

**Security Council**

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**Letter dated 3 July 2014 from the Permanent Representative of
Rwanda to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

I have the honour to inform you that, under the presidency of Rwanda, the Security Council is scheduled to hold an open debate on the theme “United Nations peacekeeping operations: the United Nations and regional partnership and its evolution”.

The open debate will be held on Monday, 28 July 2014. In order to help steer the discussion on the subject, Rwanda has prepared the attached concept note (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Eugene-Richard **Gasana**

Ambassador

Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations



Annex to the letter dated 3 July 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Concept note

July 2014 Security Council open debate on the theme “United Nations peacekeeping operations: the United Nations and regional partnership and its evolution”

I. Introduction

Demand for international peace operations remains high, while the willingness of the international community to intervene is declining and defence budgets continue to shrink. The notion of collective responsibility and greater regionalization in security thus continues to enjoy growing appeal. In Africa, this notion has been put to the test with the development of regional standby brigades and the deployment of regional and joint peacekeeping missions. Considerable difficulties remain, however, and peacekeeping in Africa will continue to require external support for the foreseeable future.

It is in this framework that the Permanent Mission of Rwanda to the United Nations, during Rwanda’s presidency of the Security Council in July 2014, will convene an open debate of the Security Council on the theme “United Nations peacekeeping operations: the United Nations and regional partnership and its evolution”, which is scheduled to take place on 28 July 2014.

II. Background

The Charter of the United Nations, under its Chapter VIII, provides for the participation of regional arrangements in the maintenance of international peace and security, particularly as first responders to ensure “peaceful settlement of local disputes” before referring the disputes to the Security Council. Chapter VIII also provides that the Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority, but the Charter goes ahead to precondition the “enforcement action” on Security Council authorization. It is important that we discuss and evaluate the progress of the partnership between regional organizations and the Security Council in peacekeeping operations, which is one of the enforcement actions used by the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security.

The tragedies of Rwanda and Srebrenica demonstrated the failures of United Nations peacekeeping in the 1990s and the dire need for rapid regional engagement and response mechanisms. The Brahimi report ([A/55/305-S/2000/809](#)), written in 2000 in response to these failures, made a number of recommendations designed to improve operational and doctrinal aspects of peacekeeping, including the need for the participation of regional and subregional organizations in the establishment and maintenance of peace and security. As a result, missions following the publication of the Brahimi report have been characterized by increasing participation of

non-United Nations third parties and regional organizations, including the African Union, the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community, among others.

III. Current trends

We find it appropriate to take stock of the partnership between the United Nations and regional organizations in peacekeeping operations, especially on the African continent, where capabilities have been tested more than ever, such as the United Nations engagement in a hybrid peacekeeping operation, the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). We should also look at models of financial and technical support by the United Nations and the European Union to Africa-led peacekeeping operations. Yet we should look as well at cases where regional organizations have deployed their forces to restore stability and set a suitable environment for a United Nations peacekeeping operations deployment, the Africa-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) and the Africa-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA), among others. We should also consider the readiness of the United Nations to support aspirations of regional or subregional organizations in the maintenance of peace and security in their region, through the deployment of their own forces, like the deployment of the Protection and Deterrent Force by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to contribute to restoring peace and stability in South Sudan.

Regional and subregional organizations in Darfur, Somalia, Mali, Central African Republic and South Sudan have gone to great lengths in their support of the United Nations and have demonstrated an invaluable presence. Below are some of the existing peacekeeping operations that may indicate evolution of the partnership between the United Nations and regional organizations, especially with the African Union.

Situation in the Sudan/Darfur: In 2004, the African Union deployed a peacekeeping mission to the Sudan, which received support from the European Union, the United Nations and NATO before it was replaced in 2008 by the unprecedented joint African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, the first hybrid mission between the United Nations and the African Union and the largest peacekeeping mission in the world. Although UNAMID is commended for its excellent work in containing the situation in Darfur, it revealed the operational flaws of hybrid peacekeeping resulting from logistical and strategic constraints and issues with the preparedness of some contingents.

Situation in Somalia: In January 2007, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union set up the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with the full support of the United Nations. AMISOM continues to provide support to the Federal Government of Somalia in its efforts to stabilize the country and foster political dialogue and reconciliation; facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid; and create the conditions necessary for the reconstruction and sustainable development of Somalia. AMISOM benefits from a United Nations logistical support package, bilateral donations and voluntary contributions through a United Nations-managed trust fund. The European Union provides the resources needed for the payment of

troop allowances and other related expenses, within the framework of the African Peace Facility. The United Nations also put in place the United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia (UNSOA) (see Security Council resolution [1863 \(2009\)](#)), a field support operation led by the Department of Field Support of the United Nations Secretariat. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) (see Security Council resolution [2102 \(2013\)](#)) was also established to provide the United Nations “good offices” functions and a range of strategic policy advice in support of the peace and reconciliation process of the Federal Government. UNSOM has instruction from the United Nations to align closely, among others, with AMISOM, IGAD, the European Union and other regional, bilateral and multilateral partners.

Situation in Mali: AFISMA, the joint African Union-ECOWAS mission, was launched in Mali and authorized by the Security Council by its resolution [2085 \(2012\)](#). AFISMA helped Mali regain control of its territorial integrity before its authority was transferred to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in July 2013. The European Union provided essential resources to AFISMA and France sent its own troops to oust Islamic militants in the north of Mali.

Situation in the Central African Republic: The Economic Community of Central African States Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African Republic (MICOPAX) was re-hatted into MISCA, the African Union-led and European Union-backed peacekeeping mission established by Security Council resolution 2127 (2013) to stabilize the country. MISCA is currently being transferred to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), which will incorporate peacekeeping missions from more countries. The swift deployments of MISCA and the French Operation Sangaris forces proved critical to saving the lives of civilians and preventing an even greater tragedy in the Central African Republic. However, given the scale and geographic breadth of the crisis, the security requirements on the ground far exceeded the capabilities and the number of international troops deployed. Consequently, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, decided to establish a United Nations peacekeeping operation (see Security Council resolution [2149 \(2014\)](#)). MISCA is mandated to establish a suitable environment for a United Nations peacekeeping operations deployment before the transfer of mandate from MISCA to MINUSCA on 25 September 2014, and the United Nations is to provide logistical support.

Situation in South Sudan: Recently in South Sudan, in the face of escalating violence and humanitarian crisis, IGAD deployed a robust force of three battalions to protect civilians and IGAD monitors. Mandated by the Security Council to operate under the unified command and control of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) Force Commander, the IGAD force receives financial and logistical support from the United Nations.

IV. Scope of the open debate

The participation of regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security has added value, and their increasing role requires less of an ad hoc coordination process and more of a streamlined framework to adequately cope

with inevitable challenges related to resources, preparedness, and political and operational aspects of cooperation, thus begging the questions: What forms will future missions take and how will organizations pool their resources and allocate responsibilities? What should future partnerships look like and, based on past and current experiences, how can we best prepare to meet major challenges ahead?

Many of the regional and subregional organizations face the same resource constraints in the conduct of their peacekeeping activities, thus highlighting the importance of matching resources to mandates, irrespective of which organization has been assigned to implement those mandates. The mandated mission should receive adequate funds and other necessary resources, including troops that are appropriately prepared. In particular, the African Union has had missions in the field for nearly a decade, and while it has proven its ability to deploy rapidly in the absence of a United Nations presence, it has often struggled to get the equipment it needs and to build up its headquarters capacity, which is currently the case in the Central African Republic and Somalia.

V. Proposed issues to be discussed

Against this backdrop, participants in the open debate should consider the following issues in their statements:

1. Political

- Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations and what it encompasses; the applicability of the Charter to the partnerships between the United Nations and regional or even subregional arrangements and regional economic communities, such as ECOWAS, the Economic Community of Central African States and others.
- **Spelling out command and control.** Effective command and control of operations underpin both success and credibility; yet this is an area where there is room for improvement. More can be done to strengthen the role of the headquarters in providing strategic guidance and support, and the mission command and control structures in relation to the conduct of operations, in order to ensure that operations are managed effectively.
- **Institutionalizing flexibility.** Comparative advantages have come into play in various forms in support for African peace support operations to date, but largely on an ad hoc basis. Greater attention should be given to understanding how effective collaboration could be attained, and to developing mechanisms of coordination that can be activated if need be.
- **Responsibility-sharing.** Who does what? Complementary roles between the United Nations and regional organizations under the new peacekeeping framework in Africa.
- **Comparative advantages of the regional interventions.** The transitions in Mali and the Central African Republic have demonstrated the complementary roles of regional economic communities, the African Union and the United Nations, building on comparative advantages of all three, ranging from force generation and rapid and robust deployments (African Union/regional

economic communities) to multidimensional peacekeeping missions (United Nations).

2. Operational

- If the United Nations is to rely more on regional arrangements or even neighbours to respond to crises swiftly in a deterrent fashion, there is a demonstrated need to invest more in terms of support in equipment, logistics, and training; this is more evident in Somalia, the Central African Republic and Mali.
- **Upgrading mission support.** Efficient logistics systems are essential to operational effectiveness; yet they are severely lacking. This has made African missions entirely reliant on the support of other actors, such as NATO for airlift, the United States of America for the contracting of logistical service providers or the United Nations for comprehensive support packages, as in the case of Somalia. While significant logistical capability resides within African Member States, it has not been tapped. Attention also needs to be given to a support model that relies on the outsourcing of service delivery, as the United Nations has done. These issues will have to be addressed, if African peace support operations are to be deployed independent of the goodwill of others.
- **Improving joint planning.** Proper planning has been a key challenge. On numerous occasions the Security Council rejected African Union plans to deploy a mission, owing to observed gaps in planning and insufficient information. The planning processes for African peace support operations are believed to have often been undertaken ad hoc, at times in an uncoordinated fashion. Yet some of the best results were attained where planning processes brought together the various departments and divisions within the African Union Commission and the regional economic communities and regional mechanisms, or where they were undertaken jointly with the United Nations.
- The most recent planning initiatives between the African Union and the United Nations on Somalia, the joint planning between ECOWAS and the African Union on Mali and the current coordination between the United Nations and the African Union in phasing out MISCA and transferring the mandate to MINUSCA bear testament to this, and serve as models for the future. If better results are to be achieved, the planning capacities available at the African Union and the regional economic communities and regional mechanisms will have to be reinforced, and Member States and partners will have to invest more in strengthening the role of the strategic headquarters in Addis Ababa and the planning elements in the regions.

3. Financial

- In 2008, the Security Council held a debate on strengthening relationships between the United Nations and regional organizations, consequentially adopting resolution [1809 \(2008\)](#), in which the Council welcomed the establishment of a joint African Union-United Nations panel to consider options for supporting African Union peacekeeping operations. The Prodi panel, as it was known, explored how the United Nations and the African Union could enhance the predictability, the sustainability and the flexibility of

financing for United Nations-mandated peace operations undertaken by the African Union. A few of the key recommendations of the panel's report included:

- United Nations and African Union to take concrete steps to strengthen their mutual relationship and develop a more effective partnership when addressing issues on the joint agenda.
 - Use United Nations-assessed funding for African Union-led and United Nations-authorized peacekeeping operations on a case-by-case basis, for no longer than six months, to be provided mainly in kind and only when there is an intention to transition to a United Nations peacekeeping operation within six months.
 - Establish a voluntary-based multi-donor trust fund to focus on comprehensive capacity-building for conflict prevention and resolution and institution-building.
 - African Union to consider developing its logistics capacity through innovative options.
 - Establish an African Union-United Nations team to examine the detailed modalities to implement the recommendations of the report.
- No progress has been made since the Prodi report was issued in December 2009. Additionally, there have been efforts at the African Union level to initiate alternative ways of supporting African Union peace operations, including the Obasanjo panel last year, but, again, no progress has been made on that either. So how do we secure predictable funding when funding constraints have impacted every African operation to date? New modes of cooperation, and financial mechanisms that provide the required levels of financial predictability and sustainability, will need to be established.

VI. Format and outcome

The meeting will be an open debate chaired by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Rwanda, Hon. Louise Mushikiwabo. The Secretary-General, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy will be invited to brief. An outcome document is expected.