

**Security Council**

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**Letter dated 7 December 2021 from the Security Council  
Facilitator for the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#)  
addressed to the President of the Security Council**

I have the honour to transmit herewith, as agreed among the representatives of the Security Council for the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), my six-month report on the implementation of the resolution, which covers the period from 25 June 2021 to 7 December 2021.

I should be grateful if the present letter and the report could be issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Geraldine **Byrne Nason**  
Security Council Facilitator  
for the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#)



## **Twelfth six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)**

### **I. Introduction**

1. The note by the President of the Security Council of 16 January 2016 (S/2016/44) sets out the practical arrangements and procedures for the Council in carrying out tasks related to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), particularly with respect to the provisions specified in paragraphs 2 to 7 of annex B to that resolution.
2. According to the note, the Security Council should select, on an annual basis, one member to serve as its Facilitator for the functions specified therein. Pursuant to paragraph 3 of the note, and after consultations among the members of the Council, I was appointed as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) for the period ending 31 December 2021 (see S/2021/2).
3. It was also established in the note that the Facilitator should brief the other members of the Security Council on its work and the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) every six months, in parallel with the report submitted by the Secretary-General on the implementation of the resolution.
4. The present report covers the period from 25 June 2021 to 7 December 2021.

### **II. Summary of the activities of the Council in the “2231 format”**

5. On 24 June 2021, the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran sent a letter addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2021/604), in which he outlined the views of the Islamic Republic of Iran with regard to the eleventh report of the Secretary-General (S/2021/602), as described further in paragraph 9 of the present report.
6. On 30 June 2021, the Security Council was briefed by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs on the eleventh report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2021/582), by me as Facilitator on the work of the Council and the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2021/602), and by the Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, on behalf of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in his capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Commission established in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, on the procurement channel (S/2021/578).
7. On 7 December 2021, the representatives of the Security Council for the implementation of resolution 2231 met in the “2231 format” and discussed the findings and recommendations of the twelfth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2021/995).
8. During the reporting period, a total of 20 notes were circulated within the “2231 format”. In addition, I sent 16 official communications to Member States and/or the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission. I received a total of 15 communications from Member States and the Coordinator.

### III. Monitoring the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)

#### Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

9. In the above-mentioned letter dated 24 June 2021 (S/2021/604), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran outlined the views of his country regarding the eleventh report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). The letter contained six points, inter alia, in which the Permanent Representative noted that the people of the Islamic Republic of Iran “continue to be under unprecedented unlawful sanctions in material breach of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)” and that the country “has been and continues to be fully compliant with its commitments under the JCPOA”. It also noted that the country “was left with no option but to take remedial measures in the exercise of its rights under paragraphs 26 and 36 of the JCPOA” and that it “stand[s] ready to reverse those remedial measures upon verification of implementation of commitments of the United States and EU/E3”.

10. In an annex to the letter dated 20 July 2021 (A/75/968-S/2021/669) from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the then Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran transmitted “a thorough review of the challenges ... during the past six years” in implementing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and resolution 2231 (2015). In the annex, he noted, inter alia, the “significant non-performance of the JCPOA in various forms”. He further stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran has “proven its commitment to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in deeds and not just words” and “remains prepared to reciprocally contribute to serious efforts to revive the full implementation of the JCPOA by all in an atmosphere of good faith, equal footing and mutual respect”.

11. After a hiatus as of the end of June, the Joint Commission convened in Vienna on 29 November 2021 to resume discussions on addressing developments regarding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, including the possible return by the United States of America to Plan of Action, and to ensure its full and effective implementation.

12. In line with paragraph 4 of resolution 2231 (2015), in which the Security Council requested the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to provide regular updates to the Council on the implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and to report at any time any issue of concern directly affecting the fulfilment of those commitments, the Director General submitted to the Agency’s Board of Governors, and to the Security Council regular reports on 7 September 2021 (S/2021/1000) and 17 November 2021 on the Agency’s verification and monitoring activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran in the light of resolution 2231 (2015).<sup>1</sup> These set out the Agency’s view that, since 23 February 2021, its verification and monitoring activities in relation to the Plan have been “seriously undermined as a result of Iran’s decision to stop the implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA, including the Additional Protocol.” They note that the February agreement has “facilitated the maintenance of continuity of knowledge ... however, [its] repeated prolongation ... is becoming a significant challenge to the Agency’s ability to restore ... continuity of knowledge.” They further state the Agency’s view that “it is indispensable that the agreement [of 12 September 2021] covers all facilities and locations in Iran in order to maintain continuity of knowledge and, thereby, for the Agency to be in a position to resume the necessary verification and monitoring activities in Iran in relation to the JCPOA.” Following from the joint statement of 12 September 2021, contacts between the Islamic

<sup>1</sup> International Atomic Energy Agency, document GOV/2021/51.

Republic of Iran and IAEA continue on this issue, including during the meetings of the IAEA Director General in Tehran on 23 November 2021. The Director General also provided updates on 25 June (S/2021/996) on the importance of maintaining “uninterrupted collection and storage of data by [Agency] monitoring and surveillance equipment”; 6 July (S/2021/997) and 16 August (S/2021/998) on activities related to “fuel manufacturing for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) using indigenously-produced uranium enriched up to 20% U-235”; 17 August (S/2021/999) on the production of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 60 per cent U-235; 12 September (S/2021/1001) and 29 September (S/2021/1002) on access “to service the identified Agency monitoring and surveillance equipment and to replace data storage media, at all necessary locations in Iran with the exception of the centrifuge component manufacturing workshop at the TESA Karaj complex”; 25 October (S/2021/1003) on research and development, including the “feeding of uranium enriched up to 20% ... without any collection of products”; and 1 December on the Agency’s verification that, as at 30 November, “Iran [had begun] feeding ...IR6 centrifuges [at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant] ... to produce UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 20% U-235.”<sup>2</sup>

### Ballistic missiles and launches

13. In a letter dated 10 August 2021 (S/2021/724), the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland noted that they wished to bring to the attention of the Security Council “recent actions” undertaken by the Islamic Republic of Iran that were “inconsistent with paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015)”, regarding “Iran’s ballistic missile programme”, including a “flight test of a satellite launch vehicle” on 12 June 2021. The Permanent Representatives noted that “launches of satellite launch vehicles amount[ed] to launches ‘using such ballistic missile technology’ under paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015)” and that these activities, as outlined in their previous letters, “constitute[d] an enduring trend of Iran continuing to advance its ballistic missile capabilities despite the provisions in Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)”.

14. In a letter dated 25 August 2021 (S/2021/753), the Permanent Representative of the United States stated that it wished to bring to the attention of the Security Council “recent incidents of Iranian activity in defiance of paragraph 3 of annex B to Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)”. It referred to the launches by the Islamic Republic of Iran on 12 June 2021 and 21 June 2021 of space launch vehicles which “did not successfully place a satellite into orbit”. In the letter, the Permanent Representative urged the international community to “hold Iran to account for its actions” and the Security Council to continue to “insist on full implementation of the binding measures in resolution 2231 (2015) that restrict outside support for Iran’s ballistic missile programme”.

15. In response to the aforementioned letters,<sup>3</sup> in a letter dated 13 September 2021 (S/2021/793), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that it “categorically reject[ed] all unsubstantiated allegations made” and “reemphasize[d] that Iran has not conducted any activity inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015)” and would “continue its activities related to ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles, both of which are within its inherent rights under international law”. In a letter dated 13 September 2021 (S/2021/792), he stated that his country “categorically reject[ed] any attempt to reinterpret that paragraph [paragraph 3]”. He made clear that “the technical characteristics and operational requirements of space launch vehicles clearly make them distinct from ballistic missile systems” and that

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., document GOV/INF/2021/46.

<sup>3</sup> S/2021/724 and S/2021/753.

such vehicles were “designed and developed exclusively for placing satellites into orbit”.

16. In response to the aforementioned letters,<sup>4</sup> in a letter dated 22 September 2021 (A/76/343-S/2021/819) from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, he reiterated the position of the Russian Federation on this issue and noted that such “accusations” were “totally unsubstantiated” and that the Islamic Republic of Iran was “fully entitled to the advantages of space science and technology”. He underscored that “none of the existing international instruments and mechanisms ... either directly or implicitly prohibit Iran from developing missile and space programmes”. He further noted that the Islamic Republic of Iran “exercised restraint and demonstrated determination to uphold the non-proliferation regime”. He stated that the Russian Federation continued to “proceed from its previous assessment that Iran is respecting in good faith the call addressed to it in paragraph 3”.

17. In a letter dated 12 November 2021 (S/2021/949) the Permanent Representative of Israel expressed his deep concern at “repeated ballistic missile tests [and] the illicit proliferation of advanced unmanned aerial vehicle systems” by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

18. In response to the aforementioned letter, in a letter dated 16 November 2021 (S/2021/951) from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic republic of Iran, he categorically rejected the “unsubstantiated allegations ... made [by Israel] against [his] country”.

19. The above-mentioned letters, addressed to the Secretary-General and/or the President of the Security Council, were circulated in the “2231 format” of the Council during the reporting period.

#### **IV. Procurement channel approval, notifications and exemptions**

20. During the reporting period, no new proposals for the supply of items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in document INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 were submitted to the Security Council.

21. Since Implementation Day, a total of 52 proposals to participate in or permit the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), have been submitted to the Security Council by five Member States from three different regional groups, including States that are not participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. To date, of the 52 proposals that have been processed, 37 have been approved, 5 not approved and 10 withdrawn. On average, the proposals were processed through the procurement channel in 50 calendar days. After the withdrawal of the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the procurement channel continues to function, and the Joint Commission continues to stand ready to review proposals.

22. According to paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), certain nuclear-related activities do not require approval but do require a notification to the Security Council or to both the Council and the Joint Commission. In this regard, during the reporting period, eight notifications were submitted to the Security Council in relation to the transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran of equipment and technology covered by annex B, section 1 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part 1, intended for light water reactors.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

23. No notifications were submitted to the Security Council related to the necessary modification of the two cascades at the Fordow facility for stable isotope production, and no notifications were submitted to the Council related to the modernization of the Arak reactor based on the agreed conceptual design.

24. On 26 November 2021, the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group transmitted to me the Group's twelfth six-month report of the Joint Commission (S/2021/992) in accordance with paragraph 6.10 of annex IV to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

## **V. Other approval and exemption requests**

25. During the reporting period, no proposal was submitted by Member States to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).

26. Exemptions to the assets freeze provisions are contained in paragraph 6 (d) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). No exemption requests were received or granted by the Security Council in relation to the 23 individuals and 61 entities currently on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015).

## **VI. Transparency, outreach and guidance**

27. As the Security Council's Facilitator for 2021–2022, I remain committed to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action as endorsed by the Council in its resolution 2231 (2015). I will continue to facilitate, strengthen and promote the implementation of the resolution and believe that dialogue, transparency and the utilization of the procurement channel remain critical. I also note and welcome the active efforts by all Member States in promoting, supporting and engaging in dialogue and in acknowledging the importance of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action as a significant achievement of multilateral diplomacy.

28. Outreach activities by the Secretariat, as mandated by the note mentioned in paragraph 1 of the present report (S/2016/44), will continue to foster awareness of resolution 2231 (2015). The website on resolution 2231 (2015), also managed and regularly updated by the Secretariat through the Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, continues to play a significant role in providing relevant information.

29. In my role as Facilitator, I held several bilateral consultations with Member States and their representatives, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, to discuss issues relevant to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). As I continue to advocate the Council's collective responses to international peace and security issues, I encourage the international community to act in line with paragraph 2 of resolution 2231 (2015), which calls upon all Member States, regional organizations and international organizations to take such actions as may be appropriate to support the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.