

**Security Council**

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**Letter dated 11 December 2014 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council**

I have the honour to transmit herewith the fifth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established pursuant to resolution 1526 (2004), which was submitted to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) in accordance with paragraph (a) of the annex to resolution 2160 (2014).

I should be grateful if the report could be brought to the attention of the Council members and issued as a document of the Security Council.

*(Signed)* Gary **Quinlan**  
Chair

Security Council Committee established  
pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011)



**Letter dated 31 October 2014 from the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011)**

I enclose the Monitoring Team's fifth report, prepared pursuant to paragraph (a) of the annex to resolution 2160 (2014).

The Monitoring Team notes that the original language of the report is English. For ease of reference, the three recommendations made by the Team are in bold.

(Signed) Alexander **Evans**  
Coordinator  
Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team  
established pursuant to resolution 1526 (2004)

**Fifth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, submitted pursuant to resolution 2160 (2014) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace, stability and security of Afghanistan**

*Summary*

The present report provides an update on the situation since the fourth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team was submitted to the Committee on 30 April 2014 (S/2014/402). The inauguration of the new President of Afghanistan on 29 September marked the first democratic and peaceful transition of executive authority in the history of Afghanistan. This was achieved despite intensive efforts by the Taliban to disrupt the second round of the presidential elections on 14 June 2014. The Taliban also exploited the political uncertainty following the elections until a government of national unity was formed in September 2014. Consequently, 2014 saw a significantly elevated number of Taliban attacks across Afghanistan, marking an increase in their activity.

Although the current fighting season has not yet concluded, the prospects of the Taliban breaking the strategic stalemate look slim despite the almost complete withdrawal of international combat troops. The most intensive military onslaught of the Taliban during the 2014 fighting season resulted in several district centres in the south and the east being overrun, but only briefly, as the government forces proved resilient and were able to recapture them within days. Meanwhile, an intensive Taliban effort to take control of Sangin district in Helmand Province failed.

On the political front, the Taliban leadership remains largely opposed to reconciliation, despite some elements that argue in favour. Hardliners from the “Da Fidayano Mahaz”<sup>1</sup> (not listed), the “Tora Bora Mahaz” (not listed) and other affiliates push for renewed military efforts and argue that a campaign of attrition will wear out government forces and institutions over a period of several years. Meanwhile, the pragmatists associated with the Mu’tasim Group argue for a negotiated settlement, which they believe could be to the Taliban’s advantage.

Stability in Afghanistan in 2015 and beyond will depend on two essential factors: the sustainability of external economic assistance, which is crucial to supporting the Government of Afghanistan and the national security forces and their continued development, and the persistence of Afghan confidence in government institutions and security forces, which is crucial to maintaining morale.

Regrettably, the Monitoring Team continues to receive a steady — albeit officially unconfirmed — flow of media reports indicating that some listed individuals have become increasingly adept at circumventing the sanctions measures, the travel ban in particular. Continuing to raise awareness with all stakeholders of the central role of the sanctions measures and their implementation as part of the wider political strategy of the international community remains one of the key tasks of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) and the Team.

<sup>1</sup> This group is also known as “Fidayi Mahaz”.

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## I. Evidence base

1. The Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team was unable to visit Afghanistan during the period leading to the present report owing to the extended political transition that followed the elections. The Team continued to receive regular official updates on the security situation, however, through established channels of communication with the Afghan National Security Forces, notably the national police's command centre and the National Directorate of Security. Through these channels, Afghan authorities continued to provide daily reports on the security situation and information concerning the status and activities of listed individuals. The Team also received information from Member States on the situation in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the Team discussed the situation with Afghan officials during meetings outside Afghanistan as well as through regular discussions with the Permanent Mission of Afghanistan to the United Nations in New York. Since the Team has not yet met with the newly formed Government of Afghanistan, it will refrain from offering detailed recommendations in the present report. The Team will include implementation proposals in its special report on organized crime and the financing of the Taliban, to be submitted by 1 December 2014 to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) in response to a request of the Council contained in the annex to its resolution 2160 (2014).

## II. Political context

2. The reporting period saw elevated levels of Taliban violence during a time of political and security transition in Afghanistan. The continuing drawdown of foreign combat troops and the two rounds of presidential elections were significant milestones for the country and a first serious test for both the post-Taliban political elite and the Afghan security apparatus. At the same time, the military forces of Pakistan started a long-awaited military operation in its border area with Afghanistan, which was still under way at the time of writing. That operation represents another important and sustained effort by Pakistan to assert control over groups located in that area. The Government of Afghanistan is concerned that the tens of thousands of refugees from the border area who are reported to have crossed over into Afghanistan as a result of the ongoing military operations could include a number of individuals from terrorist groups.

3. As outlined in the Team's fourth report, the Taliban and associated groups declared their opposition to elections at the end of 2013 and prepared to disrupt the process all through the first quarter of 2014 (see [S/2014/402](#), para. 9). The Afghan security forces dismantled cells belonging to the Haqqani Network (TE.H.12.12) in Kabul, Khost, Paktia and other provinces. Cells directed by the Quetta Shura of the Taliban were dismantled in Kandahar, Helmand and Kabul provinces, contributing to a failure by the Taliban to significantly disrupt the first round of the presidential elections.

4. During the second round of the elections, on 14 June 2014, the Taliban and associated groups focused their operations on trying to assassinate presidential candidates, with attacks in Kabul, Kandahar, Khost and Nangarhar provinces. The Taliban failed in their aim to assassinate a presidential candidate and therefore force

a constitutionally mandated restart of the presidential elections.<sup>2</sup> The National Directorate of Security conducted 61 operations between 4 and 13 June 2014 in Kabul, Kandahar, Khost, Nangarhar, Herat, Helmand and Faryab provinces. As a result, 10 terrorist cells were disrupted and 51 individuals were arrested. According to the Afghan security forces, the cells belonged to the Haqqani Network, the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (QE.L.118.05) and the Taliban. In Kabul, six terrorist cells were monitored before 14 June 2014 by the Afghan security forces and disrupted in a simultaneous operation only 24 hours before election day in order to deny these forces an opportunity to regroup in time for the election. In total, 400 suspected terrorists were detained by the National Directorate of Security between 6 April and 14 June.

5. The Afghan national army was responsible for protecting the outer perimeter of election sites. The forces of the Ministry of Defence were involved in numerous firefights on 14 June 2014 and killed 164 and wounded 82. Nine soldiers were killed and 45 wounded. The Afghan national police found and disarmed 156 improvised explosive devices on the day of and on the day after the second round of the presidential elections in the provinces of Faryab, Kabul, Kandahar, Khost, Kunduz, Ghazni, Ghor, Helmand, Herat, Logar, Paktia, Paktika, Saripul, Takhar, Uruzgan, Wardak and Zabul. Ten militants killed themselves while trying to plant improvised explosive devices on roads in Samangan, Zabul and Logar provinces.

6. Although on the day of the second round of presidential elections the Taliban were still able to launch more attacks than during previous elections held in 2009 and 2010, they were ultimately unable to affect the turnout, which was significantly higher than during the previous elections.<sup>3</sup> The resilience and strength of the Afghan security forces was hailed by many national and international commentators as one of the election's most significant outcomes.

7. Allegations of fraud in the second round of the presidential elections resulted in an unprecedented full audit of all the votes that were cast, several million in total. The audit was conducted in August and September and was supervised by the United Nations and other international monitors. Its results were binding and the winner went on to head a government of national unity. After a lengthy process to resolve complaints over irregularities,<sup>4</sup> the outcome of the elections was announced on 21 September. Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai became President and Abdullah Abdullah was appointed chief executive, a newly created post akin to that of prime minister. The four-page joint agreement between Mr. Ghani and Mr. Abdullah called for the

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<sup>2</sup> Article 61 of the Constitution of Afghanistan, which was ratified on 26 January 2004, reads: "In case one of the presidential candidates dies during the first or second round of voting or after elections, but prior to the declaration of results, re-election shall be held according to provisions of the law".

<sup>3</sup> About 300 incidents were recorded on 20 August 2009 and 488 on 18 September 2010. On 14 June 2014, 530 security incidents were recorded, representing an increase of 11.3 per cent compared with the first round of the elections, held on 5 April, when 443 incidents were recorded; at least 237 incidents were directly related to the election (see [A/69/540-S/2014/656](#), para. 23).

<sup>4</sup> See [A/69/540-S/2014/656](#), paras. 2-17.

convening of a *loya jirga* during the following two years in order to amend the Constitution to reflect the recent creation of the post of chief executive.<sup>5</sup>

8. The inauguration of the new President of Afghanistan on 29 September marked the first democratic and peaceful transition of executive authority in the history of the country. During the summer, Afghan civil society stakeholders formulated possible road maps to peace in 30 provinces, reinforcing the strong mandate of the new President to engage with the Taliban while preserving the human rights gains made in the previous decade.<sup>6</sup>

### **Afghan Taliban summer offensive**

9. The Taliban increased their attacks in many parts of Afghanistan during the period of political uncertainty that followed the elections. Massive clashes took place in Helmand and Kandahar provinces between the Taliban and the Afghan security forces. As occurred during the 2013 fighting season, the Taliban assembled particularly large fighting forces in Helmand Province. For example, in July about 800 Taliban militants participated in strikes in various districts of Helmand, including Sangin district, that lasted over a week. Afghan authorities claimed having killed around 80 Taliban fighters.<sup>7</sup> The importance that the Taliban give to Sangin district was expressed on 17 August 2014, in an official statement on the Taliban website in which the group declared that “not for a second” had a ceasefire been agreed in the battle for Sangin. In the same announcement, the Taliban stated that the offensive in Sangin district had been under way for almost a month.

10. Military engagements also intensified between the Afghan security forces and the Taliban in the provinces of Badakhshan, Balkh, Faryab, Kunar, Kunduz and Zabul. In Nuristan Province, some territory and, briefly, the centre of Duaba district were lost to the Taliban. The Taliban continued to put significant pressure on the security forces in Kunduz and Faryab provinces. In Faryab Province, additional anti-government forces used heavier weapons than had previously been seen. As a result, the security forces suffered more losses during 2014 than they had in previous years (over 2,000 police officers and about 950 soldiers were killed since 21 March 2014).<sup>8</sup> These higher casualty figures may also reflect reduced support from international forces,<sup>9</sup> especially the phasing out of close air support and medical evacuation operations. Civilians continue to be most at risk. From

<sup>5</sup> A *loya jirga* as defined in article 110 of the Constitution of Afghanistan, consists of members of the National Assembly and the chairs of the provincial and district assemblies. Ahmad Qureshi and Javed Hamim Kakar, “Ghani, Abdullah sign deal on unity govt”, *Pajhwok Afghan News*, 8 August 2014. Available from [www.elections.pajhwok.com/en/2014/08/08/ghani-abdullah-sign-deal-unity-govt](http://www.elections.pajhwok.com/en/2014/08/08/ghani-abdullah-sign-deal-unity-govt).

<sup>6</sup> United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), “Afghan people’s dialogue on peace: building the foundations for an inclusive peace process — local road maps for peace” (Kabul, June 2014).

<sup>7</sup> *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Radio Free Afghanistan*, “Afghan army says regains full control of Helmand Province”, 30 June 2014.

<sup>8</sup> A spokesman of the Ministry of Defence of Afghanistan stated, on 22 October 2014, that the Afghan national army had lost 635 soldiers in 2009, 748 in 2010, 831 in 2011, 1,170 in 2012 and 1,392 in 2013. See also Javed Hamim Kaka, “ANA loses 950 soldiers in six months”, *Pajhwok Afghan News*, 21 October 2014.

<sup>9</sup> The majority of military bases in Afghanistan are already under the control of the Afghan security forces.

1 January to 30 June 2014, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) documented 4,853 civilian casualties, an increase of 24 per cent from the same period in 2013.<sup>10</sup>

11. Humanitarian organizations too are increasingly targeted by the Taliban. Since 2014, polio vaccination teams have regularly encountered security challenges in the south of Afghanistan, in particular in Helmand and Kandahar provinces.<sup>11</sup> Furthermore, on 13 October 2014 a United Nations aircraft came under small arms fire shortly after take-off from Gardez airport. This marks the first time that a fixed-wing United Nations aircraft is attacked in Afghanistan.

12. Nevertheless, despite a significant rise in Taliban military attacks, the level of outreach conducted by unarmed Afghan civil servants to districts across Afghanistan has only slightly diminished. In 2014, while the Taliban have clearly demonstrated their ability to greatly increase the level of day-to-day violence all over Afghanistan, they remain incapable of wresting full political control from the Government, even in remote districts.

### **III. Reconciliation**

13. The international community and the Government of Afghanistan made a number of gestures in support of reconciliation, some of which addressed demands made by the Taliban in 2009 and 2010. Over 30 Taliban have since been delisted. The Taliban are now subject to a sanctions regime that is separate from the one to which the terrorists of Al-Qaida (QE.A.4.01) are subject. Furthermore, a significant number of Taliban prisoners have been released in Afghanistan and neighbouring countries. The Taliban office in Doha has remained open. In a declaration adopted in September 2013, an international conference of religious scholars (ulama) developed a framework for potential negotiations (see [S/2014/402](#), para. 16). On around 1 June 2014, five Taliban prisoners detained in Guantanamo Bay were transferred to Qatar in a prisoner exchange with the Taliban. Finally, with the military transition in Afghanistan, the size of the foreign military presence and the scope of its mission have been greatly reduced. Despite a number of Taliban demands having been met over the past few years, however, there are currently no clear signals that the Taliban leadership is willing to engage in a political negotiation in a meaningful way.

#### **A. Contacts with the High Peace Council**

14. The attitude of the Taliban leadership to reconciliation does not appear to have changed significantly since the Team's fourth report was submitted. Some in the Afghan Taliban leadership continue to signal that they are willing to talk. This minority, however, remains unable to shift the leadership of the group in the same direction. In February 2014, a delegation of the High Peace Council led by the head of the secretariat of the Council, Masoom Stanekzai, met in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, with 16 high-ranking Taliban figures led by Abdul Wasay Mu'tasim Agha

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<sup>10</sup> UNAMA, "Midyear report 2014: protection of civilians in armed conflict" (Kabul, July 2014).

<sup>11</sup> Discussions of the Monitoring Team with humanitarian aid workers, August 2014. See also Anisa Shahid, "No polio vaccinations in remote Kandahar areas", *Tolo News*, 16 October 2014.

(delisted on 19 July 2012), the former finance minister of the Taliban “Islamic Emirate” and former head of the Taliban “financial commission”, to lay the ground for peace talks. Shortly thereafter, a member of the Taliban leadership in contact with the initiative was assassinated in Peshawar, Pakistan (see S/2014/417, paras. 18-19).

15. In April 2014, Mu’tasim Agha was forced to go into hiding in Dubai in order to protect his personal security,<sup>12</sup> another sign that the Taliban movement was threatening those arguing for a negotiated settlement. He was placed in protective custody by officials of the United Arab Emirates after threats were made against his life. Then, on 20 April, he travelled to Kabul. In recent months, the Taliban has repeatedly reminded the international community and all Pashto and Dari readers of their website that the Taliban political office in Qatar is the sole external interlocutor of the “Emirate”, thereby denying the group led by Mu’tasim Agha the authority to speak on behalf of the Taliban movement.

16. The resistance of the central leadership of the Taliban extends beyond the members of the Taliban movement. The Taliban also attempted to disrupt the political process by targeting members of the High Peace Council. On 21 June 2014, a suicide attack was carried out to try to assassinate Mr. Stanekzai, the head of the High Peace Council’s secretariat, in Kabul. It was the second unsuccessful attempt to kill Mr. Stanekzai in three years.<sup>13</sup>

17. Furthermore, on 25 July 2014, in his annual strategic speech on the occasion of Eid al-Fitr, Mullah Omar, listed as Mohammed Omar Ghulam Nabi (T.I.O.4.01), again emphasized the determination of the Taliban leadership to continue fighting. He stated that the Taliban would continue their fight until the last foreign soldier had left Afghanistan. Referring to the limited number of international trainers who were to remain in Afghanistan beyond 2014 in the framework of a mission of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), he stated that the presence of a limited number under any name would mean the continuation of the occupation and of the war.

## B. Prisoner releases

18. Since the Team’s fourth report was submitted, more Taliban prisoners have been released by Pakistan and Afghanistan. On 3 October 2014, Pakistan released a dozen Taliban prisoners, including the two brothers of Tayyib Agha (not listed), the former head of the Taliban political office in Qatar.<sup>14</sup> In February 2014, the Government of Afghanistan released 65 Taliban who were held in Bagram. This release became possible after the facility had been officially handed over to the Afghan authorities in March 2013.

19. In exchange for Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl, who had been held captive by the Taliban, five Taliban detainees were transferred from Guantanamo Bay to Qatar,

<sup>12</sup> On 23 April 2014, Mu’tasim Agha explained on his website that the “enemies of the peace process” had tried to assassinate him in the United Arab Emirates.

<sup>13</sup> On 22 September 2011, Mr. Stanekzai was in the room where a member of the Taliban killed the head of the High Peace Council, Burhanuddin Rabbani.

<sup>14</sup> Tahir Khan, “Pakistan releases brothers of Afghan Taliban’s top negotiator”, *The Express Tribune*, 4 October 2014.

where they were met by the Taliban political office. Four of the individuals are listed: Fazl Mohammad Mazloom (TI.M.23.01), Khairullah Khairkhwah (TI.K.93.01), Nurullah Nuri (TI.N.89.01) and Abdul-Haq Wassiq (TI.W.82.01). This release was credited largely to negotiations led by the Taliban political office in Doha and was welcomed by the Mu'tasim Group.<sup>15</sup>

20. Thus far, however, none of the releases have led to any other concession from the Taliban. In many places, the Taliban who were released from Bagram detention centre and Afghan prisons have become active again, as in the well-publicized cases of Mullah Sadar (not listed) in Helmand<sup>16</sup> and Mullah Munib (not listed) from Kandahar,<sup>17</sup> and the organizers of high-profile attacks carried out in Kabul in June 2014.<sup>18</sup> In the October 2014 issue of the Taliban magazine *Shahamat*, an article allegedly written by the former ambassador of the Taliban "Islamic Emirate" to Pakistan, Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef (delisted on 29 July 2010), was published arguing that President Ashraf Ghani had "given a negative answer" to the peace process by signing the bilateral security agreement with the United States of America and by being in favour of un-Islamic laws.

21. Afghan commentators felt that the Taliban exploited the reconciliation initiatives without showing any willingness to offer concessions. Owing to the efforts of the political office in Doha, which performed its task under the Taliban's instructions, the Taliban gained a political face at the global level and enjoyed a boost to their internal reputation. The transfer to Qatar of detainees was publically hailed by Taliban officials as a spectacular achievement.<sup>19</sup>

### C. Internal leadership challenges

22. Meanwhile, radical splinter groups have emerged within the Taliban movement and continue to gain prominence. These splinter groups are strongly opposed to any negotiation with the Government of Afghanistan. For example, "Da Fidayano Mahaz" declared that the members of the Taliban political office in Doha were traitors who sold their religion.<sup>20</sup> Consequently, on 16 June 2014 Da Fidayano Mahaz declared on its website that it was seeking the death of all those involved in the initiative in Qatar.<sup>21</sup> The seriousness of this internal conflict is demonstrated by the killing by unknown assassins of Qari Timur Shah, the brother of Da Fidayano Mahaz leader Mullah Najibullah, on 8 June 2014. In an obituary published in Pashtu on the Da Fidayano Mahaz website on 20 June, Mullah Najibullah claimed that this was the work of the Taliban circle backing a negotiated settlement of the conflict, which he called the "Qatari militia".

<sup>15</sup> Statement about the release of Taliban leaders from Guantanamo Bay published on the Mu'tasim Group website on 2 June 2014.

<sup>16</sup> According to a statement made by the Minister of Defence, Bismillah Khan, to the lower house of parliament in July 2014. See Abasin Zaheer, "Pakistani attacks aim to strengthen Taliban: Nabil", *Pahjwok Afghan News*, 2 July 2014.

<sup>17</sup> Ahmad Ramin, "Taliban commander released from Bagram a year ago", *Tolo News*, 9 January 2014.

<sup>18</sup> Rafi Sediqi, "Spate of attacks heighten Kabul security concerns", *Tolo News*, 29 July 2014.

<sup>19</sup> *British Broadcasting Corporation*, "Taliban's Mullah Omar celebrates prisoner-swap 'victory'", 1 June 2014.

<sup>20</sup> The Monitoring Team highlighted the emergence of this splinter group in its fourth report (see S/2014/402, paras. 20-21).

<sup>21</sup> See <http://alfida.org/afg/eng/wordpress/?p=495>.

## IV. Status of the Taliban

23. In September 2014, for the first time since 2002, the Taliban posted on their website information on their internal structure, which was more or less as had been described in previous reports of the Team (see annex I).<sup>22</sup> The decision to do so could have been motivated by an attempt to portray a government-like structure in opposition to the formation of the new Government of Afghanistan. The outline of the Taliban leadership structure offers some notable details. For example, the name of the finance commission was changed to “economic commission”, signalling a widening of the scope of the responsibility of the commission. Furthermore, in a lengthy article concerning the work of the economic commission, the Taliban mention the existence of an “office for mining”. This seems to point to the importance of the role that assets derived from illegal mining in Afghanistan play in the financial structure of the Taliban. Finally, in the same article, the Taliban provide a telephone number and an e-mail address through which the public can contact the economic commission on any questions concerning economic activities in Afghanistan.

24. In the aftermath of the first round of the presidential elections in Afghanistan, the head of the Taliban military commission, Abdul Qayyum Zakir (not listed), reportedly resigned (see also [S/2014/402](#), annex, footnote d). While at the time this could have been interpreted as a reaction to the failure of the Taliban to disrupt the election process, further discussions by the Team with Afghan officials point to a longer, more steady decline in Zakir’s status within the movement. The first rumours that he might be replaced surfaced in January 2014, before the elections.<sup>23</sup> Although the Taliban have not confirmed the appointment of Ibrahim Sadar (not listed) as the successor of Zakir, his new function as the head of the military commission has been repeatedly mentioned in Taliban publications. Sadar is said to be close to Mullah Omar and Akhtar Mohammad Mansour Shah Mohammed (TI.M.11.01).<sup>24</sup>

25. The change at the top of the Taliban military structure might offer an explanation as to why in 2014 the Taliban announced their spring offensive unusually late. While in previous years the offensive was usually announced around March and April, this year the Taliban announced at the beginning of May that the fighting season would start on 12 May 2014.<sup>25</sup>

26. The Haqqani Network remains active in Afghanistan, despite the death of a number of key leaders at the end of 2013. In October 2014, Afghan security officials announced that they had arrested the son of Jalaluddin Haqqani (TI.H.40.01), Anas

<sup>22</sup> In its first report, the Team provided an overview of the various commissions and the provincial leadership of the Taliban ([S/2012/683](#)). In its second report, the Team updated the overview by pointing out changes at the provincial level ([S/2012/971](#)). In its fourth report, the Team provided an updated list of the central leadership ([S/2014/402](#)).

<sup>23</sup> Yaroslav Trofimov and Habib Khan Totakhil, “Afghan Taliban appoint new military commander”, *Wall Street Journal*, 13 May 2014.

<sup>24</sup> Ghanizada, “Taliban appoints new military commander close to Pakistani intelligence”, *Khaama Press*, 14 May 2014.

<sup>25</sup> “Statement of Leadership Council of Islamic Emirate regarding the commencement of the annual spring operation named ‘Khaibar’”, *Shahamat*, 8 May 2014.

Haqqani (not listed) and his companion Abdul Rasheed Umari (not listed).<sup>26</sup> On their website, the Taliban subsequently condemned the arrest of the two men and claimed that they had been captured by United States forces in Bahrain while returning from visiting former Taliban who had been detained in Guantanamo and who were currently living in Qatar.<sup>27</sup>

## V. Al-Qaida associates

27. There was a distinct increase in the activities and the visibility of Al-Qaida-affiliated entities in Afghanistan in 2014 (see annex II for an overview of the various Al-Qaida entities active in the Afghanistan/Pakistan border region and of how they relate to one another). Although geographically removed from Afghanistan, the recent events in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, specifically the success of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), currently listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QE.J.115.04), present a challenge to the Taliban as a movement. In January 2014, the Afghan security forces seized propaganda material originating from an Iraq-based Al-Qaida affiliate in north-eastern Afghanistan. According to official information provided by Afghan officials to the Team, in mid-2014 the Taliban leadership was concerned that the success of ISIL in parts of northern Iraq would draw young people who were potential Taliban recruits to join ISIL in Iraq.

28. Although this did not happen, apparently because of how difficult it is to travel to Iraq, the Monitoring Team has received a steady stream of as yet unconfirmed reports and press articles pointing to the existence of direct contacts between individuals associated with the Taliban and individuals associated with ISIL. For example, it has been reported in several Afghan media articles that the current ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, listed as Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai (QI.A.299.11), lived in Kabul during the Taliban regime and cooperated closely with Al-Qaida groups in Afghanistan at the time.<sup>28</sup> In addition, Taliban splinter groups such as the Da Fidayano Mahaz and the Tora Bora Mahaz continue to regularly report on and glorify ISIL activities on their websites.<sup>29</sup> The Team will continue to monitor this situation and report to the Committee once it is able to present an official confirmation.

29. Currently, two prominent supporters of ISIL from the Afghan Taliban — Mawlawi Abdul Rahim Muslimdost (not listed), who is a leader of the “Jama'at al Da'wa ila al-Qur'an wa Ahl al-Hadith” (not listed) in Kunar Province, and Mawlawi Abdul Qahir (not listed) — have endorsed the leader of ISIL, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>26</sup> See, for example, Declan Walsh, “Two Haqqani militant leaders are captured, Afghan officials say”, *New York Times*, 16 October 2014.

<sup>27</sup> “Statement of Islamic Emirate regarding the arrest of Anas Haqqani and Hafiz Abdul Rasheed”, *Shahamat*, 18 October 2014.

<sup>28</sup> Zeerak Fahim, “ISIS chief lived in Kabul during Taliban rule”, *Pajhwok Afghan News*, 11 July 2014.

<sup>29</sup> Videos of ISIL are regularly cross-posted on the websites of these movements and remain in circulation among their members on mobile phones.

<sup>30</sup> Shamim Shahid, “Spillover effect: ISIS making inroads into Pakistan, Afghanistan”, *The Express Tribune*, 3 September 2014.

Most other leaders of the Jama'at al Da'wa ila al-Qur'an wa Ahl al-Hadith had sworn allegiance to Mullah Omar's "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan" in 2010.<sup>31</sup>

30. The Tora Bora Mahaz is a militant group operating in Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan, that is reportedly under the operational control of the Taliban and its leader Anwar al-Haqq Mujahid (not listed), son of Yunus Khalis (not listed), who served as a Taliban shadow provincial governor. The group has primarily been attacking government forces in Nangarhar Province (see S/2014/402, para. 21). It publishes a magazine, *Tora Bora*, and maintains a website, on which it regularly cross-posts videos produced by ISIL.

31. At the individual level, some Arab nationals affiliated with Al-Qaida in the Afghanistan/Pakistan border area remain in touch with those who left for Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic. When in July a drone strike killed six Al-Qaida-affiliated individuals in North Waziristan, Abdul Mohsen Abdallah Ibrahim al Charekh (QI.A.324.14) — currently serving with the Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant (QE.A.137.14) — expressed grief over the loss of his friends.<sup>32</sup>

32. A militant group calling itself "Al-Tawhid Battalion in Khorasan" (not listed) pledged allegiance to ISIL. The Abtalul Islam Media Foundation posted a statement from the group using its Twitter account on 21 September 2014. In the message, the leader of the Al-Tawhid Battalion, Abu Bakr al-Kabuli (not listed), pledged loyalty to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and asked him if the group should fight in Khorasan or wait to join the ranks of ISIL, whether in Iraq, the Syrian Arab Republic, Afghanistan or Pakistan.<sup>33</sup>

33. The position of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (QI.H.88.03), the leader of the Hizb-I-Islami Gulbuddin, concerning the political situation in Afghanistan remains contradictory. On the one hand, he is seeking an enhanced political role for Hizb-I-Islami Gulbuddin in post-NATO Afghanistan. Some leading members of his party are involved in intense negotiations with the President, Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai, and with Abdullah Abdullah to explore options for future cooperation that include the possibility of joining the new Government.<sup>34</sup> Hekmatyar has also supported the holding of an intra-Afghan dialogue without foreign interference.<sup>35</sup> On the other hand, Hekmatyar has criticized the signing by Afghanistan of a bilateral security agreement with the United States and claimed that a continued foreign presence means nothing but war. He has also lashed out at Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Pakistan for supporting the deal.<sup>36</sup>

<sup>31</sup> The group's leaders, Hajji Hayatullah, Sheikh Shah Wali, Mawlawi Rahmat Khan, Mawlawi Khan Jan, Mawlawi Abdurrah and Mawlawi Enayatullah, swore allegiance to Mullah Omar as their emir in a written declaration. See *Shahamat*, the Taliban website; information in Pashto retrieved 9 January 2010.

<sup>32</sup> Bill Roggio, "Six Al-Qaeda operatives thought killed in recent drone strike in Pakistan", *The Long War Journal*, 20 July 2014.

<sup>33</sup> The message was made available by *SITE Intelligence Group* on 27 September 2014 and translated by the Monitoring Team.

<sup>34</sup> "Hezb-e-Islami's plea for peace negotiation", *Daily Outlook Afghanistan*, 18 August 2014.

<sup>35</sup> "Hekmatyar to enter negotiation with new Afghan government", *Wakht News Agency*, 17 August 2014.

<sup>36</sup> Javed Hamim Kakar, "Hekmatyar calls for intra-Afghan dialogue", *Pajhwok Afghan News*, 2 October 2014.

34. At the same time, individual fighters of Hizb-I-Islami Gulbuddin have vowed to continue fighting against the Government of Afghanistan after 2014 and even considered joining ISIL.<sup>37</sup> Hizb-I-Islami Gulbuddin members have confirmed that they have had links with some ISIL fighters. In Baghlan Province, a group of fighters previously under the command of Hekmatyar declared their loyalty to ISIL. One commander in Baghlan even went to the length of producing a video in which he swears allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.<sup>38</sup> Hekmatyar has not yet publically reacted to these events, demonstrating that he is either unwilling or unable to confront this issue openly.

35. Lashkar I Jhangvi (QE.L.96.03) is the militant offshoot of the Sunni Deobandi sectarian group Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan. After it was banned by Pakistan, many of its members sought refuge in Afghanistan with the Taliban.<sup>39</sup> They are responsible for suicide attacks using improvised explosive devices, stand-off attacks and assassinations. Their financing comes from local and foreign militants.

36. Harakat-ul Jihad Islami (QE.H.130.10) is a violent extremist group operating throughout South Asia that has carried out numerous terrorist attacks in India and Pakistan. Its relationship with Al-Qaida, which developed after the Taliban's rise in Afghanistan, led, among other things, to its members training in Al-Qaida camps. By 2005, Mohammad Ilyas Kashmiri (formerly listed as QI.K.284.10), a leader of Harakat-ul Jihad Islami, coordinated activities with the Taliban and Al-Qaida from Waziristan. By 2010, a significant number of the group's operatives were involved in terrorist operations in the federally administered tribal areas of Pakistan. Harakat-ul Jihad Islami has planned and carried out a number of terrorist attacks in recent years. Ilyas Kashmiri has been indicted in the United States for providing material support to Lashkar-e-Tayyiba operative David Coleman Headley, who planned a terrorist attack against the offices of the newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* in Denmark. Ilyas Kashmiri was killed on 11 June 2011 and removed from the 1988 Sanctions List on 2 June 2014. The detained leader of Harakat-ul Jihad Islami Jalaluddin (a.k.a. Babu Bhai) (not listed) has admitted that his group was involved in funding the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States.<sup>40</sup>

37. Al-Qaida and its affiliates remain active in Afghanistan (see [S/2014/402](#), in particular paras. 26-27, and [A/68/910-S/2014/420](#)), and are perhaps more active there than an assessment of the International Security Assistance Force, according to which "remnants of Al-Qaida and other foreign militant groups remain within the border districts", would indicate.<sup>41</sup> Individuals affiliated with Al-Qaida like Faruq al-Qahtani (not listed) remain in Kunar and Nuristan and are expected to continue to be there for the foreseeable future.<sup>42</sup> During the 2014 fighting season, the Afghan security forces regularly encountered non-Afghan terrorist fighters across

<sup>37</sup> Ghanizada, "Hezb-e-Islami militants considering to join Islamic State", *Khaama Press*, 3 September 2014.

<sup>38</sup> The video of the pledge of loyalty of commander Mirwais, a former member of Hizb-I-Islami Gulbuddin in Baghlan, is available with the Monitoring Team.

<sup>39</sup> Marie-Helen Maras, *The CRC Press Terrorism Reader* (CRC Press, 2013).

<sup>40</sup> See also the narrative summary of the reasons for listing Harakat-ul Jihad Islami available from [www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQE13010E.shtml](http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQE13010E.shtml).

<sup>41</sup> "Commander ISAF's Afghanistan update, winter 2014", *ISAF News*, 6 March 2014.

<sup>42</sup> "U.S. officials warn of Qaeda resurgence in Afghanistan", *Al-Arabyia News*, 28 February 2014.

Afghanistan, in particular in the north-east, east and south of the country.<sup>43</sup> In large part, these fighters seem to belong to Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (QE.T.132.11). A faction of that group called “Jamaat ul-Ahrar” announced, on 6 September 2014, that it had split from Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan, allegedly with the backing of between 70 and 80 per cent of that group’s commanders and fighters.<sup>44</sup> Since then, the group has produced additional messages claiming that it operates “in about 10 provinces in Afghanistan”.<sup>45</sup> Another faction, the “Punjabi Taliban”, under Ismatullah Muawiya, said that it would limit its activities to Pakistan and that it would operate in Afghanistan under the guidance of Mullah Omar.<sup>46</sup>

38. Harakat ul-Mujahidin (QE.H.8.01), a Pakistan-based group linked to Al-Qaida, maintains training camps in the eastern provinces of Afghanistan. Although its goals are focused on Jammu and Kashmir, it poses a direct threat to Afghanistan. Its membership comprises an estimated several hundred armed supporters.<sup>47</sup>

39. Lashkar-e-Tayyiba was founded by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed (QI.S.263.08) and Zafar Iqbal (QI.I.308.12) in Kunar Province, Afghanistan, in 1990 and is currently reportedly based in Muridke, near Lahore, Punjab, Pakistan. It has trained thousands of militants for terrorist operations. Lashkar-e-Tayyiba members have carried out major attacks against India and the group’s objective is to introduce an Islamic state in South Asia. According to local government officials, over 100 Lashkar-e-Tayyiba militants have been deployed to Nuristan Province to set up training camps in Kamdish district. The attack on the Indian consulate in Herat on 23 May 2014 was planned and conducted by Lashkar-e-Tayyiba.<sup>48</sup>

<sup>43</sup> According to an analysis of the national police command centre covering the period from April to August, foreign fighters were affiliated with the Taliban and with various Al-Qaida organizations in 25 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. Data collected by the Monitoring Team from sources of the Government of Afghanistan point to the killing of 133 foreign nationals fighting with the Taliban between January and June 2014 in the provinces of Helmand, Ghazni, Paktia, Paktika and Nangarhar. Where the nationality of the killed fighters could be determined, it seems that the individuals came primarily from Pakistan, but also from Iran (Islamic Republic of), Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. The Ministry of the Interior of Afghanistan shared statistics with the Monitoring Team. Threat assessments by the Afghan security forces point to the presence of citizens of States neighbouring Afghanistan (China, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) as well as from Turkey and Arab countries. Chechens from the Russian Federation were also found to be involved.

<sup>44</sup> “New TTP faction ‘Jamatul Ahrar’ announces split from Mullah Fazlullah”, *Asian News International*, 4 September 2014.

<sup>45</sup> The group that now calls itself “Jamaat ul-Ahrar” is the former Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan splinter group “Ahrar-ul-Hind” established by Omar Khalid Khorasani in February 2014. The video message announcing the establishment of the group was released on 27 August 2014 and was followed by announcements by its spokesman Ehsanullah Ehsan. The group then started an English-language magazine, *Ihya-e-Khilafat*, which featured in its October 2014 issue an interview with a member of the group who was allegedly a national of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

<sup>46</sup> The statement by Ismatullah Muawiya was faxed on 5 September 2014 to several news agencies. See, for example, “Punjabi Taliban shift focus to Afghanistan”, *Agence France Presse*, 5 September 2013.

<sup>47</sup> United States, Department of State, “Amendments to, and maintenance of, the terrorist designations of Harakat ul-Mujahidin”, 7 August 2014.

<sup>48</sup> United States, Department of State, “Amendments to the terrorist designations of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba”, 25 June 2014.

40. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (QE.I.10.01) remains active in a belt from Faryab to Badakhshan. Its fighters were involved in the attack on Jinnah International Airport in Karachi, Pakistan, on 8 June 2014. The attack, in which at least 10 fighters participated, represents the largest terrorist operation outside Afghanistan in which the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan was directly involved. It signals the continuing threat posed by the group beyond the borders of Afghanistan. In a similar vein, Jamaat Ansarullah (not listed), a splinter of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, remains active in Central Asia and northern Afghanistan.<sup>49</sup>

41. Junood al-Fida (not listed), the Baloch jihadist group from the district of Jhal Magsi in the south-western Province of Baluchistan, Pakistan, was involved in fighting in the Shorawak district in the southern Afghan Province of Kandahar. On 8 July 2014, Junood al-Fida released a statement in which it threatened the United States and pledged allegiance to Taliban leader Mullah Omar. In the same statement, Junood al-Fida indicated its loyalty to Al-Qaida, describing Aiman Muhammed Rabi al-Zawahiri (QI.A.6.01) as “Our Shaykh al Habib [beloved leader] and Amiruna [our chief]”.<sup>50</sup>

42. One continuing challenge is the reported presence of Mullah Fazlullah (not listed) and a considerable number of fighters on Afghan territory (primarily in Kunar Province), from where they continue to launch cross-border attacks into Pakistan. This faction of Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan was originally based in Swat, then retreated under pressure to Bajaur, Malakand and Mohmand agencies. A series of attacks were carried out in mid-2014. For example, in July three Pakistani soldiers were killed in Bajaur during an attack reportedly launched by Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan fighters from Kunar Province, Afghanistan.<sup>51</sup> This prompted fire from Pakistani artillery units into Afghanistan. In August 2014, a Pakistani soldier reportedly died in a clash with Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan fighters under the command of Fazlullah in south-western Baluchistan.<sup>52</sup>

## VI. Sanctions List

43. Few changes were made to the Sanctions List during the past six months. Since 1 April 2014, four new listings were approved by the Committee: three current leaders of the Haqqani Network, namely Yahya Haqqani (TI.H.169.14), Saidullah Jan (TI.J.170.14) and Muhammad Omar Zadran (TI.Z.171.14); and Qari Rahmat (TI.R.172.14), who is closely involved in the narcotics economy in Nangarhar.

44. One deceased individual was delisted. In September 2014, Sangeen Zadran Sher Mohammad was delisted, one year after another deceased individual, Badruddin Haqqani, was delisted. No individual was delisted as a result of reconciliations with the Government of Afghanistan.

<sup>49</sup> “Islamist organization activists convicted in Tajikistan”, *Interfax*, 4 June 2014.

<sup>50</sup> Bill Roggio, “Baloch jihadist group in southern Afghanistan announces death of commander”, *Long War Journal*, 5 August 2014.

<sup>51</sup> “Border attack kills three Pakistani soldiers”, *Australian Broadcasting Corporation*, 12 July 2014.

<sup>52</sup> “Militant attack from Afghanistan kills Pakistani soldier”, *The Daily Star*, 22 August 2014.

45. The Team has continuously proposed amendments to the List, six of which have been agreed upon by the Committee since the previous report was submitted.

46. One crucial element supporting the effective implementation of sanctions is the narrative summary explaining the reasons for listing. In this area, the effectiveness of the sanctions regime can be improved. Detailed and up-to-date narrative summaries will signal to the listed individuals and entities that their actions remain under close scrutiny by the Committee. This could also be interpreted as an important sign of support for the new Government of Afghanistan. Currently, around one third of the narrative summaries related to individuals and entities on the 1988 Sanctions List have little or no content.

**47. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee direct the Team to cooperate with designating States, as well as other relevant Member States, to review and update, where appropriate, the narrative summaries of listed individuals and entities and present its findings and suggested amendments by June 2015.**

## VII. Implementation of sanctions

### A. Travel ban

48. The travel ban is one of the three basic sanctions measures of the 1988 sanctions regime. It is a powerful tool that prohibits individuals on the 1988 Sanctions List from travelling internationally and therefore curbs their ability to act politically and to raise funds for their movement. With the detailed exemption procedure established by resolution 1988 (2011) and refined through resolution 2082 (2012), the sanctions regime has a built-in mechanism that allows for negotiations and discrete dialogue between the Taliban, the Government of Afghanistan and international interlocutors to proceed in full compliance with the relevant sanctions provisions.

49. Unfortunately, however, the Team continues to receive a steady stream of unconfirmed reports that individuals on the 1988 Sanctions List are travelling internationally, including Taliban members travelling freely in South-East Asia, the Gulf countries and even further afield. Some unconfirmed reports in local media indicate that listed individuals are travelling to Africa and collecting funds.

50. As previously mentioned, four listed individuals travelled from Guantanamo Bay, where they were under United States custody, to Qatar on or around 1 June 2014.

51. These media reports demonstrate that raising awareness among Member States and implementers of the travel ban on its basic function and the usefulness of the relevant exemption procedures remains a central task of the Committee and of the Team.

52. During the reporting period, the Team continued to strengthen the implementation of the travel ban through guidelines and regulations concerning international air travel. Following a request by the President of the Security Council to amend the international guidelines for advanced passenger information systems, the Contact Committee of the World Customs Organization, the International Civil

Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Air Transport Association, which authors these guidelines, discussed and agreed to amend the text of the guidelines in October 2014. The new text will highlight the usefulness of advanced passenger information systems for the implementation of Security Council sanctions provisions. The Team also continued its work with Member States and ICAO to explore the possibility of amending the definition of “inadmissible persons” set out in chapter 5 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (1944) and to explore the technical requirements necessary to provide the 1988 Sanctions List in a new format, one that would be compatible with advanced passenger information systems.

53. In December 2013, the Government of Pakistan informed the Committee of the cancellation by Pakistan of a number of identity documents that had been fraudulently obtained by individuals on the 1988 Sanctions List. This helpful step by Pakistan highlighted the continuing risk that sanctioned individuals switch identities in order to circumvent the travel ban imposed on them. Consequently, in order to strengthen the travel ban through the use of biometric data by Member States, the Team has helped the Secretariat to formulate a letter to relevant Member States requesting them to submit biometric datasets to the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) for inclusion in INTERPOL-United Nations Security Council Special Notices. This request has already been met with a positive response by a number of Member States and resulted in an increase in listed individuals for whom biometric datasets are available to Member States.

#### **Travel ban exemptions**

54. No request for a travel ban exemption has been submitted to the Committee since the Team submitted its fourth report. Therefore, it appears that the procedure allowing a prompt response and wide flexibility for exemption requests that was established by resolution 2082 (2012) remains underused. Only one exemption has been requested and granted under the procedure.

## **B. Assets freeze**

### **1. Taliban investment in private companies**

55. Taliban profits have, from an early time, been invested in companies, thereby removing the ownership of the money from Taliban individuals. Etehad Beverage Company Ltd., a company in Afghanistan, is one such company, but there are also others operating in Afghanistan and the United Arab Emirates.<sup>53</sup> Etehad Beverage Company Ltd. is owned by Atiqullah Ahmady Mohammad Din, who handles the personal and business affairs of Abdul Habib Alizai (TI.A.148.10), also known as Haji Agha Jan Alizai, a major narcotics trafficker and Taliban financier.<sup>54</sup> The Taliban might be using the same finance handlers as Al-Qaida, as the case of Ibrahim ‘Isa Hajji Muhammad al-Bakr (not listed) illustrates.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> United States, Department of the Treasury, “Kingpin act designations”, 1 May 2014.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., “Treasury designates Afghanistan-based heroin trafficker and hawaladar with ties to the Taliban”, 1 May 2014.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., “Treasury designates twelve foreign terrorist fighter facilitators”, 24 September 2014.

## 2. Taliban assets from narcotics

56. Afghanistan has seen a growth in the territory devoted to opium poppy cultivation since 2011. That area reached 209,000 ha in 2013, much of it in southern Afghanistan, reflecting an increase of approximately 60 per cent over the previous two years.<sup>56</sup> Given the growth in opium poppy cultivation, it must be assumed that the Taliban's income from the illegal trade in narcotics has remained an important factor in generating assets for the group. The Team has initiated a structured dialogue with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to analyse this problem in further detail. The Team will present its findings in its upcoming special report on organized crime and Taliban financing, to be submitted by 1 December 2014.

## 3. Court challenges against asset freeze

57. In September 2014, the Government of Pakistan officially informed the Team that an associate of Roshan Money Exchange (TE.R.11.12) had challenged the freezing of his accounts in Pakistan. His case was scheduled for hearing before a provincial high court on 22 September 2014. The Team will continue to work with the Government of Pakistan in order to obtain further details on the case.

## C. Arms embargo

58. Throughout 2013 and 2014 pistols with silencers in the same series were found in the possession of Taliban operatives in Kunduz, Ghazni, Kandahar and Helmand provinces. These pistols were of a high quality and, according to information available to the Team, had been diverted from legitimate production and import channels.

59. While civilian casualties caused by improvised explosive devices increased during the reporting period compared with the same period in 2013, the number of deaths and injuries caused by mortars, rockets, grenades and small arms fire in ground engagements jumped dramatically in 2014, in particular in areas with concentrated civilian populations.<sup>10</sup> This trend is also a reflection of the significant increase in military-style attacks by the Taliban inside Afghanistan and the continuing lack of consideration for the civilian population shown by the Taliban.

60. Data compiled by UNAMA on components of improvised explosive devices used in Afghanistan and official information received by the Team from officials of the Afghan security forces point to an increase in the use of remote-controlled improvised explosive devices, especially in the south of the country. Industrially produced remote controls that are specially modified by the Taliban are frequently used in such devices (see annex III). Some of these remote controls are built to have an effective range of up to 1,000 metres. Currently, it is not clear to the Team what potential civilian use these specific remote control devices could have.

**61. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee task the Team with a case study, based on engagement with concerned Member States and private sector stakeholders, in order to further document the issue of remote-**

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<sup>56</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2013: Summary Findings* (November 2013).

controlled improvised explosive devices and developing commercially viable and effective proposals to counter this threat, to be completed for the sixth report of the Team mandated for 1 June 2015.

## VIII. Work of the Monitoring Team

### A. Analysis, monitoring and implementation

62. Since it submitted its fourth report, the Team has continued to focus on its core business, namely analysing the threat posed by the Taliban and their affiliates to peace, stability and security in Afghanistan, providing advice on listings and focusing on strengthening the impact of the sanctions regime. The Team's advantage lies in its ability to work collaboratively with Governments around the world, in particular the Government of Afghanistan. In addition, the Team reaches out to external specialists in order to make an integrated assessment of the threat posed by the Taliban and associates and to advance a targeted, effective and fair sanctions regime. The Team's own expertise on Afghanistan, together with that of specialists on finance, arms and border security measures, helps to sustain these efforts.

### B. Cooperation with Member States, academics and civil society experts

63. The Team has continued to engage with officials from Member States, as well as with academics and civil society experts, in order to evaluate the ongoing security situation in Afghanistan and the status of listed individuals and to conduct further research on how the Taliban generate assets through the illegal exploitation of natural resources in Afghanistan.

64. One of the current strategic policy challenges that the Team has identified during its work is stimulating Afghan stakeholders and international influencers to recognize the value that the 1988 sanctions measures will continue to have after transition, in order to support a stable and successful Afghanistan. Perhaps because of the critical security situation, all too often the debate centres on tactical, short-term issues and is focused on the present. Despite the fact that a targeted workshop addressing the strategic value of the 1988 sanctions measures for the overall political process could be significant for the sanctions regime, the perception that the focus of such a workshop would be narrow has frustrated the concerted efforts of the Monitoring Team to secure external funding for such a meeting over the past 18 months.

**65. The Team recommends that, in order to increase understanding of the threat posed by the Taliban and their associates in the post-transition period in Afghanistan and to support the effective use of sanctions, it host a workshop on the 1988 sanctions regime following transition in Afghanistan for up to 15 external experts before June 2015, funding the economy class travel of invitees to the venue of the meeting through the use of the existing Team budget. The Team would present the outcomes of such a workshop at a special, focused briefing to the Committee.**

**C. Cooperation with other United Nations bodies**

66. The Team continued to cooperate daily with UNAMA. The Team is grateful for the efforts made by UNAMA to facilitate the exchange of information between the Team and Afghan officials. The Team also discusses the situation in Afghanistan, on a regular basis, with the United Nations Children's Fund in order to monitor the impact of sanctions measures on the work of humanitarian organizations.

**D. Cooperation between the Security Council and the International Criminal Police Organization**

67. The Team has continued to strengthen its active cooperation with INTERPOL. The Team has consistently received positive feedback from Member State officials during its country visits and regional meetings about the impact of the Special Notices on the implementation of the sanctions. In coordination with the Secretariat, the Team currently works with relevant Member States to connect Red Notices for individuals on the 1988 Sanctions List to the Special Notices issued in the framework of the sanctions regime established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011). The Team would also like to thank INTERPOL for its detailed cooperation in relation to specific case studies.

**E. Contributing to the public debate**

68. The Team would welcome feedback on the analysis and suggestions contained in the present report, which can be sent to 1988mt@un.org.

## Annex I

### Structure of the Taliban

In September 2014, the Taliban advertised their internal administrative structure. In earlier versions of the Taliban code of conduct (*layeha*), references were made to the structure of the Taliban shadow government, but these remained oblique. In earlier reports, the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team described the structure of the Taliban using as a basis information received from Member States. The Team is of the view that those descriptions remain valid, as they depict the actual functioning of the movement. The Team provides an English translation of the Taliban structure, using its own words, and notes where reports from Member States point to individuals filling these roles. Interestingly, in some provinces several individuals were reportedly acting as “shadow governors”, which points either to a very fast turnover of Taliban personnel or to the possibility of parallel appointments.

#### Taliban central structure

- A. *Office of Amir al-Mu'minin*. Mullah Omar claims to have direct control over the leadership council and the 11 commissions listed below.
- B. *Leadership council*. The Council, which claimed to make decisions for all “political and military affairs of the Emirate”, presided over by the deputy Amir al-Mu'minin — Mullah Akhtar Mansour.
- C. *Courts and judges*. The Taliban claim that three levels of courts are in operation throughout the country. There are primary (district-level) courts, secondary (province-level) courts and a supreme court, all allegedly based on the Hanafi school of law. According to the Taliban, it is forbidden for Afghans to refer any matter to the courts of the Government of Afghanistan.

#### Taliban commissions

1. *Military commission*. The military commission appoints provincial shadow governors, deputy shadow governors for all 34 provinces, district shadow governors and, in each district group, commanders and squad leaders. The commission is said to have its own terms of reference and to organize the training of Taliban forces. It is reported to have been led by Mullah Ibrahim Sadar (not listed) as at 14 May 2014, with Mullah Abdul Qayum Zakir (not listed) as coordinator for shadow provincial governors.
2. *Political commission*.
3. *Cultural commission*.
4. *Economic commission*. The economic commission was led by Mullah Abu Ahmad Kandahari (not listed) as at 7 June 2014. The office of the mines is mentioned as an entity subordinate to the economic commission.
5. *Health commission*.
6. *Education commission*.
7. *Outreach and guidance commission*. The outreach and guidance commission was led by Mullah Shamsuddin (listed as Shamsuddin, T.I.S.103.01) as at 16 October 2014.

8. *Prisoners' commission.*
9. *Non-governmental organization commission.*
10. *Commission on civilian casualties.*
11. *Martyrs and disabled persons commission.*

**Current Taliban shadow provincial governors, by province of operation**

Mullah Fasihuddin (not listed) . . . . .	.Badakhshan
Mawlawi Hayatullah (not listed) . . . . .	.Badghis
Mullah Musafar (not listed). . . . .	.Balkh
Hajji Baz Mohammad (not listed). . . . .	.Farah
Mullah Alam (not listed) . . . . .	.Faryab
Mawlawi Abdul Khaliq (not listed) . . . . .	.Ghor
Mohammad Naim Barich Khudaidad (TI.N.13.01). . . . .	.Helmand
Mawlawi Abdul Rahim, alias Abdul Manan (not listed). . . . .	.Helmand
Mawlawi Yaqob (not listed) . . . . .	.Jawzjan
Mullah Esmatullah (not listed) . . . . .	.Herat
Hafez Mohib, alias Hajji Lala (not listed) . . . . .	.Kabul
Mullah Muhammad Esa (not listed) . . . . .	.Kandahar
Hajji Lala (not listed). . . . .	.Kandahar
Qari Hayatullah (not listed). . . . .	.Kandahar
Qari Baryal (not listed) . . . . .	.Kapisa
Mullah Abdul Salam (not listed). . . . .	.Kunduz
Mawlawi Akbar (not listed). . . . .	.Laghman
Mawlawi Mir Ahmad Agha (not listed) . . . . .	.Nangarhar
Mawlawi Abdul Rashid (not listed) . . . . .	.Nimroz
Mullah Abdul Qayum (not listed). . . . .	.Nimroz
Mawlawi Dost Muhammad (not listed) . . . . .	.Nuristan
Sirajuddin Jallaloudine Haqqani (TI.H.144.07). . . . .	.Paktika
Mawlawi Subhanullah (not listed) . . . . .	.Parwan
Mullah Ismail (not listed) . . . . .	.Parwan
Mawlawi Atiqullah (not listed). . . . .	.Sari Pul
Abdul Rauf Khadem (TI.K.25.01) . . . . .	.Uruzgan
Mullah Abdullah Mullakhel (not listed). . . . .	.Wardak
Mawlawi Sharafuddin (not listed) . . . . .	.Zabul



### Annex III

## Improvised explosive device trigger mechanism: remote-control fob trigger (type 2)

The Afghan security forces showed the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team dozens of these triggers, over 6,000 of which were recovered by the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. It is a commercial key fob marketed as a remote-control, keyless entry system for toys and garage-door openers, with a range of up to 1 km.

