti's assassination did not disturb the repositioning strategy of the compliant armed groups, as leaders quickly reorganized the CMA governance mechanisms.

Abroad, the reconfiguration of compliant armed groups manifested itself in particular during meetings held in Rome and facilitated by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Italy. In early February, armed groups took part in discussions that led to a cooperation agreement on controlling migration flows, signed on 6 May in Rome between the Government of Italy and a Malian government minister associated with signatory armed groups. In that context, a permanent strategic framework was also constituted by CMA, the Mouvement pour le salut de l'Azawad of the Daoussak (MSA-D) and the core of the Groupe d'autodéfense des Touaregs Imghad et leurs alliés (GATIA), as part of the Plateforme des mouvements du 14 juin 2014 d'Alger.

Increased artisanal gold mining drives migration and is changing the economic outlook in northern Mali. It provides work opportunities for migrants and absorbs fighters. However, its effects on stability remain unpredictable, as it drives CMA expansion and provides terrorist financing. The new efforts to control migration flows are unlikely to deter powerful criminal enterprises from exploiting vulnerable migrants, including women and children, to work in terrorist-infested gold mines in the Kidal region and the Gourma area. Poverty and school closures are factors driving an estimated 6,000 boys to seek work in the mining areas in Gao, under deplorable

environmental and working conditions, where they are vulnerable to economic exploitation, trafficking and use by armed groups.

Meanwhile, narcotics trafficking through northern Mali remains of concern and involves criminal elements within compliant armed groups, including some that are exploiting the provisions of the Agreement to further their economic interests. A case in point is GATIA officer Moussa Tiliche, who uses the reconstituted forces in Gao and Ménaka as a launchpad for hashish trafficking. Tiliche cooperates with Ghoumour Bidika, a major drug baron from Agadez who was arrested early March 2021 in connection with a seizure in Niamey of 17 tons of hashish, worth about \$37 million.

The civilian population continues to bear the brunt of the combined effects of the political instability, delays in the implementation of the Agreement and the conflict in the tri-border area between Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger, to the detriment of their security and livelihood, as well as to humanitarian access. While sexual and gender-based violence remains widespread and underreported throughout Mali, there is a notable pattern of such violence against women and girls in the Gao region perpetrated by elements of compliant armed groups, in particular by defence groups associated with fractions of the Coordination des mouvements et fronts patriotiques de résistance (CMFPR). Amid a climate of criminality and impunity, survivors do not report those cases for fear of retaliation.

I. Background

Mandate, travel and cooperation

1. By its resolution [2541 \(2020\)](#), the Security Council decided to renew, until 31 August 2021, the measures set out in paragraphs 1 to 7 of its resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#). The sanctions regime established by resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) consists of a travel ban and an asset freeze that apply to individuals and/or entities designated by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) concerning Mali as being responsible for or complicit in, or having engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions or policies that threaten the peace, security or stability of Mali. In its resolution [2541 \(2020\)](#), the Council requested the Secretary-General to re-establish the Panel of Experts on Mali and extended its mandate, as set out in paragraphs 11 to 15 of resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#), until 30 September 2021.

2. Panel members undertook four missions to Mali, visiting Bamako, Gao, Ménaka, Ansongo and Timbuktu between February and June 2021, and one mission to the Niger, from 22 to 27 May 2021. The Panel expresses its gratitude to the Governments of Mali and the Niger for their sustained collaboration. The Panel is also thankful for the logistical support provided by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), especially the field offices and the Joint Mission Analysis Cell (the Panel's focal point within the Mission), and for the security arrangements made by the Department of Safety and Security of the Secretariat. The Panel is equally grateful for the support provided by the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict and the Team of Experts on the Rule of Law and Sexual Violence in Conflict.

3. The Panel interacted with numerous members of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) concerning Mali, ambassadors, diplomatic mission representatives, Malian stakeholders, civil society and community representatives, regional organizations and many other actors, to whom the Panel expresses its appreciation. The Panel is especially thankful to African regional States Members of the United Nations for their constructive engagement.

4. During the reporting period, the Panel addressed 26 official communications to Member States, international organizations and private entities, receiving various levels of response to its requests (see annex I).

Methodology

5. The Panel endeavours to ensure compliance with the standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions in its report of December 2006 ([S/2006/997](#), annex). While it intends to be as transparent as possible, in situations where identifying sources would expose them or others to unacceptable safety risks, the Panel withholds identifying information and, at times, locations and dates of interviews.

6. The Panel is equally committed to the highest degree of fairness and will endeavour to make available to parties, where appropriate and possible, any information in the report for which those parties may be cited, for their review, comment and response within a specified deadline.¹

7. The Panel safeguards the independence of its work against any effort to undermine its impartiality or create a perception of bias. The Panel approved the text,

¹ See annex II, appendix A, for information on the "opportunity to reply" methodology applied by the Panel.

conclusions and recommendations in the present report on the basis of consensus prior to its transmission to the President of the Security Council.

II. Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali: threats, obstructions and progress

A. Defence and security component

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

8. During the reporting period, little was achieved on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, with only 448 elements integrated since June 2020, for a total of 1,761 of 3,000 elements targeted. The third and last company reconstituted army battalion meant to be deployed in Kidal arrived on site on 29 June 2021, more than one year after it was called back to Gao following disagreements over its composition (see [S/2020/785/Rev.1](#), para. 34).

9. The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, which, according to the revised road map of 18 December 2020, was expected to start in the first trimester of 2021, but is on hold owing to disagreement between the Government and armed movements over quotas. Armed movements condition their participation in a new disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process on the Government's compliance with agreed figures. In line with the revised road map,² the Government and armed movements held, on 8 and 9 February, a two-day decision-level workshop in Bamako on defence and security. The workshop was chaired by the Chief of the General Staff of the Malian army, General Oumar Diarra.

10. During the first day of the workshop, parties reached a technical agreement on a quota of 26,000 ex-combatants to be integrated from armed movements, including 17,000 into the army and the remainder into other relevant public services.³ On the second day of the workshop, when decision makers from all parties were expected to sign off on the agreed quotas, the Minister of Defence, Colonel Sadio Camara, expressed the unwillingness of the transitional Government to approve the agreed consensus on the grounds of limited government absorption capacity. An interministerial meeting held thereafter did not lead to government endorsement either.

11. At the 42nd meeting of the Agreement Monitoring Committee (Comité de suivi de l'accord), held in Kayes on 29 March 2021, all parties were requested to reconvene and approve the consensus-based decision taken, but no action followed.

12. Instead, on 22 April 2021, the Chief of the General Staff of the Malian army, General Oumar Diarra, announced a new army recruitment of 25,000 over a period of two years (2021 and 2022), including a far smaller quota of 2,000 attributed to armed

² Action point 10 of the new road map of 18 December 2020 provides for a decision-level meeting among all signatories to address, among other matters, the issue of quotas in the army and civil services.

³ The workshop was composed of two segments, a technical segment with experts and a decision-level segment to endorse the outcome of the work of the technical team. The working group on quotas and on the medically unfit or inept was presided over by Colonel Elisée Jean Dao (Government) and co-presided over by Almou Ag Mohamed (Coordination des mouvements de l'Azawad – CMA), a rapporteur, Nouradine Zakaria Toure (Plateforme des mouvements du 14 juin 2014 d'Alger), and a facilitator, General Gabriel Poudiougou, Chair of the National Integration Commission. The technical consensus reached by all parties was for 26,000 new integrated elements: army (17,000), national police (2,000), civil protection (1,000), customs (1,000), forest services (1,000), prison services (1,000) and other public services (3,000).

movements. For 2021, the army would recruit 5,000 soldiers from all 20 regions, including a combined total of 960 from Kidal, Taoudenni, Timbuktu-Gourma, Ménaka and Gao. But it was not specified in the recruitment plan (see annex III) whether those recruited would be only from compliant armed groups. Such disagreement on quotas has since been brought up during the meetings of the Agreement Monitoring Committee and its subcommittee on defence and security, all requesting the parties to revisit the matter and to find a quick solution to the stalemate.⁴

Ceasefire violations

13. The enforcement of rules agreed to by the Technical Commission on Security, on 26 August 2019, regarding heavy weapons and movements of convoys of compliant armed groups continues to represent a challenge for MINUSMA. On 14 June 2021, the MINUSMA Force Commander issued a letter to all members of the Commission reminding the compliant armed groups of their obligation to comply with those rules, which had been agreed upon collectively. The groups also failed to provide the Commission with exhaustive lists of checkpoints and military bases, despite several reminders and their prior agreement to comply.⁵

14. On 29 June 2021, the Security Council renewed its decision that the mandate of MINUSMA should include, as a priority task, to support, monitor and supervise the ceasefire, including through the continued implementation of control measures on the movement and armament of signatory armed groups, including in designated weapon-free areas, and to report to the Security Council on violations thereof, as stipulated in paragraph 30 (a) (iii) of resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#).

15. Recurring conflicts over the payment of stipends for members of the Technical Commission on Security and the joint observation and verification teams by the Government of Mali has significantly hampered efforts to consolidate progress in the implementation of the defence and security pillar of the Agreement for the past several years (see [S/2021/151](#), para. 31, footnote 9; and [S/2020/785/Rev.1](#), para. 30). The Panel will monitor whether the recent resumption of the work of the Commission, on 20 May 2021, means that the Government of Mali has sustainably addressed the issues relating to the governance of such key mechanisms of the Agreement (see also [S/2020/158/Rev.1](#), paras. 6–8).

16. The Panel already proposed, in 2018 and 2019, several recommendations to MINUSMA that were endorsed by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) concerning Mali, relating to the enforcement of the regulations of the Technical Commission on Security. The Panel also recommended that the Commission systematically task joint observation and verification teams with investigating alleged violations of the ceasefire (see [S/2018/581](#), para. 195 (e); and [S/2019/636](#), para. 177 (b)).

B. Political and institutional component

17. Political and institutional reforms in Mali are long overdue because of the vested political interests of Malian actors, who focus more on process rather than on substantive issues. Many observers expect the military-led transitional Government

⁴ Minutes of the meeting of the Agreement Monitoring Committee subcommittee on defence and security, 18 May 2021, archived at the United Nations. See also the minutes of the 43rd meeting of the Committee, 29 June 2021.

⁵ Meeting with MINUSMA Force Commander, Bamako, 5 March 2021. See also [S/2020/158/Rev.1](#), para. 7. Only some compliant armed groups have provided such lists to date.

to be more pragmatic and less concerned with electoral repercussions when moving forward and therefore better able to deliver on institutional reforms.⁶

Territorial reorganization and elections

18. Territorial reorganization is highly politicized in Mali because of its link to the electoral system. Mali is administratively divided into regions, *cercles* and communes. A *cercle* constitutes the electoral constituency for each Member of Parliament, so political actors, including tribal organizations and armed groups, tend to push for as many *cercles* as possible in their local areas. Consequently, territorial reorganization proposals are often contested,⁷ at times violently (see S/2019/636, paras. 41–44). The current territorial reorganization proposal faces similar risks unless the transitional Government takes mitigation measures.

19. The Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Abdoulaye Maïga, appears to be single-handedly managing territorial reorganization. The Ministry established an internal commission mandated to prepare a draft proposal on territorial reorganization, but did not include representatives of signatory armed movements or other stakeholders. The work of the commission was focused on the nine new regions,⁸ the geographical delimitations of which required amendments to previously operationalized regions, notably Koulikoro, Kayes, Ségou, Sikasso, Mopti, Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal. The proposal was then presented to a select and limited number of participants at the regional level, through restitution workshops held on 29 and 30 April 2021, as a means of consultation (see annex V).

20. As expected, the political sensitivity involved in modifying delimitations of existing regions and *cercles* in Mali, compounded by a lack of inclusiveness in the proposal development process, triggered protests and counterproposals, including by compliant armed groups.⁹ At the 39th meeting of the Agreement Monitoring Committee subcommittee on political and institutional reforms, held on 18 May 2021, signatory armed movements reiterated their call for consideration of their proposals and inclusion in the decision-making process on territorial reorganization. In response, the transitional Government has committed itself to considering all suggestions before issuing a final proposal.¹⁰

Structure of the transitional Government's command and responsibilities for implementation of the Agreement

21. Since the change in the transitional Government on 24 May 2021, army officers have seized total control of all levers for the implementation of the Agreement, committing themselves to delivering on the Agreement and assuming full responsibility therefor. The army officers concerned lead all relevant institutions, notably the Presidency, the transitional legislative body (the National Transition

⁶ See annex IV for additional information on political and institutional reforms.

⁷ The previous attempt at territorial reorganization was in 2018, by the then-Minister of Territorial Administration and Decentralization, Mohamed Ag Erlaf, who was accused of trying to create as many *cercles* as possible for his communities in the north. His proposal for territorial reorganization led to violent protests, in particular in Gao.

⁸ The nine new regions are Koutiala, Kita, Niono, Nara, Dioïla, Bougouni, San, Douentza and Bandiagara.

⁹ There are protests and counter-proposals from Goundam, Gao, Kidal, Gourma-Rharous and several other locations. On 29 April 2021, CMA issued a communiqué in which it also denounced the lack of inclusiveness in the process.

¹⁰ Minutes of the meeting of the Agreement Monitoring Committee subcommittee on defence and security, 18 May 2021, archived at the United Nations.

Council) and the key ministries of reconciliation, defence, territorial administration and security.¹¹

22. There is a clear division of roles and responsibilities among the key actors in the new transitional Government with regard to the implementation of the Agreement. The President is in charge of high-level political negotiations and decisions pertaining to implementation of the Agreement. On 2 June 2021, he convened a high-level meeting to reassure representatives of armed movements who had expressed concerns over the imminent appointment of the current Prime Minister, Choguel Kokalla Maïga, who had previously expressed opposition to the Agreement.¹² That format of high-level dialogue and decision-making, chaired by the President, is under consideration for formalization.

23. The Prime Minister oversees and coordinates interventions of relevant technical ministries, in close dialogue with the President, who remains in regular contact with high representatives of signatory armed movements. The Ministry of Reconciliation, Peace and National Cohesion in Charge of the Peace Agreement and National Reconciliation, led by Colonel Ismaël Wagué,¹³ has been given a wider mandate, including to act as the transitional Government's focal point for the implementation of the Agreement and other peace-related initiatives. The Ministry has subsequently decided to formalize the intra-Malian consultation framework (see [S/2019/636](#), para. 24), specifying its mandate and methods of work.

24. The position of High Representative of the Head of State for the implementation of the Agreement is maintained, but the new transitional Government has yet to determine its role.¹⁴

C. Economic, social and cultural development component and reconciliation, justice and humanitarian component.

25. The Panel's observations are set out in annex VI.

¹¹ On 28 May, Colonel Assimi Goïta was confirmed as President of the transitional Government; Colonel Sadio Camara was reappointed Defence Minister; Colonel Malick Diaw remained as President of the National Transition Council, the transitional legislative body expected to pass needed reforms and legislation; Colonel Ismaël Wagué was reappointed Minister in charge of national reconciliation, with an explicit mandate on the implementation of the Agreement; and Lieutenant-Colonel Abdoulaye Maïga was reappointed Minister of Territorial Administration and Decentralization.

¹² The meeting convened by the President, Assimi Goïta, was attended by representatives of CMA and the Plateforme and by Choguel Maïga himself. The President reassured the armed movements about the implementation of the Agreement as part of the new Government's priorities.

¹³ Colonel Ismaël Wagué is one of the coup leaders who became the spokesperson of the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP) and has since been a prominent figure in the new Government.

¹⁴ The previous President, Bah N'Daw, tried to reinvigorate the position of High Representative of the Head of State for the implementation of the Agreement as way to gain more oversight of the Agreement implementation. On 10 March 2021, the President appointed Inhage Ag Mohamed as the new head of that office.

D. Political and regional context for Agreement implementation

Government-entertained ambiguity in the meaning of the “rereading” of the Agreement

26. Successive Governments of Mali have, to date, failed to clarify to the public the meaning of the “rereading of the Agreement”, thereby opening the door to speculation and incorrect interpretations, including by those hostile to the Agreement.

27. The plan to reinstate discussion on certain provisions of the Agreement originates from the inclusive national dialogue held in December 2019. The Government, which was then headed by Prime Minister Boubou Cissé, did not clarify the procedure for or the substance of the “rereading of the Agreement”. The subsequent Prime Minister, Moctar Ouane, also included the rereading of the Agreement in the government action plan presented to the National Transition Council on 22 February 2021, without any further explanation. The Panel received information indicating that the transitional President, Bah N’Daw, had requested that the Office of the High Representative of the Head of State for the implementation of the Agreement draft terms of reference for the rereading of the Agreement. The draft terms of reference were then submitted to the President for approval but were never disclosed to either the Ministry of Reconciliation, Peace and National Cohesion in Charge of the Peace Agreement and National Reconciliation or the signatory armed movements. During a meeting on 4 March 2021, a high-level State official told the Panel that the transitional Government had the following major points for rereading within the Agreement: (a) the election of the Governor by universal suffrage; (b) the composition of the reconstituted army to be deployed in the north; (c) northern development zone institutions; and (d) the allocation of 33 per cent of resources to decentralized State organs.

28. The Government-entertained ambiguity relating to the meaning of the “rereading of the Agreement” has been used as an excuse for extreme positions and acts by hardliners against the Agreement. In January 2021, for instance, social and political organizations created an anti-Agreement front in reaction to the publication of the updated road map of 18 December 2020 and the transitional Government’s plan to reread the Agreement.¹⁵ On 22 February 2021, a group of individuals in vehicles and on motorbikes penetrated the Governor’s office compound in Kidal to remove the Malian flag and replaced it with that of the Mouvement national de libération de l’Azawad (MNLA), a component of the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA) headed by Bilal Ag Acherif. The Malian flag had been hoisted at the Governor’s office since the meeting of the Agreement Monitoring Committee in Kidal on 11 February 2021. At the time of the event, the Governor’s office was under the protection of the Commission sécuritaire mixte de l’Azawad (CSMAK) in Kidal, a local CMA force headed by and constituted mostly of elements from MNLA. CMA officials told the Panel that the individuals who had lowered the Malian flag had justified their act by pointing to the declaration by the President to revise the Agreement.

Ethnic-based militias hampering implementation of the Agreement

29. The Panel received information indicating that the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission provided for in the Agreement had to amend its methods of work in central Mali, notably because of the presence of checkpoints manned by

¹⁵ Meeting with several representatives, Bamako, 2 March 2021. See also <https://lecollimateur.ma/39262>.

armed militia from the Fulani and Dogon communities, respectively.¹⁶ In most cases, those checkpoints were manned by members of Dan Nan Ambassagou.¹⁷

30. Because of those checkpoints, mobile teams of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission could not travel to meet victims and witnesses, as they had done in most of the regions of northern Mali. Instead, witnesses and victims were obliged to travel by their own means to be interviewed and give their testimonies to the Commission. The Panel received information that some witnesses and victims had to conceal their identities at checkpoints to prevent potential exactions by armed militias.¹⁸

31. The Malian Dogon militia, Dan Nan Ambassagou, continued to escalate its attacks on civilians, including on members of Dogon communities involved in intercommunal dialogues. The command structure of the military wing of that militia, headed by Youssouf Toloba, includes four coordinators.¹⁹ A retired Malian army officer, Mamadou Goudienkilé (see [S/2020/785/Rev.1](#), para. 60), heads the political wing and has progressively become the public face of the militia, with Youssouf Toloba being considered more and more controversial (see also annex VII).

Aguelhok is central to two high-stakes vested interests

32. The Chadian contingent faces a particular challenge in Aguelhok, owing to sustained attacks, the most recent having occurred on 2 April 2021 and 1 June 2021. Aguelhok has been consistently featured in recent reports of the Panel as being central to two high-stakes interests pertaining to the implementation of the Agreement. First, Aguelhok is at the centre of a fierce leadership rivalry in the region between CMA and the Groupe d'autodéfense des Touaregs Imghad et leurs alliés (GATIA)-Plateforme des mouvements du 14 juin 2014 d'Alger, which has led to deadly clashes and several attempted reconciliations, such as the meeting held in Anéfis in January 2021, as indicated in the most recent midterm report of the Panel (see [S/2021/151](#), paras. 39–46). Second, the Panel has underlined that Aguelhok is a strategic location for controlling drug trafficking in the region, compounded by the current presence of sanctioned individual Ahmoudou Ag Asriw (MLi.001) in the area (see [S/2021/151](#), para. 44; see also annex VII).

Additional political and regional context

33. The Panel's observations are set out in annex VII.

III. Armed groups

34. The two successive coups d'état in Mali created space for two different networks from northern Mali, which sometimes overlap, compete or share interests: compliant armed groups and tribal organizations. The gradual fragmentation of armed group coalitions since the signing of the Agreement in 2015 and the loss of influence of

¹⁶ Meeting with confidential sources, Mali, March and April 2021.

¹⁷ Dan Nan Ambassagou maintained checkpoints at numerous locations in central Mali, mostly on the roads from Mopti to Bandiagara and Douentza. Some of these checkpoints are located near Goundaka, Fiko, Tilé, Doucoumbo, Bandiagara and Parou bridge.

¹⁸ Meeting with confidential sources, Mali, March and April 2021.

¹⁹ Boureima Sagara for Bandiagara, Amadou Ongoïba for Koro, Oumar Guindo for Bankass and Seydou Maïga for Douentza.

traditional Tuareg confederations²⁰ since Malian independence have contributed to the development of ethnic-based splinter armed groups and the emergence of self-declared tribal leaders.²¹

35. By bypassing the legitimate authorities and mechanisms deriving from the Agreement, notably interim authorities at the regional, *cercle* and commune levels, several self-declared tribal leaders, who sometimes accumulate responsibilities in compliant armed groups and official or elected functions in Bamako, are acting as political entrepreneurs serving their own personal interests. The instrumentalization of their communal affiliation and manipulation of ethnic-related armed groups, and cease-fire violations that may result from such strategies, represent in this context significant delaying factors in the implementation of the Agreement.

Tribal governance

Traditional Tuareg chiefs of Mali

36. In the Adragh area, the *aménokal* (traditional chief) of the Ifoghas, Mohamed Ag Intalla, claims to maintain an apparent distance from the activities of his brothers, Attayoub Ag Intalla, the civil society coordinator in Kidal,²² and Alghabass Ag Intalla, the secretary-general of the Haut conseil pour l'unité de l'Azawad (HCUA). In reality, the organization headed by Mohamed Ag Intalla, the Conseil de l'Adragh, has been instrumental for the HCUA expansion strategy. It was particularly useful in the weakening of the Plateforme, following the split of GATIA, led by Haballa Ag Hamzatta and Ahmoudou Ag Asriw in 2019, by co-opting General Takny Ag Intikane of the Malian armed forces as chief of the Imghad community of the Adragh.²³ The Conseil de l'Adragh also played a role in the recent merge between HCUA,²⁴ the

²⁰ Some researchers, such as Pierre Boilley or Adib Benchérif, prefer to avoid the term “confederation” and consider those entities to be political groups instead. Accordingly, fractions can move from one political entity to another, or claim to be independent, depending on the political interests of the fraction chief or political representative. About 80 political entities were identified as Tuareg tribes by MINUSMA in 2016; however, there is no estimation of the population size represented by each political entity.

²¹ Tribes do not officially exist in Mali. However, they constitute an unofficial parallel political system that has been co-opted by Governments of Mali since the end of Moussa Traoré’s regime, in particular by granting tribal leaders with official or elected positions in Bamako. Although the concept of the tribe is not clearly defined, it sometimes corresponds to a confederation (Kel Antessar, Iwellemmedan or Kel Adragh), a fraction (the only entity recognized by the Malian administration) or to a social status (Imouchagh or Imghad). For the Arabs, two main geographical groups exist: Timbuktu, where Arab fractions refer themselves as belonging to the Bérabiche tribe, and Gao, where different fractions (including the Lemhar and Machdouf) would belong to the Kounta tribe, from which they have split. Other fractions, such as the Ould Chouaib from In Araban (Ménaka region), are considered to be independent Arabs.

²² Attayoub Ag Intalla, third son of the former *aménokal*, Attaher Ag Intalla, presides over the civil society coordination of Kidal and a local non-governmental organization (NGO), Solidarité pour le Sahel (SOLISA), used as an implementing partner by many international NGOs and United Nations humanitarian agencies. Attayoub also plays a prominent role in gold mining governance in Kidal (see S/2019/636 paras. 84 and 151; and S/2020/785/Rev.1, para. 121).

²³ See S/2019/636, para. 82; S/2020/158/Rev.1, sixth paragraph of the summary, and annex V, para. 8; and S/2021/151, paras. 39–41.

²⁴ The process was initiated during the inauguration ceremony, held in Tin-Aouker, of the new *aménokal* of the Chamanamas, Abdi Ag Mohamed, known as Kiyou, on 25 December 2019, then during follow-up meetings held in Amassin on 13 August 2020 and Tin-Aouker on 20 March 2021, concluding on 9 April 2021 in Amasrakad. Consequently, on 28 May 2021, in Kidal, Alla Ag Elmehdi and Colonel Jimmy were appointed by the Haut conseil pour l'unité de l'Azawad (HCUA) to be responsible for administrative affairs and for military/security affairs, respectively.

Mouvement pour le salut de l'Azawad (MSA)-Chamanamas²⁵ and the Front populaire de l'Azawad (FPA) of Hassane Ag Mehdi, known as "Colonel Jimmy".²⁶

37. Mohamed Ag Intalla, a former Member of Parliament under the banner of the Rassemblement pour le Mali (RPM), the political party of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, and currently Third Vice-President of the National Transition Council, also presides over the association of the traditional and customary Touareg chiefs of Mali, which includes the *aménokal* of the Kel Antessar (or Kel Ansar), Abdoul-Majid Ag Mohamed Ahmad Ag Attaher, known as Nasser, and the *aménokal* of the Iwellemmedan, Bajan Ag Hamatou. Nevertheless, its composition has been fluctuating, with other members being added on the basis of specific interests or tribal diplomacy.²⁷

38. In that capacity, Mohamed Ag Intalla and his representative in Bamako, Nasser, along with their delegations, can access the highest Malian authorities and the international community.²⁸ They were granted audiences by the last President of Mali and the transitional Presidents,²⁹ Prime Ministers and members of the transitional Government.³⁰

39. In addition to their role as gatekeepers for access to State officials and diplomatic missions in Bamako, tribal leaders have also benefited from the direct remittance of State resources. According to a confidential source in the office of the President,³¹ Mohamed Ag Intalla and all the members of his delegation were given funds in cash during their meeting with transitional President Bah N'Daw on 15 October 2020. The same source indicated to the Panel that this has been a common practice in recent years, in particular during the presidency of Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta.

40. In the context of the establishment of a permanent strategic framework and the recent rapprochement between CMA leadership and General El Hadj Ag Gamou, the presence of the latter was particularly noticed alongside Mohamed Ag Intalla during the audience granted by Assimi Goïta on 9 June 2021 to the traditional and customary chiefs of northern Mali.³² The Panel also observed, at the same meeting, the presence of Djibrilla Moussa Diallo, the representative of the Plateforme/Coordination des mouvements et fronts patriotiques de résistance (CMFPR-1) (Ganda Koy) to the Technical Commission on Security, and of two sanctioned individuals, Mohamed Ould Mataly (MLi.008) and Mohamed Ousmane Ag Mohamedoune (MLi.003).

41. The composition of the aforementioned delegation, a mix of traditional leaders, self-declared leaders, military commanders of armed groups (including former

²⁵ Promoted by its secretary-general, Alla Ag Elmehdi, this merge was not consensual within the Chamanamas; it was opposed by Assalat Ag Habi, Alla Ag Elmehdi's deputy secretary-general. Intalla Ag Assayid, the military chief of staff, also joined HCUA.

²⁶ As a result of the merge, the Coalition du peuple de l'Azawad (CPA) of Mohamed Ousmane issued a communiqué on 20 April 2021, in which it claimed that Makoutane Ag Almansour, the military commander of FPA in Assamed, had joined CPA.

²⁷ See annex VIII for the list of non-permanent members.

²⁸ Including the Ambassadors of Algeria, France, Turkey and the United States of America to Mali, and, on 23 July 2020, the President of the Niger.

²⁹ The traditional chiefs were received by the former President, Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, on 15 June 2020, by the former transitional President, Bah N'Daw, on 15 October 2020, by the former Vice-President, Assimi Goïta, on 27 November 2020, and by the current transitional President, Assimi Goïta, on 16 June 2021.

³⁰ Audience with Prime Minister Boubou Cissé, 8 July 2020; audience with cabinet ministers, 11 and 13 October 2020.

³¹ Meeting with the Panel, Koulouba, 3 March 2021.

³² See annex XI; that audience followed a previous joint statement signed on 16 April 2021 by General Gamou and Mohamed Ag Intalla.

government proxies) and individuals sanctioned by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) concerning Mali, casts doubt on the credibility and legitimacy of such an association of traditional leaders, and questions whether the strategy of the transitional institutions has really changed from past practices.

Divisions within the Imghad

42. The Imghad form a social group³³ composed of different fractions located all over northern Mali, in particular in the Kidal, Gao and Ménaka regions and in the Gourma area.³⁴ General Gamou created and still presides over a political entity aimed at representing the Imghad, the Conseil supérieur des Imghads et alliés (CSIA). Its military wing is GATIA, officially headed by Fahad Ag Almahmoud. Following the break-up led by Haballa Ag Hamzatta and General Takny and orchestrated by CMA and Mohamed Ag Intalla, two new entities also claim to represent the Imghad in Kidal and Gao at the military and political levels.

43. In the Gourma area, the main tribe associated with the Imghad is the Imididaghan. Their representative is Akli Iknane Ag Souleymane, who was elected Member of Parliament for Ansongo in April 2020 and is now a member of the National Transition Council. He is also a senior military commander of MNLA, previously in Libya. He was reappointed as Gourma zone commander for CMA on 29 January 2021, alongside Bahmad Ag Hamada and Ehya Ag Mossa.³⁵

44. Bahmad was reportedly arrested by International forces in Intahaka on 29 June 2021, along with Alyajid Ag Matafa and Ahmaida Ag Babahmed. They are also related to Abdoukarim Ag Matafa, Akli's cousin and a senior MNLA commander from Tessit, a member of its executive bureau and the president of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration regional bureau in Kidal since 2018.

45. In addition to his functions with CMA and at the political and tribal levels, Akli Iknane also played a significant role in the coordination of the fight against Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) in the Gourma area, which is being conducted by Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM – QDe.159) with the support of armed elements from CMA and GATIA, as previously reported by the Panel.³⁶ The MNLA base in Ti-n-Diriguitan (12 km south-west of Tessit) has been already targeted by International forces, when a group of eight MNLA combatants, already including Alyajid Ag Matafa and Hamza Ag Abdoulmalik, were arrested on 10 November 2017 under suspicion of terrorist activities.³⁷ Amoumine Ag Abdoulmalik, known as Hamza, leads the *ferka* of JNIM in Tessit, while Hicham Ag Ehya leads the one located in the vicinity of Iménas, 80 km east of Gao.³⁸ Both are Imididaghen and used to be associated with Al Mansour Ag Alkassoum, a former leader of a JNIM *katibah*

³³ The social structure of Tuareg society consists of the Imouchagh (nobles), the Imghad (subjects), the Inadan (craftsmen) and the Iklan (former slaves).

³⁴ Depending on their region of origin, the different tribes considered to be Imghad would, in theory, fall under the authority of the Ifoghas in the Kidal/northern Gao region or the Iwellemmedan in the eastern Gao/Ménaka region and would enjoy relative autonomy in the Gourma area.

³⁵ Ehya Ag Mossa, from I-n-Tillit, defected from the Groupe d'autodéfense des Touaregs Imghad et leurs alliées (GATIA) to HCUA in December 2019; HCUA communiqué No. 001/HCUA/2020.

³⁶ See S/2020/785/Rev.1, paras. 45–46; interviews with several confidential sources, Bamako and Gao, 2020 and 2021; and confidential document, 30 April 2020. On 12 July 2021, Akli denied to the Panel playing such a role.

³⁷ See CMA communiqué No. 037/2017/C.C.-CD-CMA, issued on 10 November 2017.

³⁸ Hicham Ag Ehya, son of an Imididaghan fraction chief from Iménas, Gao region, was associated with HCUA in 2018.

in northern Gourma, who was killed by International forces on 12 November 2018 (see [S/2019/636](#), paras. 102–104).

46. Akli Iknane was invited by Mohamed Ag Intalla to be part of his delegation during an audience granted by former Prime Minister Boubou Cissé, on 8 July 2020, on behalf of his Imididaghan community.³⁹ He has also recently been lobbying the entourage of the President of the Niger, Mohamed Bazoum, for a meeting.⁴⁰

Power struggles within the Kel Antessar

47. Considered until independence to be one of the main Touareg confederations in the Timbuktu region, the Kel Antessar have, in recent history, been losing the support of several Tuareg fractions from the region, as previously reported by the Panel (see [S/2018/581](#), para. 94). However, some organizations recently created along tribal lines are now also facing splinter groups and internal disputes, generating increasing polarization of tribal and armed groups geopolitics in the Timbuktu region, in particular in the Goundam *cercle*.

48. In its prior reports, the Panel detailed how Mohamed Ousmane Ag Mohamedoune (MLi.003), an individual designated by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) concerning Mali, benefited from Malian State support to advance his career as a political entrepreneur. Mohamed Ousmane continues to accumulate multiple positions, such as secretary-general of an armed group, the Coalition du peuple de l'Azawad (CPA), member of the Agreement Monitoring Committee, president of the Conseil supérieur des Kel Razzaf-Ichérifien (CSKR-I) and member of the National Transition Council. In addition, the Panel received information that the Government of Mali has continued to provide Mohamed Ousmane with financial support, in spite of the sanctions measures decided on 23 December 2018 by the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#).⁴¹

49. Mohamed Ali Ag Mattahel, known as Doly, the former President of CSKR-I, denounced the takeover of the tribal organization by Mohamed Ousmane in January 2020 and, in his capacity as supreme chief of the Kel Razzaf-Ichérifien tribe, declared its dissolution on 7 June 2020.⁴² Doly is also a member of the National Transition Council.

50. After having challenged the legitimacy of the *aménokal* of the Kel Antessar for years,⁴³ Mohamed Ousmane signed an alliance agreement with Nasser on 5 April 2020, under the patronage of Malian State security services, in the context of the legislative election held in Goundam (see [S/2020/785/Rev.1](#), para. 42).

51. In fact, the creation on 25 April 2020 of the Coordination Kel Ansar et alliés (CKAA) in Goundam was considered by Nasser to be a form of contesting his status as *aménokal*.⁴⁴ Led by Oumar Ag Hamama Cissé, Nasser's cousin, CKAA organized its first two-day congress on 12 February 2021. It was attended, notably, by Doly, Houka Houka Ag Alhousseini (MLi.005), an individual designated by the Security

³⁹ Also attended by the representative of the Imididaghan of Timbuktu, Alhassane Ag Assadeck.

⁴⁰ Meeting with government official of the Niger, Niamey, 24 May 2021.

⁴¹ Meetings with officials of the Government of Mali, Bamako, 8 and 10 March 2021 (see also para. 115 below).

⁴² The dissolution was challenged by a public communiqué (No. 01/CSKR-I/06/2020), circulated on 9 June 2020 and signed by Abdallah Ag Mohamed Assaleh, secretary-general and spokesperson of CSKR-I.

⁴³ Including by organizing the election of a dissident *aménokal*, Mohamed Attaher Ag Mohamed El Mehdi Al Ansari, in 2018 (see [S/2018/581](#), para. 94).

⁴⁴ See annex X for public communiqués.

Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) concerning Mali, Abdallah Ag Ahmedou, from Koyguma, and Mahmoud Ould Jeyid, from Lerneb.

52. Oumar Ag Hamama is a Malian customs officer married to Rahmatou Wallet Oumarou Haïdara, known as Kanto or Adi, a daughter of Oumarou Ag Mohamed Ibrahim Haïdara, a former president of the Malian Haut conseil des collectivités territoriales and president of a local non-governmental organization (NGO), the Association malienne pour la survie au Sahel (AMSS).⁴⁵ Oumar's brother-in-law, Mohamed Ousmane Ag Hama, known as Mourou, and his brother Ahmad, are military commanders of the Congrès pour la justice dans l'Azawad (CJA)-Gargando.⁴⁶

53. In addition to heading an NGO, Oumarou is the former representative in Goundam of RPM, the political party of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta. His daughter, Rahmatou, was a candidate for RPM in Goundam during the legislative elections held in 2020, alongside Oumar Sididjé Traoré, known as Gaucher or Papa, an outgoing Member of Parliament.

54. CJA-Gargando and CMA visibly supported the Gaucher/Rahmatou joint political campaign. On 20 April 2020, a dozen pickup trucks filled with armed men from MNLA and HCUA bases in Koyguma, Foïta and Ber were deployed in downtown Goundam, in a tense stand-off with Malian armed forces units guarding official buildings where the vote count was taking place, as reported by the Panel (see [S/2020/785/Rev.1](#), para. 42).⁴⁷ The day before, CJA elements commanded by Mourou also faced Malian armed forces units protecting voting operations in Echel, preventing voters from accessing the polling station.⁴⁸ During the night between 19 and 20 April 2020, CJA and CMA joined forces, under the command of Aboubacrine Ag Mohamed Elmokhtar, known as Bokari Ag Intadakmar,⁴⁹ to oppose the Malian armed forces and CPA deployed in Tonka. According to a confidential report, the Malian armed forces had to shoot into the air to dissuade CJA/CMA elements from breaking into the Mayor's office and seizing ballot boxes, following the announcement of preliminary results indicating the defeat of the Gaucher/Rahmatou joint campaign.

55. In reaction to the founding meeting of CKAA, held in February 2021, Nasser and Mohamed Ousmane organized, on 3 April 2021, a three-day joint intercommunal

⁴⁵ AMSS is a large local NGO and one of the main implementing partners of international NGOs, the United States Agency for International Development and United Nations humanitarian agencies in Mali.

⁴⁶ The Congrès pour la justice dans l'Azawad (CJA) is headed by Elmeye Ag Mohamedoune, following the death of Azarok Ag Inaborchad on 10 December 2020. CJA is composed of predominantly Kel Antessar from Gargando. Mourou is a sergeant of the national guard and Ahmad is a captain in the gendarmerie.

⁴⁷ The alliance between Nasser and Mohamed Ousmane successfully contributed to the election of Gaucher and Rahmatou's competitors, Mohamed Fall Ould Mohamed and Mohamed Elmouloud Ag Hamada, candidates of the Union pour la République et la démocratie (URD) party of Soumaïla Cissé. Both defected from URD in May 2020 and joined the presidential majority.

⁴⁸ Confidential document, 1 July 2020.

⁴⁹ Bokari was dismissed from HCUA on 29 July 2020 by a decision of Alghabass Ag Intalla (decision No. 007/2020/SG/HCUA) and replaced by Mohamed Ahmed Ag Sabar, known as Alfaki. Bokari, a Tuareg Kel Inagozmi from Ber, had previously been arrested by CMA on 30 October 2019, but was freed on 23 November 2019 by decision of a qadi in Kidal. He is accused of abduction, extortion, assassination, the massacre of civilians, carjacking and participating with other HCUA elements from his unit in the attack on the Malian armed forces base in Bamba on 6 April 2020, as reported by the Panel (see [S/2020/785/Rev.1](#), para. 47). Bokari is also associated with Houka and is now suspected of collaborating with Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) in the Gourma area (meetings held in Bamako and Timbuktu, in 2020 and 2021; see also [S/2020/158/Rev.1](#), annex V, para. 4). Hamma declared to the Panel that Bokari's successor, Alfaki, is a Kel Antessar and has no responsibility over the Kel Inagozmi HCUA combatants (meeting with Hamma Ag Mohamed, Bamako, on 21 June 2021).

meeting in Goundam *cercle*, to counterbalance the political influence of the CCAA leadership. Many local actors indicated to the Panel that, although the main audience for those meetings was in Bamako, local community leaders were still obliged to take sides and pledge allegiance to entities that remain, ultimately, virtual entities, generating unnecessary divisions in an environment that was still deeply affected by years of conflict.

Idnan coordination of Timbuktu

56. As reported by the Panel in its most recent report (S/2021/151), another self-declared political leader to have emerged in recent years is Hama Ag Mohamed. Hama, who holds a director position (Director of Interior Centres) at Électricité du Mali in Bamako,⁵⁰ has been trying to build his political legitimacy mainly by self-claiming from Bamako tribal titles and by establishing ethnic-based empty shells.

57. In 2017, after proclaiming himself head of the coordination of the Ikounéden, his own fraction, and of the Imididaghan and Kel Tich Ghayene Tuareg fractions, and president of the coordination of the traditional and customary Tuareg chiefs of Timbuktu,⁵¹ Hama began to present himself in public communiqués as secretary-general of the platform of the traditional and customary Tuareg chiefs of Mali, a title that he used until November 2020.⁵²

58. In 2019, Hama declared that he had been designated the tribal leader of the Idnan of Timbuktu during a meeting in Assané, which he could not attend. As reported by the Panel, Hama organized and funded a second meeting of the Idnan coordination on 14 November 2020, in Acharane, during which sanctioned individual Houka Houka and his relatives, namely Abdoullaye Ag Mohamed (from Acharane) and Wani Ag Mohamed (from Essakan), played a central role.

59. Hama is also opposing another Idnan coordination, created on 25 February 2021 and led by Ibrahim Ag Mohamed Assaleh, an Idnan from Bourem, Gao region. Mohamed Ousmane, in the framework of his alliance with Nasser, issued a public communiqué the next day, in his capacity as president of CSKR-I,⁵³ supporting Assaleh's designation.

60. On 11 April 2021, Hama convoked, at his home in Bamako, a meeting of the supreme council of the Idnan, at which he was designated third vice-president. The council is headed by Mohamed Ag Najim, the military chief of staff of MNL and head of the defence and security committee of CMA, and by Ahmed Ag Boya (from Almoustarat, Gao region) as first vice-president and Magdi Ag Bohada as second vice-president.

61. Hama indicated to the Panel that his approach should be considered to be a form of identity-based isolationism, which needed to include the Kel Tet of Houka in order to weaken the Kel Antessar confederation. Hama also supports Doly and CCAA of Oumarou in order to oppose Mohamed Ousmane and Nasser. It is, however, not clear to the Panel what the interest of local communities could be in belonging to one political entity (the Kel Antessar) or the other (the Idnan) if not the personal positioning of Hama Ag Mohamed.

62. Houka Houka Ag Alhousseini (MLi.005) is now supported by Hama, who designated him general qadi of the region of Timbuktu, in charge of designating other

⁵⁰ The Panel already reported on his role in the procurement of generators for Kidal (see S/2021/151, para. 61, and annex VI to the present report).

⁵¹ Hama told the Panel that he created the platform in 2013, although the Panel could not find any trace of it before 2016 (meeting with Hama Ag Mohamed, Bamako, 21 June 2021).

⁵² He stopped using the title following a communiqué from other tribal leaders denying it to him (see annex XI).

⁵³ Meeting with Attay Ag Abdallah, spokesperson of CPA and member of the National Transition Council, Bamako, 28 February 2021.

qadis, who would be subordinate to him. Hamma also replaced Mohamed Ousmane in his role of interface between Houka and authorities in Bamako. According to confidential information, Hamma played a role in the June release, by the Malian justice system, of Wani Ag Mohamed, who was arrested by International forces in Essakan in February 2021. However, Hamma refuted the Panel's information that he intervened for Wani's release. He also denied supporting Bokari Ag Intadakmar,⁵⁴ despite his good relations with the Kel Inagozmi fraction in Ber. The Panel nevertheless received confidential information indicating that Bokari would be hosted during his stays in Bamako, not only by Hamma, but also by Bellali Ould Cheibani, leader of the CPA splinter group that dismissed Mohamed Ousmane.⁵⁵

Situation in Lerneb

63. The Panel has been monitoring the situation in Lerneb, Tilemsi commune, Timbuktu region, since its first report in 2018 (see [S/2018/581](#), paras. 94 and 123; [S/2019/636](#), paras. 79 and 115; [S/2020/158/Rev.1](#), para. 9; [S/2020/785/Rev.1](#), paras. 75–76 and 97–100; and [S/2021/151](#), para. 58) Lerneb, a traditional commercial hub, is strategically located at the main border-crossing point between Timbuktu and Mauritania.

64. On 20 March 2021, the Mouvement arabe de l'Azawad (MAA)-Plateforme of Gao organized a large gathering in Lerneb, where it signed with MAA-CMA of Ber a memorandum of understanding⁵⁶ and a joint statement.⁵⁷ More than 70 pickup trucks travelled from Gao region to Lerneb for the meeting, headed by Mohamed Ould Mataly (MLi.008) and Hanoune Ould Ali. The meeting was attended on the CMA side by Dina Ould Deya, first vice-president of Taoudenni regional authorities and president of the revolutionary council of the MAA.⁵⁸

65. Despite the new agreement between CMA and the Plateforme, another attack on Lerneb was carried out on 13 June 2021. The Panel obtained video footage showing Oulad Ich MAA-Plateforme militia defending their military positions in Lerneb, including at a place used to collect taxes. The video reveals intense fighting near households, indicating that civilian lives were put at risk by the assault.⁵⁹ Reports collected by the Panel in Timbuktu indicate that the attackers were Tormouz CMA militia coming from a site located 12 km north of Lerneb, called Hassi Hakhmar,⁶⁰

⁵⁴ Hamma declared that Bokari was put aside following his dismissal by HCUA.

⁵⁵ Meeting with confidential source, Bamako, 14 May 2021. Hamma denied to the Panel hosting Bokari when he comes to Bamako. According to another confidential source, Bokari is hosted in Bamako by Bellali (meeting with confidential source, Bamako, 21 June 2021). In an audio obtained by the Panel on 28 February 2021 and archived at the United Nations, Mohamed Ousmane threatened to retaliate against Hamma. Bellali is also a relative of Hanoune Ould Ali and is close to sanctioned individual Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri (MLi.007), also known as Rouggy (meeting with Bellali, Bamako, 8 March 2021).

⁵⁶ Signed by Hanoune Ould Al for MAA-Plateforme and Dina Ould Deya for MAA-CMA.

⁵⁷ Signed by Mahmoud Ould Jeyid, a Plateforme military commander in Lerneb, and Hussein Ould Al Moctar, known as Goulam, a CMA regional military chief of staff from Ber.

⁵⁸ Dina, an Oulad Idriss, is a founder of MAA, along with Goulam and Ould Sidatti, the latter both being Oulad Ghanam (see [S/2020/785/Rev.1](#), paras. 57 and 99). According to a confidential source met in Bamako on 14 May 2021, Ould Sidatti allegedly refused to attend and give his blessing to the MAA-Plateforme meeting in Lerneb. Dina denied this and said that Ould Sidatti had never considered coming, since he, Dina, was himself planning to attend (meeting with Dina, Timbuktu, 12 June 2021).

⁵⁹ Video files archived at the United Nations.

⁶⁰ On 2 August 2020, Tormouz militia was attacked in Hassi Hakhmar by Oulad Ich MAA-Plateforme combatants. According to Mohamed Sidi Ould Mohamed, a Tormouz leader, seven Tormouz were killed, and a vehicle mounted with a PKM machine gun was taken by the assailants. This revenge attack was allegedly in retaliation for the killing of seven civilians from the Oulad Ich community on 23 July 2020 (confidential document, 12 June 2021).

and that Baba Ould Sidi Mohamed, advisor to the Governor of Taoudenni and mayor of Lerneb, was himself in the area at the time of the incident.⁶¹

66. The Panel considers the conflict in Lerneb to be predominantly political, between a group of Oulad Ich associated with the MAA-Plateforme of Hanoune Ould Ali and Ahmed Ould Sidi Mohamed, known as Boda, supported by the Idelba community, and Tormouz, an Arab ethnic group historically associated with CMA. The Panel considers that the Tormouz leadership has been hiding behind intercommunal justifications to avoid the responsibility of engaging CMA in hostilities, in violation of the Agreement, that could otherwise result in the potential designation of individuals by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) concerning Mali, as recalled by the Council in the thirteenth preambular paragraph of its resolution 2458 (2021) concerning Mali.

67. MINUSMA launched a new mediation process on 21 June 2021,⁶² following a series of failed initiatives conducted since 2019 by Mali, Mauritania, the Technical Commission on Security and sanctioned individual Houka Houka. Local actors consulted in this framework confirmed the political nature of the conflict and identified the following stakeholders as being the only ones in a position to end the conflict in Lerneb:⁶³ Baba and Zahabi Ould Sidi Mohamed for the Tormouz, and, for the Oulad Ich, Boda and Mohamed Ould Sidi Mohamed Ahmed.⁶⁴

Assassination of Sidi Brahim Ould Sidatti

68. The assassination of the secretary-general of MAA-CMA took place in the very specific context of northern Mali. That context includes, inter alia, the conflict over control of Lerneb, the issue regarding the designation of interim authorities in the region of Taoudenni, governance issues between Arab communities of Gao and Timbuktu and within the Arab community of Timbuktu, increasing attacks against MINUSMA in Ber and the continued CMA expansion in the Timbuktu region.

69. The Panel will continue to follow up on the investigation initiated by Malian judicial authorities, as well as with CMA, which claimed to have launched its own internal review process.

IV. Organized crime

A. Trafficking of narcotic drugs

Seizures and trafficking trends in Mali and the wider Sahel region

70. Although seizures in recent years in Mali were limited to Ghanaian cannabis herb, or marijuana, on its way to Senegal via southern Mali, during the current mandate of the Panel, Malian authorities have seized an unprecedented volume of more than five tons of cannabis resin, or hashish. The hashish was intended to be trafficked

⁶¹ Baba is the brother of Zahabi Ould Sidi Mohamed, a former Minister and the current president of the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, and of Mohamed, a former Member of Parliament for Goundam (meetings in Timbuktu, Monday 14 June 2021). Baba claims that the attack was carried out by Tormouz youth acting on their own initiative.

⁶² On the same day, traders were allegedly prevented by CMA Tormouz militia from accessing the weekly market, and an unsigned communiqué was circulated on social media announcing that Tormouz had declared Lerneb a war zone until the “gangs” controlling the region leave the location.

⁶³ Confidential document, 21 June 2021.

⁶⁴ Mohamed Ould Sidi Mohamed Ahmed is a retired army officer based in Bamako.

through northern Mali on its way to Libya, providing potential financing to armed groups.

71. Equally important to note are seizures and trafficking trends in the wider Sahel region, with the largest regional hashish seizure having occurred in Niamey, where anti-drug authorities seized 17 tons of presumably Lebanese hashish that had entered via the ports of Cotonou, Benin, and of Lomé. The trafficking of Lebanese hashish shipped via West African ports through the Sahel via the Niger is an entirely new phenomenon.

72. The trafficking of Lebanese hashish via Mali cannot be ruled out. On 19 December 2020, Malian authorities seized 300 parcels of cannabis, involving both marijuana and hashish. The networks responsible for marijuana trafficking could very well also be used to bring hashish into Bamako via West African ports, with the two types of cannabis going their separate ways thereafter.

73. Morocco remains the principal source of hashish passing through Mali over land. One of the two main seizures in Bamako (10,800 parcels weighing a total of one ton) was almost certainly of Moroccan origin.⁶⁵ The Panel could also monitor a drug convoy by pickup trucks, presumably carrying hashish, following an established route from northern Mauritania and crossing into Algeria or the Niger via the Taoudenni region in northern Mali (see paras. 84–85 below).

74. While the trafficking of hashish by pickup convoy through the extreme north of Mali seems to be continuing, the flow of hashish using ordinary transport vehicles between Morocco and Mauritania via Guerguerat, entering Mali south of Taoudenni, is likely to have been disrupted because of the blockade, in November 2020, of road transport going through the border town by Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguía el-Hamra y Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO) and the subsequent brief moving-in of Moroccan troops.⁶⁶ On 23 December 2020, Moroccan authorities reportedly seized over two tons of hashish at Guerguerat.⁶⁷

75. Hashish trafficking operations have further been disrupted because of the seizure and arrests carried out in Niamey in 2018 (see [S/2020/785/Rev.1](#), para. 77)⁶⁸ and the consequent United Nations sanctions against Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri (MLi.007), also known as Rouggy, an individual designated by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) concerning Mali. Insiders involved in hashish trafficking refer to his Moroccan counterparts as seeking alternative networks in the Niger, possibly avoiding Mali altogether.⁶⁹

76. Next to hashish seizures, cocaine seizures are up in Bamako, with close to 5 kg confiscated from two so-called drug mules at Bamako international airport during the first half of 2021. Malians have also been involved in two major cocaine transfers from Latin America that were seized in ports in the Gambia and in Abidjan, Côte

⁶⁵ The amount seized was about one third of the three-ton shipment, over which competition arose between competing Arab networks in Gao and Timbuktu, linked to Sherif Ould Taher and Hussein Ould Ghaname or Khanam, alias Guigoz, respectively (see [S/2020/785/Rev.1](#), paras. 83 and 94). The former ultimately took the shipment forward, assisted by his brother, Ahmed, and an Algerian national, Fethi Benyadi, after having held hostage a Moroccan national associated with the supplier (Official source (confidential), 14 December 2020; and meeting with confidential sources in Gao and Bamako, May 2021).

⁶⁶ See also Alessandro Ford, “Hashish and hatred: the desert conflict in Western Sahara”, *Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project*, 26 March 2021.

⁶⁷ “El Guerguerat: saisie de plus de 2 tonnes de haschisch, un quinquagénaire interpellé”, le 360, 24 December 2020.

⁶⁸ Serving five-year sentences, the ringleaders of the operation, Sid’Ahmed Ben Kazou Moulati, alias Zaneylou, and Khalef Elmehri, were released in April and May 2021, respectively. Both passed through Gao on their way to Morocco and Algeria, respectively.

⁶⁹ Official source (confidential), 25 May 2021.

d'Ivoire, but no information suggests intended onward overland transport through Mali or the wider Sahel region (see annex XIII).

77. The Panel does not consider that increased seizures in Mali are indicative of an increase in trafficking in the aftermath of the coup d'état of August 2020, as some commentators have suggested.⁷⁰ Rather, on the basis of the above, it would be expected that trafficking would stagnate through northern Mali. Anecdotal evidence suggests that disrupted State security involvement instead enabled the seizures to take place, as those removed from office were less able to protect associated traffickers.

Malian connection to drug seizure in Niamey and arrested individuals

78. On 2 March, anti-drug authorities in the Niger seized 17 tons of cannabis resin, or hashish, from a depot in the Kalley neighbourhood of Niamey. The hashish was concealed in boxes supposedly carrying plastic tie bags, with prints of fruit on it.⁷¹ From a bill of lading for the product recovered from the depot, Niger anti-drug authorities obtained further transport data and concluded that the container that had supposedly transported the drugs had left Beirut on 12 October in order to arrive in Lomé on 9 November and in Niamey in early December 2020.

79. However, the freight forwarder of the container indicated that he had picked up a similar container in Cotonou, shipped by the same Lebanese company, with the same contents, and, in both cases, on behalf of an individual named Elh Saley of the Niamey-based company, Establishment Moubarak.⁷² That led Niger anti-drug authorities to conclude that there had been two shipments and that the drugs recovered from the depot had probably come instead from the second container, which had left Beirut for Cotonou on 26 December. By the time of the seizure, the contents of the container that had gone through Lomé would have already left the depot and had been transported north.⁷³

80. Niger authorities arrested 14 people allegedly involved in the deal: 12 Niger nationals and 2 Algerians. Two Libyan individuals who had allegedly come to Niamey for the deal fled the country.⁷⁴ The most prominent person arrested was Ghoumour Itouwa Bidika. In its previous final report (see [S/2020/785/Rev.1](#), paras. 86 and 102), the Panel reported on his involvement in the March 2018 hashish deal in Niamey and a hashish convoy movement on 9 June 2020 between the Niger and Mali, north of Tamalet.

81. Although Malian involvement in the above-mentioned shipments of supposed Lebanese hashish has not been yet confirmed, the Panel obtained evidence of cooperation between Bidika's network and an influential military official in GATIA, Moussa Tiliche, in moving several hundreds of parcels of hashish from Mali to the Niger in February 2021.⁷⁵

82. In charge of GATIA operations in the Gourma area, Moussa Tiliche is affiliated with the eighth combined arms tactical group of the Malian armed forces, the Groupement tactique inter-armes (GTIA), and has influence over GATIA combatants integrated into the reconstituted Malian army. On 29 April, Tiliche was present during an integration ceremony for 422 former combatants in Ségou, attended by various

⁷⁰ Paul Lorgerie, "Le Mali, pays de transit de la drogue vers l'Europe", Deutche Welle, 21 June 2021.

⁷¹ See annex XIV for photographs of the boxes.

⁷² Telephone communication with freight forwarder, 19 May 2021.

⁷³ This finding challenges a contested report by Alice Fereday and Matt Herbert, "Strange days for hashish trafficking in Niger", Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 11 May 2021. See annex XV for further details.

⁷⁴ Elh Saley (see para. 79 above) remains at large.

⁷⁵ Official source (confidential), 1 June 2021.

compliant armed groups representatives, as well as the Minister of National Reconciliation, Ismaël Wagué.⁷⁶

83. In late 2020, the Panel was made aware of Tiliche's involvement in a hashish convoy movement of 7 September 2020 from the Ménaka region of Mali into the Niger. Tiliche denied to the Panel his involvement in the convoy movement and explained his presence in the area at the time by his having been part of a search operation for Jörg Lange, a German aid worker taken hostage in Tillabéri in April 2018.⁷⁷ Tiliche denied having conducted drug deals with Bidika or having been in contact with him about such deals, while acknowledging that there had been communications between the two on other matters in 2019 or 2020.⁷⁸

Hashish trafficking inquiries relating to Mauritania

84. Apart from a seizure of one ton of Moroccan cannabis in Nouakchott in late June 2021,⁷⁹ the Panel is not aware of any major interceptions of convoys crossing into Mali via the north as reported previously. The Panel has been made aware of a suspect 13-vehicle convoy crossing into Mali from Mauritania on 11 June 2021.⁸⁰

85. The convoy crossed three days after a suspected Malian drug trafficker, whose name remains to be verified, travelled between Bamako and Nouakchott. His alleged associate, undertaking frequent travels to Mauritania as well, could be identified as Hamou Ould Baba, of the Ahl Abdelhai *fraction* of Bérabiche Arabs from Oursi/Bou-DjéBéha. The latter allegedly operated a drug convoy that clashed in mid-December 2020 with a group of competitors near Aguelhok, reportedly leaving two dead and eight injured,⁸¹ including Ould Baba among the injured.⁸²

86. At the time of writing the present report, the Panel was awaiting a response to a request for information from Mauritania, sent on 9 June 2021, to verify and learn more about the alleged release of Sidi Hamidouche, alias Alito, who was arrested in July 2017 for drug trafficking. Having made fortunes in regional fuel transports, prominent members of the Lemhar Arab community have travelled to Mauritania to plead for Alito's release and subsequently re-establish commercial ties.⁸³

B. Trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants

Figures and trends

87. The Panel's observations for Timbuktu, Gao and Ménaka Regions are set out in annex XVI.B.

Migrant-smuggling networks, forced labour and sexual violence⁸⁴

88. In Timbuktu, a migrant smuggler named Mamadou Niakate, alias Tyson, was accused of extortion after three Sierra Leonean and two Senegalese migrants filed a

⁷⁶ See annex XVI for photographs of Moussa Tiliche during the ceremony.

⁷⁷ Meeting with Moussa Tiliche, Bamako, 20 May 2021. According to Tiliche, during the operation, vehicles assigned by a battalion commander of the reconstituted army of Gao, Mohamed Lamine Ag Kilita, were stolen and taken across the border by bandits and had to be recovered.

⁷⁸ Telephone interview with Moussa Tiliche, 6 July 2021.

⁷⁹ "L'effet dévastateur d'El Guerguerat sur la Mauritanie", Maghreb Online, 26 June 2021.

⁸⁰ Official source (confidential), 14 June 2021.

⁸¹ See <https://mobile.twitter.com/Amajagh/status/1338840248571338754>.

⁸² Meeting with confidential sources, Gao and Bamako, May 2021.

⁸³ Meeting with MAA representatives, Gao and Bamako, May 2021; and meeting with confidential source, Bamako, 12 May 2021.

⁸⁴ Owing to the sensitivity of the cases presented in this section and the need to protect its sources, the Panel has refrained from providing many details.

police complaint for having detained them, until they managed to escape.⁸⁵ Niakate, who is also suspected of being involved in weapons and narcotics trafficking,⁸⁶ was among nine migrant smugglers arrested in February 2018 in Gao (see S/2018/581, para. 139). Niakate was allegedly arrested again in Gao at the end of June 2021.⁸⁷

89. With regard to Kidal, the Panel obtained information about a Guinean national who had been picked up on the border between Libya and the Niger with the promise of work at a mine site to earn money so he could continue on his way.⁸⁸ He was then driven back to Mali, where he had first come from, along with several other migrants, and deposited at a mine site between Tessalit and Kidal and forced to work,⁸⁹ without basic services provided, then abandoned without pay. One of his companions perished while on their way to Kidal.

Sexual violence against female migrants

90. In addition to Baye Coulibaly (see S/2020/785/Rev.1, paras. 104–106), another linchpin in the world of migrant smuggling has emerged in Gao, commanding a network of human traffickers. Siaka Diarra is a Malian national who works with two Guinean correspondents, one in Sévare, Amadou Diallo, and one in Timeiaouine, nicknamed Rougeot.⁹⁰ The network, which focuses on migrants from francophone West Africa, mostly from Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire, has held migrants as prisoners in a house in Timeiaouine, where they have been extorted for extra payments and where women have been sexually abused.⁹¹

91. In recent months, a separate migrant smuggling network involving Nigerian nationals has taken root in Gao, operating from a bar called Hero in the Aljanabanja neighbourhood (*quartier* 4) of Gao city.⁹² The network focuses on migrants from anglophone West Africa, including Nigerians, Liberians and Sierra Leoneans. The network involves Nigerian women running brothels in Gao, where migrant women are allegedly forced into prostitution.

92. The Panel was also informed that a Tuareg couple from Kidal, based in the Château neighbourhood in Gao, was accused of keeping two Ivorian girls against their will in 2020; the man was accused of abusing her sexually. The latter then fled to Kidal, while the woman was held in provisional detention for passive complicity.⁹³

⁸⁵ Confidential report, 11 November 2020, and correspondence with confidential source, 3 July 2021.

⁸⁶ Confidential report, 17 February 2018.

⁸⁷ Correspondence with confidential source, 30 June 2021.

⁸⁸ Telephone interview with confidential source, 22 May 2021.

⁸⁹ The person was probably referring to one of the adjacent sites, Abanko, Indarset or Igharghar, which are all infiltrated by the Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM). As an example, the Panel was informed that Hamma Ag Mossa, a former weapons dealer involved in the Mouvement national de libération de l'Azawad (MNLA) and now in JNIM, exercises control in Indarset. Ag Mossa was among those subject to arrest warrants issued in 2013, which were lifted that same year as part of the preliminary Ouagadougou agreements.

⁹⁰ Rougeot is likely to have taken over from "Rasta", another Guinean previously identified by the Panel, who allegedly held migrants against their will in Timeiaouine (see S/2018/581, para. 142). Rasta supposedly served a two-year sentence in Algeria. Rasta worked together with another notorious migrant smuggler, Yaya Koné, an Ivorian, who is also based in Timeiaouine and is likely part of the same network.

⁹¹ Correspondence with confidential sources, March 2021; and correspondence with Malian justice authorities, March 2021.

⁹² Meetings and correspondence with confidential sources, May and June 2021.

⁹³ Meeting with local authorities, Gao, 10 March 2021.

Armed groups recovering migrants

93. During its recent missions in Mali, the Panel learned about a project,⁹⁴ involving signatory parties to the Agreement, to stem migrant smuggling by strengthening local capacities for territory and border control. The project was conceived of by the Minister of Malians Abroad and African Integration, Alhamdou Ag Ilyene, and presented in early February 2021, in Rome, to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Italy, with leaders from CMA, the pro-Gamou Plateforme and the Mouvement pour le salut de l'Azawad of the Daoussak (MSA-D) also in attendance.⁹⁵

94. On 6 May, Ag Ilyene and the Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Italy, Luigi Di Maio, signed a joint declaration on the control of migration flows. Italy will provide support for the project, which is to be implemented by the International Organization for Migration.⁹⁶ At the time of writing the present report, no concrete actions had yet been undertaken, and the agreed-upon financial resources mentioned had not yet been disbursed.⁹⁷

95. Malian authorities and GATIA and MSA-D representatives informed the Panel that, as part of the project, in March 2021, the above-mentioned compliant armed groups had recovered 251 migrants from traffickers or migrant smuggling networks operating in the Ménaka and Gao regions.⁹⁸ They were brought into the care of competent national services, NGOs and United Nations bodies.⁹⁹ Among those, 65 migrants, including 12 unaccompanied minors, expressed the desire to be repatriated.

96. According to civil society actors and armed group representatives in Gao, the majority did not wish to be repatriated because they were mostly migrant workers, including artisanal miners, with no intention of travelling to Algeria or beyond.¹⁰⁰

97. While the secretary-general of HCUA, Alghabass ag Intallah, took part in the initial discussions in Rome, CMA did not recover any migrants from Kidal, although they would have been able to do so given the dominance of CMA combatants in the region. A CMA representative explained to the Panel that it was necessary to find a solution to the issue that was more durable than recovering migrant workers, many of whom would return to their occupations immediately afterwards.¹⁰¹ Others attributed CMA's reluctance to repatriate migrants to the need for migrant workers in gold mines in Kidal.¹⁰²

C. Artisanal gold

98. Artisanal mining continues to boom in northern Mali, with new sites being opened across the Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu regions, often in very remote localities. Armed groups have managed to exercise a degree of control in some sites, notably in

⁹⁴ The project is entitled, "Projet d'appui à la réduction des migrations irrégulières et à la stabilisation au Mali".

⁹⁵ Alghabass Ag Intalla, for HCUA, Moussa Ag Acharatoumane, for MSA-D, and El Hadj Ag Gamou and Mohamed Ag Acherif, for GATIA.

⁹⁶ Written correspondence from the Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations, received on 29 June 2021, in response to correspondence dated 4 June 2021 from the Panel of Experts.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Telephone interview with the Director of the Regional Directorate for Civil Protection in Gao, 14 May 2021; meetings with compliant armed group representatives in Bamako, April-May 2021.

⁹⁹ See annex XVII for images from a video showing their arrival in Gao.

¹⁰⁰ Meetings with confidential civil society and armed group representatives in Gao, 14–18 May 2021.

¹⁰¹ Meeting with a CMA representative in Bamako, 16 June 2021.

¹⁰² Meetings with confidential civil society and armed group representatives in Gao, 14–18 May 2021.

I-n-Tillit-Nord, 20 km northwest of Intahaka, but this does not exclude infiltration by terrorist armed groups (see para. 140 below).

99. As the Panel concluded in an earlier report (see S/2021/151, para. 57), the artisanal mines of the Gourma area are an integral part of the CMA expansion strategy. Intahaka was the first destination for a sensitization mission from Kidal, in February 2021, led by the HCUA military chief of staff, Achafgui Ag Bouhada.¹⁰³ After the mission, CMA established a military region for the Gourma area, under the command of Akli Iknane Ag Souleymane (see para. 43 above). On 27 February, elements of Ag Souleymane established a military checkpoint about 5 km from Intahaka, so as to gain easy access to the mine sites. The creation of the checkpoint was unannounced and generated confusion when a Malian armed forces patrol passed by. The Malian armed forces ordered its removal, after which CMA combatants vacated the site, only to set up camp in the vicinity, but away from the road.

100. While pro-Gamou GATIA forces operating from Doro still have a presence in the mines north of Intahaka,¹⁰⁴ CMA is the dominant force. Its coordination is in the hands of Attaka Ag Mohamed Youssouf.¹⁰⁵ He is a former police inspector who shifted from MNLA to GATIA, and then to a pro-Haballa faction of GATIA, which today can be considered a proxy to CMA.¹⁰⁶

101. In 2020, there had been an attempt by a Bamako-based refiner to set up a smelting facility in Kadji, on the south bank of the Niger River close to Gao, to transform mineralized gravel from Intahaka into gold nuggets, and then later refine these into bars in Bamako. The project was abandoned because of high transport costs and because armed groups had forced the original local populations around Intahaka to give up their opposition to local transformation using mercury and cyanide, thereby increasing their opportunities for illegal taxation. Local transformation at the mine site appeared to be more cost effective.¹⁰⁷ For more information about humanitarian conditions in the mine sites of Intahaka, see paragraphs 140–147 below.

D. Irregular cigarette trade and trafficking

Flow of illicit whites

102. The Panel previously drew attention to the irregular transit and re-export of several brands of cigarettes through Benin, Burkina Faso, the Niger and Togo and their illicit introduction into northern Mali.¹⁰⁸ Legally manufactured brands, mostly

¹⁰³ See annex XVIII for the mission order. The order does not specify Intahaka, but, after Gao, the mission went straight to Intahaka, took two days to come back to Gao, and then went on to Forgo, Bamba and Téméra. After the mission, HCUA and pro-Haballa GATIA established two additional posts, at Téméra and at Sobori. The post at Sobori was removed because it was considered excessive by the local population in terms of levies on transport.

¹⁰⁴ Under threat by terrorist armed group, many GATIA members in the area shifted to HCUA in 2018 (see S/2018/581, paras. 101–107).

¹⁰⁵ Attaka Ag Mohamed Youssouf is the son of Mohamed Issouf Ag Gallese, the former president of the council of the Gourma Rharous *cercle* (see also S/2018/581, para. 103).

¹⁰⁶ CMA leadership in the Gourma area, however, considers him to be pro-Gamou now (communication dated 6 July 2021).

¹⁰⁷ See annex XIX for imagery of gravel washing basins being constructed near Intahaka.

¹⁰⁸ The brands have transited through one or more of those countries in violation of respective transit and re-export regulations requiring the labelling of packets of cigarettes in accordance with the declared destination country. American Legend is a product of the Karella Tobacco Company in Greece and was exported by that same company. ORIS and Gold Seal were exported from the United Arab Emirates by the Oriental Tobacco Company, while Yes and Business Royals were exported from the United Arab Emirates by Vision Tobacco and Independent Tobacco, respectively.

exported from the United Arab Emirates, continue to flood the region, with importers first declaring them upon transit, to be re-exported afterwards. Those cigarettes never reach any destination country to be sold legally, but instead enter illicit circulation. Such cigarettes are qualified as “illicit whites”.

103. Decrees issued by the ministries of commerce of the above-mentioned countries to prevent imported cigarettes from becoming illicit whites, namely, by confiscating cigarettes that do not carry labels of the supposed destination country, are rarely enforced and are generally ignored by customs authorities.

Elegance

104. Following its investigations into the brands American Legend, ORIS,¹⁰⁹ Gold Seal, Yes and Business Royals, the Panel investigated a new illicit white brand, Elegance, a product of Al Furat Tobacco in the United Arab Emirates. In September and October 2020, 400 boxes were illegally introduced into Gao via Tema, Ghana, and then into Niamey.¹¹⁰ Al Furat Tobacco shared a bill of lading dated 10 January 2021 for 1,000 boxes to be shipped to the Mondial Tobacco Company in the Niger.¹¹¹ The Al Furat representative claimed not to have been able to retrieve bills of lading for earlier shipments to the same company via the same route and did not respond to the question as to whether the company had exported to the Niger in 2020.¹¹²

105. From Niger customs officials, the Panel obtained data showing the import of 400 boxes of presumably Elegance-brand cigarettes, by the Mondial Tobacco Company in 2020. The Mondial Tobacco Company, which is authorized to transit cigarettes through, but not import them into, the Niger (see annex XX), did not respond to the Panel’s request for information. As in the case of other brands not authorized for sale in Mali and investigated by the Panel, packages of Elegance cigarettes found in Gao bore no country-specific labelling.¹¹³

106. The Panel confirms that the illicit introduction into Mali concerned the 400-box import by the Mondial Tobacco Company, because in its response, Al Furat referred to Amira International, managed by Oumar Aboubakar, as the provider of consulting services to advise Al Furat on business opportunities across the West Africa region. From other industry sources in Mali and the Niger, the Panel learned that Oumar Aboubakar, through a Malian trader, found two clients in Gao for the Mondial Tobacco Company to sell to.¹¹⁴

107. Inquiries by the Panel and local authorities in Gao since December 2020 seem to have dissuaded further attempts to illicitly market Elegance-brand cigarettes in Mali. There is no indication that any of the 1,000 boxes shipped to the Niger in January 2021 ended up on the Malian market. This notwithstanding, the initial illicit introduction into Mali would not have occurred had the authorities in the Niger

¹⁰⁹ The representative of Petacynic Niger, who is also the director of Agdal, denied to the Panel on 13 July that he had ever traded ORIS cigarettes and confirmed that Petacynic Niger had never received containers of cigarettes shipped in its name (see [S/2020/785/Rev.1](#), paras. 111 and 118).

¹¹⁰ Correspondence with industry operators in Niamey, 25 May 2021; and correspondence with local authorities in Gao, 30 May 2021.

¹¹¹ Reply by Al Furat Tobacco received on 27 May 2021 in response to official correspondence dated 14 May 2021 from the Panel of Experts.

¹¹² Correspondence with Al Furat Tobacco representative on 27 May and 7 and 8 June 2021.

¹¹³ See annex XXI for photos. The lights version is the one a witness has shown the Panel as being unloaded in Niamey in September 2020.

¹¹⁴ The Panel asked to see Oumar Aboubakar in Niamey, who requested that questions regarding the trajectory of Elegance-brand cigarettes be sent in writing to his corporate email address. The Panel’s letter remained unanswered at the time of writing the present report (correspondence of 27 May 2021).

confiscated non-labelled cigarettes meant for re-export upon arrival, in accordance with its decree of 2 June 2017 on the subject.

American Legend

108. An updated discussion regarding the American Legend case reported on by the Panel in its previous reports is set out in annex XXII.

Looting of legal brands

109. On 16 April, a truck coming from Bamako carrying 350 boxes of legal Dunhill-brand cigarettes¹¹⁵ was attacked and looted, along with 40 motorcycles also coming from Bamako, about 45 km from downtown Gao, just after passing Intahaka.¹¹⁶ According to eyewitness accounts, at least nine pickups carried away goods, heading in two directions: towards Intahaka and towards I-n-Tillit.¹¹⁷ The attack is unprecedented, as bandits operating on this route do not usually loot, but take trucks and drivers hostage for ransom payments.

110. According to representatives of various signatory parties, criminal elements attached to the CMA military region for the Gourma area carried out the attack.¹¹⁸ Following the attack, Ali Bady Maïga (see [S/2020/785/Rev.1](#), para. 54), as head of the Gao coordination framework, reunited different signatory groups, including CMA, to find a settlement, after which some of the looted goods were returned to the owners.¹¹⁹

111. Four days after the looting of the truck, during the night of 19 to 20 April, armed bandits looted and set fire to the storage room of the National Tobacco and Matches Company (SONATAM). SONATAM Bamako indirectly supplied the traders who lost their goods in the truck attack in Gao (see para. 109 above).¹²⁰ The incident bears similarities to another looting attack carried out during the night of 12 to 13 July 2018. That incident followed the seizure of American Legend cigarettes in Labézanga on 1 July 2018 and was instigated by Albashar Soumaguel Maïga, who had placed the order at the time (see [S/2019/636](#), para. 126). While the connection between the looting of the truck and the storage room remains unclear, and the culprits of the latter are yet to be identified, it should be noted that the looted truck belonged to the same Albashar Soumaguel Maïga.¹²¹

E. Asset freeze and travel ban implementation

112. On 1 April 2021, the Government of Mali provided a response to the Panel's correspondence of 12 June and 16 December 2020, in which it had inquired about the asset freeze approved for five individuals by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) concerning Mali on 19 December 2019. All three accounts involved were in the name of Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri (MLi.007), showing

¹¹⁵ The larger share, or 250 boxes, represented an order from a Gao-based wholesaler from SODIBAF in Bamako, which is also a distributor of the National Tobacco and Matches Company (SONATAM), the exclusive importer of cigarettes in Mali.

¹¹⁶ See annex XXIII for photographs of the looted truck.

¹¹⁷ Meetings with traders and civil society members in Gao, March and May 2021.

¹¹⁸ Meeting with Malian armed forces, GATIA and CMA representatives in Gao and Bamako, May and June 2021. According to a CMA communiqué, the second-in-command of the CMA Gourma military region, Ag Hamada (see para. 43 above), was arrested by International forces on 29 June 2021. The CMA commander, Akli Iknane, denied to the Panel on 12 July 2021 that his elements were involved in the looting attack.

¹¹⁹ Meetings with traders and civil society members in Gao, March and May 2021.

¹²⁰ See annex XII for photographs of the storage room.

¹²¹ Correspondence with trade insiders and representatives of local authorities in Gao, May 2021.

minor transfers and account balances. An additional account belonging to a company called Tilemsi Holding, in which Mahri holds a 25 per cent interest, was identified. That account has not been frozen, as it falls below the 50 per cent threshold.¹²²

113. The Panel made further direct inquiries with the banks in question to obtain additional details of movements on the accounts, revealing two important discrepancies with regard to the information provided by the Government. First, one of the accounts identified did not belong to Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri, but to another sanctioned individual, Mahri Sidi Amar Ben Daha (MLi.006), alias Yoro Ould Daha.¹²³ Second, the Tilemsi Holding account has debit and credit transactions of close to 72 million CFA francs (\$132,000), including large cash deposits of up to 23 million CFA francs (\$41,602), made by one of Mahri's partners in the firm. In its response letter, the Government of Mali mentioned debit and credit transactions of only 52,826 CFA francs (\$95) and 85,850 CFA francs (\$155), respectively.

114. Although his name was not mentioned in the Government's response letter, Mohamed Ould Mataly (MLi.008) told the Panel that he held an account at the Bank of Africa in Bamako.¹²⁴ Ould Mataly, who was appointed special advisor to the President of the National Transition Council in March 2021, claims not to have received any remuneration since taking that office and that his account was almost depleted. Regarding the travel ban violation to Mauritania in October 2020, as Mauritanian authorities confirmed (see [S/2021/151](#), paras. 10–11), Ould Mataly denied to the Panel having travelled.¹²⁵

115. The Panel also requested additional information from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, pursuant to information reported by the Panel in its most recent report (see [S/2021/151](#), paras. 14–15). The Secretary-General of the Institute confirmed the attendance of Mohamed Ousmane Ag Mohamedoune (MLi.003) at a workshop organized jointly with a local partner, the Centre malien pour le dialogue interpartis et la démocratie, and that direct payment was made to Mohamed Ousmane in the form of a local transport allowance. The Secretary-General of the Institute committed in his letter to taking “remedial measures to ensure that this type of incident does not recur”.¹²⁶

116. The Panel also received information from Malian officials, who spoke under conditions of anonymity, that the Government of Mali has continued to provide financial support to Mohamed Ousmane Ag Mohamedoune (MLi.003), in the form of the payment of a per diem as a member of the Agreement Monitoring Committee.

117. The Panel is aware of one request for an exemption to the travel ban, submitted to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) concerning Mali by another sanctioned individual, that was being processed at the time of writing the present report. The Panel explained the details that were needed for such a request to the person in question. The fact that a first exemption is being requested, combined with the absence of any information relating to violations of the travel ban by sanctioned individuals since the issuance of the previous Panel report, demonstrates increased awareness of and intent to comply with the sanctions measures.

¹²² Applied in jurisdictions of the United States and the European Union, which serve as reference for banks worldwide.

¹²³ Killed on 9 February 2020 (see [S/2020/158/Rev.1](#), para. 74). On 18 March 2020, in an annex to a letter to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) concerning Mali, the Panel transmitted a copy of Yoro's death certificate for due action, but he had not yet been delisted at the time of writing the present report.

¹²⁴ Meeting in Bamako, 17 June 2021.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Letter dated 23 June 2021 from the Secretary-General of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.

V. Violations of international humanitarian and human rights law¹²⁷

118. The Panel recognizes the cumulative effects on the civilian population, especially women and children, of the political instability and, in particular, the delays in the implementation of the Agreement, the security situation in the tri-border area between Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger, the associated economic challenges and the culture of impunity.

119. All those factors are observed in the Gao region, where the situation remains volatile, delays in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process affect the security situation (see paras. 8–12 above) and reported threats against the civilian population continue to increase.¹²⁸ The Malian Defence and Security Forces are present in the main urban centres and in the border town of Labézanga; the sedentary armed groups associated with the Plateforme have a reduced presence on the main axis road south of Gao to Labézanga, especially in the Ansongo *cercle* following the expansion of ISGS (see S/2020/158/Rev.1, para 59; and S/2020/785/Rev.1, para. 56). CMA continues to expand its influence in the Gourma area (see paras. 99–100 above), while elements of CMA and GATIA support the fight between JNIM and ISGS (see para. 45 above). In addition to being a trafficking hub, Gao is a destination for migrants seeking work in the gold mines (see paras. 97–98 above). Criminality is on the rise on the Gao-Labézanga axis and in and around Gao city, as well as incidents of cattle theft, extortion, and the displacement of civilians in ISGS and JNIM operational areas, compromising livelihoods and food security.

120. Within that context, and pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017), paragraph 8 (f) and (g), the Panel investigated violations and abuses affecting social segments in Gao, namely: (a) sexual and gender-based violence, especially sexual violence against women and girls; (b) the recruitment and use of children by armed groups and the economic exploitation of children (boys) in gold mines; and (c) abductions and killings of community leaders in ISGS and JNIM areas of operation.

121. In Mopti region, the Panel verified reports of enforced disappearances by the Malian armed forces in Boni, Douentza *cercle*.

A. Sexual and gender-based violence

122. In its most recent midterm report, the Panel noted that incidents of sexual and gender-based violence remained high in Mali.¹²⁹ From 2017 to 2020, 1,913 incidents of conflict-related sexual violence were recorded in the Gender-based Violence Information Management System (see annex XXV for the timeline of reported incidents). From January to March 2021, 205 incidents of conflict-related sexual violence perpetrated against women and girls (28 per cent of whom were below the

¹²⁷ See annex II, appendix B, for the Panel's investigation methodology on violations relating to international humanitarian law, international human rights law and acts that constitute human rights abuses.

¹²⁸ See annex XXIV for the timeline and geographical distribution of reported threats and incidents affecting the civilian population in Gao, from January to June 2021. Source: MINUSMA Protection of Civilians Unit.

¹²⁹ Between January and December 2020, 6,605 incidents of sexual and gender-based violence were reported through the Gender-based Violence Information Management System; 99 per cent of survivors of those incidents were female, and 58 per cent were girls under 18 years old. During the first quarter of 2021, 1,879 incidents were reported through the System.

age of 18) were documented through the System.¹³⁰ Those incidents were reportedly perpetrated by the Malian armed forces (3 per cent), compliant armed groups (49 per cent) and unidentified armed men (48 per cent). It is estimated that many cases are not being reported owing to the limited mobility of women and girls in remote areas, social stigma and the victims' fear of retaliation.

123. The Panel investigated conflict-related sexual violence in Gao. In paragraphs 90 to 92 above, the Panel describes its findings on forced prostitution in Gao and reports of sexual abuse of female migrants (see also [S/2019/636](#), paras. 140–142, and [S/2020/785/Rev.1](#), paras. 139–144).

124. Credible information gathered during the mandate shows a pattern of sexual violence perpetrated against women and girls by elements of several signatory and compliant armed groups, especially by the CMFPR-affiliated groups, Ganda Izo and Ganda Koy. The Panel also verified incidents of rape by the Malian defence and security forces in Gao. These acts do not appear to target women and girls on the basis of their social, ethnic or political associations, and they occur in a climate of increased criminality (see annex XXIV), gender inequality and impunity.

125. The Panel stresses that almost all witnesses and victims interviewed who were aware of the identity of the individual perpetrator(s) did not wish to name them for fear of retaliation. In order to prioritize considerations for their protection, the incidents of sexual violence presented below refer only to the armed group to which the perpetrator is affiliated and not the individual perpetrator.

Sexual violence by Malian defence and security forces in Gao Region

126. The Panel verified two reports of rape perpetrated by elements of the gendarmerie in 2021 in Gao city. In 2021, before Ramadan,¹³¹ a gendarme raped a 16-year-old girl when he picked her up on the street while she was in the company of her brother. The gendarme took her to a location behind the cemeteries, where he raped her. The victim recalls waking up in the hospital suffering from intra-vaginal injuries; her family blamed her for the incident, and she did not file a complaint. During the same period, two gendarmes picked up a 15-year-old girl while on patrol in the city, and one of them raped her. The victim reported the incident to the gendarmerie, and the perpetrator was arrested, only to be released a few days later. Later, in late May 2021, the girl was insulted, beaten and injured by Ganda Izo elements on the street in Gao city.

127. Also, according to credible information, in October 2020, a Malian armed forces element in Gao reportedly raped a 19-year-old woman; she did not file a complaint, on the advice of her community.

128. The Panel did not obtain the total number of incidents of sexual and gender-based violence attributed to Malian defence and security force elements in Gao region in recent years.

¹³⁰ From January to March 2021, a total of 639 incidents of sexual violence were recorded in the System (see annex XXV, figure II). In addition, the Protection Cluster for Mali published the results of a recent field study, in which the protection concerns of civilians in 20 *cercles* in the regions of Mopti, Ségou, Ménaka, Timbuktu and Gao were surveyed. The Cluster reported that an average of 35 per cent of women in all five regions feared becoming the target of sexual violence. See Yssa Oumar Basse, “Perception de la situation de protection de la population civile au Mali dans le cadre du projet de monitoring de protection”, Groupe Stratégies & Leadership, December 2020. Available at www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/amss_-_rapport_etude_de_base_protection_-_version_finale.pdf.

¹³¹ In 2021, the month of Ramadan in the Islamic lunar calendar corresponded to the period from 12 April to 12 May 2021.

Sexual violence by compliant armed groups in the Gao region

129. CMFPR (and its splinter groups) is a collection of militias and *sédentaires* defence groups that includes Ganda Koy (established in 1994) and Ganda Izo (established in 2008). The Panel previously reported on their history and shifting alliances (see [S/2020/785/Rev.1](#), paras. 49 and 54–56; and [S/2020/158/Rev.1](#), para. 59). Despite being officially absorbed by CMFPR, Ganda Izo and Ganda Koy are still viewed by the communities in Gao as identifiable groups with influence over the security situation, including through their checkpoints in and around Gao.

130. According to credible sources, between January 2020 and April 2021, 130 incidents of sexual and gender-based violence documented in Gao were attributed to individuals described as affiliates of the Plateforme, CMFPR-1, CMFPR-2, Ganda Izo and Ganda Koy. Those reports include 55 incidents of rape and 27 incidents of attempted rape.¹³²

131. In that 16-month period, perpetrators affiliated with Ganda Izo and Ganda Koy were reportedly responsible for 64 incidents of sexual and gender-based violence (32 incidents each), including a combined 25 incidents of rape and 15 incidents of attempted rape. Most of those incidents were documented in the cities of Gao and Ansongo, where survivors have a better chance of accessing referral networks pertaining to sexual and gender-based violence and first responders. The Panel collected first-hand accounts confirming the allegations and indicating that incidents of rape and attempted rape by individuals described as affiliates of Ganda Izo and Ganda-Koy were more likely to occur in the vicinity of their checkpoints and bases, including: (a) a Ganda-Koy checkpoint located north of Gao city in Zindiga, Soni Aliber commune; and (b) close to a Ganda-Koy “base” in the Aljanabanja neighbourhood of Gao city.

132. The panel also verified that, in 2019, a 16-year-old girl was raped by a Ganda Koy element in the Château neighbourhood of Gao city. She reported the incident to the police and received no follow-up. The Panel also spoke with a woman and a 15-year-old girl who were beaten by Ganda Izo elements on the street in Gao city, in May 2021.¹³³ In addition, according to credible information, in February 2021, a Ganda Izo element raped a woman in the vicinity of Ansongo town. The perpetrator was a family friend. The victim chose not to file a police report, fearing the rejection by her community.

133. Furthermore, 32 of the documented incidents of sexual and gender-based violence were attributed to CMA, including 7 cases of rape and 1 case of attempted rape (see annex XXV, figure III). All of the reported cases took place in 2020, except one incident of denial of access to resources, which was documented in 2021. The Panel did not receive any first-hand accounts concerning the incidents attributed to CMA.

134. The Panel recalls that the leaderships of the Plateforme and CMA made commitments to combat conflict-related sexual violence in Mali and within their own ranks. In 2017, CMA issued a communiqué committing itself to the prevention of conflict-related sexual violence in Mali (see annex XXVI). In a 2016 communiqué, the Plateforme (CMFPR, MAA and GATIA) committed itself to: (a) communicating clear messages prohibiting acts of sexual violence via their chain of commands; (b) ensuring that specific measures for the prevention of and protection from sexual violence are taken into consideration in their security provisions; and (c) ensuring that perpetrators of sexual violence are excluded from the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process (see annex XXVII). The failure of the

¹³² See annex XXV, figure III, for a breakdown of the number of incidents by compliant armed group and type of sexual and gender-based violence reported.

¹³³ In all three alleged incidents, the perpetrators wore shirts bearing the name of their armed group. According to witnesses, this is not a uniform and was only worn by some of the perpetrators.

leadership of the Plateforme/CMFPR to prevent, recognize and address the pattern of sexual violence perpetrated by their elements in Gao engages their responsibility and compromises their role as viable partners in the implementation of the Agreement.

Monzonga rape incident, September 2020

135. The Panel investigated an incident where, in September 2020, four armed men intercepted a group of six women and three children (a 15-year-old boy and two infants) who were collecting wood near Monzonga, in Ansongo *cercle*.¹³⁴ The perpetrators blindfolded the group, beat them and threatened them with machetes and knives, then separated the four younger women and raped them. The perpetrators, whose identity remains contested, were described as bandits riding on motorbikes and acting in a coordinated fashion. The Panel notes that this *modus operandi* is similar to that of bandits responsible for robberies along the Gao-Ansongo Road.

136. The incident, which took place in daylight and within 5 km from the Malian armed forces camp located on the periphery of Ansongo town, demonstrates the limitations in Malian defence and security force capabilities to provide security for the civilian population beyond the perimeters of the town. Following the incident, members of civil society in Ansongo met with the Governor in Gao to discuss their security concerns, citing that incident, among other issues, and, on 5 December 2020, demonstrated in Ansongo to demand greater protection.

Other reports of sexual and gender-based violence

137. The Panel received reports of sexual and gender-based violence, including conflict-related sexual violence, in Gao by affiliates of ISGS, and in other regions, namely Timbuktu and Mopti, by regular forces and community defence groups in the context of intercommunal violence. Furthermore, the Panel was informed of allegations of forced abortion perpetrated by Malian defence and security forces in the Mopti region. The Panel was not able to access the victims and obtain their consent to investigate those reports further.

138. Lastly, following consultations between the United Nations and the Government on 8 and 9 June 2021, the Government committed itself to prioritizing 4 emblematic cases of conflict-related sexual violence of 115 cases perpetrated in 2012 and 2013 that had been pending before the courts. The Panel welcomes the initiative as an important step in addressing the chronic delays in the judicial response to conflict-related sexual violence in Mali.

B. Use, recruitment and economic exploitation of children

139. The Panel continued to receive reports on the use of children by armed groups, including by MNLA, CPA and CMFPR-1, but was unable to further corroborate those reports.¹³⁵

140. With the artisanal gold mining boom in northern Mali (see paras. 98–101 above), the Panel previously took note of reports of child labour in gold mines in Gao and Kidal, related trafficking (see S/2021/151, para. 36) and violence against miners in Gao (*ibid.*, para 54). The Panel further investigated the working and security conditions of the mines near Intahaka village, in the Gao region, the presence of children at these sites and the likelihood of their use or recruitment by armed groups present there. Governmental and other credible sources confirmed the use and exploitation of children and described those sites as “anarchical” owing to the absence

¹³⁴ The incident was widely reported on social media.

¹³⁵ See annex XXVIII for an overview on grave violations against children.

of State control, inadequate services and infrastructure and unregulated working conditions. The findings of the Panel are focused on the larger of two sites near Intahaka, namely, I-n-Tillit-Nord, which grew exponentially since 2020.

141. The I-n-Tillit-Nord mine is controlled and managed by a committee led by GATIA and CMA.¹³⁶ They secure the site and control the checkpoints.¹³⁷ They also collect taxes from miners and businessmen. Miners pay a fee in exchange for protection and for permission to dig. JNIM and ISGS elements were seen on the site.¹³⁸ While there are Malian armed forces based in the nearby village of Intahaka, there is no presence of Malian defence and security forces in I-n-Tillit-Nord.

142. In July 2020, the number of workers on the two sites were estimated to be 18,000, including 6,000 boys.¹³⁹ By February 2021, the population in I-n-Tillit-Nord had at least doubled.¹⁴⁰ Despite fluctuations owing to seasonal migrations, I-n-Tillit-Nord evidently continues to grow.

143. Children are employed on the site to dig holes, sift through sand, cook and fetch water. Some children arrive at the sites accompanied by their male relatives, and others arrive unaccompanied. Observers and aid workers noted an increase in children arriving from the Niger via Gao to work at the sites in the past year.¹⁴¹ The police in Gao intercepted 21 children from Burkina Faso in June 2020, and 17 children from the Niger in March 2021, on their way to the gold mines.¹⁴²

144. According to credible sources, some children, especially those arriving from Burkina Faso and the Niger, work on credit to repay a third person for their transport and their food, and some work unpaid for days, or even for the full duration of their time at the mines.¹⁴³ Children are also solicited for small jobs by elements of the armed groups securing the sites. The presence of ISGS and JNIM elements exposes them to the risks of their recruitment by these groups.

145. Following United Nations and humanitarian advocacy efforts, the Governorate in Gao led a multisectoral fact-finding mission to I-n-Tillit-Nord, on 28 and 29 January 2021, alongside the Malian armed forces commander in Gao and representatives of government services.¹⁴⁴ During the visit, children younger than 10 years old were found working in I-n-Tillit-Nord.

¹³⁶ Confidential report, 17 February 2021.

¹³⁷ MNLA and GATIA jointly control the main checkpoint located south towards Intahaka. Confidential interview, 28 May 2021.

¹³⁸ Confidential reports, 20 January and 24 February 2021.

¹³⁹ No women or girls are present on the sites near Intahaka; however, according to a report of the Protection Cluster on Mali, in July 2021, there were 470 women and 30 girls on sites in Takalot, Tassik, Tin Zaoutène and Tessalit (“Rapport d’évaluation rapide de protection des enfants sur les sites d’orpaillage”, December 2020).

¹⁴⁰ A GATIA representative who visits the site regularly told the Panel that the site had exceeded the village of Intahaka in population. Miners hail from at least 12 countries, notably Burkina Faso, Chad, the Niger and the Sudan (confidential interview, 28 May 2021). Official sources estimated the population on the site as being at least comparable to that of Gao city (United Nations confidential report, 3 February 2021).

¹⁴¹ Children arrive via public transport buses, including Sonéf, Nour and Telemsi. In Gao, the handlers (or *passseurs*), mostly of Arab or Tamasheq ethnicity, pick them up at a bus stop near the Governorate building and transport them to mines.

¹⁴² In both cases, these children were repatriated with the assistance of the International Organization for Migration (United Nations source, June 2021).

¹⁴³ A source with first-hand knowledge told the Panel that businessmen deliberately create problems to avoid paying the miners or deduct the cost of damaged equipment from their salaries (confidential interview, May 2021). According to a confidential report dated 11 August 2020, GATIA elements confiscated migrants’ documentation and forced them to work at the gold mines of Intahaka, without payment.

¹⁴⁴ An official mission report was drafted. The Panel did not receive a copy of that report.

146. The Governorate-led mission noted the absence of health and sanitary structures, water scarcity and the prevalence of respiratory and kidney problems among miners. The mission confiscated 100 kg of cyanides and observed the use of mercury without protective equipment; these chemicals contaminate the water on the site.¹⁴⁵ Following that visit, a health crisis was reported in the village of Ti-n-Tarkat,¹⁴⁶ caused by water scarcity and toxic chemicals.¹⁴⁷ The arrival of internally displaced persons from Doro and Marsi to Intahaka in March and April 2021 added further pressure on water and other resources in the area.¹⁴⁸

147. The United Nations reported a steady increase in security incidents affecting the civilian population in I-n-Tillit commune from July to December 2020 and a notable increase in robberies and killings targeting miners in the area surrounding the gold mining sites in December 2020.¹⁴⁹ Since June 2021, there remains no notable coordination between the authorities in Gao and signatory armed groups on the site.¹⁵⁰

C. Abductions and killings of community leaders

148. The Panel previously reported on targeted killings of community leaders in Timbuktu and the Gourma area, in the context of the conflict against ISGS (see [S/2019/137](#), paras. 44–50). The Panel continued to receive reports of similar incidents within areas of operation of JNIM and ISGS. In 5 of 10 incidents reported between October 2020 and May 2021, the victims were abducted for refusing or failing to pay a *zakat* (tax imposed by ISGS and JNIM) and, in some instances, were killed.¹⁵¹

149. A prominent example is the abduction and subsequent killing of a local official of Ansongo in May 2021. On 22 May, three armed Fulani elements abducted him from his residence in Seina village, 5 km south of Ansongo town, and later demanded a ransom from his family (including cattle). In the days that followed, community members, including women and children, protested his abduction by blocking the entrance of the village. Despite mobilization by State officials to negotiate his release, the victim was reportedly killed by his abductors by 9 June.¹⁵²

150. Some community leaders see no choice but to align with ISGS or JNIM as a mean of survival.

D. Arbitrary arrests and enforced disappearances by Malian armed forces in Mopti

151. The Panel received reports of human rights violations by Malian armed forces in the context of counter-terrorism operations. In Douentza, those violations occur in a cycle of retaliatory attacks between the Malian armed forces and extremist armed

¹⁴⁵ Interview with official source, Gao, 24 May 2021. Several officials in Gao reiterated their concerns for the health and humanitarian situation in I-n-Tillit-Nord in other bilateral exchanges (confidential reports, 3 and 5 February 2021).

¹⁴⁶ Ti-n-Tarkat village is in close vicinity of I-n-Tillit-Nord, and the two names are often used interchangeably.

¹⁴⁷ Confidential report, 10 February 2021.

¹⁴⁸ Confidential report, 19 May 2021.

¹⁴⁹ Confidential report, 2 December 2020.

¹⁵⁰ The Panel was informed that, following this mission, the Governorate created four committees to tackle the situation: security, development, health and sanitation. Until May 2021, the security committee, composed of representatives of the Government and armed movements, had not yet become operational. Confidential interview, 28 May 2021.

¹⁵¹ See annex XXIX for a list of incidents reported.

¹⁵² Confidential interviews with officials and community members, May and June 2021; and confidential reports dated 23 and 24 May and 9 June 2021.

groups. The events that have occurred in Boni village since 3 February 2021 demonstrate this pattern of violence.

152. Boni village is the administrative centre of Hairé commune, Douentza, located on highway RN16, which connects Gao to Mopti. There is a Malian armed forces camp in Boni, which is within the operational area of Katiba Serma. The area features challenging operational terrain, as the highway runs through rocky hills, which both Katiba Gourma and Katiba Serma use as strategic hideaway.

153. On 3 February 2021, the Malian armed forces camp was attacked, and its commander subsequently replaced shortly thereafter. Following that change in leadership, human rights organizations documented a surge in arbitrary arrests, disappearances and extrajudicial executions perpetrated by Malian armed forces in Boni and surrounding villages. The Panel received the names of at least 30 persons who had been arrested and/or detained by Malian armed forces in Boni between 18 February and 17 May 2021 and whose whereabouts remain unknown. On 23 March, security forces stopped and search a bus near Boni, arrested at least 35 male passengers and detained them at the military camp in Boni. Twelve of those passengers (three from Mondoro and nine Fulani from Burkina Faso) have since disappeared (see annex XXX).

154. Following advocacy efforts made, the Government sent an investigation team to Boni in May and took witness testimonies confirming the reports. At the time of writing the present report, no further action has been taken. The Panel will continue investigating these events and will report to the Committee as appropriate.

VI. Obstruction of humanitarian assistance

155. The Panel notes systemic issues affecting the delivery and distribution of aid and access to aid in remote areas or areas outside of State control. It has also observed preventable interference by armed groups with regard to humanitarian access.

156. In remote areas, community leaders inevitably wield a degree of influence in assessing and communicating humanitarian needs and for providing the necessary local logistical support to humanitarian organizations, leverage which they frequently use to their financial advantage. Criminality on the Gao-Labézanga Road complicates access by target communities to services in Gao and Ansongo and by humanitarian actors to recently displaced persons in Tessit (see para. 45 above). Humanitarian access in Ménaka town improved following the Ménaka without Weapons initiative, but remains as fragile as the power balance shouldering the deal. In Aguelhok, some 600 households have fled in the wake of the attacks on the MINUSMA camp and their aftermath, and the competing political interests of GATIA factions influence their narratives of the humanitarian needs of the population (see annex XXXI, see also para. 32 above).

VII. Recommendations

157. The Panel recommends that the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) concerning Mali:

(a) Encourage signatory parties, including the Government of Mali, to investigate and undertake disciplinary measures and/or legal procedures against individual members or officers involved in any sort of trafficking;

(b) Encourage MINUSMA to maintain an updated centralized database compiling all information concerning enforcement of the rules of the Technical

Commission on Security relating to movements of convoys of compliant armed groups, monitor undeclared convoys and task joint observation and verification teams with systematically investigating alleged violations of the ceasefire agreement;

(c) Encourage Mali and regional States to submit to the Committee, on a timely basis and whenever necessary, requests for travel ban exemptions on behalf of sanctioned individuals, including all information specified in article 10 (c) of its guidelines;

(d) Consider additional sanctions designations, including of business entities that are entirely or partly controlled by sanctioned individuals;

(e) Remind the Malian authorities and the leadership of CMA and the Plateforme of their commitments to combat conflict-related sexual violence, call on the Plateforme/CMFPR to implement the concrete measures enumerated in their 2016 communiqué with regard to preventing and addressing sexual violence within their ranks (see para. 133 above);

(f) Commend MINUSMA and the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict for their cooperation with the Panel and encourage the continued exchange of information with the Panel on all pertinent information relevant to the application of targeted sanctions against those who perpetrate or direct sexual violence, in such a way that will not put survivors at risk;

(g) Request the Malian authorities and the conflict-related sexual violence task force of the monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangement at the country level to set up a programme for the protection of witnesses and survivors of sexual violence who wish to share information with the Panel of Experts, pursuant to resolution [2467 \(2019\)](#);

(h) Request the Malian authorities and compliant armed groups to engage with relevant parts of the United Nations system to address child labour and trafficking in connection with artisanal gold mines in Mali and the related risk of child recruitment, pursuant to resolution [2427 \(2018\)](#) (para. 39).

Annex I: Table of correspondence sent and received by the Panel from 1 October 2021 to 6 July 2021.

Country/ entity	Number of letters sent	Information fully supplied	Information partially supplied	No answer/ Information not supplied	Pending	N/A, visit accepted
Al Furat	1		1			
Algeria	1	1				
Banque Atlantique	1	1				
BIM bank	1	1				
BOA bank	1				1	
BSIC bank	1	1				
CMA-CMG	1	1				
Ecobank, the Gambia	1			1		
Ecobank, Togo	1					1
Guinea Bissau	1				1	
IIDEA	1	1				1
Mali	5	1				4
Mauritania	3	1			1	1
Mondial Tobacco Company	1			1		
Niger	1					1
Orabank	1			1		
SOBUREX	1	1				
UBA bank	1	1				
Zenith Bank	1			1		

Annex II: Methodology

Appendix A: ‘The opportunity to reply’ methodology used by the Panel

1. Although sanctions are meant to be preventative not punitive, it should be recognized that the mere naming of an individual or entity in a Panel’s report, could have adverse effects on the individual. As such, where possible, individuals concerned should be provided with an opportunity to provide their account of events and to provide concrete and specific information/materiel in support. Through this interaction, the individual is given the opportunity to demonstrate that their alleged conduct does not fall within the relevant listing criteria. This is called the ‘opportunity to reply’.
2. The Panel’s methodology on the opportunity to reply is as follows:
 - a. Providing an individual with an ‘opportunity to reply’ should be the norm;
 - b. The Panel may decide not to offer an opportunity of reply if there is credible evidence that it would unduly prejudice its investigations, including if it would:
 - i. Result in the individual moving assets if they get warning of a possible recommendation for designation;
 - ii. Restrict further access of the Panel to vital sources;
 - iii. Endanger Panel sources, or Panel members;
 - iv. Adversely and gravely impact humanitarian access for humanitarian actors in the field;
or
 - v. For any other reason that can be clearly demonstrated as reasonable and justifiable in the prevailing circumstances.
3. If the circumstances set forth in 2 (b) do not apply, then the Panel should be able to provide an individual an opportunity to reply.
4. The individual should be able to communicate directly with the Panel to convey their personal determination as to the level and nature of their interaction with the Panel.
5. Interactions between the Panel and the individual should be direct, unless in exceptional circumstances.
6. In no circumstances can third parties, without the knowledge of the individual, determine for the individual, on the other hand, in making their determination of the level and nature of
7. The individual, on the other hand, in making their determination of the level and nature of interaction with the Panel, may consult third parties or allow third parties (for example, legal representative or his government) to communicate on his/her behalf on subsequent interactions with the Panel.

Appendix B: Investigations methodology on violations relating to IHL, IHRL, and acts that constitute human rights abuses

1. The Panel adopted the following stringent methodology to ensure that its investigations met the highest possible evidentiary standards. In doing so it has paid particular attention to the “Informal Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions Reports”, S/2006/997, on best practices and methods, including paragraphs 21, 22 and 23, as requested by paragraph 12 of resolution 2511 (2020).
2. The Panel’s methodology, in relation to its investigations concerning IHL, IHRL and human rights abuses, is set out as below:
 - a. All Panel investigations are initiated based on verifiable information being made available to the Panel, either directly from sources or from media reports.
 - b. In carrying out its investigations on abductions and enforced disappearances and the Panel relied on the following sources of information:
 - i. Interviews with at least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident.
 - ii. Interviews with people with knowledge of the event such local authorities and community members.
 - iii. Investigation and other documentation from local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident.
 - iv. Documentation from local or international organisation that provide contextual information and crime pattern analysis.
 - v. Open-source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel’s findings.
 - c. In carrying out its investigations on child exploitation and risks of use or recruitment in gold mining, the Panel is also particularly mindful of the risk pose by its investigations for the children and their family. The Panel did not have access to the site in question, however, it relied on the following sources of information:
 - i. Interviews with local authorities and others with first-hand knowledge of the situation on the site.
 - ii. Interviews with people and organization providing assistance to these children.
 - iii. Interviews with other people with knowledge of the situation such as family members, community leaders, teachers, and social workers.
 - iv. Investigations and other documentation from local and international organizations that have independently investigated the situation on the site.
 - v. Open-source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel’s findings.
 - d. The investigation of sexual and gender-based violence presents its own specific challenges. These include the survivors’ inability or unwillingness to report the incident due to social, cultural, or religious factors, and fear of retaliation; their lack of access to medical care of health providers; limited domestic investigations, and absence of a judicial response. The Panel is mindful that victims of sexual and gender-based violence may face the additional risks of discrimination, social stigma, exclusion from their family and community, or other forms of reprisals. In order to minimise their exposure and possible retraumatisation, the Panel exercised caution in approaching survivors and witnesses, and collected contextual or corroborating data, such as statistical or pattern-related information, from relevant experts, intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations, and other reliable sources. In carrying out its investigations on sexual and gender-based violence, the Panel relies on the following sources of information:

- i. The victims, where they are able and willing to speak to the Panel, and where medical and security conditions are conducive to such an interview.
 - ii. Given the abovementioned. medical and police reports are not required by the Panel to conclude that rape or sexual violence took place. the Panel accepts testimonies as prima facie evidence of sexual violence.
 - iii. Interviews with at least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident.
 - iv. Interviews with medical personnel who treated the victim, wherever possible.
 - v. Interviews with local authorities.
 - vi. Interviews with other people with knowledge of the violations such as family members, community leaders, teachers, and social workers.
 - vii. Investigation and other documentation from local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident.
 - viii. Open-source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel's findings.
3. The Panel will not include information in its reports that may identify or endanger its sources. Where it is necessary to bring such information to the attention of the Council or the Committee, the Panel will deposit such information in the custody of the Secretariat for viewing by members of the Committee.
4. The Panel will not divulge any information that may lead to the identification of victims, witnesses, and other particularly vulnerable Panel sources, except 1) with the specific permission of the victims and witnesses; and 2) where the Panel is, based on its own assessment, certain that these individuals would not suffer any danger as a result. The Panel stands ready to provide the Council or the Committee, on request, with any additional documentation to supports the Panel's findings beyond that included in its reports. Appropriate precautions will be taken though to protect the anonymity of its sources.

Annex III: Recruitment decision and annexed lists by the Chief of the General Staff of the Malian army, General Oumar Diarra on 22 April 2021

MINISTÈRE DE LA DÉFENSE ET
DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS

ETAT – MAJOR GÉNÉRAL DES ARMÉES

REPUBLIQUE DU MALI
Un Peuple - Un But - Une Foi

N° **E00142** /CEMGA/S/CEM/ADM/SP

Damako, le 22 AVR 2021

Le Chef d'Etat-major Général des Armées

A

Tous Chefs d'Etat-majors et Directeurs de Services


Confidentiel

BORDEREAU D'ENVOI

Désignation des pièces	Nombre	Observations
BE transmettant projet de Directives pour le recrutement 2021.....	12	« Transmis pour exploitation, avts, propositions et suggestions »
TOTAL	12	

Reçu à.....
Par le.....
Nom-Prénom et Signature

Le Chef d'Etat-major Général des Armées P/O
Le Chef d'Etat-major Général Adjoint des Armées


Colonel-major Daoud Ali MOHAMMEDINE
Chevalier de l'Ordre National

DIRPA
Commissariat "Armées"
du 22-04-2021
Désignés pour
0683

MINISTRE DE LA DEFENSE
ET DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS



RÉPUBLIQUE DU MALI
Un Peuple - Un But - Une Foi

ETAT-MAJOR GENERAL DES ARMÉES

N° _____ /CEMGA/S/CEM/ADM/D-RH

Bamako, le.....

DIRECTIVES POUR LE RECRUTEMENT 2021 - 2022

Références : Projet Loi d'Orientation de la Programmation Militaire N°2 (LOPM-2) ;
Programme d'Action Gouvernementale (PAG) ;
Directive Inter Armées Annuelle de Préparation Opérationnelle (DIAPO).

Pièce-jointe : Répartition des quotas par Régions Administratives et par Etat-major et Direction au titre du recrutement 2021 (1^{re} vague : 5000).

Conformément aux directives politiques, les Forces Armées Maliennes (FAMA) en pleine restructuration continuent leurs montées en puissance. Le renforcement des effectifs étant un des piliers de cette montée en puissance, il est prévu un recrutement de vingt-cinq mille (25000) éléments (Homme et Femme) courant 2021-2022 au sein des FAMA.

Il s'agit d'un acout d'une volonté politique affichée pour faire face à la priorité de sécurisation du processus électoral de la transition.

Cette directive est élaborée pour partager les orientations de l'Etat-major Général des Armées planifier et encadrer le processus de recrutement en corrigeant les insuffisances et en intégrant les leçons apprises des derniers recrutements, dans un souci d'efficacité, de coordination entre les Etats-majors et Directions et l'Etat-major Général des Armées au profit immédiat des opérations.

I. Leçons apprises des derniers recrutements :

- La primauté du recrutement est de la responsabilité des Etats-majors et Directions conformément à la réglementation en vigueur ;
- La mutualisation des efforts minimise les coûts du recrutement ;
- La diligence dans le processus est essentielle à sa crédibilité ;
- La moralisation du processus passe par l'implication assidue de ses acteurs ;
- L'Etat-major Général des Armées reste le niveau de coordination et de décision du processus.

II. Nouveau concept du recrutement :

1. Critères du recrutement :

Les critères définissent la qualité des populations cibles rendant ainsi le recrutement inclusif. Ils sont énumérés ainsi comme suit :

- Etre âgé de 18 à 28 ans au 31 décembre de l'année en cours ;
- Etre célibataire sans enfant ;
- Etre de nationalité exclusivement malienne ;
- Etre de bonne moralité ;

- Jouir de ses droits civiques ;
- Avoir une bonne aptitude physique.

2. Pièces à fournir :

Pour être recruté dans les forces armées maliennes, les candidats doivent fournir un dossier composé des pièces suivantes :

- Une demande manuscrite timbrée à 200 FCFA adressée au Chef d'état-major d'armée ou au Directeur de service selon le choix du candidat ;
- Deux photos d'identité en couleur ;
- Une copie d'extrait d'acte de naissance ;
- Un certificat de résidence ;
- Une copie conforme de la carte NINA ou la fiche individuelle d'enrôlement au recensement administratif à vocation d'état civil délivré par le centre compétent ;
- Un extrait de casier judiciaire datant de moins de trois mois ;
- Un certificat d'aptitude médicale délivré par un médecin civil, au format indiqué par la direction centrale des services de santé des armées ;
- Une déclaration de célibataire sans enfant ;
- Une copie certifiée du diplôme demandé par une armée ou un service.

Les niveaux d'étude requis pour postuler par Armée et Service sont déterminés comme suit :

- L'Armée de Terre recrute 50% des titulaires de diplôme équivalent ou supérieur au Diplôme d'Etude Fondamentale ;
- L'Armée de l'Air recrute seulement à partir du Diplôme d'Etude Fondamentale ;
- La Garde Nationale du Mali recrute pour 70% des titulaires de diplôme équivalent ou supérieur au Diplôme d'Etude Fondamentale ;
- La Gendarmerie Nationale recrute seulement à partir du baccalauréat ;
- Le Génie Militaire recrute pour 50% des titulaires de diplôme équivalent ou supérieur au Diplôme d'Etude Fondamentale ;
- Le Service des Transmissions et des Télécommunications des Armées recrute seulement à partir du Diplôme d'Etude Fondamentale ;
- La Direction du Matériel, des Hydrocarbures et du Transport des Armées recrute seulement à partir du Diplôme d'Etude Fondamentale ;
- Le Service de Santé des Armées recrute pour 50% des titulaires de diplôme équivalent ou supérieur au Diplôme d'Etude Fondamentale.

Les Etats-majors et Directions peuvent adjoindre des critères additionnels et des pièces à fournir par les candidats en fonction de leurs spécificités.

3. Justification des critères :

Pour rendre inclusif le recrutement, permettant d'avoir un large champ de populations cibles plus combattantes avec un état civil réel, l'âge limite est ramené à vingt-huit (28) ans.

4. Prise en compte des nouvelles régions administratives :

Le contexte actuel du pays impose à chacune et à chacun d'imprimer sa marque dans la construction de l'édifice militaire. Ainsi, toutes les régions administratives (anciennes et nouvelles) y compris le district de Bamako sont concernées par le recrutement en cours.

En ce qui concerne le personnel féminin, son quota pourrait se réduire compte tenu du vivier envisagé pour des besoins opérationnels.

Aussi, il est prévu un recrutement spécial au compte des Groupes armés d'environ deux milles (2000) éléments. Ce vivier sera issu du processus d'intégration des ex-combattants à travers la Démobilisation, le Désarmement et la Réintégration (DDR) dans le cadre de

Répartition des quotas par régions administratives et par État-major et direction au titre du recrutement 2021 (1^{er} vague)

REGIONS	AT: 2000		AA: 500		E: NM: 1100		DG: C: 600		DG: M: 350		DT: A: 200		DC: S: A: 150		DM: HT: A: 200		TOTAL X
	H	F	H	F	H	F	H	F	H	F	H	F	H	F	H	F	
1 District Bhamou	97	20	25	12	30	15	20	5	15	4	15	2	20	5	15	0	300
2 Kayes	105	7	10	1	90	5	40	1	20	0	10	2	10	2	10	0	300
3 Koulikoro	82	10	20	5	80	10	20	2	20	2	15	1	10	2	15	0	356
4 Sikasso	95	8	30	4	85	5	50	0	30	1	20	1	8	1	15	0	348
5 Ségou	90	10	40	5	75	6	50	1	30	1	15	0	5	1	10	0	285
6 Kédougou	95	7	30	3	65	4	30	0	25	1	13	0	5	0	10	0	236
7 Gao	90	4	25	0	80	2	30	0	25	1	8	1	6	0	15	0	236
8 Fatick	95	7	20	1	40	3	25	0	15	0	8	1	6	0	5	0	127
9 Kolda	50	2	7	0	25	1	20	0	10	0	4	0	3	0	10	0	218
10 Diourbel	80	5	15	0	50	1	32	0	15	0	5	0	5	0	10	0	269
11 Bignona	110	8	12	1	65	4	33	0	15	0	8	0	5	0	10	0	285
12 Kolda	115	5	12	1	45	2	25	0	15	0	5	0	5	0	5	0	237
13 Kouroussa	105	8	10	2	50	2	25	0	12	0	5	0	5	0	10	0	200
14 Niakhar	95	3	7	1	35	2	25	0	12	0	5	0	5	1	9	0	241
15 Ségou	100	7	13	1	45	5	30	0	15	0	10	0	6	1	8	0	241
16 Diourbel	100	2	8	0	40	2	25	0	13	0	10	0	5	0	8	0	213
17 Diourbel	100	5	8	1	50	2	25	0	15	0	10	0	5	0	10	0	231
18 Fatick	65	1	10	0	13	0	10	0	10	0	2	0	3	0	5	0	119
19 Médina	100	2	8	0	30	1	25	0	10	0	5	0	5	0	7	0	193
20 Niakhar	106	4	10	0	35	2	20	0	18	0	5	1	5	0	8	0	211
TOTAL X	1875	125	360	40	1026	74	590	10	340	10	190	10	134	16	200	0	5000

l'accord de paix et de la réconciliation, en vue de mettre en place une force armée reconstituée.

III Chronogramme du recrutement :

Il est l'étape de mise en œuvre du processus du recrutement :

N°O	Désignation	1 ^{re} vague	2 ^{de} vague	Observations
1	Dépôt de dossiers	Du 28/04 au 18/05/2021	Du 20/08 au 09/09/2021	03 semaines
2	Dépouillement	Du 21 au 03/06/2021	Du 12 au 25/09/2021	02 semaines
3	Visites médicales (toutes les phases)	Du 06 au 30/06/2021	Du 28/09 au 22/10/2021	25 jours
4	Acheminement et début formation	Du 05 au 10/07/2021	Du 27 au 31/10/2021	05 jours

Ce chronogramme inclut le recrutement spécial.

IV Les orientations :

Ces orientations résultent du respect des conclusions des documents ci-dessus référencés et impliquent certains principes qui sont :

- L'équité entre toutes les filles et fils du Mali ;
- La transparence dans le processus ;
- L'imputabilité des acteurs impliqués ;
- La séparation des phases et des acteurs impliqués.

Les commandants des zones de défense sont responsables de la coordination et de la mise en œuvre du processus de recrutement relevant de leurs circonscriptions administratives. Les Etats-majors et Directions sont chargés de la diffusion des résultats provisoires et définitifs. Ils procèdent à l'organisation d'une cérémonie collective de signature des contrats d'engagement.

Chaque Etat-major et Direction sera responsable de son processus de recrutement en coordination avec l'Etat-major Général des Armées. Les visites corporelles et biologiques des candidats seront assurées par les Directions Zones de Santé en coordination avec la direction centrale des Services de Santé des Armées (DCSSA). Ces visites d'incorporation doivent respecter scrupuleusement les directives N°2015-491/DCSSA/SD/ST du 24 juillet 2015 relatives aux opérations médicales d'incorporation à l'exception de la taille.

Les tailles exigées sont fixées comme suit :

- Taille minimum pour les hommes 1m70 ;
- Taille minimum pour les filles 1m60.

V Conclusion :

Un recrutement inclusif et de qualité nécessite l'implication de tous. Ainsi l'Etat-major Général des Armées est le garant du processus dont le but est de renforcer les effectifs par du personnel de qualité répondant aux besoins opérationnels. Ainsi le recrutement et la formation de douze mille (12000) hommes est estimé à un an deux mois et vingt jours allant du 27 avril au 30 novembre 2021 (1^{ère} vague : 6000) et du 22 juillet 2021 au 29 février 2022 (2^{ème} vague : 6000). Le recrutement du quota restant (13000) éléments sera projeté de la même manière sur l'année 2022.

Ampliations :

MDAC.....CR
IGAS.....Info
TsEM/Dit/sces.....26
Archives et Chrono02

Le Chef d'Etat- Major Général des Armées

Général de Brigade Oumar DIARRA
Officier de l'Ordre National

Annex IV: Additional information on political and institutional reforms

1. The new transitional government puts the responsibility for political and institutional reforms within the Prime Minister's office. The new Prime Minister, who was appointed on 7 June 2021, is expected to deliver mostly on a wider consensus around the needed political and institutional reforms by engaging as many and diverse stakeholders as possible.¹ To that end, the transitional Government includes a Minister Delegate in the Prime Minister's office on political and institutional reforms, held by Mme Fatoumata Sékou Dicko, one of the six women (1.6%) of the new 28 members Cabinet.
2. While the Prime Minister is yet to issue an updated electoral calendar² or roadmap, he has already announced a number of pre-reform processes including a national forum for State reformation (*Assises Nationales pour la Refondation*" de l'Etat) and an independent single electoral management body (organe unique indépendant de gestion des elections)
3. The new "*Assises Nationales pour la Refondation*" de l'Etat, which was one of the Prime Minister key demands as leader of political opposition (M5-RFP) back in September 2020, is expected to start in September 2021.³ However, it is not specified whether it would replace the Strategic Orientation Committee (*Comité d'Orientation Stratégique*, COS),⁴ which is the 50-members consultative body on institutional reforms established by the previous Prime Minister that the current Prime Minister welcomed when he was still in the opposition.
4. The independent single electoral management body (*organe unique indépendant de gestion des elections*) that was announced by the president⁵ is a body to which the previous Prime Minister, Moctar Ouane, said he could not commit to due to the brevity of the transitional period. On 29 June, the Minister of Territorial Administration, Lieutenant-Colonel Abdoulaye Maiga, nevertheless launched a consultation-workshop to establish this electoral management-body.
5. However, the Government did not specify whether the new body would replace the Steering Committee for the Referendum and General Elections (*Comité de Pilotage*

¹ The Prime Minister has been holding regular meetings with all sections of Malian social and political actors, including with High Islamic Council, former Primer Ministers, Youth Associations, trade unions, other heads of institutions and employers organisations,

² On 15 April 2021, a new electoral calendar was published, providing a constitutional referendum 31 October 2021, local elections for 26 December 2021 and the first ever in Mali coupled legislative and presidential elections for 22 February 2022.

³ The "*Assises Nationales pour la Refondation*" de l'Etat would consist of meetings seeking to collect the views of wider opinions and stakeholders on needed political and institutional reforms. On 21 June, the Prime Minister announced the proposal to include consultations at regional levels; but a number of political parties are already argued that such meeting is not necessary and would only serve to delay the transition. See also at: <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1116760/politique/mali-fallait-il-supprimer-la-ceni/>

⁴ COS was created on 19 April 2021 by a Prime Minister decree. The body included representatives of political parties, civil society and other social actors. It included also five experts and permanent secretary a former Secretary General of at the Presidency during IBK Mohamed Alhousseiny Touré.

⁵ The current Prime Minister, Choguel Maiga, appointed experts to assess the feasibility and relevance of the single elections management body

du referendum et des élections générales)⁶, chaired by the re-appointed Minister of Territorial Administration (Lieutenant-Colonel Abdoulaye Maïga). There are ongoing discussions between the Government and socio-political actors to decide on whether or not the independent single electoral management body would be rolled out during the current transitional period or after.⁷


6. Constitutional reform is within reach of the new transitional government. The government has at hand several unused proposed reviews, including the 2019 constitutional review proposal that was supported by the government and armed groups (see A/2019/636, para.18),⁸ This draft could serve as a basis to enable for a constitutional reform.
7. Enshrining into the Constitution key provisions of the Agreement on institutional and political reforms would constitute for the transitional Government, a major step, which would shift the balance of responsibility and pressure on signatory armed movements to make equally groundbreaking steps towards the implementation of the Agreement, notably on disarmament or relinquishing their collusion with terrorist armed groups.

⁶ The “Comité de Pilotage du referendum et des élections générales » is composed of a Chair (the Minister of Territorial Administration), deux vice Chairs and 22 members all from the Ministry of territorial administration. It was lunched by the Minister in April 2021

⁷ The Ministry of Territorial Administration organized a workshop on 29 June 2021, bringing together various socio-political actors and other stakeholders to discuss the way forward on the independent single electoral management body. Reportedly, the participants to this workshop discussed among others things whether the creation of this body would occur and unrolled during this transition period. See also at : <https://www.dw.com/fr/mali-choguel-kokalla-maïga-assimi-goïta-transition-politique/a-58160503>

⁸ On 2 April 2019, the group of experts mandated to make proposal for a constitutional review handed to the President its final report. Signatory movements, had stigmatised their limited participation in the work of the Panel of experts, but they supported the end product, which they considered as incorporating political and institutional reforms provided for by the Agreement. Meeting with a confidential source, Bamako June 2021

Annex V: Terms of reference of the regional consultation-workshop on territorial reorganization held on Menaka on 29-30 April 2021.



I. CONTEXTE ET JUSTIFICATION :

La Charte de la Transition promulguée par le Décret n°2020-0072/PT-RM du 1^{er} octobre 2020 consacre les missions de la Transition en son article 2 qui sont notamment :

- le rétablissement et le renforcement de la sécurité sur l'ensemble du territoire national ;
- le redressement de l'Etat et la création des conditions de base pour sa refondation ;
- la promotion de la bonne gouvernance ;
- l'adoption d'un pacte de stabilité sociale ;
- le lancement du chantier des réformes politiques, institutionnelles, électorales et administratives ;
- l'organisation des élections générales ;
- la mise en œuvre de l'Accord pour la paix et la réconciliation au Mali, issu du processus d'Alger.

Le « **parachèvement du processus de réorganisation territoriale** » par la détermination des circonscriptions administratives et des collectivités territoriales des Régions de Nioro, Kita, Dioïla, Nara, Bougouni, Koutiala, San, Douentza et Bandiagara, tel que prévu par la Feuille de route de la Transition demeure une des préoccupations majeures du Ministère de l'Administration territoriale et de la Décentralisation. Ce processus affectera également dans leurs configurations actuelles, les Régions de Kayes, Koulikoro, Sikasso, Ségou, Mopti, Tombouctou, Gao et Kidal, dont les nouvelles créations sont issues et le District de Bamako.

L'adoption de la Loi n°2012-017 du 2 mars 2012 portant création de circonscriptions administratives en République du Mali a eu pour conséquence une augmentation du nombre des Régions de huit (8) à dix-neuf (19), avec onze (11) nouvelles créations. Elle maintient en même temps le District de Bamako.

Cette loi prévoit en son article 2 que les Cercles et les Arrondissements composant chaque Région seront déterminés par la loi. Son article 5 précise que sa mise en œuvre se fera sur cinq (5) ans à compter de sa date de promulgation. Le délai de cinq (5) ans a expiré depuis le 2 mars 2017.

Toutefois, la loi précitée a connu, dès mars 2012, un début d'exécution avec la création des Cercles et Arrondissements composant les Régions de Tombouctou, Taoudénit, Gao, Ménaka et Kidal, par la Loi n°2012-018 du 2 mars 2012.

Le processus de détermination des Cercles et Arrondissements des autres Régions a été interrompu par la crise institutionnelle et sécuritaire que notre pays a connue à partir de mars 2012.

La nomination des Gouverneurs des Régions de Taoudénit et de Ménaka, en janvier 2016, est considérée comme une relance du processus de l'opérationnalisation de ces deux nouvelles Régions. La nomination de ces Gouverneurs a permis l'organisation des concertations des acteurs locaux pour la création des collectivités territoriales desdites Régions. Sur cette base, ont été adoptés les textes suivants :

- Loi n°2018-040 du 27 juin 2018 portant création des collectivités territoriales de Région, de Cercles et de Communes de la Région de Taoudénit ;
- Loi n°2018-041 du 27 juin 2018 portant création des collectivités territoriales de Région, de Cercles et de Communes de la Région de Ménaka.

Ainsi, l'organisation territoriale actuelle se présente comme suit :

- 410 circonscriptions administratives dont 19 Régions, 1 District, 60 Cercles et 330 Arrondissements ;
- 819 collectivités territoriales dont 10 Régions, 1 District, 58 Cercles, 750 Communes.

Il reste à déterminer les Circonscriptions administratives et les Collectivités territoriales des nouvelles Régions de Nioro, Kita, Dioïla, Nara, Bougouni, Koutiala, San, Douentza et Bandiagara et des anciennes Régions de Kayes, Koulikoro, Sikasso, Ségou, Mopti, Tombouctou, Gao et Kidal.

En raison du rôle et des missions assignées aux circonscriptions administratives dans la construction du sentiment d'appartenance à une Nation commune, des concertations régionales ont été organisées en 2018, par le Ministère de l'Administration territoriale et de la Décentralisation, dans le cadre de l'opérationnalisation des nouvelles Régions et du District de Bamako en vue de prendre en compte les préoccupations et attentes des populations à la base. Ces concertations ont permis d'aboutir à un minimum de consensus en vue de doter le pays d'un cadre organisationnel approprié répondant aux attentes et aux défis du moment.

Pour parachever le processus entamé en 2018, le Ministère de l'Administration territoriale et de la Décentralisation a mis en place une Commission chargée de l'accompagnement de l'entrée en fonction des Gouverneurs des nouvelles Régions suivant la Décision n°2019-000409/MATD-SG du 30 septembre 2019, devenue plus tard **la Commission chargée de la réorganisation territoriale**.

La Commission chargée de la réorganisation territoriale s'est inspirée des conclusions et recommandations des concertations de 2018 et des travaux de l'équipe de consultants commandités par le Ministère de l'Administration territoriale et de la Décentralisation. Elle a également bénéficié des contributions et analyses des Représentants de l'Etat et de personnes ressources.

Les critères qui ont prévalu dans l'analyse des supports ont concerné notamment :

- les critères de populations et de superficies ;
- les critères sociologiques (l'histoire, les liens de solidarité, le vivre ensemble) ;
- les critères de viabilité économique ;
- le maillage du territoire, prenant en compte les besoins sécuritaires, en vue d'assurer une meilleure présence de l'Etat et des services sociaux de base ;
- le critère de compensation consistant à tenir compte de la situation initiale du nombre de Cercles des différentes Régions.

Le processus a également enregistré des choix stratégiques dans le seul souci de satisfaire l'Intérêt Général.

Pour rendre le processus inclusif et participatif afin de s'assurer de la prise en compte des attentes des populations et aboutir à un découpage consensuel, le Ministère de l'Administration territoriale et de la Décentralisation entend partager les conclusions des travaux relatifs à la réorganisation territoriale à travers des ateliers de restitution dans les Régions et dans le District de Bamako.

Les délégués des nouvelles Régions participeront aux travaux de restitution dans les anciennes Régions.

Les travaux de restitution respecteront les principes ci-après :

- rester dans le cadre des 19 Régions et du District de Bamako définis par la Loi n°2012-017 du 2 mars 2012 portant création de circonscriptions administratives en République du Mali : aucune création de nouvelle Région ne peut être proposée ;
- rester dans le cadre des Communes existantes : aucune création de nouvelle Commune ne peut être proposée.

Toutefois, il serait possible :

- o de proposer des modifications de rattachement de la Commune ou l'Arrondissement au Cercle ;
- o de proposer des modifications de rattachement des entités administratives de base (village, fraction et quartier) à la Commune et à l'Arrondissement ; à ce niveau il conviendra de veiller à ce que toutes les entités de base soient rattachées à une Commune et à un Arrondissement ;
- o de proposer des modifications liées à l'orthographe y compris le nom des circonscriptions administratives, des collectivités territoriales et des entités administratives de base (village, fraction et quartier).

Le parachèvement de la réorganisation territoriale permettra à l'Etat de faire face à ses missions régaliennes, notamment en se dotant d'une organisation territoriale capable de faire face au défi sécuritaire, en promouvant le développement local et en créant un cadre propice pour l'organisation des élections à venir.

II. OBJECTIFS :

2.1. Objectif général :

Expliquer les choix et orientations du Gouvernement aux populations afin de recueillir leurs recommandations éventuelles.

2.2 Objectifs spécifiques :

Les objectifs spécifiques des ateliers sont :

- obtenir l'adhésion des populations sur les choix opérés ;
- apporter des réponses aux attentes et préoccupations des populations ;
- impliquer les populations dans le processus de réorganisation territoriale ;
- doter le pays d'une organisation territoriale solide.

III. RESULTATS ATTENDUS :

Les résultats attendus sont :

- l'adhésion des populations sur les choix opérés est obtenue ;
- des réponses sont apportées aux attentes et préoccupations des populations ;
- les populations sont impliquées dans le processus de réorganisation territoriale ;
- le pays est doté d'une organisation territoriale solide.

IV. ORGANISATION :

Les ateliers régionaux de restitution seront organisés au niveau de chacune des Régions actuellement opérationnelles (Kayes, Koulikoro, Sikasso, Ségou, Mopti, Tombouctou, Gao, Kidal, Taoudénit, Ménaka) et du District de Bamako.

Au niveau de chaque Région et dans le District de Bamako, une commission d'organisation sera créée et présidée par le Gouverneur de Région ou du District de Bamako. Celui-ci sera assisté, le cas échéant, par les Gouverneurs des nouvelles Régions émanant de la Région d'origine.

Cette commission sera composée du Préfet du Cercle du chef-lieu de Région, du Président du Conseil Régional, du Président du Conseil de Cercle du chef-lieu de Région, du Maire de la Commune du chef-lieu de Région et des Chefs des services régionaux. Elle aura en charge d'arrêter la liste des participants aux travaux, d'assurer l'organisation matérielle, l'animation et le rapportage de l'atelier de restitution.

V. DATE ET LIEU :

Les ateliers de restitution se dérouleront pendant deux (2) jours, **les jeudi 29 et vendredi 30 avril 2021** au niveau des chefs-lieux des Régions de :

N°	Lieux	Régions concernées
1.	Kayes	Kayes, Nioro et Kita
2.	Koulikoro	Koulikoro, Dioïla et Nara
3.	Sikasso	Sikasso, Bougouni et Koutiala
4.	Ségou	Ségou et San

5.	Mopti	Mopti, Douentza et Bandiagara
6.	Tombouctou	Tombouctou
7.	Gao	Gao
8.	Kidal	Kidal
9.	Taoudénit	Taoudénit
10.	Ménaka	Ménaka
11.	Bamako	District de Bamako

VI. PARTICIPANTS :

Participeront aux ateliers de restitution, les représentants des forces vives de la Région ou du District :

- les Représentants de l'Etat ;
- les représentants des collectivités territoriales ;
- les représentants des partis politiques ;
- les représentants des associations et organisations de la société civile ;
- les chefferies de village, de fraction et de quartier ;
- les chefs religieux.

Les participants doivent être représentatifs et désignés de manière inclusive.

VII. DEROULEMENT DES TRAVAUX DES ATELIERS DE RESTITUTION :

Les travaux des ateliers de restitution seront présidés par les Gouverneurs de Région ou du District, qui seront assistés, le cas échéant, par les Gouverneurs des nouvelles Régions émanant de la Région d'origine et le Président du Conseil Régional ou le Maire du District de Bamako.

Le document intitulé « **CONCLUSIONS DES TRAVAUX RELATIFS A LA REORGANISATION TERRITORIALE** » sera présenté par le Gouverneur de Région ou du District de Bamako.

Les Gouverneurs seront accompagnés par des cadres du Ministère de l'Administration territoriale et de la Décentralisation désignés à cet effet et éventuellement des personnes ressources.

Le rapportage est assuré par la commission régionale ou de District.

VIII. IMPUTATION BUDGETAIRE :

La prise en charge des ateliers régionaux et de District est assurée par le Ministère de l'Administration territoriale et de la Décentralisation.

Bamako, le 05 avril 2021.

Le ministre,

Lieutenant-colonel Abdoulaye MAIGA

Annex VI: Economic, social and cultural development component; Sustainable Development Fund

1. Regarding the economic development window of the Agreement, progress has been achieved during the Panels present mandate in terms of operationalising the sustainable development fund, be it after much delay.
2. Almost a year after the fund's management committee first examined submitted projects, its steering committee on 29 April 2021 approved 16 projects, for a total amount of 38.45 billion FCFA (\$ 69.34 million).⁹ Funds are equally divided between projects in the north, centre and south of the country.¹⁰ All approved projects were submitted by local authorities and none by ministerial departments. Local interim authorities argue that the eligibility of ministerial departments to submit projects, as put in the procedures manual of the fund, should in fact be removed.¹¹
3. On 23 March 2020, a presidential decree was passed to include representatives from the two armed movements, as well as the *inclusivité*, in the fund's management committee.¹² However, a ministerial order is still forthcoming, and the CMA continues to call for the movements' inclusion in the steering committee as well.¹³ The government committed to including armed movements in both committees already in June 2019.¹⁴

⁹ By May 2021 the fund had raised 61.6 billion FCFA (\$111 million), from Malian tax revenues.

In addition, 13.4 billion CFA francs (\$24 million) spent on dam construction, electricity and drinking water projects in the 2015–2017 period, were advances to the fund, pending its creation, this amount being substantially lower than pretended to be executed (see S/2019/636, paras. 56-60). One of the projects was the installation of two generators in Kidal for 2.7 billion (\$4,9 million) CFA francs by the company SIBAT. The Panel had cited the company's director who claimed the generators were not been switched on because government payments were still pending (S/2019/636, para. 58). A representative of the state-owned Société Énergie du Mali, however, claimed that SIBAT was contractually responsible for certain technical amendments to render the generators functional upon which outstanding payments would be made. Meeting in Bamako, 16 June 2021.

¹⁰ According to the Agreement, the FDD was supposed to finance the Special Development Strategy, budgeted at 2.194 billion FCFA (US\$ 369.26 million), that aims to raise the northern regions to the same level as the rest of the country in terms of development. However, the focus of the fund was changed in Parliament to facilitate equal development of all regions in Mali (See S/2018/581, para. 55.). The Independent Observer has qualified the use of the FDD to implement projects in other regions of Mali to undermines the Agreement. Carter Center, "Report of the Independent Observer: observations on the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, emanating from the Algiers process", December 2020.

¹¹ Meeting with interim authorities, Timbuktu, 10 June 2021.

¹² Mali, Presidential Decree n°2020-0148/ P-RM of 23 March 2020.

¹³ Summary of the meeting of the CSA sub-committee for economic, social and cultural development of 19 May 2021, archived at the United Nations.

¹⁴ Proceedings of the meeting of the CSA subcommittee on economic, social and cultural development of 14 June 2019, archived at the United Nations.

Annex VII: Additional political and regional context

Security and defence forces in the region facing increased challenges

1. Armed forces from States in the region et international contingents faced increased challenges, particularly in the tri-border area between Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, as regional trafficking networks and militants continue to merge, expand and access to new resources such as gold-mining.
2. On 6 June 2021, Burkina Faso experienced its deadliest attack since 2015, when 160 civilians were killed in Solhan village, Yagha province on border with Niger. The Tahoua and Tillaberi regions of Niger bordering Mali have also experienced similar trend of increased attacks, including the killing of an estimated 137 civilians on 21 March 2021. On 15 March 2021, the Malian army also recorded a high toll of 33 soldiers killed and 14 injured following a militant attack on an army post at Tessit, South-East of Ansongo, Gao region.
3. The Chadian contingent faces a challenge. On 2 April 2021, militants attacked the MINSUMA camp in Aguelhok, hosting a Chadian contingent. Four peacekeepers were killed and 34 injured following during? the attack. There were allegedly also three civilians killed. An internal MINUSMA investigation is underway. On 20 January 2019, this same MINUSMA camp was attacked by JNIM, killing 8 peacekeepers and injuring many others, as reported by the 2019 Panel final report (see S/2019/636, para.82)

Ethnic-based militia obstructing implementation of the Agreement

4. The escalating violence by militant groups and ethnic-based militias in the centre of Mali continued to obstruct implementation of the Agreement. The Panel received information indicating that the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (CVJR), provided for by the Agreement, had to amend its methods of work in the Centre of Mali, notably because of the presence of checkpoints manned by armed militia respectively from Fulani and Dogon communities.¹⁵ In most cases, those checkpoints were manned by members of Dan Na Ambassagou.¹⁶
5. Because of those checkpoints, CVJR mobile teams could not travel to meet victims and witnesses, as done in most of the regions of northern Mali. Instead, witnesses and victims were obliged to travel by their own means to be interviewed and give their testimonies to the CVJR. The Panel received information that some witnesses and victims had to conceal their identities at checkpoints to prevent potential exactions by armed militias.¹⁷
6. The Malian Dogon militia Dan Na Ambassagou continued to escalate its attacks on civilians, including on members of Dogon communities involved in inter-communal dialogues.¹⁸ The command structure of the military wing of this militia, headed by

¹⁵ Meeting with confidential sources, Mali March 2021 and April 2021

¹⁶ Dan Na Ambassagou maintained checkpoints at numerous locations in the Centre of Mali, mostly on the roads from Mopti to Bandiagara and Douentza. Some of these checkpoints are located near Goundaka, Ficko, Tille, Doucoumbo, Bandigara and Parou bridge.

¹⁷ Meeting with confidential sources, March and April 2021, Mali

¹⁸ MINUSMA, “Note sur les tendances des violations et abus de droits de l’homme: 1er Janvier – 31 mars 2021”, see at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/ML/Note_Trimestrielle_Janv_Mars_2021.pdf. The Panel received also reports indicating that heads of Dogon villages were killed or forced to leave their areas following mediation initiatives with other

Youssouf Toloba, includes four Coordinators.¹⁹ A retired Malian army officer, Mamadou Goudienkilé (S/2020/785/Rev.1, para. 60), heads the political wing and has progressively become the public face of the militia, with Youssouf Toloba being considered more and more controversial.²⁰

7. The new Government has softened its position towards Dan Na Ambassagou, despite its official disbanding on 24 March 2019 (see S/2020/785/Rev.1, para. 12). Two Government ministers recently met Youssouf Toloba in his stronghold of Bandiagara, including the Employment Minister²¹ and the Minister of National Reconciliation, Colonel Ismael Wagué, who on 9 March 2021 reportedly attempted unsuccessfully to convince him to abandon violence, engage into DDR and endorse dialogue with other communities.²²

communities, therefore opposing Toloba's confrontational strategy. Meeting with a confidential source, 6 March 2021.

¹⁹ Namely Boureima Sagara for Bandiagara, Amadou Ongoïba for Koro, Oumar Guindo for Bankass, and Seydou Maïga for Douentza

²⁰ A number of Dogon communities do not share the extreme positions of Youssouf Toloba and would like to take the path of reconciliation, mostly in cercle of Koro where a number of splinter groups are emerging notably Dana Amakene and Dana Atem.

²¹ The Minister of employment and technical training, Mohamed Salia Touré, was the first to meet with Toloba on 26 December 2020 in a village near Bandiagara; see at: <https://malijet.com/actualite-politique-au-mali/251152-echange-entre-mohamed-salia-toure-et-youssouf-toloba.html>

²² At the meeting with Toloba, Colonel Wagué was accompanied by one his cabinet staff (chargé de mission) Sékou Allaye Bolly, a former representative of MSA-Chamanamas in the central Mali, where he had a camp of mostly Fulani young people allegedly converted from radicalism and awaiting for DDR. Sékou Allaye Bolly continue to have a camp of mostly young Fulani (Peuls) at Ouro-Nema, which was attacked on 25 March 2021 by alleged radical group. Bolly had previously another camp in Ogossagou with alleged demobilized Fulani, who were specifically targeted during the first attack on the village conducted by Dogon militia on 23 March 2019, when 150 civilians were killed.

Annex VIII: Non exhaustive list of non-permanent members of the *Chefferies Traditionnelles et Coutumières Touarègues du Mali*

- Mohamed Ag Intalla, Aménokal Kel Adragh, president of the *Chefferie*, member of the CNT
- Abdoul-Majid Ag Mohamed Ahmad Ag Attaher. Aménokal Kel Antessar, representative of the *chefferie* in Bamako, member of the CNT
- Ahmed Ag Boya, secretary-general of the conseil supérieur des Idnanes
- Akli Iknane Ag Souleymane, chief of the Imididaghan in the Gourma. CMA regional commander for Gourma, member of the CNT
- Alhassane Ag Assadeck, chief of the Imididaghdanes in Timbuktu
- Bajan Ag Hamatou, Aménokal Oulimiden, member of the CNT
- Choghi Ag Attaher, chief of the Idnanes of Kidal
- Djibrilla Diallo, village chief in Fafa, Pateforme/CMFPR representative at the CTS
- Hamma Ag Mohamed, Coordinator of the Idnans communities of Timbuktu
- Hamoudi Sidi Ahmed Ag Ada, representative of the Hel Araouane
- Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Oumrani, representative of the Berabiche
- Mohamed Ould Mataly, representative of the Lemhar in Gao, representative of the MAA-Plateforme Gao at the CSA, special adviser of the President of the CNT
- Mohamed Ousmane Ag Mohamidoune, president of the Conseil Supérieur des Kel Rezzaf-Ichérifène, secretary general of the CPA, member of the CNT
- Moulaye Chirfi, representative of the Chorfas
- Mousas Souma Maiga, Songhaï chief
- Sidi Ali Ould Mohamed Soultane, coordinator of the Hel Araouane
- Taha Ag Mohamed, chief of the Daoussak
- Waïss Dicko, chief of the Walad Azaghib
-

Annex IX: Audience granted by Assimi Goïta on 9 June 2021 to the *Chefs traditionnels et coutumiers du nord*



Annex X: Public communiqués



République du Mali
Un-Peuple-Un But-Une Foi
Conseil Général de la Tribu Kel Ansars
de Tombouctou

Communiqué du Chef de la Tribu Kel-Ansars et Alliés

Bamako le, 31 Mai 2020

Depuis hier une information circule sur les réseaux sociaux faisant état de la mise en place d'une prétendue Coordination regroupant des leaders et cadres de la communauté Kel-Ansars et Alliés.

J'informe les ressortissants de ladite communauté ainsi que l'opinion nationale et internationale qu'il ne s'agit là en fait que d'une tentative de destabilisation fomentée par une poignée d'individus en mal de légitimité dans le seul but de porter atteinte à la cohésion de la Tribu en vue d'assouvir des ambitions personnelles et des desseins inavoués de vengeance.

J'en appelle par conséquent à la vigilance et à l'esprit de discernement de tous pour étouffer dans l'œuf cette énième machination uniquement inspirée par la malveillance de ses initiateurs.

J'en appelle à tous les Kel-Ansars et Alliés au Mali et dans la diaspora de resserrer leurs rangs dans l'unité et la solidarité sociale et économique en ces temps de défis immenses pour nos communautés et nos voisins.

Le Chef de Tribu des Kel Ansars
Abdoul Magid Ag Mohamed Ahmed dit Nasser
Officier de l'Ordre National du Mali

**Coordination Kel Ansar**

À l'instant •

Nous prenons note de la communication ci dessous et rapellons qu'il est temps de jouir de la liberté d'expression et d'association consacrées par les lois maliennes. Il est temps d'arrêter de voir toute expression de liberté comme un plan de destabilisation de notre tribu à tous. Nous en appellons à la sagesse et à la retenue ainsi que la recherche des bonnes informations en lieu eu place des rumeurs.

Le Coordination Kel Ansar n'est ni une nouvelle tribu Kel Ansar ni une concurrence mais une volonté de construire à côté et en complémentarité avec toutes les bonnes volontés en toute independance.

Merci de la compréhension de tous.

Oumar Ag Hamama
Comission d'organisation
+223 76 14 96 83



ICIMALI.COM

Tentative de déstabilisation de tribu Kel Antessars et Alliés : Un énième échec... ..

Rapport Final CKA&A Goundam

Discours du Chef suprême de Tribu Kel Razzaf-Icheriffène Membre du CNT, Honorable Mohamed Ali AG MATTAHEL lors de la rencontre de la Coordination des Kel Ansar et Alliés 12-13-14 Février 2021 à Goundam

Mesdames et Messieurs

Tout d'abord permettez-moi de demander une minute de silence à la mémoire de toutes les victimes civiles et militaires de notre pays. Je vous avoue chers frères et concitoyens que je suis préoccupé par la paix pour nos communautés et pour notre pays. Je ressens une tristesse infinie suite à la dégradation de nos valeurs sociétales et des harcèlements que subit notre religion de paix et de tolérance.

Par patriotisme je sens en mon fond intérieur un devoir de vous tenir un discours de la vérité pour un pays renaissant. Pour y arriver il faudra cultiver des esprits de responsabilité épris de paix et de justice pour une gouvernance transparente. La transition actuelle a pour mission d'y parvenir et pour y parvenir elle a besoin de citoyens animés de la défense de l'intérêt général et non de citoyens obnubilés par des intérêts égoïstes et matérialistes.

Chers frères et sœurs de tout bord je sens en moi que la région de Tombouctou en particulier et le pays en général ont besoin d'un nouvel élan pour sortir de la routine et initier des actions innovatrices et porteuses.

Chers frères et sœurs de tout bord je suis triste que nos services de base soient paralysés et inopérants sur une grande partie du territoire dû d'une part à l'insécurité mais d'autre part à l'insouciance de certains d'entre nous qui ont perdu la fibre patriotique.

Chers frères et sœurs de tout bord je suis inquiet de ce feu d'insécurité qui embrase notre pays et qui pourrait si nous ne l'éteignons pas rapidement, détruire notre Vivre ensemble et notre cohésion sociale.

Chers frères et sœurs de tout bord l'incivisme à tous les niveaux rend périlleux la situation de notre jeunesse et le système de fonctionnement de nos différentes structures....



Remerciements aux acteurs suivants ayant exprimé leur soutien à travers des messages adressés lors de la rencontre.

- Monsieur Oumarou Ag Mohamed Ibrahim Haidara
- L'Imamat de Goundam
- Les fractions Kel Razzaf à travers le chef suprême de la tribu Kel Rhazaf cheriffène Mohamed Ali AG MATTAHEL
- Cadres et notabilités Kel Ansar parmi lesquelles les représentants de grandes familles de Gargando, Tin Aicha, Essakane, Douekiré et RazelMa
- Abdallah Ag Ahmedou, Président Association Cheriffène, Koiguima
- La coordination des Idnanes et alliés
- La coordination des Fractions Kel Inteberemt et Alliés
- La coordination des Idnanes et alliés
- Le Collectif Intégrateur des Imouchagh de Tombouctou
- Les chefs coutumiers et notabilités des 16 communes du cercle n'ayant pas pu effectuer le déplacement
- Les communautés Kel Tèt et kel Aghabob d'Essakane
- Les mouvements signataires de l'accord d'Alger ayant été présents.
- Mahmoud Ould Jayid, Lerneb
- Associations des griots et forgerons de Tombouctou

Tous ces messages expriment leur soutien et leur disponibilité à accompagner toutes les initiatives de paix et de réconciliation.

Nos remerciements vont aussi à l'endroit de nos parrains et invités d'honneur, aux autorités administratives et militaires de la région de Tombouctou et du cercle de Goundam, à la MINUSMA, aux populations et leurs représentants qui ont activement participé aux débats, aux populations de la ville de Goundam et la mairie pour le grand accueil et l'organisation, sans oublier les membres et équipes de la coordination Kel Ansar et Alliés qui ont tout donné pour la réussite de cette rencontre.

Annex XI: Hama



Association Vivre Ensemble

7 September 2020 · 

...

Dementi des chefs traditionnels et Coutumiers touaregs du mali
Ces derniers temps, il nous a été donné de constater sur les réseaux sociaux qu'une prétendue plate-forme des chefs coutumiers et traditionnels inonde les médias à travers des communiqués fallacieusement fantaisistes.

A cet effet, nous portons à l'attention de l'opinion publique et internationale qu'il s'agirait d'une manœuvre mal intentionnée conduite par un homme sans foi ni loi.

Les chefs coutumiers et traditionnels dont il est question, ne s'associent à aucune plate - forme ou entité quelconque. Chacun d'entre eux dirige en toute responsabilité, légitimité et liberté son canton/ tribu. L'ensemble forme un idéal contribuant aux efforts de consolidation de la paix dans notre pays.

Toute autre entité parallèle ne saurait être que de la pire manipulation et instrumentalisation assortie d'un éhonté faux et usage de faux.

Aussi, nous appelons les uns et les autres à veiller minutieusement à toutes formes d'escroquerie conduisant à la haine ou à l'incompréhension.

Nous resterons vigilants pour une mobilisation effective dans l'atteinte de nos objectifs.

Les marchands d'illusions seront identifiés et détournés pour éviter toute ambiguïté.

**Annex XII: Photographs of burned and looted Sonatam storage room in Gao
obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 22 April 2021**



Annex XIII: Regional cocaine seizures with Malian involvement

1. On 7 January, Gambia's anti-drug authority seized nearly three tonnes of cocaine from a sea container originating from Ecuador. In relation to the seizure an Interpol red notice was issued on 14 January against Banta Keita, including a French and Gambian Passport. Later his two Malian passports were retrieved and added, one with the name Banta Keita and one with the name Lassana Kante. While the latter had expired by the time of the seizure, the first passport was valid until 19 February 2021, possibly allowing the suspect to exit the Gambia and seek refuge elsewhere, possibly in Mali. The cocaine, disguised as industrial salt, was most likely destined to be transhipped from the Gambia to Europe.²³ Malian authorities, did not detected entry of the individual in question.²⁴
2. On 24 February, the Ivorian Gendermerie seized just over one tonne of cocaine in Abidjan. The transaction appears to have involved a Malian national who fled to Mali. The Panel obtained a name that appeared too common to make a detailed inquiry of entry of the person on Malian territory.

²³ Member State information, 2 April 2021.

²⁴ Member State information, 13 May 2021.


Annex XIV: images

Photographs of box with hashish parcels (above) and with plastic tie bags (below), obtained by the Panel from a confidential source, 1 June 2021



Annex XV: Challenges to a contested report by the Global Initiative on Transnational Organised Crime

1. the Global Initiative on Transnational Organised Crime (GI-TOC) reported that four tons of hashish from the seized 17 tonnes had arrived in Tobruk, Libya by early May 2021, alleging that these four tonnes had been diverted from the seized volume and not been incinerated.²⁵
2. The Panel judges this conclusion premature. Considering there were two shipments, it very well possible that the 17 tonnes that came in via Cotonou were seized, while four tonnes from the earlier shipment via Lomé had indeed reached Libya.
3. The Niger anti-drug authority vehemently denied the NGO's allegation (see below). The authority also strongly denies the NGOs second allegation that in a context of political contestation, Zerma dominated security forces linked to the opposition had seized the hashish shipment belonging to Arab networks linked to newly elected President Bazoum, and a third insinuation that the latter would have played a role in resituating part to the traffickers.²⁶



Octris press release following GI-TOC report

²⁵ GI-TOC, “Strange Days for Hashish Trafficking in Niger”, 11 May 2021, available at <https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/hashish-trafficking-niger/>.

²⁶ Correspondence with the Niger anti-drug authority, 28 May 2021; see also “Droit de réponse de l’OCTRIS par rapport à un article de Global Initiative”, Actuniger, 28 May 2021, available at <https://www.actuniger.com/societe/17230-droit-de-reponse-de-l-octris-par-rapport-a-un-article-de-global-initiative.html>

Annex XVI: Photographs of Moussa Tiliche

Photographs of Moussa Tiliche (right) on 30 April in Ségou, obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 17 May 2021.



Annex XVIIb: Figures and trends Trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants

1. As indicated in its midterm report (S/2021/151, para. 54), the mining boom in northern Mali continues to drive migration, particularly to Gao. The peak in Gao was reached in December 2020, with close to 6,000 arrivals. These numbers declined thereafter stabilizing at around 2,000 per month after February 2021. According to the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), 90 % of arriving migrants reportedly did not intend to travel onwards.²⁷
2. A similar trend is currently observed in Timbuktu. IOM figures reflect that only a small percentage of an odd 1500 migrants moving through Timbuktu per month intends to reach Algeria, while the large majority intend to stay in Mali. This differs from the Panel's finding in early 2020 that the Timbuktu – In Afarak route to Algeria had taken prominence over the one from Gao crossing either at In-Khalil, Talhandak or Tindiska, to reach Bordj Badji Mokhtar or Timiaouine in Algeria. (S/2020/158/Rev.1, annex II). At that time, more than half of the outgoing migrants aimed to travel to the Maghreb or Europe. The recent emergence of gold mining opportunities may explain the shift (see paras x – y below).
3. While Kidal is also hub for migrant workers at gold mines, 75 %, of an odd 500 arriving migrants arriving per month intend crossing to Algeria. For Ménaka this is half. In Menaka, a relatively only 200 migrants continue to arrive per month, although the route may gain popularity as an alternative, less supervised access to In-Guezzam in Algeria, passing via Agazragane²⁸ then north through the Tamesna desert and the tri-border area between Mali, Niger and Algeria.

²⁷ IOM, “Flow monitoring: Mali”, results snapshot, No. 64 (May 2021), 16 June 2021, available at <https://migration.iom.int/reports/mali-%E2%80%94-flow-monitoring-report-64-may-2021>

²⁸ Agazragane is the biggest market, including weapons and munitions, in Ménaka region not controlled any armed group and accessible to all.

Annex XVII: photographs of migrants recovered by Gatia

Migrants recovered by GATIA between Gao and Kidal, screenshots from publicly diffused video.



Annex XVIII: Mission order for Achafgui Ag Bouhada led sensitization mission in February 2021 obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 9 March 2021

COORDINATION DES MOUVEMENTS
DE L'AZAWAD (CMA)



تنسيقية الحركات الأزواوية
+00 14.50221 48.71A

COMITE DIRECTEUR

N° 00 /SG-CMA-2021

ORDRE DE MISSION

CHEF DE MISSION : *Ichafighi Ag Bouhada*

PERSONNEL : *30 véhicules et leurs équipages*

ARMEMENTS : *PH - PKM - et 12.7*

MOYENS DE COMMUNICATION : *Talqis et thoraya*

MOYENS DE LOCOMOTIONS : *Toyota - 4/4*

ITINERAIRE : *Djebel, GAO, Theroual, T.tractu, Tassalit*

OBJECT DE LA MISSION : *Sensibilisation, sécurité, éducation*

DATE DE DEPART : *le 19/02/2021*

DATE DE RETOUR : *le 19/03/2021*

NB : Nous prions les autorités administratives civiles et militaires de faciliter le passage au titulaire du dit document pour l'accomplissement de sa mission

Kidal Le...../...../2021

AMPLIATIONS

- Intresse1
- FAMAS1
- MINUSMA1
- BARKHANE1
- Archives..... 1/5



LE PRESIDENT EN EXERCICE

[Signature]

P/O BILAL AG ACHERIF

pris connaissance le 19/02/2021



Annex XIX: Screenshot from video showing new washing plant in Intillit-Nord obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 13 March 2019.



Annex XX: Niger based companies authorized to either imports (and commercialise) and transit cigarettes as per 2 June 2017, document obtained from a confidential source on 7 March 2021

Liste des sociétés agréées pour l'importation des cigarettes


MCM GROUP : (ticket)
WEST AFRICAN TRADING ;
STREET DISTRIBUTION NIGER
ITC ; (gold seal, oris, yes, empire)
BAGUE DAOUDA : (fine)
NIGER BRIQUES: (rothmans, craven)
SITOR SARL:(fine change, time)
SOCIETE DE DISTRIBUTION: (Marlboro, gold)

Liste des sociétés agréées pour le transit des cigarettes

DANGARA ET FILS
ITC :
AMINOU HAMIDOU SOULEYMANE
NAGOSSAW SARL
MOUSSA ET FILS
MONDIAL TOBACCO COMPANY : (golden dear, oris, Benson, Rothman king size, Craven A, Marlboro, Mile, Welden);
AGDAL IMPORT EXPORT: (bond, American legend, one, mile-full flavor kings)
SONISA SARL: (fancy, viva, bon international)
Mcm group : (marlboro)
IMPEXCO : (force 10, original, jack)

Annex XXI: Images

Packet of elegance lights retrieved from Gao (above left), obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 10 December 2020, and boxes of Elegance lights (above right and below) unloaded in Niamey on 19 September 2020, obtained by the Panel from a confidential source, 25 May 2021.



Annex XXII: Update concerning American Legend case of July 2018

1. While Karelia stopped exports of American Legend to Soburex, of Appollinaire Compaore after the Panel's reports in 2019, discussion regarding the case re-emerged following a 26 February 2021 publication of an NGO report on the subject.²⁹ The report wrongly refers to the UN – meaning the Panel – naming Appollinaire Compaore as a smuggler, provoking the latter to publicly state the Panel lied.³⁰
2. To reiterate, the Panel never qualified Apollinaire Compaore as a smuggler, but argued that either he or Soburex, knowingly supplied those that smuggle since there is no legal market for American Legend beyond Markoye in northern Burkina Faso, where cigarettes are kept in customs depot before being re-exported by Soburex clients. American Legend has never been an authorised brand in Mali nor in Algeria since 14 October 2014 (see S/2019/636, para 131). Meanwhile, Mauritania and Libya receive direct shipments from Karelia in Greece so these would not need to be shipped through Burkina Faso.
3. Rather than smuggling, the Panel insisted on Soburex' partial legal compliance, allowing the transfer of cigarettes to Markoye to continue. First, transit forms show non-existing company representations outside Burkina-Faso. The Panel already showed this in its 2019 midterm report, transit forms stating Soburex Mali as recipient in 2016 (S/2019/137, para. 79). The same goes for its 10.000-box shipment in 2018, transit forms for which state Soburex Mauritania as recipient.³¹ False customs declarations of the recipient of goods is qualified as an infraction in Burkinabé Faso's customs law, leading to confiscation of goods and a penalty of up to 100.000 FCFA.³²
4. Soburex responded to the Panel that the mention of Soburex Mauritania was due to an error of the freight forwarder.³³ A representative of the company further explained that customs officers may have compelled the freight forwarder to declare a recipient outside Burkina Faso since the company is authorised to transit cigarettes to Mauritania and Algeria only, as per its extraordinary licence issued in 2000.³⁴
5. According to the Burkina Faso customs code re-exports via entrepot take place under transit regime, thus legalising Soburex' operation. However, the responsibility of assuring the destination being either Algeria or Mauritania would then be with

²⁹ Aisha K. Down, Gaston Bonheur Sawadogo, Tom Stocks, Ramdane Guidiguoro, and Kétéri Mangal, "Marlboro's Man: Philip Morris' Representative in Burkina Faso is a Known Cigarette Smuggler", Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, 26 february 2021, available at: <https://www.occrp.org/en/loosetobacco/marlboros-man-philip-morris-representative-in-burkina-faso-is-a-known-cigarette-smuggler>

³⁰ Henry Wilkins, "VOA Exclusive: Tobacco Giant's Burkina Faso Distributor Denies Smuggling, Funding Terrorism", Voice of America, 27 May 2021, available at: <https://www.voanews.com/africa/voa-exclusive-tobacco-giants-burkina-faso-distributor-denies-smuggling-funding-terrorism>. In the Interview Appollinaire Compaore also stated that those who worked on the report for the UN are no longer employed by them. As the committee is aware, the Panel's finance expert has not changed since the first mandate.

³¹ See photograph of one of the bills below. The document was annexed to Soburex' response on 8 July 2019 to the Panel's first request for information.

³² See Burkina Faso, Customs Code, No. 03/ 92/ADP, 3 December 1992, Article 259 c).

³³ Response received on 23 April 2021 to a Panel of Experts correspondence of 9 April 2021.

³⁴ Telephone interview with company representative, Emmanuel Kabre, 25 June 2021.

the re-exporting party, which Soburex cannot guarantee.³⁵ The client of the 10.000 box 2018 shipment was Soumaguel Albashar Maiga in Gao (See S/2019/636, para. 126).³⁶ The company Agdal in Niamey was the transporter for a tenth of it, 1.000 boxes, over half of which were seized in Labbezanga. But Agdal had no commercial relationship with Soburex, according to its representative.³⁷ Since no other declarations of cigarettes transiting Niger were made, the larger share of the shipment crossed straight into Mali illegally via other transporters³⁸, as no customs are present on the Malian side. Soburex claims to be responsible only for the product leaving its depot under Burkinabe customs supervision.

6. As already indicated previously (S/2019/636, para. 129) the 2018 shipment did not comply with Burkina Faso's 27 July 2017 decree banning from entry into the country cigarettes that transit through Burkina Faso but do not respect labelling requirements in the declared destination country. In this regard, Soburex responded to the Panel that neither the company, nor apparently the Burkinabé customs authorities were aware of this decree at the time.³⁹ Soburex further stated to have not made any order since and committed to respect the decree in case of any future order.⁴⁰ Soburex representative however stated that the company stopped sending cigarettes through Mali because of the associates risks emanating from the volatile security situation, as demonstrated by the Panel⁴¹

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Telephone interview with company representative, Emmanuel Kabre, 6 July 2021.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ This already appeared from correspondences between customs authorities in Mali and Burkina Faso in 2017 referenced in the Panel's 2019 mid-term report (S/2019/137, para. 80)

³⁹ Soburex letter (foortnote 23)

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Telephone interview with company representative, Emmanuel Kabre, 6 July 2021.


Annex XXIII: Photographs of looted truck carrying legal Dunhill cigarette boxes, obtained by the Panel from confidential civil society source on 12 June 2021



Annex XXV: Sexual and Gender-Based Violence statistics

Figure 1:

Timeline showing number of incidents of conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) recorded by GBVIMS from 2017 to March 2021.



Source: GBVIMS

Figure 2:

The Table below reflects the percentage of women interviewed in a field study conducted by the Mali Protection Cluster, published in December 2020, who felt at risk of becoming a target of sexual violence.

Tableau 12: Risque d'être victimes de violence sexuelle

Comment vous sentez-vous par rapport au risque d'être victime de violence sexuelle ?						
	Gao	Ménaka	Mopti	Ségou	Tombouctou	Moyenne
Très inquiet	13%	21%	24%	21%	14%	19%
Inquiet	20%	7%	21%	19%	18%	17%
Un peu inquiet	40%	32%	31%	30%	25%	32%
Pas du tout inquiet	27%	40%	24%	30%	43%	33%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: *Perception de la situation de protection de la population civile au Mali*, Cluster Protection Mali, December 2020; available on www.humanitarianresponse.info.

Figure 3:

Incidents of SGBV reported in Gao region from January 2020 until April 2021 and attributed to compliant armed groups

	Rape	Attempted Rape	Physical violence	Forced marriage	Domestic violence	Denial of access to resources	Total per group
CMFPR-1	11	0	2	4	4	0	21
CMFPR-2	8	4	2	3	0	2	19
Ganda-Izo	14	6	7	5	0	0	32
Ganda-Koy	11	9	4	8	0	0	32
Platforme	11	8	0	0	0	7	26
CMA	7	1	11	0	0	13	32
Total per type of SGBV	62	28	26	20	4	22	162

Panel comments:

- On the credibility and credibility of the data:
 - o The incidents in these table are collected through sources with first-hand knowledge of this incidents. The Panel deems the sources to be reliable and credible, and deems the information reasonable to believe, based on incidents verified by the Panel and taking into consideration the overall context in Gao.
 - o The groups are named as they are described by witnesses and victims.
- On the geographical scope of these incidents:
 - o The table above reflect incidents were reported in Gao from 2020 to April 2021.
 - o All incidents attributed to the Platforme and associated groups occurred in Gao region.
 - o With regards to incidents attributed to the CMA, the panel was informed that some of these cases were reported in Gao but took place in Kidal or elsewhere.
 - o The only incident attributed to the CMA in 2021 was an incident of denial of access to resources.

Annex XXVI: Unilateral communiqué of the CMA for preventing and combating conflict related sexual violence

**COMMUNIQUE UNILATERAL
LA COORDINATION DES MOUVEMENTS DE L'AZAWAD (MNLA, HCUA,
MAA) SUR LA PREVENTION ET LA LUTTE CONTRE LES VIOLENCES
SEXUELLES LIEES AU CONFLIT**

Considérant les résolutions pertinentes du Conseil de Sécurité de l'Organisation des Nations Unies sur Femmes, Paix et Sécurité, notamment les résolutions 1820 (2009), (1882 (2009), 1888 (2009) 1960 (2010) et 2106 (2013) sur les violences sexuelles dans les conflits armés;

Considérant le contenu de l'Accord pour la Paix et la Réconciliation au Mali issu du Processus d'Alger (signé les 15 mai et 20 juin 2015) qui stipule dans son article 46 alinéa 4 « *création d'une commission d'enquête internationale chargée de faire la lumière sur tous les crimes de guerre, crimes contre l'humanité, crime de génocide, crimes sexuels, ...* » et dans son alinéa 6 « *non amnistie pour les auteurs de crimes de guerre, ..., y compris des violences sur les femmes, les filles et les enfants, liées au conflit* » ;

Tenant compte de l'engagement des leaders politiques de la Coordination des Mouvements de l'Azawad (CMA) à combattre les violences sexuelles liées au conflit, exprimé à l'issue de la journée de sensibilisation sur les violences sexuelles liées au conflit tenu le 9 septembre 2015 à Bamako ;

Le Président, par cette présente, tient à formaliser l'engagement de la Coordination des Mouvements de l'Azawad (CMA) avec l'adhésion individuelle de tous les mouvements membres (HCUA, MNLA, MAA) qui le constituent à lutter contre l'impunité de tels crimes.

L'engagement de la Coordination des Mouvements de l'Azawad (CMA) à coopérer avec les Nations Unies et autres partenaires est réitéré afin d'adresser le problème à travers des mesures concrètes comme celles ci-après :

1. Développer un plan de mise en œuvre qui inclut, inter alia, l'émission d'ordres clairs par la chaîne de commandement interdisant les violences sexuelles ;
2. Appuyer pour l'enquête à temps des allégations et collaborer avec le système judiciaire national et international ainsi que la justice transitionnelle sur les cas de membres présumés responsables de violences sexuelles pour leur mise à disposition aux services habilités ;
3. S'assurer que des provisions spécifiques pour la prévention et la protection contre les violences sexuelles sont incluses dans les arrangements sécuritaires ;
4. S'assurer que les responsables de violences sexuelles sont exclus des listes des candidats à proposer pour l'intégration ;
5. Encourager et soutenir le travail des prestataires de services aux victimes de violences sexuelles dans les zones où la Coordination des Mouvements de l'Azawad (CMA) est présente ;

- 6. Profiter de la présence de la Coordination des Mouvements de l'Azawad (CMA) dans une zone pour renforcer la sensibilisation contre les violences sexuelles en menant une campagne de prévention en collaboration avec les Nations Unies

La Coordination des Mouvements de l'Azawad (CMA) compte sur les Nations Unies, particulièrement la MINUSMA à l'appuyer et singulièrement tous les mouvements qui le constituent, en vue de pouvoir mettre en œuvre tous les engagements inscrits dans ce Communiqué. Le plan de mise en œuvre, préparé et approuvé par les participants représentant le MNLA, HCUA et le MAA durant l'atelier de deux jours tenu à Kidal les 5 et 6 juillet 2017, contient les priorités exprimées dans ce Communiqué ainsi que de l'assistance nécessaire requise.

La Coordination des Mouvements de l'Azawad (CMA) nommera un point focal de Haut Niveau qui sera appuyé par deux points focaux représentant chaque mouvement de la CMA (2 MNLA, 2 HCUA et 2 MAA) avec pour rôle de diriger et de coordonner les efforts de la Coordination des Mouvements de l'Azawad (CMA) et de travailler avec le système des Nations Unies au Mali ainsi que le bureau de la Représentante du Secrétaire Général de l'ONU sur les violences sexuelles liées aux conflits pour la mise en œuvre effective de ce Communiqué.

Fait à Kidal, le 10/07/2017.

Président en exercice de la CMA



Mouvements Adhérent:

Pour le HCUA,



Pour le MAA,

Sidi Ibrahim OULD SIDATI

Pour le MNLA,

Bilal AG ACHERIF

Annex XXVII: Communiqué of the Plateforme (GATIA – CMFPR – MAA) on the prevention of conflict related sexual violence in Mali

PLATEFORME DES MOUVEMENTS ARMES REPUBLICAINS DU 14 JUIN 2014 D'ALGER

Communiqué

La Plateforme (CMFPR, MAA, GATIA) Sur la Prévention des Violences Sexuelles liées au conflit au Mali

Considérant les résolutions pertinentes du Conseil de Sécurité de l'Organisation des Nations Unies sur Femmes, Paix et Sécurité, notamment les résolutions 1820 (2009), (1882 (2009), 1888 (2009) 1960 (2010) et 2106 (2013) sur les violences sexuelles dans les conflits armés;


Considérant le contenu de l'Accord pour la Paix et la Réconciliation au Mali issu du Processus d'Alger (signé les 15 mai et 20 juin 2015) qui stipule dans son article 46 alinéa 4 « création d'une commission d'enquête internationale chargée de faire la lumière sur tous les crimes de guerre, crimes contre l'humanité, crime de génocide, crimes sexuels, ... » et dans son alinéa 6 « non amnistie pour les auteurs de crimes de guerre, ..., y compris des violences sur les femmes, les filles et les enfants, liées au conflit » ;

Tenant compte de l'engagement des leaders politiques de la Plateforme à combattre les violences sexuelles liées au conflit, exprimé à l'issue de la journée de sensibilisation sur les violences sexuelles liées au conflit tenu le 9 septembre 2015 à Bamako ;

Le Président, par cette présente, tient à formaliser l'engagement de la Plateforme avec l'adhésion individuelle de tous les groupes membres (MAA, CMFPR, GATIA) qui le constituent à lutter contre l'impunité de tels crimes.

L'engagement de la Plateforme à coopérer avec les Nations Unies et autres partenaires est réitéré afin d'adresser le problème à travers des mesures concrètes comme celles-ci-après :

1. Développer un plan de mise en œuvre qui inclut, inter alia, l'émission d'ordres clairs par la chaîne de commandement interdisant les violences sexuelles ;
2. Appuyer pour l'enquête à temps des allégations et collaborer avec le système judiciaire national et international ainsi que la justice transitionnelle sur les cas de membres présumés responsables de violences sexuelles pour leur mise à disposition aux services habilités ;
3. S'assurer que des provisions spécifiques pour la prévention et la protection contre les violences sexuelles sont incluses dans les arrangements sécuritaires ;
4. S'assurer que les responsables de violences sexuelles sont exclus des listes des candidats à proposer pour l'intégration ;





5. Encourager et soutenir le travail des prestataires de services aux victimes de violences sexuelles dans les zones où la Plateforme est présente ;
6. Profiter de la présence de la Plateforme dans une zone pour renforcer la sensibilisation contre les violences sexuelles en menant une campagne de prévention en collaboration avec les Nations Unies

La Plateforme compte sur les Nations Unies, particulièrement la MINUSMA à l'appuyer et singulièrement tous les groupes qui le constituent, en vue de pouvoir mettre en œuvre tous les engagements inscrits dans ce Communiqué. Le plan de mise en œuvre, préparé et approuvé par les participants représentant le CMFPR, le MAA et le GATIA durant l'atelier de deux jours tenu à Bamako les 29 et 30 juin 2016, contient les priorités exprimées dans ce Communiqué ainsi que de l'assistance nécessaire requise.

La Plateforme nommera un point focal de Haut Niveau qui sera appuyé par trois points focaux de Haut Niveau du CMFPR, MAA et GATIA, avec pour rôle de diriger et de coordonner les efforts de la Plateforme et de travailler avec le système des Nations Unies au Mali ainsi que le bureau de la Représentante du Secrétaire Général de l'ONU sur les violences sexuelles liées aux conflits pour la mise en œuvre effective de ce Communiqué.

Me Harouna Toureh
Président de la Plateforme

Adhésion:

Mr.
Président
CMFPR

Mr.
Président
GATIA

Mr.
Président
MAA

Annex XXVIII: Overview of violations against children in Mali

1. In May 2021, the report of the Secretary General report on Children in armed conflict noted elevated numbers of grave violations against children from January to December 2020, with 809 grave violations against 535 children (394 boys, 135 girls, 6 sex unknown).⁴²
2. During this period, the United Nations verified the use and recruitment of 284 children by the CMA, including MNLA, HCUA, MAA; the Plateforme include GATIA, Ganda Koy, Ganda Lassa Izo, MSA; DNA; FLM; and the Malian armed forces). Most children were recruited in Kidal (112) and Gao regions (75) regions. The report expressed grave concern by the continued recruitment and use of children by the CMA and Plateforme; called on the CMA to continue implementing its 2016 action plan; and called on the Plateforme to adopt and implement an action plan addressing children recruitment and use.⁴³
3. In addition, the Secretary General reported that 173 children (115 boys, 52 girls, 6 sex unknown) killed and maimed. Most of these incidents were reported in Mopti region (134), because of attacks on villages, crossfire, improvised explosive devices and explosive remnants of war. In addition, 80 children were abducted (48 boys, 32 girls), most of them by unidentified perpetrators (63). Twelve girls were victims of sexual violence (2 cases perpetrated by the Malian armed forces and by 10 unidentified perpetrators). The UN verified 36 attacks on schools and 25 hospitals, mostly attributed to unidentified perpetrators (57) and to JNIM, ISGS, DNA and the Malian armed forces. One school was reportedly used by Dozo hunters in Mopti. Denial of humanitarian access affecting children was mostly reported Mopti (60), Gao (39) and Ménaka (35) regions.⁴⁴
4. During its mission in Gao region, the Panel was informed of several incidents of killing, maiming, and kidnapping of children were reported by unidentified individuals. For instance, on 27 March 2021, the corpse of a child was found beheaded in the neighbourhood of Aljanabandja in Gao;⁴⁵ a 7-year-old girl was hit with a machete by two unidentified men and severely injured; two unidentified men on a motorcycle attempted to kidnap a 2-year-old girl at the quartier 8; two unidentified men attempted to an infant from his home in Chateau.⁴⁶ Several reports indicated that these incidents were a recent phenomenon and suspected that they may be perpetrated by foreign miners. Furthermore, during its mandate, was informed of allegations on the integration of children in the DDR process using fake IDs. The Panel notes the findings of the Secretary General report, and the additional information received for further investigations.

⁴² Secretary General report, 06 May 2021, A/75/873–S/2021/437

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Confidential interview, Gao, 13 March 2021.

⁴⁶ Confidential report, 10 March 2021; confidential report 12 March 2021.

Annex XXIX: List of reported abductions and/or killings of village chief

The Panel received the following credible reports on incidents of abductions and/or killings of village chiefs in Ansongo cercle, Gao region, and one incident in Menaka, October 2020 and May 2021 (source: confidential UN reports). The Panel did not investigate these reports.

Date of incident	Location	Event	Source
23 October 2020	Tikanassine village, Tin-Hama commune, Ansongo cercle	Unidentified armed men on motorcycles reportedly stormed into Tikanassine village (located 24 km south of Tin-Hama, in Tin-Hama commune, Ansongo cercle), and abducted the village chief for not paying the requested <i>zakat</i> (tax form imposed by ISGS).	UN report, 28 October 2020
3 November 2020	Sorory village, Ansongo cercle	Unidentified armed individuals on motorcycles stormed into Sorory village (located 65km south of Ansongo on the Ansongo-Labezanga Axis) and abducted the village chief for not paying <i>zakat</i> on livestock.	UN report, 06 November 2020
19 December 2020	Ikalla village, Tin-Hama, Ansongo cercle	Unidentified armed elements arrived on motorcycles in Ikalla village (16 km south of Tin-Hama, Ansongo cercle) and abducted the village chief for not paying <i>zakat</i> on livestock.	UN report, 25 December 2020
7 March 2021	Karou village, Ansongo cercle	Four unidentified armed men on motorcycles arrived in Karou village (located 18 km north of Labezanga) and kidnapped the village chief Ahamadou Diallo.	UN report, 10 March 2021
8 March 2021	Inalabague, Bourra, Ansongo village	On 8 March 2021, unidentified armed men arrived in the village of Inalabague and abducted the village chief for non-payment of the <i>zakat</i> on livestock.	UN report, 12 March 2021
14 March 2021	Abokaira village, Bamba commune, Bourem cercle	JNIM elements kidnapped the village chief in Abakaira Songahi village (130 km west of Bourem, Bamba commune, Bourem cercle) during the village's weekly market.	UN report, 19 March 2021
4 April 2021	Tagacherif camp, Tin-Hama, Ansongo cercle	Elements allegedly affiliated with ISGS abducted the village chief and eight other persons of the Touareg community in Tagacherif camp site (located 40 km north-west of Tin-Hama, Ansongo cercle) and stole their livestock. On 6 April, the abductees were released except the village chief.	UN report, 06 April 2021
23 April 2021	Agarangabo village, Menaka	The chief of Agarangabo village (Menaka) was reportedly killed by ISGS elements.	UN report, 23 April 2021; UN report, 05 May 2021
9 May 2021	Gassi village, Bourra commune, Ansongo cercle	At around 08:00PM, unidentified armed men broke into a house in the village of Gassi (25 km southeast of Ansongo, Bourra commune), abducting the village chief and stealing his livestock. He was reportedly found dead 17 May 2021 near Tassiga village, in Ansongo cercle.	UN report, 10 May 2021; UN reports, 19 May 2021

Annex XXX: Reported violations by FAMA in Mopti region

1. The Panel continues to receive information on FAMA violations in and around Boni, Duentza. This includes an incident on 18 March 2021, when FAMA patrol hit an IED on the outskirts of Boni village killing at least a soldier and wounded another. One soldier who was unharmed asked two men on motorbikes who were near the scene to lie face down on the ground and called base for reinforcements. The officers shot dead the two men the two men lying on the ground and shot indiscriminately at the civilian population in Boni.⁴⁷ The Panel also received credible reports of extra-judicial executions by FAMA in nearby village. On 1 March, several FAMA vehicles entered the Fulani villages of Tanborga, and Guitram, in the Haire commune, reportedly executed two Fulani men, burned several houses, granaries and livestock. On 6 March, FAMA burned several homes and granaries in hamlets in the vicinity of Beni-Bebbi village, located ten kilometers south of Boni, in Haire commune. Subsequently eleven households fled to Boni.⁴⁸
2. The Panel will continue to verify and investigate these events and will report its findings to the Committee.
3. In previous years, the Panel has investigated and reported on serious violations by FAMA in Mopti region, including the events of Ogossagou on 14 February 2020 (see S/2018/581, annex XIII; S/2019/636; S/2020/785/Rev.1).⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Confidential telephone interviews, June 2021; also see report by Human Rights Watch, April 2021, Mali: Killings, ‘Disappearances’ in Military Operations. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/04/20/mali-killings-disappearances-military-operations>, accessed on 07.11.2021.

⁴⁸ Confidential reports, March 2021.

⁴⁹ For a comprehensive list of reports by human rights organisation on human rights violations perpetrated by FAMA from 2013 to 2020, see online tool by the Security Forces Monitor https://whowasincommand.com/en/search/?entity_type=Violation&selected_facets=countries_exact%3AMali; accessed on 11 July 2021.

Annex XXXI: GATIA statement on humanitarian needs in Aguelhok, 24 June 2021



Les jeunes	Les chefs de Fractions	La coordination de Gafia
W	no point [Signature]	[Signature]
Rima Ay Gaphid tel: 76 23 87 33	Boudou Ay Mely Bouge Ay Moky tel: 92 53 61 45 tel: 94 87 93 66	
Le Président de l'Assemblée Interiminaire du Cercle de Tenaklit Le 1 ^{er} Vice Président		
Ayl		
Mohamed Ay Achewf tel: 7310 9364		