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2016年1月22日安全理事会第2140(2014)号决议所设也门问题专家小组给安全理事会主席的信*

安全理事会第2140(2014)号决议所设也门问题专家小组成员谨随函转递按照第2204(2015)号决议第5段要求编写的专家小组最后报告。

请提请安全理事会成员注意本函及报告并将其作为安理会文件印发为荷。

安全理事会第2140(2014)号决议所设
也门问题专家小组

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安全理事会第 2140(2014) 号决议所设也门问题专家小组最后报告

摘要

安全理事会第 2140(2014)号决议所设并经第 2204(2015)号决议延期的也门问题专家小组的最后报告，对 2015 年 4 月 7 日专家小组受命组成直至本报告提出之日期间第 2140(2014)号决议所规定的制裁措施，包括资产冻结和旅行禁令以及第 2216(2015)号决议所规定的定向军火禁运的实施情况，作了分析。报告还概述了专家小组的调查结果，并向安全理事会和安全理事会第 2140(2014)号决议所设委员会提出 15 项建议，以改进相关措施的实施工作。

专家小组自受命组成以来，访问了 16 个国家。在沙特阿拉伯，专家小组会晤了也门总统阿卜杜拉布·曼苏尔·哈迪·曼苏尔以及也门合法政府的其他官员。专家小组数次尝试前往也门，但外交部官员受胡塞武装组织的控制，起初虽然同意接待专家小组，但迄未最终准许专家小组入境。

专家小组指出，胡塞武装组织协同与之有隶属关系的政治组织“真主的辅士”，逐步控制了国家机构，导致了当前的危机局面。“真主的辅士”2015 年 2 月 6 日发布宪政宣言，设立机构，履行纯属也门合法政府特权范围内的职责。

专家小组注意到，无论是也门还是联军均没有任何一方充分遵守过一次人道主义停火以缓解也门人民的苦难。也门冲突各方以及由联合国促成的磋商的所有参与者，包括萨那和利雅得代表团的成员，都未能诚意互动，因此都应对停止敌对行动和恢复政治进程受阻承担责任。

2015 年，专家小组注意到，胡塞武装组织力量与原由前总统阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫(YEi.003)及其家庭控制的特种兵残余力量日益走向一体。专家小组认为，胡塞-萨利赫部队组成了一个新的混合武装团体，其根基在于北方传统的社会精英。相比之下，抵抗力量的组成则具有高度的地方性，体现了所争夺地区具体的社会条件和政治优先事项。

专家小组指出，在抵抗运动控制的城区，尤其是在亚丁和塔伊兹市，在动员萨拉菲团体方面出现了新趋势。许多萨拉菲团体针对胡塞-萨利赫部队攻击平民地区作出的反应更趋极端，萨拉菲传教士通过居民区清真寺动员当地的支持者。伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯兰国在也门的存在日益扩大，助长了日益宗派化的观点；这也激励了阿拉伯半岛的萨拉菲团体和“基地”组织支持者。

专家小组注意到这样一种已成模式的情况：也门军队正规部队代表被委员会指认违反第 2216(2015)号决议的个人阿布杜勒马立克·胡希(Yei.004)和阿里·阿布杜勒·萨利赫并按其指示行事，向胡塞-萨利赫部队转移武器和提供军事支持。

专家小组还注意到，联军向抵抗力量提供武器，而未采取适当措施确保问责制，这也在助长也门境内军火的囤积，有碍局势稳定。

专家小组认为，在当前冲突爆发前即已存在且颇具规模的军火走私网络在 2015 年继续运作，并利用了因军队解散和武装团体及民兵大量涌现而带来的机会。专家小组正在调查一起可能向胡塞-萨利赫部队移交反坦克制导弹的案件，这是因为 9 月 25 日在阿曼沿海的一艘独桅帆船上查获了一批军火物资。专家小组检查了现由美国看管的导弹和有关设备，指出，它们源自伊朗伊斯兰共和国，其特征与 8 月开始见诸媒体、由胡塞武装组织所拥有的军火类似。

专家小组查明了胡塞-萨利赫部队用以资助军事行动的一些收入的来源。此外，专家小组对资产进行跟踪，发现有价值 4 880 万美元的资产属于两名受制裁的个人，阿里·阿布杜拉·萨利赫和艾哈迈德·阿里·阿布杜拉·萨利赫(Yei.005)。专家小组查明了用以绕过资产冻结的两个金融网络。专家小组继续调查与代表上述两人或按其指示行事的个人或实体有关的可能案件。专家小组继续监测所有受制裁个人可能违反旅行禁令的情形。9 月，阿拉伯联合酋长国当局向专家小组口头确认，艾哈迈德·阿里·阿布杜拉·萨利赫在阿联酋境内。

也门的人道主义局势对平民百姓产生了破坏性影响。狂轰滥炸、肆意炮击、使用儿童兵情形增多，加上禁止商品进入该国和封锁塔伊兹市等因素，不仅限制了医院和人道主义行动者开展业务并对局势作出回应的能力，而且也限制了人们努力自我维持生计的能力。

安全局势给人道主义援助的提供和分配带来了重大障碍，这可以归因于广泛违反国际人道主义法和系统地严重侵犯公民和政治权利等行为。这一趋势日积月累，走向复杂化，使得人道主义行动的空间更为缩小。专家小组指出，敌对行动对百姓的生活造成了极为严重的影响，因为有关方面广泛和系统地使用各种战术，实际上，在某些情形下直接构成了违禁利用饥饿作为战争手段的行为。

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一. 背景

A. 任务规定和任命

1. 安全理事会第 2140(2014)号决议规定了制裁也门的制度，并设立了制裁委员会(安全理事会第 2140(2014)号决议所设委员会)和专家小组(也门问题专家小组)，以监测制裁措施的实施情况。

2. 安全理事会第 2204(2015)号决议延长了制裁措施期限，并把专家小组任务期再延长一年。安理会第 2216(2015)号决议规定实施定向武器禁运，要求专家小组监督武器禁运的实施，并把专家小组成员人数增至 5 人。安理会还把违反武器禁运的行为列入指认标准。

3. 秘书长与委员会协商后，于 4 月 7 日任命专家小组的四名成员(见 [S/2015/237](#))：一名区域专家(哈立德·法塔赫)，一名武装团体专家兼专家小组协调员(弗吉尼亚·希尔)，一名国际人道主义法专家(露西·马西森)和一名金融专家(乔尔·沙莱克)。6 月 18 日，他任命了一名武器专家(尼古拉斯·达佩纳·费尔南德斯)(见 [S/2015/455](#))。随后，在区域专家辞职后，他任命艾哈迈德·希梅舍接替，并指定他从 2015 年 8 月 31 日起履行协调员职能(见 [S/2015/639](#))。

4. 简而言之，专家小组担负下列任务：

(a) 协助委员会完成第 2140(2014)号决议规定的任务，包括随时为委员会提供相关信息，用于在后一阶段指认可能参与第 2140(2014)号决议第 18 段所述、危及也门和平、安全或稳定的活动，和(或)参与第 2216(2015)号决议第 19 段所述、违反武器禁运、或阻碍向也门提供人道主义援助、阻碍获得或分配也门境内的人道主义援助的个人和实体；

(b) 收集、审查和分析各国、联合国相关机构、区域组织和其他有关各方提供的关于制裁措施和定向武器禁运执行情况的信息，尤其是破坏政治过渡的事件的信息；

(c) 在与委员会讨论后，最迟于 2015 年 9 月 24 日向委员会提交中期报告，最迟于 2016 年 1 月 24 日向安全理事会提交最后报告；

(d) 协助委员会完善和更新受制裁措施限制者名单的信息，包括提供生物鉴别信息和公开公布的列名理由简述的增列信息。

5. 专家小组努力执行这些任务。8 月 17 日，专家小组根据第 2204(2015)号决议第 5 段，向委员会提交中期情况通报。10 月 9 日，应委员会要求，专家小组向委员会又提交了一份关于金融及国际人权法和国际人道主义法问题的情况通报。专家小组借此机会与委员会确认调查线索。

6. 专家小组继续监测资产冻结、旅行禁令和定向武器禁运的实施情况。截至提交本报告之时，委员会订立并维护的名单上有：阿卜杜拉·叶海亚·哈基姆(YEi.002)、阿卜杜勒马利克·胡希(YEi.004)、阿卜杜·哈利克·胡塞(YEi.001)、艾哈迈德·阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫(YEi.005)和阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫(YEi.003)。更多信息见附件 2。专家小组向委员会提供信息，帮助于 9 月 16 日更新了有关艾哈迈德·阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫的识别信息。

B. 方法

7. 专家小组努力遵循安全理事会关于制裁的一般性问题非正式工作组 2006 年 12 月报告(S/2006/997)所建议的标准。这些标准要求尽可能依靠经核实的真实文件、具体证据和专家的现场观察，包括拍照。在专家小组整个任期内，都无法在也门进行实地检查、观察和现场访问。专家小组使用会员国和官方来源提供的文件，较为重视主要行为体的言论。

8. 专家小组利用了联合国向私人供应商采购的卫星图像。它也利用了记录海上和航空交通的商业数据库。专家小组使用了官员的公开言论，较为重视主要行为体通过其官方媒体渠道发布的言论。

9. 专家小组使用社交媒体和跨平台即时通讯来监测有关情况，并收集也门的活动人士希望分享的信息。使用社交媒体收集到的信息，只有在得到能切实达到可及的最高标准的多个独立消息来源和事件第一手目击者确证后，才被用作证据。

10. 专家小组打算尽可能保持透明，但如果指明信息来源者身份会使他们或他人面临不可接受的安全风险，专家小组则不打算公布身份信息，把相关证据保存在联合国档案中。专家小组致力秉持最高度的公平性，努力给予有关各方答辩权。

11. 专家小组重视在协商一致基础上开展工作，同时商定，如果在报告编写过程中出现不同意见和(或)保留意见，只有在五名成员中有四人同意的情况下，专家小组才会通过报告的文本、结论和建议，然后由协调员提交安全理事会主席。如建议指认某个个人或实体，此类建议仅在协商一致的基础上提出。

12. 按照大会关于控制文件和字数限制的决议，特别是第 52/214、53/208 和 59/265 号决议，专家小组决定将一些案例研究和调查结果收入本报告附件中。

C. 与各利益攸关方和各组织的合作

13. 专家小组希望再次强调，在也门和所访的邻国，它与秘书长也门问题特使办公室及联合国驻地协调员/人道主义协调员开展了出色的合作。

14. 专家小组还同第 1526(2004)号决议所设分析支助和制裁监测组、伊朗伊斯兰共和国问题专家小组和索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组建立了有益的工作关系。总体而言，专家小组同广大国际行为体、公司、个人和组织进行了良好的合作。

15. 6 月和 9 月，专家小组在利雅得会晤了也门总统阿卜杜拉布·曼苏尔·哈迪·曼苏尔和也门合法政府的其他官员。专家小组起初未能前往也门是因为联合国内部的安保规定限制，此类规定仅允许出于拯救生命行动的目的而进行国家实地访问。后来，专家小组与也门常驻联合国代表团协调，争取到了“真主的辅士”及其所控制、位于萨那的外交部官员批准，可以在 11 月初前往也门。为此做了所有必要的安排。然而，就在两名专家启程之前，萨那的同一批官员推迟了这次访问，理由是也门的相关部门在处理其他活动(见附件三)。专家小组继续同萨那的官员进行接触，争取他们同意或建议新的访问日期，但在本报告提交之时，专家小组仍然在等待答复。

16. 专家小组前往下列各国，会晤了相关官员：巴林、吉布提、埃及、法国、德国、伊朗伊斯兰共和国、以色列、约旦、荷兰、阿曼、卡塔尔、俄罗斯联邦、沙特阿拉伯、阿拉伯联合酋长国、大不列颠及北爱尔兰联合王国和美利坚合众国。

17. 专家小组向 38 个会员国、3 个组织和 1 家银行发出 103 封公函，其中 72 封得到了回复。有 4 个常驻代表团称，将发出回复，但专家小组遗憾地指出，依然有 26 封公函没有得到回复(见附件一)。

18. 专家小组致函联军成员，讨论空袭造成百姓伤亡、非军用财产受破坏的情形，这可能违反了国际人道主义法。作出回复的会员国称，参加联军的各方力量全面遵守了完全符合国际人道主义法的交战规则和行动程序。¹ 然而，它们没有提供进一步信息，说明为减少平民伤亡和(或)减少对非军事目标的破坏而采取的措施。它们说，参加联军的各国及其武装部队为支持也门合法政府并应其请求而正在开展的军事行动不在专家小组职权范围之内。专家小组不同意这一说法，继续调查也门境内可能违反适用的国际人权法和国际人道主义法的行为或构成侵犯人权行径的行为。

19. 专家小组还特别遗憾地指出，下列会员国没有对专家小组的公函作出答复：专家小组在公函中要求就事关定向武器禁运和不遵守旅行禁令和资产冻结规定的具体调查提供资料。

(a) **巴哈马**。专家小组发出公函，要求了解在该国注册的、属于两名被指认个人(阿里·阿布杜拉·萨利赫和艾哈迈德·阿里·阿布杜拉·萨利赫)的公司情况。该国常驻代表团表示，将向首都了解情况；

(b) **阿拉伯联合酋长国**。专家小组两次在阿拉伯联合酋长国会晤了官员，并提交了哈立德·阿里·阿布杜拉·萨利赫代表被指认的个人，阿里·阿布杜拉·萨利赫，进行金融交易的证据。专家小组还发出公函，要求了解有关上述金融交易和实施资产冻结的情况。截至本报告提交之时，专家小组尚未收到任何信息；

¹ 专家小组收到埃及、约旦、摩洛哥、卡塔尔和沙特阿拉伯的立场相同的回复。塞内加尔回答说，截至 2015 年 10 月 16 日，它没有在也门部署任何塞内加尔部队。科威特、苏丹和阿拉伯联合酋长国尚未答复。

(c) 也门。专家小组通过也门常驻代表团发出公函，要求进一步了解亲萨利赫的高级军官和安全官员名单的情况；专家小组有理由相信，名单上的官员参与了危及也门和平、安全与稳定的行为，而且是在代表被指认的个人行事。还要求提供关于萨那的金融机构挪用国家金融资产、支持胡塞武装组织的数据资料。截至本报告提交之时，专家小组尚未收到任何信息。

二. 对和平与安全的威胁

A. 阻碍和破坏政治过渡的顺利完成

1. 导致冲突升级的事件

20. 到 2015 年 2 月 20 日专家小组上一份报告(S/2015/125)发布之时，来自萨达省的武装团体，胡塞武装组织，协同其隶属的政治组织“真主的辅士”，已经控制了也门合法政府的机构和事务。胡塞武装组织和“真主的辅士”在 2014 年 9 月接管萨那，后来与总统签署《民族和平伙伴协议》，由此加强了对政府各部事实上的控制。²“真主的辅士”成立于 2011 年发生的导致阿里·阿布杜拉·萨利赫总统下台的街头抗议期间，此后，这一名称基本成了整个胡塞武装组织的代名词。

21. 2015 年 1 月，胡塞武装组织采取单方面行动，绑架了总统办公室主任艾哈迈德·阿瓦德·本·穆巴拉克，以此来反对新宪法草稿中关于把也门变为六区联邦的条款。³ 1 月 19 日，胡塞武装组织控制了总统府、各部和政府重要机构，对总统及其内阁部分成员实施软禁。三天后，总统、总理哈立德·马赫福德·阿布杜拉·巴哈和内阁迫于“真主的辅士”的压力而辞职，“真主的辅士”施压是为了使总统决策对其有利，包括在提名重要职位人选方面。

22. 在萨那的瑞亨酒店举行会谈期间，“真主的辅士”未能与秘书长也门问题特别顾问贾迈勒·比诺马尔诚意交流，危机因而持续。2 月 6 日，“真主的辅士”发布宪政宣言，新设革命委员会，作为最高国务机构。宣言第 11 条责成革命委员会采取一切必要程序和措施，以保护国家主权，确保国家安全稳定，并保护人民权利和自由(见附件 4)。

23. 革命委员会在阿布杜勒马利克·胡塞的指示和引导下，巩固了对也门政府权力机构的控制。“真主的辅士”提名曾在 2014 年 9 月接管萨那过程中发挥关键作用的穆罕默德·阿里·胡塞来领导该委员会；该委员会控制政府各部、行政事务部门和在首都及其控制的各省的重要国家机构(见附件 5)。

² 在本报告中，“真主的辅士”指胡塞武装组织的政治及意识形态部分，而“胡塞武装组织”则指武装团体部分。

³ 采访被提名为也门驻美大使的艾哈迈德·阿瓦德·本·穆巴拉克，2015 年 9 月 4 日，美国首都华盛顿。关于把也门变成六区联盟之事，请看 2015 年 1 月 15 日由宪法起草委员会完成定稿的宪法草案第 391 条，见 www.constitutionnet.org/files/yemen-draft_constitution-15jan2015-_english.pdf。

24. 大多数外交使团于 2 月份关闭,国际航空公司决定停止在也门的业务;此后,“真主的辅士”于 2 月 28 日与伊朗伊斯兰共和国签署航空运输合作谅解备忘录,规定两国首开直航。其中准许也门和伊朗的两家公司,分别为也门航空和马汉航空,每周从各自国家开通 14 次航班。⁴ 3 月 1 日,伊朗第一架航班降落在萨那,3 月 6 日,又一架航班降落,由此开始的一系列航班持续到 3 月 26 日联军实施空中封锁为止(见附件 6)。

2. 军事升级: 胡塞武装组织、反对胡塞武装组织的抵抗力量和联军

25. 2 月 21 日,总统逃往亚丁。3 月 19 日,也门空军一架战斗机遵照萨那的命令,轰炸了亚丁的机场,并且对那里的总统府实施空袭;总统当时就住在里面。其后一个星期内,胡塞武装组织和与萨利赫有联系的也门联军向亚丁挺进,忠于萨利赫的阿布杜勒哈菲兹·萨卡夫准将率领亚丁特别行动部队提供了支持。

26. 胡塞武装组织和亲萨利赫部队对总统发动攻势,很有可能是不让他宣布亚丁为也门临时首都;亚丁的内部战斗由此加剧。3 月 24 日,也门常驻联合国代表代表总统致函安全理事会主席,称总统请海湾阿拉伯国家合作委员会和阿拉伯国家联盟采取一切必要手段和措施,包括军事干预,立即提供支持,保护也门及其人民免遭胡塞武装组织持续侵略之害。⁵

27. 3 月 25 日,总统飞往阿曼,然后前往利雅得。3 月 26 日,沙特阿拉伯国防部长接见了,同一天,沙特阿拉伯所领导的联军,包括海湾合作委员会 4 个成员国(巴林、科威特、卡塔尔和阿拉伯联合酋长国)和阿拉伯国家联盟 4 个成员国(埃及、约旦、摩洛哥和苏丹)发动了“决定性风暴”行动。好几家新闻媒体和第三国的官员称,非阿拉伯国家国民作为雇佣军和私营安保公司成员参加了战斗。还有媒体报道和官方言论称,美利坚合众国等其他非阿拉伯国家正在支持联军。⁶ 据报道,厄立特里亚也允许联军的海空军使用其港口。⁷

28. 从 3 月末到 8 月初,胡塞-萨利赫部队与地方抵抗运动民兵在亚丁发生激烈冲突。7 月末,联军部队进入亚丁,迫使胡塞武装组织及其盟友撤出,先是撤离亚丁,后来又退出拉哈吉省的阿纳德空军基地(位于亚丁以北),退往中央高原地区。

⁴ 见“伊朗、也门签署空运谅解备忘录”,伊斯兰共和国通讯社,2015 年 3 月 1 日,参见 www3.irna.ir/en/News/81524416/。

⁵ 见安全理事会第 2216(2015)号决议序言部分第二段。

⁶ 见“国家安全委员会发言人贝尔纳黛特·米汉就也门局势发表声明”,2015 年 3 月 25 日,参见 www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/03/25/statement-nsc-spokesperson-bernadette-meehan-situation-yemen。

⁷ 见“阿联酋海军抵达厄立特里亚”,斯特拉特福环球情报机构,2015 年 10 月 29 日,参见 www.stratfor.com/analysis/emirati-navy-arrives-eritrea。

33. 专家小组认定，革命委员会、安全委员会和监督委员会都行使了纯属也门合法政府职权范围内的行政责任，趁时局动荡，让“真主的辅士”和忠于萨利赫的人员从中渔利。

4. 停止敌对行动和恢复政治进程的障碍

34. 在贾迈勒·比诺马尔辞去也门问题特别顾问一职后，秘书长4月25日任命伊斯梅尔·乌尔德·谢赫·艾哈迈德作为他的也门问题特使。特使几次试图通过调解，使敌对行动停止或实现临时人道主义停火，以便为恢复会谈创造条件。他通过谈判，使各方接受6月15日至19日的第一次日内瓦磋商、从7月11日开始为期四天的人道主义停火、“马斯喀特原则”(见下文)以及随着12月15日第二次日内瓦磋商开幕开始的为期七天的人道主义停火。

35. 第一次日内瓦磋商由于对磋商方式无法达成一致而失败。总统同意磋商，但条件是来自利雅得的政府代表只能同作为武装团体的胡塞武装组织会面。另一方面，“真主的辅士”组织坚持认为，其应同其他在9月谈判《和平与全国伙伴关系协议》并参加随后从1月至3月在秘书长特别顾问主持下在瑞享酒店举行的会谈的政党一道，作为政党参加磋商。“真主的辅士”组织拒绝确认参与，直至特使接受上述方式。据数个处理运送来自也门萨那代表团的联合国航班的后勤和飞行许可事务的消息来源称，胡塞-萨利赫部队两次阻止代表团成员登机。因此，包括“真主的辅士”组织代表在内的该代表团未能及时到达日内瓦参加开幕全体会议。萨那代表团和利雅得代表团在日内瓦没有面对面相遇。

36. 萨那代表团离开日内瓦后，于6月20日直接飞抵马斯喀特，然后返回也门。随后，8月7日，四名“真主的辅士”组织代表和四名全国人民大会成员返回马斯喀特，与特使举行后续讨论，最终商定了第2216(2015)号决议条款和七点附加内容，这被称为“马斯喀特原则”，成为今后会谈的基础。讨论促进改变了磋商方式，变为进行直接会谈，一方面是总统指定的代表团，另一方面是来自萨那的代表团，其成员包括 Abdulmalik al-Houthi 和阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫的亲近人员(见附件8)。

37. 特使调解两个代表团从12月15日至20日在日内瓦举行了直接会谈，目的是制订详细的和平谈判框架，其中包括建立信任措施。¹³ 在会谈开始时，各方宣布承诺停止敌对行动，但没有一方在实地遵守。相反，战斗变得更加激烈，联军在哈杰和焦夫的反胡塞活动不断推进，胡塞-萨利赫部队向马里卜和沙特阿拉伯发射了弹道导弹。

¹³ 见联合国日内瓦办事处，“秘书长也门问题特使牵头的会谈的最后公报”，2015年12月20日，可查询：[www.unog.ch/unog/website/news_media.nsf/\(httpPages\)/c80dbb6cb0551f71c1257eb90034379d?OpenDocument&ExpandSection=1.1#_Section1.1](http://www.unog.ch/unog/website/news_media.nsf/(httpPages)/c80dbb6cb0551f71c1257eb90034379d?OpenDocument&ExpandSection=1.1#_Section1.1)。

38. 尽管特使说第二轮会谈预计在 2016 年 1 月中旬举行，但很明显，会谈与实地现实脱节。12 月 28 日，萨利赫公开宣布他与胡塞武装组织并肩作战，以及他们不同总统举行会谈，而是同沙特阿拉伯并只在敌对行动停止的情况下举行会谈。同样，沙特阿拉伯 2016 年 1 月 2 日单方面宣布结束总统最初要求的休战，原因是胡塞-萨利赫部队“一再公然袭击王国领土，向沙特城市发射弹道导弹，并把沙特边境检查站作为攻击目标”。¹⁴

39. 专家小组注意到，特使调解的两次人道主义停火都未得到完全遵守。关于第一次停火，总统向秘书长转达了他接受停火的书面文件，并补充说，他已通知了联军；¹⁵ 然而，本应于 7 月 11 日午夜开始的停火从未生效。联合国官员报告说，他们观察到在宣布开始停火后仅两小时，萨那就发生了一次空袭。第二天，隶属于联军的媒体机构宣布，联军未收到也门合法政府有关停火的要求。¹⁶ 专家小组注意到，据媒体机构称，第二次停火也在一开始就受到各方违反，并据一些新闻报道，战斗在哈杰和焦夫甚至变得更加激烈。

40. 此外，联军宣布的两次单方面人道主义停火也未得到各方遵守。¹⁷ 专家小组还注意到，数项地方停火倡议也未得到遵守，特别是在塔兹，原因是各方未能制订适当的建立信任措施，就独立的监测和报告机制做出规定。

41. 专家小组认为，也门所有冲突各方以及两次磋商的所有参与者、包括萨那代表团和利雅得代表团成员，都应对阻碍停止敌对行动和恢复政治进程负责，因为它们未抱有诚意。

B. 武装团体

1. 胡塞武装力量

42. 2004 年至 2010 年间，胡塞家族领导在北部高地针对忠于萨利赫最高级将领阿里·穆赫辛·艾哈迈尔的军队断断续续地进行了反叛斗争。因此，胡塞领导人及许多核心支持者有丰富的游击战经验；他们斗志高昂，有强烈的意识形态，并因共同的群体特征和在作战中的忠诚联系在一起。这支作战部队的核心随后与阿

¹⁴ 见“Yemen support coalition command declares ending Yemen ceasefire at 14: 00 on Saturday”，沙特通讯社，2016 年 1 月 2 日，可查询：www.spa.gov.sa/English/details.php?id=1442062。

¹⁵ 见“也门：联合国秘书长欢迎宣布人道主义停火”，联合国新闻服务处，2015 年 7 月 9 日，可查询：www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51371#.VIL_H3bhDIU。

¹⁶ 见“Coalition: we have not received any request from the Government of Yemen regarding the pause”，Alarabiya 通讯社，2015 年 7 月 11 日，可查询：www.alarabiya.net/ar/arab-and-world/yemen/2015/07/11/الهدنة-بشأن-اليمنية-الحكومة-من-طلب-أي-نتلق-لم-التحالف.html。

¹⁷ 见联合国新闻服务处下列报道，“也门临时人道主义停火为陷入战火的平民提供“一条生命线”——联合国主管救济事务官员”，2015 年 5 月 11 日，可查询：www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=50814#.VIME4HbhDIU；“也门：联合国秘书长欢迎沙特领导的联军宣布人道主义休战”，2015 年 7 月 26 日，可查询：www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51501#.VIL983bhDIU。

姆兰省和萨那省意气相投的部落和家庭结成联盟。¹⁸ 在这个层面上，胡塞盟友和萨利赫长期的裙带关系结构受益者之间有很大程度的重叠。

43. 自 2014 年以来，胡塞武装组织已把这一模式扩大到阿姆兰省和萨那省以外，方式是同中部高地和沙漠边缘地区意气相投的部落和家族建立联盟，这些部落和家族估计，与胡塞武装组织结盟有助于自己的利益，例如他们与地方对手的抗衡。¹⁹ 胡塞武装组织提供基本训练，以换取一定数量的战斗人员(也被称为“民众委员会”)，并同意保护盟友的经济利益，以此来巩固联盟。这项安排使胡塞武装组织能够派自己的少量老兵去领导每一个新战线，并有效把管理检查站等日常任务外包给熟悉当地情况的地方盟友。¹⁹

2. 胡塞-萨利赫部队成为混合武装团体

44. 在萨利赫放弃总统职位之前，其军事和情报保护关系网的直接受益者是共和国卫队成员，其中包括他的儿子 Ahmed Ali 领导的共和国卫队特种兵、他的侄子 Yahya Mohammed 领导的中央安全局以及 Yahya 的兄弟 Ammar Mohammed 领导的国家安全局。与包括穆欣·阿里将军的第一装甲师在内的常规军队相比，共和国卫队显然有更好的装备和管理，并在全各地战略要地设有基地。

45. 在萨利赫担任总统期间，国防部无权进行自上而下的控制；相反，萨利赫本人经常在正式指挥体系和其家族的军事关系网之间斡旋。当阿卜杜拉布·曼苏尔·哈迪在 2012 年年初掌权时，他把大量萨利赫的亲戚和盟友从关键军事职位上解雇，并开始执行安全部门改革方案，旨在打破萨利赫时代的割据现象。他还努力确立对武器采购、军事库存和军事人员的直接控制，其长期目标是建立统一的国家军队。

46. 然而，许多效忠于萨利赫的私人关系网没有被体制变革打破，一些离开正式职位的人继续行使非正式权力。在 10 月接受 Al-Mayadeen 的电视采访中，萨利赫说他已不再控制军队，但同一些高级官员保持关系。数个保密消息来源告诉专家小组，萨利赫帮助胡塞武装组织联系其私人网络中的人员，这些人掌握先进武器的技术知识、支助服务或专门当地知识等有用的信息。²⁰ 萨利赫还同向目前战斗提供士兵的许多北部部落有广泛联系。²¹

47. 2015 年，专家小组发现，胡塞武装力量同萨利赫先前控制的军队残余力量之间日益融合。²² 专家小组认为，胡塞-萨利赫部队成了新的混合武装团体，其根源是北部精英们的传统网络。胡塞家族有受人尊重的赛义德身份，即先知穆罕默德

¹⁸ 专家小组与正式消息来源的约谈，2015 年 9 月至 10 月，得到可信独立消息来源的证实。

¹⁹ 与正式和非正式消息来源的约谈，2015 年 6 月至 10 月。

²⁰ 与正式消息来源的多次约谈，2015 年 5 月至 10 月。

²¹ 与正式消息来源的约谈，2015 年 9 月至 10 月，得到可信独立消息来源的证实。

²² 与多个正式和非正式消息来源的约谈，2015 年 6 月至 11 月。

德的一支后裔,并支持复兴北部高地本地的宗教传统宰德什叶派教义。²³ 在 1960 年代,革命和内战用军事共和国取代了执政的宰德派伊玛目,这削弱了作为政治贵族的赛义德阶层,推动了部落的商业和政治利益。萨利赫派没有赛义德身份,而且,虽然其家族的传统为宰德派,但萨利赫本人从未作为宰德派复兴主义者进行统治。²⁴

48. 因此,现在萨利赫派与胡塞武装组织之间的联盟是以下二者的结合,一方面是由胡塞武装组织代表的宰德派复兴主义和赛义德利益,另一方面是萨利赫家族明确的自身利益,该家族是一个在现代共和国框架内与对手派系竞争的有权势的精英派别,也是一个主要以家族为基础的小部族。此外,这个通过权宜联盟创立的新混合武装团体也推动了许多北方军官的自我利益,这些人主要来自萨那周边地区,他们在萨利赫担任总统期间获利丰厚,并抵触 2012 年至 2014 年间重组军队的尝试。²⁵

49. 胡塞-萨利赫部队联合控制的领土不到也门土地面积的一半,但包括也门大部分人口,这片领土是毗邻西海岸的肥沃的北部高地,以及帖哈麦西部沿海地区,包括红海港口荷台达、摩卡和萨利夫。这些地区主要是宰德什叶派教徒。萨利赫派有更多控制城市地区的经验,而胡塞武装组织对在山区作战有更好的准备。

3. 抵抗力量

50. 总体而言,抵抗力量的构成高度本地化,并反映不同地区具体的社会状况和政治优先事项。抵抗力量部分依靠联军顾问的培训和技術支助以及外部行为体的直接和间接资助。最初,抵抗力量内部各组成部分在多个战线上对胡塞-萨利赫部队开战,但他们不能(或不愿)作为统一的国家武装力量行动。例如,在亚丁和拉哈杰的抵抗团体不愿部署到阿拉伯也门共和国(北也门)和也门人民民主共和国(南也门)前边界以北,即在塔兹或伊卜作战,表明他们主要从当地角度看待打击胡塞-萨利赫部队的斗争。到 2015 年年底,有迹象显示,塔兹和亚丁的抵抗力量加强了协调和支助。

51. 在胡塞-萨利赫部队 7 月从亚丁撤离前,抵抗力量的形式是社区民兵,主要由平民志愿者组成,他们与出身南部的前军官以及前也门人民民主共和国军队退伍军官并肩作战。作为未经训练被迫加入战斗的作战人员,他们的作战方式体现出仓促征募的民兵的性质,他们建立自上而下指挥与控制的速度缓慢,没有良好

²³ 宰德派的名字来源于 Zayd ibn Ali,是先知穆罕默德的女儿法蒂玛及其丈夫阿里的直系后裔。宰德派以 Zayd ibn Ali 的名字作为伊玛目的名称,以示与 Twelver 什叶派的不同, Twelver 什叶派是什叶派穆斯林占主导地位的分支,存在于巴林、伊朗(伊斯兰共和国)、伊拉克、科威特和黎巴嫩。宰德什叶派据说比什叶派穆斯林的任何其他分支都更接近于逊尼派法学学派。

²⁴ 萨利赫在 1962 年至 1967 年内战后,于 1978 年在北也门开始执政。

²⁵ 与也门前官员的约谈,2015 年 10 月,得到可信独立消息来源的证实。

的组织，但随着战斗时间延长，他们逐渐积累了更多经验。²⁶ 在亚丁的当地抵抗力量中，比较突出的是隶属于 HiraK 南方运动的分离派民兵，他们同与也门改革集团结盟的民兵、萨拉菲民兵和基地组织战斗人员并肩战斗，各自有不同的议程。²⁷

52. 专家小组确定了萨拉菲武装团体动员的一个新趋势，主要是在亚丁和塔兹等抵抗力量控制的城市地区。²⁸ 与专家小组接触的民间社会消息来源认为，萨拉菲团体动员的原因是他们认为既定政党失败以及正式的政治机构缺乏合法性；与此同时，胡塞-萨利赫部队的侵略使许多先前的寂静主义萨拉菲团体成了激进的派别团体。胡塞武装组织关闭了萨达省萨拉菲教育机构 Dar al-Hadith，导致许多学员回家，其中一些人后来拿起武器反对胡塞-萨利赫部队，例如在塔兹和亚丁。²⁹

53. 当代萨拉菲团体源于 1980 年代和 1990 年代政府资助的萨拉菲学院(被称为科学研究所)的普及，例如 Dar al-Hadith；这些机构主要践行“寂静主义”，即不谈政治。然而，由于当前的冲突，许多萨拉菲团体具备了新的特点：他们对胡塞-萨利赫部队对平民区的攻击的反应变得更加极端，萨拉菲传道者通过社区清真寺动员当地的支持者。²⁹ 分离派(南方运动)民兵表明自己是南方自卫队，反抗从萨那入侵的胡塞-萨利赫部队带来的北方统治，萨拉菲团体则表现为逊尼派治安员，抵制伊朗支持的热衷于什叶派扩张的意识形态团体胡塞武装组织的入侵。

4. 恐怖主义团体

54. 基地组织及其有关人员自 1990 年代早期以来一直在也门活动。目前出现的相互竞争的恐怖团体现象可追溯到 2009 年阿拉伯半岛基地组织成立，2011 年其分支伊斯兰教法辅士组织出现，以及最近建立了伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯兰国(伊黎伊斯兰国，又称为达伊沙)的地方专家小组或教省。伊黎伊斯兰国在也门的存在不断扩大，促进派别观点不断增强，这也激励了萨拉菲团体以及阿拉伯半岛基地组织的支持者。

55. 阿拉伯半岛基地组织和伊黎伊斯兰国在也门相互竞争，所涉背景不仅是这场地方冲突，还有基地组织全球领导和伊黎伊斯兰国在国际一级的竞争。2014 年 6 月，伊黎伊斯兰国宣布在易卜拉欣·阿布·贝克尔·巴格达迪领导下建立哈里发

²⁶ 与正式和非正式消息来源的约谈，2015 年 6 月至 7 月。

²⁷ 与正式和非正式消息来源的约谈，2015 年 6 月至 11 月。也门改革集团是 1990 年成立的伊斯兰政党。

²⁸ 与多个正式和非正式消息来源以及亚丁和塔兹的基层消息来源(通过跨平台移动短信)的约谈，2015 年 5 月至 11 月。萨拉菲派力求恢复先知穆罕默德及其追随者践行的早期伊斯兰教的纯洁。萨拉菲派的特征可大致分为：“寂静主义”萨拉菲派信徒，他们原则上不参与政治；“行动主义”萨拉菲派信徒，他们愿意参与政治竞争；“takfiri”萨拉菲派信徒，他们倡导使用暴力。

²⁹ 与也门现任官员和前官员的约谈，2015 年 10 月至 11 月，得到可信独立消息来源的证实

国。然而，基地组织的全球领袖埃曼·扎瓦希里质疑哈里发国的合法性，拒绝巴格达迪的派别战术，并谴责伊黎伊斯兰国的极端残暴行为。

伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯兰国

56. 伊黎伊斯兰国在也门第一次有记录的存在是 2014 年 11 月发出的一条推文，该推文联接着一段四分钟的音轨，来自于一个宣誓效忠巴格达迪的自称为“也门圣战者”的团体。三个月后，在 2015 年 2 月，一小群来自扎马尔和萨那的也门人发表了一份联合声明，其中，他们声称不再效忠于扎瓦希里，而是宣布效忠于巴格达迪。随后的社交媒体活动通过向逊尼派发出战斗口令，称赞哈里发国的成就，诋毁胡塞武装组织是叛教者和伊朗伊斯兰共和国的代理人，把也门潜在的招募人员作为招徕目标。³⁰

57. 自 3 月以来，伊黎伊斯兰国声称对在亚丁、贝达、扎马尔、哈德拉毛、伊卜、拉哈杰、萨那和夏卜瓦的 20 多次行动负责。³⁰ 3 月中旬，该团体在星期五礼拜期间针对萨那两座清真寺的两起自杀性爆炸事件中杀害了 140 多人。10 月，自杀炸弹手有针对性地袭击了住在亚丁 Qasr 酒店的政府部长和联军部队。12 月，伊黎伊斯兰国在一次汽车爆炸事件中杀害了亚丁省省长 Jaafar Mohammed Saad 少将。

阿拉伯半岛基地组织

58. 就组织结构、战斗人员人数和攻击频率而言，阿拉伯半岛基地组织比伊黎伊斯兰国更强大。6 月至 11 月，半岛基地组织声称在阿比扬、亚丁、贝达、达利阿、哈德拉毛、荷台达、伊卜、拉哈杰、马里卜、萨那和夏卜瓦开展了 200 多次行动；迄今为止，发生在贝达的行动次数最多，该组织在贝达与胡塞武装组织-萨利赫武装力量对抗。³⁰ 这些行动包括自杀爆炸、袭击、检查站冲突、伏击车辆、手榴弹袭击、迫击炮和定点暗杀。³⁰ 尽管阿拉伯半岛基地组织也认为胡塞武装组织是背教者，但该组织明确远离伊黎伊斯兰国袭击什叶派平民的战略。

59. 自 4 月以来，阿拉伯半岛基地组织同部落首领和有萨拉菲主义倾向的团体合作，共同控制哈德拉毛省沿海城市穆卡拉。在一个自称为“哈德拉毛之子”的新团体的旗帜下，其领导人将他们整合为一个临时市议会，承担一些警务和治理职能并控制港口。阿拉伯半岛基地组织攻占了位于穆卡拉以东 18 英里(28 公里)的第二区域军事指挥部总部，并继续在沿海和内陆地区扩大其影响力。³¹

伊斯兰教法辅士组织

60. 2011 年和 2012 年，伊斯兰教法辅士组织宣布在阿比扬省和夏卜瓦省建立临时伊斯兰酋长国，但随后被政府军驱散。2015 年 12 月，该团体在阿比扬两个镇(津吉巴尔和杰阿尔)重新建立存在。

³⁰ 见 SITE Intelligence Group(<https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/>)。

³¹ 与非正式消息来源的约谈，2015 年 11 月。

5. 争议地区

61. 自 2015 年年初以来，合法政府垮台，武装部队四分五裂，联军开始进行空袭，这为相互竞争的武装团体努力扩大自己的实力营造了宽松的安全环境。此外，专家小组认为，部落和萨拉菲武装团体的动员，出现相互竞争的参与恐怖活动的武装团体，以及大量出现有分离主义议程的武装抵抗团体、特别是在亚丁，这些给有争议地区今后的和平与安全带来了巨大风险。

亚丁

62. 亚丁是也门第二大城市和商业港口，位于曼德海峡以东约 200 公里。自 2000 年代后期以来，亚丁也出现了各种分离主义(Hiraki)团体。亚丁是也门人民民主共和国的前首都，2015 年，支持脱离北方并实现独立的趋势在亚丁变得更加明显。

63. 3 月下旬至 7 月，胡塞-萨利赫部队控制了通向亚丁的主要道路，即北至塔兹和萨那的 N1 号道路，以及西至曼德海峡的 N2 号道路。他们还控制了 Jebel Shamsan，这是一个可以俯瞰 Crater、Tawahi 和 Mualla 住宅区的设防制高点，以及机场和历史港口。抵抗组织战斗人员占据着 Sheikh Othman 和 Mansura 的人口密集地区，以及小亚丁的炼油厂和 Buraiqa 港口。

64. 自胡塞-萨利赫部队在 7 月撤出以来，在没有有效的国家提供法律和秩序的情况下，一些地方民兵开始作为治安员运作。与专家小组接触的消息来源谈到 Hiraki 派别和其他武装团体之间开展地盘战，竞相争夺外部资金和政治支持。³² 专家小组认为，总统解除抵抗团体武装和/或把它们纳入国家安全架构的速度缓慢，这对当地的安全状况产生了不利影响。

塔兹省

65. 塔兹省跨越传统区域的社会断层线，北面是宰德什叶派宗教信仰地区，南面是逊尼派的沙斐仪教派。全国最繁忙的过境路线，即从北向南在萨那和亚丁之间的 N1 号道路穿过该省。到 2015 年年底，在 23 个区中，有 3 个区出现了抵抗力量；其余各区由胡塞-萨利赫部队控制，包括塔兹市郊区。

66. 3 月中旬，胡塞-萨利赫部队在从萨那到亚丁向南推进期间，控制了塔兹市的关键设施。在武装力量 7 月撤出亚丁后，塔兹成为制止联军支持的抵抗力量向北推进的新前线。冲突在 8 月加剧，当时，联军支持的抵抗力量开展了协调一致的猛攻，以挑战胡塞-萨利赫部队及其当地支持者，争夺对该市的控制权。

67. 在塔兹的抵抗力量包括：忠于 Sheikh Hamud Sa'id al-Mikhlaifi 的与改革集团结盟的民兵；忠于穆欣·阿里第一装甲师前准将 Sadiq Ali Sarhan 的战斗人员；忠

³² 与正式和非正式消息来源的约谈，2015 年 10 月至 11 月。

于合法政府的第三十五装甲旅的一个营。³³ 此外，数个萨拉菲武装团体也同抵抗力量并肩战斗。在抵抗委员会的旗帜下进行了协调。

68. 到 2015 年年底，抵抗力量和同盟民兵出现在城市中心，胡塞-萨利赫部队则控制着北边群山上的战略高地。³³ 主要前线是 Salah 区，在那里，胡塞-萨利赫部队控制着俯瞰城市商业心脏的海角。离开大市区的两条主要道路也在胡塞-萨利赫部队的控制之下：

(a) 萨那路，该道路向北通往萨那，经过 Janad 区和机场。该道路由前共和国卫队第二十二装甲旅控制；

(b) N3 道路，该道路向西通往摩卡港，穿过塔兹市郊区的 Beir Basha 区。到摩卡的道路由第三十五装甲旅控制。

69. 由于塔兹市地形多山，该城正南没有交通要道。但在塔兹以南大约 20 至 30 公里处，有两条地方道路联接 N1 道路。军事态势使胡塞-萨利赫部队能够从北面山区战略要点炮轰城市中心，并能够几乎完全地封锁商业和人道主义物资，因为他们控制着主要的供应路线。

70. 10 月和 11 月，地方消息来源告诉专家小组，在塔兹与萨利赫武装力量一道驻守的胡塞武装组织人员的人数越来越多。³³ 10 月，阿卜杜勒·叶海亚·哈基姆和穆罕默德·阿里·胡塞访问了塔兹，当地消息来源也认为，这表明“真主的辅士”组织的领导层支持包围。

马里卜省

71. 马里卜省的首府马里卜市位于萨那以西驱车行驶约 170 公里处，在萨那和哈德拉毛之间的主要东西向交通道路上。马里卜有也门主要的发电厂以及重要的石油和天然气基础设施，包括开采场地、出口管道和一个小炼厂。胡塞武装组织自 2014 年以来一直在马里卜西部山区活动，与同盟部落共同打击阿拉伯半岛基地组织和与改革集团结盟的民兵。9 月，一次弹道导弹攻击打死了 40 多名驻扎在马里卜的联军地面部队人员，包括来自阿拉伯联合酋长国的人员。到 2015 年年底，前线转移到 Sirwah 西部山麓。

三. 武器以及执行武器禁运

A. 监测禁运执行情况

72. 安全理事会在第 2216(2015)号决议中，促请会员国，特别是也门的邻国，在其境内，包括在其港口和机场，检查所有运往也门的货物，以确保对该国的定向

³³ 来自塔兹的多个保密消息来源，2015 年 10 月至 11 月。

武器禁运规定得到严格执行。³⁴ 联军已对胡塞-萨利赫部队控制的地区执行海上和空中封锁，实施了检查制度，其中要求船舶和飞机必须获得在利雅得的沙特阿拉伯国防部撤离和人道主义行动股的批核(见附件 9)。

73. 专家小组对也门官方持有的武器库进行了案头调查，作为监测潜在违反禁运行为的基线(见附件 10)。专家小组打算利用基准来确定观察到的会员国先前没有报告的胡塞-萨利赫部队拥有的新武器系统。专家小组将考虑此类武器可能违反禁运进入也门。

74. 专家小组向邻国和参加联军的其他会员国以及参与该地区反海盗行动的会员国和组织发出了 32 封正式信函，寻求关于可能涉及也门的非法转让武器和其他非法走私活动的信息。³⁵ 专家小组目前正在调查一起可能通过走私网络违反禁运的案例。

B. 武器走私和缴获反坦克导弹案例

1. 背景

75. 在目前冲突开始之前，就有向也门、来自也门和过境也门的武器走私活动，在一些情况下安全官员和商人勾结。法里斯·穆罕默德·马尼阿从 2011 年至 2014 年 12 月被“真主的辅士”组织任命为萨达省省长，他因向索马里走私武器受到联合国制裁。³⁶ 专家小组认为，这些牢牢建立的网络在整个 2015 年间继续运作，利用解散军队以及武装团体和民兵迅速增长带来的机会。

76. 在同专家小组举行的会议上，联军成员表示，他们的武装部队在也门境内截获了走私的武器，但他们没有提供任何证据。³⁷ 同样，一些会员国在会上说，联军封锁无法现实地阻止所有使用帆船的海上走私活动。³⁸ 几位受访者告诉专家小组，在红海和亚丁湾运送移民和难民的帆船也曾被用来走私武器。

³⁴ 安全理事会促请会员国在有情报提供合理理由认为货物中有该决议禁止供应、销售或转移的物项时，进行此类检查。安理会要求有关会员国立即向委员会提交初步书面报告，特别是说明检查的理由以及检查的相关详细内容。

³⁵ 专家小组向邻国(吉布提、印度、印度尼西亚、伊朗(伊斯兰共和国)、以色列、黎巴嫩、马来西亚、阿曼和巴基斯坦)、联军成员(巴林、埃及、约旦、科威特、卡塔尔、沙特阿拉伯和阿拉伯联合酋长国)、在区域开展反海盗行动的会员国(澳大利亚、加拿大、中国、丹麦、法国、德国、意大利、日本、新西兰、葡萄牙、俄罗斯联邦、大不列颠及北爱尔兰联合王国和美国)以及欧洲联盟和非洲联盟驻索马里特派团发出了信函。

³⁶ 他 2010 年 4 月 12 日被安全理事会关于索马里和厄立特里亚的第 751(1992)号和第 1907(2009)号决议所设委员会指认(SOI.008)。

³⁷ 专家小组 2015 年 9 月 8 日在迪拜与阿拉伯联合酋长国官员举行的会议以及 2015 年 9 月 12 日至 13 日与沙特阿拉伯官员举行的会议。

³⁸ 专家小组 2015 年 9 月 13 日在利雅得与联军官员举行的会议以及 2015 年 9 月 12 日至 13 日在麦纳麦与海上联合部队举行的会议。

77. 现有的走私网络可能已开始为胡塞-萨利赫部队带入反坦克导弹等高度便携的威力强大武器。

2. 可能走私反坦克导弹的案例

78. 胡塞-萨利赫部队 8 月开始在行动中使用反坦克导弹，当时，“真主的辅士”组织在其电视频道 Al-Masirah 的宣传片中，播放了一枚此类导弹在边界击中沙特阿拉伯 Abrams 坦克的视频(见图二)。数个视频播放的导弹的特征类似于俄罗斯制造的 9M113 Konkurs 和 9M133 Kornet 导弹或伊朗由此改制的导弹(见附件 11)。

79. 9 月 30 日，阿拉伯电视台报道说，联军 9 月 25 日在阿曼沿海截获了一批运送的武器，据称目的地是也门。³⁹ 报道显示数枚反坦克导弹，其型号、油漆和标记类似于可在网上公布的几部视频中看到胡塞-萨利赫部队拥有的导弹。沙特阿拉伯军方发言人 Ahmed Asiri 准将提到曾扣押一批打算为也门胡塞武装组织运送的伊朗武器。

80. 基于沙特阿拉伯官员的上述声明，专家小组发出了数封公函，并收到澳大利亚和美国的确认，称它们的军舰曾在登船验证旗帜的过程中制止了一艘无国籍帆船 Nassir 号，并发现船只携带武器(见附件 12)。

81. 美国收缴了武器和有关物资，并应专家小组的要求，邀请专家小组同伊朗伊斯兰共和国问题专家小组一道对武器进行检查。12 月 29 日，在一个美国政府大院进行了检查(见图一)。

图一

从 Nassir 号收缴的在座架上的 Konkurs 导弹



来源：专家小组(2015 年 12 月 29 日)。

³⁹ 见 “In pictures ... coalition seizes Iranian boat loaded with weapons”，2015 年 9 月 30 日，可查询：www.alarabiya.net/ar/arab-and-world/yemen/2015/09/30/التحالف يسيطر زورقاً إيرانياً محملاً بالأسلحة.html。

图二

一名胡塞战斗人员操作的 Konkurs 导弹



来源：Al-Masirah 电视台，见 www.youtube.com/watch?v=dxnRSY_DPVs&feature=youtu.be。

82. 专家小组发现，缴获的武器包括反坦克导弹及辅助设备，其型号类似于美国制造的 BGM-71 陶式导弹和俄罗斯制造的 9M113 Konkurs 导弹。专家小组注意到，陶式导弹及其辅助设备和电子元期间的标识有伊朗工业公司的名字。专家小组还注意到，Konkurs 导弹的标识有类似于俄罗斯和伊朗标识的特征，表明这些导弹可能在伊朗伊斯兰共和国维护或检修(见附件 13)。专家小组继续调查并同有关会员国互动协作，以追查武器，目的是查明与运送武器有关的潜在走私网络。

C. 武器弹药扩散和转移的危险

83. 2015 年，武装团体从也门各地的国家武库掠夺武器，却未遇到正规部队的抵抗，有迹象表明这是精心策划的将武器转交给胡塞武装组织的人员、部落军阀和阿拉伯半岛基地组织及其同伙的行动。部落战斗人员掠夺夏卜瓦省 Bayhan 第十九旅武器的案件就是明证。2 月 12 日，伊斯兰教法辅士组织和部落战斗人员袭击了该主要基地，该基地有 700 多名士兵常驻，屯有该旅大部分设备。这次袭击未遇抵抗，仅一名士兵身亡，6 人受伤(见附件 14)。专家小组从各媒体消息来源注意到，在阿比洋、夏卜瓦、哈达拉毛和马哈拉省，伊斯兰教法辅士组织还掠夺了其他七个旅(见附件 18)。据活动人士和政府官员评估，大多数掠夺实际上是忠于萨利赫的高级指挥官精心策划的武器转交行动。⁴⁰

84. 联军针对胡塞-萨利赫部队控制地区的武器储存设施的行动导致各种军事装备、武器和弹药流失和扩散，一些弹药被恐怖分子用于设计简易爆炸装置。联军还在未采取适当措施确保问责和储存安全的情况下，向武装团体提供武器，直接加剧了也门的武器扩散。当地媒体和活动人士向专家小组提供的视屏显示，一些

⁴⁰ 2015 年 9 月 13 日，对利雅得也门合法政府的公务人员的采访。

武器被空投到亚丁，部分最终落入胡塞武装团体手中(见附件 15)。专家小组还看到有视屏显示，塔伊兹的抵抗战斗人员使用类似联军所用的装甲车，该团体据称隶属于由 Adil Abduh Fari‘或 Abu al-Abbas 领导的最初来自 Dammaj 的自称为“信条保护者酋长国”的萨拉菲团体(见附件 16)。

85. 虽然专家小组没有受权监测联军向抵抗战斗人员转让武器的情况，但希望提请各方注意，如果联军和也门合法政府不实施严格的问责措施，则可能导致武器落入激进团体手中，并流入黑市。专家小组记录的案例显示，抵抗战斗人员在社交媒体上表示愿意出售小武器和轻武器(见附件 17)。

D. 也门各行为体违反武器禁运、非法转让武器和军事活动有关援助的行为

86. 专家小组注意到，也门军队和安全部队经常为也门各地的胡塞-萨利赫部队开展的作战行动提供军事装备等援助，并仍在继续提供。忠于萨利赫的高级军事领导人和部队指挥官参与了向胡塞武装组织的人员提供军事支助的行为。

87. 专家小组在分析整个任务期间也门的军事结构和作战行动的战斗序列时，发现以前隶属于共和国卫队和特种作战部队/中央安全局的一些部队一直在系统地支持胡塞武装组织的人员，并为其作战行动提供帮助(见附件 18)。根据媒体报道曝光的某些已知军事存在地区的相关部队和炮击模式，专家小组有合理理由认为，开展行动支持胡塞武装组织的人员包括：驻 Dali‘的第三十三旅；驻 Yarim 的第五十五炮兵旅；驻夏卜瓦省的第二十一机械化旅；驻扎马尔省的第 201 旅；驻塔伊兹的第二十二旅；驻马里卜的第十三旅；驻 Bab al-Mandab 的第十七旅；驻塔伊兹的第三十五旅的大多数部队。

88. 专家小组约谈了多个官方和非官方来源，包括与也门的消息来源通了电话，还在利雅得与忠于总统的武装部队参谋长 Al-Maqdishhi 上将举行了一次会谈，他指出下列指挥官支持胡塞-萨利赫部队：驻 Dali‘的第三十三旅指挥官 Abdullah Dab‘an 准将；驻 Shabwah 的第二十一机械化旅指挥官 Awad Muhammad Farid 准将；驻塔伊兹的第二十二旅指挥官 Salih Ali Dahamash 准将。

89. 根据媒体报道和活动人士指明的部队和炮击模式，专家小组认为，上述人员很可能对其部队参与违反定向军火禁运、支持胡塞-萨利赫部队的行为负有长官职责。

四. 金融以及旅行禁令和资产冻结的执行情况

A. 胡塞-萨利赫部队的可用资金

90. 自冲突开始以来，胡塞-萨利赫部队控制了也门经济，利用资金后盾战斗了 9 个多月。它们控制着大多数国家资产，包括中央银行和燃料分配，还从其他活动中牟利，例如在主要城镇周围的收集点，向卡特叶(也门广泛使用的一种温和的

麻醉叶)等农产品非法征税。此外, 专家小组继续调查关于胡塞-萨利赫部队在检查站敲诈勒索和通过黑市贸易和走私活动牟利的报告。

91. **中央银行。**胡塞武装组织的人员控制着中央银行, 但允许总统任命的行长继续在萨那履行技术职责。中央银行继续发挥作用, 管理金融系统, 收集或支付资金、费用和薪金, 包括支付给亚丁的工作人员以及宣布为反“胡塞武装团体”的驻外使馆和领事馆的工作人员。⁴¹ 专家小组几次试图通过外交使团和财政部副部长与行长联系, 以了解中央银行采取了哪些措施避免胡塞武装组织的人员转用或挪用资产或非法干涉银行的技术职能, 但无法联系上行长。

92. **萨利赫的财富。**专家小组正在调查萨利赫家族和有关主要也门商人积累的财富在何种程度上被用于资助冲突。总统告知专家小组, 萨利赫利用各经济部门累积财富, 包括也门境内外银行的股份和交易、石油和基础设施建筑行业、当地汽车经销、武器交易以及军事和公共服务机构中的影子工人的工资(见附件 19)。

93. **燃料分配。**⁴² 自 7 月底至 10 月 6 日, 运输部长限制燃料进口到胡塞武装团体控制的也门红海港口(Mocha、Hudaydah 和 Salif)。因此, 胡塞-萨利赫部队控制的地区燃料短缺, 黑市盛行, 燃油售价比正常价格高出四至六倍。⁴³ 控制当地燃料市场的胡塞武装组织的人员趁机从中牟取了暴利。

94. **非法征税。**胡塞武装组织的人员为积累资金, 采用伊斯兰札卡特惯例, 对所有农民和商人实行胡姆斯税收, 税额相当于他们 20% 的利润。专家小组收集的证词表明, 胡塞武装组织的人员还向卡塔叶农民征税, 特别是在 Sa'dah、Amran 和萨那。胡塞武装组织的人员还继续通过所谓的“强制性捐款”敛财。也门活动人士向专家小组出示了此类付款的收据样本(见附件 20)。

B. 资产冻结

1. 阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫的金融结构

95. 专家小组已查明了阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫及其家属设立的金融网络, 包括在北美、欧洲、东南亚、加勒比和中东各国的企业活动、公司和个人。

⁴¹ 2015 年 10 月 8 日, 也门驻纽约外交官向专家小组证实这一点, 此外, 2015 年 10 月 13 日也门驻美大使在华盛顿特区也予以证实。

⁴² 也门的燃料分配做法以及应国际货币基金组织(货币基金组织)针对中期信贷的要求而取消燃料补贴的行动, 导致 2014 年 9 月萨那出现抗议, 真主的辅士组织趁机占领了首府。见货币基金组织, “货币基金组织执行董事会核准与也门的为期 3 年、价值 5.529 亿美元的中期信贷安排”, 2014 年 9 月 2 日, 可查阅 www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2014/pr14408.htm。

⁴³ 例如, 2015 年 11 月 30 日专家小组通过电话询问萨那有关人士得知, 20 公升燃料的售价在冲突前为 13 美元, 而 2015 年 11 月为 50 至 75 美元。

96. 该网络有九个公司：Pact Trust；New World Trust Corporation；NWT Services Limited(原为 NWT Nominees Limited)；Albula Limited；Weisen Limited；Foxford Management Limited；NWT Directors Limited；NWT Management SA；CT Management。⁴⁴ 目前，Albula Limited，Weisen Limited 和 Foxford Management Limited 这三个主要公司用于代表阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫转移资金。NWT Directors Limited、NWT Management SA 和 CT Management 向上述三个主要公司提供管理和金融服务(见图三和附件 21)。

97. 专家小组有证据表明，两家银行(根据专家小组签署的保密协定，在表 1 中以 X 和 Y 表示)冻结了属于这三个主要公司的账户。但是，专家小组无法证实，表 1 所列的第三家银行阿拉伯联合酋长国的第一海湾银行是否已冻结部分或所有这些公司的资产。


表 1
与阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫有关联的公司持有的账户

银行	公司	数额	现况
X	Albula Limited	44 009.97 美元	已冻结
X	Weisen Limited	3 923 773.39 美元	已冻结
Y	Foxford Management Limited	35 340.00 瑞士法郎	已冻结
第一海湾银行(阿拉伯联合酋长国)	Albula/Weisen/Foxford	734 786.49 欧元	不详
第一海湾银行(阿拉伯联合酋长国)	Albula/Weisen/Foxford	33 471 993.37 美元	不详

98. 专家小组有证据表明，2014 年 10 月 23 日，Albula Limited 和 Weisen Limited 属于阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫及其家属的所有股份已转让给他的儿子之一哈立德·阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫，以规避定向制裁。专家小组还发现，哈立德·阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫已经利用这些公司转移了 734 786.49 欧元和 33 471 993.37 美元。

⁴⁴ 图三根据层级和成立日期开列了这些公司。

图三
阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫的金融结构



注：实线表示被指认人员拥有的公司或其金融网络的一部分，虚线表示公司提供管理或金融服务。

北美洲

99. New World Trust Corporation 是 Pact Trust 的受托人, 由阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫成立, 1977 年在加拿大新不伦瑞克注册。其总部与一家法律事务所一样, 都设在新不伦瑞克的圣约翰。专家小组还得知, NWT Nominees Limited(现称为 NWT Services Limited)是 New World Trust Corporation 和 Pact Trust 的最终受托人(见附件 22 至 25)。

欧洲

100. NWT Services Limited 还是 Albula Limited、Weisen Limited 和 Foxford Management Limited 的董事和完全股东。专家小组获得的文件显示, 这三家公司的邮寄地址相同(16-18 Rue de la Pâtisserie, PO Box 3501, 1211 Geneva 3, Switzerland)。

101. 此外, Albula Limited、Weisen Limited 和 Foxford Management Limited 持有账户的四个授权签字人同时是第三家总部设在欧洲的公司董事会(见附件 26 至 28), 专家小组正在对此开展调查。这一最新公司拥有类似于 NWT Services Limited 的全球金融网络(见附件 29)。

102. 专家小组正在继续调查, 因为它认为第三家总部设在欧洲的公司及其管理委员会正在代表受资产冻结限制的个人或按其指示行事。

东南亚

103. Albula Limited、Weisen Limited 和 Foxford Management 在东南亚的第一海湾银行设有公司账户。2014 年 10 月, 734 786.49 欧元和 33 471 993.37 美元从阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫的信托账户转入哈立德·阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫在东南亚第一海湾银行的账户。2014 年 12 月, 后者将这些资金转至他在阿拉伯联合酋长国第一海湾银行的账户, 并关闭了他在东南亚的账户。

巴哈马

104. NWT Services Limited 与 Albula Limited、Weisen Limited 和 Foxford Management Limited 的注册地址相同(Winterbotham Place, Marlborough & Queen Streets, PO Box N-7523, Nassau, Bahamas)。2002 年 10 月 4 日, Foxford Management 在巴哈马注册, 注册号码为 125174B, 地址为 New World Nassau Limited, 107 Shirley Street, Nassau, Bahamas。

英属维尔京群岛

105. Weisen Limited 的注册号码为 395883, 注册代理人/注册办事处是 Newhaven Corporate Services (BVI) Limited, 原为 Caribbean Corporate Services Limited, 地址为: 3rd floor, Omar Hodge Building, Wickhams Cay 1, PO Box 362, Road Town,

Tortola, British Virgin Islands。截至 2014 年 10 月 23 日, Weisen Limited 的最终受益者为艾哈迈德·阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫, 据确定他持有也门外交护照(见附件 30)。

特克斯和凯科斯群岛

106. Albula Limited 的注册号码为 E29459, 最初公司名为 Harrison Limited, 在特克斯和凯科斯群岛成立。2001 年, 改名为 Albula Limited。它的注册地址为普罗维登夏莱斯市中心大楼的 Chartered Trust Company Limited 的地址(见附件 31 至 33)。

107. 截至 2015 年初, 有关 Albula Limited 成立和管理的所有指示均来自日内瓦的 NWT Management SA。此外, 自 2009 年以来, Chartered Trust Company Limited 的一个附属公司 CT Management 一直是 Albula Limited 的公司服务提供者。CT Management 的地址是: Regent House, Suite F206, Regent Village, Grace Bay, Providenciales, Turks and Caicos Islands。

108. 自 2015 年以来, CT Management 接受了自 2014 年 10 月 23 日成为最终实际所有人的哈立德·阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫提供的关于公司持续管理的指示和费用。他的地址是 38 Al Raha Blvd, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates。最近的付款是通过通过阿拉伯联合酋长国阿布扎比国家银行的电子资金转账(见附件 34)。

阿拉伯联合酋长国


109. 一些银行转账是来自或转入阿拉伯联合酋长国的第一海湾银行和阿布扎比国家银行。此外, 阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫和艾哈迈德·阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫的若干家庭随员都在阿拉伯联合酋长国设有住址。

2. 艾哈迈德·阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫所属资产概述

110. 专家小组掌握的文件显示, 艾哈迈德·阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫是两家公司的主要股东: Tilsit Real Estate BV 和 SCI 59 Rue Galilée。⁴⁵ 前者在荷兰注册, 后者在法国注册。这两家公司分别在荷兰和法国拥有资产(银行账户和房地产)(见图四)。

⁴⁵ 已在联合国存档。

图四
艾哈迈德·阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫的金融网络



注：实线表示被指认人员拥有的公司或其金融网络的一部分。

111. 表 2 汇总了属于艾哈迈德·阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫的资产。

表 2
艾哈迈德·阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫所属资产

公司	说明	估计值	现况
Tilsit Real Estate BV	公寓 1	3 150 000 欧元	受到相关政府机构的监督
Tilsit Real Estate BV	公寓 2	6 500 000 欧元	受到相关政府机构的监督
SCI 59 Rue Galilée	建筑	不确定	受到相关政府机构的监督
荷兰银行	号码 48, 89, 88, 330	–	已冻结
Europe Arab Bank PLC, 巴黎分支机构	号码 1101-638633 345	–	受到相关政府机构的监督

112. 关于 Tilsit Real Estate BV，专家小组收集到如下信息：

- (a) 属于私营有限责任公司，1976 年成立，详情如下：
 - (一) 单一股东：Ahmed Ali Abdullah al-Ahmar(艾哈迈德·阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫的别名)，1972 年 7 月 25 日生于萨那；
 - (二) 地址：59 Rue Galilée, 75008, Paris；
- (b) 该公司总部设在阿姆斯特丹，因此受阿姆斯特丹法律管辖。主要营业地是 5 Simon Carmiggeltstraat, Alkmaar。在 Alkmaar 注册，注册号码为 33150937；

(c) 该公司的主要资产是两套公寓，具体如下：

(一) 第一套公寓面积 220 平方米，位于 5 Rue de Tilsit, 3rd floor, Paris, France。根据 2008 年 2 月 13 日的股份转让契据，该公司以 315 万欧元购得该公寓(见附件 35 和 36)；

(二) 第二套公寓面积 334 平方米，也位于 5 Rue de Tilsit，二楼。购买日期为 2010 年 7 月 29 日，购价 650 万欧元。艾哈迈德·阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫从 Europe Arab Bank PLC 贷款 600 万欧元用于购买该公寓(见附件 37)。

113. 关于 SCI 59 Rue Galilée，专家小组收集到如下资料：

(a) 识别号码是 488 382 730 R.C.S. Paris。

(b) 管理号码是 2006 D 00637；

(c) 注册日期为 2006 年 2 月 3 日；

(d) 法律形式是房地产投资基金，资本 1 000 欧元；

(e) 主要活动是获取、拥有、管理、发展和经营(通过租赁或租用或其他形式)法国境内的房地产，包括位于巴黎的 59 Rue Galilée 大楼的附属设施；

(f) 期限直到 2105 年 2 月 2 日；

(g) 总部设在 59 Rue Galilée；

(h) 主要资产是位于 59 Rue Galilée 的一座建筑，估价数百万美元；

(i) 关于资产状况，法国当局提高了对该公司的警惕；

(j) 其他 9 个股东的姓氏也是 al-Ahmar。

3. **Abdullah Yahya Al Hakim、Abdulmalik al-Houthi 和 Abd Al-Khaliq al-Huthi 的资产**

114. 专家小组调查了 Abdullah Yahya Al Hakim、Abdulmalik al-Houthi 和 Abd Al-Khaliq al-Huthi 的资产，他们都是被指认个人，但迄今没有发现任何属于他们的资产。一些消息来源告知专家小组，为避免定向制裁，他们主要进行现金操作并通过他方运作。⁴⁶

4. **代表阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫或按其指示行事的个人**

115. 专家小组有证据表明，作为阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫的儿子和艾哈迈德·阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫的兄弟的哈立德·阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫在阿拉伯联合酋长国有地址，并正在代表其父亲或兄弟或按其指示行事，因此符合

⁴⁶ 2015 年 9 月、10 月和 11 月与机密消息来源之间的电话。

决议第 2140(2014)号决议第 11 段规定的资产冻结标准。此外，专家小组了解到，他是受制裁个人多笔转账资金的接收方或保存人，具体如下：

(a) 如上所述，2014 年 12 月，他接收资金 734 786.49 欧元和 33 471 993.37 美元，转入他在阿拉伯联合酋长国第一海湾银行的账户。专家小组致函阿拉伯联合酋长国请求了解更多交易详情，但尚未获得正式答复；

(b) 他目前是 Albula Limited 唯一的实际所有人和董事，该公司自 2014 年 10 月 23 日起属于他，之前属于阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫(见附件 38 至 41)；

(c) 来自 Albula Limited 的资金通过阿拉伯联合酋长国的阿布扎比国家银行转账；

(d) 他目前是 Weisen Limited 的董事和实际所有人，该公司于 2014 年 10 月 23 日起属于他，之前属于阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫(见附件 42 至 46)。

5. 代表艾哈迈德·阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫或按其指示行事的个人

116. 专家小组已查明代表艾哈迈德·阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫或按其指示行事的个人和公司，详见附件 63(严格保密)。

C. 监测旅行禁令

117. 专家小组继续收集关于受旅行禁令制约的个人的所在地信息。

阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫

118. 若干媒体报道显示阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫多次出现在塔伊兹以及萨那及周围地区。在一次采访中，他宣布埃塞俄比亚和摩洛哥愿意向他提供安全庇护，但并未细说。⁴⁷ 12 月 27 日，媒体广播了他最近的言论。⁴⁸ 专家小组认为，但无法确定，他被指认后一直呆在也门。

艾哈迈德·阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫

119. 在专家小组访问阿拉伯联合酋长国迪拜期间，9 月 6 日，当局口头证实艾哈迈德·阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫在该国。专家小组请求与他面谈，但未获准。当局还表示，已撤销他的外交身份。⁴⁹ 专家小组解释说，只要他仍然留在该国，则没有违反旅行禁令，任何离开该国的旅行都必须遵守第 2140(2014)号决议第 16 段以及委员会的准则。

⁴⁷ 2015 年 10 月 12 日 Al-Mayadeen 采访阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫的录像载于 www.youtube.com/watch?v=ED4VJFw_bf8。

⁴⁸ 见 www.youtube.com/watch?v=D5STfg1K44k。

⁴⁹ 2013 年 4 月至 2015 年 4 月，艾哈迈德·阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫任也门驻阿拉伯联合酋长国的大使。

Abd Al-Khaliq al-Huthi、Abdullah Yahya Al Hakim 和 Abdulmalik al-Houthi

120. 专家小组收集的口头证词表明，上述个人声称，他们不担心受到制裁，因为他们没有护照或可追踪资产供冻结。关于是否违反旅行禁令，专家小组没有证据显示他们迄今在也门境外旅行过，但无法确定他们被指认后从未离开过也门。

121. 专家小组看到了 9 月 26 日 Abdullah Yahya Al Hakim 在塔伊兹的胡塞武装组织的人员附属正式媒体上的视频(见附件 5)。该报道称，7 月 23 日 Abd Al-Khaliq al-Huthi 在亚丁收押。⁵⁰ 专家小组请也门合法政府和联军成员证实该报道，但迄今尚未收到反馈。

五. 违反国际人道主义法和人权法的行为以及交叉问题

122. 为收集信息并证实侵权行为，专家小组采取了多种途径，例如采访难民、人道主义组织、记者和地方活动家，并开展敌对行为趋势分析。专家小组还获取了卫星图像，用于帮助证实广泛⁵¹ 或系统的袭击。⁵²

A. 违反国际人道主义法的行为

1. 违反区分原则、相称原则和预防原则的行为

123. 区分原则作为国际人道主义法的基础，要求冲突各方只针对军事目标，而非平民或平民个人或民用物体(如家庭、学校和医院)。相称原则限制伤害并保护平民免遭伤害，要求尽量减少对平民造成的伤害，如果伤害不可避免，则必须与军事目标相称。此外，冲突各方必须采取一切可行的预防措施，保护其控制下的平民百姓和民用物体不受袭击影响。

124. 在这方面，也门冲突各方违反了区分原则、相称原则和预防原则，他们对住宅区和民用物体及其周围使用了重型爆炸性武器，违反了国际人道主义法。广泛或系统地开展此类袭击的行为可能构成法律标准认定的危害人类罪。

125. 9 月 1 日，据人道主义事务协调厅报告，95%的死亡是由于在住宅区使用了重型爆炸性武器；在这些死亡事故中，86%是平民。⁵³ 按照不同的武器发射方法，人口稠密地区遭受重型爆炸性武器(60%的袭击)而造成的大量平民伤亡分类如下：

⁵⁰ 见 www.youtube.com/watch?v=rcyFfVui02U。

⁵¹ “广泛”的概念可定义为集体开展的大范围、频繁、大规模的行动，具有相当大的严重性，并侵害众多人员。

⁵² “系统”表示攻击的有组织性。相关政策或计划可作为证据，帮助证明该袭击以平民为目标，并且是广泛或系统的。

⁵³ 见 Hannah Tonkin and Iain Overton, eds., “State of crisis: explosive weapons in Yemen” (武装暴力问题行动组织；人道主义事务协调厅，2015 年)。可查阅 <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/State-of-Crisis.pdf>。

- (a) 60%(2 682 起)的平民伤亡是因为空中发射的爆炸性武器;
- (b) 23%(1 037 起)的平民伤亡是因为地面发射的爆炸性武器;
- (c) 17%(774 起)的平民伤亡是因为简易爆炸装置。⁵³

126. 对事先已知爆炸可能造成平民伤亡或破坏重要非军事设施的地点的袭击行为违反了《1949 年日内瓦四公约》。⁵⁴ 最近, 联合国人权事务高级专员指出, 关于也门境内的敌对行动, 他“极其关切地注意到, 在居民集居地区继续受到来自地面和空中的密集轰炸, 民用基础设施——尤其是医院和学校——继续受到冲突各方的破坏, 尽管不合比例的一部分似乎是联军的空袭所致”(见 [S/PV.7596](#))。虽然, 胡塞-萨利赫战斗人员违反国际人道主义法, 驻扎在住宅区, 但联军仍有义务在开展军事行动时遵守国际人道主义法。如要打击有罪不罚现象和遏制今后也门境内的违反行为, 追究违反国际人道主义法和国际人权法的犯罪人的责任是基本和必要措施。

127. 在这方面, 胡塞-萨利赫部队的系统性袭击包括开展定点炮击以及不分青红皂白的火箭攻击, 摧毁房屋, 破坏医院, 导致了许多平民伤亡, 显然违反了区分原则、相称原则和审慎原则。在亚丁等地任意发射瞄准不佳的对空导弹造成了重大的财产和生命损失。3 月至 7 月, 炮击运送试图逃避亚丁战乱的平民的渡船的行为严重违反了国际人道主义法。从亚丁撤退后使用地雷的行为导致伤亡人数增加。⁵⁵ 对塔伊兹的平民地区和物体及其周围实施不分青红皂白的炮击和使用卡秋莎火箭炮的行为继续造成伤亡, 并毁坏了家园、居民区和医院。

128. 联军针对平民实施空袭, 包括轰炸居民区或将整个 Sa'dah 市和 Maran 区作为军事目标的行为, 都严重违反了区分原则、相称原则和审慎原则。在某些情况下, 专家小组发现此类违反行为具有广泛和系统的特点。⁵⁶

129. 专家小组收到的信息显示, 联军在一些攻击之前投放了传单(见附件 52)。国际非政府组织和联合国机构等许多来源告知专家小组, 联军对建筑物屋顶进行了导弹警告“轻敲”提醒。然而这种行为并不构成有效预警(见附件 52 和 56)。此外, 即使试图事先提供预警, 也不能将整个城市和省份视为军事物体。

⁵⁴ 关于不分青红皂白的袭击的定义载于 1949 年 8 月 12 日日内瓦公约第一附加议定书。

⁵⁵ 也门于 1998 年 9 月 1 日批准了 1997 年《禁止杀伤人员地雷公约》, 该公约于 1999 年 3 月 1 日对也门生效。利伯守则(1863)明确禁止残伤肢体行为, 1949 年 8 月 12 日日内瓦四公约共同第 3 条也予以重申。

⁵⁶ 见《国际刑事法院罗马规约》中关于“危害人类罪”的定义。详情见 www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/about%20the%20court/frequently%20asked%20questions/Pages/12.aspx。1949 年 8 月 12 日日内瓦四公约的第一议定书禁止不分青红皂白地空袭可能有平民聚集的城市、城镇、乡村等地。

130. 专家小组正在继续调查联军在也门西北部人口稠密地区使用集束弹药的行为。⁵⁷ 沙特阿拉伯的军事发言人 Ahmed Asiri 准将指出, 沙特阿拉伯对也门境内的装甲车使用了集束弹药, 但未针对平民目标。两个国际非政府组织和一个联合国机构提供的照片和录像显示, 他们在也门一个村庄附近和上空使用集束弹药。专家小组正待前往也门亲自完成调查。

2. 袭击平民和民用物体

131. 如上所述, 冲突各方没有一方遵守区分、相称性和审慎原则。在这方面, 各方都袭击了平民和民用物体。下文所列情形未计入所有这类事件的实际数字。然而, 这些资料可典型说明犯下的各类违反国际人道主义法行为。

132. 在亚丁和塔伊兹, 胡塞-萨利赫部队攻击平民和民用物体, 包括轰炸平民住宅区、医疗设施、学校和其他民用基础设施, 并利用待在楼顶上的狙击手瞄准寻觅安全、医疗或食物者。在亚丁, 胡塞-萨利赫部队袭击了从亚丁逃往吉布提的平民乘坐的三角帆船。专家小组在吉布提访谈的一名难民说, 5月6日或前后, 胡塞-萨利赫部队袭击了一大群人, 当时这群人正要登上亚丁附近 Tawahi 港口码头边就要驶走的一艘三角帆船。另一难民报告说两艘三角帆船遭到炮击, 当时这两艘船正试图离开同一港口, 所有乘客丧身(见附件 48)。⁵⁸

133. 至少有三名联合国和国际非政府组织工作人员告诉专家小组说, 胡塞-萨利赫部队不止一次将非洲移民和难民作为人盾隐匿在曾遭到空袭的亚丁废弃建筑物中或者是据称存放储存武器处。⁵⁹ 专家小组的访谈⁶⁰ 表明, 7月7日, 亚丁一所收容难民的学校遭到炮击, 六名索马里人被打死, 数人重伤, 其中包括孤身未成年人。⁶¹

134. 在亚丁和塔伊兹, 胡塞-萨利赫部队有计划地不让平民获得基本的生活必需品, 在塔伊兹采取围困形式, 通过封锁进城的主要路线来阻碍获取食物、水和医疗用品(见附件 49)。胡塞-萨利赫部队从医院并在医院内进行炮击和枪战。⁶² 专家小组记录了至少两起胡塞-萨利赫部队袭击正在接受治疗的受伤抵抗战士事件。

⁵⁷ 见“Yemen: Saudi-led airstrikes used cluster munitions”, Defence Blog, 3 May 2015, available from <http://defence-blog.com/news/yemen-saudi-led-airstrikes-used-cluster-munitions.html>.

⁵⁸ 2015年7月和8月, 吉布提奥博克 Markazi 难民营的也门难民所述情形相似。

⁵⁹ 专家小组于2015年6月和8月收到了这种报告。专家小组从若干来源听说了这个情况, 还看到了媒体对这一发生在亚丁湾情形的报道。

⁶⁰ 同上。这是媒体也报道的一个特例。

⁶¹ 见“Update: Houthi shelling kills six Somali national refugees in Adan Yemen”, Oximity, 2015年7月7日, 可见于 www.oximity.com/article/Update-Houthi-shelling-kills-six-Somal-1?utm_campaign=it&utm_source=it-1-autoTw&utm_medium=twitter&utm_term=articleId-710512.

⁶² 对联合国和非政府组织工作人员的访谈。

专家小组还记录了袭击医院工作人员、医务人员和救护车事件，以及多起平民在想方设法获取医疗救治时被胡塞-萨利赫狙击手枪击和(或)杀害事件。在亚丁省发生的至少一起事件中，胡塞-萨利赫狙击手射杀了到一所制药大楼获取医疗用品的医务人员。胡塞-萨利赫部队还不让一名抵抗士兵获取医疗救治(见附件 48-50)。

135. 在亚丁的抵抗战士对平民和民用物体实施了系列袭击，包括轰炸平民住宅区、医疗设施、学校和其他民用基础设施并使用狙击手瞄准平民。专家小组访谈的来自亚丁的也门难民报告的情形有，男抵抗战斗人员身着妇女衣服(阿拉伯长袍和面纱)，偷偷摸摸地隐藏自己的身份让人难以察觉。他们这样做危及了亚丁妇女的人身安全，导致一些妇女被射杀，致使妇女限制行动(见附件 51)。

136. 专家小组记录了胡塞-萨利赫部队和抵抗战士针对境内流离失所者的情况，因为境内流离失所者被认为与冲突各方有政治联系。这两个团体都将目标对准了来自非洲之角的移民和难民。武装团体强行招募被贩运的第三国国民，其中许多人是贩运网络售卖的青年或未成年人。⁶³ 移民和难民也因此被视为战斗人员或潜在的战斗人员，而不论其平民身份或作为贩运受害者易受伤害情况，并遭到袭击。

137. 专家小组记录了联军违反国际人道主义法空袭平民和民用物体情况，其中包括境内流离失所者和难民营地；平民聚会，包括婚礼；民用车辆，包括公共汽车；平民住宅区；医疗设施；学校；清真寺；市场、工厂和粮食储存仓库；其他重要民用基础设施，例如萨那机场、Hudaydah 港口和国内转运路线(见附件 52、54 和 61)。⁶⁴

138. 专家小组记录了联军违反国际人道主义法出动飞机 119 架次。⁶⁵ 许多袭击涉及多次空袭多个民用物体。在这 119 架次飞行中，专家小组确定了有 146 个定向目标(见附件 47)。⁶⁶ 专家小组还记录了三起据称平民逃离住宅轰炸而被直升机驱赶射杀的情况。

139. 虽然专家小组无法前往也门，但利用了外勤支助部地理空间信息科合同约定的商业公司提供的卫星图像，获得了联军空袭前后的哈拉德、Sa'dah、萨那和塔伊兹各市现有卫星图像比较。图像显示，住宅区和民用物体因内部战事和联军空袭遭到了广泛破坏。专家小组注意到，哈拉德、Sa'dah 和萨那未报告有地面战

⁶³ 专家小组听取了吉布提奥博克 Markazi 难民营也门难民的类似叙述。另见联合国难民事务高级专员公署，也门区域难民和移民应对计划数据库，可见于 <http://data.unhcr.org/yemen/regional.php>。

⁶⁴ 机密消息来源有也门内部、联合国工作人员、非政府组织工作人员、外籍记者和难民。

⁶⁵ 专家小组记录了访谈难民、非政府组织和联合国各机构获取的空袭情况，得到了包括被直接击中的组织和人权组织等当地消息来源的证实。


⁶⁶ 根据联合国人权事务高级专员办事处发言人 Cécile Pouilly 所述：“自 6 月 17 日起，民用基础设施遭到进一步破坏，在萨那省、亚丁省、塔兹省、焦夫省、马哈维特省和哈贾省至少有 36 座建筑物，包括医院、学校、法院、发电设施和通信机构遭到部分或完全破坏。”见 www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16209&LangID=E。

斗，这意味着广泛破坏可能是联军空袭和炮击造成的。另一方面，塔伊兹是胡塞-萨利赫部队和抵抗战士以及联军空袭的炮击地点。

140. 5月8日，整个 Sa'dah 市和 Maran 地区被联军宣布为“军事目标”。由于联军空袭和整个城市被作为攻击目标，Sa'dah 仍然是也门遭受最有计划的攻击和破坏的城市之一，这直接违反了国际人道主义法。图五是 Sa'dah 卫星图像，更多图像载于地图 1 至 8 中，这是联军空袭前于 2015 年 1 月 6 日所拍卫星图像和联军行动早期阶段期间于 2015 年 5 月 22 日所拍卫星图像的对比图。Sa'dah 还受到联军对医院、学校和清真寺等有计划、不加区分的攻击。

图五

空袭对 Sa'dah 的破坏情况



资料来源：地理空间信息科，资料由数字地球(DigitalGlobe)提供。

注：根据对地图 1 至 8 所示卫星图像分析，其中包括哈拉德、Midi 港、Mocha、摩卡，Sa'dah、萨那和塔伊兹的卫星图像，专家小组注意到，在联军发动军事行动不到六个月时间内，750 多个建筑和民用物体遭到空袭破坏。

141. 上述 Sa'dah 卫星图像显示了(见黄点)对建筑物和物体的空袭情况，通过对 2015 年 1 月 6 日和 2015 年 5 月 22 日所拍图像比较予以识别。Sa'dah 在遭受空袭的所有城市中受到的破坏最大，至少有 226 所建筑物仅在空袭开始后不到两个月时间就被摧毁。

142. 专家小组还注意到关于阿拉伯联合酋长国部署“雇佣军”的报告。这种部署增加了违反国际人道主义法的可能性。⁶⁷ 专家小组在继续监测并开展相应调查。

⁶⁷ 见人权高专办，“私营军事和保安公司问题专家小组：规章和国家经验”，可见于 www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Mercenaries/WG/Event2015/ConceptNote.pdf。

B. 违反国际人权法的行为

143. 第 2140(2014)号决议第 18(c)段规定，威胁也门和平、安全或稳定的行为包括规划、指示或实施违反适用的国际人权法的行为或构成侵犯人权的行为。在这种情况下，专家小组认为，冲突各方违反了国际人权法。

144. 胡塞-萨利赫部队违反国际人权法，有计划地压制言论自由和集会自由，以期控制亚丁、伊卜、萨那、塔伊兹和其他城市地区的居民。⁶⁸ 它们颁布限制公民权利和政治权利的法令，以强制推行法律结构性措施，对活动家、评论家、学者、政治反对派成员和示威者实行即决法外处决、任意逮捕、拘留、酷刑和失踪，以便压制批评(见附件 58)。⁶⁹

145. 专家小组记录了 19 起任意逮捕和拘留事件，与实际普遍存在的任意逮捕和拘留情况相比这似乎是一个小数字。⁷⁰ 因为在被拘留期间受到酷刑而在羁押期间或羁押后不久就死亡似乎已成为一个模式。⁷¹ 专家小组记录了两例酷刑、一例切割/污辱尸体和多例被拘留个人或多人被捕后被认定失踪。

146. 专家小组记录了在伊卜市有计划射杀示威者、任意逮捕、拘禁、对被羁押人实施酷刑、即决法外处决、失踪和一起亵渎尸体案，该地区强烈抗议并积极反对胡塞-萨利赫部队的存在。专家小组还记录了在伊卜袭击政治反对派人士住宅和袭击地方官员办事处情况(见附件 57)。⁷²

147. 塔伊兹居民的言论自由和集会自由也受到了有计划的攻击。此外，专家小组于 10 月收到了未经证实的报告称，胡塞-萨利赫部队通过书面命令冻结了 20 多个地方民间社会组织的资产(见附件 49 和 58)。⁷³

148. 同样，自 2014 年 9 月以来有众多报告称，在萨那，被认为对胡塞武装组织持批评立场的政治反对派人士、积极分子、当地和国际记者及平民遭到任意拘留、酷刑，有的失踪。

149. 2015 年 11 月，⁷⁴ “真主的辅士”在萨那主持了各政党会议，以期签署反对沙特阿拉伯和联军行动的单边协议。继会议之后，胡塞-萨利赫官员制定了一

⁶⁸ 记者、联合国工作人员和也门平民向专家小组提供了资料和证词。

⁶⁹ 包括违反《禁止酷刑和其他残忍、不人道或有辱人格的待遇或处罚公约》。

⁷⁰ 包括当地消息来源、新闻报道、联合国工作人员和非政府组织。

⁷¹ 见人权观察，“也门：胡塞绑架维权活动家：医生下落不明”，2015 年 8 月 6 日，可见于 www.hrw.org/news/2015/08/06/yemen-houthis-abduct-rights-activist。另见，“International report documents crimes committed by al-Houthi militia, Saleh group: report in full”，酋长国通讯社，可见于 www.wam.ae/en/news/international/1395286001275.html。

⁷² 专家小组依靠也门内部消息来源提供关于人权状况的信息。

⁷³ 塔伊兹保密消息来源。

项法令，禁止在社交媒体网站上发表对萨那政权的负面报道或批评。⁷⁴自其实施以来，专家小组注意到社交媒体上来自萨那的、对胡塞-萨利赫政权的批评大幅减少。

150. 抵抗战士在亚丁和塔伊兹也违反了国际人权法，⁷⁵ 包括对被推定或被认为支持胡塞-萨利赫者实施即决法外处决、任意逮捕、拘留和施加酷刑，在亚丁还有多起污辱尸体、勒索和抢劫属于来自也门北部人的财产事件。此外，10 月和 12 月，专家小组得到报告称，萨拉菲派抵抗民团已经开始在亚丁高等教育机构中强制隔离妇女和男子(见附件 51)。⁷⁶

151. 除违反公民权利和政治权利情况外，专家小组还观察到人道主义状况和商业封锁对也门平民的社会和经济权利的影响。不让实施人道主义援助可构成战争罪，无论其是否发生在国际或非国际武装冲突中(见附件 59)。然而，商业封锁也影响了也门人民的社会和经济权利，从而影响了生命权(见附件 58)。⁷⁷

C. 贯穿各领域的问题

152. 在本节中，专家小组分析了也门冲突对儿童和妇女的交叉影响。

1. 冲突对儿童的影响，包括关于武装冲突期间六类严重侵犯儿童行为的信息

153. 安全理事会在其各项决议中历数的武装冲突期间六类严重侵犯儿童行为⁷⁸是：招募或利用儿童；杀害或残害儿童；对儿童实施性暴力；袭击学校或医院；绑架儿童；剥夺儿童获得人道主义援助的机会。这些行为都构成了严重违反国际人道主义法行为，影响也门儿童的人权。⁷⁹

⁷⁴ 秘密消息来源，提供了来自会议的信息和照片证据。

⁷⁵ 包括机密消息来源、也门平民、记者和联合国工作人员在内的多个消息来源常常会证实信息。

⁷⁶ 见“Gunmen shut Yemen faculties for mixing of sexes”，每日星报(贝鲁特)，2015 年 12 月 29 日，可见于 www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2015/Dec-29/329377-gunmen-shut-yemen-faculties-for-mixing-of-sexes.ashx。

⁷⁷ 《世界人权宣言》第 3 条。

⁷⁸ 包括第 1261(1999)号、第 1314(2000)号、第 1379(2001)号、第 1460(2003)号、第 1539(2004)号、第 1612 (2005)号和第 1882(2009)号决议。

⁷⁹ 见“武装冲突期间六个严重侵犯儿童行为：法律基础”，第 1 号工作文件(联合国，纽约，2013 年 11 月)。可见于 https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/publications/WorkingPaper-1_SixGraveViolationsLegalFoundation.pdf。

154. 根据联合国儿童基金会(儿基会), 也门每天平均有 8 名儿童因敌对行动直接遭到杀害或残害。⁸⁰ 2015 年第二季度近四分之三(73%)的儿童死伤归咎于联军空袭,⁸¹ 18%的儿童死亡和 17%的儿童伤害是胡塞-萨利赫部队所为。⁸²

155. 随着暴力和不稳定的增加, 近 400 万儿童的人身安全和生存受到严重威胁。⁸³ 中断与阻碍商品供应链和人道主义用品流动、阻碍人道主义准入以及攻击学校、医院及住家使得儿童特别容易受到伤害。暴露在空袭、巷斗、炮击和防空弹药之下迅速增加了伤亡风险。儿童受到狙击手的杀害和残害, 他们在交火中、由于酷刑和被招募也遭到杀害和残害。⁸⁴ 专家小组还记录了因空中轰炸儿童和因而被严重烧伤事件, 正继续对此进行调查。所有冲突方都在武装冲突期间侵犯了儿童权利且犯下了严重侵害儿童行为(见附件 59)。

156. 专家小组根据访谈情况注意到, 贩卖来自非洲之角的第三国青年国民情况在冲突期间有所增加。在吉布提接受采访的来自也门的被贩卖埃塞俄比亚年轻妇女告诉专家小组, 也门人口贩子和武装团体在折磨埃塞俄比亚青少年。她们还说, 年轻妇女和女孩还面临遭受性暴力和强奸的风险。⁸⁵ 专家小组听到的情况是, 亚丁所有本地战斗团体的年轻男子和儿童战斗人员在被抓后遭到强暴。⁸⁶ 性暴力极有可能比当前报告所述情况普遍得多。

157. 在易受性暴力和性剥削及虐待情况下, 早婚或童婚虽然在也门已广为盛行, 又有所增加。这种婚姻主要是作为一个先行措施, 避免在冲突期间因可能遭到强奸就“能否适于结婚”节外生枝。⁸⁷ 这种情况的盛行最有可能关涉到也

⁸⁰ 见儿基会, “也门冲突: 迄今一千多名儿童伤亡——儿基会”, 2015 年 8 月 19 日, 可见于 www.unicef.org/media/media_82940.html。

⁸¹ 见“负责儿童与武装冲突问题的秘书长特别代表莱拉·泽鲁吉关于也门局势的声明”, 2015 年 8 月 24 日, 可见于 <https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/press-release/statement-on-the-situation-in-yemen-by-leila-zerrougui-special-representative-of-the-secretary-general-for-children-and-armed-conflict/>。

⁸² 见 Lucia Withers 和 Mark Kaye, “Nowhere safe for Yemen’s children; the deadly impact of explosive weapons in Yemen” (国际救助儿童会, 2015)。可见于 www.savethechildren.org.uk/sites/default/files/images/Nowhere_Safe_for_Yemens_Children.pdf。

⁸³ 见国际救助儿童会, “Yemen conflict: under fire”, 2015 年 4 月 2 日, 可见于 <https://www.savethechildren.net/article/yemen-conflict-children-under-fire>。

⁸⁴ 同上。此外, 在吉布提的也门难民妇女向专家小组讲述了胡塞-萨利赫部队在近距离平射射程内射杀其街区儿童情形。

⁸⁵ 在也门和吉布提与国际移民组织以及在调查期间与埃塞俄比亚年轻人的交谈。

⁸⁶ 对保密消息来源和联合国驻亚丁工作人员的访谈。

⁸⁷ 对联合国工作人员和非政府组织工作人员的访谈。

门社会更贫穷和更边缘化的阶层，这些阶层即使在正常情况下也更易受到性剥削和性虐待。

158. 营养不良和饥饿是也门所有儿童的首要问题。50 多万名儿童目前面临威胁生命的营养不良问题。⁸⁸ 这一情况自 3 月以来增加了三倍，表明粮食储备被消耗殆尽，再加上商业和人道主义货运有限，医疗系统每况愈下，无法照顾饥饿儿童或对他们进行免疫接种抵抗疾病。⁸⁹

159. 粮食短缺和经济无保障与武装团体招募儿童有直接关联。也门各家各户都在收到让孩子加入武装团体的奖金；孤儿因缺乏食物、人身安全和保障特别容易受到招募。在这种情况下，也门所有战斗人员近三分之一年龄未满 18 岁。儿基会已核对了超过 609 例招募儿童情况。⁸⁹ 尽管胡塞-萨利赫部队招募了绝大多数儿童，但抵抗战斗人员也招募儿童兵。隶属于萨利赫的军队中和隶属于也门合法政府的军队中究竟有多少儿童兵不得而知，但估计有数千人，据信儿童兵人数自 3 月以来有所增加。

2. 冲突的性别影响

160. 结构性性别不平等、基于性别的暴力和也门冲突是相互关联的。⁹⁰ 冲突增加了缺乏生殖保健服务以及 5 岁以下儿童和孕妇营养不良日增情况造成的风险。冲突还对儿童教育有负面影响，同时加剧了传统上地位低下群体的社会排斥现象，增加了包括性剥削和性虐待在内的保护问题，还鼓动了强行招募、童婚和家庭暴力。

161. 加入武装团体的男子将女人和女孩撇在家中或任其流离失所，使她们更容易受到剥削和虐待。⁹¹ 全国各地的女户主努力撑着家庭并设法获取基本服务。⁹² 即使在冲突前，往往需要一名男性亲属的同意方可准许妇女住院，⁹² 若男子不在家中或遭到杀害，则会造成严重的人道主义问题。

⁸⁸ 见“Half a million Yemen children face severe malnutrition: United Nations”，路透社，2015 年 10 月 16 日，可见于 www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/16/us-yemen-security-children-idUSKCN0SA28W20151016。

⁸⁹ 见儿基会，“也门六个月的暴力造成 500 多名儿童死亡，约 170 万儿童可能营养不良：儿基会”，2015 年 10 月 2 日，可见于 www.unicef.org/infobycountry/media_85714.html。

⁹⁰ 见人道主义事务协调厅，《2016 年人道主义需求审查：也门》（2015 年 10 月），第 13 页。可见于 http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2016_HNO_English_%20FINAL.pdf。

⁹¹ 根据人道主义事务协调厅性别平等备用能力项目开展的 50 多个性别评估概况。

⁹² 见联合国人口基金，“暴力和不平等困扰着受冲突蹂躏的也门妇女”，2015 年 9 月 22 日，可见于 www.unfpa.org/news/violence-inequality-plague-women-conflict-ravaged-yementhash.AOajaOtv.dpuf。

162. 也门冲突中的性暴力似乎涉及一些社会最弱势阶层，其中包括第三国国民和妇女。专家小组正在调查因法律秩序崩溃造成伺机强奸和性骚扰案件增加情况。专家小组还听说了在地面敌对行动期间，尤其是在亚丁，包括男子和男孩在内的男战斗人员遭受强暴情况。

163. 妇女的公民权利和政治权利，包括组织权，也日益受到地方当局和官员的威胁。专家小组了解到，只有两名也门妇女被正式列为 12 月在日内瓦举行的和谈代表，⁹³ 这提出了关于冲突的第 1325(2000)号决议的适用问题，以及性别平等是否将被有效纳入今后的正式解决办法和协定中。⁹⁴

六. 阻碍人道主义援助

164. 在第 2216(2015)号决议第 19 段中，安全理事会将阻碍人道主义援助行为与威胁也门和平、安全或稳定的行为联系在一起。然而，联军实施武器禁运对运往也门的商业和人道主义货物的影响也与人道主义方面有明确联系。⁹⁵

165. 目前，约 2 120 万人(82%的人口)亟需某种形式的援助以满足其基本需求。⁹⁶ 也门 90%的谷物和其他粮食来源依赖进口。⁹⁶ 不断恶化的人道主义状况与开展敌对行为、阻碍人道主义援助及其交汇方面直接相关。然而，即使没有障碍和冲突问题(这是无法准入的一个关键原因)，人道主义行为体也没有能力提供所需的大量粮食、药品和燃料，所有这些都因商业封锁而受到重大影响。一个明显的例子是燃料短缺的影响，其对电力供应、泵水、医院和通货膨胀造成了冲击效应，对基本必需品价格很高的国内黑市系统的购买力产生了不利影响(见附件 60)。

166. 胡塞-萨利赫部队和联军蓄意破坏包括港口、桥梁和道路在内的关键后勤基础设施对平民造成了令人震惊的后果。⁹⁶ 粮食和燃料供应短缺，陆路运输障碍、谋生机会有限以及燃料和商品价格提升在加剧普遍盛行的营养不良情况。⁹⁷ 高度不安全和敌对行动持续不断，导致保险费增加，影响了商业航运公司向也门进口货物的费用，还引起到货减少。

⁹³ 专家小组听说，胡塞-萨利赫部队阻止一名妇女参加 12 月和谈。

⁹⁴ 2015 年 10 月 11 日，45 名也门妇女领导人在联合国组织的拉纳卡会议上会见了也门问题特使，强调必须让妇女参与和平谈判。另见妇女署，“也门妇女呼吁将自己纳入和平努力”，2015 年 10 月 27 日，可见于 www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2015/10/yemeni-women-call-for-their-inclusion-in-peace-efforts。

⁹⁵ 在快开始专家小组调查时，联合国一名官员说，人道主义供应商没有能力应对粮食、医疗和其他援助的庞大需求，因为该国大部分粮食需求和其他需求在冲突前借助进口予以满足。在这方面，封锁商业货物直接加剧了人道主义状况。

⁹⁶ 见“联合国：也门 2 100 多万人需要基本的人道主义援助，”联合国新闻服务处，2015 年 11 月 24 日，可见于 www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=52638#.Vm3DHjalw6_。

⁹⁷ 见“也门：复杂的紧急情况，概况介绍，第 1 期，2016 财政年度(美国国际开发署，2015 年 11 月 6 日)，可见于 www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/yemen_ce_fs01_11-06-2015.pdf。

167. 在这方面，有计划地封锁一个城市或一个国家，是一种军事包围形式，旨在防止货物进入和人员离开，从国际人道主义法的角度看，这会带来严重后果。若一个城市或一个国家获得食物、水和(或)药品的通路被切断，或采取措施不让获取这种人类生活基本必需品，则区分原则实际上同所有可行手段和目的都反向了——因为其不仅没有特别保护平民，而且平民也不可避免首当其冲地遭受了这些措施造成的后果(见附件 48、49 和 60)。

A. 阻碍提供人道主义援助

168. 有计划地广泛封锁商业货物直接阻碍了提供救助和人道主义援助，同时限制了不在第 2216(2015)号决议范围或目前不受制裁的商业燃料、食品和其他物品的重要进口。

169. 联军视察程序实际上是阻挠措施，安保程序借此延误停泊，而与之相比，因也门港口停泊能力或行政方面的拖延造成的耽搁情况较轻(见附件 60)。安保程序还造成迟迟不交付人道主义货物和让运送援助物资的船只改道，以及为运送人道主义人员的航班等人道主义航班安排飞经沙特阿拉伯的路线，从而拖延和实际上阻碍向也门提供人道主义援助。

170. 袭击进入该国的海上和空中路线进一步阻碍了提供人道主义援助。胡塞-萨利赫部队炮击亚丁港以及全面敌对行动也产生了负面影响。

171. 4 月 1 日和 8 月 17 日间，进入也门的货运数目迅速下降，联军又在安保方面予以拖延。联军于 8 月 17 日空袭荷台达港基础设施，限制了获取泊位，拖延了卸货，严重阻碍了 8 月和 9 月的商业和救济行动，加剧了人道主义状况，抬高了粮食、燃料和其他基本商品的价格。轰炸萨那机场使航班和人道主义货物延误了 10 天。

172. 10 月 1 日和 29 日间，估计有 50 艘船只在也门港口停靠，相较于 9 月增加了 8 艘船只。燃料等基本商品的商业和人道主义交付情况继 10 月中出入也门港口情况有所改善后逐步提升。⁹⁷ 10 月下旬，装运 30 多万吨燃料的约 11 艘商业油轮正在等待进入红海港口。

173. 来自吉布提的一艘船只于 11 月 16 日抵达亚丁，为世界卫生组织(世卫组织)运载了 18 吨医疗用品。⁹⁸ 12 月，抵达 Hudaydah 的人道主义用品获取情况大大提升。不久打算推出一个联合国核查和视察机制，以便促进商船出入也门港口并减少目前漫长的、旷日持久的停泊安保程序。⁹⁹

B. 阻碍分配人道主义援助

174. 联合国人道主义国家工作队通过在也门的国家和国际行为体网络开展协调一致的救济行动。然而，在胡塞-萨利赫部队和武装团体控制的地区，深入到受

⁹⁸ 见“局势最新情况：也门”，后勤群组，2015 年 11 月 23 日，可见于 www.logcluster.org/document/situation-update-yemen-23-november-2015。

⁹⁹ 截至 2015 年 12 月中，联合国项目事务厅正在等待存入美国、联合王国和欧洲联盟提供的专用资金，然后才能启动该机制。

影响民众仍然受到限制。持续不断的政治暴力，威胁绑架和暗杀援助工作者，安全和安保部因关切安全问题以及通讯和后勤困难施加的行动限制，妨碍了在激烈冲突地区开展大规模救济行动。¹⁰⁰

175. 截至 11 月 23 日，27 辆运送援助的卡车抵达夏卜瓦、穆卡拉和 Mahrah。代表联合国难民事务高级专员公署和世卫组织的另外三辆卡车因为局势不安全以及联军延误发放旅行安全许可而未抵达最终目的地。

176. 胡塞-萨利赫部队有计划地围困亚丁和塔伊兹，并袭击人道主义服务提供者及其设施，阻碍了配发救助和人道主义援助。¹⁰¹ 围困形式有封锁道路和通道，导致粮食、水和医疗用品短缺。

177. 在塔伊兹，胡塞-萨利赫部队蓄意限制商品和人道主义援助，影响了 Muzaffar、Qahirah 和 Salah 的市中心各区。约三分之二的人口现在流离失所，其余居民急需粮食、水和医疗服务。¹⁰² 11 月，世界粮食计划署称，可从亚丁由公路出入塔伊兹，尽管检查站和不安全状况继续阻碍提供“挽救生命的”人道主义援助。¹⁰³ 12 月，向塔伊兹分发中心运送了援助，但在本报告撰写之时尚未分发物资。

178. 封锁塔伊兹导致医院病人死于可治疗的疾病。10 月有各种报告称，Thawrah、¹⁰⁴ Rawdah 和 Jumhuri 这三所医院的医疗用品和运行发电机的燃料以及氧气罐、透析设备和基本药品或者就要耗尽或者已经告罄(见附件 49)。

179. 此外，专家小组记录了胡塞-萨利赫部队在伊卜和萨那省黑市上以及抵抗运动成员在亚丁黑市上销售救援物品阻碍人道主义援助情况(见附件 49 和 50)。

180. 除了在当地带头阻碍分发人道主义物资外，专家小组还记录了联军对运输路线(包括海洋和空中通道)、4 个公路供应路线和 5 个容纳粮食援助的储存设施(包括运送援助的两辆车以及储存粮食的三个仓库和设施)实施了 10 次空袭，还空

¹⁰⁰ 见 Brian Wittbold、Maisoon al-Awdi 和 Salama Mubarak，“也门的人道主义救济和复原能力建设”，人道主义实践网络，2014 年 4 月。可见于 <http://odihpn.org/magazine/humanitarian-relief-and-building-resilience-in-yemen/>。

¹⁰¹ 见“也门：红十字国际委员会和无国界医生组织震惊于袭击国家生命线行为”，无国界医生组织，可见于 www.msf.org/article/yemen-icrc-and-msf-alarmed-attacks-country's-lifelines。

¹⁰² 见“也门人道主义协调员 Johannes Van Der Klaauw 关于 Taizz 市严峻局势的声明”，2015 年 10 月 24 日，可见于 <http://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/statement-humanitarian-coordinator-yemen-johannes-van-der-klaauw-dire-situation-taizz>。

¹⁰³ 见“应对也门的人道主义危机”，粮食署也门情况报告，第 18 期(世界粮食计划署，2015 年 12 月 13 日)。可见于 <http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ep/wfp280159.pdf>。

¹⁰⁴ 胡塞-萨利赫部队于 2015 年 10 月 25 日开始轰炸 Thawrah 医院。

袭了乐施会存放欧洲联盟在 Sa'dah 资助的一个水项目设备的仓库。专家小组还记录了联军对当地粮食和农业生产地点实施了三次袭击。

C. 袭击人道主义空间

181. 专家小组记录了若干起冲突各方袭击人道主义组织情况。专家小组记录了人道主义组织和援助机构在 3 月 26 日和 12 月 20 日间受袭的 9 起案件。专家小组还记录了至少 29 起袭击医院事件，其中许多涉及人道主义组织或涉及提供人道主义服务，至少有一次袭击了一辆救护车。

182. 世卫组织 10 月 1 日报告，69 个保健设施被损坏或摧毁，其中 10 所医院被完全摧毁，26 个部分受损，6 个保健中心被完全摧毁，6 个部分受损(见附件 50 和 61)。¹⁰⁵ 此外，世卫组织报告，在开展敌对行动期间，20 名保健人员受伤，8 人死亡，几辆救护车被击中，4 辆车遭到劫掠，两辆监测车被盗。这些袭击责任方未予明确。

183. 专家小组记录了胡塞-萨利赫部队和抵抗运动战士多次炮击亚丁和塔伊兹医院以及攻击医务人员和劫掠医疗用品事件(见附件 48 和 50)。专家小组还记录了 22 起联军空袭医院事件(见附件 62)。

184. 专家小组记录了胡塞-萨利赫部队抢掠粮食援助和一度控制联合国驻亚丁和萨那办事处情况(见附件 48 和 50)。专家小组记录联军空袭了隶属于一个非政府组织的仓库(见第 179 段)以及或是直接空袭联合国驻也门各办事处或给各办事处造成附带损害的 3 次空袭。

185. 专家小组记录了人道主义人员受袭情况，包括多次非法拘留援助人员，其中一些非法居留据称动用了酷刑。¹⁰⁶ 3 月 26 日和 12 月 20 日之间，专家小组记录了涉及武装团体的 6 起案件，有 23 名援助人员被绑架(1 人死于在押期间)，6 人被开枪打死，当时他们正乘坐在有标记的人道主义车辆中，还有 17 人被拘留(其中 8 人被认为仍在押或已失踪)(见附件 50)。

186. 人道主义组织针对自己的建筑物和车辆受袭情况，特别是对国际工作人员实行了出入和安保限制。¹⁰⁷ 本国工作人员目前要在许多最不安全的环境中在第一时间做出应对，往往最易受到攻击(见附件 50 和 58)，这进一步限制了该国的人道主义行动空间。

¹⁰⁵ 见世界卫生组织，“也门：2015 年危机中暴力侵犯卫生部门报道”(2015 年 10 月)。可见于 http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/reported_violence.pdf。

¹⁰⁶ 见“人权观察谴责也门严重虐待被拘留人员”，世界公报，2015 年 9 月 2 日，可见于 www.worldbulletin.net/haber/163831/hrw-condemns-serious-abuses-of-detainees-in-yemen。

¹⁰⁷ 见 Julia Brooks，“Attacks on Yemeni aid workers imperil assistance in overshadowed conflict”，2015 年 9 月 11 日，可见于 <http://atha.se/blog/attacks-yemeni-aid-workers-imperil-assistance-overshadowed-conflict>。

七. 建议

187. 专家小组建议：

与各利益攸关方和各组织合作

(a) 主席代表委员会接触也门总统和合法政府以及联军各成员，争取让专家小组可不受阻碍地在也门接触人员和文件并出入各地，以便专家小组能够执行任务，并为专家小组访问也门、尤其是亚丁提供便利；

(b) 主席代表委员会接触专家小组确定尚未答复专家小组公函中所询问事项的会员国；

(c) 主席代表委员会鼓励总统向专家小组分享专家小组要求提供的信息，包括已列名的也门个人的识别信息，参与或支持威胁也门和平、安全或稳定行为的也门文职和军事官员的名字，特别是参与完全属于也门合法政府权力范围内的行为的人员姓名；

武装团体

(d) 安全理事会今后在起草关于也门的决议和主席声明时，特别是在探讨撤军、交出从军事和安保机构收缴的武器以及停止敌对行动时，将胡塞-萨利赫部队视为一个整编的混合武装团体；

(e) 安全理事会今后在起草关于也门的决议和主席声明时，考虑要求也门合法政府建立一个审查机制，确保编入国防和安保部门的战斗人员以前没有参与恐怖主义、违反国际人道主义法和侵犯人权行为；

武器

(f) 安全理事会在其下一个关于也门的决议中，考虑要求所有会员国采取必要措施，仅许可在通知委员会后直接或间接向也门合法政府控制的安全部队供应、销售或转让军火和有关物资；

(g) 安全理事会在其下一个关于也门的决议中，授权会员国在国家层面或通过海上联合部队等自愿多国海军伙伴关系以及沙特阿拉伯领导的联军与也门合法政府合作，在延伸至并包括阿拉伯海、亚丁湾和红海的也门沿海公海检查有合理理由认为违反对也门的定向军火禁运、正在给也门直接或间接运送武器或军事装备但未通知委员会、或将武器或军事设备运给委员会指认的个人或实体的船只；

(h) 安全理事会请秘书长加强专家小组，增加一名武器专家来监测武器禁运和对也门合法政府的武器转让情况，并增加一名海事专家和一名航空专家来监测军火禁运执行情况，并俟联合国核查和视察机制建立后与该机制协调；

(i) 安全理事会在其下一个关于也门的决议中，考虑就参与视察的联合国核查和视察机制制定更明确的提交视察报告准则，尤其是在与专家小组交流信息方面；

(j) 主席代表委员会接触与也门相邻的会员国以及在该地区开展行动的会员国，提醒这些会员国根据第 2117(2013)号决议第 10 段承担的义务，并请其配合，与也门合法政府和专家小组分享关于以也门为目的地的小武器和轻武器贩运嫌疑人和贩运路线、可疑金融交易和中介活动或转移此类武器的信息，以及其他有关小武器和轻武器非法转让、破坏性囤积或滥用的信息；

金融

(k) 主席代表委员会接触巴哈马和阿拉伯联合酋长国，鼓励他们就专家小组的正式通信提供资料，说明有关资产冻结的具体情况；

(l) 若有资产在本报告中被确定为直接或间接由被指认个人拥有或控制、或由代表这些被指认个人或按其指示行事的个人或实体拥有或控制，或由这些被指认个人拥有或控制的实体拥有或控制，则主席代表委员会接触这些资产所在地会员国，请他们向专家小组提供资料，说明采取了哪些步骤冻结在其领土上的这些资产；

国际人道主义法

(m) 安全理事会在今后关于也门的决议和主席声明中，提及在也门开展军事行动的会员国和所有相关冲突方，表示注意到联合国人权事务高级专员最近的评论意见，强调它们有责任遵守和维护国际人道主义法，尤其是区别和相称原则和国际人权法，包括必须配合专家小组的工作；

(n) 安全理事会考虑建立一个国际调查委员会，调查关于各方在也门违反国际人道主义法和人权法的报告，并查明实施此类违反行为者，以确保追究责任人的责任；

(o) 安全理事会鼓励也门合法政府采取步骤追究在也门严重侵犯儿童行为人的责任，为此确保在与胡塞-萨利赫部队的任何会谈中考虑到儿童兵的具体需求。

**Annex 1: Correspondence sent and received by the Panel from 19 May to 28
December 2015**

Entities addressed	Letters sent	Letters replied	Info provided	partially provided	Not provided	Remarks
AMISOM	1				1	
Arab Bank PLC	1	1		1		
Australia	2	2	2			
Bahamas	1					Expected*
Bahrain	5	3			2	
Canada	2	2	2			
China	1				1	
CMF	1	1	1			
Denmark	1				1	
Djibouti	4	3	2		1	
Egypt	3	2	1	1	1	
EU	1	1				
France	3	2	2			Expected*
Germany	4	4	4			
India	1				1	
Indonesia	1					Expected*
Iran	5	3	3		2	
Israel	1				1	
Italy	1	1	1			
Japan	1	1	1			
Jordan	3	2	1	1	1	
Kuwait	2				2	
Lebanon	1				1	
Malaysia	1					Expected*
Morocco	1	1		1		
Netherlands	2	2	2			
New Zealand	1	1	1			
Oman	3	3	3			

Entities addressed	Letters sent	Letters replied	Info provided	partially provided	Not provided	Remarks
Pakistan	1				1	
Portugal	1				1	
Qatar	5	4		1	1	
Russian Federation	4	4	4			
Saudi Arabia	9	9	8	1		
Senegal	1	1	1			
Singapore	1	1	1			
Sudan	1				1	
Switzerland	3	3	3			
Turkey	1	1	1			
UAE	10	4	4		6	
UK	5	5	5			
USA	4	4	4			
Yemen	3	2	2		1	
Total	103	73	59	6	26	4

*: Permanent Missions informed that replies are expected from their capitals.

Annex 2: List established and maintained by the Committee

2140 Sanctions List

Last updated on: 16 September 2015



The List established and maintained by the 2140 Committee

Generated on: 16 September 2015

Composition of the List

The list consists of the two sections specified below:

A. Individuals

B. Entities and other groups

Information about de-listing may be found on the Committee's website at:

<http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/delisting.shtml>

A. Individuals

YEi.002 Name: 1: ABDULLAH 2: YAHYA 3: AL HAKIM 4:

Name (original script): عبد الله يحيى الحاكم

Title: Designation: Huthi group second-in-command DOB: a) Approximately 1985 b) Between 1984 and 1986

POB: a) Dahyan, Yemen b) Sa'dah Governorate, Yemen Good quality a.k.a.: a) Abu Ali al Hakim b) Abu-Ali al-Hakim c) Abdallah al-Hakim d) Abu Ali Alhakim e) Abdallah al-Mu'ayyad Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: Yemen Passport no: na National identification no: na Address: Dahyan, Sa'dah Governorate, Yemen Listed on: 7 Nov. 2014 (amended on 20 Nov. 2014) Other information: Gender [Male].

YEi.004 Name: 1: ABDULMALIK 2: AL-HOUTHY 3: 4:

Title: Designation: na DOB: na POB: na Good quality a.k.a.: na Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: na Passport no: na National identification no: na Address: na Listed on: 14 Apr. 2015 Other information: Leader of Yemen's Houthi Movement. Has engaged in acts that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Yemen.

YEi.001 Name: 1: ABD 2: AL-KHALIQ 3: AL-HUTHI 4:

Name (original script): عبد الخالق الحوثي

Title: Designation: Huthi military commander DOB: 1984 POB: na Good quality a.k.a.: a) Abd-al-Khaliq al-Huthi b) Abd-al-Khaliq Badr-al-Din al Huthi c) 'Abd al-Khaliq Badr al-Din al-Huthi Low quality a.k.a.: Abu-Yunus Nationality: Yemen Passport no: na National identification no: na Address: na Listed on: 7 Nov. 2014 (amended on 20 Nov. 2014) Other information: Gender [Male].

YEi.005 Name: 1: AHMED 2: ALI 3: ABDULLAH 4: SALEH

Name (original script): أحمد علي عبد الله صالح

Title: Former Ambassador, former Brigadier General Designation: na DOB: 25 Jul. 1972 POB: na Good quality a.k.a.: Ahmed Ali Abdullah Al-Ahmar Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: Yemeni Passport no: a) Yemeni passport number 17979 issued under name Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh (referred to in the diplomatic identity number no.:31/2013/20/003140 below) b) Yemeni passport number 02117777 issued on 08-11-2005 under name Ahmed Ali Abdullah Al-Ahmar (good quality a.k.a.) c) Yemeni passport number 06070777 issued on 03-12-2014 under name Ahmed Ali Abdullah Al-Ahmar (good quality a.k.a.) National identification no: na Address: United Arab Emirates Listed on: 14 Apr. 2015 (amended on 16 Sep. 2015) Other information: Has played a key role in facilitating the Houthi military expansion. Has engaged in acts that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Yemen. Ahmed Saleh is the son of the former President of the Republic of Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003). Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh comes from an area known as Bayt Al-Ahmar, which lies some 20 kilometres southeast of the capital, Sana'a. Diplomatic identity card no.:31/2013/20/003140, issued on 07-07-2013 by the United Arab Emirates' Ministry of Foreign Affairs under name Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh; current status: cancelled.

YEi.003 Name: 1: ALI 2: ABDULLAH 3: SALEH 4:

Name (original script): علي عبد الله صالح

Title: Designation: a) President of Yemen's General People's Congress party b) Former President of the Republic of Yemen DOB: a) 21 Mar. 1945 b) 21 Mar. 1946 c) 21 Mar. 1942 d) 21 Mar. 1947 POB: a) Bayt al-Ahmar, Sana'a Governorate, Yemen b) Sana'a, Yemen c) Sana'a, Sanhan, Al-Rib' al-Sharqi Good quality a.k.a.: Ali Abdallah Salih Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: Yemen Passport no: 00016161 (Yemen) National identification no: 01010744444 Address: na Listed on: 7 Nov. 2014 (amended on 20 Nov. 2014) Other information: Gender [Male].

B. Entities and other groups

Annex 3: Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Sana'a, under the control of Ansar Allah, postponing the Panel's visit to Sana'a

Non official Translation:

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Yemen presents its compliments to Office of the United Nations Resident Coordinator in Sana'a.

With reference to the Office's correspondence dated 19 October 2015 related to the facilitation of the Panel established pursuant Security Council resolution 2140(2014) for a visit to Yemen from 1 to 7 November 2015, the Ministry would like to inform the Office that the date is not convenient due to engagement of relevant services with other businesses. In order to ensure a successful visit, the Ministry wishes to suggest a new date.

The Ministry avails herself of this opportunity to renew to Office of the United Nations Resident Coordinator in Sana'a the assurances of its highest consideration.



تهدي وزارة خارجية الجمهورية اليمنية أطيب تحياتها إلى
مكتب المنسق المقيم لمنظمات الأمم المتحدة بصنعاء.

بالإشارة إلى مذكرة المكتب بدون رقم وتاريخ 2015/10/19م
بخصوص طلب تسهيل مهمة فريق الخبراء المشكل بموجب قرار مجلس
الأمن رقم 2140 للعام 2014م لبلادنا في الموعد المقترح من قبل المنسق
للفترة من 1 - 7 نوفمبر 2015م، تود الوزارة إبلاغ المكتب بأن الموعد
المقترح غير مناسب نظراً لارتباط الجهات المعنية ببعض الأعمال، وحرصاً
على إنتاج الزيارة تأمل الوزارة تحديد موعد آخر.

تفتتم وزارة خارجية الجمهورية اليمنية هذه المناسبة لتعرب إلى
مكتب المنسق المقيم لمنظمات الأمم المتحدة بصنعاء مجدداً عن فائق
تقديرها واحترامها.



إلى /

مكتب المنسق المقيم لمنظمات الأمم المتحدة

Annex 4: Constitutional declaration issued in Yemen by Ansar Allah on 6 February 2015

Article No. (1): Provisions of the applicable Constitution will remain valid unless they contradict with the provision of this Declaration.

Article No. (2): This Declaration organizes governance rules during the transitional period.

Article No. (3): Public rights and freedoms are guaranteed and the state is committed to protect them.

Article No. (4): The state foreign policy is based on commitment to good neighboring and non-interference in internal affairs of the state, in addition to approving peaceful and sound means to solve disputes, and cooperation to realize joint interests in a way preserving the state sovereignty, independence, security and the supreme interests.

Article No. (5): The Revolutionary Committee is the representative of the Revolution and from which the revolutionary committees branch in the governorates and districts across the country.

The Transitional National Council

Article No. (6): Based on a resolution by the Revolutionary Committee, a Transitional National Council shall be formed consisting of 551 members to replace the dissolved parliament, and to include components not represented in it. Members of the dissolved parliaments are entitled to join the Council.

Article No. (7): The internal bylaw of the Transitional National Council shall define its work system and rights and duties of the members.

Article No. (8): Presidency of the Republic during the transitional period will be assigned to a Presidential Council of 5 members to be selected by the Transitional National Council and to be approved by the Revolutionary Committee.

Article No. (9): The internal bylaw of the Presidential Council shall define its work system and rights and duties of the members.

The Transitional Government

Article No. (10): The Presidential Council assigns any of the Transitional National Council members or from outside it to form a transitional government of national competencies.

General Provisions

Article No. (11): The Revolutionary Committee is tasked with taking all the necessary procedures and measures to protect the state sovereignty, insure its security and stability and protect people rights and freedoms.

Article No. (12): Specializations of the Transitional National Council, Presidential Council and the government are to be specified by a complementary resolution to be issued by the Revolutionary Committee.

Article No. (13): Authorities of the transitional state shall commit during a period of two years to work to achieve requirements of the transitional period according to outcomes of the Comprehensive National Dialogue Conference and the Peace and National Partnership Agreement, including the revision of the new constitution draft, issuing laws required by the foundation phase and holding a referendum on the constitution in order to move forward to the permanent situation as well as carrying out the parliamentary and presidential elections according to its provisions.

Article No. (14): The normal legislations shall continue to be valid unless they explicitly or implicitly contradict with texts of this Declaration.

Article No. (15): This Declaration is effective from the date of its issuance.

Issued at the Republican Palace in Sana'a on 6 February 2015.

Constitutional Declaration Ceremony, Presidential Palace, Sana'a, 6 February 2015



https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=48&v=eNkMhj3O13w, last accessed on 10 November 2015.

Annex 5: Revolutionary Committee

The Supreme Revolutionary Committee was established by Ansar Allah following the Constitutional Declaration of 6 February 2015, to act as an executive body after the resignation of President Hadi and Bahah Government.

The Supreme Revolution Committee is headed by Mohamed Ali Abdelkarim Amir Eddine Al Houthi “Abou Ahmed” known generally as Mohamed Ali Al Houthi. He became known when the Houthis took Sana’a on September 2014. He is believed to be a cousin of Abdulmalik Al Houthi (YEi.004).

Since he assumed his functions as head of the Revolutionary Committee, Mohamed Ali Alhouthi started to act as a de facto president of Yemen.

In late September 2015, Media showed Mohamed Ali Alhouthi visiting Ansar Allah combatant in the fronts in Al Houdaydah, Ma’rib and Ta’izz.

In Ta’izz footage taken of Mohamed Ali Al Houthi showed also Abdullah Yahya Al Hakim designated as (YEi.002) in the 2140 sanctions list.

The Supreme revolutionary Committee comprises:

1. Mohamed Ali Abdelkarim Amir Eddine Al Houthi AKA Abou Ahmed;
2. Youssef Alfaichi Aka Abou Malik ;
3. Taha Ben Ahmed Almoutawakil;
4. Mohamed Ahmed Meftah;
5. Mohamed Al Maqaleh;
6. Naif Ahmed Alqanes;
7. Khaled Almadani;
8. Ibtissam Mihamed AlHamdi;
9. Alia Faissal Abdellatif Achaabi;
10. Sadeq Abdallah Abou Chawarib;
11. Talal Aqlan.

Mohamed Ali Alhouthi visiting Salif port near Alhudaydah on 5 October 2015



Yemen street Web page, <http://www.yemenstreet.net/news-14778.htm>, last accessed, 20 October 2015

Mohamed Ali Alhouthi visiting Ta'izz with Abdullah Al Hakim, 26 September 2015



1- Mohamed Ali Al Houthi, Head of the Supreme revolution Committee, Acting head of the executive
2- Abdullah Yahya Abdullah Al Hakim “Abou Ali”, (listed as YEi.002);
<http://almawqea.net/news.php?id=2303>, last accessed on 20 October 2015



Source: <http://www.almasirahnews.com/?p=3741>, last accessed on 11 November 2015

Annex 6: Islamic Republic of Iran-Yemen air transport cooperation



Source: Islamic Republic News Agency, 1 March 2015,
<http://www3.irna.ir/en/News/81524416/>, last accessed on 12 November 2015



Rival Yemeni camps entrench as Iran flights arrive, AP, 1 March 2015,
<http://news.yahoo.com/first-iran-flight-arrives-rebel-held-yemeni-capital-112941975.html>, last
 accessed on 03 December 2015.

Annex 7: Security Commission acting under the direction and/or on behalf of Ansar Allah

The Supreme Revolutionary Committee nominated on 6 February 2015, 18 members to serve in the Security Commission:

1. Major General Mahmoud Soubaihi, Acting Defense Minister (**escaped Sana'a to Aden, arrested by Houthis and put under detention**);
2. Major General Jalal Arouichan, Acting Minister of Interior;
3. Major General Hamoud Khaled Soufi, Director of Political Security Office (**left Sana'a**)
4. Major Ali Hassan al Ahmadi, Director national Security Bureau NSB, joined Hadi (**joined Hadi**);
5. Major General Houssain Khirano, Chief of staff;
6. Brigadier General Zakaria Chami;
7. Major General Ahmed Mohsin Al Yafai;
8. Major General Abderrazak Al Marouni, Commander Special Operations Command;
9. Major General Awad Ben Farid;
10. Major General Abderraqib Thabet Assoubaihi;
11. Major General Ali Ben Ali Al Jaifi;
12. Major General Abdallah Mohnif;
13. Youssef Hassan Ismail Al Madani;
14. Abdallah Yahya Abdallah Al Hakim;
15. Abd Arrab Saleh Ahmed Jarfan;
16. Taha Hassan Al Madani;
17. Mohamed Daif Allah Saleh Sabhan;
18. Mohamed Abdelkarim Al Ghoumari.

Meeting of the Security Commission at the Ministry of Defense in Sana'a, 07 February



2015

Chaired by Major General Mahmoud Soubaihi, the four individuals in uniform are from Ansar Allah left to right: Youssef Hassan Ismail Al Madani, Abdallah Yahya Abdallah Al Hakim, Abd Arrab Saleh Ahmed Jarfan, Taha Hassan Al Madani, (screen shot from Yemeni TV channels)

The Panel has identified some of key actors of the Security Commission involved in the Command and Control as well as coordination between Houthis and Saleh family.

Link to pro Saleh Bureacracy for administration and management		
		
Gen. Jalal Arrouichan Acting Minister of Interior	Gen. Hussein Khirano Acting Minister of defense	Gen. Zakaria Chami Ansar Allah Regular Officer

Link to Houthis Armed Groups		
		
Youssef Al Madani Ansar Allah	Abdallah Yahya AlHakim Ansar Allah	13. Taha Hassan Al Madani 14. Ansar Allah
Link to pro Saleh units with special expertise and operational enablers		
		
Gen. Aberrazak Almarouni Special Operations	*Gen. Abd alRaqib alSubaihi Close to Ahmed Ali Saleh	Gen. Abdullah Mohnif Director Intelligence Services

Annex 8: Consultations facilitated by the United Nations

1. Participants to PNPA and Movenpick talks

1. Ansar Allah (Mahdi Machat and Hussein Al Azzi);
2. Al Haq Party (Hassan Zaid);
3. GPC (Abdul Karim Ali Al-Iryani);
4. National Democratic Alliance Parties (Kassem Sallam);
5. Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party (Mohamed Al Zubairy);
6. Islah (Abdul Wahab al-Ansi)
7. Yemeni Socialist Party YSP (Yahya Mansour Abou Sobo'a);
8. Yemeni Unionist Congregation (Abdullah Aobel)
9. Popular Front Union (Mohamed Arobai);
10. Nasserist (Abdullah Noaman, didn't sign);
11. Arrashad Party (Mohamed Moussa Al Amri);
12. Justice and Construction Party (Mohamed AboLuhoum);
13. Southern HiraK (Yassine Al Makkaoui).

2. Participants to First Geneva Consultations

Participants to Geneva talks as political constituents from Sana'a

1. Faika Alsayed – GPC;
2. Yahia Dowaid- GPC;
3. Aref Al-Zwka – GPC;
4. Yaser Al-Awadi- GPC;
5. Adel Qassem Abdu Al-Shugaa –GPC;
6. Obeid Bin-Dubeia - GPC;
7. Abu Bakr Al Qirbi -GPC;
8. Madhi Almshat -Ansar Allah;
9. Hamza Al-Houthi -Ansar Allah;
10. Ali Emad -Ansar Allah;
11. Abdulsalam Jaber -Ansar Allah;
12. Abdulmalek Alhajri -Ansar Allah;
13. Nasser Al-Nassiri Democratic Alliance;
14. Ghaleb Musad HiraK;
15. Mohamed Al-Zubairy Baath;
16. Bderrahman Al-Sakkaf -Yemeni Socialist Party;
17. Hassan Zaid -Al Haqq Party;
18. Mohammed Aboluhoum Justice and Construction;
19. Nabil Al Wazir Federation of Popular Forces.

Participants to Geneva talks as Government representatives

1. Riyadh Yassin Abdullah;
2. Ezzeddin Al-Asbahi;
3. Ahmed bin Ahmed Al-Maisari;

4. Abdul Wahhab Al-Humaikani;
5. Abdel Aziz Joubari;
6. Fahd Salim Kafayen;
7. Othman Hussein Majli;
8. Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak;
9. Mohamed Al-Mukhlafi;
10. Mohamed Ali Al-Sakkaf;

3. Ansar Allah and GPC Participants to Muscat

- 1 Mahdi Almachat (Ansar Allah);
- 2 Hussein Alaazi (Ansar Allah)
- 3 Abdelmakek Alaajri (Ansar Allah)
- 4 Mohamed Ben Abdessalam (Ansar Allah)
- 5 Yahya Dowaid (GPC)
- 6 Yasser Alawadi (GPC)
- 7 Aref Azzoukka (GPC)
- 8 Abu baker Qorbi (GPC)

4. Participants to second Geneva Consultations

Participating to Geneva talks as political constituents from Sana'a

Ansar Allah:

- 1 Mahdi Almachat (Sa'dah);
- 2 Mohamed Ben Abdessalam (Sa'dah)
- 3 Hamid Radman Assem (Sana'a)
- 4 Abdelilah Hajr (Sana'a)
5. Salim Maghlis (Ta'izz)
6. Nasser Mahfouz Baqazqouz (Hadramout)

GPC:

- 1 Yasser Alawadi (Al Baydah)
- 2 Aref Azzoukka (Shabwah)
- 3 Abu baker Qorbi (Al Baydah)
4. Faiqa Assayed (Aden)-Woman
- 5 Yahya Dowaid (Sana'a)
6. Khaled Addini (Hadramout)

Participating to Geneva talks as Government representatives

1. Abdelmalik Abdeljalil Al Mekhlafi;
2. Abdelaziz Ahmed Joubari;
3. Mohamed Moussa Al Aamri (AlBaydah);
4. Yassine Omar Makkaoui (Aden);
5. Mohamed Said Assaadi (Abyan);
6. Mohamed Said Assaadi (Abyan);
7. Khaled Omar Bajneid (Hadramout);
8. Nehal Naji Al Awlaki (Shabouah)-Woman;
9. Abdellah Abdellah Al Alimi (Shabwah);
10. Shai'I Mohsein Azzandani(Dale'a);
11. Azzedin Al Asbahi (Ta'izz)
12. Mouine Abdelmalik Said (Ta'izz)

5. Political Parties allied to Ansar Allah

Press conference, Sana'a, 1 September 2015: Ansar Allah and four allied parties announce their readiness to form a national Government.



<http://www.sabanews.net/ar/print403059.htm>

Left to right: Hamid Abdulmalek Alhajri (Al Karama, federation of parties allied to Ansar Allah), Hamid Assem (Nasserist Unionist People's Organisation), Hassan Zaid (Al Haq Party), Hamza Alhouthi (Ansar Allah), Mohamed Al Zubairy (Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party), Kassem Sallam, Nasser AL-Nassiri.

Annex 9: Inspection regime enforced by the coalition

List of Vessels which went through the inspection process by the coalition

M/V Name	Month	Destination	Boarded Y/N	Date Boarded
IRAN SHAHEED	May	Hudaydah	N	
ISTANBUL I	May	Aden	N	
AL NUBA I	May	Mokha	N	
ZAABEEL	May	Djibouti	N	
NAVIMOON	June	Hudaydah	Y	11-Jun-15
FREE STAR	June	Hudaydah	Y	11-Jun-15
EVANGELIA	June	Hudaydah	N	
RASS LAFFAN	June	Aden	N	
AL NUBA II	June	Mokha	N	
RAMA I	June	Aden	Y	17-Jun-15
CHANG HANG TAN SUO	June	Hudaydah	Y	14-Jun-15
PRYA	June	Hudaydah	N	
CASSENDRA	June	Hudaydah	Y	22-Jun-15
STELLA DI MARE	June	Hudaydah	N	
STARTRADER	June	Hudaydah	N	
LINA - Y	June	Salif	N	
ROYAL 8	June	Hudaydah	N	
VENUS	June	Mokha	N	
AREZOU	June	Hudaydah	N	
BEST WAVE	July	Hudaydah	Y	08-Jul-15
INCE INEBOLU	July	Salif	N	
RADHE	July	Hudaydah	N	
GEMA	July	Mokha	N	
SHAKER 1	August	Hudaydah	N	
PEARL OF ATHENA	August	Hudaydah	N	
TESSALINA	August	Hudaydah	Y	19-Aug-15
BOLERO	August	Salif	N	
MARWAN H	September	Salif	N	

M/V Name	Month	Destination	Boarded Y/N	Date Boarded
JABAL ALI	September	Aden	N	
AFRICAN 4	September	Aden	N	
EMIRATES PEACE	November	Nishtun	N	
MADINA I	November	Nishtun	N	

(source: Maritime Coalition Forces: list of vessels boarded may not be complete as information is provided by reports from third party)

Contact details for requesting clearances from the Evacuation and Humanitarian Operation Cell (EHOC) of the Saudi Ministry of Defence.



No Fly zone and Flight Restrictions

Following No Fly zone restrictions by the coalition all flights to and from Sana'a in Yemen have to be cleared

Flight schedule of 26 June 2015 with diplomatic clearance

استاذة العامة للتجارة الخارجية اليوم الجمعة 26/06/2015 م

رحلات المروحة

المرحلة	الطائرة	الوقت	الوقت	الوقت	الوقت	الوقت	الوقت
رحلة خاصة	مسقط / صنعاء / مسقط	1300	1200	A320	MAJAN 525	551	1079
تقن التفتيش العائلي في الخارج	عصان كويشة / صنعاء / كويشة / صنعاء	1315	1215	A320	7551/656	يمنية	1069
	عصان كويشة / صنعاء / كويشة / صنعاء	1315	1215	A320	7551/656		
	القاهرة كويشة / صنعاء / كويشة / كادي	1445	1315	A310	7551/656		

لطف معيار
مناوب النقل الجوي

محمدا الهتاري
مناوب النقل الجوي

(Leaked and posted on social media, authenticity confirmed by confidential source)

Translation

Flight	Type	Itinerary
Oman (special flight for UN)*	Special flight	Muscat-Sana'a-Muscat
Yemenia	Passenger	Amman- Bisha -Sana'a- Bisha -Amman
Yemenia	Passenger	Amman- Bisha -Sana'a- Bisha -Amman
Yemenia	Passenger	Cairo- Bisha -Sana'a- Bisha -Cairo

*Flight serving to transport Delegation that participated in Geneva consultations

18-04248

(Leaked by activists and posted in social media)

Flight	Type	Itinerary
Russian Ministry of Emergency	Evacuation	Russia-Sana'a-Russia
Solenta aviation	Medical supplies	Djibouti-Sana'a-Djibouti
Oman (special flight for UN)	Special flight	Muscat-Sana'a-Muscat
Red Cross	Humanitarian	Djibouti-Sana'a-Djibouti
Ruby Star	Medical supplies	Shariqa- Bisha -Sana'a- Bisha -Shariqa
	For Aljabal Cie	
Yemenia*	Passenger	Amman- Bisha -Sana'a- Bisha -Amman
Yemenia	Passenger	Cairo- Bisha -Sana'a- Bisha -Cairo
Yemenia	Passenger	Sayun- Soqatra-Sayun-Amman

* Flight used to transport Ansar Allah and GPC delegation participating to the Muscat talks.

Annex 10: Profile of weapons serving as baseline to monitor potential violations of the targeted arms embargo

As a result of successive wars in Yemen, arms have proliferated both within the regular military as well as within tribal militias. Since the reunification of North and South Yemen in 1990, the country has continued to increase its military arsenal. Between 1994 and 2013, the major suppliers that have reported exports of conventional weapons to Yemen were Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, the Russian Federation, South Africa and Ukraine.¹ During this period, Yemen received at least 384 main battle tanks, 572 armoured combat vehicles, 193 artillery systems, 75 combat aircraft. In their annual reports to the UN Register of Conventional Arms from 2008 to 2014, Member States have also reported the export to Yemen of 108 light mortars, 60 heavy machine guns, 2,000 light machine guns, 40,700 assault rifles, 20,000 mortar rounds (120mm) and 4 millions weapon cartridges calibre 12,7x108 for medium machine gun.²

Yemen also has medium range and tactical ballistic missiles in its arsenals. South Yemen had acquired 6 SCUD-B missiles launchers as early as 1989 which were integrated in the Yemeni arsenal after reunification in 1990. Yemen also has short range (70 km) OTR 21 Tochka missiles, or SS21 SCARAB. SCUDs were used in the 1994 civil war and were fired at Sana'a and Aden by both North and South Yemen. In 2002, Spanish and US navy vessels intercepted a vessel flagged in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and found 15 disassembled Hwasong-6 missiles (the North Korean version named SCUD-C) and about 85 drums of a chemical—later identified by Yemeni officials as missile fuel. The SCUDs were allegedly part of an old deal that the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) had signed with the DPRK. Yemen has allegedly received 45 Hwasong-6 (SCUD-C) missiles from the DPRK. According to technical specifications from open sources, these types of missiles have a range from 300 to 500 km. They have been fired on many occasions towards south-western governorates of Saudi Arabia along the Yemeni borders.

¹Member States are called upon to provide the UN Secretary-General annually with a report on their transfers of major conventional weapons. Since its inception in 1991, the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms has received reports from more than 170 States capturing the vast majority of official transfers. See <http://www.un-register.org>

²Since 2006, the General Assembly calls upon Member States to include, on a voluntary basis, their imports and exports of small arms in the annual national report on their arms imports and exports. see <http://www.un-regisr.org/SmallArms/Index.aspx>

List of conventional weapon transferred to Yemen as reported by Member States:

Exporting Country	Year	Number	Type
Belarus	2000	27	T-72B (S)
	2010	66	T-805
	2012	14	T-80
Bulgaria	1994	56	Tank-62
	1994	6	Tank-55
	1994	10	166 Mine-Thrower
	2010	54	82mm mortar
	2010	36	120mm mortar
	2010	50	81mm mortar
China	2007	2	Missile launchers
Czech Rep.	2000	97	Tank T-55
	2002	35	T 55 AM2
	2002	30	100 mm tank gun TK10-T2S
	2010	15	BVP-1 with MG 14,5
	2012	10	APC
	2013	5	APC
France	1999	10	AML
	1998	5	AML
Poland	1999	20	Battle tank
Moldava	1994	13	Launch rocket "Uragan"
	1994	4	MIG-29 aircraft
Russian Federation	2000	1	APC
	2000	31	MBT
	2002	14	Combat aircraft
	2004	128	APC
	2004	2	Combat aircraft
	2005	60	APC
	2005	4	Combat aircraft
	2005	2	Attack helicopters
	2010	94	APC
South Africa		112	APC

Ukraine	1995	4	SU-22 aircraft
	2003	32	T- 72
	2003	36	BMP-2
	2004	64	BMP-2
	2005	12	L-39S
	2006	2	L-39S
	2006	4	MiG-21
	2006	6	Su-22
	2007	17	Mig-21
	2007	6	Su-22
USA	2006	30	M113A2 ACV
	2006	2	M577A2 APC

Member states which reported transfer of conventional weapon to Yemen



<http://www.un-register.org/HeavyWeapons/Index.aspx?CoI=YE&type=2&year=0&#nkreg>

Type of small arms used by Houthis, mostly AK type, fifth rifle from the left has characteristics similar to Saudi variant of G3A4.



Tribesmen loyal to the Houthi movement hold their weapons at a gathering to show their support for the group, in Yemen's capital Sanaa December 15, 2015. REUTERS/Khaled Abdullah,

<http://www.reuters.com/news/picture/push-for-peace-in-yemen?articleId=USRTX1YMEL>

Annex 11: 9M113 Konkurs anti-tank guided missile used in Yemen

Konkurs system operated by a Houthi fighter allegedly against a Saudi Tank along the borders with Saudi Arabia



Screen shot from Almasirah video

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dxnRSY_DPVs&feature=youtu.be, last accessed on 9 November 2015.

Konkurs system from another video



https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dxnRSY_DPVs&feature=youtu.be, last accessed on 9 November 2015.

Annex 12: Interdiction of the fishing dhow *Nassir* and seizure of smuggled weapons**Sequence of events related to the investigation:**

- 15 September: Panel sends official communications to all Members States conducting operations in the area requesting information on potential seizures of arms;
- 25 September: Vessels of two Member States interdict the fishing dhow and seized weapon reported on media;
- 5 October: Panel sends official communications to Saudi Arabia and CMF requesting information on seizures of arms reported on media;
- 28 October: One confidential source confirms the seizure;
- 17 November: Panel received information from confidential source that an Australian vessel has been involved in the interdiction of the dhow and has seized weapons;
- 20 November: Panel sends official communications to Australia requesting information on seizures of arms by its vessel;
- 24 November: US reports to the Committee on Yemen and on Iran that one of its vessel in conjunction with another Member States has interdicted a dhow and seized weapons;
- 20 November: Panel sends official communications to Australia requesting information on seizures of arms by its vessel;
- 2 December: Panel sends a letter to USA requesting information on seized weapons and an inspection the weapons;
- 2 December: Australia replies to the Panel informing that in the course of a flag verification boarding, one of its vessel interdicted a ship which was found to be carrying weapons;
- 16 December: USA sends a letter inviting Panels on Iran and on Yemen to USA to inspect arms seized;
- 29 December: Panel conducted the inspection in USA of the arms seized



(According to information provided by a confidential source)

Dhow *Nassir* during Interdiction



Photo showing the flag verification operation (confidential source)

Weapons discovered during the Flag Verification Boarding on the *Nassir*



(US report, 24 November 2015)

Weapon Seized according to US report

56 TOW Anti-Tank Guided Missiles; 4 TOW Optical Sights; 4 TOW Tripod Mounts; 4 TOW Launch Tubes; 2 TOW Battery Sets; 2 TOW Launcher Assembly Units; 3 TOW Missile Guidance Systems; 14 TOW Battery Assemblies; and 19 9M113 AT Konkurs.



(US report, 24 November 2015)



Annex 13: Inspection of anti-tank guided missile seized by the United States from the *Nassir*

Following the US report on seizure, the Panel in conjunction with the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1929 (2010) on Iran were invited by the United States to inspect the seized weapons from the *Nassir* that were in their possession. The inspection took place on 29 December in a US Government compound near Washington DC.

1. Observations on BGM71 TOW and associated equipment

6 of the 56 missiles ATGM BGM71 TOW seized, inspected by the Panel





Marking and serial number

Top: Date 2013 on missiles likely date of overhaul

Markings and serial numbers on associated equipment indicating Iranian companies



Technical instruction in Persian language found by the Panel in a box containing the Missile Guidance System MGS for TOW



2. Observations on ATGM 9M113 Konkurs and associated equipment



4 of the 19 missiles ATGM 9M113 Konkurs seized, inspected by the Panel



9M113 Konkurs on its mount inspected by the Panel



Marking and serial number likely similar to Iranian models



Marking and serial number likely similar to Russian models

Markings and serial numbers on mount and optical system with characteristics similar to Russian models



3. ATGM 9M113 Konkurs observed in the region (Hezbollah, Iran and)

Konkurs operated by Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon (2006)



August 14, 2006 A Russian-made anti-tank missile launcher captured by IDF forces in southern Lebanon belonging to Hezbollah.

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Flickr_-_Israel_Defense_Forces_-_Russian-Made_Missile_Found_in_Hezbollah_Hands.jpg, last accessed on 09 November 2015.

Konkurs model held by Iranian forces



Annex 14: Plundering of the Nineteenth Brigade in Bayhan

On 14 February, local media reported that Ansar Asharia attacked the main military compound situated in Baihan in Chabwa governorate which comprises the majority of equipment of the 19th Infantry Brigade.

According to the order of battle of the Brigade in possession of the Panel, the Brigade had a registered strength of 3971 troops but only around 1390 troops were declared to be operational in the area during the attack and less than 35 were in fact present in the compound and were allowed to leave without their weapon after mediation by local sheikhs.

During the attack there was almost no resistance as only one soldier was killed and six wounded. Open sources stated that local tribes took control of looted arms and ammunition in Byahan and from two other battalions in Salim and Hai Ben Aqil in Shabwah.

Senior Yemeni officer in Riyadh confirmed to the Panel during an interview in September that troops of the 19th brigade were still in their homes.

According to the Brigade's order of battle, equipment and ammunition held by the Brigade comprise:

- 47 heavy artillery gun calibre up to 122;
- 143 machine gun (medium and heavy);
- x2460 riffles;
- 104 rocket propelled grenade launchers;
- 24 tank T55 and 1 T62,
- 9 Armoured personnel carriers;
- 45 pickups; 16000 shells for artillery
- 270 anti tank missiles
- 5400 propelled grenades;
- More than 1.8 millions cartridges for riffles and machine guns.



Entrance of Headquarters 19th Infantry Brigade in Bayhan, stormed by Ansar Asharia, The group raised it flag and is taking a T55 tank. Markings in Arabic on the gate indicates Headquarters on the 19th Brigade, see http://yemen-press.com/uploaded_files/ups/yp12-02-2015-66298.jpg, last accessed on 23 december 2015.

Translation (Order of Battle 19th Brigade)

Brigade Commander: Hamid Yahya Assaoumali

1. Order of battle (Personnel):

- Total Strength: 3971;
- Officers: 387, NCO and Rank: 3584 (according to salaries disbursed in December 2015)
- Personnel registered: 4044
- Personnel declared operational: less than 45%
- Personnel present during the attack: less than 35%

2. Table of equipment for the Brigade: See above (list of equipment looted)

قوام وجاهزية اللواء / ١٩ مش - بيعان						
أولاً :- جاهزية القوى البشرية :-						
١. إجمالي القوة البشرية (٣٩,٧١) ضابط وفرد على النحو التالي :-						
ضباط (٣٨٧) - صف ضباط وأفراد (٣٥٨٤) مستلمي مرتب شهر ديسمبر ٢٠١٤ م من الدائرة الحالية						
أما كشوفات اللواء فأجمالي القوة (٤٠٤٤) .						
٢. نسبة الجاهزية البشرية المتواجدة في اللواء لا تتجاوز (٤٥) % .						
٣. نسبة التواجد أثناء حادثة الهجوم على اللواء والاستيلاء عليه لا تتجاوز (٣٥) % تقريباً						
ثانياً الجاهزية القتالية (الأسلحة)						
الذخائر	بنادق البنية	قذائف	قواعد صواريخ	معدلات	الرشاشات	المدفعية
لغزير متروكة بكمية كبيرة للتفصيل في المرفقات	(٢٤١٥) بنادق + عشر بنادق كده	(١٠٤) قذائف	(٢٠) قاعدة + عدد (٩) أجهزة إطلاق بترس	(٩٢) معدل متنوع	(٥٧) رشاش متنوع	- مدافع متنوعة (٣١) . - مدافع جوي (٢٤) . الاجملي (٢٥)
ثالثاً : المعدات والسيارات (أنظر المرفق)						
رابعاً : قيادة اللواء هم :-						
- قائد اللواء .						
- رئيس أركان اللواء .						
- رئيس عمليات اللواء .						
- عميد ركن / حامد يحيى الصوملي						
- عقيد ركن / علي قائد يحيى مطير						
- عقيد ركن / أحمد محمد القشيم						

Annex 15: Airdrop and supply of arms to the resistance

Weapons and ammunition airdropped in southern areas Yemen



http://aawsat.com/sites/default/files/styles/galleryformatter_thumb/public/1428086211267469100.jpg?itok=mvziXUf1



www.almashhad-alyemeni.com/news49896.html

Heckler & Koch G3A4 rifle and 7.62×51 ammunition box with inscription indicating Saudi Origin



http://aawsat.com/sites/default/files/styles/galleryformatter_thumb/public/1428086211267469100.jpg?itok=mvziXUf1

Rocket propelled grenades intended to resistance finishing in Houthis hands



Houthis show rocket propelled grenades with characteristics similar to RPG 26. RPG with similar characteristics have been supplied by the coalition to Resistance Forces in Aden and Ta'izz. Houthis declare that they get these weapons which were airdropped by the coalition by mistake. On a note they have written "Thank you Salman (King Salman), Thank Mekhlafi (Hamoud Mekhlafi a resistance leader in Ta'izz).

http://www.ibb-press.net/user_images/news/29-04-15-290641263.jpg



Weapon seized in Sana'a in September 2015,
<https://pbs.twimg.com/media/COKo6kSWgAAov16.jpg>

Ammunition used to build improvised explosive device (IED)



Left: Vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), discovered by Houthis in Ibb on 21 December 2015 (shared with the panel by activists).

Anti tank mines TM 48 and TM 57, Russian made.

Annex 16: Armoured combat vehicles provided by the coalition to alleged Salafist in Ta'izz



<http://www.emirates247.com/news/region/uae-saudi-send-weapons-to-taiz-resistance-2015-11-07-1.609560>



<http://shabwahalhadath.net/uploads/pics/1446403389.jpeg>

Annex 17: Arms supplied by the coalition sold by the resistance



Type US M4 for sale
1000000 Yemeni Rial ie
(around 5000 USD)




Type G3A4 Saudi 600000
Yemeni Rials ie (around 3000 USD)



Type AK 74: 1 Million
Rial (around 5000 USD)

Annex 18: Order of battle of Yemen military units before the start of the coalition campaign
(updated based on media reports)



Annex 19: Examples of wealth accrued by Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003)

Arms and ammunition deals: An arms trader accomplished an arm deal of \$ 200 million consisting in purchasing 50,000 machine guns at a unitary price of \$ 150 which were later sold at \$ 600 each. Half of the profit was for Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003) who facilitated the purchase of the weapons by taking advantage of his position as President of the Country. Another example is the purchase of 1000 bullets for machine guns at a unitary price of \$ 0.50 each. Later on, each unit was sold at \$ 1.

Education: Records of teachers and civil servants were also artificially manipulated to obtain funds for those none existing or “ghost” workers. On papers, Ali Abdullah Saleh’s government accounted for 9 children to 1 teacher, although the reality was different to the point that a large number of schools were empty. The designated individual tricked inspections from control authorities by artificially filling schools during inspections days.

Health: The Panel has been informed that during the many years of Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003) in power, not a single hospital was built. Many hospitals and medical centers only existed on papers, again, as set up to divert funds from the states’ budget.

Money Laundering: In one occasion, Ali Adbullah Saleh (YEi.003) allocated \$ 4 million to buy \$ 20 million obtained from illicit gains. The \$ 20 million were deposited in the Central Bank of Yemen and further withdrawn clean.

Military and Defense: The military forces were largely tainted with corruption. Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003) used to artificially inflate the numbers of active soldiers and military facilities to obtain illicit gains. For instance a list of 1,500 soldiers appeared as if there were 80,000 soldiers. Therefore, the designated individual was able to collect wages of those “ghost soldiers” on a monthly basis. The same was made to collect maintenance expense for non-existing military facilities.

Ministry of roads and reconstruction: The Ministry did not approved a single contract unless obtaining 16% kickback in cash. Overall cost of projects were increased to obtain more gains. For instance, a \$ 15 million worth contract was presented as \$ 80 million worth project contract.

Oil companies and contractors: The Panel was assured that Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003) was the direct recipient of 20% commission of the country’s oil production. The Panel received assurances that all oil companies operating in the country were aware of this situation. Basically, every oil contract was made in parallel. One in Sana’a to be presented to the Yemeni Parliament for approval with the exact conditions of the agreement, while a parallel contract was signed in a Gulf country. The later established the conditions of the kickback to be paid to Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003).

In summary, all funds illicitly obtained from corruption were distributed, laundered and watered down through a well-established and complicated financial network. Anyone refusing to be part of it was immediately ousted from the government.

Source: Panel of Experts’ interview with the highest level Yemeni Government official on 11 June 2015 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

Annex 20: Compulsory donations

Receipt for payment of funds for the central commission for collection of donations for God's sake (sabil Allah).



Shared by activists with the Panel.

Letter allegedly sent to to Kamran Industry and Investment Company, dated 9 December 2015, asking to provide 10 Millions Yemeni Rials for Houthi activists


Translation:

Kindly provide a sum of 10 Millions Rials that would be used to fund travels of Human Rights activists to Geneva to submit reports on Saudi aggression and to present its effect to the international public opinion.

Signed

Mohamed Abdelkader Aljunaid

Director of the office of the President



See, <http://almashhad-alyemeni.com/news65772.html>, last accessed on 23 December 2015.

Annex 21. Description of companies entailing one of the networks of Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003)

In addition to the outline of the worldwide financial network described in the text of the report, the Panel wishes to outline and describe in more detail the companies comprising one of the financial structures used by the designated sanctioned individuals Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003) or those acting on their behalf, to conduct business operations or to hide ownership of individual under sanctions and allow transactions.

1. The Pact Trust

The Trust was settled by designated individual Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003) and is the owner of a number of companies as indicated in the following paragraphs. Beneficiaries of the Trust are members of his family entourage.

2. New World Trust Corporation NWT

New World Trust Corporation NWT is the trustee of the Pact Trust. The Company was registered in the province of New Brunswick, Canada, number 012167 of 16 June 1977 at the address One Germain Street, Suite 1500, PO Box 1324, Saint John, New Brunswick, E2L 4H8 Canada.

The address of the head office of New World Trust Corporation NWT, matches that of a law office firm in Saint John, New Brunswick, while its mailing address matches that of NWT Magament SA, in Geneva, according to the latter's website (www.newworldtrust.)”

3. NWT Nominees Limited now NWT Services Limited

NWT Nominees Limited with address at Winterbotham Place, Marlborough and Queen Streets, PO Box N-3026 Nassau Bahamas is the trustee for New World Trust Corporation NWT in Canada which was in turn the trustee of the Pact Trust. NWT Nominees Limited later changed its name to NWT Services Limited.

NWT Services Limited was also the sole shareholder of three companies (Albula Limited, Weisen Limited and Foxford Management Limited), which ownership was later transferred to Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh. The Company latest address appeared at Aleman, Cordero, Galindo & Lee Trust (BVI) Limited 3rd Floor, Geneva Place, Waterfront Drive, P.O. Box 3175, Road Town, Tortola, British Virgin Islands.

4. NWT Directors Limited, formerly NWT Directors Inc.

NWT Directors Limited a company incorporated in the Commonwealth of the Bahamas. It appears as the signing party that transferred the shares of Albula Limited and Weisen Limited from NWT Services Limited to Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh. NWT Directors Limited address is the same as NWT Services Limited above.

New Directors Limited further continued as a British Virgin Islands registered company effectively from 29 May 2103.

5. NWT Management S.A.

As indicated above, Canadian authorities confirmed that the mailing address of New World Trust Corporation (NWT) matches that of NWT Management in Geneva, Switzerland “according to the latter’s website (www.newworldtrust.ch).” Also, NWT Management address appears as Rue Muzy 10, 1207 Genève, Switzerland, which matches the address of the company NWT Group (NWT).

6. Albula Limited, formerly Harrison Limited

Albula Limited, register number E29459 was incorporated by Chartered Trust in the Turks and Caicos Islands in July 2000 under the original name Harrison Limited, and in 2001, that name was changed to the present name. According to official information in possession of the Panel, the instruction to incorporate the company came from NWT Management SA of Geneva, Switzerland. Further, all subsequent instructions came from that company up to early 2015.

7. Foxford Management Limited

Foxford Management Limited, register number 125174 was incorporated on 4 October 2002 at the Commonwealth of the Bahamas.

8. Weisen Limited, formerly Centaure Limited

Weisen Limited, register number 395883 was incorporated on 6 July 2002 at the British Virgin Islands.

Annex 22. Pact Trust settled by Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003)

Pact Trust	Other information	Trustee of Trust	
		Settlor (Funder) of Trust	New World Trust Corporation
New World Trust Corporation	Incorporation	Beneficiary of Trust	<p>The names of the beneficiaries are as follows:</p> <p>a. Ali Abdullah Saleh; b. Ahmad Ali Abdullah Saleh; c. Bilqis Ali Abdullah Saleh; d. Fowzia Ali Abdullah Saleh; e. Saba Ali Abdullah Saleh; f. Altaf Ali Abdullah Saleh; g. Wafa Ali Abdullah Saleh; and h. Iman Ali Abdullah Saleh</p>
		Entity's Address	Unknown
		Registration Number	012167
		Country of Incorporation	Canada
		Date of Incorporation	16 June 1977

Annex 23: Pact Trust and New World Trust Corporation

DECLARATION OF ORGANISED ASSOCIATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS, ASSETS OR PATRIMONY WITH OR WITHOUT SPECIFIC BENEFICIAL OWNERS

PURSUANT TO POINTS 43 & 44 OF THE AGREEMENT ON THE SWISS BANK'S CODE OF CONDUCT WITH REGARD TO THE EXERCISE OF DUE DILIGENCE (CDB 08), THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY DECLARE(S) THAT, AS TRUSTEE(S), BOARD MEMBER(S) OF THE FOUNDATION OR BOARD MEMBER(S) OF AN UNDERLYING COMPANY BELONGING TO THE TRUST OR FOUNDATION, ETC. AND IN SUCH CAPACITY, PROVIDED(S), TO THE BEST OF HIS/HER/THEIR KNOWLEDGE, THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

Name of trust / foundation: The Pact Trust

Type of entity (e.g. revocable / irrevocable and / or discretionary trust, foundation): Discretionary, Revocable, Reserved Power Trust - Cayman Islands

Actual settlor(s) (not fiduciary):	Full Name(s)	Date of Birth	Nationality	Legal Address (including country)
	<u>His Excellency Ali Abdulla Saleh</u>	<u>21.03.1942</u>	<u>Yemeni</u>	<u>Sana'a, Yemen</u>
Person(s) who may revoke the entity (revocable trust / foundation):				
	<u>The Settlor</u>	<u>21.03.1942</u>	<u>Yemeni</u>	<u>Sana'a, Yemen</u>
Trustee(s) / Board members of a foundation, etc.:				
	<u>New World Trust Corporation</u>	<u>16.06.1977</u>	<u>Canadian</u>	<u>One Garmah Street, Suite 1600, Po Box 1324</u>
	<u>as trustee of the Pact Trust</u>			<u>Saint John, New Brunswick, E2L 4H8, Canada</u>
Curator / Protector*:	<u>nila</u>			
Person(s) authorized to instruct the above or their agents*:				
	<u>The Settlor</u>	<u>21.03.1942</u>	<u>Yemeni</u>	<u>Sana'a, Yemen</u>
First beneficiaries**:				
	<u>The Settlor</u>	<u>21.03.1942</u>	<u>Yemeni</u>	<u>Sana'a, Yemen</u>
	<u>The descendants of the Settlor</u>			

PLEASE CONTINUE ON ADDITIONAL SHEETS IF SPACE IS NOT SUFFICIENT

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Annex 25: NWT Nominees Limited (current NWT Services Limited)**DECLARATION OF TRUST**

We, NWT Nominees Limited of Winterbotham Place, Marlborough & Queen Streets, PO Box N-3026, Nassau, Bahamas **HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE AND DECLARE** that we hold the shares shown in the schedule hereto registered in our name as nominee and trustee for New World Trust Corporation of Suite 1500, One Brunswick Square, Germain Street, St John, New Brunswick, Canada as Trustee of the Pact Trust (hereinafter called "the Owner") **AND WE UNDERTAKE AND AGREE** not to transfer deal with or dispose of the said shares so we as the Owner may from time to time direct **AND WE HEREBY DECLARE** that we or our legal representative will at all times hereafter stand possessed of the said shares and of all distributions in respect thereof in Trust for the Owner or their assigns and will at all times hereafter deal with and dispose of the said shares and exercise the votes thereby conferred as the Owner or their assigns shall from time to time direct or determine.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF these presents have entered into the declaration this 19th March 2014 with effect from 20th September 2001.

SCHEDULE

One Ordinary Share of USD 1.00 in the undertaking known as **ALBULA LIMITED** a company incorporated in the Turks & Caicos Islands with its registered office at Regent House, Suite F206, Regent Village, Grace Bay, Providenciales.

SIGNED by the above named

NWT Nominees Limited

in the presence of:



DIRECTOR



Annex 26: NWT Nominees Limited and Albula Limited

Entity	Type of Information	Available Information	Details
1. Albula Limited	Incorporation	Registration Number	E. 29459
		Country of Incorporation	Turks & Caicos Islands
		Date of Incorporation	10 July 2000
		Entity's Registered Address	The Chartered Trust Company Limited Town Centre Building Providenciales Turks and Caicos Island
		Directors & Shareholder details	Director & Shareholder: NWT Nominees Limited (100% shareholdings) Address: Winterbotham Place, Marlborough & Queen Streets PO Box N-7523, Nassau, Bahamas
		Account Number	6000108
	Account Information	Date Opened	10 April 2013
		Account Type	Current (in Euro, GBP and Swiss Francs)
		Date Closed	9 January 2015
		Closing Balance	USD 0.00
		Bank where account is maintained	First Gulf Bank
		Authorized Signatories	a. Angelo De Riz (UIN.: X0182907, Country of Issue: Switzerland, Nationality: Swiss, DOB: 31 Oct 72); b. Supreeya Nishta Tacouri (UIN.: 516680564, Country of Issue: United Kingdom, Nationality: British, DOB: 21 Jan 71); c. Kim Grover (UIN.: 706824571, Country of Issue: United Kingdom, Nationality: British, DOB: 7 Jul 73); d. Benjamin Philippe Verne (UIN.: 05RE67883, Country of Issue: France, Nationality: French, DOB: 9 Oct 71); e. Anna Kathleen Nydegger (UIN.: MB155948, Country of Issue: Australia, Nationality: Australian, DOB: 22 Jun 79); f. Bernard John Hess (UIN.: F2014483, Country of Issue: Switzerland, Nationality: Swiss, DOB: 20 Jun 52); and

g. Colin Richard Walker (UIN.: 622122709, Country of Issue: Jersey, Nationality: British, DOB: 30 Aug 51).

Annex 27: NWT Nominees Limited and Foxford Management Limited

2. Foxford Management Limited	Incorporation		g. Colin Richard Walker (JRN: 622122709, Country of Issue: Jersey, Nationality: British, DOB: 30 Aug 51).
		Registration Number	1251748
		Country of Incorporation	Bahamas
		Date of Incorporation	4 October 2002
		Entity's Registered Address	New World Nassau Limited 307 Shirley Street Nassau Bahamas
		Directors & Shareholder details	Director & Shareholder: NWT Nominees Limited (100% shareholdings) Address: Winterbatham Place, Marlborough & Queen Streets PO Box N-7523, Nassau, Bahamas
	Account Information	Account Number	6000109
		Date Opened	10 April 2013
		Account Type	Current (in Euro, GBP and Swiss Francs)
		Date Closed	9 January 2015
		Closing Balance	USD 0.00
		Bank where account is maintained	First Gulf Bank
		Authorized Signatories	a. Angelo De Ritz (JRN: 30162997, Country of Issue: Switzerland, Nationality: Swiss, DOB: 31 Oct 72);
			b. Supriya Nisha Tascott (JRN: 515480944, Country of Issue: United Kingdom, Nationality: British, DOB: 21 Jan 71);
			c. Kim Grever (JRN: 76824571, Country of Issue: United Kingdom, Nationality: British, DOB: 7 Jul 78);
			d. Benjamin Philippe Verne (JRN: 059657883, Country of Issue: France, Nationality: French, DOB: 9 Oct 71);
			e. Anna Kathleen Nyländer (JRN: M9155948, Country of Issue: Australia, Nationality: Australian, DOB: 22 Jun 79);
			f. Bernard John Hess (JRN: 72014483, Country of Issue: Switzerland, Nationality: Swiss, DOB: 30 Jun 52); and

g. Colin Richard Walker (JRN: 622122709, Country of Issue: Jersey, Nationality: British, DOB: 30 Aug 51).

Annex 28: NWT Nominees Limited and Weisen Limited


3. Weisen Limited	Incorporation		g. Colin Richard Walker (UIN.: 622122709, Country of Issue: Jersey, Nationality: British, DOB: 30 Aug 51).
		Registration Number	395883
		Country of Incorporation	British Virgin Islands
		Date of Incorporation	5 July 2000
		Entity's Registered Address	Caribbean Corporate Services Limited 3rd Floor, Omar Hodge Building Wickhams Cay I PO Box 362 Road Town, Tortola British Virgin Islands
	Account Information	Directors & Shareholder details	Director & Shareholder: NWT Nominees Limited (100% shareholdings) Address: Winterbotham Place, Marlborough & Queen Streets PO Box N-7523, Nassau, Bahamas
		Account Number	6000107
		Date Opened	10 April 2013
		Account Type	Current (in Euro, GBP and Swiss Francs)
		Date Closed	9 January 2015
		Closing Balance	USD 0.00
		Bank where account is maintained	First Gulf Bank
		Authorized Signatories	a. Angelo De Riz (UIN.: X0182997, Country of Issue: Switzerland, Nationality: Swiss, DOB: 31 Oct 72); b. Supreeya Nishta Tacouri (UIN.: 516680564, Country of Issue: United Kingdom, Nationality: British, DOB: 21 Jan 71); c. Kim Grover (UIN.: 706824571, Country of Issue: United Kingdom, Nationality: British, DOB: 7 Jul 73); d. Benjamin Philippe Verne (UIN.: 05RE67883, Country of Issue: France, Nationality: French, DOB: 9 Oct 71); e. Anna Kathleen Nydegger (UIN.: M9155548, Country of Issue: Australia, Nationality: Australian, DOB: 22 Jun 79); f. Bernard John Hess (UIN.: F2014483, Country of Issue: Switzerland,

g. Colin Richard Walker (UIN.: 622122709, Country of Issue: Jersey, Nationality: British, DOB: 30 Aug 51).

Annex 29: Financial network of NWT Nominees Limited compared with a third company

NWT Nominees Limited	Third Europe based Company
Canada	Canada
Common Wealth of the Bahamas	British Virgin Islands
British Virgin Islands	Hong Kong
Singapore	Republic of Mauritius
Switzerland	Nevis Island
Turks and Caicos Islands	
United Arab Emirates	

Annex 30: Copy of the diplomatic passport of Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.005)




CONFIDENTIAL & TRUE COPY

Certified True Copy
OTians
 Newhaven Corporate Services (B.V.I.) Limited
 Date: 3 Dec. 2012

I Colin Walker, Chartered Certified Accountant, No 6826684, hereby declare that this is a true copy of the original and a true likeness of the person.

Date: 3 December 2012

Signature: *[Signature]*

Annex 31: Certificate of incorporation of Albula Limited

Annex 32: Albula Limited (formerly Harrison Limited) located at the premises of Chartered Trust Company

THE COMPANIES ORDINANCE 1981
TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS

MEMORANDUM OF ASSOCIATION of

HARRISON LIMITED

An Exempted Company Limited By Shares.

Company No. **E-29457**
Recorded in the Turks & Caicos
Islands Companies Registry on
JUL 10 2000
Signed *[Signature]*

1. The name of the Company is **HARRISON LIMITED**
2. The Company is an exempted company registered under Part VII of the Companies Ordinance 1981.
3. The Registered Office of the Company will be situated in the Turks and Caicos Islands, at the premises of The Chartered Trust Company Limited, Town Centre Building, Providenciales.
4. The liability of each member of the Company is limited to the amount for the time being unpaid, if any, on the shares held by such member.
5. The share capital of the Company is as set out hereunder with power for the Company insofar as is permitted by law to redeem any of its shares and to increase or reduce the said capital subject to the provisions of the Companies Ordinance 1981 and the Articles of Association of the Company and to issue any part of its capital whether original redeemed or increased with or without any preference, priority or special privilege or subject to any postponement of rights or to any conditions or restrictions and to that end, unless the conditions of issue shall otherwise expressly declare, every issue of shares whether declared to be preference or otherwise shall be subject to the powers hereinbefore contained.

US\$5,000.00 divided into 5,000 shares of US\$1.00 each par value

Annex 33: Share certificate of Albula Limited

SHARE CERTIFICATE

NUMBER 2

NUMBER OF SHARES One

ALBULA LIMITED

Authorised Capital: US\$5,000.00 divided into 5,000 shares of US\$1.00 each per value
Incorporated with limited liability in the Turks & Caicos Islands

This Certifies that NMT Honduras Limited
is the Registered Proprietor of One
fully paid Ordinary Shares of US\$1.00 each
numbered 1 to - inclusive
in the Capital of the Company and subject to the Memorandum and Articles of Association thereof

In Witness Whereof, the Company has caused this Share Certificate to be executed under its
Common Seal this 20th day of September A.D. 2001

Secretary Director


SEMINOLE FORM 1012-1

Card 201 511/101

Annex 34: Khaled Saleh (Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh), new shareholder of Albula Limited

Register of Members and Share Ledger

Name of Company: Albula Limited		Company Number: E.39459	
Member details			
Name: Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh		Profession:	
Residential name:			
Address: P.O. Box 33381, Ain Shams, United Arab Emirates			
Present company/Trading Place: 0001000, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Addis Ababa		ID Number:	Nationality: Sudan
Company number:		Place of Incorporation:	
Share details			
Class of share:	Denomination:	Current holding:	Date entered as a shareholder:
Ordinary	USD 1.00	1.00	25-Oct-2014
Shares acquired			
Date of acquisition or transfer:	Number of shares acquired:	Certificate number:	Distinctive numbers of shares:
25-Oct-2014	1.00	8	
			Total Consideration: USD 1.00
			Amount still payable: USD 0.00
Shares transferred/disposed			
Date of transfer:	Number of shares transferred/disposed:	Certificate number:	Distinctive numbers of shares:
			Total Consideration: USD
			Transfer fee/Transfer Method:

 28/10/14

Page 1 of 2

Date printed 24 October, 2018

Annex 35: Tilsit Real State B.V.: notes to the financial statement

<p style="text-align: center;">TILSIT REAL ESTATE B.V.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Notes to the Financial Statements (EURO)</p>	
1. GENERAL	<p>Tilsit Real Estate B.V. is a Dutch private company with limited liability, incorporated in Amsterdam on December 27, 1978.</p> <p>The Company mainly acts as a real estate company.</p> <p>Since February 2006 Mr. Ahmed Ali Abdullah Al Ahmar is the only shareholder.</p> <p>Since March 2006 the apartment is being under a total reconstruction. We expect the completion by mid 2011.</p> <p>The company bought another apartment in the same building July 29, 2010.</p> <p>The debt to the shareholder has been converted to a premium reserve.</p>
2. SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL ACCOUNTING POLICIES	<p>(a) General</p> <p>The accompanying financial statements have been prepared in accordance with the provisions of the fourth Directive of the European Community as set forth in Title 9, Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code.</p> <p>The annual report shows a negative equity. Due to the fact that it is not impossible that the business operations will be maintained in the longer term, the accounting principles applied are based on the assumption that the company will be able to continue as a going concern.</p> <p>(b) Foreign currencies</p> <p>All assets and liabilities denominated in currencies other than Euros have been translated at the rates of exchange prevailing on balance sheet date. All transactions in foreign currencies have been translated into Euros at rates of exchange approximating those prevailing on the dates of the transactions. Unless otherwise indicated, any resulting exchange differences are included in the Profit and Loss Account.</p>
<p>Net Tangible Fixed assets</p>	

Annex 36: Apartment No. 1, assets of Tilsit: Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.005)

seventyone thousand six hundred and eighty six euro (€ 2,071,586.00) and the purchase price of -
the transfer of the Receivable amounts to one million seventy-eight thousand three hundred
and fourteen euro (€ 1,078,314.00), also a total purchase price of three million one hundred
and fifty thousand euro (€ 3,150,000.00). -----

The Transferee has paid the purchase price into a trust account of the Actus Notarissen -----
partnership in accordance with the notarial settlement. -----

The Transferee confers irrevocable agency to the Actus Notarissen partnership for the -----
immediate transfer of the purchase price on the cheque account indicated by the -----
Transferor, with expenses to be paid by the Transferee. -----

The Transferee hereby grants the Transferee discharge for paying the purchase price in the
above manner. -----

STIPULATIONS AND PROVISIONS -----

D. I. Stipulations and provisions of the contracts of sale -----

Save as otherwise provided in the present Deed, the aforesaid agreements of sale and -
transfer were concluded subject to the stipulations and provisions as mentioned -----
hereafter. -----

II. Other stipulations and provisions -----

When entering into the aforesaid agreements of sale and transfer, the following -----
additional provisions were agreed upon: -----

1. Transferor's guarantees -----

The Transferor warrants and represents to Transferee as follows: -----

a. shares paid up in full: -----
the transferred shares constitute one hundred percent (100%) of the -----
Company's issued capital and have all been paid up in full; -----

b. full and free title to the shares: -----
the full and free title to the sold shares is hereby transferred, therefore free ---
from any pledge, usufruct, attachment, issue of depository receipts, and any --
other right that a third party might exercise in respect thereof on any ground -
whatsoever; -----

c. shareholders' resolutions: -----
no shareholders' resolutions have been passed in respect of the issue of -----
shares, distributions of dividend, reserves or capital which have yet to be -----
carried out, nor have any other shareholders' resolutions been passed -----
unknown to the Transferee; -----

d. corporate Articles of Association of the Company: -----

Annex 36 continued

for dissolution pursuant to Section 185 of Book 2 of the Netherlands Civil Code been filed by the Public Prosecutor; nor can the Company be dissolved pursuant to an order of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry that it comes under, now that it does not satisfy the criteria referred to in Section 19 (a) of Book 2 of the Netherlands Civil Code; the Company has therefore not received any notification of the intention of the said Chamber to dissolve the Company;

g. no ban on transfer of the shares sold -----
the shares sold are not subject to any ban on transfer pursuant to Section 22 --
(a) of Book 2 of the Netherlands Civil Code; -----

h. commercial register -----
the Company is currently registered in the commercial register of the -----
Chamber of Commerce at Alkmaar under number 33150937; -----
the information regarding the Company which is registered in the commercial
register is correct and complete. -----

2. Date of transfer of dividends, benefits and burdens -----

a. All benefits, burdens and dividends of the shares transferred shall be for the --
Transferee's account as from the present date. -----

b. Any dividends not yet declared and any other payments in respect of shares --
shall also be for the Transferee's account as from the date stated in paragraph
2.a. -----

3. Real estate -----

The principal asset of the Company is a flat on the third floor, stair case A, in the --
building situated at Rue Tilsit 5, Avenue Hoche 66, avenue Wagram 2, Place -----
Charles de Gaulle without number, 75008 Paris (France), filed with the Land -----
Registry under Section 0802 AV n° 2, place called - Rue de Tilsit - for 17a 92ca,
the flat consisting of an entrance hall, a living room, a dining room, three -----
bedrooms, two bathrooms, waterclosets, a separate water closet, a kitchen, a -----
pantry and a service entrance (lot 62); a cellar in the basement (lot 7); a room on --
the fourth floor with view in the court (lot 51); a room on the fourth floor with -----
view on Rue de Tilsit (lot 50) and a parking in the court (lot 57/rr.5). (the "Real --
Estate"). -----

The Company has the full legal and beneficial ownership of the real estate free --
and clear from any encumbrance or mortgage. -----

The real estate is completely known to the Transferee, who abandons a further -----
description of it in this Deed. -----

The person appearing sub 2, acting in his capacity of independently authorised -----
attorney of the Company, represents and guarantees to the Transferee that the real -----

Annex 37: Apartment No. 2, Assets of Tilsit: Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.005)

THIS CASH COLLATERAL AGREEMENT IS MADE ON 29th July 2010 BETWEEN:

- (1) **TILSIT REAL ESTATE B.V.**, a private limited company with a share capital of EUR 11,344.51 organized and existing under the laws of Netherlands, whose registered office is located Amsterdam, and whose principal place of business is located at Simon Carmiggeltstraat 5, 1822MA Alkmar, Netherlands, registered in the commercial register of the Chamber of Commerce at Alkmaar under file number 33150937, represented by Albert Hagelen duly authorized for the purpose herein,
(hereinafter referred to as the **"Obligor"**);
- (2) **EUROPE ARAB BANK PLC**, a company duly organized under the laws of England and Wales, which registered office is located at 13-15 Moorgate, London EC2R 6AD, United Kingdom, with registered number 5575857, acting through its Paris Branch located 26, avenue des Champs-Élysées, 75008 Paris registered under n° RCS Paris B 492 934 310 at the Trade and Companies Registry represented by Mrs. Nadine Cazaubieilh and Mr. Gilles Charmey duly authorized for the purpose herein,

(hereinafter referred to as the **"Beneficiary" or "EAB"**)

The Obligor and the Beneficiary hereinafter jointly referred to as the **"Parties"** and individually as a **"Party"**.

RECITAL:

- A. The Borrower is a Dutch limited liability company created in December 1976 that mainly acts as a real estate company and its current principal asset is an apartment with a total square footage of 220m², located 5 rue de Tilsitt in Paris (on the 3rd floor). The Borrower is in the process of purchasing a second apartment with a total square footage of 335m² at the same address (on the 2nd floor) (the **"Property"**).
- B. The Borrower, which is in particular willing to finance the acquisition of the Property, contacted the Lender.
- C. The Lender issued in this respect an offer letter in connection with this refinancing in favour of the Borrower on July 15th, 2010; such letter being accepted by the Borrower.
- D. The Parties have therefore agreed to enter into a loan facility agreement (hereinafter the **"Loan Agreement"**) which sets out the terms on and subject to which the Lender has agreed to make available to the Borrower a loan facility of a maximum amount of six millions Euro (EUR 6,000,000).

Annex 38: Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh, sole director of Albula Limited

TURKS & CAICOS ISLANDS
THE COMPANIES ORDINANCE 1981
CERTIFICATE OF INCUMBENCY

ALBULA LIMITED
(formerly Harrison Limited)

We, Unicorn Administration Limited of Regent House-Suite F206, Regent Village, Grace Bay, Providenciales, Turks & Caicos Islands, being the duly appointed Resident Representative of the Company do hereby declare that we have examined its Memorandum & Articles of Association, Certificate of Incorporation and other requisite resolutions passed by the Company and can therefore CERTIFY THAT:-

- 1) The Company was originally registered as an Exempted Company under the name of HARRISON LIMITED pursuant to the provisions of the Companies Ordinance 1981 of the Turks & Caicos Islands on:-

10th July 2000

- 2) The Company changed its name to ALBULA LIMITED by resolution passed pursuant to the provisions of the said Companies Ordinance 1981 on 21st August 2001 as evidenced by Certificate of Change of Name issued by the Registrar of Companies of the Turks & Caicos Islands on:-

20th day of September 2001

- 3) The Company is registered at the Companies Registry of the Turks & Caicos Islands in Grand Turk under the registered number:-

E.29459

- 4) The Company's registered office is located at:-

Regent House-Suite F206
Regent Village, Grace Bay Road
Grace Bay, Providenciales
Turks & Caicos Islands
British West Indies

- 5) By resolutions of the Shareholder of the Company, the following person was appointed to the Board of Directors to hold office as Sole Director subject to all the provisions of the Company's Articles of Association until resignation or replacement in accordance with Regulation 24 thereof:-

Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh of 38 Al Raha Blvd, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates

18-04248

Name of company: Albulu Limited

Company Number: E.29459

[illegible]

Annex 39: Transfer of the entire issued shares of Albula Limited to Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh

**DIRECTOR'S RESOLUTION
ALBULA LIMITED
(the 'Company')**

Company Number E29459

DATED
27th October 2014

Resolution of the sole Director passed pursuant to the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the Company and the laws of the Turks & Caicos Islands.

IT IS NOTED that Share Certificate N°2 dated 4th October 2002 in favour of NWT Services Limited (formerly NWT Nominees Limited) (the 'Owner') represents the entire issued share capital of the Company, being 1 ordinary share of US\$1.00 and that NWT Directors Limited (the 'Resigning Director') is the sole director of the Company.

IT IS NOTED that instructions have been received from the Owner to transfer the entire issued share capital of the Company to Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh holder of Yemeni passport N° 00013939 (the 'Ultimate Owner') and to appoint the Ultimate Owner as sole director of the Company.

IT IS RESOLVED to cancel Share Certificate N°2 in favour of the Owner and to issue Share Certificate N°3 for 1 ordinary share of US\$1.00 in the Company in favour of the Ultimate Owner, a copy of which is attached and forms an integral part of this resolution.

IT IS FURTHER RESOLVED to accept the appointment of the Ultimate Owner as sole director of the Company with effect from this day, the evidence of his acceptance being confirmed by his countersigning of this resolution, and to hereby tender the Resigning Director's resignation as sole director of the Company, with immediate effect, without compensation either for loss of office or otherwise.


NWT Directors Limited


KHALED ALI ABDULLAH SALEH

Annex 40: Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh: certificate of incumbency, Albula Limited

TURKS & CAICOS ISLANDS
THE COMPANIES ORDINANCE 1981
CERTIFICATE OF INCUMBENCY

ALBULA LIMITED
(formerly Harrison Limited)

We, Unicorn Administration Limited of Regent House-Suite F206, Regent Village, Grace Bay, Providenciales, Turks & Caicos Islands, being the duly appointed Resident Representative of the Company do hereby declare that we have examined its Memorandum & Articles of Association, Certificate of Incorporation and other requisite resolutions passed by the Company and can therefore **CERTIFY THAT:-**

- 1) The Company was originally registered as an Exempted Company under the name of HARRISON LIMITED pursuant to the provisions of the Companies Ordinance 1981 of the Turks & Caicos Islands on:-

10th July 2000

- 2) The Company changed its name to ALBULA LIMITED by resolution passed pursuant to the provisions of the said Companies Ordinance 1981 on 21st August 2001 as evidenced by Certificate of Change of Name issued by the Registrar of Companies of the Turks & Caicos Islands on:-

20th day of September 2001

- 3) The Company is registered at the Companies Registry of the Turks & Caicos Islands in Grand Turk under the registered number:-

E.29459

- 4) The Company's registered office is located at:-

Regent House-Suite F206
Regent Village, Grace Bay Road
Grace Bay, Providenciales
Turks & Caicos Islands
British West Indies

- 5) By resolutions of the Shareholder of the Company, the following person was appointed to the Board of Directors to hold office as Sole Director subject to all the provisions of the Company's Articles of Association until resignation or replacement in accordance with Regulation 24 thereof:-

Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh of 38 Al Raha Blvd, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates

Annex 40 continued

Page 2

- 6) By resolution of the Board of Directors, the following person was appointed to the office set opposite his name, to hold such office until removed by resolution of the Board of Directors:-

Khaleed Ali Abdullah Saleh

Secretary

- 7) Insofar as evidenced by the corporate records kept at the Registered Office of the Company, the Company is in good standing with the Turks & Caicos Islands Financial Services Commission.

IN WITNESS whereof we have caused our Common Seal to be hereunto affixed this:-

18th day of November 2014





UNICORN ADMINISTRATION LIMITED
Resident Representative
Regent House-Suite F206, Regent Village
Grace Bay, Providenciales, Turks & Caicos Islands
British West Indies




AUTHENTICATION

I, RICHARD FRANK SAVORY, QC of Grace Bay, Providenciales, Turks & Caicos Islands, Notary Public HEREBY CERTIFY that on the date hereof this Certificate was executed under Common Seal in the presence of Peter Allan Savory and Patricia Rosalia Eke who have hereunto in my presence witnessed the Common Seal of UNICORN ADMINISTRATION LIMITED, a Company incorporated in the Turks and Caicos Islands.



Annex 41: Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh: handwritten address and signature

First & Last Names and Address	Title or Function	Specimen Signature	Signing Authority*
1. KHALED ALI ABDULLAH SALEH	DIRECTOR		INDIVIDUAL

Full name (or Company)	Date of Birth	Nationality	Address (Domicile), Country
KHALED ALI ABDULLAH SALEH	02/08/1987	YEMEN	Po Box 32291 Abu Dhabi U.A.E.
			Al- Raha Bldg
			TH 38 MD

Annex 42: Transfer of the entire issued shares of Weisen Limited to Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh

**DIRECTOR'S RESOLUTION
WEISEN LIMITED
(the 'Company')**

Company Number 395883

DATED
23rd October 2014


Resolution of the sole Director passed pursuant to the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the Company and the laws of the British Virgin Islands

IT IS NOTED that Share Certificate N°2 dated 10th March 2014 in favour of NWT Services Limited (formerly NWT Nominees Limited) (the 'Owner') represents the entire issued share capital of the Company, being 1 ordinary share of US\$1.00 and that NWT Directors Limited (the 'Resigning Director') is the sole director of the Company.

IT IS NOTED that instructions have been received from the Owner to transfer the entire issued share capital of the Company to Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh holder of Yemeni passport N° 0001393 (the 'Ultimate Owner') and to appoint the Ultimate Owner as sole director of the Company.

IT IS RESOLVED to cancel Share Certificate N°2 in favour of the Owner and to issue Share Certificate N°3 for 1 ordinary share of US\$1.00 in the Company in favour of the Ultimate Owner, a copy of which is attached and forms an integral part of this resolution.

IT IS FURTHER RESOLVED to accept the appointment of the Ultimate Owner as sole director of the Company with effect from this day, the evidence of his acceptance being confirmed by his countersigning of this resolution, and to hereby tender the Resigning Director's resignation as sole director of the Company, with immediate effect, without compensation either for loss of office or otherwise.


NWT Directors Limited


KHALED ALI ABDULLAH SALEH

Annex 43: Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh, certificate of incumbency of membership of Weisen Limited

Newhaven Corporate Services (B.V.I.) Limited
3rd Floor, J & C Building
P.O. Box 362
Road Town, Tortola
British Virgin Islands
VG1110



Telephone: 284-494-5108
Facsimile: 284-494-4704
Email: info@newhavenbvi.net
Website: www.newhavenbvi.net

WEISEN LIMITED
(the "Company")


CERTIFICATE OF INCUMBENCY OF MEMBERSHIP

We, Newhaven Corporate Services (B.V.I.) Limited of 3rd Floor, J & C Building, P.O. Box 362, Road Town, Tortola, British Virgin Islands, VG1110, being the Registered Agent of the above Company hereby certify to the best of our knowledge and belief:

1. Newhaven Corporate Services (B.V.I.) Limited is the Registered Agent of and provides the Registered Office for the Company.
2. The Registered office and address of the Company is 3rd Floor, J & C Building, P.O. Box 362, Road Town, Tortola, British Virgin Islands, VG1110.
3. According to the records available at the Registered Office of the Company, the Company is duly incorporated, validly existing and in good standing under the laws of the British Virgin Islands.
4. The Company does not maintain a Register of Mortgages and Charges.
5. According to the records available at the Registered Office of the Company, no proceedings are pending or threatened against the Company.
6. No action has been taken to wind-up the Company or to appoint a receiver over its assets.
7. The Company was incorporated on 6th July, 2000.
8. The Company Registration Number is 395883.
9. The Current Director is as follows:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Office held</u>	<u>Date of Appointment</u>
Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh	Director	23 October 2014
10. The Authorised Share Capital is 50,000 par value shares of a single class.
11. The Issued Share Capital is US\$1.00.

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY



Annex 43 continued

12. The Current Shareholder is as follows:

<u>Name</u>	<u>No. of Share Held</u>
Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh	1


We also confirm that the share currently issued is in Registered Format.

We issue this certificate relying solely on the documents that have been delivered to us by the directors, officers, and members of the above-named Company to be kept by us as Registered Agent of the Company at the Company's Registered Office in the British Virgin Islands. We have assumed that such documents are true and accurate and have assumed that all signatures and seals contained in such documents are genuine and correspond to the signatures and seals of the persons that purport to be signing or sealing the said documents.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this certificate this 14th day of November, 2014.



Newhaven Corporate Services (B.V.I.) Limited
Registered Agent



Annex 44: Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh, register of members and share ledger, Weisen Limited

Register of Members and Share Ledger

Name of Company: Weisen Limited		Company Number: 395883	
Member details			
Name	SALEH Khaled		Profession
Former name			
Address	Po Box 32291, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.		
Passport number/Issuing Place	00010938, Ministry of foreign affairs- saudi's	ID Number	Nationality Yemen
Company number	Place of incorporation		
Share details			
Class of share	Denomination	Current holding	Date entered as a member
Ordinary	USD1.00	1.00	23-Oct-2014
Shares acquired			
Date of acquisition or transfer	Number of shares acquired	Certificate number	Distinctive numbers of shares
23-Oct-2014	1.00	3	
			Total Consideration USD
			Amount still payable USD
			Notes
			Abolished
Shares transferred/dispensed			
Date of transfer	Number of shares transferred/dispensed	Certificate number	New Certificate number (if any)
			Distinctive numbers of shares
			Total Consideration USD
			Transfer/Disposal Method

Handwritten signature
28/10/14

Annex 45: Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh, register of directors, Weisen Limited

Register of Directors	
Name of company: Weisen Limited	
Company Number: 395883	
Corporate Name: BWT Directors Limited	Registration number: 1779923
Former names:	Place of incorporation: BVI
Aliases:	Date of incorporation: 18-Jul-1991
Principal office of corporation: Alaman, Contorno, Galvado & Lee Trust (BVI) Limited, 3rd Floor, Gernika Plaza, Rosewood Drive, P.O. Box 3178, Road Town, Tortola, British Virgin Islands.	Business occupation: Corporate Director and Secretary
Business address: Alaman, Contorno, Galvado & Lee Trust (BVI) Limited, 3rd Floor, Gernika Plaza, Rosewood Drive, P.O. Box 3178, Road Town, Tortola, British Virgin Islands.	Position: Director
	Date of appointment: 6-Jul-2009
	Date of resignation: 23-Oct-2014
	Notes: Previously a Bahamas Incorporated company (no 58945) but continued as a BVI registered company with effect from the 29 May 2013
Name and Surname: SALEH Khaled	HN/CONAPDI number:
Former names:	Passport number: 20513996, Ministry of foreign affairs - Yemen
Aliases:	Nationality: Yemen
Usual residential address: P.O. Box 32291, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.	Date of birth: 2-Aug-1967
Business address:	Business occupation:
	Position: Director
	Date of appointment: 23-Oct-2014
	Date of resignation:
	Notes:
	Particulars of other directorships:

27/10/14

Page 1 of 1


Date printed: 24 October, 2014

Annex 46: Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh, handwritten signature before the bank, Weisen Limited

RESOLVED that all general signing authority previously granted to any officers and/or other persons to represent the Company towards the Bank are hereby cancelled.

28/10/14
DATE

WEISEN LIMITED
COMPANY NAME
PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT IN BLOCK LETTERS


SIGNATURE

KHALED ALI ABDULLAH SALEH
NAME(S) OF SIGNATORY(IES)
PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT IN BLOCK LETTERS

Annex 47: Documented international humanitarian law violations

Attack by Characteristic	No. of Specific Incidents Recorded from the Coalition	No. of Specific Incidents Recorded from the Houthi-Saleh forces
Attacks on farms and agricultural areas	<u>3</u>	--
Attacks on residential areas and villages	<u>41</u> (individual air strikes)	<u>4</u> (multiple cases based upon Aden, Ta'izz, Sana'a and Ibb)
Attacks on schools	<u>8</u>	<u>Multiple</u> (including fighting in and around school buildings)
Attacks on mosques	<u>3</u>	--
Attacks on hospitals, Health Clinics, Medical facilities, including medical personnel	<u>22</u>	<u>7</u>
Attacks on IDP and refugee Camps	<u>9</u>	<u>3</u>
Attacks on Humanitarian organisations and national NGOs	<u>7</u>	<u>2</u>
Attacks on Ports	<u>1</u>	--
Attacks on Dhows and Fishing Vessels, including fishing market villages	<u>5</u>	<u>2</u>
Attacks on Factories	<u>4</u> (including 1 food storage warehouse)	--
Attacks on Food Distribution	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u> (cases of aid being sold on the black market)
Attacks on airports	<u>9</u>	--
Attacks on key road supply routes, including sieges	<u>4</u>	<u>2</u> (multiple cases from Aden and Ta'izz)
Attacks on civilian gatherings	<u>3</u>	--
Attacks on Government Buildings	<u>3</u>	--
Attacks on homes of political opponents	<u>1</u>	<u>Multiple</u>
Attacks on marketplaces	<u>10</u>	--
Attacks on heritage buildings, places, things	<u>9</u>	--
Attacks on vehicles transporting aid	<u>2</u>	--
Attacks on vehicles transporting civilians	<u>5</u> (including 1 ambulance)	<u>Multiple</u>

Sniper shooting	--	<u>12</u> (including one case of a sniper shooting at a medical personnel)
Attacks upon troops <i>hors de combat</i>	--	<u>3</u> (including one case of the Houthi-Saleh forces denying treatment to an opposition combatant)
Attacks upon Embassies	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>

Annex 48: Houthi-Saleh forces in Aden

Houthi-Saleh Occupation of Aden: Sources told the Panel that the people of Aden took up arms to defend themselves in late March 2015, as the Houthi-Saleh forces and allied united encircled Aden and took control of the land routes into the city;¹ during this period several civilians were killed in a series of explosions at an arms depot in Aden.²

Houthi-Saleh Shelling and Snipers' targeting Civilians: Yemeni refugees from Aden, told the Panel that "Houthi-Saleh forces snipers" had taken over buildings in Sabir, and put snipers on the rooftops early in the takeover. The Panel found reports of a sniper attack occurring on 31 March 2015, a young woman activist, who had been supporting the delivery of medical aid, who was shot and killed by Houthi-Saleh forces snipers, corresponding to information provided by an INGO and Yemeni refugees on the types of attacks that snipers were undertaking.³ By 1 April 2015, Houthi-Saleh force snipers were on the rooftops of the Aden Mall, the Mercure Hotel, the Sana'a Wedding Hall and the Yemen Continental Hotel.⁴ Many snipers were also based in Kormaskar, Aden.⁵



¹ Interviews with Yemeni refugees in Markazi, Obock, and in Djibouti City. Also information provided by some United Nations staff who had been based in Aden.

² Reuters, "Explosions at Aden's largest arms depot – witnesses", at <http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-yemen-security-explosions-idUKKBN0MO0FR20150328> [last accessed on 2 December 2015].

³ Local activist reported on social media from Aden.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.



All photographs uploaded on social media by commentators, critics and local journalists in Aden

The Panel was told that because of the accuracy of the snipers' targeting, many of the former local residents (who were currently based as refugees in Djibouti) had believed that the snipers came from ex-President Saleh's elite forces of the Republican Guards.⁶ Yemeni refugees told the Panel that the snipers had targeted "anyone who moved" in Al-Dhale and in Aden, including women and children. Six refugees and two medical INGOs told the Panel that snipers had targeted civilians in Aden as they tried to access medical assistance.⁷ The Panel documented corresponding reports occurring on 17 and 18 April 2015, where two women had been struck by gunfire in two separate incidents and had died before relatives could find a medical facility

⁶ Five refugees in Markazi, Obock, Djibouti, told the Panel that they believed this. A Yemeni citizen, working for an INGO in Aden, also told the Panel this and went on to say with another young male refugee, that the Houthis-Saleh forces were already embedded and heavily armed, as if in preparation for the attack on Aden.

⁷ Also confirmed by 15 Yemeni women refugees during a focus group meeting conducted by the Panel in Djibouti City, Djibouti, during July 2015.

that could treat them.⁸ On 18 April 2015, another four women were shot and killed by the snipers in Aden. On 22 April 2015, a small child was shot and killed by snipers in Aden.⁹

One medical INGO and two human rights INGOs, along with one United Nations agency, told the Panel that Houthi-Saleh force sniper attacks had also focused upon targeting medical facilities and personnel. The Panel documented corroborative information of an attack occurring on 27 April 2015, where Houthi-Saleh force snipers had targeted a WHO Medical Warehouse, by shooting at them and in doing so not allowing workers to enter the building to obtain supplies for distribution to clinics and hospitals.¹⁰

Multiple refugees told the Panel that several residential areas of Aden had come under attack for shelling by Houthi-Saleh forces. The Panel documented corroborative reports of late April shelling attacks on Khormakar, Crater and Enma. Refugees and a United Nations staff member told the Panel that as a result of the shelling and snipers attacks, people were unable to flee their homes and bury the dead. Local people were running out of food and unable to leave their homes. In this manner, refugees and an INGO explained to the Panel that aid and food were thereby prevented from being distributed to areas the snipers were located in, and volunteer aid workers attempting to deliver food, were targeted by snipers. The Panel was also told by three INGOs, including one medical organisation, and one United Nations agency staff member, that ambulances had also come under attack from snipers, making the delivery of sick and wounded difficult and at times, impossible.¹¹ The Panel heard multiple reports of attacks on medical clinics, hospitals and *troops hor combat* by the Houthi-Saleh forces in Aden.¹²

A United Nations staff member who spoke with the Panel and who had been based in Aden, along with two refugees based in Markazi, in Obock, Djibouti, stated that dead and dying bodies lay in the streets, unable to be collected.¹³ The older Yemeni taxi driver, told the Panel:

“[...] The Houthis fighters occupied the streets, when we moved from one place to another to get food, they were all along the street. If there was no fighting in the street, we could pass; when the shooting starts, we could not. When the shooting would start, we would take small boats to be offshore and would travel from one town to the next.

“[...] We saw some journalists and they told us that people were saying they could not go to Aden town, because it stinks of dead bodies.”



⁸ HR

⁹ Social Media reporting corresponding with testimony gathered from refugees in Djibouti and interviews with two medical INGOs who had been working in Aden.

¹⁰ Social media reports provided by online commentators and activists.

¹¹ Interviews taken during the first period of the Panel's investigations undertaken in Geneva, Amman and in Djibouti.

¹² Interviews with two human rights INGOs, following their investigations, and interviews with staff of United Nations agencies in Yemen, along with a medical humanitarian organization.

¹³ Yemeni refugees from Aden told the Panel, corpses of civilians shot and killed by snipers lay in the streets of Khormaksar and Dar Saad, unable to be collected by their families for fear of also being shot.



Photographs of Snipers in Aden dated 9 April 2015, uploaded to social media by a local Adenite



Ambulance in Aden shot at by snipers on 3 April 2015, killing three volunteer Emergency Medical Technicians.

Yemeni refugees from Aden told the Panel that anyone who moved in the sniper-ridden areas of Aden, came subject to attack. One young man from Crater, a refugee in Markazi, Obock, Djibouti, who had worked as a local news camera operator and who provided the Panel with film footage he had personally taken on the streets of Aden, largely in and around Crater, told the Panel that civilians had been caught in both cross-fire, alongside being targeted and shot by snipers. The Panel viewed video footage provided by the young cameraman from Crater, showing a shot civilian lying shot in the street, trying to pull himself to safety. In this respect, multiple refugees told the Panel that it became impossible for Aden residents to go about their normal activities, including to go and collect food, but also to attend the mosque. A Yemeni middle-aged woman living in the Markazi refugee camp, told the Panel:

"I have been here for three months, I came here when the war was starting, when the air strikes started. But I stayed for three weeks inside Yemen during the missile attacks. I did not know from where the attacks were coming, but they came from the ground, but could not locate from exactly where they came on the ground. They were striking from the mosque, killing youths; if they knew anyone had guns they would go to their house.

[...] When the killing became so much, the youths started organising to defend their families. It was the Houthis that were attacking, the Houthis and the Adbullah militias. Ali Abdullah's people were living amongst us; it was like they were prepared and waiting for this to happen, because suddenly they were armed. Like they were prepared and armed already and knew what to do [...]."

The Panel found corresponding reports occurring on Friday, 1 May 2015, of snipers shooting and killing four civilian men in Aden who had been on their way to Mosque.¹⁴ An elderly woman from Aden advised of an attack during Ramadan,

“[...] Some children were breaking fast in the open and they [Houthis] just killed them right there.”

Siege upon Aden: The Panel was told by two United Nations personnel from two different agencies, along with at least 20 Yemeni refugees in Djibouti, that at the time of the siege of Aden, the only way for Aden's residents to get basic goods was through the black market being run by Houthi-Saleh forces. The Panel heard in a variety of social media and news reports that the situation of a siege in Aden had worsened as the Houthi-Saleh forces gained control of all of the points of entry in the city.¹⁵

Attacks upon fleeing civilians: Two refugees based in Markazi, Obock, in Djibouti, told the Panel civilians trying to flee Aden, or other parts of the country, had come under attack from Houthi-Saleh force shelling. One elderly Yemeni woman, who had worked as a matron in a hospital in Aden and was a refugee in Markazi at the time the Panel interviewed her, told the Panel that she had left Aden and departed Yemen from Mokha. She stated that the boat she had departed on had been attacked by Houthi-Saleh shelling:

“[...] We traveled from Aden to Ta'izz, Ta'izz to Al-Maha. A boat with people and the Houthi sunk it, with 19 people, from Ta'izz to Maha. There was so much going on, some missiles. There were nine days just waiting for a boat, people were dying in front of us, from the war. The Houthis had long rifles from Iran and this is how they killed our youth. Our youth just had a few ones [weapons]. Many bodies were in the water. Where they were assembling people, they were shooting them. Truly speaking, people are finished. Aden is not used to guns and shooting. [...]”

The older Yemeni taxi driver, a refugee in Markazi, also told the Panel that Houthi-Saleh forces had shelled some of the boats of fleeing civilians. This was again corroborated by a Yemeni academic, who provided the Panel with a report of the shelling of a small quay in Aden. The Panel undertook a research of local and international news media, along with social media, to corroborate information on attacks upon departing boats. The Panel documented corresponding information of an attack that occurred on the morning of Wednesday, 6 May 2015, where civilians attempting to depart Aden and were waiting at Tawahi port, were hit by at least three mortars. The refugee told the Panel that the mortars had come from the direction of Hugeif, an area he stated was known to be controlled by the Houthi-Saleh forces. Corresponding social media reports stated that some of those waiting at the port had been waiting to cross over the Gulf of Aden to Djibouti, while others were hoping to cross to Bureiqa, a safer area of Yemen to seek shelter or access hospitals. The Panel documented corresponding social media reports of an attack occurring later on Wednesday, 6 May 2015, where Houthi-Saleh forces had targeted and shelled a barge of civilians as it left Aden for al-Buraiqa, with at least 32 people killed while trying to flee from al-Tawahi.¹⁶

¹⁴Information and photographs uploaded onto social media by a local resident, along with video footage provided to the Panel by the young Yemeni cameraman from Crater, Aden.

¹⁵Middle East Eye (3 July 2015) “Houthis besiege Aden as organisations struggle to deliver humanitarian aid” at, <http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/Houthi-Saleh-forces-besiege-aden-province-organisations-struggle-deliver-humanitarian-aid-786186321#sthash.NI9ZdqTf.dpuf> [last accessed on 8 November 2015].

¹⁶BBC World News (3 July 2015) “Yemen conflict: Aden boat shelling kills dozens” at, <http://linkis.com/www.bbc.co.uk/news/aVxvU> [last accessed on 31 October 2015].

The Panel documented additional reports on the intensification of shelling upon residential areas on Sunday, 19 July 2015, particularly in the Dar Saad neighbourhood of Aden. Dar Saad is a densely populated residential area and was housing displaced civilians, who had moved to the area over the previous two-month period. Forty-eight died in the shelling of Dar Saad, with another 182 being wounded as a result of the attacks.¹⁷ At the time, pockets of Houthi-Saleh forces remaining situated within and across the city.

¹⁷Al Jazeera International (19 July 2015) “Houthi shelling blamed for deaths in Yemen's Aden” at, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/07/Houthi-Saleh-forces-shelling-blamed-deaths-yemen-aden-150719132800084.html> [last accessed on 31 October 2015].

Annex 49: Houthi-Saleh forces in Ta'izz

Ta'izz Overview: The Panel has followed the events occurring in Ta'izz, including the Houthi-Saleh imposed virtual state of siege since the beginning of September 2015. Initially in its investigative period, the Panel was able to meet and interview Yemeni refugees from Ta'izz, who told the Panel about the initial entrance of Houthi-Saleh forces into Ta'izz; later on its its investigative process, the Panel has relied ostensibly upon information from INGOs within Ta'izz, United Nations agencies who work in the logistical aspects of aid delivery and distribution, along with local sources who provide social media commentary on the developing humanitarian context in Ta'izz, in particular providing updated photographs of the result of the siege and civilian casualties from the conduct of hostilities.

Within this context, two staff members of two different INGOs told the Panel that little, if any, commercial goods or humanitarian assistance were able to enter the three city districts of Al Mudhafer, Al Qahirah and Al Salh. WFP officials told the Panel that during December 2015, trucks carrying WFP aid had entered Ta'izz, but at the time in which this report was being written, the aid had yet to be distributed. More recently, local NGOs and INGOs have reported that whilst aid had been delivered to Ta'izz, it remains undistributed.¹ Official reports suggest that two-thirds of the population of Ta'izz has left the city; some 175,000 to 200,000 men, women and children, however, still remain. They desperately need access to food, water and medical and other critical services to ensure their survival.² In addition, a medical humanitarian organisation told the Panel, that residential areas, medical facilities and other civilian infrastructure are repeatedly subject to attacks of Houthi-Saleh shelling in Ta'izz.³

Takeover of Ta'izz: The Panel spoke with Yemeni Ta'izz residents based in Markazi refugee camp, in Obock, Djibouti. The Panel corroborated interview testimony that the Houthi-Saleh forces had initially entered Ta'izz on Sunday, 22 March 2015, taking control over the military airport along with other parts of the city. During the takeover, one civilian was killed and five were wounded.⁴

Local residents of Ta'izz, currently based in Markazi refugee camp in Obock, Djibouti, told the Panel that initially local Ta'izz residents, especially young men, had actively protested and taken up arms against the Houthi-Saleh forces. In one corresponding interview with a group of young Ta'izz refugees based in Markazi refugee camp, the Panel documented the following interaction:⁵

¹ WFP Press Release, "WFP Appeals To All Parties To The Conflict In Yemen To Allow Food Distributions In Ta'izz", at <https://www.wfp.org/news/news-release/wfp-appeals-all-parties-conflict-yemen-allow-food-distributions-taiz> [last accessed on 2 December 2016]; Gulf News Yemen, "Local NGOs say no aid reaching besieged Yemen city" at <http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/yemen/local-ngos-say-no-aid-reaching-besieged-yemen-city-1.1644975> [last accessed on 2 December 2016].

² Reliefweb (20 October 2015) "Statement of the Humanitarian coordinator for Yemen, Johannes Van Der Klaauw, On The Dire Situation in Ta'izz City" at, <http://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/statement-humanitarian-coordinator-yemen-johannes-van-der-klaauw-dire-situation-taizz> [last accessed on 30 October 2015].

³ Panel two interviews with a medical humanitarian organization during October and November 2015.

RTL (22 March 2015) "Yemen: les rebelles chiites prennent Ta'ez" at <http://www.rtl.fr/actu/international/yemen-le-conflit-s-etend-7777097083> [last accessed on 30 October 2015].

⁵ Panel interview with a group of young men and women from Ta'izz, taken in Markazi refugee camp in Obock, Djibouti, during a Panel investigative trip there during June 2015.

[...] Young Ta'izz Man 1: *"Boys had some guns to protect themselves from the Houthis."*

Young Ta'izz Woman 1: *"Sometimes the boys were the ones starting the fighting with the Houthis."*

Young Ta'izz Man 1: *"The youth were starting because Houthis were pushing to gain territory. People wanted to bury the dead bodies. Others were fighting back at night. But the young people did not know how to use the guns."*

[...] *The Houthis are small as a group, but it is the Army of Ali Abdullah who was saying the Army were the Houthis. There were changes in the authorities, amongst the Army, some refused to fight the people. Those who were opposing the Army came mostly from Sana'a. One Chief in Ta'izz was changed by the authorities by the so-called "Houthis". So when they brought the authority from Sana'a, some refused to join Ali-Abdullah [sic]. This situation was to get to Aden to Ali Abdo-Rabo [sic]."*

The Panel documented corresponding media reports of demonstrators clashing with Houthi-Saleh forces in Ta'izz. On Tuesday, 24 March 2015, there were reports of five demonstrators killed by Houthi-Saleh forces and 80 injured during a protest against their presence in the city. On the same day, in the city of Al Turba, 80 kilometres to the southwest, three protesters were killed and 12 injured while attacking a Houthi-Saleh forces position.⁶ Between 17 and 18 April 2015, at least 30 people were killed when Houthi-Saleh forces gunmen, supported by the Republican Guard, assaulted the headquarters of the 35th Armoured Army Brigade, which had announced its loyalty to President Hadi.⁷

Fighting was heaviest around government and security buildings in the city centre, with approximately 20 civilians killed. The WHO put the death toll at 19 civilians, after the local Al-Thawra hospital was hit.⁸

A young man from Ta'izz, currently resident in Markazi refugee camp in Djibouti, told the Panel, that during this period:

"On the street there were Houthis and people with klashnikovich, the Houthis had tanks. The Saudi bombing killed people with the shrapnel, the metals that came out, many people [sic]. They were even trying to target where political people were, but the bombs were hurting other people. The house was shattered and fell down, glass was broken, people with diabetes and high blood pressure were dying. [...]"

At the beginning of October 2015, the spokesperson of the Resistance in Ta'izz, Rashad al-Sharabi, accused Houthi-Saleh forces of targeting civilian homes, saying eight civilians were killed by militia shelling in al-Wazeya on Saturday, 3 October 2015, while many others had been injured.⁹ The Panel documented media reports stating that on Wednesday, 21 October 2015, Houthi-Saleh rockets were fired indiscriminately into civilian areas killing at least 15 people, including one

⁶L'Orient Le Jour (24 March 2015) "Yemen: 5 manifestants tués, 80 blessés par balles à Ta'izz" [last accessed on 25 March 2015].

⁷Daily Times (19 April 2015) "30 killed in fighting between Hadi's forces, Houthi-Saleh forces in Yemen's Ta'izz" at <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/foreign/19-Apr-2015/30-killed-in-fighting-between-hadi-s-forces-Houthi-Saleh-forces-in-yemen-s-taiz> [last accessed on 30 October 2015].

⁸Economic Times (1 May 2015) "Yemen violence kills 1,244, injures 5,044: WHO" at <http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/yemen-violence-kills-1244-injures-5044-who/articleshow/47120316.cms> [last accessed on 30 October 2015].

⁹Middle East Eye (6 October 2015) "Houthis open new fronts in Yemen's Ta'izz" at <http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/Houthi-Saleh-forces-open-new-frontlines-yemens-taiz-1394529375> [last accessed on 30 October 2015].

woman and two children, and injuring over 70, more than 12 of them being children. Residential areas, medical facilities and other civilian infrastructure have repeatedly been subjected to such attacks by Houthi-Saleh forces in Ta'izz. However, the Panel was also told of Houthi-Saleh snipers targeting civilians or requesting money to allow people to pass unharmed within the city. The young man in Markazi refugee camp, told the Panel:

"[...] The Houthis took hold of the Medical University and the schools to hide the guns and tanks. From 6pm there was a curfew. Often if they saw you were a family, they would let you go, sometimes they would ask for money and check for guns. There was no target. If women or people were walking in the street they might get hit by the shooting, but indirectly. I had heard that they forbade women to go out, because they thought men were hiding in burkhas."

In corroborating the information provided, the Panel documented a report of an attack on social media, by a local Ta'izz journalist and critic, who stated that on Thursday, 22 October 2015, Houthi-Saleh forces had fired katyusha rockets at civilians in Ta'izz, killing a large number of civilians including children.



Photographs provided on social media by a local journalist from Ta'izz in connection with the reports on 22 October 2015

The Panel documented further reports of attacks upon civilian and residential areas by Houthi-Saleh forces. On Friday, 23 October 2015, heavy fighting again broke out in Ta'izz, with Houthi-Saleh forces shelling residential neighbourhoods in the city. On Wednesday, 4 November 2015, the Houthi-Saleh forces shelled residential neighbourhoods in Ta'izz, killing 11 civilians and wounding a further 21 civilians. On Tuesday, 10 November 2015, several civilians within Ta'izz were killed by Houthi-Saleh forces' snipers whilst walking in the streets in Ta'izz city.



Photograph on social media from a local critic in Ta'izz, showing a Ta'izz woman who had reportedly gone out to purchase bread, having been shot by Houthi-Saleh snipers

According to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), at least 15 civilians were killed and 73 injured after shells fell in a residential area of the city in or around 23 October 2015. Shells had been fired from an area controlled by the Houthi-Saleh forces.¹⁰ The Panel corroborated the reports with social media updates on the incident, which provided graphic photographic evidence of the shelling, showing bodies torn apart in the street [photographs are stored in the United Nations Archive].

Houthi-Saleh Siege of Ta'izz: The Panel began to hear information on the imposition of a siege on Ta'izz during August and September 2015. The conduct of hostilities was exacerbated by the deteriorating humanitarian context where, according to the United Nations spokesperson Rupert Colville (23 October 2015),¹¹

"[the] Ta'izz civilian population is bearing the brunt of the siege as they struggle to meet their most basic needs, including potable water. And according to reports received by OHCHR, members of the popular committees affiliated with al-Houthi-Saleh forces and the armed forces loyal to former president Saleh, have also prevented local traders and residents from crossing local check points."

On Sunday, 25 October 2015, MSF made public statements to the effect that Houthi-Saleh forces were blocking them from delivering essential supplies to Ta'izz.¹² The MSF Media Statement advised that despite weeks of intense negotiations with "Ansarallah (Houthi-Saleh forces)" officials, Médecins Sans Frontières' (MSF) stocks of essential medical supplies could not be delivered to two hospitals in a "besieged enclave" of the city of Ta'izz. MSF's trucks were being stopped at Houthi-Saleh forces's checkpoints and denied access to the area."¹³ Ms Karline Kleijer, MSF's emergency manager for Yemen, stated,¹⁴

"The hospitals in this besieged area are seeing large number of patients with war wounds. [...] And yet we have been prevented from delivering essential medical supplies – including chest tubes, anaesthetic drugs, IV fluid, sutures and antibiotics – to help staff provide lifesaving surgery [...] It is very frustrating that, after weeks of negotiations, we have made no progress in convincing officials of the need to provide impartial medical assistance to the victims of the ongoing fighting within this enclave, despite the continued support we are providing to health facilities in Houthi-controlled areas."

¹⁰United Nations Radio, News in Brief 23 October 2015 (AM), at <http://www.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/2015/10/news-in-brief-23-october-2015-am/#.VjPHk4QTZv0> [last accessed on 30 October 2015].

¹¹ United Nations Radio, News in Brief 23 October 2015 (AM), at <http://www.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/2015/10/news-in-brief-23-october-2015-am/#.VjPHk4QTZv0> [last accessed on 30 October 2015].

¹² MSF Media Statement (25 October 2015) at <http://www.msf.org/article/yemen-medical-aid-blocked-entering-besieged-area-taiz> [last accessed on 30 October 2015].

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

Within this context, the Panel documented how Ta'izz residents began facing increasing restrictions to bring in water, fuel and food supplies. Prices within the area surged dramatically and people struggled to find enough drinking water. Yemenis living in the densely populated areas of Ta'izz faced snipers, stray bullets and mortar shelling, used indiscriminately by fighting groups, while airstrikes hit Ta'izz city on a daily basis. People struggled to reach clinics and hospitals, due to the fighting and lack of transport due to fuel shortages.

In an interview with a humanitarian organisation, the Panel was told that Ta'izz formerly had 20 hospitals for its population of more than 600,000. However, that due to the conflict, only six continue to function, albeit only partially. One Humanitarian organisation told the Panel that the still operational hospitals lack health staff, fuel and essential medicines, and are overwhelmed by the high numbers of wounded seeking to access their emergency services on a daily basis.¹⁵ Another humanitarian organisation confirmed the situation in Ta'izz.



Photograph of women combatants in Ta'izz dated October 2015. The photograph was posted on social media by a local journalist. The same source also provided photographs of Houthi-Saleh forces organised marches and formations in Ta'izz city.

The Panel in following Ta'izz social media and local journalist online updates, documented that the Authorities in Ta'izz, in cooperation with local residents, had taken steps to attempt to break the siege imposed on the city, by paving a mountainous road from the southwest of Ta'izz, in order to deliver food and fuel supplies to the residents.¹⁶ The same sources stated that one of those involved in the attempt, a water march protest leader, Adel Taha, was tortured by Houthi-Saleh forces, for attempting to deliver water to civilians in Ta'izz city.

On 1 July 2015, as a result of the siege, the United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) classified Ta'izz as facing food insecurity at 'emergency' level – one step below famine on a five-point international scale, but the highest level of emergency classification.¹⁷

¹⁵ Interviews with two humanitarian organisations located in Ta'izz.

¹⁶ Al Arabiya News (30 October 2015) "Houthis Obstruct Humanitarian Aid to Ta'izz" at <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/webtv/reports/2015/10/30/Houthi-Saleh-forces-obstruct-humanitarian-aid-to-Ta'izz.html> [last accessed on 30 October 2015].

¹⁷ United Nations, IASC PRINCIPALS AD HOC MEETING – YEMEN, Final Summary and Action Points (1 July 2015), at <https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/principals/documents-public/summary-record-ad-hoc-iasc-principals-meeting-yemen-1-july-2015> [last accessed on 2 December 2015]. The IASC met on 1 July 2015 to decide on the activation of the System-wide Level 3 (L3) Emergency response in Yemen.



Photograph Copyright to ICRC, Yemen, Ta'izz, people gathering around a water truck donated by a philanthropist with their jerry cans to fill water due to the lack of water for several months, (28.08.2015, Wael Al Absi, ICRC)



Photograph Copyright to ICRC, Yemen, Ta'izz, this used to be a vibrant street full of life. since the intense hostilities started, snipers have been present. two men on a motorcycle defy their fear of death and drive through the area. (15.08.2015, Wael Al Absi, ICRC)



Photograph Copyright to ICRC, Yemen, Ta'izz, an injured man suffers through immense pain injured in the absence of essential medicine such as Morphine, (24.09.2015, Wael Al Absi, ICRC)



Photograph Copyright To ICRC, Yemen, Ta'izz, This child was injured in a shelling on his neighbourhood. His brother did not survive, (24.09.2015, Wael Al Absi, ICRC)



Ta'izz social media photographic updates of the impact of the water shortage in Ta'izz dated October 2015



Ta'izz social media photographic updates of Ta'izz civilians alternate mountainous route utilised in an attempt to break the Houthi-Saleh siege and bring life-sustaining supplies into the city. Photograph posted during October 2015



Ta'izz social media photographic update of the impact of shelling in the city of Ta'izz. Photograph posted during October 2015. The same source also provided graphic photographic updates of civilians killed in the shelling, available upon request as archived with the United Nations

During October 2015, two humanitarian organisations and one United Nations agency staff member, told the Panel that they were facing obstructions in the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Ta'izz. On Thursday, 29 October 2015, the United Nations World Food Programme made a Press Statement about the humanitarian situation in the city, advising,¹⁸

“[...] “We plead for safe and immediate access to the city of Ta'izz to prevent a humanitarian tragedy as supplies dwindle, threatening the lives of thousands – including women, children and the elderly, [...] These people have already suffered extreme hunger, and if this situation continues the damage from hunger will be irreversible.”

Later in October, the one humanitarian organisation and local social media updates, started to speak out publicly about Houthi-Saleh obstructions to the delivery of medical humanitarian assistance to Ta'izz. On 30 October 2015, Houthi-Saleh forces denied access to medical aid providers carrying oxygen tanks for hospitals and medical clinics in Ta'izz. From late October/early November 2015, the Panel began hearing that hospitals and medical facilities in Ta'izz had run out of oxygen tanks and patients requiring artificial respiration were dying from a lack of the tanks, which were not being replaced due to the Houthi-Saleh forces siege on the city and its entrance routes.¹⁹ Thawra Hospital, Arrawda Hospital and Algomhori Hospital in Ta'izz ran out of medical supplies and fuel

¹⁸WFP (29 October 2015) “WFP Warns Of Deepening Hunger In Southern Yemen City Of Ta'izz” at, <https://www.wfp.org/news/news-release/wfp-warns-deepening-hunger-southern-yemen-city-taiz> [last accessed on 30 October 2015].

¹⁹ Two humanitarian organisations and multiple reports on local social media.

to run the generators in the hospitals. During this time, a local doctor stated on social media that he was now asking his patients in Ta'izz, who required dialysis, to bring 20 litres of fuel with them to the hospital if they wanted to receive their dialysis treatment, due to the fact the hospital was running out of fuel stores. The Houthis-Saleh forces siege on water into Ta'izz, beginning on 18 August 2015, also had impacted the ability of hospitals to provide medical assistance.

Annex 50: Houthi-Saleh attacks on medical facilities, aid organizations and humanitarian offices

Overview: The Panel was told of multiple instances of Houthi-Saleh forces intensively targeting medical infrastructure and healthcare staff, severely affecting the capacity of the country's healthcare structure to respond to the context. United Nations personnel told the Panel that humanitarian offices, particularly in Aden, had suffered from looting and temporary takeovers by Houthi-Saleh forces. Three different United Nations staff members told the Panel about the sale of aid on the black market by businessmen in connection to Houthi-Saleh forces.¹

Attacks upon hospitals: Medical personnel in the southern part of the country told the Panel that hospital windows had been "blasted out" by shelling and bomb blasts. The Panel was told how Houthi-Saleh forces had taken over hospital wings and conducted street battles from within them in Aden; in Ta'izz the Panel was told by humanitarian organisations how Houthi-Saleh forces had damaged hospitals as a result of indiscriminate shelling and issues of proportionality as a result of attacking resistance positions close to hospital buildings.

In one such report, on 24-25 October 2015 and again on 8 November 2015, Houthi-Saleh forces indiscriminately shelled Thawra Hospital in Ta'izz, whilst fighting Resistance groups positioned near the hospital.²

In another attack in Ta'izz, the Panel was told by a humanitarian organisation, and corroborated by local social media reports, that on 25 October 2015, Houthi-Saleh forces shelled Thawra Hospital. The shelling was aimed at resistance forces who were located on the same hill as the Hospital. The attack damaged the hospitals intensive care unit.



Intensive Care Unit of Al Thawra Hospital in Ta'izz, shelled by the Houthi-Saleh forces in and around 24-25 October 2015 (left); Shelling of Al Thawra Hospital in Ta'izz on 8 November 2015 (right)

In an earlier attack in Hajjah, a humanitarian organisation told the Panel how a hospital in Harad, one of the few fully operational hospitals left in the area of Hajjah, had been shelled by Houthi-Saleh forces during mid-June 2015, and was rendered non-operational. On approximately 4-5 July 2015, an INGO medical team visiting the site of the bombed hospital in Harad, found itself

¹The Panel was able to obtain photographs of the aid being sold in Sana'a that had been posted by a local critic.

²Interview with a humanitarian organization based in Ta'izz, along with social media reporting on the incident.

under fire and had to flee the town.³ The hospital and ambulance were also targeted and hit by stray bullets as Houthi-Saleh snipers were present in the surrounding area and fighting was ongoing.⁴

Stealing of aid and medical supplies: Four humanitarian organisations, including three United Nations agencies, told the Panel how Houthi-Saleh forces had stolen medical supplies and had sold it on the black market, first when they had been based in Aden, and later, in Sana'a. In Aden, the Panel was told through a secondary source of statements attributed to a local activist about the impact of the black market sale of aid in Aden by Houthi-Saleh forces, where the price for a bag of wheat, which used to cost YR 5,000 (US \$23) had increased to YR 15,000 (\$70),

“Humanitarian aid usually fell into the hands of Houthi forces, who would in turn take this aid and sell it to the black market. I myself buy wheat from the black market. It's the only way to get basic goods. Otherwise, we would die.”

Occupation of Humanitarian Organisations and Offices:

During the early period of its investigation, several United Nations agencies told the Panel that their offices have been temporarily taken over by Houthi-Saleh forces. In one particular instance, on 18 April 2015, the UNFPA-Yemen Office in Fajah Al-Dan, Sana'a, Office Guards had been injured during air strikes in the area. After the bombing, due to a lack of security, Houthi-Saleh forces occupied the UNFPA-Yemen Office for two weeks, in what they justified as a response to UN Agencies “lack of legitimacy within Yemen”. A similar situation occurred to the UNDP Office, with similar justification for the take-over.⁵

Moreover, WHO Mobile Health Clinics were also targeted for looting during the same period.⁶ WHO ambulances were looted, and the WHO Office was raided and one other unnamed, at its request, humanitarian organisation's warehouse was also raided.⁷

³Refer to MSF Press Release (Dated 7 July 2015) at <http://www.msf.org/article/yemen-msf-treats-dozens-wounded-after-attacks-markets-and-residential-areas> [last accessed on 13 July 2015].

⁴MSF Media Report (July 2015) at <http://www.msf.org.uk/country-region/yemen> [last accessed on 13 July 2015].

⁵ Reported to the Panel during its investigation in Amman, Jordan, during May-June 2015.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Reported confidentially to the Panel during July 2015.

Annex 51: Resistance violations

Overview: The Panel was told of violations committed by the resistance in Aden and Ta'izz. Refugees from Aden told how local resistance had attacked residential areas for shelling, placed snipers and killed civilians moving around the city. The resistance had also been involved in summary extra-judicial execution, torture and defilement and mutilation of corpses. The Panel also heard one account of the resistance committing perfidy by dressing in Yemeni women's attire so as to operate by stealth. Furthermore, the Panel documented reports during December 2015, of resistance fighters in Ta'izz, obstructing the distribution of humanitarian assistance by shooting at trucks carrying aid.¹

Attacks upon civilians: One refugee from Crater told the Panel that many young men took up arms and joined the resistance, but many of them had no idea of how to use or aim the weapons and often ended up shooting civilians. The same young man advised that guns became a currency amongst these young male fighters in Aden and that armed young resistance fighters used the weapons to loot and terrorise local people. The Panel was told by an older man based in Markazi refugee camp in Djibouti, a former Aden taxi driver, that a group of young resistance fighters had robbed him at gunpoint and stolen his taxi. Two older women from Aden, based in the Markazi refugee camp in Djibouti, confirmed to the Panel that the young men often had no idea how to use the weapons and killed many residents due to misfiring and crossfiring during battles with Houthi-Saleh forces.

In October 2015, the Panel began observing reports corroborating information provided by refugees as to looting and extortion. Individual groups within Resistance forces based in Aden started demanding money for protection from members of the local population.

The Panel was told by a United Nations staff member who had been based in Aden, that resistance groups had actively undertaken arbitrary arrest, summary extra-judicial execution, detention and torture of presumed or perceived dissidents and supporters of the Houthi-Saleh forces and/or the ex-President Saleh. The Panel was able to corroborate such information via social media reports and local news reports on such incidents, including obtaining photographic evidence of such incidents (refer to photographs below).

More recently, the Panel in following news reports has documented particular elements of the resistance, asserting moral orders and religious decrees on the local population, such as the segregation of women and men in tertiary institutions in Aden. There have also been social media reports during August 2015, of resistance groups being involved in the looting of property of civilians, particularly northern Yemenis based within Aden.



Two men arrested and killed summarily in Aden. Photograph posted online during December 2015 by a local activist

¹Expatriate social media commentator in Ta'izz stated that all sides to the conflict in Ta'izz have blocked humanitarian assistance. In interviews with a United Nations agency, the Panel was also told that obstructions in the provision of humanitarian assistance had come from all sides to the ground fighting in Yemen.



Believed to be a captured and killed Houthi-Saleh forces-Saleh fighter's corpse being dragged behind a vehicle in Aden during late November 2015

Sale of aid in the black market: The Panel was able to obtain information and photographic evidence of the resistance's involvement in the sale of aid in Aden from online activists in Aden, along with receiving information from a United Nations staff member and a NGO staff member.



Photographs of aid from the UAE being sold in shops in Aden dated 4 October 2015 (top left, right); Photograph of food aid from Germany being sold in shops in Aden dated 30 April 2015 (bottom left)


Annex 52: Coalition attacks on civilian objects, cities, villages and residential areas

1. Hajjah Airstrikes on Civilian Objects – Mosque, School, Heritage Structure (Palace), and a Health Clinic (dated 17 August 2015)

On Saturday, 17 August 2015, the Coalition dropped leaflets over Hajjah, warning residents to stay away from areas it intended to target for airstrikes, including a mosque, a school, a heritage structure and a health clinic.¹ The leaflet (below) is translated, as:

“Brother Yemeni Citizen, Coalition troops from and for you, All citizens of Al Shamal and Al Gafil Provinces should stay away from Houthi forces gathering places in these locations, including: 1. Hassien School; 2. Elhadi School; 3. Alhaga Mosque; 4. Rural clinic; 5. Province centre; 6. Mirakhia Ahmar Palace.

In Gafil Shimar province 1. Gafil Shimar Province centre; 2. Rural clinic; 3. Grahim yafouz Palace; 4 Althineen Mahli Market (Souq) for (48) hours from the date of 13 October.”



Leaflets dropped by the Coalition over Hajjah province, stating that people should stay away from particular schools, a medical clinic, a palace, a market for a 48-hour period on 13 October 2015

2. Damt Airstrikes (dated 11 to 12 November 2015)

On Wednesday and Thursday, 11 to 12 November 2015, the Coalition conducted multiple targeted airstrikes on the city of Damt, a town near Yemen's southern province of al-Dhalea. The Coalition undertook 65 airstrikes over a 24-hour period. The airstrikes destroyed large parts of the city.²



Photographs of Damt after the Coalition target multiple airstrikes on the city from 11-12 November 2015. Photographs uploaded on social media

¹Leaflet uploaded by an activist on social media. Local media sources on social media provided information on the airstrike attacks.


²Cihan (8 November 2015) “Pro-Houthi forces recapture town in southern Yemen” at, <http://en.cihan.com.tr/en/pro-Houthi-Saleh-forces-recapture-town-in-southern-yemen-1933032.htm> [last accessed on 12 November 2015].

3. Bombing of Faj Attan in Sana'a, Yemen (dated 20 April 2015)

On Monday, 20 April 2015, the Coalition undertook targeted airstrikes on a Scud missile base in Sanaa, which triggered a large explosion killing 25 people and wounding almost 400. The blast hit the base on Faj Attan mountain, beside Hadda district, where the presidential palace and many embassies are located, blowing out the windows of homes for a number of kilometers beyond the site.³

The incident was stated to be “the largest recorded number of civilian deaths and injuries from aerial explosive weapons took place in Sana’a [...]”⁴ Residential homes near the site were flattened.⁵ The shockwaves were felt up to four miles away, and local Red Cross workers said that civilian casualties were spread throughout the city as windows were shattered and debris was scattered across Sana’a.⁶

First Screen shots at the explosion Time: 06 Seconds⁷



³Reuters (21 April 2015) “Air strike on missile base in Yemen capital kills 25, wounds hundreds” at <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/04/21/us-yemen-security-idUSKBN0NB0R820150421> [last accessed on 23 October 2015].

⁴State of Crisis Report (2015), developed by Action on Armed Violence and OCHA Policy Development and Studies Branch, p. 7.

⁵The New York Times (20 April 2015) “At Least 25 Die as Airstrike Sets Off Huge Blast in Yemen,” at www.nytimes.com/2015/04/21/world/middleeast/sana-yemen-explosion.html [last accessed 28 August 2015].

⁶The Associated Press, posted by The Guardian (20 April 2015) “Air strikes in Yemen damage homes,” www.the-guardian.com/world/2015/apr/20/yemen-sanaa-air-strike-homes-damage-saudi-coalition [last accessed 28 August 2015]; Yemen Times (21 April 2015) “At least 40 killed in violence attacks on Sana’a,” at www.yementimes.com/en/1875/news/5055/At-least-40-killed-in-violent-attacks-on-Sana%E2%80%99a.htm [last accessed 28 August 2015].

⁷Source: Samer Habib, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_iz45MZ4QXU [last accessed on 17 October 2015].



First Screen shots at the explosion Time: 06 Seconds, the dashed arc in Blue shows the shock wave that is propagating towards the city rising dust within its passage. The wave moves at a speed of sound i.e. 330 meters per second.

Screen shot at Time: 07 Seconds (about 1 second after Explosion), the dashed arc in Blue shows the position of the shock wave reaching population areas more than 330 meters from the impact.

Screen shot at Time: 10 Seconds (about 4 second after Explosion), the wave is about 1500 meters from the explosion point within the populated area.

Screen shot at Time: 12 Seconds (about 6 second after Explosion), the wave is about 2100 meters from the explosion point within the populated area and is about to hit the cameramen.

The wave has reached the cameraman who was seriously wounded.

4. Airstrikes on Non-Military Factories (dated 31 March, 12 September and 29 October 2015)

On Monday evening on 31 March 2015, the Coalition conducted airstrikes upon the National Cement Company (NCC) located in Wadi Sa'an area, Musaymir district, of Lahj governorate. At least ten people were killed and thirteen injured. Nine employees who were on a bus at the time of the airstrikes, had been preparing to leave work and they along with at least one truck driver working for a wholesaler were killed immediately.⁸ Two truck drivers were unable to be found.

An assessment conducted by ARES Conflict Damage Assessment YEM049 stated that it had determined with high confidence that at least one of the munitions which struck Site YEM049 was a Hakim A series precision guided munition, very likely delivered by a United Arab Emirates Air Force (UAEAF) Dassault Mirage 2000-9 or F-16E/F 'Desert Falcon' fighter.⁹



⁸Ali Al-Ahdal, the marketing manager and spokesperson of NCC (Wednesday, 1 April 2015).

⁹ Provided to the Panel by a confidential source.

Photograph of NCC immediately after the airstrike on 31 March 2015	Photograph of Yemany Dairy and Beverage Factory immediately after the airstrike on 31 March 2015 – Photograph Courtesy of HRW (2015) at https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/15/yemen-factory-airstrike-killed-31-civilians-0 [last accessed on 23 October 2015].
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Also on Monday, 31 March 2015, the Coalition conducted airstrikes upon a dairy factory in Yemen, killing at least 31 civilians and wounding a further 11. The Yemany Dairy and Beverage factory is located outside Yemen's Red Sea port of Hodaida. The Yemany Dairy and Beverage factory was a multi-building compound, located approximately 7 kilometers outside of the Red Sea coast.¹⁰

5. Airstrikes on Harad marketplace on 4 July 2015

In its investigations in Djibouti, the Panel met with a young third country national male/youth, who described being hit twice during an air strike on a Harad Market, in Harad, during early July 2015. The attack was reported by *Medecins Sans Frontieres* (MSF) as having taken place on 4 July 2015, in Beni Hassan Market and in the evening at the breaking of the fast of Ramadan. MSF stated that 67 civilians were killed as the result of the air strike; MSF had incidentally also treated the young man with whom the Panel spoke.¹¹ The young man stated of the incident,

"[...] I was hit by a strike, hit by sharp metal. It was in Harad, on the border with Saudi Arabia. The thing that hit me came from the air; from the Saudi air force. I was unconscious from the first blast of the strike. I had been walking on the street, I had nothing with me. I got burns from the first blast. There were many people around when it landed and exploded, then in the second explosion, small pieces hit all over and cut me.

[...] It was a place with houses and shops. The Houthis forces were not there. There was nothing there, no barracks, only normal people. The bomb strikes had been on and off, but suddenly it became more rapid."

The young man sustained severe injuries to his neck and damage to his carotid artery, along with burns and shrapnel wounds to his back, arms and legs.

The air strike on Harad Market was only one amongst several such attacks that occurred during early July 2015. On 6 July 2015, 23 civilians were also injured as the result of an air strike that took place in Alfayush market, Lahij governorate.

¹⁰Information documented on social media by local journalists and reported on by HRW, at Courtesy of HRW (2015) at <https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/15/yemen-factory-airstrike-killed-31-civilians-0> [last accessed on 23 October 2015].

¹¹Refer to MSF Media Statement (dated 6 July 2015) "Yemen: Hundreds Wounded in Attacks on Markets and Residential Areas" at <http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/article/yemen-hundreds-wounded-attacks-markets-and-residential-areas> [last accessed on 3 September 2015].



Photograph of Injuries to Third Country National (Ethiopian) Youth taken by the Panel during its investigations in Djibouti

Annex 53: Coalition attacks on civilian gatherings and groups**1. Airstrikes on wedding party 1**

On Monday, 28 September 2015, Coalition airstrikes fired two missiles at and hit a wedding party hall in Wahijah village, outside of al-Mokha, in Yemen, killing at least 135 people, including 12 children. Many more were wounded and seriously injured. The Panel was told that the exact death toll had been difficult to ascertain due in part to the fact that the bodies of the victims were “badly mangled”.¹

The attack on the wedding came one day after residents in two villages - Bani Zela and Zaylaa - near Yemen's border with Saudi Arabia – were attacked by air strikes on Sunday, 27 September 2015, killing more than 50 people.

2. Airstrikes on wedding party 2

On Wednesday, 7 October 2015, Coalition airstrikes hit a house south of Sana’a, killing approximately 23 people who were attending a wedding party. The attack took place in Dhamar Province, about 50 miles south of Sana’a, upon the house of father of three sons who were due to be married in a joint ceremony on Wednesday night.

The airstrikes took place as the brides arrived at the house. Bodies were said to be lying in the yard, decapitated, and charred. 23 people were killed, with bodies lying under the rubble of the house.

¹From a United Nations staff member. Refer also to the Save the Children Report, “NOWHERE SAFE FOR YEMEN’S CHILDREN - The deadly impact of explosive weapons in Yemen” (dated 2015).



UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS AND EMERGENCY
RELIEF COORDINATOR, STEPHEN O'BRIEN

STATEMENT ON YEMEN

I am deeply disturbed by the news of civilians being killed by coalition air strikes that hit a wedding party in Yemen's Dhamar Governorate yesterday. The Ministry of Public Health and Population reports that at least 47 civilians were killed, and 35 injured, among them many women and children.

Once again we are seeing the devastating impact of explosive weapons – used by all parties – in this conflict. Some 4,500 civilians have reportedly been killed or injured by explosive weapons in Yemen during the first seven months of this year: that is more than in any other country or crisis in the world during the same period.

International humanitarian law very clearly sets out the responsibilities of warring parties to protect civilians and to take every possible measure to avoid damage to homes and other civilian structures. With modern weapons technology there is little excuse for error.

Ninety-five per cent of the Yemeni people killed or injured by explosive weapons in towns or cities were civilians, according to a recent report, and more than half of all the air strikes occurred in towns or cities, often in densely populated areas, resulting in very high numbers of civilian casualties.

I call for a swift, transparent and impartial investigation into this incident. Real accountability for parties to conflict, whether they are States or non-State armed groups, is urgently needed, to ensure that the commitment under international law to protect civilians is meaningful.

8 October 2015
 New York

Annex 54: Coalition attacks on fishing vessels and dhows

Overview: The Panel has observed attacks upon fishing vessels and dhows within the Bab-al-Mandab. Between September and November 2015, the Panel documented 3 cases of attacks upon fishing vessels and dhows, and 2 cases of attacks upon fishing markets and their communities, causing the deaths of at least 115 fishermen.

1. Airstrikes on Indian Fishing Vessel on 8 September 2015

On Tuesday, 8 September 2015, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs reported that seven Indian nationals were missing after the Coalition hit their fishing boats (two boats respectively named *Asmar* and *Mustafa*) during an air strike off the coast of Yemen near Hodeidah. The vessels were traveling from Berbera in Somalia to Mokha in Yemen.¹



Photographs provided on social media via local journalists

In an interview with the New Indian Express, members of the surviving Indian crew, stated:²

A crewmember of the *Asmar*: “We stayed out [in] the sea as we could see the planes hitting targets on the shore and smoke rising [...]”

A second crewmember of the *Asmar*: “[...] We raised the Indian flag on our boat when we saw the plane coming towards us hoping that it will stop them [...] but that didn’t help [...] There was no warning, nothing”.

The *Mustafa* crew tried to rescue the sailors from *Asmar*, who were in water from the shock of the blast:

A crewmember of the *Mustafa*: “We stayed in the area as we were tried to take on some of the men from *Asmar* in the water. Then plane came back and hit us.”

¹Protection Vessels International (16 September 2015) Weekly Maritime & Onshore Security Report 15 Sep 2015, at, Refer at, <https://pvilt.com/news-insight/news/article/weekly-maritime-onshore-security-report-15-sep-2015.html> [last accessed on 26 October 2015]. Also information posted by online media commentators.

²The New India Express (11 September 2015) “Surviving Indian Sailors Clinged to Gas Cylinder for Four Hours After Airstrikes Hit Boats” Refer at, <http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/Surviving-Indian-Sailors-Clinged-to-Gas-Cylinder-for-Four-Hours-After-Airstrikes-Hit-Boats/2015/09/11/article3022756.ece> [last accessed on 26 October 2015].

2. Airstrikes on Ogbaan and Kadmaan islands in the Red Sea

On Thursday, 22 October 2015, and Friday, 23 October 2015, Coalition airstrikes targeted and killed many fishermen, and wounded many others³ on the Ogbaan and Kadmaan Islands, located within the Bab-el Mandab. The death toll from the attacks rose to 100 as wounded fishermen, who initially survived the airstrikes, died from the injuries they had sustained. On Tuesday, 27 October 2015, 15 corpses of fishermen who had died during the airstrike on their fishing boats, washed up upon the beach in Hodeida.

³Reuters (24 October 2015) “Several Yemeni fishermen killed in Saudi-led strikes – witnesses” at, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/10/24/uk-yemen-security-idUKKCN0SI07C20151024> [last accessed on 31 October 2015].

Annex 55: Coalition air strikes on internally displaced persons and refugees

1. Air strike attack on Al-Mazrak IDP Camp near Harad, in Hajjah Governorate

On Monday, 30 March 2015, either a short time before or at approximately 11.00am, at least 45 refugees and IDPs were killed and over 200 displaced civilians injured from an air strike on Al-Mazrak camp near the border with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.¹ A few days preceding the attack, five hundred families had arrived at the camp near the northern town of Harad. The civilians in the camp were newly arrived, having fled recently from militia fighting and air strikes in Sada'a. An NGO staff member told the Panel that before the air strikes, there had not been any fighting close to the camp. The Camp's entrance, clinic, food area, and administrative centre were destroyed during the air strikes. An NGO stated that it had treated 34 injured people at its hospital in Harad, and that 29 others had been pronounced dead upon arrival.

On 31 March 2015, in response to the attack, the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator to Yemen advised that all the structures that had been hit within the IDP Camp, constituted civilian infrastructure. A statement from Yemen's Defence Ministry in respect to the attack advised that, "Saudi warplanes targeted one of four refugee camps in the Harad district, which led to the death and injury of several of its residents. The air strike targeted camp 1 in the Mazraq region, which houses around 4,000 refugees, leaving over 40 people dead – including women and children – and over 250 others injured."²



Photograph of Al-Mazrak Camp before the airstrikes on 30 March 2015, provided by social media activists

¹ OHCHR, "Yemen: The world must be prepared for rapid collapse into mass displacement crisis – UN expert" (8 April 2015). Refer also to IRIN (30 March 2015) "Yemen camp bombing – what you need to know," at www.irinnews.org/report/101295/yemen-camp-bombing-what-you-need-to-know [last accessed 16 September 2015].

² RT (30 March 2015) "'45 people killed, 65 injured': Yemen refugee camp hit by airstrike" at <https://www.rt.com/news/245349-yemen-refugee-camp-strike/> [last accessed on 2 January 2016].



Annex 56: Indiscriminate coalition air strikes, issues of proportionality and lack of effective advance warning in Sa'dah

Overview: The Panel interviewed a variety of sources to obtain information on the situation in Sa'dah, along with the manner in which advance warning had been provided ahead of the Coalition attacks. In addition, the Panel obtained satellite imagery of Sa'dah from before 26 March 2015, and some two months after, to ascertain damage caused by airstrikes. Sa'dah satellite imagery showed that it has received the worst damage to civilian infrastructure of any of the cities within Yemen. Due to the fact that Houthi-Saleh forces have not been situated as a ground-fighting force conducting shelling in Sa'dah, all such damage has a high probability of having been caused by Coalition airstrikes. In addition, technicians analysing the circumference of craters left from strikes, analysed them as having been air-launched attacks.

Coalition targeting of Sa'dah: On 26 March 2015, the Coalition began air strikes on Sa'dah. Satellite imagery obtained by the Panel appears to show significant damage to civilian areas as a result of the air strikes. In particular, the alleged statement dated 8 May 2015, that the entire city of Sa'dah and Marran would be treated as "military targets," raises serious concerns around issues of proportionality, distinction and effective advance warning.¹ A United Nations assessment mission to Sa'dah during August 2015, confirmed the scope of the devastation. The assessment mission shared photographs of the city with the Panel.

On 14 April 2015, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, High Commissioner Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, advised that recent strikes had hit residential areas and homes across five provinces.² In addition to the reports of civilian injury and casualty, throughout May-June and July-August 2015 investigative periods, several humanitarian organisations' told the Panel how their offices and warehouses had been either indirectly impacted or directly struck during air strikes, some of which appear to have been linked to non-supply of GPS coordinates to the Coalition³ or as linked to air strikes on munitions sites close to civilian areas in which such organisations are based, including a warehouse supplying water equipment funded by the EU for an aid organisation project situated in Sa'dah.

Due to the fact that collective punishment of a civilian population is prohibited under all circumstances, including their allegiance or presumed/perceived allegiance to armed opposition groups - the targeting of the city of Sa'dah raises extremely serious concerns, including potential violations of the principles of precaution, proportionality and the principle of distinction.

During its initial investigation period of May-June 2015, a staff member of a UN agency who was based in Yemen at the time interviewed by the Panel, said that initially prior to the Coalition-led air strikes in Sa'dah, "Warning" leaflets were dropped across Sa'dah, perhaps an hour to two hours before the strikes were conducted". The same source, along with another UN staff member from a different agency stated that due to the fact that the attacks were occurring across an indiscriminate

¹Saudi Ministry of Defense, Brig. Gen. Ahmed al-Assiri, News Conference (9 May 2015) video clip, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I38aLG9I_ec [Last accessed on 31 May 2015].

²Refer to OHCHR's Press Statement at <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16253&LangID=E> (dated 21 July 2015) [Last accessed on 7 August 2015]; see also, <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15776> [Last accessed on 21 September 2015].

³In some instances, there have been claims that UN Offices GPS Coordinates had not been supplied to the Coalition. In other instances, there have been allegations that the UN supplied incorrect coordinates to the Coalition.

area, including civilian homes as well as schools and hospitals, and that it is an area of high illiteracy, the “leaflet drops” were deemed largely if not almost completely, ineffective as a warning mechanism or alert system.

In more recent discussions with an independent expert of IHL, it was raised that even if leaflets had been dropped as an advance warning mechanism, the main cause of concern was that a whole governorate had been labelled a military target and as such a one to two hour warning or evacuation notice period was simply not enough time to allow civilians to safely evacuate an area.⁴ A further confidential source told the Panel that Saudi Arabia had issued radio warnings approximately six or seven hours before the onset of air strikes in Sa’dah, also before the leaflet drops, but that, along with the short-time frame for such a large-scale evacuation, fuel shortages had impeded civilian’s ability to leave the area within the prescribed timeframe.

During the Panel’s May-June 2015 investigative period, a number of members of the United Nations humanitarian and INGO community in Yemen stated that as a result of the use of air strikes in Sa’dah, and the failure to provide an effective advance warning, they had been witnessing an unusual occurrence in the current situation of conflict, where they were experiencing “far higher levels of civilian casualties amongst women and children”.⁵ During the May-June 2015 investigative period, multiple sources inside Yemen, including medical personnel, told the Panel that the main cause of civilian casualties in Sa’dah was the air strikes. On 22 April 2015, local officials in Sa’dah declared the Governorate as a “Disaster State”.



Photographs from Sada’a City, taken by MonaRelief dated 31 October 2015

⁴ Meeting with a confidential source, dated 3 August 2015.

⁵ In this respect, there has been and continues to be some variation in figures relating to civilian casualties between the different agencies. This is largely due to the fact that different agencies utilise different methods and sources for obtaining their data. It can be stated that casualty reports reliant on formal hospital figures are usually lower than actual casualty numbers. In Sa’dah, it can be assumed with some confidence that casualties have been underreported due to access problems for the majority of humanitarian response services.



Photographs taken by a UN assessment mission to Sa'adah in August 2015 (Photograph courtesy of a UN Agency staff member in Yemen)

During the Panel's July-August 2015 investigative period, in meetings with Yemeni refugees and third country nationals in Djibouti, the Panel was told that initial air strikes had occurred at certain times of day, but then it had become almost non-stop, across all times of the day and the night. Based upon analysis of satellite imagery, refer to satellite imagery provided in the annex, Sa'dah has suffered the most with 226 destroyed buildings identified on 22 May 2015, in less than three months of coalition campaign. Harradh and Midi port which are small in size and without military structures visible have also been highly affected by bombing especially in congested areas.

This pattern was not limited to areas of the north of the country, Yemeni refugees from Aden with whom the Panel spoke, also stated that the air strikes "kill everyone, woman, man and child, with the sharp pieces of metal."⁶

Photograph of Leaflet dropped across Sada'a prior to airstrikes from March 2015 [Albawaba.com, accessed at, <http://www.albawaba.com/loop/leaflet-dropped-yemen%E2%80%99s-villages-warning-people-leave-coalition-strikes-726738>, (last access on 29 September 2015)]



Warning

Brothers sons of Yemen

Houthi-Saleh forces Militias are shelling Saudi villages along the borders, from your villages.

We are going to shell the origin of the shelling.

Therefore, for your safety, you have to evacuate the villages where Houthi-Saleh forces are present.

⁶ Panel of Experts on Yemen Interview with Yemeni Refugees in Markazi Camp in Obock, Djibouti, during July-August 2015.



Urgent appeal for help

Designation of Sa'dah governorate as a disaster zone

We, administrators of Sa'dah governorate and civil society organizations, hereby make this humanitarian appeal for urgent relief. Coalition forces led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have systematically come down on the governorate in a savage and barbaric onslaught against its land and people in their entirety. Some 250 civilians have been killed, most of them women and children. Hundreds have been injured. The attacks have caused massive destruction of all basic necessities, particularly in the city of Sa'dah, the capital of the governorate. The assailants have bombarded and destroyed the city's infrastructure, including water, electricity, gas and communication facilities. They have also bombed food warehouses, shops, markets, farmland and most fuel stations. They have targeted most government buildings, including the government complex, the Post Office, the Cooperative and Agricultural Credit Bank, the Executive Council, the Central Prison, the Political Security building and the Directorate of Security.

Other districts have been attacked in the same barbaric manner, displacing some 300,000 civilians.

We therefore designate the city of Sa'dah as a disaster zone and urge all Government agencies, the international community, local and international relief organizations and rights organizations to mobilize swiftly and fulfil their humanitarian and relief mandates by coming to the aid of the city, the governorate and their inhabitants, whose basic necessities we are no longer able to provide.

(Signed) Muhammad Jabir al-Razihy

Governor, Sa'dah governorate

Chair of the Local Council

22 April 2015

Annex 57: Houthi-Saleh forces in Ibb

Overview: The Panel documented many human rights violations within Ibb, largely tied to civil and political rights, but also related to the strong resistance Houthi-Saleh forces encountered within Ibb from protestors and anti-Houthi demonstrators.

Houthi-Saleh forces have used military camps across the parts of the country it controls, using them as prisons for opponents, including the Sixth Regional Military Command 1st Armored Division, weapons stores at Nuqum Mountain, Attan Mountain in Sana'a, and Hirran Mountain in Dhamar, Al-Anad military base in Lahej Governorate, and Hadeed Mountain in Aden city. In addition to Amran and Ibb sports stadium, Al-Saleh Park, Arwa school, Al-Saqr club in Ta'izz city, the Officers club in Hodiedah, Guest House in Dhamar, and government complexes in Abyan, Shabwa and Al-Baidha Governorates.¹

Human Rights violations in Ibb: Houthi-Saleh forces expanded their control beyond Sana'a, entering into Ibb during October 2014.² Ibb was one of the provinces that strongly resisted the Houthi-Saleh forces takeover.³ Later, in their July 2015 retreat from Aden, Houthi-Saleh forces combatants who had been fighting in Aden re-entered Ibb after being pushed out of Al-Dhalea. The initial entrance into Aden had also brought Houthi-Saleh forces combatants/fighters from Ta'izz, Ibb and Marib, already having been embedded in these areas. There have been reports or suggestions of Ibb being one of the areas for Houthi-Saleh forces-sleeper cells for the planned entrance into Aden.⁴ Ibb has experienced strong protest and activism against the Houthi-Saleh forces, and with it high levels of arbitrary arrest and detention, along with allegations of the torture of detainees and at least one instance of defilement of a corpse of resistance/opposition fighters from Ibb.⁵

Ibb is of strategic importance for the Houthi-Saleh forces, and the Panel finds with a high degree of probability that it is one of the main transit routes for the arms market. Reports suggest that humanitarian aid is also currently being channeled through and sold in Ibb and Sana'a by the Houthi-Saleh forces and potentially serves as a source of revenue for small arms sales/market.⁶ Ibb also appears to be one of the locations from where Houthi-Saleh forces have had sustained recruitment of child soldiers.⁷

On Saturday, 14 February 2015, the Houthi-Saleh forces killed and wounded several protestors in Ibb, with one source suggesting the deaths of 26 civilians.⁸ Local activists said they had been responding to the death on Saturday of **Saleh al-Bashiri**, who was detained by Houthi gunmen breaking up an

¹ The Yemeni Coalition to Monitor Human Rights Violations (YCMHRV), International report documents crimes committed by al-Houthi militia, Saleh group: Report in full (28 September 2015) at <http://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/international-report-documents-crimes-committed-al-houthi-militia-saleh-group-report> [last accessed on 2 January 2016].

² Al Jazeera (20 October 2015) "Yemen's Houthis push south into Ibb" at, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/10/yemen-houthi-saleh-forces-push-south-into-ibb-2014102014621476170.html> [last accessed on 2 November 2015].

³ Panel monitoring trends from Ibb from online communications about the type of events being arranged, undertaken and arrests as a result of these planned events.

⁴ Social media communications between activists within Ibb.

⁵ Social media information provided by an activist in response to defilement/mutilation of a corpse, also providing photographic evidence of the corpse (as attached in annex).

⁶ Panel analysis based upon protestor commentary on social media sites.

⁷ Multiple social media reports of children having been taken and women protesting to try and get their children back from Houthi-Saleh forces.

⁸ Reuters (14 February 2015) "Clashes between Shi'ite Houthis and Sunnis in Yemen leave 26 dead" at, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/14/us-emirates-yemen-idUSKBN0LI06H20150214> [last accessed on 31 October 2015].

anti-Houthi-Saleh forces protest in Sanaa two weeks before. Saleh al-Bashiri had been and released from custody to a hospital with signs of torture on his body and died shortly after.⁹

On Sunday, 22 February 2015, Houthi-Saleh forces abducted **President Hadi's nephew** in Ibb en route to Aden. President Hadi's nephew was released later through tribal mediation.¹⁰

On Saturday, 7 March 2015, protests in Ibb were dispersed by Houthi-Saleh forces, causing a number of casualties and taking at least four protestors into their custody.¹¹

On Thursday, 12 March 2015, Yemeni women and men protested in Ibb for the release of their children taken by the Houthi-Saleh forces as child combatants.¹²

On Wednesday, 25 March 2015, Yemeni civilians gathered outside the governor's building in Ibb city to protest against the Houthi-Saleh forces. On Friday, 27 and Saturday, 28 March 2015, there were further protests in Ibb against Houthi-Saleh forces.¹³

On Tuesday, 7 April 2015, Houthi-Saleh forces tanks from the Hamza Military Camp in Ibb, targeted the Rashidi school in Ibb, killing two students and wounding many others.¹⁴ On Wednesday, 8 April 2015, Houthi-Saleh forces laid siege to a pro-legitimacy demonstration in Ibb.¹⁵

On Saturday, 11 April 2015, the Houthi-Saleh forces shelled the house of an opposing tribal leader, **Sheikh Noman Albarah**, in Al-Gafr, Ibb, for refusing to cooperate with them.¹⁶

On Thursday, 16 April 2015, Houthi-Saleh forces set up checkpoints on both sides of the Ibb/Ta'izz border. By at least Wednesday, 22 April 2015, aid in the form of wheat began to be sold in the markets in Mafraq, Jibla and Ibb, intended for distribution in Al-Dhalea.¹⁷

On Saturday, 2 May 2015, Houthi-Saleh forces militias attacked several villages in Makhader province in Ibb city, demolishing a religious school and several civilian homes.¹⁸

On Saturday, 24 October 2015, the Houthi-Saleh forces imprisoned the organisers of the water march in Ibb.¹⁹ On Monday, 26 October 2015, Houthi-Saleh forces raided the office of the **Director of Finance of Ibb** with 30 gunmen and kidnapped him.²⁰ On Tuesday, 27 October 2015, Houthi-Saleh forces abducted a young woman on her way to the hospital in Modheikkerah in Ibb.²¹ On Thursday, 29 October 2015, Houthi-Saleh forces shelled Odain Village in Ibb.²² On Saturday, 31 October 2015, five youth activists were detained and tortured in the intelligence security prison by the Houthi-Saleh forces in Ibb.²³

⁹At least three social media activists commented separately on this incident. Many more commented in connection or linked to the three separate reports and commentary.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ At least three social media activists commented separately on this incident.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹At least three social media activists commented separately on this incident. Many more commented in connection or linked to the three separate reports and commentary.

²⁰ At least three social media activists commented separately on this incident.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³At least three social media activists commented separately on this incident. Many more commented in connection or linked to the three separate reports and commentary.



Houthi-Saleh forces-Saleh forces destruction of political opponents homes in Ibb, dated 14 October 2015. Photographs supplied by local social media activists and critics in Ibb



Asaqaf and 30 other activists abducted by Houthi-Saleh forces in Ibb for planning a water march to Ta'izz, in order to break the siege on the city, on 11 October 2015

Protestors in Ibb stage public demonstration against the Houthi-Saleh forces dated 8 March 2015





Defilement of the corpse of a resistance fighter in Hazm Alodain, Ibb. Photographs supplied by local social media critics from Ibb

Annex 58: Houthi-Saleh abductions, arbitrary detention and enforced or involuntary disappearances

Overview: Since taking over Sana'a, Ibb and Ta'izz, Houthi-Saleh forces have undertaken a number of measures to control dissent, criticism and the civil and political rights of residents within the cities. Serious breaches of human rights law have occurred with multiple cases of arbitrary arrest, detention, torture, summary extra-judicial execution, and disappearances.

Human Rights Breaches by Characteristic	No. of Specific Incidents, Multiple/Systemic Prevalence Recorded or Observed
Structural Measures Suppressing the Freedom of Expression	<u>22</u> (NGOs shut down by an asset freeze); <u>1</u> Decree silencing criticism of the Houthi-Saleh regime in Sana'a; <u>1</u> woman stopped from participating in Peace Talks from Sana'a; <u>1</u> Human Rights Organisation removed from participation in Peace Talks by President Hadi
Arbitrary arrest and detention	<u>19</u> (specific cases, but believed to be Multiple/Systemic in prevalence)
Custodial Death	Multiple/Pattern
Summary judicial execution	Multiple (Panel heard reports on many occasions)
Sniper Shootings	<u>11</u> (specific cases, but believed to be Multiple/Systemic in prevalence in Aden and Taiz)
Breach of the Right to Health	<u>2</u> Multiple/Systemic (cases in Aden and Taiz)
Breach of the Right to Life	<u>2</u> Multiple/Systemic (cases in Aden and Taiz)
Torture and the Defilement of Corpses	<u>5</u> (including 2 cases of defilement; torture believed to be Multiple/Systemic in prevalence)
Child Recruitment	Multiple/Systemic
Sexual Violence	Multiple/Pattern

The Panel has followed media representations of the ongoing human rights context, along with interviewing and communicating with United Nations staff who have been monitoring the human rights context, local activists and online communities who provide commentary on the human rights situation on the ground.

Violations of Civil and Political Rights: After obtaining control of Sana'a during September 2014, Houthi-Saleh forces abducted a tribal elder, **Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah Ghalib**, who had been a vocal critic of their expansion in Yemen. He was taken to an unknown location and is presumed to have been disappeared.¹ Since late March 2015, arbitrary arrests and detentions increased, along with the disappearance of journalists, opponents or perceived political opposition.² Houthi-Saleh forces have been holding at least 13 journalists who were forcibly disappeared in Sana'a. Two journalists were killed in Dhamar province after they were apprehended by the group while they were in their

¹ Alkarama (29 August 2015) "International Day of the Victims of Enforced Disappearances: Snapshot on a Widespread Practice" at, <http://en.alkarama.org/1841-international-day-of-the-victims-of-enforced-disappearances-snapshot-on-a-widespread-practice> [last accessed on 2 November 2015].

² Panel trend analysis of prevalence of such cases.

own way back from covering an anti-Houthi-Saleh forces tribal meeting in Hada'a district, Dhamar province, northern Yemen. And another two journalists were held captive in a complex controlled by Houthi-Saleh forces. According to claims of witnesses, Houthi-Saleh forces used this complex for military purposes and it has been targeted by Coalition air strikes. The two journalists along with other detainees were killed as a result of the airstrikes on the complex.³ Houthi-Saleh forces' have blocked more than 36 news websites and broken into more than 14 offices and headquarters of some media outlets that they took over along with their contents.⁴ Most of the media outlets the group raided are anti-Houthi-Saleh forces and others belong to Yemeni Islah opponent Party.⁵

On Sunday, 1 March 2015, two of the five men arrested during anti-Houthi-Saleh forces demonstrations in Ibb on Saturday, 28 February 2015, were released by the Houthi-Saleh forces.⁶ Journalist **Aziz Al-Samei** and **Dr. Faris Fuad Al-Banna**, had been kidnapped along with three others in Ibb city at the Al-Suhool checkpoint during a demonstration at 12pm on Saturday, 28 February 2015. **Ammar Al-Hamati**, **Hesham Al-Faqih**, and **Mohammad Al-Dhubiani** status is not known and they are presumed to have been disappeared.⁷

Mr Abdulrahman Maudha, an activist who was kidnapped by the Houthi-Saleh forces on Tuesday, 10 February 2015, died on Saturday, 28 February 2015, at the University of Science and Technology Hospital. Mr Maudha was released from captivity on Tuesday, 17 February 2015, but died as the result of a severe lung infection caught during his detention as a result of being tortured. Before he died, Mr Maudha had told his colleagues that he had been held at one of Ali Mohsen's homes in Sana'a.⁸

On Thursday, 26 February 2015, the Houthi-Saleh forces took a large number of young men from youth marches in Sana'a. **Mr Naif Al-Nashri**, one of the abducted youth, was released the next day and said he had been tortured while in custody.⁹

On Saturday, 14 February 2015, an activist, **Mr Ahmad Hazza**, general secretary of the Rafdh, or "Rejection" Movement, along with two others were kidnapped from an anti-Houthi-Saleh forces protest in Sana'a by Houthi-Saleh forces, and are presumed to have been disappeared.¹⁰

On Wednesday, 12 August 2015, **Mr Abdul Kader al-Guneid** was disappeared by Houthi-Saleh forces. Mr al-Guneid, a 66-year old doctor and human rights activist from Taiz, managed to post a last tweet on his Twitter account before he was dragged barefoot from his home in Yemen by plainclothes gunmen. Mr al-Guneid's Twitter post read, "Houthi-Saleh forces militiamen are at my house". Then, his Twitter feed fell silent. Mr al-Guneid's wife saw him being taken away by men she said she recognised as among the Houthi-Saleh forces rebels controlling their hometown of Taiz.¹¹ His family has not seen or heard from him since.¹²

³ At least three social media activists commented separately on this incident. Many more commented in connection or linked to the three separate reports and commentary.

⁴ At least three social media activists commented separately on this incident.

⁵ Mwatwana Organisation (18 October 2015) "Houthi authority: A dark era in history of Yemeni press" at, <http://mwatana.org/en/21102015438> [last accessed on 8 November 2015].

⁶ At least three social media activists commented separately on this incident.

⁷ At least three social media activists commented separately on this incident. Many more commented in connection or linked to the three separate reports and commentary.

⁸ Yemen Times (2 March 2015) "Islah Leaders Kidnapped, Accused By Houthis Of Al-Qaeda Ties" at, <http://www.yementimes.com/en/1864/news/4939/Islah-leaders-kidnapped-accused-by-Houthi-Saleh-forcess-of-Al-Qaeda-ties.htm> [last accessed on 2 November 2015].

⁹ At least three social media activists commented separately on this incident.

¹⁰ At least three social media activists commented separately on this incident.

¹¹ HRW (6 August 2015) "Yemen: Houthis Abduct Rights Activist - Doctor's Whereabouts Unknown" at, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/08/06/yemen-houthis-abduct-rights-activist> [last accessed on 2 November 2015].

¹² At least three social media activists commented separately on this incident. Many more commented in connection or linked to the three separate reports and commentary.

	
<p>Mr Al-Guneid who was disappeared from his home on Wednesday, 12 August 2015</p>	<p>A journalist/writer, Mr Mahmood Yassin, tortured in Ibb for participating in a planned initiative to take water to Taiz, on Wednesday, 21 October 2015</p>

A long string of activists, journalists and politicians have disappeared in Yemen since September 2014.¹³ There have been dozens of reports about people being arbitrarily detained for different periods of time.¹⁴ During August 2015, Houthi-Saleh forces rebels reportedly detained several leading members of the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Islah party¹⁵ - Islah said the leaders were kidnapped from the party's Student Department in Sana'a, located on Rabat Street. The four men are **Ali Al-Hadma**, **Mohammad Al-Sabri**, youth activist **Anwar Al-Himyari**, and **Habib Al-Ariqi** - some of whom were later released.¹⁶ **Mohammad Al-Imad**, a leading figure in the Islah Party, said that at least three vehicles filled with Houthi-Saleh forces wearing security forces uniforms besieged the Student Department and took the men,¹⁷

"They took them to secret prisons," he said. "We asked most of the police stations in the Capital Secretariat and we could not locate any of them. We are sure that they have been disappeared."

More recently, on Saturday, 24 October 2015, **Mr Mohammed Al-Adeel**, Head of the Arabic Language Department at Amran University was disappeared by Houthi-Saleh forces in Sana'a.¹⁸

¹³ At least three social media activists commented separately on this incident. Many more commented in connection or linked to the three separate reports and commentary.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Memo – Middle East Monitor (10 August 2015) "Yemen's Muslim Brotherhood condemns arrest of its leaders" Refer at, <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/middle-east/20326-yemens-muslim-brotherhood-condemn-s-arrest-of-its-leaders> [last accessed on 2 November 2015].

¹⁶ The World Post (14 August 2015) "Doctor Who Tried To Tell World About Yemen's War Pays Heavy Price" at, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/yemen-twitter-abdul-kader-al-guneid_55cd0a81e4b0399742ef3e1f [last accessed on 2 November 2015].

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ At least three social media activists commented separately on this incident. Many more commented in connection or linked to the three separate reports and commentary.

On 5 November 2015, the Houthi-Saleh forces Officials announced that social media sites, Facebook and Twitter would be monitored for critics of the regime, increasing concerns around Freedom of Expression and the potential for further critics of the regime to face arbitrary arrest and detention and/or disappearance.¹⁹



¹⁹ At least three social media activists commented separately on this incident. Many more commented in connection or linked to the three separate reports and commentary.

Annex 59: Six grave violations against children in conflict: recruitment or use of children as soldiers

Nearly one third of fighters in the armed groups involved in the Yemen conflict are under 18.¹ Houthis-Saleh forces are responsible for the vast majority. Houthis-Saleh forces post many of the boys at checkpoints in Sana'a after they ousted the internationally recognised government from the capital in September last year.² Many could be seen riding on armoured vehicles and guarding seized government buildings.³ Child soldiers reportedly receive salaries, although it is not clear whether it is on the same scale as adults.⁴ In Ta'izz, Resistance forces were also using children to man checkpoints.⁵

The Panel heard numerous accounts by UN personnel and Yemeni civilians/refugees of the active recruitment of child soldiers within Yemen, which is stated to be largely due to the influence and activities of Popular Committees.⁶ United Nations officials told the Panel that, children as young as six to eight years are regularly seen, especially near checkpoint areas, "dragging Kalashnikovs, taller than them."⁷

In this regard, the Panel had the opportunity to meet with Yemeni refugees in Djibouti, many of who (approximately 15-20 individuals) had experienced or witnessed attempts to recruit their children or those of their neighbours. For one such woman, fear of recruitment of her teenage son had been one of the main reasons for fleeing Yemen when she had, during April 2015. In this context, a variety of sources, United Nations and refugees, told the Panel that the Houthis-Saleh forces are using children as fighters, along with as a means of communication between groups of fighters and as couriers.

A Yemeni woman resident in Djibouti City, during a focus group meeting with urban women refugees in the city, told the Panel that her 15 year old son had been subject to the Houthi recruitment process. She described how the Houthis forces in her area would offer children and youth meals and food to entice them out of their homes; they would then be given leaflets and written materials of a political nature, referencing the Houthis as "good" and other actors/groups as "bad". The children and minors would be given the guns of the Houthis combatants and allowed to carry them around; they were also allegedly given keys by the Houthis, to wear in a similar manner to a necklace on a chain. The minors were advised that these keys were the keys to the gates or door to paradise and if the children died during fighting, they had no reason to fear, as with this key they could enter paradise and the Houthis would be there to open the door for them. Another young

¹UNICEF Country Information – Yemen (2 October 2015), "Six months of violence in Yemen leave more than 500 children dead, some 1.7 million at risk of malnutrition: UNICEF" at, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/media_85714.html [last accessed on 8 November 2015].

²Panel interviews with United Nations agency staff from two organisations, along with one Yemeni activist who sighted child combatants being used at checkpoints. The Panel also conferred with local human rights actors. All figures are official ones provided by the United Nations.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

⁵The National World (11 October 2015) "Mother mourns for son recruited as one of the Houthis' child soldiers" at, <http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/mother-mourns-for-son-recruited-as-one-of-the-houthis-child-soldiers> [last accessed on 31 October 2015].

⁶In this context, child recruitment has been undertaken and ongoing since before the recent conflict and is currently being undertaken by armed groups supporting Saleh and also those supporting President Hadi.

⁷This account was substantiated by a former Yemeni diplomat who had departed Sana'a, who told the Panel that he/she witnessed child soldiers at checkpoints on leaving the country by road.

Yemeni boy, interviewed along with his mother in Markazi Camp, in Obock in Djibouti, told the Panel that,

“[...] It was in April [2015], they closed on Thursday the school and on 1st April the bombing started. The boys from my school were protesting with banners, not fighting. We heard they take the young and give them guns, the Houthis, and hide behind them. They would take the children in Ta’izz, taking them in the evenings. I did not go out of the house in the evening. The Houthis kidnapped our neighbours’ kids. The Houthis had a sign and were with the Police of Salah. [...]”

In the Panel’s Focus Group Meeting⁸ with Yemeni women in Djibouti City, Yemeni mothers’ described their fear at the possibility of their children being recruited by the Houthi-Saleh forces and, in at least one case, a mother said that they had fled their town and eventually Yemen as her son was actively being targeted for recruitment.

The Panel was told how some of the Yemeni children were being used or instrumentalised in order to recruit other children. In this regard, the Panel was told that the Houthis-Saleh forces were using children to recruit other children from schools, by sending leaflets and books to read which included statements to the effect that in joining they would become “closer to God.”


However, the Panel has also heard of an increase in abductions of children by the Houthi-Saleh forces. A United Nations staff member told the Panel that children were being abducted to serve as child soldiers in fighting units. A report written by the Yemeni Coalition to Monitor Human Rights Violations (YCMHRV) (September 2015), confirmed that child abduction cases have increased in areas under Houthis’ control. Parents of abductees accuse the Houthis-Saleh forces of abducting their children and forcing them to join in fighting without their parents’ knowledge or consent.⁹

In this regard, the Panel was also told by at least three sources that young third country nationals have been either sold into or co-opted into fighting for armed groups in Yemen. During its investigations in Djibouti, the Panel met with a group of young teenage Ethiopian men/youths, some of whom were minors. The Panel also met with staff members of IOM-Djibouti, who reported that trafficking networks in Yemen, were selling youths who could not pay them the fees required to be released from their custody, off to armed groups.

The Panel found it significant that several of the young Ethiopian men/youths had been maimed by gunshot wounds, albeit at least two of the cases in Obock had been deliberately shot by traffickers, both of whom stated that the traffickers “wore a police uniform” and provided the Panel with information that they also appear to have been connected to the Houthi-Saleh forces. An international NGO working with third country nationals in Yemen, confirmed that the traffickers in Yemen wear police uniforms and that if migrants cannot pay the trafficker fee to be released, they are sometimes sold off to armed groups as “fighters”. This phenomenon appears to be more prevalent with young Somali men, who are deemed to be more “battle-hardy” than Ethiopian youths/minors. Several of the young Ethiopian nationals (both men and women), told the Panel that traffickers “pay-off” Houthi-Saleh forces at check-points in order to be able to pass with their “human cargo”.

⁸A Focus Group Meeting or Workshop is a common methodology utilised for working with vulnerable groups, to deal with sensitive topics in a manner in which provides the participants with a safe environment to speak through issues and share information, that might otherwise be difficult to do. The Focus Group Meeting took place in the UNFPA-Djibouti Office and was with Yemeni urban unregistered refugees. It was the first such time the women had been gathered together to talk about their experiences in Yemen prior to them departing the country.

⁹The Yemeni Coalition to Monitor Human Rights Violations (YCMHRV), International report documents crimes committed by al-Houthi militia, Saleh group: Report in full (28 September 2015) at <http://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/international-report-documents-crimes-committed-al-houthi-militia-saleh-group-report> [last accessed on 2 January 2016].





Photograph of young boys recruited by the Resistance within Yemen. All photographs provided online by social media commentators and critics from inside Yemen



Child soldiers killed in the conduct of ground hostilities within Yemen. Photographs uploaded by local activists on social media.



Photograph and Interview taken by the Panel in Obock MRC Centre, IOM-Djibouti, Djibouti, dated July 2015 – young Ethiopian third country national, probably coopted by an armed group and shot in the arm during crossfire or fighting.

Annex 60: Commercial obstruction and obstruction of humanitarian assistance by the coalition

Overview: The Panel conducted numerous interviews with United Nations agencies, INGOs, humanitarian organisations and international human rights organisations related to the situation of the blockade in Yemen. The Panel also met and spoke with Government Officials of several countries. In addition, the Panel obtained shipping records from Lloyds and undertook its own comparative analysis. The Panel also spoke with members of the Humanitarian Logistics Cluster in Yemen. The Panel has been analyzing the situation around the blockade since it began its investigations during April 2015.

Analysis: During June 2015, UN sources were stating that only 15 per cent of the pre-crisis volume of imports were getting through into Yemen.¹ Utilising data obtained from commercial sources, the Panel compared the number of ships arriving each month from 2014 and 2015 in Aden and Houdaidah [refer below], finding a decrease across both ports.

Some five days after the Coalition airstrikes began, the Coalition enforced an aerial and naval blockade, which caused large decreases and delays in commercial ships entering Yemeni ports. As a result, the import of food, aid or diesel and fuel oil to Yemen decreased and faced long delays, with hospitals, schools and water pumps closing down due to the lack of electricity supply.² During April, The food and fuel situation rapidly deteriorated as supply ships carrying wheat and fuel were refused entry at Hodeidah port.³ In June, at the time of the Panel's trip to Amman, Jordan, an official of one member of the UN Family in Yemen, advised, that the only way to ensure that people in Yemen did not die of malnutrition, was to allow for commercial operations and the markets to function. In this context, the official noted:⁴

"[...] There is no way the humanitarian community can substitute that. Yemen, pre-conflict, had one of the worst nutritional situations. Now with the current conflict context, Yemen is very quickly deteriorating into a catastrophe of food security. Currently there are 12 million people who are food insecure and it is getting worse and worse every day. There is no other solution than for the commercial sector being allowed to work. The economy must be working. The economic embargo must be lifted to allow people to earn money; must lift the commercial embargo to ensure the economy functions. [...]"

The UN Official went on to advise:

"[...] In two-three-four months, children, women, elderly and sick will start dying from a lack of food. This is going to quickly spiral out of control. The population at large must not be punished like this en masse.

The international community must accept the potential for collateral damage and accept the need for providing fuel, even if it means that they also end up fueling Houthi-Saleh forces tanks.

¹Panel interviews with a senior United Nations Official working in Yemen.

²The Guardian, (5 June 2015) "Saudi-led naval blockade leaves 20m Yemenis facing humanitarian disaster", at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/05/saudi-led-naval-blockade-worsens-yemen-humanitarian-disaster> [last accessed on 2 January 2016]; see also UK FCO Press Release (26 March 2015): The current situation in Yemen.

³MS Risk report on Yemen (15 April 2015), at http://www.steamshipmutual.com/Downloads/Loss-Prevention/SecurityAdvisory_Yemen_Bab-el_Mandeb_Strait_Apr15.pdf [last accessed on 26 December 2015].


⁴Panel Interview with a Senior Official from the UN Family in Yemen. The Interview took place in Amman, Jordan, and like most of the other such interviews with UN Officials and Personnel was undertaken on a confidential basis [Dated 9 June 2015].

The consequences of not doing so are unacceptable. The solution must be simple and independent. [...]

More recently, a UNDSS Report dated 10 September 2015, advised that shipping to Yemen is “grinding to a halt as Saudi-led navy inspections hold up cargoes, shippers say, depriving it of desperately needed fuel and food as aid groups warn of famine.” Another report noted that many shipping companies have stopped bringing cargo to Yemen and that those still willing to bring cargo faced incalculable delays and searches by the Coalition.⁵

The security system of authorisation and inspection put in place by the Coalition and President Hadi corresponds directly to the reduced shipping activity in the port of Al Houdaidah, the main entry of commercial products, but also the main port of entry for humanitarian shipments into the north of the country. Entry conditions were applied to all vessels calling at Yemeni ports. Vessels needed to obtain entry permission from the Ministry of Transport, through the local agent and/or receivers, prior to arrival. Entry to Yemeni territorial waters is permitted only following an inspection by the naval forces of Saudi Arabian-led Coalition. Once a vessel reaches the outskirts of Bab Al Mandab, the vessel must anchor pending completion of the inspection and approval of the port entry.⁶

It is as a result of these security procedures that delays have occurred at anchorage, as opposed to lesser delays caused by capacity or administrative-related delays at berth in ports within Yemen.⁷ With somewhat of an exception from the port of Hodeidah due to the fact it was also targeted by airstrikes from the Coalition, which has also slowed berth procedures.




Source: MCCC, October and November 2015.

⁵ Information obtained from a US Naval Report on Humanitarian Situation and Commercial Shipping.


⁶ Hellenic Shipping News (7 December 2015) “Gard Alert: Yemen – port security situation – update”, at <http://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/gard-alert-yemen-port-security-situation-update/> [last accessed on 26 December 2015].

⁷ Information obtained from UN interviews in consultation with WFP figures related to shipping delays since March 2015. Interviews conducted with WFP in June, August and December 2015.

On 28 July 2015, the Ministry of Transport of Yemen had denied permit approvals for fuel imports and placed restrictions on vessels accessing the Red Sea ports. The impact of food, fuel and medicine shortages worsened further when the coalition then conducted airstrikes on Al Hodeidah and the port was left non-operational for weeks. And, currently still only has limited operational capacity.



Port of Aden was closed during the clashes between Houthis and Resistance fighters, for security until the Coalition liberated Aden in August 2015




In this context, the graph above shows the drop in arrivals in Al Houdaidah port during April 2015, following the start of the Coalition campaign. Ships arrival improved in May, June and July, with the clearance system adopted by the Coalition and with arrival of several humanitarian ships. However, following military operations around Al Houdaidah, including the bombing of a part of the port infrastructure, during July and August 2015, and suspension of clearances to the Red Sea,

shipping arrivals dropped again in August - corresponding with President Hadi and the Coalition's plans to use Aden as the hub for humanitarian shipments.⁸

Panel Graphs based on data provided by Lloyd's List Intelligence (refer at www.lloydslistintelligence.com) through a UN licence for the panel.

Beyond the effect of the delays in and of itself, it has had a roll-on effect for fuel prices (along with other items) within the country. During the September and October 2015, the impact of the shortage in fuel, as a result of the obstruction on commercial vessels into Houdaidah, contributed to a flourishing of black market with fuel being sold at prices ten-fold more than normal cost. The Houthi-Saleh forces maintained the mechanism by putting restrictions on import and distribution of fuel in their favour.⁹


After several weeks of pressure from the International community, commercial shipping and fuel began entering into Al Houdaidah during November 2015. President Hadi had written a letter authorising the entrance of commercial shipping on 6 October 2015, into the port of Houdaydah. OCHA reported on 18 December 2015, that November imports of food had returned to pre-crisis levels with 560,000 metric tons (MT) imported into the country.



⁸ A confidential member state source advised the Panel that aid diversion and securitization are clearly linked to previous Coalition statements about not allowing the delivery of aid to areas of Houthi-Saleh forces control.

⁹ The Head of the Delegation of ICRC in Yemen reported (12 October 2015) at the time, that during September 2015, only 1 per cent of the country's fuel needs were imported into Yemen.

Similarly, fuel imports increased substantially, reaching 248,486 MT. However, import levels are still insufficient to meet in-country demand.¹⁰



Fuel shortages within Yemen have greatly affected the capacity for discharging ships. Al Hudaydah port can only discharge bulk goods, such as grain and fuel, as all cranes remain non-functional and beyond repair having been severely damaged by air strikes in August. Import restrictions during the conflict's first seven months have exacerbated the humanitarian situation and brought the economy to near collapse.¹¹

¹⁰ OCHA, Humanitarian Bulletin – Yemen, Issue 7 (Issued on 18 December 2015) at http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/OCHA_YEMEN_Hum_Bulletin_7_18_Dec.pdf [last accessed on 27 December 2015].

¹¹ Ibid.

Annex 61: Coalition air strikes on Sana'a airport

Overview: On Tuesday, 28 April 2015, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia air force targeted and struck Sana'a International Airport, *El Rahaba Airport*, hitting the runway, several commercial passenger airplanes and some of the airport buildings.¹ The strikes on the airport coincided with an attempt of the Iranian Red Crescent Society to fly a passenger plane carrying, said to have been carrying humanitarian cargo (food and medicine),² into Yemeni airspace and land in Sana'a.

Analysis: The airport was struck at least two times, damaging the runway and temporarily blocking the entry and exit route by air into and out of Sana'a. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia air force jets undertook the airstrikes upon Sana'a airport as the Iranian passenger plane that was being used by the Iranian Red Crescent Society, said to be carrying humanitarian aid,³ was making an approach to land in Sana'a, forcing it to turn back.

The death toll as a result of the airstrikes included approximately 13 people, along with a doctor who had been pulled from the rubble of a damaged clinic. Four or five houses located near to the International Airport were also damaged in the airstrikes on 28 April 2015.⁴

On 4 May 2015, after the initial airstrikes on Sana'a International Airport, Mr Johannes Van der Klaauw, the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen, advised that [refer below for a copy of the Statement ("Humanitarian Coordinator Statement A")],⁵

"[...] coalition airstrikes have targeted the runways of Sana'a international airport over the past week, rendering them inoperable. No flights can take off or land while the runways are being repaired.

Yemen's airports constitute an essential lifeline for the country. Without access to the airports, aid agencies are unable to bring in staff, vital supplies of medicines and other critical life-saving assistance, or undertake medical evacuations of their personnel. Emergency relief and medical teams from abroad are likewise unable to fly in to scale up the humanitarian operation to address the needs of increasingly vulnerable Yemenis. [...]"

The United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen went on to state that his Office, "[...] urge[d] the coalition to stop targeting Sana'a international airport and to preserve this important lifeline - and all other airports and seaports - so that humanitarians can reach all those affected by the armed conflict in Yemen."⁶

On Tuesday, 5 May 2015, MSF and ICRC released a Press Statement in response to the attacks, advising that they were, "[...] extremely concerned about the severe damage caused by recent

¹ The Guardian (28 April 2015) "Aid flights to Yemen blocked after Saudi Arabian jets bomb airport runway" at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/28/aid-flights-to-yemen-blocked-after-saudi-arabia-bombs-airport-runway> [last accessed on 26 October 2015].

² Interview of the Panel with the Iranian Red Crescent Society in Tehran during September 2015.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Online social media commentary related to the strikes.

⁵ Office For The Coordination Of Humanitarian Affairs – Yemen, Statement By The Humanitarian Coordinator For Yemen, Johannes Van Der Klaauw (Amman, 4 May 2015) at http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/PR_EN_0.pdf [last accessed on 26 October 2015].

⁶ Ibid.

Coalition attacks on airports in Sana'a and Hodeida, obstructing delivery of much needed humanitarian assistance and movement of humanitarian personnel.”⁷

On 20 May 2015, Sana'a International Airport was reopened after repairs to the damaged runway and essential infrastructure for the safe operation of the airport.

Additional Coalition airstrike targeted attacks upon Sana'a International Airport have been reported.⁸ However, the Panel has been unable to corroborate them to date.

Analysing satellite UNITAR-UNOSAT imagery acquired 15 May 2015 and 12 December 2014 (published on 3 June 2015), the Panel identified a total of 70 affected structures and transportation vehicles. Approximately 18 of these were destroyed, 32 severely damaged, and 20 moderately damaged. Additionally, 32 impact craters were found. One medical facility was identified within 500 meters of impact craters (Satellite Imagery A).⁹

Sana'a International Airport has served as the main conduit for humanitarian access into the north of Yemen, both in terms of personnel, but also during the onset of hostilities and more recently became particularly important due to the incapacity of port Hodeida from the Coalition bombing of the port (on Monday, 17 August 2015), for bringing in humanitarian shipments of food, medicine and fuel for generators and United Nations vehicles.

⁷ RTT News (5 May 2015) “UN, Red Cross Call For Access To Yemen's Airports, Hit By Coalition Airstrikes” at

<http://www.rttnews.com/2492923/un-red-cross-call-for-access-to-yemen-s-airports-hit-by-coalition-airstrikes.aspx> [last accessed on 26 October 2015].

⁸ Yemen Media.Com (20 June 2015) “Saudi-led airstrikes destroy runways of Sana'a Airport” at http://yemen-media.com/news_details.php?lng=english&sid=6455 [last accessed on 26 October 2015].

⁹ Reliefweb (3 June 2015) “Damage Assessment of Sana'a International Airport, Sana'a Governorate, Yemen (as of 3 Jun 2015)” at <http://reliefweb.int/map/yemen/damage-assessment-sanaa-international-airport-sanaa-governorate-yemen-3-jun-2015> [last accessed on 26 October 2015].



Photographs and Photograph Satellite Imagery of after the airstrikes on 28 April 2015



Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - Yemen

**STATEMENT BY THE HUMANITARIAN COORDINATOR FOR YEMEN,
JOHANNES VAN DER KLAUW**

(Amman, 4 May 2015) – The aid operation in Yemen is dependent on safe access in and out of the country to meet the life-saving needs of people. For that reason, it is critical that humanitarians are assured safe and reliable access to Sana'a international airport, which is an important operational hub for the country.

However, coalition airstrikes have targeted the runways of Sana'a international airport over the past week, rendering them inoperable. No flights can take off or land while the runways are being repaired.

Yemen's airports constitute an essential lifeline for the country. Without access to the airports, aid agencies are unable to bring in staff, vital supplies of medicines and other critical life-saving assistance, or undertake medical evacuations of their personnel. Emergency relief and medical teams from abroad are likewise unable to fly in to scale up the humanitarian operation to address the needs of increasingly vulnerable Yemenis.

I strongly urge the coalition to stop targeting Sana'a international airport and to preserve this important lifeline - and all other airports and seaports - so that humanitarians can reach all those affected by the armed conflict in Yemen.

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OCHA press releases are available at www.unocha.org or www.reliefweb.int


The mission of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is to mobilize and coordinate effective and principled humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT OF SANA'A INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, SANA'A GOVERNORATE, YEMEN

Analysis with WorldView-2 Data Acquired 13 May 2015 and WorldView-3 Data Acquired 12 December 2014



Production Date:
6/3/2015
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Globe Number:
CE27116401YEM



This map illustrates satellite-detected damage and destruction at Sana'a International Airport, Sana'a Governorate, Yemen, using satellite imagery acquired 13 May 2015 and 12 December 2014. UNOSAT/UNOSAT identified a total of 178 affected structures and transportation vehicles. Approximately 18 of these were destroyed, 80 severely damaged, and 80 moderately damaged. Additionally, 30 impact craters were found. One medical facility was identified within 500 meters of impact craters. This is a preliminary analysis and has not yet been validated in the field. Please send ground feedback to UNOSAT/UNOSAT.

- Legend**
- Destroyed Structure
 - Severely Damaged Structure
 - Moderately Damaged Structure
 - Impact Crater
 - Medical Facility
 - Highway / Primary Road
 - Secondary Road
 - Local / Urban Road

Map Scale for A2: 1:14,000

Satellite Data (1): WorldView-2
Imagery Date: 13 May 2015
Resolution: 30 m
Copyright: DigitalGlobe, Inc.
Source: US Department of State, Humanitarian Information Unit, Northview License
Satellite Data (2): WorldView-3
Imagery Date: 12 December 2014
Resolution: 45 m
Copyright: DigitalGlobe, Inc.
Source: US Department of State, Humanitarian Information Unit, Northview License
Road Data: Google Map Maker / DSM / ESRI
Other Data: USGS, UNOSAT, NASA, WGA
Analysis: UNOSAT/UNOSAT
Production: UNOSAT/UNOSAT
Analysis conducted with ArcGIS v10.2
Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 38N
Projection: Transverse Mercator
Datum: WGS 1984
Units: Meter

The depiction and use of boundaries, geographic names and related data shown here are not warranted to be accurate nor do they imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. UNOSAT is a program of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), providing satellite imagery and related geographic information, research and analysis to UN humanitarian aid development agencies and their implementing partners.

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Annex 62: Coalition air strikes and attacks on medical facilities

Overview: The Panel documented 22 cases of airstrike attacks upon medical facilities, either directly hitting or damaging as a result of issues of proportionality. WHO reported on 1 October 2015, that with the conduct of hostilities in Yemen, **69** health facilities had been damaged or destroyed, including **10** hospitals fully damaged, **26** hospitals partially damaged, **6** health centres fully damaged and **6** health centres partially damaged.¹ However, these figures do not provide any information related to alleged perpetrators of the attacks. The Panel has documented an additional two attacks both upon MSF medical facilities, one in Haydan and more recently, in Ta'izz, raising WHO's figures of completely destroyed medical facilities to 30. In both cases of Haydan and Ta'izz, MSF had supplied GPS coordinates of their hospital locations to the Coalition.² The following provides information supplied of attacks upon hospitals and medical clinics in Yemen. All sources remain confidential.

1. Airstrikes upon MSF Mobile Clinic in Al Houban, Ta'izz

At 11.20am on Wednesday, 2 December 2015, the Coalition undertook airstrikes upon the MSF Mobile Health Clinic in Ta'izz. The Panel was told that MSF had been sharing its GPS coordinates with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on regular occasions, most recently on 29 November 2015.³ MSF's **clinic in Al Houban** provided urgent medical care to people displaced from their homes by the current conflict.⁴

On the occasion of this attack, three airstrikes targeted a park in Ta'izz city's Al Houban district, about two kilometers from MSF's tented clinic. The MSF team immediately evacuated the Al Houban clinic and informed the Saudi-led coalition that their jet planes were mounting an attack nearby. The clinic itself then came under attack. Those wounded in the airstrikes, including two with critical injuries, who were transferred to Al Qaidah and Al Resalah hospitals. Where MSF was also supporting both hospitals in treating war-wounded patients.⁵

The United Nations Secretary-General, Mr Ban Ki-moon, made an official statement condemning the attack.⁶

2. Airstrike upon MSF Haydan Hospital in Sada'a on 26 October 2015

The bombing of Haydan Hospital in Sada'a, was targeted and bombed by the Coalition airstrikes on the evening of Monday, 26 October 2015.⁷ The hospital was staffed by medical personnel from the

¹WHO "Yemen: Reported Violence Against Health Sector in Crisis 2015" (As of October 2015)". The information is available on-line at Reliefweb, at http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/reported_violence.pdf [last accessed on 2 January 2016].

²Panel interviews. Refer also to, The Guardian (4 December 2015) "MSF accuses Saudi-led coalition of bombing clinic in Yemen" at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/04/msf-accuses-saudi-led-coalition-of-bombing-clinic-in-yemen> [last accessed on 2 January 2016].

³MSF (3 December 2015) "Yemen: Nine Wounded in Saudi-Led Coalition Airstrike on MSF Clinic in Ta'izz" at, <http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/article/yemen-nine-wounded-saudi-led-coalition-airstrike-msf-clinic-taiz> [last accessed on 8 December 2015]. Information also provided to the Panel from a confidential source.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Panel interviews.

⁶United Nations, Statement attributable to the Spokesman for the Secretary-General on Yemen (New York, 2 December 2015) at, <http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=9306> [last accessed on 8 December 2015].

international medical NGO, MSF, at the time. The Coalition undertook at least five strikes upon the hospital; patients and staff inside the hospital at the time of the attack.⁸

The Director of the Hospital, Doctor Ali Mughli, stated that several people had been injured during the strikes,⁹

“The air raids resulted in the destruction of the entire hospital with all that was inside - devices and medical supplies - and the moderate wounding of several people [...].”

Some reports suggested that the Coalition had preceded the strikes by two smaller missile taps on the roof as a warning mechanism, thus demonstrating its intent to target the hospital.¹⁰

An MSF spokesperson said that all staff had left the facility following the first strike. There were two patients in the in-patient department who also managed to escape after the first airstrike. Miriam Czech, MSF project coordinator in Sa'ada, stated,¹¹

“I was not able to go inside as we believed there were remaining bombs that have not been exploded, but I can confirm that the facility is 99 percent destroyed, [...] The emergency room was destroyed, the OPD, the IPD the lap and the maternity was destroyed. There was functioning OT but that was also destroyed.”

The facility had been the only life-saving facility in the region and has a catchment area of 200,000 people. The hospital received around 150 emergency cases a week.¹² Since May 2015, the hospital received around 3,400 injured, but fewer patients had been received recently, due to fears of airstrikes.¹³

The United Nations Secretary General, Mr Ban Ki-Moon, responded officially in a Written Statement about the attack,¹⁴

“[...] hospitals and medical personnel are explicitly protected under international humanitarian law. He further reminds all parties of the utmost necessity to respect their obligations under international human rights law and international humanitarian law to prevent attacks against civilians and civilian objects. The Secretary-General calls for a prompt, effective and impartial investigation in order to ensure accountability. [...]”

⁷Reuters (27 October 2015) “Yemeni MSF hospital bombed, Saudi-led coalition denies responsibility” at, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/27/us-yemen-security-idUSKCN0SL0VK20151027> [last accessed on 27 October 2015].

⁸Panel interviews.

⁹ RT (27 October 2015) “Yemen hospital hit by Saudi-led airstrikes - Medecins Sans Frontieres” at, <https://www.rt.com/news/319817-yemen-hospital-saudi-strike/> [last accessed on 27 October 2015].

¹⁰ Panel interviews.

¹¹ Ibid at note 193.

¹² Panel interviews.

¹³ Middle East Eye (27 October 2015) “UN chief condemns Saudi-led strike on MSF hospital in Yemen” at, <http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/msf-facility-northern-yemen-hit-airstrike-1635444162> [last accessed on 27 October 2015].

¹⁴ Statement attributable to the Spokesman for the Secretary-General on Yemen, (New York, 27 October 2015), at <http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=9187> [last accessed on 27 October 2015].

Refer below for a full copy of the United Nations Secretary General's Written Statement (dated 27 October 2015).



Photographs taken by MSF in Sada'a, Yemen, after the airstrike upon Haydan Hospital on 26 October 2015.

3. Airstrikes attacks on at least 20 Medical Facilities within Yemen

The Panel was provided written information pertaining to airstrikes observed by humanitarian organisations within Yemen.¹⁵ The Panel has documented these, but has been unable to independently corroborate them. These incidents are listed below:

On Saturday, 18 April 2015, MSF Health Centre in Huth (Amran) was partially destroyed because of an airstrike close by. Patients were evacuated and the staff left the hospital. The subsequent lack of medical services available has resulted in severe consequences for the general health of the population. A nearby MSF hospital in Khameer was overcrowded, when trying to care for the patients from Huth; patients from the north of Amran province were without alternatives, including some critical obstetric cases and as a result some patients with treatable conditions died. The Huth Health Centre remained closed for one month.

On Friday, 24 April 2015, several shells fell on Haradh town (Hajja governorate). Big pieces of shrapnel fell less than thirty meters from Haradh public hospital while medical staff received the first of the wounded.

On Thursday, 7 May 2015, an unexploded missile from a coalition attack was found 150m away from the main entrance of a MSF hospital in Aden (sheikh Othman). It took more than two weeks to remove.

On Monday, 11 May 2015, Coalition airstrikes on Nuqum Mountain near Sana'a impacted surrounding residential areas, including hospitals such as al-Thawra hospital or al-Andalus health centre.

During June 2015, the Al Acha Health Centre (Amran), was partially destroyed in an airstrike and closed for several weeks. Saqain hospital was also hit during June 2015, resulting in patients having to travel to Haydan or Saada for their medical treatment.

At 9.00am on Friday, 5 June 2015, an ambulance of Haradh Hospital was attacked by a helicopter while recovering injured people in Al Minzalah area in Al Malahed district. On board were 7 people: the morgue responsible and his assistant; one medical assistant driving the ambulance, 2 patients

¹⁵ During interviews and follow-up with a number of humanitarian organisations in Yemen, including two United Nations agencies.

and their respective caretakers. The morgue responsible and his assistant managed to escape from the car during the attack. They were injured, but they were able to arrive to Haradh. The medical assistant and the 4 civilians remain unaccounted for.

On Thursday, 25 June 2015, Coalition airstrikes hit around and inside the compound of the Haradh Hospital (maternity building). The 20 staff members had to flee with two ambulances.

On Tuesday, 30 June 2015, two bombs hit a school located less than 200m from the Haydan hospital.

On Thursday, 25 June and Saturday, 11 July 2015, Haradh Public Hospital (Hajjah governorate) was hit during airstrikes, causing serious damage to the hospital's main departments, as well as civilian injuries.

On Tuesday, 30 June 2015 and Monday and Tuesday, 6-7 July 2015, there were strikes within 250 metres of Haydan hospital. These strikes targeted private houses, a school and the market. Hospital windows were broken and shrapnel landed in the compound. During both occasions, MSF teams were inside the hospital during the strikes.

On Tuesday, 7 July 2015, Haradh's German hospital suffered collateral damage from airstrikes targeting a nearby house, causing damage to the generators and buildings, as well as several casualties.

On Thursday, 23 July 2015, seven bombs hit Haydan town, including the market, fuel station, two private houses, and a school located within 75 metres of the hospital. Ten hospital windows were broken and the hospital walls were damaged by shrapnel.

On Friday, 7 August 2015, bombs hit a building next to Al Jumhury general Hospital and a MSF house in Sa'ada. Shrapnel fragments arrived in the yard of the hospital.

At the end of August 2015, Maran Health Centre (Sa'ada) was destroyed during an airstrike by a direct hit. The Centre served a city of 30,000 inhabitants. As a result of the airstrike the population had to travel to Haydan or Saada, for medical treatment.

On the 3 September 2015, Razih Hospital (Sa'ada) was completely destroyed by two direct airstrikes on the hospital, three people were seriously wounded.

On Sunday, 6 September 2015, Al Sabeen Child Hospital was evacuated due to a series of airstrikes in front of the premises. The patients (some in critical conditions) were transferred to other hospitals. This was the main paediatric hospital in the country.

On Tuesday, 8 September 2015, the Coalition fighter jets from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the UAE conducted airstrikes on the **al-Sabeen Maternity and Children's Hospital**, which reportedly asked for help from international aid organisations to evacuate patients. Two children were killed in the attack.¹⁶

On Monday, 26 October 2015, the Coalition conducted airstrikes on **Nasser hospital** in Sana'a. The hospital had many patients inside at the time of the air strikes. The hospital sustained some damage, but was not destroyed.

On 9 October 2015, the Coalition conducted airstrikes in Hodeida that damaged the **Al-Thawra Hospital**. The hospital was damaged due to airstrikes taking place all around it and some of which had hit the hospital roof.

¹⁶ Vice News (6 September 2015) "Saudi-led Airstrikes Reportedly Hit a Wake and a Children's Hospital in Yemen" at, https://news.vice.com/article/saudi-led-airstrikes-reportedly-hit-a-wake-and-a-childrens-hospital-in-yemen?utm_source=vicenewstwitter [last accessed on 27 October 2015].

Earlier in the conflict, during May 2015, the Coalition undertook airstrikes hitting the **Al Qafla Hospital**.

STATEMENT

Statement attributable to the Spokesman for the Secretary-General on Yemen

New York, 27 October 2015

The Secretary-General condemns the airstrikes by the Saudi-led Coalition that hit the Hayadeen Medical Hospital, run by Médecins Sans Frontières with support from UNICEF and the World Health Organization in Sa'dah governorate. The strikes reportedly resulted in injuries to several people and the complete destruction of the facility.

The Secretary-General notes that hospitals and medical personnel are explicitly protected under international humanitarian law. He further reminds all parties of the utmost necessity to respect their obligations under international human rights law and international humanitarian law to prevent attacks against civilians and civilian objects. The Secretary-General calls for a prompt, effective and impartial investigation in order to ensure accountability.

The Secretary-General calls on all parties to the conflict in Yemen to immediately cease all operations, including airstrikes.¹⁷

¹⁷ Statement attributable to the Spokesman for the Secretary-General on Yemen, (New York, 27 October 2015), at, <http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=9187> [last accessed on 27 October 2015].

Annex 63: STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL*

* The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential.

Map 1: Methodology and analysis

1. Methodology

In order to corroborate evidences collected from reports and testimonies, the Panel who was not able to travel to Yemen chose to use satellites imagery provided by commercial companies contracted by Geospatial Information Section (GIS) of the UN Department of Field Support (DFS).

The Panel drafted the requirements in order to allow GIS to purchase the service needed to allow:


- Assessment of damage related to the conflict in population centers;
- Assessment damage to civilian objects;
- Assessment military buildup in areas controlled by Houthi-Saleh forces;
- Assessment looting of military compounds and diversion of arms Houthi-Saleh forces;
- Assessment of infrastructures potentially used for smuggling activities.

The Panel opted for an analysis of satellite imagery and comparison of the situation on the ground before and after issuance of resolution 2140 and 2216 mandating the sanctions and the arms embargo. The general aim was to identify general trends of destruction and military buildup in order to identify potential actors behind violation of the sanction regime.

The Panel intended to compare images at the following three time intervals:

- Pre Ansarallah: just before 26 February 2014, date of issuance of resolution 2140;
- Pre coalition campaign/arms embargo: Just before 26 March 2015 start of the campaign and 14 April 2015 issuance of resolution 2216;
- Pre drafting of the report coalition airstrikes October 2015 (Drafting of the report mid November 2015)

The geographical points of interests desired by the Panel comprised: Aden, Ad Dali, Al Hudeyda, Al Mukalla, Amran, Midi Port, Harad, Mocha Port, Sa'dah, Sana'a, Ta'izz, Ma'rib, Bab Al mandab, Border Oman.



2. Parameters for analysis

However due to lack of availability of archives images for desired periods, the Panel had to review its requirements and opt for comparing images between the most current image and the most recent before the conflict. At the submission of this report, the Panel was able to get images for Harad, Midi, Sa'dah and Sana'a only. Images for Ta'izz and Mokha have been purchased during the last days before submitting the report and were not processed in time to be included in this report. They will be provided to the committee as an additional annex.

1. The Panel made its analysis based on the fact that:
2. Most of the building destroyed in Sana'a is a result of airstrikes by coalition forces. Sana'a has not seen any internal fighting using heavy weapons by ground forces although few buildings might have been destroyed as result of terrorist attacks or blown up by Houthis;
3. Most of building destroyed in Harrad, in Midi and Sa'dah have been as a result of coalition's airstrikes and shelling since these cities are within ranges of ground artillery using 155 mm shells;
4. The coalition has generally used 500 to 2000 pounds bombs or air to surface guided missiles of type similar to US made MK 82, MK 84 as well as BLU 109 (see photo below). MK 82, the smallest bomb has a blast and fragmentation radius of 1000 meters at a minimum.
5. Individuals within 1000 metters of destroyed buildings suffer most likely from severe wounds by blast and fragmentations effects. Individuals within closer radius suffer from burns, blast and fragmentations effects.



6. Unexploded BLU 109, probably as a result of fuse's failure to arm, found in Yemen and shared with the panel by activists. BLU-109 is a 2000 pounds hardened penetration bomb called "bunker busters". It is not part of the Yemeni arsenal and is used in the region by Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates and most likely supplied by Saudi Arabia to other coalition members.

3. Findings

Based on analysis of satellite images, the Panel noted that within less than six months of bombings out of nine months at the submission of this report, more than 750 buildings may have been destroyed as a result of airstrikes within population centers.

Sa'dah has suffered the most with 226 destroyed buildings identified on 22 May 2015, in less than three months of coalition campaign. Harradh and Midi port which are small in size and without military structures visible have also been highly affected by bombing especially in congested areas.

In Sana'a and Sana'a airport, most of the bombings seem to have targeted security forces structures which are scattered throughout these localities. However, most of the bombs impacts are within less than 1000 meters of civilian centers and hence civilians have most likely suffered from blast and fragmentation effects.

The Panel has grounds to believe that the coalition has deliberately targeted civilian centers in Harad and Sa'dah and has not taken precautionary measures while targeting security forces inside population centers in Sana'a.

Summary


Location	Affected or destroyed buildings, constructions or objects (estimated)	Analyzed satellite imagery
Harad	12 buildings or constructions; 89 buildings or constructions (unverified);	Before impact: WV1 acquisition date 2013-12-22 time 07:34:45 ; After impact: GE1 acquisition date 2015-08-31 time 07:46:29
Port Midi	38 buildings or constructions;	Before impact: WV3 acquisition date 2014-11-17 time 07:39:39; After impact: WV1 acquisition date 2015-07-24 time 09:15:50
Sa'dah	226 buildings or constructions;	Before impact: WV3 acquisition date 2015-01-06 time 07:30:58; After impact: WV1 acquisition date 2015-05-22 time 08:57:33
Sana'a	390 buildings or constructions; 38 buildings or constructions (prior to impact); 11 Craters	Before impact: Pléades acquisition date 2015-03-14 time 07:23:57; After impact: Pléades acquisition date 2015-09-23 time 07:39:53

Location	Affected or destroyed buildings, constructions or objects (estimated)	Analyzed satellite imagery
Sana'a airport	52 buildings or constructions; 29 airplane debris; 27 craters	Before impact: Pléiades acquisition date 2015-03-13 time 07:31:57; After impact: Pléiades acquisition date 2015-09-10 time 07:39:32

Map 2: Harad


NOTE:

1. Satellite imagery covering exact extent of Panel's Area Of Interest (AOI) within specified time frame were not available in the archive of Satellite Imagery Vendor.
2. Panel selected imagery collected on 22 December 2013 and 31 August 2015. See below image: Image outlined in green was collected on 22 December 2013; Image outlined in purple was collected on 31 August 2015.
3. The verification of destroyed buildings was conducted in the area overlapping both images. Marked with yellow circles.
4. The observation of destroyed buildings was conducted in the area that does not overlap both images. Marked in blue circles and identified as UNVERIFIED destroyed buildings.
5. The observation was conducted based on presence of rubble around buildings with burnt colour as partial destruction of building's shape.



Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DPS, United Nations
 Imagery source: WV1 acquisition date 2013-12-22 time 07:34:45 (c) DigitalGlobe; GF1 acquisition date 2015-08-31 time 07:40:29 (c) DigitalGlobe


Harad, Index, Destructions (before and after)



Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: WV1 acquisition date 2013-12-22 time 07:34:45 (c) DigitalGlobe; GE1 acquisition date 2015-08-31 time 07:46:29 (c) DigitalGlobe


Harad town – North, P3, destructions (after)



Note: Comparison/verification of destruction could not be performed due to lack of pre-event imagery. Observed destroyed buildings marked in blue and identified as UNVERIFIED. The observation was conducted based on presence of rubble around buildings with burnt color and partial destruction of building's shape.

Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations Imagery source: WV1 acquisition date 2013-12-22 time 07:34:45 (c) DigitalGlobe; GE1 acquisition date 2015-08-31 time 07:46:29 (c) DigitalGlobe

Harad town – Centre, P4, destructions (after)



Note: Comparison/verification of destruction could not be performed due to lack of pre-event imagery. Observed destroyed buildings marked in blue and identified as UNVERIFIED. The observation was conducted based on presence of rubble around buildings with burnt color and partial destruction of building's shape.

Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations Imagery source: WV1 acquisition date 2013-12-22 time 07:34:45 (c) DigitalGlobe; GE1 acquisition date 2015-08-31 time 07:46:29 (c) DigitalGlobe

Harad town – West, P5, destructions (after)



Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations


Imagery source: WV1 acquisition date 2013-12-22 time 07:34:45 (c) DigitalGlobe; GE1 acquisition date 2015-08-31 time 07:46:29 (c) DigitalGlobe

Harad town – South, P6, destructions (after)

Note: Comparison/verification of destruction could not be performed due to lack of pre-event imagery. Observed destroyed buildings marked in blue and identified as UNVERIFIED. The observation was conducted based on presence of rubble around buildings with burnt colour and partial destruction of building's shape.

Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: WV1 acquisition date 2013-12-22 time 07:34:45 (c) DigitalGlobe; GE1 acquisition date 2015-08-31 time 07:46:29 (c) DigitalGlobe


Map 3: Port Midi

Port Midi, P2, destructions (after)



Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: WV3 acquisition date 2014-11-17 time 07:39:39 (c) DigitalGlobe; WV1 acquisition date 2015-07-24 time 09:15:50 (c) DigitalGlobe

Port Midi, P3, destructions

Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: WV3 acquisition date 2014-11-17 time 07:39:39 (c) DigitalGlobe;


WV1 acquisition date 2015-07-24 time 09:15:50 (c) DigitalGlobe

Map 4: Mocha**NOTE:**

Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations


Imagery source: Pléiades acquisition date 2015-03-29 time 07:57:54 (c) Airbus; Pléiades acquisition date 2015-10-04 time 07:55:27 (c) Airbus PAGE 1

1. Satellite imagery covering exact extent of Panel's Area Of Interest (AOI) within specified time frame were not available in the archive of Satellite Imagery Vendor.
2. Panel selected Imagery collected on 29 March 2015 and 04 October 2015. See below image: Image outlined in green was collected on 29 March 2015; Image outlined in red was collected on 04 October 2015.
3. The observation of destroyed or partially destroyed building or constructions on the northern part of Mocha was no possible. Post event imagery of northern Mocha is not available.
4. The observation of destroyed buildings was conducted only for imagery overlapping area – southern Mocha.



Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations


Imagery source: Pléiades acquisition date 2015-03-29 time 07:57:54 (c) Airbus; Pléiades acquisition date 2015-10-04 time 07:55:27 (c) Airbus

Mocha, P2, destructions, Index

Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: Pléiades acquisition date 2015-03-29 time 07:57:54 (c) Airbus; Pléiades acquisition date 2015-10-04 time 07:55:27 (c) Airbus

Mocha, P3, destructions, Index



Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: Pléiades acquisition date 2015-03-29 time 07:57:54 (c) Airbus; Pléiades acquisition date 2015-10-04 time 07:55:27 (c) Airbus

Mocha, P4, destructions, Index



Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: Pléiades acquisition date 2015-03-29 time 07:57:54 (c) Airbus; Pléiades acquisition date 2015-10-04 time 07:55:27 (c) Airbus

Mocha, P5, destructions, Index



Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations


Imagery source: Pléiades acquisition date 2015-03-29 time 07:57:54 (c) Airbus; Pléiades acquisition date 2015-10-04 time 07:55:27 (c) Airbus

Mocha, P6, destructions, Index


Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: Pléiades acquisition date 2015-03-29 time 07:57:54 (c) Airbus; Pléiades acquisition date 2015-10-04 time 07:55:27 (c) Airbus

Map 5: Sa'dah




Sa'dah, P2, destructions (after)



Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: WV3 acquisition date 2015-01-06 time 07:30:58 (c) DigitalGlobe; WV1 acquisition date 2015-05-22 time 08:57:33 (c) DigitalGlobe


Sa'dah, P3, destructions (after)



Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: WV3 acquisition date 2015-01-06 time 07:30:58 (c) DigitalGlobe; WV1 acquisition date 2015-05-22 time 08:57:33 (c) DigitalGlobe

Sa'dah, P4, Military positions



Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: WV3 acquisition date 2015-01-06 time 07:30:58 (c) DigitalGlobe; WV1 acquisition date 2015-05-22 time 08:57:33 (c) DigitalGlobe

Sa'dah Airport, P5, destructions (after)



Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: WV3 acquisition date 2015-01-06 time 07:30:58 (c) DigitalGlobe; WV1 acquisition date 2015-05-22 time 08:57:33 (c) DigitalGlobe


Sa'dah, P6, destructions (after)



Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: WV3 acquisition date 2015-01-06 time 07:30:58 (c) DigitalGlobe; WV1 acquisition date 2015-05-22 time 08:57:33 (c) DigitalGlobe

Map 6: Sana'a



Sana'a, P2, destructions (after)

Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: Pléiades acquisition date 2015-03-14 time 07:23:57 (c) Airbus; Pléiades acquisition date 2015-09-23 time 07:39:53 (c) Airbus

Sana'a, P3, destructions



Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: Pléiades acquisition date 2015-03-14 time 07:23:57 (c) Airbus; Pléiades acquisition date 2015-09-23 time 07:39:53 (c) Airbus

Sana'a, P4, destructions

Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: Pléiades acquisition date 2015-03-14 time 07:23:57 (c) Airbus; Pléiades acquisition date 2015-09-23 time 07:39:53 (c) Airbus

Sana'a, P5, destructions



Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: Pléiades acquisition date 2015-03-14 time 07:23:57 (c) Airbus; Pléiades acquisition date 2015-09-23 time 07:39:53 (c) Airbus

Sana'a, P6, destructions



Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations


Imagery source: Pléiades acquisition date 2015-03-14 time 07:23:57 (c) Airbus; Pléiades acquisition date 2015-09-23 time 07:39:53 (c) Airbus

Sana'a, P6, destructions



Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: Pléiades acquisition date 2015-03-14 time 07:23:57 (c) Airbus; Pléiades acquisition date 2015-09-23 time 07:39:53 (c) Airbus

Sana'a, P8, destructions

Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: Pléiades acquisition date 2015-03-14 time 07:23:57 (c) Airbus; Pléiades acquisition date 2015-09-23 time 07:39:53 (c) Airbus

Sana'a, P9, destructions



Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: Pléiades acquisition date 2015-03-14 time 07:23:57 (c) Airbus; Pléiades acquisition date 2015-09-23 time 07:39:53 (c) Airbus

Sana'a, P10, destructions

Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: Pléiades acquisition date 2015-03-14 time 07:23:57 (c) Airbus; Pléiades acquisition date 2015-09-23 time 07:39:53 (c) Airbus

Sana'a, P11, destructions



Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: Pléiades acquisition date 2015-03-14 time 07:23:57 (c) Airbus; Pléiades acquisition date 2015-09-23 time 07:39:53 (c) Airbus

Sana'a, P12, destructions



Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: Pléiades acquisition date 2015-03-14 time 07:23:57 (c) Airbus; Pléiades acquisition date 2015-09-23 time 07:39:53 (c) Airbus

Sana'a, P13, destructions



Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: Pléiades acquisition date 2015-03-14 time 07:23:57 (c) Airbus; Pléiades acquisition date 2015-09-23 time 07:39:53 (c) Airbus

Sana'a, P14, destructions

Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: Pléiades acquisition date 2015-03-14 time 07:23:57 (c) Airbus; Pléiades acquisition date 2015-09-23 time 07:39:53 (c) Airbus

Sana'a, P15, destructions



Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: Pléiades acquisition date 2015-03-14 time 07:23:57 (c) Airbus; Pléiades acquisition date 2015-09-23 time 07:39:53 (c) Airbus

Sana'a, P16, destructions

Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: Pléiades acquisition date 2015-03-14 time 07:23:57 (c) Airbus; Pléiades acquisition date 2015-09-23 time 07:39:53 (c) Airbus

Sana'a, P17, destructions



Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: Pléiades acquisition date 2015-03-14 time 07:23:57 (c) Airbus; Pléiades acquisition date 2015-09-23 time 07:39:53 (c) Airbus

Sana'a, P18, destructions



Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: Pléiades acquisition date 2015-03-14 time 07:23:57 (c) Airbus; Pléiades acquisition date 2015-09-23 time 07:39:53 (c) Airbus

Sana'a, P19, destructions



Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: Pléiades acquisition date 2015-03-14 time 07:23:57 (c) Airbus; Pléiades acquisition date 2015-09-23 time 07:39:53 (c) Airbus


Sana'a, P20, destructions



Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: Pléiades acquisition date 2015-03-14 time 07:23:57 (c) Airbus; Pléiades acquisition date 2015-09-23 time 07:39:53 (c) Airbus

Map 7: Sana'a airport



Sana'a airport, P2, destructions

Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: Pléiades acquisition date 2015-03-14 time 07:23:57 (c) Airbus; Pléiades acquisition date 2015-09-23 time 07:39:53 (c) Airbus

Sana'a airport, P3, destructions



Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: Pléiades acquisition date 2015-03-14 time 07:23:57 (c) Airbus; Pléiades acquisition date 2015-09-23 time 07:39:53 (c) Airbus

Sana'a airport, P4, destructions

Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: Pléiades acquisition date 2015-03-14 time 07:23:57 (c) Airbus; Pléiades acquisition date 2015-09-23 time 07:39:53 (c) Airbus


Sana'a airport, P5, destructions



Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: Pléiades acquisition date 2015-03-14 time 07:23:57 (c) Airbus; Pléiades acquisition date 2015-09-23 time 07:39:53 (c) Airbus


Sana'a airport, P6, destructions



Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: Pléiades acquisition date 2015-03-14 time 07:23:57 (c) Airbus; Pléiades acquisition date 2015-09-23 time 07:39:53 (c) Airbus


Map 8: Ta'izz



Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: Pléiades acquisition date 2015-04-02 time 07:28:40 (c) Airbus; World View 1 acquisition date 2015-07-16 time 09:07:58 (c) Digital Globe

Ta'izz, P2, destructions



Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: Pléiades acquisition date 2015-04-02 time 07:28:40 (c) Airbus; World View 1 acquisition date 2015-07-16 time 09:07:58 (c) Digital Globe

Ta'izz, P3, destructions



Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: Pléiades acquisition date 2015-04-02 time 07:28:40 (c) Airbus; World View 1 acquisition date 2015-07-16 time 09:07:58 (c) Digital Globe


Ta'izz, P4, destructions



Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: Pléiades acquisition date 2015-04-02 time 07:28:40 (c) Airbus; World View 1 acquisition date 2015-07-16 time 09:07:58 (c) Digital Globe


Ta'izz, P5, destructions



Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: Pléiades acquisition date 2015-04-02 time 07:28:40 (c) Airbus; World View 1 acquisition date 2015-07-16 time 09:07:58 (c) Digital Globe


Ta'izz, P6, destructions



Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: Pléiades acquisition date 2015-04-02 time 07:28:40 (c) Airbus; World View 1 acquisition date 2015-07-16 time 09:07:58 (c) Digital Globe

Ta'izz, P7, destructions



Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: Pléiades acquisition date 2015-04-02 time 07:28:40 (c) Airbus; World View 1 acquisition date 2015-07-16 time 09:07:58 (c) Digital Globe


Ta'izz, P8, destructions



Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: Pléiades acquisition date 2015-04-02 time 07:28:40 (c) Airbus; World View 1 acquisition date 2015-07-16 time 09:07:58 (c) Digital Globe


Ta'izz, Possible check points, situation on markets and gas stations, Index



Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: Pléiades acquisition date 2015-04-02 time 07:28:40 (c) Airbus; World View 1 acquisition date 2015-07-16 time 09:07:58 (c) Digital Globe

Ta'izz, Possible check points, situation on markets and gas stations, P2



Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: Pléiades acquisition date 2015-04-02 time 07:28:40 (c) Airbus; World View 1 acquisition date 2015-07-16 time 09:07:58 (c) Digital Globe


Ta'izz, Possible check points, situation on markets and gas stations, P3




Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: Pléiades acquisition date 2015-04-02 time 07:28:40 (c) Airbus; World View 1 acquisition date 2015-07-16 time 09:07:58 (c) Digital Globe

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Ta'izz, Possible check points, situation on markets and gas stations, P5



Prepared by: Geospatial Information Section, ICTD, DFS, United Nations

Imagery source: Pléiades acquisition date 2015-04-02 time 07:28:40 (c) Airbus; World View 1 acquisition date 2015-07-16 time 09:07:58 (c) Digital Globe