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# Письмо Временного поверенного в делах Постоянного представительства Соединенных Штатов Америки при Организации Объединенных Наций от 27 июня 2019 года на имя Генерального секретаря

24 июня 2019 года Соединенные Штаты представили членам Совета Безопасности дополнительную информацию, свидетельствующую о том, что Иран несет ответственность за нападения на четыре нефтяных танкера, совершенные 12 мая в порту Эль-Фуджайра в Объединенных Арабских Эмиратах, нападения на два нефтяных танкера, совершенные 13 июня в Оманском заливе, и за сбитый 20 июня беспилотный летательный аппарат Соединенных Штатов, находившийся в международном воздушном пространстве. Представление Соединенными Штатами информации Совету отражает нашу приверженность обеспечению транспарентности в ходе наших расследований этих инцидентов. Мы продолжаем проводить расследования при содействии со стороны союзников и партнеров, и по мере поступления дополнительной информации мы намерены делиться ей с Советом.

В целях оказания содействия членам Совета мы прилагаем письменное резюме наших первоначальных выводов, сделанных по итогам расследований нападений на танкеры, совершенных 12 мая и 13 июня (приложение I). Мы также прилагаем карту, на которой показана траектория полета беспилотного летательного аппарата Соединенных Штатов, которая наглядно свидетельствует о том, что он находился в международном воздушном пространстве, когда по нему нанесли удар иранские силы (приложение II).

Соединенные Штаты настоятельно призывают членов Совета Безопасности внимательно изучить эту информацию. С учетом этих убедительных доказательств мы призываем членов Совета поддержать наш вывод о том, что эти нападения были совершены Ираном. Членам Совета и другим государствам-членам, у которых возникнут вопросы относительно доказательств, следует связаться с Миссией Соединенных Штатов Америки при Организации Объединенных Наций.

Просим распространить настоящее письмо и приложения к нему в качестве документа Совета Безопасности.

(Подпись) Джонатан Р. Коэн Посол Представительство Соединенных Штатов Америки при Организации Объединенных Наций





Приложение I к письму Временного поверенного в делах Постоянного представительства Соединенных Штатов Америки при Организации Объединенных Наций от 27 июня 2019 года на имя Генерального секретаря

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ASSESSMENT OF RECENT INCIDENTS
IN THE PERSIAN GULF

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#### ASSESSMENT OF RECENT INCIDENTS

- We assess with a high degree of confidence that Iran was responsible for the 12 May attacks in Fujairah as well as the 13 June attacks on two tankers in the Gulf of Oman. This assessment is based on intelligence, the weapons and tactics used in the attacks, and the fact that no proxy in the region has the capabilities.
- The information below is the result of close interagency coordination as well as ongoing cooperation with our allies and partners. In the days and weeks since the attacks, the United States has analyzed a range of sources. Our investigation into the attacks is ongoing and we will continue to share information as it becomes available.

#### 12 MAY ATTACKS IN VICINITY OF UAE PORT OF FUJAIRAH:

- The United States assesses that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) likely conducted the attacks on four oil tankers in the vicinity of Fujairah during a 53-minute period in the early morning of 12 May.
- The attacks were consistent with a known IRGC capability, with credible threats we were tracking and with public statements from Iran threatening freedom of navigation. The attacks were likely conducted by IRGC boats that violated UAE territorial sovereignty in the area near the attacks hours prior to the first explosion.
  - o The attack on four tankers near the UAE port of Fujairah was conducted with magnetic "limpet-style" mines, on the hull of those four tankers.
  - o The blasts on each ship occurred under the waterline of each ship, and were significant enough to blow a large hole ranging from a couple meters to as many as 5 meters square on each vessel. The blasts showed no evidence of a projectile or torpedo that would have left significant debris within the skin of the ships. Detonations occurred within 53 minutes, indicating the most common method of limpet mine initiation.
  - o The United States assesses that the IRGC has a naval diver capability to conduct this type of covert mining activity.
  - o The most convincing piece of information is a report to U.S. Naval Forces Central Command from the USS Mason that approximately 20 IRGC fast inshore attack craft traveled from the Iranian side of the Strait of Hormuz into UAE territorial waters near Fujairah hours before the attacks. The report places IRGC vessels capable of delivering trained IRGC divers near the sabotaged tankers mere hours before the attacks.
  - o These findings are consistent with and support the assessment that a sophisticated state actor was likely responsible for the attacks, which the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Norway

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concluded during their joint briefing to UN Security Council Members on 6 June 2019.

#### 13 JUNE ATTACKS IN GULF OF OMAN:

Iran was also responsible for attacking two tankers in the Gulf of Oman near the Strait of Hormuz. Iran targeted the FRONT ALTAIR and KOKUKA COURAGEOUS. The tankers were targeted while they were underway and carrying oil or related products from Saudi Arabia and UAE. The attacks coincided with Prime Minister Abe's visit to Iran, who was visiting the country in an effort to ease tensions between the U.S. and Iran.

- Our intelligence confirms that Iranian vessels operating in and around the Strait of Hormuz on 12-13 June approached both the Front Altair and Kokuka Courageous before each vessel suffered explosions. We assess this activity is consistent with an Iranian operation to attach limpet mines to the vessels. A senior IRGC official also confirmed that personnel had completed two actions, possibly in the Gulf of Oman.
- Further, during the early morning hours of 13 June, Iranian naval elements were observed monitoring the tankers around the time that both vessels reported being attacked. At the time, both tankers were only 10 nautical miles apart and transiting out of the Strait of Hormuz into the Gulf of Oman.
- We assess with high confidence the limpet mines used in the attack on the Kokuka Courageous were of Iranian origin and design, based on exploitation and our understanding of the technical characteristics of world-wide limpet mines. Furthermore, the attack was almost certainly conducted by the IRGC Navy (IRGCN), based on historical Iranian press video of IRGCN training with the same class of limpet mine and an IRGCN vessel being used to retrieve the unexploded mine after the attacks.
- The type of limpet mine observed in this incident is unique in structure when compared to the international inventory of limpet mines. It bears a striking resemblance to and is consistent with Iranian made limpet mines that have been publicly displayed by Iran. The green composite material on the recovered magnet, location of the cartridge-actuated nail holes, number of nail holes, and diameter of the limpet placement area is consistent with the Iranian "Indigenous Extra-Large" limpet mine advertised in a 2015 arms display.
- We also have post-attack video of an Iranian military vessel pulling up at high speed alongside the Kokuka Courageous to remove an object from the hull. We assess this object to be an unexploded limpet mine. The procedures the IRGC personnel followed were inconsistent with standard safety practices that Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams would employ when approaching unknown ordnance. The video, which has been released publicly, shows that IRGC personnel took no safety precautions when approaching or removing the ordnance, suggesting they knew how it was intended to function and exactly where it was. The removal and

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confiscation of the mine suggest an attempt by Tehran to hide its involvement in the attacks.

 A U.S. Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal team has gathered fragments and pieces of metal from the external explosion onboard the Kokuka Courageous as well as explosive residue, fingerprints, and trace evidence to process through explosive and biometric laboratories. We will continue to assess this evidence.

#### DISPOSITION OF CREW MEMBERS

When FRONT ALTAIR sent a distress call, a nearby Marshall Islands-flagged oiler responded and rescued the crew from their life raft - a 23 member crew of Russian, Filipino, and Georgian nationals.

- Iranian military vessels surrounded the oiler and demanded they turn
  over the FRONT ALTAIR crew. The master of the oiler felt he had no
  choice but to comply with their demands and transfer the FRONT ALTAIR
  crew to the Iranian military.
- The crew of the FRONT ALTAIR were held in Iran for two days. They were eventually released and arrived in Dubai on 15 June.

When KOKUKA COURAGEOUS sent a distress call, a nearby Dutch-flagged vessel responded.

- The Dutch vessel informed the KOKUKA COURAGEOUS master that there was an object on the KOKUKA's hull, which they believed to be an unexploded naval limpet mine.
- The KOKUKA crew all Filipino nationals evacuated to the Dutch vessel, which was hailed by an Iranian military vessel requesting transfer of the KOKUKA crew. However, the USS BAINBRIDGE reached the Dutch vessel before the Iranian military vessel, and took the KOKUKA COURAGEOUS crew on board at the request of the KOKUKA's master.

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
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#### M/V KOKUKA COURAGEOUS Attacked With Iranian Indigenous Extra-Large Limpet Mines (High Confidence)

 (U) NAVCENT Team conducted post-blast analysis and evidence collection on Panamanian-flagged M/V KOKUKA COURAGEOUS in the Gulf of Oman

#### Findings:

- (U) Imagery observed object on starboard side of the vessel (witnessed being removed by Iranian Naval forces) consistent with limpet mine size and shape
- (U) Recovered magnet and explosive cartridge actuated nail holes consistent with limpet mine attachment techniques
- (U) Imprint is consistent with an Iranian "Indigenous Extra-Large" limpet mine
- (U) 2x nail holes at the imprint site are consistent with an Iranian "Indigenous Extra-Large" limpet mine
- (U) Aluminum and composite remnants on the recovered magnet are consistent with advertised Iranian "Indigenous Extra-Large" limpet mine material composition
- (U) Mine appears consistent with Iranianmade limpet mines displayed publicly by Iran



(U) 14 JUN image of M/V KOKUKA COURAGEOUS

(U) Measurements are consistent with advertised Iranian Indigenous Extra-Large Limpet Mine diameter

(U) NAVCENT and the Office of Naval Intelligence assesses with high confidence the limpet mines used in the attack on the M/V KOKUKA COURAGEOUS were of Iranian origin and design, based on exploitation and our understanding of the technical characteristics of world-wide limpet mines. Furthermore, the attack was almost certainly conducted by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN), based on historical Iranian press video of IRGCN training with the same class of limpet mine and an IRGCN vessel being used to retrieve the unexploded mine after the attacks.

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#### M/V KOKUKA COURAGEOUS Attacked With Iranian Indigenous Extra-Large Limpet Mines (High Confidence)



(U) Brochure for Iranian Indigenous Extra-Large Limpet Mine, Publicly Revealed at 2015 Military Display

#### Translation

Project Objectives: This mine has been designed and built to be used against vessels and fixed and mobile metallic and non-metallic structure.


General Specifications:

Diameter (mm): 550

Height (mm): 320 Weight (kg): 42

Casing: Aluminum and Composite

Operational Application: To destroy a variety of vessels and fixed and mobile and non-metallic structures.



(U) Measurements are consistent with reported diameter of Iranian Extra-Large limpet mine



(U) Magnet 3.5" diameter; aluminum, composite remnants

(U) The green composite material on the recovered magnet, location of the cartridge-actuated nail holes, number of nail holes, and diameter of the limpet placement area is consistent with the Iranian "Indigenous Extra-Large" limpet mine advertised in a 2015 arms display. Chemical analysis of collected explosive residue swabs is pending.

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#### Statement explaining additional imagery:

The Motor Tanker (M/T) Kokuka Courageous sustained damage from a limpet mine attack while operating in the Gulf of Oman, on June 13th. Limpet mines are attached to a vessel via magnets and/or nails and detonated by a timer. Following the attack, sailors from the Kokuka Couragous discovered a second, unexploded, limpet mine on their vessel and abandoned ship. The Dutch tug Coastal Ace rescued the crew of 21 sailors. The USS Bainbridge (DDG 96) then transferred and transported the Sailors to safety. Later that day, an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Gashti Class patrol boat approached Kokuka Courageous and was observed and recorded by a U.S. Navy MH-60R helicopter removing the unexploded limpet mine from Kokuka Courageous. Iran is responsible for the attack based on video evidence and the resources and proficiency needed to quickly remove the unexploded limpet mine. The hull penetration measures 1.1m at the widest point by 1.5m 4'2" x 3'8" (H x W) at the tallest point. The penetration begins approximately 1m above the water line.

#### Photos from an MH-60R on Jun 13, 2019



Imagery taken from a U.S. Navy MH-60R helicopter of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy removing an unexploded limpet mine from the M/T Kokuka Courageous.

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Imagery taken from a U.S. Navy MH-60R helicopter of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy after removing an unexploded limpet mine from the M/T Kokuka Courageous.



Imagery taken from a U.S. Navy MH-60R helicopter of blast -damage to M/T Kokuka Courageous. M/V Kokuka Courageous received damage consistent with a limpet mine attack in the Gulf of Oman, June 13.

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Imagery taken from a U.S. Navy MH-60R helicopter of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy of the remnants of the magnetic attachment device of unexploded limpet mine from the M/T Kokuka Courageous.

#### Photo taken by a crewman on an MH-60R with a handheld camera on Jun 13, 2019



Imagery taken from a U.S. Navy MH-60R helicopter of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy after removing an unexploded limpet mine from the M/T Kokuka Courageous.

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#### Photos of Damage and Mine Remnants taken June 14.



7710 – This is a view of hull penetration/blast damage on the starboard side of motor vessel M/T Kokuka Courageous, which was sustained from a limpet mine attack while operating in the Gulf of Oman, on June 13th.



7725 - This photo is a view of hull penetration/blast damage sustained from a limpet mine attack on the starboard side of motor vessel M/T Kokuka Courageous, while operating in the Gulf of Oman, June 13.


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7729 - This photo is a view of internal hull penetration/blast damage sustained from a limpet mine attack on the starboard side of motor vessel M/T Kokuka Courageous, while operating in the Gulf of Oman, June 13.



7714 – This is the view of the remnants of a removed limpet mine's placement, location, and damage sustained from a limpet mine attack, on the starboard side of motor vessel M/T Kokuka Courageous, while operating in the Gulf of Oman, June 13. A limpet mine is attached to a vessel via magnet and/or nails. The holes seen were created by nails used to hold the mine in place.

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7761 -This photo depicts the aluminum and green composite material left behind following removal of an unexploded limpet mine used in an attack on the starboard side of motor vessel M/T Kokuka Courageous, while operating in the Gulf of Oman, June 13th.

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## Приложение II к письму Временного поверенного в делах Постоянного представительства Соединенных Штатов Америки при Организации Объединенных Наций от 27 июня 2019 года на имя Генерального секретаря

