

**Security Council**

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**Letter dated 24 May 2019 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council**

Upon the request of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat, I have the honour to transmit the communiqué of the 848th meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union on the African Union-United Nations joint review of the African Union Mission in Somalia, which was adopted on 9 May 2019 in Addis Ababa (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

*(Signed)* António **Guterres**



**Annex****Letter dated 20 May 2019 from the Chairperson of the African Union Commission addressed to the Secretary-General**

Let me start by expressing my appreciation for the partnership between the African Union and the United Nations in restoring peace and security in Somalia.

In this context, I would like to inform you that the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, at its 847th meeting, held in Addis Ababa on 7 May 2019, considered and adopted my report on the situation in Somalia. The report provides an update on activities during the period from November 2018 to January 2019, focusing on the progress made by Somalia and the support provided by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in the implementation the United Nations Transition Plan for Somalia, including progress by AMISOM in implementing its mandate.

At its 848th meeting, held in Addis Ababa on 9 May 2019, the Peace and Security Council also considered and adopted my report on the fifth African Union-United Nations joint review of AMISOM. The report highlights the key outcomes of the joint review, as well as my recommendations on key issues for consideration for the renewal of the mandate of AMISOM, bearing in mind that the current mandate of AMISOM will come to an end on 27 May 2019.

The fifth African Union-United Nations joint review was conducted following the decision of the Peace and Security Council in accordance with its communiqué PSC/MIN/COMM.3 (DCCLXXXII), adopted at 782nd meeting, on 27 June 2018. In that communiqué, the Peace and Security Council called for a joint review, prior to the expiry of the mandate of AMISOM, “to assess progress achieved on the implementation of the Transition Plan, the state and effectiveness of the AMISOM reconfiguration and its support for the transition process and any further reconfiguration and alignment, as appropriate” (para. 22). As you recall, the Security Council, in its resolution [2431 \(2018\)](#), also requested a review of the reconfiguration of AMISOM in support of the Transition Plan, in line with paragraphs 5, 7, 8 and 23 of the resolution.

In this regard, I would be most grateful if the attached communiqué of the Peace and Security Council, PSC/PR/COMM.1 (DCCCXLVIII), adopted at its 848th meeting (see enclosure I), at which it also adopted my report on the situation in Somalia and my report on the fifth African Union-United Nations joint review of AMISOM (see enclosure II), could be urgently transmitted to the members of the United Nations Security Council for information and action, as appropriate, including their adoption as working documents of the Security Council. I also request your incorporation of the Peace and Security Council decision into your letter to the Security Council on the renewal of the mandate and authority of AMISOM.

Furthermore, I would appreciate the convergence of the United Nations resolution with the attached communiqué of the Peace and Security Council to ensure clear and unambiguous direction to AMISOM in its support for the federal Government, the federal Member States and the people of Somalia through the implementation of the Transition Plan, leading to its completion and the transition of AMISOM by December 2021.

*(Signed)* Moussa Faki **Mahamat**

## Enclosure I

### **Communiqué of the 848th meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, held on 9 May 2019**

**Adopted by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union at its 848th meeting, held on 9 May 2019, on the report of the Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union on the fifth African Union-United Nations joint review of the African Union Mission in Somalia and the renewal of the mandate of the Mission**

*The Peace and Security Council,*

*Taking note* of the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the AU-UN Joint Review of AMISOM, as well as statements made by H.E. Ambassador Hope Tumukunde Gasatura, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Rwanda and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of May 2019; Dr. Admore Kambudzi, Ag. Director for Peace and Security Department on behalf of H.E. Ambassador Smail Chergui, AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, and H.E. Ambassador Francisco Madeira, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission for Somalia and Head of AMISOM; Also noting the statement by the Representatives of Somalia, Ethiopia, in its capacity as the Chair of IGAD, Equatorial Guinea, as member of the A3, as well as the United Nations and European Union,

*Recalling* its previous decisions and pronouncements on the situation in Somalia and AMISOM, particularly Communiqué [PSC/PR/COMM. (DCCCXXVII)], adopted at its 827th meeting held on 13 February 2019; Communiqué [PSC/PR/COMM. (DCCCVI)], adopted at its 806th meeting held on 07 November 2018; Communiqué [PSC/MIN/COMM.3 (DCCLXXXII)], adopted at its 782nd meeting held on 27 June 2018; Communiqué [PSC/PR/COMM. (DCCLXIX)], adopted at its 769th meeting held on 30 April 2018; and Communiqué [PSC/PR/COMM. (DCCLIII)], adopted at its 753rd meeting held on 15 February 2018,

*Acknowledging* the significant progress made to secure peace and stability in Somalia, while noting the fragility of the gains made so far in the political and security situation,

*Underlining the imperative* for Somalis to reach consensus on national reconciliation, a final constitution on the nature of a Federal Somalia, comprehensive implementation of the National Security Architecture,

*Also noting* the continued tensions around regional elections and acceptance of the federal elections model, as well as the risks that external interference presents to the current momentum and progress achieved,

*Commending* the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) for its continued commitment to the transition, the recent steps taken to enhance the administration and management of the Somali National Security Forces (SNSF); *welcoming* the commencement of political dialogue and reconciliation process between the FGS and the Federal Member States (FMS), through the convening of a meeting in Garowe, Puntland, which started on 4 May 2019; *also urging* the FGS and FMS to ensure realization of an implementable political agreement that will guarantee inclusive politics and facilitate finalization of the federal constitution that will clarify the devolution of responsibilities, implementation of the National Security Architecture (NSA), as well as involvement of the FMS in the planning and implementation of critical elections processes to guarantee a successful election in 2020/2021 and transition process,

*Further commending* the AU Commission for the successful conduct of the AU-UN Joint Review of AMISOM, the FGS, the UN, Troop and Police Contributing Countries (T/PCCs) as well as bilateral partners for their continued commitment and cooperation extended to the Joint Review Team,

*Welcoming* the findings, observations and recommendations of the 5th AU-UN Joint Review of AMISOM, particularly issues relating to the progress achieved so far, on the implementation of the Somalia Transition Plan (STP), including the challenges relating to the differences between the FGS and FMS, limited capacity of the Federal Government and coordination between the federal level and the regional administrations with regard to the implementation of the NSA and the planning for national elections,

*Commending* AMISOM and the SNSF for the recent operations that led to the liberation of some locations from Al-Shabaab, especially in Lower Shabelle and Juba Valley, the Police deployment in Kismayo, including their training and mentoring activities in the FMS, the expansion of AMISOM civilian component to cover all AMISOM sectors and their efforts in supporting broader stabilization, including increased community engagement, technical capacity-building support to the National Independent Election Commission (NIEC) on elections processes, enhancement of human rights and humanitarian compliance and implementation of community-led quick impact and peace strengthening projects (QIPs/PSPs),

*Also commending* the continuous progress and immense contribution of AMISOM police component in the provision of training, mentoring and advisory support in building effective federal and regional police capacity,

*Further commending* AMISOM military for the handover of the Mogadishu Stadium and the Jalle Siyad Military Academy in Mogadishu to the Federal Government and security services, including joint planning with the Somali National Army to capture and secure Leego and the Mogadishu-Baidoa, and Baidoa-Leego Main Supply Routes, in line with the objectives of the Transition Plan, and

*Acting under Article 7 of its Protocol, the Peace and Security Council:*

1. *Pays tribute* to the AMISOM Troop and Police Contributing Countries (T/PCCs), especially those that have paid the ultimate sacrifice in the cause of peace, security, stability and reconciliation in Somalia;
2. *Reiterates* its gratitude to the UN, the EU and other bilateral partners for their continued support to AMISOM efforts to promote a multidimensional and comprehensive approach in supporting the efforts of the Federal Government (FGS) and Federal Member States (FMS) of Somalia in the implementation of the Somalia Transition Plan (STP), including in degrading the Al-Shabaab terrorists group, as well as UN, EU and other partners financial and material support to AMISOM and the Federal Government of Somalia;
3. *Reaffirms* its endorsement of the STP, its implementation and support to the FGS and *appeals* to the FGS and all Somali stakeholders to fully commit themselves towards the effective implementation of the STP, which forms the basis for channelling collective efforts to make progress towards the taking over of primary security responsibilities by the FGS;
4. *Reiterates* that successful implementation of the STP is dependent on resolution of the differences between the FGS and FMS and political progress underpinned by good relations required to overcome the challenge facing the implementation of the National Security Architecture (NSA), including force generation, as well as agreements on immediate practical approaches to utilize the

Regional Forces identified during the Operational Readiness Assessment (ORA) of Regional Forces, as part of the NSA;

5. *Expresses deep concern* over Al-Shabaab's continued ability to carry out attacks against innocent civilians, Somali security forces and AMISOM and the presence of Deash in Somalia, which further exacerbates insecurity in Somalia;

6. *Endorses* the recommendations in the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the situation in Somalia and on the 5th AU-UN Joint Review of AMISOM, and:

(a) *Requests* the AU Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) to authorize the Commission to fill the outstanding approved AMISOM vacant staff positions, including civilians, in order to facilitate the expansion of the civilian component across all AMISOM sectors and sector headquarters to enhance cross-Mission representation and multidimensional coordination support to the domestication of the Transition Plan in the Federal Member States, facilitate humanitarian assistance and human rights compliance, community engagement and confidence-building, as well as support quick impact and peace strengthening projects (QIPs/PSPs) in local communities; and *requests* the UN Security Council to authorize support to AMISOM's efforts by increasing UN logistics support to an additional 50 substantive civilian personnel who will focus on supporting the domestication of the Transition Plan in the Federal Member States;

(b) *Notes* that the security threat level in Somalia still remains high and that the lack of progress in the implementation of the STP, particularly the slow pace of generating capable Somalia Security Forces (SSF) will create critical security risks for the successful planning and conduct of elections in 2020/2021;

(c) *Takes note* of the two options presented by the Joint Review on the AMISOM Uniformed Personnel strength and levels, and *underlines the need* for AMISOM to be ready to contribute in securing the conduct of the elections scheduled for 2020/2021;

(d) *Underscores the imperative* of expediting the generation of outstanding force enablers and multipliers, in particular, air assets to enhance mobility, resupply, rapid reaction, quick attack combat capability and the implementation of other mandated tasks, as well as the deployment of outstanding Mission Enabling Units and counter-Improvised Explosive Ordnances (IED) capabilities, and Unarmed Aerial Vehicles (UAVs/UAS) needed to enhance AMISOM's support and protection in clearing priority Main Supply Routes;

7. *Reiterates* AMISOM's significant contribution in support of the political and stabilization processes in Somalia, and *calls on* the UN, consistent with the framework of the "Joint UN-AU Framework for Enhancing Partnership on Peace and Security" based on comparative advantages and complementarity for the revitalization of the tripartite MoU between the AU, IGAD and the UN through the immediate operationalization of appropriate coordination mechanism, in order to immediately commence facilitation of joint strategic agreements and initiatives;

8. *Stresses* the need for the enhancement of the capacity of the United Nations Support Office to Somalia (UNSOs), in line with AMISOM's reconfiguration and mandated tasks, *requests* the review of the AMISOM support concept to address existing gaps and to enhance AMISOM's role in support to the implementation of the STP;

9. *Reiterates the importance* of continued presence of AMISOM in Somalia, as well as the need for predictable and sustainable funding for the Mission, and in this

regard, *expresses deep appreciation* to the UN, EU and other international partners for their continued funding for AMISOM;

10. *Decides* to renew the mandate of AMISOM for another 12 months until 27 May 2020, to support implementation of the STP, in line with the objectives of the 2018–2021 AMISOM CONOPs and the Exit Strategy and for AMISOM to maintain its current tasks, including the four tasks highlighted in the 700th and 782nd communiqués of the PSC, including the tasks outlined in Phase 1 and 2 of the STP, as well as to:

(a) consolidate and enhance the substantive functions of the civilian component and in expanding their political and stabilization roles in all AMISOM sectors, including ensuring International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and human rights compliance and accountability of AMISOM, while supporting SNSF to enhance same;

(b) continue AMISOM's police progressive training, mentoring and advising of the Somali federal and regional Police, including Darwish forces required to successfully implement the STP;

(c) continue enhancing joint planning and operations with the SSF to degrade Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups to guarantee security and stability across Somalia;

(d) provide technical support to the FGS and FMS, including through the National Interim Electoral Commission, in ensuring effective planning, conduct and security for the 2020/2021 elections;

11. *Requests* the Commission to work closely with the UN to monitor implementation of this communiqué and to ensure timely quarterly reports to the PSC on the situation in Somalia; undertake a Joint AU-UN Assessment of required equipment not later than July 2019, as well as to also undertake the 6th AU-UN Joint Review of AMISOM's multidimensional capacities and capabilities, before the expiration of the new mandate, in order to ascertain progress achieved in the implementation of the mandated tasks and made recommendations on the way forward;

12. *Also requests* the Chairperson of the Commission to transmit this Communiqué to the African Members of the UN Security Council (A3), as well as to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for incorporation into his letter to the UN Security Council on the renewal of AMISOM's mandate and as a working document for the members of the UN Security Council;

13. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

## Enclosure II

### **Report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the fifth African Union-United Nations joint review of the African Union Mission in Somalia**

#### **I. Introduction**

1. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has continued to perform its essential role of providing security and enabling political and state-building processes in Somalia since its deployment in 2007. This has been done notably by supporting successive Somalia governments in liberating main cities from Al-Shabaab; securing main population centres, including Mogadishu; protecting key government installations and facilities; and enabling the presence and operations of the United Nations and international partners. AMISOM made a critical contribution in securing the 2016 election process that saw a transition of power to the current federal political dispensation under President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo and Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khaire. Since 2017, Somalia and the international community's consensus has been for a transition of security responsibility from AMISOM to Somali Security Forces (SSF) and institutions, with the aim of Somalis taking the lead in security by December 2021. To this end, in 2018, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) adopted the Somali Transition Plan (STP), which was endorsed by the African Union (AU) Peace and Security (PSC) during its 769th meeting held on 30 April 2018. The STP provides for a phased, conditions-based transfer of security responsibility from AMISOM to the FGS between 2018 and 2021.

2. Through the Communiqué PSC/MIN/COMM.3(DCCLXXII) of its 782nd meeting held on 27 June 2018, the PSC renewed AMISOM's mandate until 27 May 2019 and set out AMISOM's strategic objectives and priority tasks in paragraphs 11 and 21–22, respectively. Similar objectives and priority tasks were authorised by the UN Security Council (UNSC) in paragraphs 7 and 8 of resolution [2431 \(2018\)](#), in the context of the long-term objective of Somalia assuming full responsibility for its security. Taking note of, inter alia, the 4th AU-UN joint review of AMISOM of May 2018 that proposed concrete elements of an AMISOM reconfiguration to support the transition to Somali security forces and institutions, the AU PSC Comm. 782 and UNSCR 2431 welcomed a number of steps to be undertaken that AMISOM has facilitated. These included (a) the completion of an Operational Readiness Assessment (ORA) of AMISOM in September 2018 that identified AMISOM's capacities and requirements to support the implementation of the STP and provided a baseline for; (b) the development of a new AMISOM Concept of Operations (CONOPS) in November 2018 that is aligned to support the implementation of the STP and concurrent activities and provides clear target dates for the progressive transfer of security responsibility to Somali security institutions; (c) development of a reconfiguration plan reported to the AU PSC and UNSC as part of the 2018–2021 AMISOM CONOPS; and (d) a reduction in the level of AMISOM uniformed personnel to a revised ceiling of 20,626 that has already been completed.

3. The 2018–2021 AMISOM CONOPS was endorsed by AU PSC on 13 February 2019 and sets out the strategic level tasks for AMISOM to transfer security responsibility to the Somalis, in three phases over the period June 2018 to December 2021, aligned with the phases of the STP. This was followed by an AMISOM-Somali National Army (SNA) Joint Sector Commanders' Conference held from 11 to 14 February 2019, during which a detailed operational plan was jointly developed for each phase with timelines, including locations for handover, joint operations and planning for securing Main Supply Routes (MSRs).

4. Against this backdrop, the Commission presents the Chairperson's Report on the outcomes of the 5th AU-UN Joint Review of AMISOM, bearing also in mind that the current mandate of AMISOM will come to an end on 27 May 2019.

## II. Objectives of the 5th AU-UN Joint Review of AMISOM

5. The 5th AU-UN joint review of AMISOM was conducted from 4 to 19 March 2019, pursuant to AU PSC Communiqué PSC/MIN/COMM.3(DCCLXXII) (paragraph 22), which called for a technical assessment of the implementation of the STP to be carried out within six months, in addition to a Joint Review prior to the expiry of the AMISOM mandate and UNSCR 2431 (paragraph 23) which welcomed the intention of the Secretary-General (SG) to undertake a technical assessment of AMISOM. The aims of the Review were to: (a) assess progress on the implementation of the STP, including priorities, conditions and timelines for the handover of primary security responsibility from AMISOM to SSF, and the building of capable federal security institutions, including force generation and level of preparedness of SSF; (b) review AMISOM's reconfiguration in support of the STP, at Force, Police and Mission Headquarters and in the Sectors; (c) assess the Federal Government of Somalia's (FGS) priorities for effective implementation of the STP; (d) assess support of AMISOM civilian component to AMISOM military and police tasks and implementation of the STP, including coordination with UNSOM and the deployment of AMISOM civilian personnel in the sectors; and, (e) assess AMISOM's use of available support, including enablers and multipliers, supporting the implementation of the STP and preparations for the conduct of elections in 2020/21, as well as the effectiveness of joint UNSOS-AMISOM management of logistical support and its alignment to AMISOM priorities.

## III. Methodology

6. The Joint Review was co-led by the UN Departments of Political and Peace building Affairs and Peace Operations and AU Peace Support Operations Division, with participation from UN Department of Operational Support, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) and United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU), as well as key international partners on security in Somalia. The review team held meetings in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 4 and 5 March with AMISOM Police and Troop Contributing Countries (P/TCCs) and with members of the international community, followed by a visit to Somalia from 6 to 16 March for consultations with the FGS, AMISOM, UNSOS and visits to all AMISOM Sector Headquarters (Mogadishu, Baidoa, Kismayo, Beletweyne and Jowhar) where the review team received briefings and interacted with the relevant officials, especially on the progress of AMISOM towards achieving the strategic objectives and priority tasks in paragraphs 11, 21 and 22 of the AU PSC Comm. 782 and paragraphs 7 and 8 in UNSC resolution [2431 \(2018\)](#), taking into considerations, the capacities of SSF, AMISOM planning for reconfiguration, transition and handover at the sector level.

7. The review presented its findings and recommendations, as detailed in this report, to the AU Commission and the international partners in Addis Ababa on 18 and 19 March 2019. The planned meeting and de-briefing which had been planned for the Somali Prime Minister, H.E. Hassan Ali Khaire on the outcomes of the Joint Review, could not take place before the Joint Review team left Somalia. Notwithstanding, the findings of this report were communicated to the FGS by the UN.



## IV. Key findings

8. The following were the key findings reflected of the Joint Review:

### *Political overview and the upcoming electoral period*

9. The FGS, under the leadership of President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo and Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khairi, continues to make notable progress on political, security and economic priorities. These have been based on road maps that set milestones and timelines to be achieved for progress in building an inclusive, federal Somali State, despite a number of challenges with slippages in timelines and at times re-adjusted priorities. Over the previous year, the FGS and the Federal Member States (FMS) reached agreements on fisheries, oil and mineral resources, as well as on an electoral model for the next elections due to take place in 2020/21. As part of the constitutional review process, the federal entities have thus far completed the review of nine out of 15 chapters of the Provisional Federal Constitution, with six chapters remaining, concerning key issues such as relationship between the FGS and the FMS, fiscal federalism, the status of Mogadishu, as well as the issue of Somaliland. Somali authorities also made notable progress on reconciliation, with the validation of a National Reconciliation Framework in February 2019.

10. In addition to the key federal issues highlighted above, a key indicator of progress on Somalia's path towards becoming a fully functioning federal State (with full and active participation of the FMS) will be preparations and readiness for the one person, one vote elections scheduled for 2020/21. According to the National Independent Electoral Commission (NIEC), the process of selecting registration sites will commence in June 2019 with voter registration beginning by March 2020, followed by polling which is expected to take place in late October or early November 2020 in about 1,760 polling stations spread across the Federal Republic of Somalia. In this regard, and in order to ensure credible elections, the FGS and the NIEC needs technical support to facilitate the required processes. This will be confirmed and coordinated within the soon-to-be established and operationalized Federal Electoral Support Task Force (FESTF), to ensure coordination and complementarity with AMISOM, the UN and other key stakeholders. These processes are expected to be put in place in 2019, which is a critical year to ascertain whether Somalia is able to overcome existing internal political divisions and regain momentum for sustained progress.

### *Security situation and threat assessment*

11. AMISOM continues to operate in a volatile environment, where its forces, and SSF control only the urban centres and the immediate environs and bases where its military components are deployed. The main security threat still comes from Al-Shabaab, a network of an estimated 4,000 to 7,000 fighters spread throughout the country, particularly in southern and central Somalia, with the exception of Somaliland and limited presence and activities in Puntland. Al-Shabaab continues to control the rural areas and the vast countryside and continues to pose challenges to AMISOM as well as the Somali authorities and people. The security situation in Somalia, therefore, continues to remain complex and difficult to predict, and has not improved over the past year.

12. Al-Shabaab has demonstrated continued ability to adapt to increasing pressure, including from an increased rate of air strikes by Somalia's bilateral partners targeting its members. It operates under a well-organized structure, with well-functioning operational, ideological and administrative units, capable of generating sufficient revenue through taxation of business and local communities and toll collection at

checkpoints along MSRs, among other revenue streams. The group continues to carry out deadly attacks targeting AMISOM, SSF, government entities and civilians, using capabilities such as Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), asymmetrical and complex attacks tactics and targeted assassinations. The presence of Al-Shabaab in some population centres offers a viable governance alternative, making it difficult for government institutions to exert influence and security. Thus, the role and influence of clans in Al-Shabaab's activities is a matter of serious concern that may provide insights for political solution to address the insecurity in Somalia.

13. The security threat in the wider AMISOM Area of Responsibility in the country also remains high. As AMISOM reconfigures, especially its military component, and vacates positions or hands them over to SSF as part of the transition, the risk of Al-Shabaab returning to the vacated areas is high, leaving populations exposed and vulnerable to reprisal attacks, victimization and dire humanitarian consequences. The reconfiguration may also affect the activities of AMISOM Police and civilian components in the vacated location(s). It is, therefore, important that the impact and consequences of AMISOM's reconfiguration, especially by the military component, on communities is well assessed, understood and mitigated.

#### *Stocktaking of the Transition Plan and Somali Security Forces*

14. It should be recalled that the STP, developed by the FGS, in consultation with FMS in March 2018, has three areas of focus, namely: Operational activities, Institutional capacity-building, and supporting activities. The Plan sets out priorities, milestones and conditions for transition with key indicators starting with transfer of security responsibilities from AMISOM to SSF and Institutions. This includes stabilization and state-building activities through capacity-building of the military, police and the justice sector to ensure rule of law and sustainable peace.

15. As part of operational activities, a number of key locations were prioritized and identified for handing over to SSF, including deploying forces agreed in the Somalia National Security Architecture. To this end, so far, two key locations – Mogadishu Stadium and the Jalle Siyad Military Academy in Mogadishu have been transferred from AMISOM to Somali authorities and security services control. When 400 AMISOM troops in Sector 5 were withdrawn, as part of the implementation of the AU PSC Comm. 782 and UNSCR 2431,<sup>1</sup> there were serious challenges for the SSF, including the Middle Shebelle Regional Forces, to effectively take over the locations vacated by the troops. The challenges were due to a combination of factors including lack of capacity of the FGS and coordination with the regional administration to mobilize forces to occupy the locations. Another point to note in the implementation of the operational activities relates to the diversion from agreed priorities by the FGS to other issues that are not part of the priorities outlined in the STP. This has justifiably been due to political considerations, one of which was the circumstances surrounding the presidential election in the South West State in November 2018 wherein the FGS redirected its focus from the initially envisioned operational priorities within Phase 1, including securing the town of Leego in the South West State and also securing the Mogadishu-Baidoa MSR.

16. On institutional capacity-building, the FGS indicated that it was taking steps towards institutional reform and capacity-building in the security sector. Notably, a two-year biometric registration process of the SNA was recently completed, which would inform "rightsizing" of the SNA forces, entailing retiring veterans under a pension's scheme and recruitment of new personnel. Biometric registration of personnel in other security services including the Somali Police Force (SPF) and

<sup>1</sup> AU PSC Comm. 782 and UNSCR 2431 called for the drawdown of 1,000 AMISOM troops by 28 Feb 2019.

National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) is ongoing. Other measures under way, as highlighted by the FGS, include payment of salaries of security personnel through direct electronic transfers to their bank accounts; establishment of regional security offices; standardization of defence procurement contracts; and improvements in weapons distribution and management. It is worth noting that with the foregoing observations, out of the 17 tasks highlighted in the STP to be accomplished between January 2018 and June 2019, three have been successfully accomplished, namely: reduction of AMISOM strength by 1,000 troops; AMISOM's handing over of the identified priority locations (Mogadishu Stadium and the Military Academy) to SSF; and the conduct of ORA of Regional Forces (which culminated with 19,945 Regional Forces identified). Progress is being facilitated on all the other tasks.

17. UNSOS continues to provide logistical support to up to 10,900 SNA troops under criteria set by the UNSC, and the FGS provides for the remainder of the SNA. The Joint Review noted the slow progress of the FGS in building the management policies and structures of the SNA, especially at the Ministry of Defence and Army Headquarters. The FGS provided a training programme which would see a total of some 11,400 SNA troops being bilaterally trained by FGS partners, by December 2021. The challenge of force generation was noted and may, thus, not enable the SNA to sufficiently take over security responsibility in Somalia within the specified timelines. In this regard, and in view of the AMISOM planned exit by December 2021, the FGS force generation plan is unlikely to be enough to take over security responsibilities from AMISOM by 2021. The FGS stressed that the arms embargo remains an obstacle to properly arm their security forces to enable them conduct operations as required. They also highlighted the need for infrastructure for the SNA including barracks, and also requested the Joint Review to explore the possibility of extending UNSOS logistical support to the entire SNA, up to 18,000 soldiers when the formation of the army is complete.

18. Under similar plans for the police, the FGS highlighted their plans to generate over 7,500 new police forces by December 2021, to supplement the 7,700 existing federal police, majority of them deployed in Mogadishu, and 1,260 state police in Kismayo (Jubbaland), Baidoa (South West) and Jowhar and Beletweyne (Hirshabelle). The National Security Architecture provides for a total of 32,000 federal and state police forces by 2027. Currently, the strength of state police and their capability vary widely across the FMS due to differing conditions. The review heard of FGS plans to deploy and recruit police in the regions, mainly the capitals and main urban centres, although the pace of police forces recruitment and deployment was noted to be slow. In this regard, the review noted the outcomes of the ORA of regional forces in Somalia presently not part of a federated security sector which was completed in February 2019. The ORA shows some 19,948 regional forces spread throughout the FMS that could be integrated into the Somali security sector under the National Security Architecture. Plans for where and how many of these forces would be integrated into the Somali security sector, and how they would be distributed between military, police and other security services are not yet in place.

19. The review noted that prospects for integration of regional forces into a federal security sector depend to a large extent on progress on the political and reconciliation processes, and the willingness of both the FGS and respective FMS, regional entities or clans to cooperate towards this goal. Also, the review noted a very critical challenge in the utilization of the SNA troops trained or generated by partners to directly support implementation of the STP priorities. Apart from the DANAB forces, trained by the United States of America (USA), which are used for targeted and disruptive operations, there was no clarity on how the troops being trained by all the other partners are being used or will be used to directly support implementation of the STP.

*AMISOM Operations*

20. AU PSC Communiqué PSC/MIN/COMM.3(DCCLXXXII) of its 782nd meeting, and UNSCR 2431 provides three key strategic objectives of AMISOM, namely: (a) enable the gradual handover of security responsibilities from AMISOM to Somali Security Forces; (b) reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other Armed Opposition Groups; and (c) assist the SSF to provide security for the political process at all levels as well as stabilization, reconciliation and peacebuilding. AMISOM has continued to successfully implement its roles and tasks outlined in paragraphs 11, 21 and 22 of AU PSC Comm. 782 as well as in UNSCR 2432, paragraphs 8a, 8b, 8c and 8f, including 8g partially. However, it faces challenges of coordination in undertaking targeted offensive operations, including joint operations with SNA; securing key MSRs because of different levels of preparedness of the multiplicity of actors required to secure the MSRs; and mentoring of SNA due to lack of a coordinated mentoring programme and clarity on which troops to be mentored as well as shift in focus of the FGS which continue to delay the priorities set out in the STP.

21. Notwithstanding the challenges mentioned above, AMISOM continues to secure the main population centres, protecting key installations and government facilities and enabling international presence and operations in the country. The challenges experienced by AMISOM in carrying out certain priority tasks and undertaking major offensive operations includes insufficient joint planning between AMISOM and SNA, change of plans and priorities by the FGS after joint planning, deficiencies in the readiness and logistics capabilities of SSF and institutions, the lack of identified forces to hold and continue securing areas to be captured. It is expected that the planned deployment of four (4) additional military helicopters will be instrumental to augment AMISOM's readiness to conduct offensive operations and support the effective implementation of the STP. This success will also depend on the commitment and ability of SSF to hold liberated areas, comprehensive and inclusive efforts involving military, police and civilian elements that include FMS as well as district and local administrations, to prevent recovered areas and population centres from reverting to Al-Shabaab.

*Compliance and accountability*

22. The review team noted improvements in AMISOM sectors' reporting to the Civilian Casualty Tracking and Reporting Cell (CCTARC). Translation of AMISOM ROEs into different TCC languages and dissemination of these ROEs has also helped to enhance the understanding and compliance of troops on the ground. Training on International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Laws (IHRL) continues to be provided to AMISOM troops, as well as SSF to enhance compliance and accountability. AMISOM also continues to monitor the status of implementation of the measures for the use of armed air assets based on signed Letters of Assist and the risk assessments for the use of air assets to ensure mitigation measures are followed. This has resulted in the reduction in civilian casualties (by AMISOM) and allegations on AMISOM as well as improved response to concerns raised by the UN since the last review. The improved collaboration between AMISOM and the UN entities through the UN-Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) and the Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC) Working Groups and AMISOM's adherence to AU's Zero Tolerance Policy of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse has also facilitated constructive engagement between AMISOM and UNSOM on issues of human rights.

23. However, the review noted that continuous strengthening and harmonization of AMISOM's procedures, especially those for Boards of Inquiry and investigations is necessary as part of AU's efforts to enhance its IHL and IHRL compliance and accountability mechanism on human rights. The review noted that limited facilities at

the front line to hold defectors till they are handed over to FGS and/or FMS authorities within 72 hours, present challenges in the implementation of AMISOM's Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) on the treatment and handling of disengaged combatants at reception stage. The need to strengthen follow-up mechanisms after the handing over of disengaged combatants to local authorities were also noted. The review also noted challenges in tracking civilian casualties arising from air operations of Somalia's bilateral partners that are not under the command, control and/or coordination of AMISOM. This was highlighted noting that, as more air assets are being considered for AMISOM, enhanced preventive and CCTARC measures and tracking mechanisms, to support identification of civilian casualties due to AMISOM actions, as against those of other Somalia bilateral partners are well managed for a more effective prevention and response processes and approaches.

24. Looking ahead, the need to focus on strengthening the capacity of SSF to comply with human rights and international humanitarian law is critical. In this regard, a mechanism for constructive engagement among AMISOM, the relevant UN entities and SSF would play a key role in support of professionalization and further enhancement of SSF's human rights compliance at strategic and operational levels, particularly in light of expected increased level of operations, including with AMISOM.

#### *AMISOM Reconfiguration*

25. AMISOM's reconfiguration is ongoing and being undertaken by all the three components: Military, Police and Civilian Components. This is being considered along four lines, namely: (a) operating spaces; (b) size and composition at different levels of personnel; (c) level of required equipment and resources; and (d) tasks and priorities.

#### *Military Component*

26. The 2018–2021 AMISOM CONOPs provides that AMISOM sector boundaries will not change in Phase 1 of the implementation of the STP, and that re-sectorization can be considered in subsequent phases. In this regard, and in order to be successful, operations to liberate areas and strongholds from Al-Shabaab and to secure MSRs, require changing AMISOM's operations approach from its current concept of mainly undertaking active defence to an aggressive active defence coupled with ground and helicopter-borne mobile operations. This will be done by establishing strong points (FOBs) close to population centres and/or along MSRs or in support of SSF protecting such centres and MSRs, and having mobile, agile forces, including Quick Reaction Forces (QRFs), coupled with an effective Counter Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) capabilities, supported by sufficient force multipliers and enablers and timely intelligence support provided by Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISRs) capabilities (including UAS/UAVs). This concept, therefore, requires a change in AMISOM forces posture (as part of the reconfiguration), with the creation of a number of mobile units to effectively conduct strike, disruptive, support and rescue operations.

#### *Police Component*

27. As part of the reconfiguration process, expansion of police presence to all AMISOM sectors has been envisaged and will be critical to enhance police role and support to the military and civilian components as well as their role to train and mentor federal and regional police personnel as part of police force generation processes. Currently, AMISOM police component is deployed in Mogadishu (Sector 1), Baidoa (Sector 3), Jowhar and Beletweyne (Sector 5) and Kismayo (Sector 6) with plans to expand AMISOM Police presence to Dohbley (Sector 2). The review was

briefed on the support needs of the AMISOM police component including the need for armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and armoured vehicles as well as office equipment, especially in the regions. The STP and the AMISOM CONOPs provide for extending police services to major population centres beyond the regional capitals as part of the efforts to facilitate implementation of the Somalia Joint Police Programme (JPP). The Police component has also put in place plans for them to play a robust role in supporting the upcoming Somalia elections in 2020/21. The plan includes increased AMISOM Police presence across AMISOM sectors, capacity-building for the federal and regional police institutions and personnel. The review noted commendable working relationships between AMISOM police and other stakeholders in Somalia including UNSOM Police, UNSOS, United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and international partners.

#### *Civilian Component*

28. For the civilian component, reconfiguration includes cross mission representation through deployment of AMISOM Civilian Sector Teams (CSTs) to all AMISOM sectors to enhance their substantive role and support to the military and police components and their tasks as well as support to regional administration and the local population. Since the deployment of AMISOM CSTs, the civilian component has enhanced multidimensional coordination at the sector level, including increased reporting from the sectors to the mission headquarters as well as expanded its substantive work in support of the STP as directed by AU PSC Communique 782. The review observed good working relationships between AMISOM CSTs and UNSOM personnel in the sectors where they are present. This has the potential for both AMISOM and UNSOM to complement the work of each other within their respective mandates through structured cooperation while maximizing the comparative advantages of both AMISOM and UNSOM. This includes the comparative advantages of AMISOM CSTs who currently have greater location and access than UNSOM and better-placed for tasks in areas of civil and community engagement, humanitarian affairs and human rights. In this regard, AMISOM reiterated its plans to increase its civilian capacities in these thematic areas and roles in each AMISOM sector to enhance current engagement with local communities within population centres in these sectors and FOBs. These efforts are in fulfilment of the AU PSC Comm. 782 (paragraph 15), and will strengthen the AU's support to the political and governance processes in Somalia.

29. At the Mission Headquarters, the AMISOM civilian component continues to provide political analysis and support to the Mission leadership; conducts human rights monitoring and investigations; and performs administrative and support functions – a capacity that has been gravely affected due to the deployment of the AMISOM CSTs using some of the personnel from the Mission Headquarters. AMISOM's political engagement with the FGS was also reiterated in the review, highlighting the outcomes of the AU workshop in January 2019 in Addis Ababa on the development of AU political strategy to support state-building in Somalia. The review welcomed the plans to revive the tripartite AU-IGAD-UN memorandum of understanding (MoU), which should ensure that all the three organizations work in a coordinated manner in support of agreed and joint strategies that will be guided by political primacy in assisting Somalia move from conflict to sustainable peace.

#### *Alignment of support and equipment right-sizing*

30. Since early 2017, Al-Shabaab has adapted to mobile warfare against AMISOM troops. As highlighted earlier on in this report, this requires that AMISOM also adapts to having an agile force to deal with this type of threat and Al-Shabaab posture in the same manner, support to AMISOM and equipment for its use should be reconfigured,

prioritized and focused for this purpose. Therefore, AMISOM reconfiguration will include alignment of support and equipment right-sizing to match current and predicted threats of Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups, and SSF capacity gradually increased. Furthermore, due to the harsh terrain and other country-specific limitations, AMISOM P/TCC are facing challenges in the maintenance of critical COE whose serviceability is not in compliance with MoUs with P/TCCs, with some below the required standards as set out. Likewise, POE faces maintenance challenges due to, inter alia, an inability to move some of these equipment that is “beyond local repair” to established sector workshops for major repairs. The Joint Review recommends a phased approach towards achieving optimization of AMISOM equipment: (i) immediate repatriation of not-fit-for-purpose equipment and immediate deployment of equipment identified as critical gap; and (ii) following the renewal of AMISOM’s mandate, conduct a comprehensive AMISOM equipment review based on defined Statement of Unit Requirements (SURs) and Table of Equipment (TOE) and recommend detailed equipment adjustments. The equipment reconfiguration review should include an analysis of all operational requirements to identify opportunities for resources that could be made available to support the deployment of identified gaps, to enhance force protection, AMISOM safety and security and to strengthen AMISOM’s operational capacity and capability.

31. During the equipment assessment conducted during this review, a number of key criteria were taken into consideration. These criteria shall, therefore, guide the upcoming comprehensive and detailed equipment review. Key amongst them is the need to replace, by another capability, equipment identified as not-fit-for-purpose or redundant, and deployment of additional equipment in keeping with the SUR (to be developed) in order to enhance capabilities such as air and ground mobility, force protection, intelligence acquisition, surveillance and reconnaissance including UAVs and UAS. In consultation with AMISOM, the AU-UN Joint Review identified an initial quantity of six battle tanks – four from Sector 1 and two from Sector 3 – and a number of redundant engineering equipment and vehicles for repatriation, and proposes a continuation of this process through a detailed line-by-line review of equipment on the ground.

#### *Electoral Support*

32. AMISOM, with support from the AU Department for Political Affairs, and in collaboration with UN Integrated Election Support Group (IESG), also continues its efforts to enhance the capacity of, and provide technical support to the NIEC to ensure the conduct of the elections in 2020/21 as scheduled. This includes through the implementation of capacity-building workshops for the NIEC and deployment of NIEC Commissioners as election observers across AU member states, in addition to NIEC’s participation in annual sessions for African Association of Election Agencies. As part of these efforts, and to ensure effective preparation for free, credible and inclusive elections, AMISOM will also provide support to the NIEC and the SPF in developing and implementing an electoral security plan which is a critical element of a successful election in 2020/21. The review noted the need to bring on board all key stakeholders involved in the electoral process, including AMISOM, so that each party and component understands its roles, responsibilities and tasks and in a coordinated manner, develop its respective plan of action to guarantee effective implementation as will be required.

## **V. Observations and recommendations**

33. Within the framework of the recommendations outlined by the Joint Review, and in a bid to guarantee a seamless conditions-based transition from AMISOM to the

FGS and taking note of the strategy and position of the AU in Somalia, the Commission makes the following recommendations for consideration by the Council:

(a) **Progress on inclusive politics:** The Commission notes considerable progress in processes aimed at facilitating and guaranteeing inclusive politics, and realized that more needs to be done to ensure consensus between the FGS and FMS and across Somalia. In this regard, Council may wish to reiterate the need for more commitment and dedication of the FGS in the federalization process, including in expediting and making more progress on the finalization of relevant provisions of the Provisional Federal Constitution that relates to security, resources sharing and devolution of powers of the FMS. Council may also wish to reiterate the need for the FGS to come up with immediate practical and workable approaches to utilize the 19,945 Regional Forces identified during the ORA of Regional Forces to directly support implementation of the STP and enable the FMS to take control of the security of their states, noting the delays in achieving all the objectives of phase one and the commencement of phase two in July 2019. This can, and should, be linked as part of the process to integrate these forces in line with the National Security Architecture and ongoing efforts to operationalize a Commission for their integration. Furthermore, Council may wish to reiterate the need for consultation and involvement of FMS in the planning processes for the conduct of the elections scheduled for 2021, starting with the identification of registration and polling sites as well as inclusion in the relevant entities and coordination mechanisms to facilitate smooth and successful conduct of one person one vote election as envisioned.

(b) **Political primacy for achievement of STP priorities:** Progress in the security sector, and in implementation of the STP, is inherently linked to political progress underpinned by good relations between the FGS and FMS to ensure sustained political consensus across the country. Resolution of the political differences are needed to overcome the slow pace of force generation, including agreements between the FGS and FMS on how regional forces are to be integrated into federal security structures (i.e. SNA, NISA, Somali Police Force, and Darwish). Besides the handing over of the National Stadium and Jalle Siyad Military Academy in Mogadishu, activities related to Phase 1 of the STP by the FGS and SSF have not been completed in line with agreed STP objectives. In this regard, Council may wish to call on the FGS to meet agreed commitments for the successful implementation of the STP, including enhancing relations with the FMS to guarantee inclusive politics and actualization of the remaining objectives of phase 1 of the STP and commencement of implementation of phase 2 of the STP. Council may also wish to underline the need for the tripartite MoU among the AU, IGAD and the UN to be resuscitated with the commencement of joint and coordinated work among by the representatives of the three organizations on the ground, through an appropriate coordination mechanism to immediate start facilitating joint strategic agreements and initiatives.

(c) **Regular coordination and information-sharing:** There is strong need for better and regular coordination and information-sharing between the FGS and AMISOM to enable appropriate and effective joint planning and conduct of operations and activities is critical. Without this, implementation of the STP and AMISOM support to it will not be appropriately aligned, likely resulting in further delays. Council may wish to consider calling for the establishment of an effective STP Coordination Mechanism (including the FGS, AMISOM, UNSOS and key partners directly and actively involved in the implementation of the STP). This is very critical to monitor implementation of roles, tasks and responsibilities of every key participant to the implementation of the STP. This should be coordinated by FGS with FMS involvement and AMISOM political leadership with UNSOS, AMISOM Heads of Components, SNA and SPF leadership as well as all relevant actors including



relevant FMS authorities, support elements, and partners in the form of a coordination cell.

(d) **Reconfiguration:** Political and security risks and reprisal killings by Al-Shabaab and other Armed Opposition Groups (AOGs) as well as humanitarian impacts and consequences of the reconfiguration, including hand over and/or collapsing of FOBs and locations should be properly assessed and averted. Council may wish to consider reiterating that this should be done in a manner that adequately takes into account the needs and vulnerabilities of the populations. All efforts should also be made to make sure the reconfiguration and transition is aligned with electoral support and security planning for the 2020/21 elections.

(e) **AMISOM Military Component:** The Military Component's efforts to support the SSF to degrade the capability of Al-Shabaab and other AOGs will remain critical during the transition period. The Military Component should continue to (i) degrade Al-Shabaab and AOGs; (ii) support the SNSF in securing main population centres and (iii) secure the MSRs; (iv) support the SNSF to secure key critical government installations and facilities; (v) mentor SNA who are engaged in joint operations with AMISOM and others as shall be agreed between FGS and AMISOM leadership. The Military Component should develop a mentoring programme in coordination with the SNA leadership with an outline of how this will be facilitated, including roles and responsibilities with all relevant actors. Priority for mentoring should be given to SSF units directly involved in the implementation of the STP.

(f) **AMISOM personnel levels:** AMISOM's exit strategy envisages a full handover of security responsibility to the Somali authorities. With this in mind, progress on the transition, specifically on generating Somali security forces and building Somali institutional capacity and a constant assessment of the threat environment, should be the driving parameters in determining AMISOM troop and police levels. In addition, any option on troop levels should ensure that existing gains are preserved in a strategic sense and that tactical successes are not adversely impacted, that protection of civilians is guaranteed with humanitarian access safeguarded and that electoral security is not compromised.

(g) The Commission takes serious note that the threat level remains high in Somalia and that the slow level of progress in the implementation of the STP in the past year, particularly the slow pace of generating capable SSF, does not allow for a clear prospect for uniformed personnel reductions at this stage. The suspension of uniformed personnel reduction will allow for sufficient time for AMISOM to plan and conduct operations, securing of MSRs, collapsing or handing over FOBs and other reconfiguration tasks in phases 1 and 2 in the implementation of its CONOPS and in support of the STP. It will also avoid impacting voter registration which is expected to commence by March 2020, enable AMISOM to provide adequate support to electoral security and guarantee the conduct of a free and fair one person one vote elections in early 2021.

(h) With this in mind, progress on the transition, specifically on generating SSF and building Somali institutional capacity and a constant assessment of the threat environment, should be the driving parameters in determining AMISOM troop and police levels. In addition, any option on troop levels should ensure that existing gains are preserved in a strategic sense and tactical successes are not adversely impacted, that electoral security is not compromised, and humanitarian access is safeguarded. This will thus help build confidence in the government and among the population and ensure a conditions-based transition of security responsibility from AMISOM to SSF by end of 2021. In this regard, the Commission has, therefore, considered two options for uniformed personnel levels:

(i) **Option One:** AMISOM to maintain the current uniformed personnel levels including troop ceiling, while allowing for reductions based on progress on the ground. This option is based on the diagnosis that the threat level remains high in Somalia and that the lack of progress in the implementation of the STP in the past year, particularly the slow pace of generating capable SSF, does not allow for a clear prospect for uniformed personnel reductions at this stage. Implementation of respective plans articulated by the FGS and AMISOM for the latter to withdraw from a number of locations and for the Somali authorities to take over security in certain areas would provide opportunities to free up AMISOM uniformed personnel numbers to be reduced, but only under adequate and clan-balanced generation of security personnel under the National Security Architecture, and international partners involved in the training of forces.

(ii) **Option Two:** AMISOM to withdraw up to 2,000 troops by the end of February 2020. This option would mean reducing AMISOM by all of the troop numbers that would have been freed by the collapsing/handover of FOBs if those take place on time. While this could provide an opportunity for accelerated generation of Somali capabilities to assume security responsibility, it comes with very high risks. A reduction of 2,000 troops would likely preclude the ability of AMISOM for further reconfiguration and would prevent the creation of mobile forces. If there continue to be delays in Transition Plan implementation, AMISOM would have to vacate positions without SSF being ready to take over, leaving populations in those areas exposed and vulnerable to Al-Shabaab and increasing the likelihood of their internal displacement. Alternatively, AMISOM would continue to hold those positions but at the risk of reducing the implementation of a number of its mandated tasks, potentially negatively affecting overall security, including for voter registration and elections.

(i) Noting the foregoing considerations, the Commission recommends option one: to maintain current troop levels including troop ceiling, while allowing for any reductions based on assessed progress on the ground.

#### *AMISOM Police Component*

(j) In the long term, responsibility for internal security in Somalia should progressively become a police task, especially in population centres and including in the opening and securing of MSRs. In addition to the exiting role and mandate of AMISOM Police, and with a view to facilitate a successful transition of such responsibilities as well as considering the critical role Somali and AMISOM police will have to play in securing the 2020/21 elections, an increase in the police personnel of AMISOM should be considered. This should be done within the overall uniformed personnel ceiling as decided by the AU PSC and UNSC, which called for AMISOM to reconfigure in favour of the police. The Commission recommends that the AMISOM Police Component should be augmented through the deployment of two additional FPU of 160 personnel each and up to 67 IPOs by 2020. This increase in AMISOM police numbers can be matched with the just concluded reduction of 1,000 AMISOM troops. Additional logistics/administrative support in different areas (accommodation, additional APCs, CITS equipment and welfare facilities) are required to augment the operational capability of the police.

#### *AMISOM Civilian Component*

(k) The Commission recalls paragraph 15 of Communiqué 782, which directs that AMISOM reconfiguration should include the expansion of its civilian component to specific and key locations across AMISOM's area of operation to carry out their substantive work and provide guidance and support to military and police tasks and

operations. In this regard, AMISOM Civilian Component should therefore continue to implement its support to political and confidence-building processes, stabilization efforts (including civil affairs, community engagement, humanitarian and SSR assistance), as well as human rights and resources management compliance. As Somalia continues to stabilize and the implementation of the STP gains momentum in the FMS, increase in the deployment of civilian staff in the sectors and support activities are expected to guide AMISOM's military and police operations as well as to contribute to the implementation of the STP. In this regard, there is need for the mobilization of adequate funds and resources for Quick Impact Projects and Peace Strengthening Projects (QIPs/PSPs), confidence-building measures, and technical support to NIEC as required. Consequently, Council may wish to call on the UNSC to authorize logistics support to additional 50 civilian staff to be provided by UNSOS as AMISOM civilian personnel numbers increase beyond the current 70 civilians authorized by the UNSC to ensure enhancement of current facilities and support to CSTs. Council may also wish to direct the Commission to include this request for support to an additional 50 civilian personnel in the letter of the Chairperson transmitting this report and its Communique to the UN while recalling and emphasizing the importance of the civilian component of AMISOM as reiterated in the Communiqué of its 782nd meeting, to ensure multidimensionality and guarantee political primacy and approach to assist Somalia move from conflict to sustainable peace.

(l) **Compliance and Accountability:** AMISOM should continue to ensure that human rights issues are considered, applied and reviewed across the preparatory, conduct and review phases of all its operations. Beyond training, these activities should continue to include selection and screening, human rights integration into planning, continuing to tailor and apply SOPs and Force Commander Directives and other operational orders to the current operational context, consolidated practices on civilian casualty tracking and efforts to ensure accountability should violations occur. AMISOM should also continue promoting its experience and activities in ensuring compliance and accountability and the operational dividends that can be drawn from strong compliance mechanisms in its mentoring and engagement with SSF to enhance compliance and accountability by SSF.

(m) **Alignment of support and equipment right-sizing:** In consultation with AMISOM, the AU-UN Joint Review identified an initial quantity of six battle tanks – four from Sector 1 and two from Sector 3 – and a number of redundant engineering equipment and vehicles for repatriation, and proposes a continuation of this process through a detailed line-by-line review of equipment on the ground, to be conducted jointly by AU, AMISOM and UNSOS by June 2019, to define AMISOM SURs in order to further refine AMISOM equipment and identify additional needs on items such as UAV/UAS (providing ISR capability), counter-IED equipment and other capabilities which could be made available by utilizing resources saved from the equipment repatriated. The review further recommends that the development of SURs for AMISOM military units and capabilities is also needed to harmonize the CONOPs with capabilities on the ground. Council may consider reiterating the point that the review of equipment should not be seen as a means to save cost but to ensure that AMISOM has the required capacity and capability, including equipment the right equipment to deal with the threats it is exposed to and tasks it is mandated to undertake. In this regard, Council may also consider reiterating the need for equipment and support requirements to focus on enhancing AMISOM operations, including those jointly conducted with SSF aimed at degrading the capabilities of Al-Shabaab and other AOGs, securing MSRs, and in implementing other mandated tasks.

(n) **Mandate:** Noting that the implementation of the STP is in its early stages, and recalling the primary responsibility of the FGS for the peace, security and prosperity of Somalia and noting the need for increased involvement by the FGS of the FMS in facilitating the transition, as well as the strong commitment and dedication of the AU, UN and key partners in assisting the people of Somalia, and based on demonstrable progress of AMISOM in Somalia (AMISOM) since 2007 and since the last Joint Review, and in line with the strategic objectives of AMISOM that is clearly articulated in the 2018–2021 AMISOM CONOPS, the Commission recommends that Council renews the mandate of AMISOM for another 12 months up to 27 May 2020 and calls on the AU, UN, EU and key partners to provide the required resources to support AMISOM in a sustainable and predictable manner.

## VI. Conclusion

34. As rightly observed in the Joint Review, the Commission wishes to reiterate that progress in the security sector, and in the implementation of the STP, are inherently linked to political progress in Somalia, and dependent on good and effective relations between the FGS and FMS. In this regard, sustained political consensus between the FGS and FMS and across the country and progress on federalization processes are needed to guarantee achievement of the objectives of the STP. Relatedly, stronger collaboration among FGS, FMS, AMISOM and the relevant UN entities and international partners, both at the mission headquarters and in the sectors, will be imperative for such success to be realized. Additionally, the need to focus attention on strengthening the capacity of SSF to comply with human rights and international humanitarian law in the context of the transition is critical and integral to ensuring a sustainable secure environment for populations, including in the context of the election processes. Worth noting is the fact that 2019 is a critical year to ascertain whether Somalia will be able to overcome existing internal political challenges and regain momentum for sustained progress and achievement of the objectives of the STP for transition of primary security responsibilities from AMISOM to SSF by December 2021. In this regard, well-coordinated holistic efforts underpinned by political primacy and in line with the Comprehensive Approach to Security (CAS) are required by AMISOM, the UN and the broader international community towards the attainment of a peaceful, sustainable and a prosperous Somalia.

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