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رسالة مؤرخة ٢٦ حزيران/يونيه ٢٠١٤ موجهة إلى رئيس مجلس الأمن
من فريق الخبراء المعني بجمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى المنشأ عملاً بقرار مجلس الأمن
٢١٢٧ (٢٠١٣)

باسم أعضاء فريق الخبراء المعني بجمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى المنشأ عملاً بقرار مجلس
الأمن ٢١٢٧ (٢٠١٣)، يشرفني أن أحيل إليكم طيه التقرير المؤقت الذي أعده الفريق وفقاً
للفقرة ٥٩ (ج) من القرار المذكور.

وفي هذا الصدد، أرجو ممتناً أن تتفضلوا بإطلاع أعضاء مجلس الأمن على هذه
الرسالة والتقرير وإصدارها بوصفهما وثيقة من وثائق مجلس الأمن.

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تقرير فريق الخبراء المعني بجمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى المنشأ عملاً بقرار مجلس الأمن ٢١٢٧ (٢٠١٣)

موجز

عقب الإطاحة بالرئيس فرانسوا بوزيزي في ٢٤ آذار/مارس ٢٠١٣ وإجبار الرئيس الخلف ميشيل دجوتوديا على الاستقالة في ١٠ كانون الثاني/يناير ٢٠١٤، ما زال يتعين على حكومة جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى أن تتغلب على عقبات كبيرة تعترض إنجاز المرحلة الثانية من عملية الانتقال السياسي، التي من المتوقع أن تفضي إلى إجراء انتخابات ديمقراطية حرة ونزيهة في عام ٢٠١٥.

فالإفلات التام من العقاب الذي يتيح للأفراد المشاركة في أعمال تقوض السلام في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى وأمن البلد وسلامته الإقليمية أو دعم تلك الأعمال ما زال يشكل العقبة الرئيسية في طريق الانتقال السياسي. وقد أوجع نيران دورات العنف المتكررة في البلد هذا الافتقار إلى المساءلة، مما أدى إلى تهينة أرض خصبة لأنشطة المجرمين والمتمردين في البلد. ويحيط فريق الخبراء علماً بقرار لجنة مجلس الأمن المنشأ عملاً بالقرار ٢١٢٧ (٢٠١٣) بشأن جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى في ٩ أيار/مايو فرض جزاءات محددة الأهداف على فرانسوا بوزيزي وعلى ليفي ياكيتي ونور الدين آدم بوصف ذلك تدبيراً من التدابير التي تساهم في إنهاء الإفلات من العقاب في البلد. ويعتزم الفريق رصد تنفيذ تجميد أصول الأفراد المدرجة أسماؤهم في القائمة والحظر المفروض على سفرهم.

وتمكن الفريق من تحديد عدة من أصحاب المشاريع السياسية الآخرين في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى، مثل بعض عناصر "سيليك الجديدة" أو الميليشيات التي أعلنت نفسها ميليشيات للمتصدّين لحملة السواطير (انظر المرفقين ٥ و ٦)، ممن يستغلون الفراغ الأمني السائد في البلد لتمويل الجماعات المسلحة أو تنظيمها أو التحكم فيها إما لتحديد موقعها في العملية الانتقالية الوطنية أو لتشجيع على تقسيم البلد. ويشير الفريق إلى أن أفراد القوات المسلحة والدرك في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى ما زالوا في المناصب القيادية داخل بعض الجماعات الرئيسية للمتصدّين لحملة السواطير.

وقد سجل الفريق في قاعدة بياناته أنه في الفترة من ٥ كانون الأول/ديسمبر ٢٠١٣ إلى ٣٠ نيسان/أبريل ٢٠١٤، وقع ٤٤٤ حادثاً أسفر عن مقتل ٢٤٢٤ مدنياً. غير أن الفريق يقر بأن ثمة نقصاً كبيراً في الإبلاغ عن الحوادث.

واستمرار هذه الحالة، بعد مرور أكثر من أربعة أشهر على انتخاب رئيسة الدولة في المرحلة الانتقالية، يقوض استعادة السلام والأمن في البلد، ويثير تساؤلات بشأن الاستراتيجية التي تنفذها السلطات الانتقالية تجاه الجماعات المسلحة بشكل عام وتجاه جماعات المتصدين لحملة السواطير بوجه خاص. وقد أعرب بعض أعضاء المجتمع الدولي إلى الفريق عن شعورهم بالإحباط بشأن عدم صدور إدانة شديدة من السلطات الانتقالية للاعتداءات التي ترتكبها ميليشيات المتصدين لحملة السواطير.

والجماعات المسلحة ضالعة في الاتجار بالموارد الطبيعية واستغلالها على نحو غير مشروع، ولا سيما الذهب والماس. ففي غرب الجمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى، يقوم أفراد جماعات المتصدين لحملة السواطير بالتنقيب عن الماس والاتجار به في القرى النائية مثل بودا (مقاطعة لوباي) وغان (مقاطعة ماماير - كاديي). وفي الشرق، ما زالت قوات سيليك ثحكم قبضتها على مناجم الذهب التقليدية مثل نداسيما (مقاطعة أواكا). وبشكل تدريجي تقوم الهيئات الحكومية المعنية بالتعدين بإعادة السيطرة على مناطق إنتاج الماس الواقعة حوالي بريا وسام - أواندجا (مقاطعة كوتو العليا) واستئناف أنشطة التجارة الرسمية نحو بانغي. غير أن فرادى قادة سيليك يسيطرون على جزء من هذه التجارة، ويوجهون الماس إلى السودان خلاف ذلك.

وصُدرت كمية من الماس لم يسبق لها مثيل خلال الأشهر الأولى من عام ٢٠١٣، غير أن تعليق مشاركة جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى بصورة مؤقتة في نظام عملية كيمبرلي لإصدار شهادات المنشأ في أيار/مايو أسفر عن حظر صادرات الماس الرسمية. ومع ذلك، تواصل مكاتب الشراء في بانغي شراء الماس من جميع مناطق الإنتاج وتخزينه بصورة رسمية، في وقت تتزايد فيه الأنشطة التجارية الاحتيالية، إما مروراً عبر بانغي أو عن طريق الدول المجاورة. ويوجد حالياً في الكاميرون كثير من جامعي الماس الذين فروا من أعمال العنف الطائفي والقائم على أسس دينية الذي قامت به جماعات المتصدين لحملة السواطير (البالاكا) في غربي جمهورية أفريقيا في نهاية عام ٢٠١٣ من أجل مواصلة أعمالهم التجارية.

وباستثناء الواردات غير المشروعة من الذخيرة المستخدمة في الصيد، لم يسجل الفريق أي عمليات كبرى لنقل الأسلحة أو الذخائر أو المعدات العسكرية منذ فرض حظر توريد الأسلحة في ٥ كانون الأول/ديسمبر ٢٠١٣. وتستخدم الجماعات المسلحة أساساً الأسلحة الصغيرة المتداولة في البلد قبل الأزمة أو التي حُصل عليها من مخزونات الحكومة في أعقاب انهيار قوات الدفاع والأمن الوطنية وبداية حكم سيليك في بانغي.

ويستند التقرير المؤقت للفريق إلى التحقيقات التي أجريت في الفترة من آذار/مارس إلى أيار/مايو ٢٠١٤ في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى (بما في ذلك في بانغي ومقاطعات لوبا، ومامبير - كادي، ونانا - مامبيري، وأوهام، وأواكا، وكوتو العليا، وبامينغي - بانغوران) وفي الدول المجاورة (غابون، والكاميرون، والكونغو)، وكذلك إلى المعلومات التي قدمتها السلطات الانتقالية لجمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى، والدول الأعضاء، والمنظمات الإقليمية ودون الإقليمية، عملاً بقرارات مجلس الأمن ٢١٢٧ (٢٠١٣) و ٢١٣٤ (٢٠١٤) و ٢١٤٩ (٢٠١٤).

ويشير الفريق إلى الطابع الإقليمي للأزمة السائدة في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى، واختلاف أصول عناصر الجماعات المسلحة، واستخدام أراضي الدول المجاورة. ويقر الفريق أيضاً بالتدابير المختلفة التي اتخذها البلدان في المنطقة من أجل تنفيذ قرار مجلس الأمن ٢١٢٧ (٢٠١٣).

ويبين الفريق بإيجاز في هذا التقرير المؤقت تطور السياق السياسي والأمني في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى، ويقدم دراسات لحالات، ويدرج توصيات مقدمة إلى لجنة مجلس الأمن المنشأة عملاً بالقرار ٢١٢٧ (٢٠١٣) بشأن جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى.

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أولا - معلومات أساسية

ألف - الولاية والتعيين

١ - فرض مجلس الأمن بقراره ٢١٢٧ (٢٠١٣)، المؤرخ ٥ كانون الأول/ديسمبر ٢٠١٣، نظاما للجزاءات على جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى وأنشأ لجنة للجزاءات (لجنة مجلس الأمن المنشأة عملا بالقرار ٢١٢٧ (٢٠١٣) بشأن جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى) وفريقا للخبراء (فريق الخبراء المعني بجمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى) لرصد تنفيذ ذلك النظام. وجرى تمديد ولاية اللجنة عقب اتخاذ القرار ٢١٣٤ (٢٠١٤) في ٢٨ كانون الثاني/يناير ٢٠١٤ لإدراج تدابير محددة الهدف (حظر السفر، وتجميد الأصول) على الأفراد والكيانات المسؤولين على الأعمال المبينة في الفقرتين ٣٦ و ٣٧ من ذلك القرار.

٢ - في ١٣ شباط/فبراير ٢٠١٤، عين الأمين العام، بالتشاور مع اللجنة، خمسة أعضاء في الفريق (S/2014/98)، الذي يتألف من خبير إقليمي (بول - سيمون هاندي)، وخبير في الأسلحة (أحمد حميش)، وخبير في الشؤون المالية والموارد الطبيعية (روبن دي كوننغ)، وخبير في شؤون الجماعات المسلحة ومنسق للفريق (أوريليان لوركا)، وخبيرة في الإغاثة الإنسانية (كارولينا ريبس أراغون).

٣ - ويعمل أعضاء الفريق من بلدانهم ولكنهم حافظوا على وجود شبه دائم في بانغي في الفترة من آذار/مارس إلى أيار/مايو ٢٠١٤، وقاموا ببعثات إلى المقاطعات إما برا (إلى بامباري، باتاليمو، وبيلوكو، وبودا، وبوسانغوا، وبوار، وكونتوني، وكارنوت، وكادزي، وغان، ومبايكي) أو جوا (إلى نديلي وبريا). وسافر الفريق أيضا إلى الكاميرون (ياوندي)، وغابون (ليرفيل)، والكونغو (برازافيل)، وفرنسا (باريس) للتعريف بولايته والاجتماع بالمسؤولين الحكوميين.

٤ - وفي آذار/مارس، سافر الفريق إلى مقر الأمم المتحدة لمناقشة تقريره المستكمل الأول مع اللجنة، وهو التقرير الذي أحيل إلى رئيس مجلس الأمن في ٥ آذار/مارس ٢٠١٤، ولعقد لقاءات ثنائية مع أعضاء اللجنة، والدبلوماسيين من الدول المجاورة لجمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى، ورئيس لجنة بناء السلام، ومبعوثه إلى جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى، وكيانات الأمم المتحدة.

باء - المنهجية

٥ - يسعى الفريق إلى كفالة الامتثال للمعايير التي أوصى بها الفريق العامل غير الرسمي التابع لمجلس الأمن المعني بالمسائل العامة المتعلقة بالجزاءات في تقريره الصادر في كانون

الأول/ديسمبر ٢٠٠٦ (S/2006/997، المرفق). وتدعو تلك المعايير إلى الاعتماد على الوثائق الأصلية التي جرى التحقق منها والأدلة الملموسة وملاحظات الخبراء الميدانية، بما في ذلك الصور الفوتوغرافية، متى أمكن ذلك. وإذا تعذر القيام بتفتيش ميداني، يسعى الفريق إلى التثبت من المعلومات باستخدام مصادر متعددة ومستقلة لكي يفي على النحو المناسب بأعلى معيار يمكن بلوغه، مؤلياً بذلك قيمة أعلى لبيانات الجهات الفاعلة الرئيسية والشهود الذين عاينوا الأحداث بصورة مباشرة.

٦ - ومع أن الفريق يرغب في التحلي بأقصى قدر ممكن من الشفافية، فإنه سيمتنع عن كشف مصادر معلوماته في الحالات التي قد يؤدي فيها كشف تلك المصادر إلى تعريضها هي أو غيرها إلى مخاطر غير مقبولة تهدد سلامتها، وسيعمد إلى إدراج الأدلة ذات الصلة بالموضوع في محفوظات الأمم المتحدة.

٧ - ويلتزم الفريق كذلك بأعلى درجات الإنصاف، وسيعمل جاهداً على أن يتيح للأطراف، حيثما يكون ذلك مناسباً وممكناً، أي معلومات واردة في التقرير قد تنسب إلى تلك الأطراف، لاستعراضها والتعليق عليها والرد عليها في غضون فترة زمنية محددة.

٨ - ويحافظ الفريق على استقلال عمله عن أية جهود لتقويض حياده أو إيجاد تصور بوجود تحيز. وقد أقر الفريق نص هذا التقرير واستنتاجاته وتوصياته على أساس توافق الآراء قبل أن يحيل المنسق التقرير إلى رئيس مجلس الأمن.

٩ - ووفقاً لقرارات الجمعية العامة بشأن مراقبة الوثائق وحدود عدد الكلمات، ولا سيما القرارات ٢١٤/٥٢ و ٢٠٨/٥٣ و ٢٦٥/٥٩، قرر الفريق إدراج جزء من نتائج ملاحظاته في مرفقات هذا التقرير، مما سيحول دون ترجمة قدر كبير من مضمون التقرير.

جيم - التعاون مع الجهات المعنية والمنظمات

١٠ - يود الفريق أن يسلط الضوء على المستوى الممتاز من التعاون المشهود مع السلطات الانتقالية لجمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى، ولا سيما مع ديوان رئيسة الدولة الانتقالية، كاثرين سامبا - بانزا. وقد فُسرت ولاية اللجنة والفريق للأعضاء المعنيين في الحكومة، بمن فيهم رئيس الوزراء وعدة وزراء، وحصل الفريق، وفقاً لولايته وبعد الطلب، على معلومات من الإدارات المختصة والموظفين المختصين، عند وجودها. وفسر الفريق أيضاً ولاية وقرارات مجلس الأمن ذات الصلة بالموضوع إلى الجهات المعنية الموجودة في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى، بما في ذلك القوات الدولية وأعضاء المجتمع الدولي.

١١ - وتمكن الفريق من الاعتماد على بعثة الدعم الدولية بقيادة أفريقية في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى، وبعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي لحفظ السلام، في ما يتعلق بعمليات الحراسة في المقاطعات، والوصول إلى الأسلحة والذخيرة المحجوزة أثناء العمليات، وتبادل المعلومات ذات الصلة بولايتيه، على أساس السرية. ويتطلع الفريق إلى التعاون مع القوة الأوروبية في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى، في انتظار نشرها بالفعل على أرض الواقع. وزودت الفريق القوات الفرنسية في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى (عملية سانغاري) بإمكانية الوصول التام إلى الأسلحة والذخائر المحجوزة. غير أن تبادل المعلومات كان محدودا حتى الآن، حتى في سياق الهجمات التي تشن ضد القوات الدولية.

١٢ - وأخيرا، تلقى الفريق دعما لوجستيا كبيرا من مكتب الأمم المتحدة المتكامل لبناء السلام في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى لتنفيذ ولايته، وهو يعمل حاليا مع بعثة الأمم المتحدة المتكاملة المتعددة الأبعاد لتحقيق الاستقرار في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى من أجل إضفاء الطابع الرسمي على تبادل المعلومات وكفالة الدعم اللوجستي على المدى الطويل.

١٣ - وبعث الفريق ٢٣ رسالة من الرسائل الرسمية إلى ١٨ دولة ومنظمة وكيانا خاصا، وتلقى حتى الآن تسعة ردود تقدم المعلومات المطلوبة (انظر المرفق ١).

ثانيا - الأخطار التي تهدد السلام والأمن

ألف - السياق السياسي الإقليمي

١ - لمحة عامة: فهم أبعاد النزاع

١٤ - يعد النزاع الذي اندلع عام ٢٠١٢ في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى والذي أفضى في ٢٤ آذار/مارس ٢٠١٣ إلى قيام تحالف انتهازي لجماعات متمردة يدعى "سيليك" بالإطاحة بالرئيس فرانسوا بوزيزي آخر تصعيد في سلسلة أزمات شهدتها البلد خلال فترة تناهز ٤٠ عاما. فعلى مدى عدة عقود، ركزت الحكومات المتعاقبة سلطة ضعيفة في العاصمة في حين سيطرت جماعات مسلحة (من المتمردين وقطاع الطرق) على مناطق واسعة من أراضي جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى.

١٥ - وقد شهدت جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى، منذ أن حصولها على الاستقلال عن فرنسا في عام ١٩٦٠، أربع حركات انقلابية متتالية والعديد من المحاولات الانقلابية التي أوجدت ثقافة سياسية اتسمت بالعنف والنهب الاقتصادي. وكان إنشاء جماعات مسلحة والإنفاق عليها الأسلوب السائد للوصول إلى السلطة السياسية والثروة الاقتصادية (انظر المرفق ٢).

١٦ - وقد تسببت هذه الحلقة المفرغة من الأزمات السياسية في إضعاف اقتصاد جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى بشكل خطير. ولم تقدر جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى، ذلك البلد الفقير وغير الساحلي الذي يعيش حالة عدم استقرار دائم، على أن تستغل بنجاح مواردها الاقتصادية الهائلة، تاركة غالبية سكانها يعيشون في فقر^(١).

١٧ - وفي الوقت نفسه، احتكرت النخبة السياسية والجماعات المسلحة السيطرة بصورة غير قانونية على الموارد البلد المعدنية، ولا سيما الماس والذهب. وأصبح التحكم في التعدين على نطاق ضيق أداة هامة تفيد في الوقت ذاته شبكات الزبونية الموجودة في جهاز الدولة وتمول جزئياً أنشطة جماعات المتمردين (انظر الفرع جيم أدناه بشأن الموارد الطبيعية).

١٨ - والموقع الجغرافي لجمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى يجعلها في نقطة التقاء عدد من المناطق المهمشة والفقيرة على طول الحدود مع دول شهدت أيضاً نزاعات مسلحة كبرى في السنوات الأخيرة، على غرار حالة كل من تشاد، وجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية، وجنوب السودان، والسودان، والكونغو.

١٩ - وفي كثير من الحالات، كان النزاع العنيف في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى نتيجة لعدم الاستقرار التي تعيشها الدول المجاورة ودافعاً له على حد سواء. فمثلاً في النزاعات التي عصفت بالسودان وتشاد وجمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى، استُخدمت هذه الأخيرة بمثابة قاعدة خلفية لجموعات المتمردين الموجودة في البلدان المجاورة^(٢). وهرب جيش الرب للمقاومة، وهو جماعة من المتمردين الأوغنديين الذين يزعمون الاستناد إلى إيديولوجية مسيحية أصولية، من قوات الدفاع الشعبية الأوغندية ولجأ إلى أراضي جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى حيث يشن من حين لآخر هجمات على القرى الواقعة في الشرق (انظر الفرع باء أدناه).

٢٠ - وقامت أيضاً جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى من جهتها بتصدير مشاكل أمنية إلى البلدان المجاورة. فخلال التسعينيات مثلاً، تسبب قطاع طرق محليون يعرفون بالزراغينا (قطاع الطرق الرئيسية) في انعدام الأمن في الطرق الكاميرونية في الغالب. وبالإضافة إلى ذلك، تسببت الأزمات الأمنية المتعاقبة في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى في نزوح أعداد كبيرة من اللاجئين، بعضهم مسلحون، إلى البلدان المجاورة.

(١) برنامج الأمم المتحدة الإنمائي، تقرير التنمية البشرية ٢٠١٣: هفزة الجنوب - تقدم بشري في عالم متنوع (نيويورك، ٢٠١٣).

(٢) في عام ٢٠٠٦، استخدم المتمرّدون التشاديون القادمون من السودان جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى لشن هجوم حاسم ضد نجامينا. وفي فترة الثمانينات، استخدم الجيش الشعبي لتحرير السودان التابع لجنوب السودان هذه الأراضي على نطاق واسع قاعدة خلفية له.

٢١ - وقد شجعت هذه الحالة، بالإضافة إلى عوامل أخرى، على إنشاء ميليشيات للدفاع عن النفس على مستوى المجتمعات المحلية، بعضها يشكل جذور حركة المتصدين لحملة السواطير (البالاكا) (انظر المرفق ٥).

٢٢ - وبسبب ذلك، وجدت بلدان في المنطقة مصلحة في التطورات السياسية التي تحدث في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى، إما بتقديم الدعم إلى مجموعة سياسية أو أكثر^(٣)، وإما بإرسال قوات لحفظ السلام إلى البلد، أو تقديم الدعم للوساطة السياسية.

٢٣ - ومع ذلك، لم تكن مشاركتها دائما بدون توترات، على غرار ما جسدهت التصورات المحلية عن تورط تشاد المزعوم مع متمردي تحالف سيليك. فهذه التصورات مهدت الطريق لأن تعلن تشاد في ٣ نيسان/أبريل ٢٠١٤ عن انسحابها من بعثة الدعم الدولية بقيادة أفريقية في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى، وهي القوة الإقليمية التي شكلها الاتحاد الأفريقي في ١٩ كانون الأول/ديسمبر ٢٠١٣ للاستعاضة عن بعثة الجماعة الاقتصادية لدول وسط أفريقيا لتوطيد السلام في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى التابعة.

تأسيس خطاب مناهض للأجانب ولتشاد

٢٤ - من أبرز سمات الأزمة الراهنة في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى هو ظهور خطاب ينم عن عداة شديد للأجانب وللتشاديين ويتسم بصبغة دينية في سياق عملية إعادة تنظيم للشؤون السياسية والأمنية. وتكمن أسباب ذلك في التصورات التي لدى السكان المحليين وكذلك في الأحداث الأخيرة التي تمثلت تولى مقاتلين أجانب لمناصب نفوذ في جهاز الدولة وفي مناطق خاضعة لسيطرة المتمردين. وارتفاع عدد انتهاكات حقوق الإنسان، بما في ذلك حالات النهب والاعتصام والمضايقات التي ارتكبت على نطاق واسع أثناء حكم تحالف سيليك القصير الأمد قد أدى إلى تعميم خطاب معاد للأجانب في المجال السياسي^(٤).

٢٥ - وعلى مر التاريخ، سكن الشمال الشرقي لجمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى الذي تقل كثافته السكانية فئات إثنية (الغولا والعرب والفلان والرونغا) تربطها روابط ثقافية واقتصادية متينة بمجموعات مماثلة موجودة في تشاد وجنوب السودان والسودان والكاميرون. والشمال الشرقي أشد المناطق إهمالاً في البلد، فسبل وصول الناس هناك إلى العاصمة عن طريق البر

(٣) وصل الرئيس فرانسوا بوزيزي إلى السلطة في عام ٢٠٠٣ عن طريق انقلاب دعمه كل من تشاد وفرنسا. وتقبل البلدان إطاحة تحالف سيليك بالسيد بوزيزي في آذار/مارس ٢٠١٣، ولكن بعد أن اختلف معهما.

(٤) اجتماعان مع أحد أعضاء المجلس الوطني الانتقالي ووزير سابق في الحكومة الانتقالية لميشيل دجوتوديا، في بانغي، يومي ٢١ و ٢٤ أيار/مايو ٢٠١٤.

قليلة أو معدومة والهيكل الأساسي الاجتماعي ضعيف للغاية. وهذه المنطقة أيضا هي الجزء من البلد الذي تقطنه غالبية المسلمين الذين يشكلون حوالي ١٥ في المائة من مجموع سكان جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى. ونتيجة لذلك، تعد المنطقة الشمالية الشرقية من الناحية الاقتصادية والثقافية أكثر توجهاً نحو تشاد والسودان مقارنة بتوجهها نحو بانغي وبقية أنحاء البلد.

٢٦ - وينظر إلى سكان المناطق الشمالية الشرقية من جانب غيرهم من سكان جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى في سائر أنحاء البلد على أنهم أجانب بالنظر إلى انتمائهم الإثني والديني وأسباب رزقهم، وعلى النقيض من ذلك، كثيرا ما يشعر الشماليون بوجه عام والشماليون الشرقيون بوجه خاص بالتهميش^(٥).

٢٧ - ويجب فهم سبب تفجر المشاعر المعادية للأجانب ولتشاد في الآونة الأخيرة واقتراحها بصيغة مناهضة بشدة للمسلمين في ظل استيلاء تحالف سيليكا السابق على السلطة وحكمه الذي دام ١٠ أشهر في عام ٢٠١٣. وبالنظر إلى وجود جنود تشاديين وسودانيين في صفوف تحالف سيليكا، فقد نظر معظم سكان جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى إلى تحالف المتمردين على أنه جماعة أجنبية تُخضع غالبية السكان لسيطرتها. وقد أدت مضايقة تحالف سيليكا لغالبية المجتمعات المحلية غير المسلمة إلى تأجيج مشاعر السخط الدفينة التي أعرب عنها بصورة انتهائية، تحقيقاً لأغراض سياسية، من خلال جماعات المتصدين لحملة السواطير.

٢٨ - وعودة ظهور هذه الجماعة التي كانت في البداية جماعة للدفاع عن النفس في النصف الثاني من عام ٢٠١٣ بهدف حماية المدنيين والمجتمعات المحلية مما كان يعتبر اضطهاداً ترعاه الدولة لغير المسلمين، أسفرت عن حركة مناهضة لتحالف سيليكا أكبر حجماً وأفضل من حيث الهيكلية والتنظيم. وأتاح ذلك أيضاً فرصة لعناصر القوات المسلحة لأفريقيا الوسطى السابقين كي يثأروا بعد طول انتظار من أولئك الذين أذلّوهم أثناء انقلاب آذار/مارس ٢٠١٣.

٢٩ - وقد استند في الغالب الدعم القوي الذي حظيت به حركة المتصدين لحملة السواطير في صفوف السكان إلى تصور مفاده أنهم حرروا البلد من الغزو الأجنبي^(٦). وأسهمت

(٥) اجتماع مع رئيس حزب سياسي، في بانغي في ٢٤ أيار/مايو ٢٠١٤. وأحد الأدلة الواضحة على هذا التهميش هو وجود تمثيل ضئيل جدا لسكان المناطق الشمالية الشرقية في المستويات العليا لإدارة الدولة والقوات المسلحة. فعلى سبيل المثال، لم يكن هناك على الإطلاق أي جنرال في الجيش من المنطقة الشمالية الشرقية باستثناء من نصبوا أنفسهم بهذه الصفة من جنرالات تحالف سيليكا.

(٦) هذا التصور الشائع على نطاق واسع في صفوف سكان الجمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى تصور خاطئ في واقع الأمر لأن نشر البعثة الفرنسية المسماة عملية سانغاري، في ٦ كانون الأول/ديسمبر ٢٠١٣، قد وضع حدا

الأنشطة التي اضطلع بها عدد من أصحاب المشاريع السياسية، المؤيدين خصوصاً وليس حصراً للرئيس السابق بوزيزي، إسهاماً فعالاً في ظهور هذا الخطاب الذي حرص في نهاية المطاف على استهداف المسلمين بالقتل في بانغي وفي مناطق أخرى واقعة تحت سيطرة المتصدين لحملة السواطير. وفي هذا الوقت، كان ينظر بالفعل إلى المسلمين على أنهم متساوون مع أعضاء تحالف سيليك والأجانب والتشاديين والجهاديين.

العملية الانتقالية الحالية وتحدياتها

٣٠ - تستمد العملية الانتقالية الحالية أسسها القانونية من اتفاق ليبرفيل^(١٣) ونجامينا. وترى عدة جهات فاعلة ومراقبة أن اتفاق ليبرفيل لاغ وباطل لأن موقعيه الرئيسيين (الرئيس بوزيزي وميشيل دجوتوديا) لم يعودا في السلطة^(١٤). غير أن اتفاق نجامينا اعتبر من جانب واضعيه استمراراً لاتفاق ليبرفيل إذ احتفظ الاتفاق الثاني بروح الاتفاق الأول وإن كان ذلك في ظروف مختلفة تنطوي على جهات فاعلة مختلفة.

٣١ - وتفيد التقارير بأن تحالف سيليك حصل على وعد من رئيس تشاد إدريس ديبي بشغل منصب رئيس الوزراء في الحكومة الجديدة لجمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى. وأدى عدم تحقق ذلك على إثارة غضب سيليك^(١٥). وعلى النقيض من ذلك، اعتبرت عناصر مناهضة لحملة السواطير أن موقعي اتفاق نجامينا قد أضاعوا الفرصة بعدم إصلاح المجلس الوطني الانتقالي الذي عين أعضائه ميشيل دجوتوديا^(١٦).

٣٢ - ويمكن أن تعطل الشكوك حول شرعية المرحلة الانتقالية الحالية عمل الحكومة الحالية، ولا سيما بقدر تناولها لمسألة التمثيل الحساسة. ولبلد تاريخ طويل في العمليات الانتقالية الفاشلة وفي إبرام اتفاقات سلام هشة. ومنذ استيلاء السيد بوزيزي على السلطة في

لعمليات القتل التي يقوم بها تحالف سيليك وشجع ميليشيا من ميليشيات الدفاع عن النفس التي وسعت نطاق هجماتها على المسلمين.

(٧) اجتماع مع جان - جاك ديمافوت (الذي يشغل حالياً منصب وزير في رئاسة الجمهورية وزعيم سابق للمتمردين ووزير في حكومات مختلفة)، عقد في بانغي، في ٢٠ آذار/مارس ٢٠١٤. وقد تكرر هذا الرأي على لسان عدة عناصر فاعلة في بانغي وليبرفيل.

(٨) في ١٤ آذار/مارس ٢٠١٤، أصدر تحالف القوات الديمقراطية من أجل الانتقال بيانه رقم ٠١٤/٠٠٧ الذي انتقد فيه رئيس تشاد، على إصراره على الوعود التي قطعها لقادة سيليك السابق كشروط لعزل ميشيل دجوتوديا ونيكولاس تيانغايي. وفي هذا البيان، بحث التحالف جميع الأطراف على احترام اتفاق نجامينا والعملية الانتقالية الحالية.

(٩) اجتماع مع السيد باتريس إدوارد اناغيسونا، عقد في بانغي، في ٣ أيار/مايو ٢٠١٤.

عام ٢٠٠٣، انتشرت حركات التمرد في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى، وتلى ذلك سلسلة من الاتفاقات التي لم تنفذ بجدية. ويمكن أن يعزى سقوط السيد بوزيزي إلى أمور من ضمنها افتقاره إلى الإرادة السياسية لتنفيذ الاتفاقات السياسية والعمل بجدية في جهود نزع السلاح والتسريح وإعادة الإدماج (انظر المرفق ٢).

٣٣ - والجيش الوطني غائب تماما نتيجة الهزيمة العسكرية التي مُنيت بها القوات المسلحة لأفريقيا الوسطى في انقلاب آذار/مارس ٢٠١٣، وتجمع تحالف سيليكافوتفككه في وقت لاحق إثر التدخل الفرنسي وسقوط حكومة دجوتوديا. وتتفاقم هذه المشكلة بسبب الهشاشة التي نشأت عن السياق الحالي المتسم بإعادة تنظيم الميليشيات وعن الأنباء المتناقضة بشأن احتمال تقسيم البلد (انظر الفرع باء أدناه المتعلق بالجماعات المسلحة). ويتمثل التحدي الذي يواجه الجهات الفاعلة الدولية في بسط الأمن في ظل غياب جيش وطني وفي الوقت نفسه تقديم المساعدة إلى السلطات الانتقالية لبنائه.

٢ - السياق الإقليمي

٣٤ - تمتد جذور النزاع الجاري في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى في شبكة من الديناميات الإقليمية التي تربطه بالتطورات في عدد من الدول المجاورة. فانعدام الأمن في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى يرتبط جزئيا على الأقل بانعدام الأمن في البلدان المجاورة (تشاد وجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية وجنوب السودان والسودان). ويتميز السياق الإقليمي للأزمة بعدد من العوامل الرئيسية وهي: عدد كبير من المقاتلين الأجانب ومستغلي أعمال العنف (الجماعات المتمردة، وجماعات الزاراغينا، وممارسي الصيد غير المشروع)، وتداول كمية كبيرة من الأسلحة الصغيرة والأسلحة الخفيفة في المنطقة، وعدد قليل من الدول المجاورة ذات المصالح الاستراتيجية في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى، ووجود عدد من المنظمات الإقليمية (الجماعة الاقتصادية والنقدية لوسط أفريقيا، والجماعة الاقتصادية لدول وسط أفريقيا، والاتحاد الأفريقي). وإضافة إلى ذلك، يعتبر خطر التطرف الديني الذي تشكله جماعة بوكو حرام، وهي مجموعة أضافها مجلس الأمن إلى قائمة المشمولين بالجزاءات المفروضة على تنظيم القاعدة، تهديدا أمنيا كبيرا في معظم عواصم المنطقة.


٣٥ - وقد أثر عدم الاستقرار الذي شهدته جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى مؤخرا على البلدان المجاورة بدرجات متفاوتة. ففي حين تأثرت تشاد وجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية والكاميرون بشكل مباشر في مجال الأمن والمساعدة الإنسانية والاقتصاد، تأثرت بلدان أخرى مثل الكونغو وخاصة جنوب السودان والسودان وغابون بدرجات أقل. ونتيجة لذلك، تعكس التدابير التي اتخذتها بلدان المنطقة لمعالجة الأزمة في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى مدى اعتبارها أن انعدام الأمن في ذلك البلد يشكل تهديد لاستقرارها.

٣٦ - وتمكن الفريق بعد أن تولى مهامه في ١٣ شباط/فبراير ٢٠١٤، من زيارة غابون والكاميرون والكونغو حيث قُدمت له معلومات مباشرة عن التنذير التي اتخذتها هذه الدول لتنفيذ قرار مجلس الأمن ٢١٢٧ (٢٠١٣) و ٢١٣٤ (٢٠١٤) (انظر المرفق ٣).

باء - الجماعات المسلحة

٣٧ - في الوقت الراهن، تمارس الجماعات المسلحة نفوذها على جميع المناطق المأهولة في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى تقريبا، باستثناء عدد قليل من الأحياء في بانغي ومعظم مقاطعتي امبومو وامبومو العليا. والبلد مقسم بحكم الواقع إلى قسمين، إذ يوجد أحد الخطوط الفاصلة حاليا شمال مقاطعة أوهام - بندي، وشمال وشرق مقاطعتي أوهام وكيمو وغرب وجنوب محافظة أوাকা، ويغلب في هذه المنطقة وجود ما يسمى بميليشيات المتصددين لحملة السواطير في الغرب وتحالف سيليكاجا الجديد في شرق خط المواجهة (انظر الخريطة أدناه).

مناطق سيطرة الجماعات المسلحة ونفوذها في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى في ٢٥ أيار/مايو ٢٠١٤



٣٨ - وإلى حد أقل، تستخدم الجماعات المسلحة الأجنبية أيضا أراضي جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى كقاعدة خلفية حيث تقوم بنهب الممتلكات وتعتدي على المدنيين. وعلى وجه التحديد، يقوم جيش الرب للمقاومة بأنشطة في الجزء الشرقي من جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى

منذ عام ٢٠٠٧، حيث ضلع في حوادث متفرقة بشكل منتظم (للاطلاع على معلومات عن الجماعات المسلحة الأخرى، انظر المرفق ٤).

٣٩ - وتمكن الفريق من مقابلة معظم القادة السياسيين والعسكريين الرئيسيين لحركة المتصدّين لحملة السواطير ومختلف مكونات تحالف سيليكاس السابق، في العاصمة وفي المقاطعات التي تمكّن الفريق من السفر إليها.

٤٠ - وعلى النحو المبين بتفصيل أعلاه (انظر الفرع ألف)، يمثل السياق الحالي المتسم بفراغ في السلطة أرضية خصبة لتقليد الجماعات السياسية العسكرية المترسخ في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى منذ أمد بعيد. وفي الواقع، يتنافس أصحاب المشاريع السياسية على تمثيل الجماعات المسلحة والتحدث باسمها، من أجل التفاوض على مناصب داخل الحكومة وتعزيز مساهمهم في المناصب السياسية، ويميلون إلى المبالغة في درجة تمثيلهم لفئات السكان (من حيث مناطق نفوذ الميليشيات وقوامها)، وفي نهاية المطاف، في قدرتهم على الإشراف على أنشطتها والتحكم فيها بشكل فعال.

٤١ - وعلاوة على ذلك، تشير المعلومات الواردة وملاحظات فريق الخبراء في الميدان إلى أن الجماعات التي أعلنت نفسها جماعات للمتصدّين لحملة السواطير وتحالف سيليكاس الجديد تستفيد من الضرائب غير المشروعة المفروضة على حركة البضائع والركاب والشركات المحلية العاملة في مناطق نفوذها (انظر الفرع جيم)، وتعزز وجودها السياسي والعسكري وقدرتها على مواصلة السيطرة وممارسة النفوذ بشكل مباشر وطويل الأمد على معظم أنحاء البلد، بما في ذلك العاصمة.

٤٢ - وأخيراً، يرى الفريق أن الجماعات المسلحة، سواء منها المرتبطة بجماعة المتصدّين لحملة السواطير أو بتحالف سيليكاس السابق، هي ألعوبة يحرّكها المفسدون السياسيون ويخضونها على ارتكاب أعمال العنف ضد المدنيين والقوات الدولية، بهدف تعزيز نفوذ هؤلاء القادة وزعزعة استقرار العملية الانتقالية أو الترويج لتقسيم البلد.

٤٣ - ويرى الفريق أن هذا الوضع يقوض مصداقية السلطات الانتقالية وقدرتها على استعادة السلامة العامة وسيادة القانون والحفاظ عليهما، وبالتالي يهدد اتفاقات الانتقال وعملية الانتقال السياسي، بما في ذلك تنظيم انتخابات ديمقراطية حرة ونزيهة في عام ٢٠١٥.

٤٤ - ولذلك ينبغي للجنة النظر في فرض جزاءات محددة الأهداف على الأفراد والكيانات الذين حدد الفريق أنهم يشاركون في مثل تلك الأعمال أو يقدمون الدعم لها (على النحو

المبين في الفقرتين ٣٦ و ٣٧ من قرار مجلس الأمن ٢١٣٤ (٢٠١٤)، بمن فيهم الأشخاص والكيانات الذين يروجون لتقسيم البلد، الذي يمثل حالياً أكبر تهديد لاستقرار جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى والمنطقة.

الحوادث الأمنية

جماعات المتصدين لحملة السواطير

٤٥ - ليست حركة المتصدين لحملة السواطير جماعة مسلحة ذات هيكل مركزي تمارس قيادة ورقابة فعاليتين على عناصرها. وإنما يُعرّف الفريق حركة المتصدين لحملة السواطير بأنها عدد كبير من الميليشيات المختلفة التي تعتبر نفسها جزءاً من هذه الحركة، أو أنها مرتبطة أو كانت مرتبطة بها تلقائياً.

٤٦ - ووفقاً للمعلومات الواردة في قاعدة بيانات الفريق، في الفترة من ٥ كانون الأول/ديسمبر ٢٠١٣ إلى ٣٠ نيسان/أبريل ٢٠١٤، قتل ٦٧٠ مدنياً و ٣ من العاملين في مجال المساعدة الإنسانية على أيدي جماعات تعتبر منتمةً للمتصدين لحملة السواطير. وترد في المرفقين ٥-٥ و ٢٣ دراسات حالات عن جماعات المتصدين لحملة السواطير في بوسانغوا وبودا، حيث وثّق الفريق هجمات على المدنيين، وتدمير الممتلكات وعرقلة المساعدة الإنسانية.

٤٧ - وفي بانغي يرى الفريق، استناداً إلى مقابلات أجراها مع مصادر متعددة في حركة المتصدين لحملة السواطير وجهات فاعلة أخرى، أن جماعات المتصدين لحملة السواطير المرتبطة بالفصيل الذي يقوده باتريس - إدوارد انغاييسونا مسؤولة عن هجمات شنت على القوات الدولية. ففي ٢٢ آذار/مارس ٢٠١٤ مثلاً، أصيب بجروح خطيرة عدة جنود كونغوليين وروانديين تابعين لقوات بعثة الدعم الدولية بقيادة أفريقية في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى على أيدي جماعات المتصدين لحملة السواطير في حي كومباتان وحي فو في بانغي، وفقاً لتقرير رسمي قدمته البعثة إلى الفريق. وفي ٢٥ آذار/مارس ٢٠١٤، شهد الفريق القوات الفرنسية تتعرض لهجوم شديد بالقرب من المطار (انظر المرفق ٥-٦).

٤٨ - ومع أن الفريق قادر على إثبات أن الهجمات على حي PK5 في بانغي، حيث لا يزال يعيش معظم ضحايا العنف الطائفي والديني، قد ارتكبتها أساساً جماعات من المتصدين لحملة السواطير من مخيم المشردين داخلها الواقع في المطار وحيي بوينغ وكاستور، فإن المسؤولية المباشرة لأي قائد معين من قادة هذه الحركة لم تثبت بعد. غير أن انغاييسونا

صرح خلال اجتماع مع الفريق أن منظمته تتحكم في جماعات المتصدّين لحملة السواطير الموحدة في هذين الحيين^(١١).

٤٩ - يرد في المرفق ٥ بيان مختلف مكونات حركة المتصدّين لحملة السواطير ودينامياتها الحالية.

تحالف سيليك

٥٠ - وفقا للمعلومات الواردة في قاعدة بيانات الفريق، كان تحالف سيليك السابق مسؤولا عن مقتل ٤٥٣ مدنيا و ٧ من العاملين في مجال المساعدة الإنسانية، في الفترة من ٥ كانون الأول/ديسمبر ٢٠١٣ إلى ٣٠ نيسان/أبريل ٢٠١٤.

٥١ - وتمكن الفريق من تأكيد المعلومات الواردة من مصادر متعددة عن ضلوع عناصر من تحالف سيليك السابق تابعين للعقيد عيسى^(١١)، وهو ضابط كبير تحت قيادة العميد الخاتم^(١٢)، في مقتل ٣ من العاملين في مجال المساعدة الإنسانية و ١٥ من المدنيين وقادة المجتمع المحلي في بوغبغا يوم ٢٦ نيسان/أبريل ٢٠١٤.

٥٢ - وشاركت قوات العميد الخاتم أيضا في اشتباك عنيف مع القوات الفرنسية جنوب بلدة بيمال (مقاطعة أوهم - بندي)، في ٥ أيار/مايو ٢٠١٤ (انظر المرفق ٧)^(١٣). وأكدت عدة مصادر سرية للفريق مرة أخرى مشاركة العقيد عيسى بصورة مباشرة.

٥٣ - وعلاوة على ذلك، حصل الفريق على شهادة^(١٤) تفيد بضلوع العقيد صالح زبادي، قائد منطقة تحالف سيليك الجديد في باتانغافو (مقاطعة أوهم)، والعميد الخاتم، في خطف أسقف بوسانغوا مع ثلاثة قساوسة آخرين في ١٦ نيسان/أبريل ٢٠١٤ لدى وصولهم إلى باتانغافو للاحتفال بعيد الفصح^(١٣). وأفرج عن القساوسة الأربعة في اليوم التالي في كابو، بعد تعبئة قوية في بانغي من المجتمع الدولي وجهات فاعلة أخرى^(١٤)، ولكن دون أي من ممتلكاتهم.

(١٠) لقاء مع باتريس - إدوارد انغاييسونا، بانغي في ٣ أيار/مايو ٢٠١٤.

(١١) لقاءات مع مصادر سرية وجهات اتصال مؤسسية، في بوسانغوا وبانغي، نيسان/أبريل وأيار/مايو ٢٠١٤.

(١٢) مكالمات هاتفية مع العميد الخاتم محمد، في ٢٠ أيار/مايو ٢٠١٤.

(١٣) هذه الشهادة محفوظة لدى الأمم المتحدة.

(١٤) أكد للفريق الدبلوماسيون الذين شاركوا في المحادثات من أجل الإفراج عن القساوسة تورط العميد الخاتم بشكل مباشر.

٥٤ - وأخيراً، أبلغت مصادر عسكرية الفريق بأن القوات الموالية للعميد على داراس شاركت، في ٢٤ أيار/مايو ٢٠١٤، في هجمات عنيفة ضد القوات الدولية، استُخدمت فيها القذائف الصاروخية والرشاشات الخفيفة، في سياق تنفيذ "تدابير بناء السلام" في بامباري.

٥٥ - ورغم ضعف الواجهة السياسية المؤيدي التقسيم، ما زال هؤلاء يمارسون تأثيرهم على مصير تحالف سيليك الجديد ومساره. وينبغي ألا يقلل من أهمية ذلك التأثير، إذ يمثل خطراً حقيقياً على استقرار جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى وسلامتها الإقليمية.

٥٦ - وترد في المرفق ٦ تفاصيل الهيكل العسكري الجديد لتحالف سيليك وتنسيقه السياسي المؤقت.

جيم - استغلال الموارد الطبيعية

١ - الماس

٥٧ - في ٢٣ أيار/مايو ٢٠١٣، عُلفت مؤقتاً مشاركة جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى في عملية كيمبرلي لإصدار شهادات المنشأ. وعلى النحو الوارد في قرار الجمعية العامة ٥٦/٥٥ المؤرخ ١ كانون الأول/ديسمبر ٢٠٠٠، لقد استهلت عملية كيمبرلي من جانب بلدان أفريقية منتجة للماس وتشمل الحكومات وقطاع صناعة الماس والمجتمع المدني بغية وقف تدفق الماس الخام الذي تستخدمه حركات التمرد في تمويل الأنشطة العسكرية ضد الحكومات الشرعية. ونشرت عملية كيمبرلي، قبل شهرين من تعليق العضوية، خريطة تبين تقدم متمرد في حركة سيليك ومواقعها في المناطق الغنية بالماس في الجزء الشرقي من البلد، أي في بريا وسام - أواندجا (مقاطعة كوتو العليا) وبامينغي (مقاطعة بامنغي - بانغوران) (انظر المرفق ٨). وفي ١٨ نيسان/أبريل ٢٠١٣، دعا الرئيس المشاركين في العملية إلى التحلي باليقظة في ما يتعلق بإمكانية إدخال الماس الخام بطريقة غير مشروعة في سلسلة الإمدادات من قبل الجماعات المتمردة. وكان تحالف متمرد سيليك قد استحوذ على السلطة في بانغي بالفعل في ذلك الوقت.

٥٨ - ووفقاً للتقرير السنوي لعام ٢٠١٣ للأمين الدائم لعملية كيمبرلي في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى، صدرَ البلد ٨٩ ٣٤٦ قيراطاً، بقيمة تزيد على ١٥ مليون دولار خلال الربع الأول من عام ٢٠١٣. وصدرَ البلد ١٢١ ٣٣٩ قيراطاً، بقيمة تزيد على ١٨ مليون دولار خلال الربع الثاني من العام. وكانت جهات التصدير الرئيسية هي الاتحاد الأوروبي (٧٦ في المائة)

والإمارات العربية المتحدة (٢٤ في المائة). وفي المقابل، صدر البلد ٩١٧ ٣٧١ قيراطا بقيمة تزيد على ٦٢ مليون دولار في عام ٢٠١٢^(١٥).

٥٩ - ومع أن صادرات الماس الخام قد عُلِّقت، فإن مشتريات الماس المشروعة قد استمرت. وفي آذار/مارس ٢٠١٤، قامت المديرية العامة للمناجم والجيولوجيا بالاشتراك مع الوحدة الخاصة لمكافحة الغش بتفتيش مخزونات مكاتب شراء الماس الرئيسية في بانغي. فكان لدى شركة أفريقيا الوسطى للماس (صوديام) ٥٧٦ ٤٠ قيراطا بقيمة ٨,٣ ملايين دولار في المخازن، معظمها من غرب جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى. وتبين سجلات الشراء بالمديرية العامة للمناجم والجيولوجيا أن معظم مخزون شركة صوديام (٩٠ في المائة) اشترى بعد عملية التعليق^(١٦). وأبلغ الفريق جامعو الماس من كارنو وغان وبودا في مقاطعتي مامبيري - كادي ولوباوي الغربيتين بأن شركة صوديام تواصل شراء الماس منهم^(١٧).

٦٠ - وفي آذار/مارس، كان لدى شركة باديكيا (مكتب شراء الماس في أفريقيا الوسطى) ٧٦٠ قيراطا في المخازن^(١٨). وأبلغ المدير العام لشركة باديكيا الفريق بأن الشركة توقفت عن الشراء بسبب تعليق المشاركة في عملية كيمبرلي لإصدار شهادات المنشأ وخطر التعرض للنهب في المكاتب الميدانية، وهو ما حدث في بيربراتي في شباط/فبراير ٢٠١٤^(١٩). ومع ذلك، خلصت عملية تقييم ثانية في باديكيا في نيسان/أبريل ٢٠١٤، إلى أن الشركة قد اشترت ٦٩٨ ١ قيراطا أخرى بقيمة ٩١٧ ٢٩٢ دولارا من بريا وسام - أواندجا^(٢٠). ولم تُوضع أختام ولا تواريخ على رُزم الماس المخزونة لدى شركة باديكيا، على النحو المطلوب. بموجب خريطة طريق عرضتها سلطات جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى في تشرين الأول/أكتوبر ٢٠١٣ من أجل إعادة إدماج جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى في عملية كيمبرلي^(٢١).

(١٥) انظر: https://kimberleyprocessstatistics.org/static/pdfs/public_statistics/2012/2012GlobalSummary.pdf

(جری الاطلاع عليه في ١ أيار/مايو ٢٠١٤).

(١٦) التقرير الكامل محفوظ لدى الأمم المتحدة.

(١٧) مقابلات عديدة مع جامعي الماس في كارنو وغان وبودا، ٢٤-٢٧ نيسان/أبريل ٢٠١٤.

(١٨) تعمل باديكيا في إطار مجموعة عبد الكريم التي مقرها في أنتويرب، وهي عضو في بورصة أنتويرب للماس. وتشمل الشركة أيضا شركة مينايير للطيران (Minair) وشركة صوفيا للنقل البري. وجميع هذه الشركات الثلاث مسجلة في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى. انظر: www.groupeabdoulkarim.com (جری الاطلاع عليه في ٢٢ أيار/مايو ٢٠١٤).

(١٩) مقابلة مع المدير العام لباديكيا في بانغي، ٢٨ نيسان/أبريل ٢٠١٤.

(٢٠) التقرير المتعلق بتفتيش مخزونات شركة باديكيا محفوظ لدى الأمم المتحدة.

(٢١) خريطة طريق عملية كيمبرلي (تشرين الأول/أكتوبر ٢٠١٣) محفوظة لدى الأمم المتحدة.

٦١ - ولم يُعثر على مخزونات في شركتي سيد أزير (Sud Azur) وسوساديام (Socadiam). وأبلغ المدير العام لسيد أزير الفريق بأن الشركة قدمت تمويلا مسبقا لعمليات تعدين في غرب البلد وشرقه، وبأن الشركة لم تتمكن من متابعة استثماراتها بسبب انعدام الأمن.

٦٢ - ومع أن جزءا صغيرا من الماس الخام يباع بصورة قانونية في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى ويخزن في بانغي، فإن الماس الخام يُصنَّع أيضا في العاصمة، من أجل بيعه محليا وربما تصديره إلى الخارج، سواء في شكل مجوهرات أو شكل آخر. وعلى سبيل المثال، شركة بيجوتيري غينو مرخص لها بشراء الماس وتصنيعه وصقله. وهي تجهز ما يصل إلى ١٠٠ قيراط في الشهر. والماس المصنَّع الذي يباع في بانغي مخصص للاستخدام الشخصي بصورة عامة وليس موجهة للمبيعات التجارية. ولا يتعلق نظام عملية كيمبرلي لإصدار شهادات المنشأ بالاتجار في الماس المصنَّع.

٦٣ - وفي نيسان/أبريل ٢٠١٤، قام الفريق بزيارة مناطق التعدين الحرفي للماس في غرب البلد. وقد انخفض إنتاج الماس، وفقا لعمال المناجم المحليين، من نسبة ٥٠ إلى ٧٠ في المائة مقارنة بعام ٢٠١٣، على طول محور بودا - غون - كارنو. ويُعزى الانخفاض بدرجة كبيرة إلى رحيل كافة جامعي الماس المسلمين تقريبا بعد انسحاب قوات حركة سيليكات وتمرد ميليشيات المتصدّين لحملة السواطير في نهاية كانون الثاني/يناير ٢٠١٤. واعتاد جامعو الماس المذكورون تمويل عمليات التعدين مسبقا والشراء من عمال المناجم والبيع لمكاتب الشراء في بانغي أو تهريب الماس إلى الخارج. ورحل جامعو الماس إلى بلدانهم الأصلية، مثل تشاد والسنغال ومالي، أو انتقلوا إلى مناطق الماس في المنطقة الشرقية التي لا تزال تحت سيطرة حركة سيليكات أو استقروا في مدينتي كينزو وغاروا بولاي الحدوديتين في الكاميرون. أما جامعو الماس الذين ما زالوا في مناطق إنتاج الماس في الغرب فكثيرا ما يكونون من أصل مسيحي أو إسلامي - مسيحي مختلط. وبعضهم، مثل ليونارد باكونغو في غون وغريغوار موسى في ساسيل، يعملون أيضا قادة محليين لحركة المتصدّين لحملة السواطير.

٦٤ - وإلى جانب العمل في المناجم وجمع الماس، يسعى المتصدّون لحملة السواطير إلى توفير الحماية مقابل الحصول على أموال من تجار الماس في المراكز الحضرية. ففي كارنو، اعترف أعضاء من حركة المتصدّين لحملة السواطير للفريق بأن رئيس مجموعتهم، آيمي زوورو بليز، قد اتصل بجامعي ماس مرتبطين بمكاتب الشراء أو كانوا مرتبطين بها سابقا من أجل التفاوض على ترتيب للحماية؛ وهذا بعدما شاهد الفريق أسماء الأشخاص المستهدفين مكتوبة على ورقة (انظر المرفق ٩). ويعد زوورو ورجاله جزءا من هيكل قيادة انغاييسونا (انظر المرفق ٥)، ويحملون شارات هوية موحدة لحركة المتصدّين لحملة السواطير (انظر المرفق ٥-٣).

٦٥ - ويطلب المتصدّون لحملة السواطير في كارنو المال مقابل الحماية من جهات فاعلة اقتصادية على غرار ما كانت تقوم به حركة سيليكسا سابقا. ووفقا لما ذكرته وحدة مكافحة الغش في كارنو، اعتادت حركة سيليكسا المطالبة بأموال مقابل توفير الحماية قدرها ٤٠٠ دولار في الشهر من مكاتب الشراء و ١٠٠ دولار شهريا من جامعي الماس في كارنو.

٦٦ - وفي أيار/مايو ٢٠١٤، زار الفريق مركز تجارة الماس في بريّا. ووفقا لسلطات التعدين المحلية، تجري عناصر حركة سيليكسا دوريات على الطريق الرئيسي المؤدي نحو الشمال، ولكنها غير موجودة في مناطق التعدين. وأبلغ جامعو الماس الفريق بوجود حركة سيليكسا في مناطق التعدين ولكنها لا تفرض أي ضرائب. وقبل مجيء قوات بعثة الدعم الدولية بقيادة أفريقية في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى وعملية سانغاري في ٧ نيسان/أبريل، اعتادت حركة سيليكسا فرض ٧٥ دولار كضريبة هبوط على الخطوط الجوية الخاصة التي تستأجر شركتا صوديّام وباديكا طائرتها بغية تعجيل نقل الماس إلى بانغي.

٦٧ - ويزعم جامعو الماس الرئيسيون في بانغي وغون وبريّا أنهم يبيعون الماس بطرق قانونية لمكاتب الشراء في بانغي، ويتهمون جامعي الماس والمتاجرين به الآخرين بتهريب الماس في الخارج إلى تشاد والسودان والكاميرون. وفي الواقع، يميل جامعو الماس إلى بيع جزء منه بطريقة قانونية من أجل إرضاء سلطات المناجم، بينما يجري إخراج جزء آخر من البلد بالاحتيال، وذلك ببساطة لأن القدرة الشرائية لمكاتب الشراء في بانغي منخفضة جدا. ووفقا لما ذكره أفراد من القوات المسلحة لجمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى، يهرّب جامعو وخبراء الماس في بانغي وبريّا و”جنرال” حركة سيليكسا عمر يونس (المدعو ”عمر صوديّام“)، الماس من بريّا وسام - أواندجا إلى السودان. وما زال الفريق يحقق على أساس معلومات أولية عن المتجرين بالماس العاملين في الكاميرون وتشاد.

٢ - الذهب

٦٨ - يُقدر إنتاج الذهب الحرفي في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى بطنين في السنة، وهو مماثل من حيث القيمة لقطاع الماس في البلد^(٢٢). وتوجد رواسب الذهب تقريبا في نفس مناطق وجود الماس. وخلال عام ٢٠١٣، صدّرت جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى رسميا ١١ كيلوغراما

(٢٢) Tieguhong Julius Chupezi, Verina Ingram and Jolien Schure, Impacts of Artisanal Gold and Diamond Mining on Livelihoods and the Environment in the Sangha Tri-national Park Landscape (Bogor, Indonesia, Centre for International Forestry Research, 2009). متاح على العنوان الشبكي: www.cifor.org/publications/pdf_files/Books/BChupezi0901.pdf (جرى الاطلاع عليه في ٣ أيار/مايو ٢٠١٤).

من الذهب، بينما بيع أقل من كيلوغرام واحد لاستخدامه في صنع المجوهرات المحلية، بعد أن وسمته الإدارة العامة للمناجم والجيولوجيا (محفوظات الأمم المتحدة)^(٢٣). ويُهرَّب كل الذهب تقريباً إلى البلدان المجاورة. فعلى سبيل المثال، ضبّطت السلطات الجمركية الكاميرونية في عامي ٢٠١٣ و ٢٠١٤ في مطار دوالا ما مجموعه ٧,٥ كيلوغرامات من الذهب مع مسافرين، أحدهم كاميروني واثنان منهم صينيّان، أثناء مرورهم العابر من بانغي^(٢٤).

٦٩ - في كانون الأول/ديسمبر ٢٠١٢، توقفت أنشطة الشركة الوحيدة للتنقيب الصناعي عن الذهب، أكسمين (Axmin Inc. of Canada)، في نداسيما (مقاطعة أواكا)، الواقعة حوالي ٤٠٠ كيلومتر شمال شرقي بانغي في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى، بسبب استمرار نشاط المتمردين. وأفادت الشركة بأن المتمردين، الذين انتقلوا من الشمال للاستيلاء على بلدة بامباري، احتلوا مخيم التعدين قسراً واستولوا على المواد الغذائية واللوازم الطبية والمركبات^(٢٥). وتندرج عمليات شركة أكسمين في انداسيما في إطار مشروع باسيندرو ومنجم باسيندرو الذي يتوقع أن ينتج نحو ٦ ٤٠٠ كيلوغرام في السنة خلال السنوات الثلاث الأولى بعد بدء تشغيله^(٢٦).

٧٠ - وزار الفريق منجم انداسيما في أيار/مايو ٢٠١٤ حيث يعمل عدة مئات من عمال المناجم الحرفيين حالياً في امتياز شركة أكسمين، الذي ينتج ما يقدر بحوالي ١٥ كيلوغراماً في الشهر (انظر المرفق ١٠). وقد احتلت قوات سيليكات التابعة للمنطقة العسكرية الخامسة لمقاطعة أواكا الخاضعة لقيادة الجنرال علي داراس مخيم أكسيم للتعدين، وتوجد عند مدخل قرية عمال المناجم في الطريق المؤدي إلى المنجم (انظر المرفقين ٦ و ١١). ووفقاً لعمال المناجم الحرفيين والتجار المحليين وقائد في حركة سيليكات، صدرت تعليمات للجنود بعدم المشاركة في الأنشطة التجارية وعدم فرض ضرائب^(٢٧). فهم يحصلون على تعويضات مالية من السكان عند التصدي لحوادث مثل السرقة. ويُهرَّب الذهب من نداسيما إلى الكامبيرون، عن طريق بانغي حوا وبراً.

(٢٣) ثمة وثائق عن الحالة المعدنية والجمركية لصادرات الذهب (كانون الثاني/يناير - كانون الأول/ديسمبر ٢٠١٣) محفوظة لدى الأمم المتحدة.

(٢٤) وثائق محفوظة لدى الأمم المتحدة.

(٢٥) انظر: www.axmininc.com/site/Newsnbs/News2012/PRDecember242012.aspx (جرى الاطلاع عليه في ٣ أيار/مايو ٢٠١٤).

(٢٦) Omayra Bermúdez-Lugo, "The mineral industries of Central African Republic and Togo", 2012 (٢٦) Minerals Yearbook (United States Geological Survey, December 2013).

(٢٧) مقابلة مع عمال المناجم الحرفيين وتجار الذهب وقادة تحالف سيليكات في نداسيما، في ٢٢ أيار/مايو ٢٠١٤.

٣ - الأحياء البرية

٧١ - كان الصيد غير المشروع والاتجار بالأحياء البرية عاملين أساسيين من عوامل تمرد تحالف سيليكاف الذي بدأ في الشمال الشرقي من البلد وامتد إلى الجنوب الشرقي بعد تولي تحالف سيليكاف مقاليد السلطة في بانغي في آذار/مارس ٢٠١٣. وفي كانون الأول/ديسمبر ٢٠١٢، انضم لتحالف سيليكاف ٢٢ من بين ٦٠ من "حراس البيئة"، وهم أشخاص عينهم مشروع حماية الأنواع المهددة بالانقراض "إيكوفون" الذي يموله الاتحاد الأوروبي للقيام بدوريات في متزهي شمال بامينغوي - بانجوران ومانوفو - غوندا سانت فلوريس الوطنيين، وقاموا بنهب مركز لحراس الغابات في سانغابا^(٢٨). وزُعم تورطهم في قتل ١٢ فيلا في المنطقة في شباط/فبراير ٢٠١٣^(٢٩).

٧٢ - وبينما يعتقد أن عددا قليلا من الفيلة ما زال في المنطقة، يظل صيد الأنواع الكبيرة من الطباء، مثل علند لورد ديربي وطي البونغو، وبيع لحوم الطباء مصدر دخل للقوات المحلية التابعة لتحالف سيليكاف. وتسيطر قوات سيليكاف على هذه الأنشطة إما عن طريق الصيد بنفسها، أو بتزويد الأسلحة والذخائر للصيادين غير الشرعيين. وتؤدي طرق تجارة لحوم حيوانات الأدغال إلى بانغي، وكذلك إلى تشاد والسودان. وتشير السلطات المحلية، وأنصار حفظ الطبيعة من نديلي (مقاطعة بامنغي - بانغوران) إلى مالك شاحنات اسمه أرون أساني (المعروف باسم "تيغان")، باعتباره الناقل الرئيسي للحوم حيوانات الأدغال الذي يعمل بالاشتراك مع تحالف سيليكاف^(٣٠).

٧٣ - وقبل مروق حراس البيئة ونهب محطة سانغابا، قام مشروع إيكوفون بنقل معظم أسلحته، بما في ذلك ٦٢ بندقية هجومية من طراز كلاشينكوف AK-47، إلى وزارة المياه والغابات في بانغي من أجل تجنب مصادرتها من قبل قوات سيليكاف^(٣١). ونهب مستودع الوزارة، عندما سيطر تحالف سيليكاف على بانغي في ٢٤ آذار/مارس ٢٠١٣. وكان من بين الأصناف التي سرقت ما مجموعه ١٣٥ بندقية من طراز كلاشينكوف AK-47، و ١٢٤ نابا

(٢٨) مقابلة مع بعض أنصار حفظ الطبيعة في بانغي، ٢٠ آذار/مارس ٢٠١٤.

(٢٩) Kasper Agger, *Behind the Headlines: Drivers of Violence in the Central African Republic* (Enough Project, May 2014). متاح على العنوان الشبكي التالي: www.enoughproject.org/files/CAR%20Report%20-%20Behind%20the%20Headlines%205.1.14.pdf (جرى الاطلاع عليه في ١٧ أيار/مايو ٢٠١٤).

(٣٠) مقابلات مع بعض أنصار حفظ الطبيعة والمديرين المحليين في نديلي وبانغي، في ٢٠ و ٢٢ آذار/مارس و ٨ نيسان/أبريل.

(٣١) إحدى الرسائل التي تقر بنقل أسلحة من مشروع إيكوفون إلى الوزارة محفوظة لدى في الأمم المتحدة.

من العاج كانت سلطات الغابات والحياة البرية قد صادرتها على مدى العقدين الماضيين (انظر المرفق ١٢).

٧٤ - وفي ٦ أيار/مايو ٢٠١٣، دخلت مجموعة من الصيادين غير الشرعيين المدججين بالسلاح متترة دزانغا نودكي الوطني في مقاطعة سانغا مبايري (جنوب غربي البلد)، وقتلوا ٢٦ فيلا وأزالوا أنيابها وحملوها^(٣٢). وأذنت سلطات سيليك في بانغي - سواء من وزارة المياه والغابات، أو وزارة الدفاع - بالأنشطة المذكورة أعلاه التي قام بها الصيادون غير الشرعيون الذين كانوا يتنقلون في قافلة مكونة من الخيول والجمال^(٣٣).

٧٥ - ومع رحيل قوات سيليك من جنوب غربي جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى في نهاية كانون الثاني/يناير ٢٠١٤، عاد الصيادون غير الشرعيون الذين كان لهم نشاط سابق في المنطقة. وفي ١٧ شباط/فبراير ٢٠١٤، اعتقلت قوات الدرك والسلطات المعنية بالأحياء البرية في بيانغا صيادا يمارس الصيد غير الشرعي لفترة طويلة هو ريني سانغا زيلي وذلك داخل متترة دزانغا سانغا الوطني بسبب الحيازة غير المشروعة لبندقية من طراز ماوزر (Mauser) عيار ٣٧٥ تستخدم لصيد الطرائد الكبيرة (في أفريقيا الوسطى، تشير عبارة "الطرائد الكبيرة" أساسا إلى الجواميس والأفيال، التي هي من الأنواع المحمية)^(٣٤). وبالفعل كانت سلطات جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى قد اعتقلت ريني سانغا زيلي في عام ٢٠٠٧ بتهمة قتل الفيلة، ولكنه فر من السجن، ليعتقل مرة أخرى في آب/أغسطس ٢٠١٣ في متترة لوبك الوطني في الكاميرون وبحوزته نابان من العاج، وبندقية صيد كبيرة. وفي أيلول/سبتمبر ٢٠١٣، حكمت محكمة يوكادوما على ريني سانغا بالسجن شهرين بينما حكم على شقيقه التوأم سيمفوريان سانغا بعقوبة أقصاها ثلاث سنوات سجن، حيث لم تدنه المحكمة بقتل

(٣٢) "Elephant death toll at Dzanga Bai starts to come in"، Wildlife News، 10 أيار/مايو ٢٠١٣. متاح على العنوان الشبكي: <http://wildlifeneews.co.uk/2013/elephant-death-toll-at-dzanga-bai-start-to-come-in> (جرى الاطلاع عليه في ١٧ أيار/مايو ٢٠١٤).

(٣٣) مقابلات أجريت مع بعض أنصار حفظ الطبيعة وحراس الغابات، في بانغي، في ٢٠ آذار/مارس و ٢١ نيسان/أبريل ٢٠١٤.

(٣٤) معلومات قدمها أنصار حفظ الطبيعة، في بانغي وباوندي، في ١ نيسان/أبريل ٢٠١٤.

الأفيال فحسب، بل أيضا بالاعتداء على أحد حراس الغابات^(٣٥). واتهم الأخوان بقتل ما مجموعه ١٠٠ فيل في منطقة سانغا التي تضم ثلاثة ممتلكات وطنية^(٣٦).

٧٦ - وما زال الفريق يواصل التحقيق بشأن شبكة ريني سانغا للصيد غير المشروع التي تشمل، وفقا لما ذكره أنصار حفظ الطبيعة والسلطات المعنية بالأحياء البرية، أحد أفراد الشرطة في سالو، والتحري عن دور ريني سانغا المحتمل في جلب بنادق الصيد وذخائرها إلى جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى في انتهاك للحظر المفروض على توريد الأسلحة.

٧٧ - ويرد في المرفق ١٣ مزيد من التحليل بشأن الأخشاب والماشية والنفط.

ثالثا - انتهاكات حظر الأسلحة

ألف - حالة الأسلحة والذخائر في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى

٧٨ - من خلال الدعم المقدم من القوات الفرنسية وبعثة الدعم الدولية بقيادة أفريقية في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى في كانون الأول/ديسمبر ٢٠١٣، عملا بالولاية الواردة في قرار مجلس الأمن ٢١٢٧ (٢٠١٣)، انهار تحالف سيليكاف وقد كامل سيطرته على الأسلحة والذخائر التي كانت فيما مضى في عهدة الحكومة.

٧٩ - ووضع الفريق خط أساس للبيانات المتعلقة بالأسلحة والذخائر المتداولة في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى ليستخدم كمعيار لتقييم مدى تنفيذ الحظر المفروض على توريد الأسلحة وأثره. وتحقيقا لتلك الغاية، استخدم الفريق مؤشرات ومصادر مختلفة توفر تقديرات كمية ونوعية لمختلف ترسانات الأسلحة الموجودة في البلد.

٨٠ - وبفضل التحليل النوعي للأسلحة والذخيرة التي جمعتها بعثة الدعم الدولية بقيادة أفريقية في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى والقوات الفرنسية خلال عمليات نزع السلاح التي أجرتها منذ كانون الأول/ديسمبر ٢٠١٣، تمكن الفريق من تكوين فكرة واضحة عن نوع وطرز العتاد العسكري المتداول في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى. والفريق على ثقة بأن المخزونات التي جمعتها القوات الدولية هي عينة تمثل إلى حد كبير ما كان سابقا لدى قوات الحكومة وتحالف سيليكاف من ترسانات. وتتألف هذه الترسانة أساسا من أسلحة صغيرة

(٣٥) المرجع نفسه.

(٣٦) Robbie Corey-Boulet, "Cameroon court judges twin brothers accused of killing 100 elephants" (٢٤ أيلول/سبتمبر ٢٠١٣، متاح على الموقع الشبكي: www.voanews.com/content/cameroon-court-judges-twin-brothers-accused-of-killing-100-elephants/1755919.html) (جرى الاطلاع عليه في ١٧ أيار/مايو ٢٠١٤).

وأسلحة خفيفة مع مجموعات قليلة من مدافع الهاون أكبرها من عيار ١٢٠ ملم ونظم أسلحة أخرى مثل قاذفات الصواريخ المتعددة، ومروحيتين هجوميتين معطلتين من طراز Mil Mi-24 موجودتين في قاعدة القوات الجوية في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى في بانغي، وناقلات جنود مدرعة (انظر المرفق ١٤). ولا يذكر سجل الأمم المتحدة للأسلحة التقليدية أي صادرات من الأسلحة التقليدية إلى جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى سوى ثلاث مركبات مدرعة صدرتها سلوفاكيا في عام ٢٠٠٨. وترد في المرفقين ١٥ و ١٦ مواصفات الأسلحة والذخائر.

٨١ - والذخائر المتداولة في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى من أصول مختلفة، وقد صنع أحدثها في السودان في الفترة من ٢٠١١ إلى ٢٠١٣. وتبين نبذة أعدها الفريق عن مواصفات الذخيرة أن الذخيرة المتداولة في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى أنتجها ٤٢ مصنعا من ١٦ بلدا، على مدى فترة ٥٢ عاما، من عام ١٩٦١ إلى عام ٢٠١٣. وتشمل النبذة ١١٦ قسما ومعلومات عن الجهات الصانعة وسنوات الإنتاج.

باء - انتشار الأسلحة

٨٢ - يجعل عدم توافر السجلات والمحفوظات من الصعب على الفريق تقدير كميات وأنواع الأسلحة والذخيرة التي استولت عليها مختلف الجماعات المسلحة والشبكات الإجرامية، وبالتالي تقدير مدى انتشار الأسلحة والذخيرة في جميع أنحاء البلد والمنطقة دون الإقليمية.

٨٣ - وحددت مصادر أغلب الأسلحة والذخيرة المتداولة حاليا في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى على النحو التالي:

- (أ) ترسانات القوات المسلحة لأفريقيا الوسطى؛
- (ب) المخزونات الأولية لتحالف سيليكا؛
- (ج) المخزونات التي جرى تحويلها ثم جمعت أثناء عمليات التسريح ونزع السلاح وإعادة الإدماج السابقة؛
- (د) مخزونات الرئيس السابق بوزيزي التي نُهبت؛
- (هـ) الأسلحة المهربة عبر الحدود من جانب مختلف الجماعات المسلحة والشبكات الإجرامية.

٨٤ - وجهاز تحالف سيليكا السابق معظم العاملين في صفوفه من المخزونات الموجودة في بوسانغوا، وبوسمبيلي، وفي بانغي في وقت لاحق. وعلى سبيل المثال، كشف تقييمان أجرتهما

دائرة الأمم المتحدة للإجراءات المتعلقة بالألغام في كانون الأول/ديسمبر ٢٠١٢ وفي كانون الأول/ديسمبر ٢٠١٣، في ثلاثة مرافق لتخزين الذخائر في إطار عمليات نزع السلاح والتسريح وإعادة الإدماج في بانغي، عن أن أكثر من ٨٢ في المائة من الذخائر العتيقة، و ٩٨ في المائة من ذخائر الأسلحة الصغيرة لم يعرف مصيرها، وهو ما يمثل خسارة ٦٠٠ ٩ من الأصناف العتيقة و ١٦٤ ٠٠٠ خرطوشة. وعلاوة على ذلك، استعادت سلطات جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى في إطار تحالف سيليكاس السابق أيضا أسلحة من القوة المتعددة الجنسيات لوسط أفريقيا كانت قد جمعت خلال عمليات نزع السلاح السابقة^(٣٧).

٨٥ - ومن بين العتاد العسكري الذي كان أول الأمر في حوزة ما يقرب من ٨ ٠٠٠ من جنود القوات المسلحة لجمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى، بمن فيهم قوات الدرك، وبضع مئات من مقاتلي سيليكاس قبل استيلائهم على بانغي، أعلن عن وجود ١٢٢ بندقية هجومية فقط في عهدة القوات النظامية لجمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى حاليا (٥٢ في حوزة قوات الدرك و ٧٠ في حوزة القوات المسلحة). وفي بانغي، جمعت القوات الدولية حوالي ١ ١٠٠ قطعة من الأسلحة الصغيرة وربما معظم الأسلحة الخفيفة والذخيرة المتصلة بها التي كانت في حوزة تحالف سيليكاس السابق المتمركز في بانغي، بما في ذلك مدافع رشاشة ما بين الثقيلة والخفيفة حتى عيار ١٤,٥ ملم، ومدافع هاون من عيار يتراوح بين ٦٠ ملم و ١٢٠ ملم، ومجموعة مختلفة من القنابل اليدوية الصاروخية الدفع (انظر المرفق ١٤).

٨٦ - ونتيجة لانتشار الأسلحة، علم الفريق أن الأسلحة الصغيرة تتدفق إلى الأسواق المحلية حيث يبيع أفراد تحالف سيليكاس السابق حسب الأنباء الواردة بنادق هجومية من طراز كلاشينكوف في بعض المناطق بسعر يبلغ حوالي ٨٠ دولار، ويبيع المتصدون لحملة السواطير قنابل يدوية صينية الصنع من نوع ٨٢-٢ بسعر يتراوح بين دولار ودولارين. ويقال إن القنابل اليدوية شكلت تحديا كبيرا للجهات الفاعلة الإنسانية خلال الربع الأول من عام ٢٠١٤، نظرا لتسببها في قتل أو جرح عدة مدنيين، بمن فيهم الأطفال.

٨٧ - وقل استخدام الأسلحة الصغيرة في بانغي بصورة كبيرة خلال الشهرين الماضيين، ولكن ما زالت هنالك بعض المناطق التي يمكن أن يسمع فيها دوي الأسلحة النارية ليلا من حين لآخر. ولاحظ الفريق أثناء رحلاته الميدانية خارج بانغي نقاط تفتيش مختلفة تابعة لحركة المتصدّين لحملة السواطير يقوم بحراستها أفراد مسلحون، بعضهم يرتدي الزي

(٣٧) إحدى نسخ وثيقة التسليم الموقعة من قبل أحد أعضاء القوة المتعددة الجنسيات لوسط أفريقيا والجنرال عيسى إيساكا محفوظة لدى الأمم المتحدة.

العسكري ويحمل بنادق هجومية وبعضهم مقاتلون محليون بالزني المدني يحملون بنادق صيد تقليدية أو سواطير.

٨٨ - ولاحظ الفريق أيضا في بعض الأحيان مجموعات صغيرة تتألف من مقاتلين تابعين لحركة المتصدّين لحملة السواطير مدججين بالبنادق الهجومية والرشاشات الخفيفة والقنابل الصاروخية اليدوية كانت تتحرك في قافلة تتألف من شاحنتين صغيرتين. وتشير الحوادث التي وقعت في الشمال والتقارير الأمنية إلى انتشار الأسلحة الصغيرة داخل الجماعات المسلحة، سواء الجماعات المجهولة الهوية أو المرتبطة بتحالف سيليكاس السابق. غير أنه ليس هناك أي دليل على استخدام المدافع الرشاشة الثقيلة، أو البنادق عديمة الارتداد أو مدافع الهاون.

جيم - النقل غير المشروع للأسلحة والذخائر

٨٩ - أتاح تفتيش الأسلحة والذخيرة المضبوطة للفريق فرصة للبدء في التحقيق في عمليات النقل غير المشروع للأسلحة الصغيرة والذخائر التي تمثل انتهاكا لحظر توريد الأسلحة. ولاحظ الفريق في ثلاث حالات وجود أسلحة صغيرة لم تكن معروفة من قبل في ترسانة القوات المسلحة لجمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى وتحالف سيليكاس السابق.

٩٠ - وتعلق الحالة الأولى بإزالة العلامات والأرقام التسلسلية عن عمد من العديد من البنادق الهجومية من طراز كلاشينكوف باستخدام أداة تجليخ (انظر المرفق ١٧). ومن المؤكد أن العلامات أزيلت لإخفاء مصدر الأسلحة، التي ربما قد هربت إلى جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى في انتهاك لحظر توريد الأسلحة. وأبلغت أفرقة أخرى وأفرقة خبراء مكلفة من قبل مجلس الأمن عن الإزالة المتعمدة للعلامات بوصفها وسيلة لإعاقة الجهود الرامية إلى تعقب الأسلحة باعتباره أداة لرصد حظر توريد الأسلحة^(٣٨). ويحقق الفريق حاليا في الحالتين الأخريين.

٩١ - وأخيراً، يحقق الفريق في حالة ضبطت فيها السلطات الجمركية لجمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى ذخيرة صيد (عيار ١٢ ملم) جرى تهريبها عن طريق امرأة وطفل في المعبر البري الرئيسي مع الكاميرون. وقد علم الفريق أنه حدثت سابقا حالات مماثلة لتهريب نفس هذه الخراطيش في نفس الموقع. وقد شحنت هذه الخراطيش، المصنوعة في أوروبا، إلى وسيط في الكاميرون مع إقرار من المستعمل النهائي بأن الذخيرة لن تباع أو يعاد تصديرها لأي بلد آخر. وتبين هذه الحالة أن تهريب الأسلحة والذخائر ليس نتيجة للحدود المليئة بالثغرات

(٣٨) أبلغ فريق الخبراء المعني بكوت ديفوار في عدة من تقاريره عن مثل هذه الممارسات في ما يتعلق بالأسلحة التي تستخدمها القوات الجديدة السابقة (انظر على سبيل المثال S/2013/228).

فحسب، بل أن من الضروري أيضا تبادل المعلومات بفعالية بشأن عمليات النقل غير المشروع للأسلحة والذخائر فيما بين دول منطقة وسط أفريقيا دون الإقليمية، عملا باتفاقية وسط أفريقيا لمراقبة الأسلحة الصغيرة والأسلحة الخفيفة وذخائرها وجميع القطع والمكونات التي يمكن أن تستخدم في صنعها وإصلاحها وتركيبها، المبرمة في تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر ٢٠١٠.

٩٢ - وقد حقق الفريق في هذه الحالة بشكل متعمق، نظرا لأن حالات أقدم فيها عناصر جماعات المتصدين لحملة السواطير على تعديل خراطيش الصيد المصممة للطرائد الصغيرة كي تكون أكثر فعالية ضد الطرائد الأكبر حجما - أو ضد البشر - قد لوحظت أيضا أثناء البعثات الميدانية وعمليات التفتيش. وتتألف هذه العملية من إزالة المقذوفات الأصغر من الخراطيش الأصلية، والاستعاضة عنها برصاصات صغيرة مصنوعة يدويا، أو إدخال خرطوش عسكري من عيار ٧,٦٢ ملم أو مقذوف يدوي الصنع ليفعل فعل مقذوفات بنادق الرش. ولا تزال العملية بدائية، ولكنها قد تتحسن مع مرور الوقت لتحقيق الأثر المتوقع (انظر المرفق ١٨).

٩٣ - ويرد وصف الإطار القانوني لنظام حظر توريد الأسلحة في المرفق ١٩. ويرد في المرفقين ٢٠ و ٢١، عرض تفصيلي لحالات عدم الامتثال والدعم الدولي المقدم إلى جهود إصلاح قطاع الأمن في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى، على التوالي.

رابعاً - عرقلة إيصال المساعدة الإنسانية إلى جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى

٩٤ - خلال عام ٢٠١٤، واصلت المنظمات الإنسانية الاستجابة للأزمة الإنسانية في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى. غير أن عدم إمكانية الوصول إلى أجزاء كبيرة من البلد نظرا للحالة الأمنية غير المستقرة وقيود التمويل، من بين أسباب أخرى، يجعل البلد حاليا من بين أخطر حالات الطوارئ الإنسانية في القارة الأفريقية.

٩٥ - ووفقا لمنظمة تنسيق شؤون المساعدة الإنسانية^(٣٩) يوجد ٥٦٠ ٠٥٠ من الأشخاص المشردين داخليا في البلد؛ منهم ١٣٥ ٠٥٠ شخصا يقيمون في ٤٣ موقعا في بانغي ومع أسر مضيفة. وحوالي نصف السكان (نحو ٢,٥ مليون شخص من مجموع السكان البالغ عددهم قرابة ٤,٦ ملايين شخص) في حاجة إلى المساعدة الإنسانية. وتشمل الاحتياجات الإنسانية

(٣٩) Situation report on the Central African Republic، رقم ٢٥ (١٤ أيار/مايو ٢٠١٤). متاح على العنوان الشبكي: <http://car.humanitarianresponse.info>، جرى الاطلاع عليه في ٢١ أيار/مايو ٢٠١٤.

للفئات السكانية الضعيفة المساعدة في ما يتعلق بالأغذية والمياه والصرف الصحي، وتوفير المأوى في حالات الطوارئ، والمواد غير الغذائية، والرعاية الصحية، والتعليم، والحماية.

٩٦ - ووفقاً لمفوضية الأمم المتحدة لشؤون اللاجئين، منذ كانون الأول/ديسمبر ٢٠١٣، يوجد ١٢٠ ٤٧٢ لاجئاً جديداً من جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى في البلدان المجاورة، بالإضافة إلى ٧٨٣ ٢٤٤ لاجئاً مشردين بالفعل. والأغلبية الساحقة من اللاجئين هم في الكاميرون، تليها تشاد وجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية وجمهورية الكونغو (انظر المرفق ٣١)^(٤٠).

٩٧ - وأسفرت التحقيقات التي أجراها الفريق عن توثيق ١٠٣ حوادث لعرقلة تقديم المساعدة الإنسانية في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى خلال الفترة من ٥ كانون الأول/ديسمبر ٢٠١٣ إلى ٣٠ نيسان/أبريل ٢٠١٤، ويمثل ذلك عملاً تسري عليه الجزاءات عملاً بالفقرة ٣٦ (هـ) من قرار مجلس الأمن ٢١٣٤ (٢٠١٤). ولا يشمل هذا الرقم جميع الحوادث التي وقعت في جميع أنحاء البلد. وتوضح ملفات الحوادث التي جرت في بودا ونديلي كيف تأثرت المنظمات الإنسانية وعملياتها سلباً بعدم استقرار الحالة الأمنية، وكيف أن ذلك أثر بدوره على توزيع المعونة على الفئات الضعيفة من السكان (انظر المرفقين ٢٢ و ٢٣).

٩٨ - وخلال الفترة المذكورة أعلاه، قُتل ١٤ من العاملين في مجال تقديم المعونة في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى (انظر المرفق ٢٤). ولا يبدو أن عمليات القتل هذه تسير على نمط أو في اتجاه معين (انظر المرفق ٢٨). ففي بعض الحالات، لقي أفراد مصرعهم بسبب طبيعة عملهم، أما في حوادث أخرى فعلى ما يبدو أن أعمال العنف ارتكبت عشوائياً، أو تصادف وجود العاملين في مجال تقديم المعونة في المكان غير المناسب في الوقت غير المناسب (انظر المرفق ٢٤).

٩٩ - ووفقاً للمعلومات التي جمعها الفريق من المصادر الأولية والثانوية، جرى تحديد هوية الجناة في ٦٠ في المائة على الأقل من الحوادث الموثقة. ويدّعى أن جماعات المتصدين لحملة السواطير مسؤولة عن حوالي ٣٠ في المائة من الحوادث الموثقة، وأن عناصر سيليكا السابقين مسؤولة عن حوالي ٢٥ في المائة من الحوادث الموثقة، وأن جنّة مجهولين أو جماعات أخرى مسؤولون عن ارتكاب حوالي ٤٥ في المائة من الحوادث (انظر المرفق ٢٤).

(٤٠) Central African Republic Situation UNHCR External Regional Update 15, 9-15 May 2014. متاح على

العنوان الشبكي: <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNHCR%20Externa%20Regional>

2315.pdf، جرى الاطلاع عليه في ٢١ أيار/مايو ٢٠١٤.

١٠٠ - ووفقا للمعلومات التي جمعها الفريق أيضا، وقع ١٣ حادثا تعرضت فيها للهجوم قوافل شاحنات تحمل مساعدات إنسانية، أو جرى إيقافها أو تهديدها خلال الفترة المشمولة بالتقرير. وكان للهجمات شنت على القوافل أثر سلبي حاد على إيصال المعونة الإنسانية وسبل عيش الفئات الضعيفة من السكان (انظر المرفق ٢٤).

١٠١ - وعلاوة على ذلك، تعرضت للهجوم قوافل السكان المسلمين الفارين بسبب الأوضاع الأمنية. وقد جرى تسجيل ١٠ وفيات على الأقل في صفوف المدنيين نتيجة لهذه الحوادث.

١٠٢ - ومما يبعث على القلق بصفة خاصة أن العديد من الحوادث التي انطوت على عرقلة تقديم المعونة الإنسانية، والتي يزعم أنها ارتكبت على يد عناصر من جماعات المتصدين لحملة السواطير، كانت تستهدف على وجه التحديد العاملين المسلمين في تقديم المعونة، أو المعونة الإنسانية الموجهة إلى مناطق غالبية السكان فيها من المسلمين (انظر المرفق ٢٤ للاطلاع على معلومات بشأن حوادث محددة).

١٠٣ - وخلال الفترة من ٥ كانون الأول/ديسمبر إلى ٣٠ نيسان/أبريل ٢٠١٤، تعرضت المنظمات الإنسانية باستمرار للتوقيف والمضايقة والعرقلة في نقاط التفتيش التي أنشأها مختلف الجماعات المسلحة والمجرمون في جميع أنحاء البلد ممن يقومون بابتزاز الأموال مقابل المرور بأمان أو مقابل السماح باستخدام الطرق.

خامسا - انتهاكات القانون الإنساني الدولي^(٤١)

١٠٤ - على نطاق التحقيقات التي أجراها الفريق والمعلومات التي تم جمعها من المصادر الأولية والثانوية، وثق الفريق نحو ٤٢٤ ٢ عملية قتل غير مشروعة لمدنيين، بمن فيهم العاملون في تقديم المعونة الإنسانية، ارتكبها جميع أطراف النزاع خلال الفترة من ٥ كانون الأول/ديسمبر ٢٠١٣ إلى ٣٠ نيسان/أبريل ٢٠١٤ (انظر المرفق ٢٥)^(٤٢). ومع أن الغالبية العظمى من حوادث القتل الموثقة وقعت في بانغي خلال ذروة أعمال العنف في كانون الأول/ديسمبر ٢٠١٣، فإن قتل المدنيين استمر في جميع أنحاء البلد على يد جميع أطراف النزاع خلال الأشهر الأولى من عام ٢٠١٤ (انظر المرفق ٢٧).

١٠٥ - وكان من أخطر الحوادث الموثقة خلال الفترة المشمولة بالتقرير المذبحة التي وقعت في قرية غان (مقاطعة مامبير - كاديي) في ١ و ٥ شباط/فبراير ٢٠١٤، التي زرها الفريق

(٤١) انظر المرفق ٢٨ للاطلاع على الملاحظات المنهجية.

(٤٢) هذا تقدير جرى حسابه على أساس المعلومات التي تمكن الفريق من الوصول إليها.

في ٢٥ نيسان/أبريل ٢٠١٤، حيث قتلت جماعات المتصدين لحملة السواطير ٤٣ مدنيا (انظر المرفق ٢٩).

١٠٦ - ويلاحظ الفريق أن افتقار المدنيين لحرية الحركة في جميع أنحاء البلد يشكل مصدر قلق متزايد. وردا على ذلك، بلورت مجموعة الحماية التابعة للجنة الدائمة المشتركة بين الوكالات مفهوم "الاجتماعات المحلية المعرضة للخطر"^(٤٣). وفي وقت كتابة هذا التقرير، حددت المجموعة ١١ من الاجتماعات المحلية المعرضة للخطر في جميع أنحاء البلد، ومعظمها في الغرب، وتشمل حوالي ٢١ ٠٠٠ شخصا. وثمة شواغل خاصة بشأن السكان الذين يعيشون في PK5 (بانغي)، وبودا (مقاطعة لوباي)، وكارنو (مقاطعة مامبير - كادي)، وبوار (مقاطعة نانا مامبيري)^(٤٤). وبينما صُنّف بعض هذه الاجتماعات المحلية باعتبارها معرضة للخطر للخطر منذ وقت قريب، صنفت مجتمعات محلية أخرى من قبيل بوالي وبوسمبيلي ويالوكي (مقاطعة أومبيل - موكو) على هذا النحو منذ أشهر عديدة. وقد فر جزء كبير من سكان هذه الأماكن إلى الكاميرون، مما قلل بالتالي عدد الأشخاص المعرضين للخطر، ولكن أسهم في تفرغ المناطق الغربية في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى من تجمعات المسلمين بما نتيجة للعنف الطائفي والديني^(٤٥).

١٠٧ - وحتى الآن، وفق ما أوردته مجموعة الحماية، نقل السكان المسلمون ثلاث مرات إلى مناطق أخرى من البلد وإلى الكاميرون: من بوسمبيلي في ١٧ كانون الثاني/يناير ٢٠١٤ (٥٨ شخصا)، ومن بوسانغوا (مقاطعة أوهام) في ١٤ نيسان/أبريل ٢٠١٤ (٥٤٠ شخصا - في الغالب بتنظيم من السكان أنفسهم) ومن PK12 من ٢١ إلى ٣٠ نيسان/أبريل ٢٠١٤ (نحو ١ ٣٠٠ شخصا).

١٠٨ - ونقص إمكانية حصول السكان المدنيين على الخدمات الأساسية (الصحة والتعليم، والأمن وغير ذلك) منتشر على نطاق واسع ويبحث على القلق بشكل خاص.

١٠٩ - وفي وقت كتابة هذا التقرير، تشير اليونيسيف إلى أنه بانقضاء أكثر من نصف السنة الدراسية الجارية، ما زالت المدارس في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى مغلقة بنسبة تقارب الثلثين^(٣٩). ووفقا لمجموعة التعليم التابعة للجنة الدائمة المشتركة بين الوكالات، تعرضت

(٤٣) تستخدم مجموعة الحماية ثلاثة مؤشرات لتحديد ما إذا كان أحد الاجتماعات المحلية معرضا للخطر، وهي: الافتقار إلى حرية الحركة، وانتشار العنف وانعدام الأمن بشكل عام، والافتقار إلى سبل الحصول على المساعدة الإنسانية.

(٤٤) تؤكد الفريق من صحة هذه المعلومات من خلال مقابلات وزيارات أجراها إلى المواقع المذكورة.

(٤٥) مقابلة مع رئيس مجموعة الحماية، في بانغي، في ٢٢ أيار/مايو ٢٠١٤.

١١١ مدرسة في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى لهجمات، خلال الفترة من ١ آذار/مارس ٢٠١٣ إلى ٣٠ نيسان/أبريل ٢٠١٤^(٤٦). وتشكل هذه المدارس الـ ١١١ نسبة ٣٣ في المائة من مجموع المدارس على صعيد البلد. ولا تتوفر بيانات بشأن التواريخ المحددة لهذه الهجمات، ويرجع ذلك أساساً لعدم إمكانية وصول الجهات الإنسانية الفاعلة إلى أجزاء عديدة من البلد، ولا سيما المناطق الريفية^(٤٧). وقد تمكن الفريق من التحقق من إغلاق المدارس أثناء الزيارات الميدانية التي أجراها إلى نديلي وبودا.

١١٠ - وخلال الفترة المذكورة أعلاه، وثق الفريق سبع حالات استهدفت فيها عناصر مسلحة مستشفيات. وفي جميع تلك الحالات، هاجمت جماعات مسلحة المستشفيات وسرقت المعدات، وأعاقت إيصال المعونة الإنسانية للسكان المدنيين. وأبلغ عن وقوع حوادث في بانغي ونديلي وبوغبغا (مقاطعة أوهايم)، وبوار ويونجورو (مقاطعة نانا مامبيري). وقد أسفر أحد هذه الحوادث عن مقتل ثلاثة من العاملين في تقديم المعونة، في بوغبغا، في ٢٦ نيسان/أبريل ٢٠١٤ (انظر المرفق ٢٤).

١١١ - ووثق الفريق ستة حوادث مختلفة من العنف الجنسي من مصادر ثانوية في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى خلال الفترة المشمولة بهذا التقرير (انظر الفصل ثانياً - باء أعلاه والمرفق ٣٠). وسيجري الفريق تحقيقات بشأن مسألة العنف الجنسي في الأشهر المقبلة.

١١٢ - وسجل الفريق، استناداً إلى مصادر ثانوية، خمس حوادث مختلفة في ما يتعلق بوجود الأطفال الجنود، وقعت جميعها في المنطقة الجنوبية الشرقية ويزعم أنها من فعل قوات جيش الرب للمقاومة. وخلال الزيارات الميدانية التي أجراها الفريق حتى الآن، لم يشهد وجود جنود أطفال في صفوف الجماعات المسلحة، غير أنه يعتزم إجراء مزيد من التحقيقات بشأن هذه المسألة التي تبعث على القلق بصفة خاصة.

(٤٦) يشمل تعريف "الهجوم" الذي تستخدمه مجموعة التعليم ما يلي: أعمال النهب التي تقوم بها الجماعات المسلحة والمدنيون، واحتلال الأماكن من جانب الجماعات المسلحة، والحرائق المتعمدة، والإصابة بطلقات أو أي نوع آخر من الذخيرة، ووجود المتفجرات في الأماكن.

(٤٧) انظر: <https://car.humanitarianresponse.info/fr/clusters/education>. [الصيغة الفرنسية: <https://car.humanitarianresponse.info/fr/clusters/education>].

سادسا - التوصيات

١١٣ - يوصي الفريق بما يلي:

- (أ) أن تطلب اللجنة من البلدان المجاورة لجمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى أن تصدر سنويا إحصاءات كاملة عن استيراد وتصدير الموارد الطبيعية، بما في ذلك الماس والذهب؛
- (ب) أن تحث اللجنة جميع الأطراف، بما في ذلك بلدان منطقة وسط أفريقيا، والمنظمة الدولية للشرطة الجنائية (الإنتربول)، والمنظمات الإقليمية ودون الإقليمية، على تعزيز تبادل المعلومات واتخاذ إجراءات مشتركة للتحقيق ومكافحة الشبكات الإجرامية الإقليمية الضالعة في الاستغلال غير المشروع للموارد الطبيعية والاتجار بها، بما في ذلك الأحياء البرية ومنتجاتها؛
- (ج) أن تحث اللجنة السلطات الانتقالية لجمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى على اتخاذ جميع الخطوات اللازمة من أجل:
- ١' تقديم إقرار إلى اللجنة بأن أفراد الدفاع والأمن الذين جرى تحديدهم باعتبارهم أعضاء في الجماعات المسلحة النشطة في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى، قد عزلوا من مناصبهم في قوات الدفاع والأمن؛
- ٢' تقديم تقارير إلى اللجنة بشأن التدابير التي اتخذتها السلطات الانتقالية لضمان إدارة الأسلحة والذخائر بصورة آمنة، بما في ذلك تسجيلها وتوزيعها واستخدامها وصيانتها، وتحديد أي احتياجات متعلقة بالتدريب وبالهياكل الأساسية.

Annex 1: Table of correspondences sent and received by the Panel to date

Country/ Other Entity	Number of letters sent	Requested information fully supplied	Information partially supplied	No answer	Pending*
African Union	1			1	
BINUCA/UNDP	1	1			
Cameroun	3		1	1	1
Central African Republic	2	2			
People's Republic of China	1				1
Republic of the Congo	1	1			
Gabon	1	1			
IWI	2		1		1
MAXAM	1	1			
MINUSCA	1	1			
Morocco	1		1		
SAMT	1	1			
SANGARIS	2		1		1
Senegal	1			1	
Steyr AUG	1	1			
Sudan	1			1	
Togo	1			1	
Ukraine	1			1	
TOTAL	23	9	4	6	4

* Either the Member State or the entity indicated that a response is forthcoming, or the deadline has not expired at the time of drafting.

Annex 2: The political context of the Central African Republic

1. The current crisis is the culmination of several unresolved structural problems that have characterized the CAR for several decades. The permanence of *coups d'état* has deepened state fragility and deepened ethnic divisions in both the administration and the armed forces, which has impeded economic progress and triggered a proliferation of non-state armed groups and of light weapons throughout the region.
2. As a result the country's political landscape is deeply fragmented, militarised and saturated with political actors showing little interest in finding sustainable and peaceful solutions to the crises.

A weakly institutionalized state

3. The delay in state building in the CAR has resulted in successive governments' inability to project substantive presence beyond the capital Bangui. This is mostly visible from security and administrative points of view. In fact, the state has never had the monopoly on the use of force in the country.¹ Successive governments' security forces were not just insufficiently equipped to provide basic security, but they have, in many ways like non-state armed groups, also been drivers of insecurity against civilians.²
4. Physical infrastructure is poorly developed with northern provinces being more marginalised and neglected than the southern ones, a situation that also owes to colonial patterns of state formation. Most rebel groups in the northeast cite this as one of their central grievances.³ Weak deployment of state institutions throughout the country means limited access to basic education, healthcare and other social services for a majority of the population. However, the recent professionalization of armed groups and their ambition to control physical territories is pushing them towards forms of political and security rule that could pre-empt governance arrangements with the central government in Bangui.⁴

¹ The Central African Republic in: Bertelsman Transformation Index 2014, accessed at: <http://www.bti-project.org/reports/country-reports/wca/caf/2014/index.nc> on 22 May 2014

² Several studies have well documented the very poor human rights record of the CAR security forces. For an overview, see: Sian Herbert, Nathalia Dukhan and Marielle Debos (2013), *State Fragility in the Central African Republic: What prompted the 2013 coup?* Rapid literature review. Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.

³ Cite where

⁴ The recent Seleka statements after the meeting in Ndélé on 10 May mentioning their ambition to partition the country and create a Republic of North Ubangui are the most visible manifestations of this trend so far. Although this secession claim is contested within Seleka ranks, it nevertheless indicates that stateless enclaves are not necessarily lacking political and security control. See: Emmanuel Chauvin, Christian Seignobos (2014), *L'Imbroglie Centrafricain. Etats, rebelles et bandits: La fusion des territoires*; To be published in: *Afrique Contemporaine*, in 2014

A profusion of politico-military groups

5. Since the early 2000s, a fundamental aspect of the CAR political landscape has been the presence and increased activities of a multitude of rebel groups (also referred to as politico-military groups) that have taken control of large swaths of the CAR's territory. While the reasons for their creation and expansion vary greatly, most rebel groups have understood the potential benefits linked to the maintenance of armed elements as a tool for political bargaining during peace negotiations. Because conflict resolution mechanisms in the CAR have favoured consensual exit strategies (inclusive political dialogue, power-sharing) with guaranteed impunity for grave human rights violations, the formation of a rebel group has become an additional tool for many political entrepreneurs with presidential ambitions.⁵
6. The systematic practice of impunity in the past has therefore increased militarisation tendencies and widespread human rights violations. In the last ten years state and non-state armed groups increasingly overlap. The distinction between rebels, bandits (*zarguinas*, poachers, illicit miners) and representatives of the state is not always clear. Not only do allegiances between actors fluctuate greatly, but also several fighters happen to be simultaneously rebels, bandits and representatives of the state. Many combatants follow the rebellion – reintegration – defection trajectory.⁶ It has come to the attention of the Panel in Bangui that several members of the former Seleka and anti-Balaka (currently the most important rebel groups) fall into this category, particularly those in government.

Decreased influence of political parties

7. In the last 20 years, the multiplication of politico-military groups has largely eclipsed political parties, which have struggled to exist in a context dominated by militarisation of social discontent.⁷ As a result of state capture by rebel groups, the space for political parties has been reduced and their capacity to mobilise social groups has suffered.
8. With the exception of independence, the last time a political party came to power without resorting to violence was in 1993 when Patassé's *Mouvement de Libération du Peuple Centrafricain* (MLPC) claimed victory and assumed power for 10 years. To date, there is no political party with nationwide representation and coverage.
9. The main political parties of the last 20 years (the MLPC and Bozizé's presidential coalition known as *Kwa na Kwa* (KNK)) hardly survived the ousting of their initiator, indicating their lack of ideological and social rooting. In fact, there are to date about 60 registered political parties in the CAR and it is rather unclear how representative

⁵ International Crisis Group (2007), RCA, Anatomie d'un état fantôme, Rapport Afrique de Crisis Group No 136, p.26

⁶ Marielle Debos (2008), Fluid loyalties in a regional crisis: Chadian combatants in the Central African Republic; African Affairs, Vol. 107, No 427, p.226. E. Chauvin, C. Seignobos (2014) *ibid*

⁷ Andreas Mehler (2009), Reshaping political space: the impact of armed insurgency in CAR; Working Paper No. 116. Hamburg: GIGA Institute of African Affairs. Accessed on 23rd April 2014 at: http://repec.giga-hamburg.de/pdf/giga_09_wpl16_mehler.pdf

they are at the moment, owing to the irregularity of elections under Bozizé. The result is a fragmentation of the party landscape and the persistence of personality-driven parties.⁶

Large presence of foreign combatants and implications

10. A recent development within politico-military groups is the increasingly large presence of foreign elements and particularly their direct involvement in political and military processes. Their presence in the CAR is the direct consequence of the decades long interconnection of local crises that have formed a regional conflict system between Chad, Sudan and the CAR characterised by historic transnational networks and cross-border activities in the tri-border zone.
11. The porous nature of borders, historical patterns of living (including nomadism and an increasingly violent pastoralism)⁹ and the existence of clan family links across borders have transformed the tri-border zone into a territory where civilians, traders, bandits and rebel groups are used to cross borders. The crisis in the CAR can therefore not be fully understood without taking into account the specific trajectory of mostly Chadian and, to a lesser extent, Sudanese combatants of various social provenance who have been roaming in the region for decades offering their skills to a multitude of clients across the borders of the tri-zone region.¹⁰
12. The composition of individual rebel groups forming the Seleka is representative of this trend without being unique in the Central African Republic's political history. In fact, the involvement of foreign elements in military-political battles started under

⁶ After the demise of Bozizé's regime in March 2013, political parties have attempted to build electoral groupings in order to maximise their chances in the post-transition elections. As a result, 3 main coalitions of political parties dominate the political scene. The first one is the *Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Transition* (AFDT) which is centered around the MLPC, the former ruling party under President Patassé now led by his former Prime Minister Martin Ziguélé. In addition to the MLPC, the AFDT is composed of: the *Alliance pour la solidarité et le développement* (ASD), the *Convention républicaine pour le progrès social* (CRPS) and the *Rassemblement démocratique centrafricain* (RDC). The second coalition consists of the parties that formed the former presidential majority under President Bozizé. It is currently led by his former communication minister Cyriaque Ngonda and is organized around the *Kwa na Kwa*. The third grouping, the *Alternative Citoyenne pour la Démocratie et la Paix* (ACDP) is comprised of parties from both former opposition and presidential majorities. It mainly claims to stand for a democratic renewal in contrast to the AFDT and KNK, which are linked to the previous regimes of Patassé and Bozizé.

⁹ The Bamingui-Bangoran and Vakaga prefectures have always been very popular among Chadian and Sudanese herders who come to the CAR to pasture their herds. In recent decades, these foreign herders have acquired firearms, which they often use against local populations. In addition to being illegal, this activity is potentially detrimental to the CAR's ecosystem in the region. For some government members, Chad openly ignores existing bilateral arrangements that regulate this transhumance sphere. Panel's interview with a current Transition Government member who previously served in former governments. Bangui, March 2014.

¹⁰ The conflict system between Chad, Sudan, South Sudan and the CAR also involves to a lesser extent the DRC and Uganda. It is however not unique in Africa where a similar 'nomadism of combatants' was observed in the Mano river conflicts in West Africa. See Marielle Debos (2008), *Fluid Loyalties*, op.cit.

Patassé who resorted to Libyan troops in 2001 to protect his power, which had been threatened by a series of army mutinies and rebellions.

13. These rebellions, particularly the one led by the then former chief of staff Bozizé, were also comprised of substantial amounts of foreign fighters, mostly from Chad.¹¹ However, the negative memory of Patassé's militarised response to mutinies and rebellions is rather linked to the support he got from foreign fighters from the DRC's *Mouvement de Libération du Congo* (MLC) led by the former warlord turned vice-president and subsequently ICC defendant, Jean-Pierre Bemba.¹²
14. President Patassé was eventually ousted on 13th March 2003 and François Bozizé assumed power inaugurating a new era of rebel groups mostly composed and supported by foreign elements. President Bozizé subsequently relied heavily on both elements of the *Armée Nationale du Tchad* (ANT) and some former Chadian 'Liberators'¹³ to rebuild his Presidential Guard and the *Forces Armées Centrafricaines* (FACA), the CAR armed forces. This strongly contributed to the widespread perception that Chad was the main mentor and patron of Bozizé's regime and by extension of the CAR as a country.¹⁴
15. Bozizé himself lost his power to a rebel coalition that displays a number of similar features like the one that had helped him to conquer the presidency ten years earlier: a rebel coalition comprised of several Chadian and Sudanese fighters, as well as support from Chad and other countries in the region despite the presence of a regional stabilization force. Because of this and other political developments, the CAR crisis cannot be understood without its regional dimension.¹⁵

The current transition

16. The incapacity of the Seleka to enforce a semblance of order and security in the country, including the capital, exposed the group's lack of governance capacity and ultimately prompted its downfall. In a combined diplomatic effort, France and ECCAS countries (particularly Chad and Congo) obtained the demise of the Seleka

¹¹ ICG (2007), *ibid.* p. 16.

¹² The brutal intervention of Bemba's forces alongside Patassé's Presidential Guard in 2002-2003 did not prevent Patassé's fall in 2003.

¹³ Chadian Liberators are former unemployed Chadian soldiers that were recruited to fight alongside Bozizé's successful campaign to topple President Patassé in 2003. Many of them fell out with him and joined other rebel movements that later formed the Seleka and ousted Bozizé.

¹⁴ Michel Luntumbue et Simon Massock, 'Afrique Centrale, Risques et envers de la pax-tchadienne', Note d'Analyse du Groupe de Recherches et d'Information sur la Paix (GRIP), 2014, pp 2-4.

¹⁵ Roland Marchal, 'Aux marges du monde en Afrique Centrale. Les Etudes du CERI No. 153-154', accessed on 10 May 2014 at: www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/sites/ceri/sciencespo.fr/ceri/files/etude153_154.pdf. See also: Steven Spittals and Filip Hilgert Mapping conflict motives: The Central African Republic, Antwerpen: IPIS. 2009

leadership on 10 January 2014 at an extraordinary summit of the regional organisation held in N'Djamena.

17. The removal of President Djotodia by ECCAS is an unprecedented move that reflects both the regional organisation's involvement in the crisis and the CAR's dependence on its neighbours. This paved the way to a new transition led by Catherine Samba-Panza who was elected by the Transitional National Council (TNC) on 20th January 2014.
18. Initial hopes of a new beginning did increase security for the population. On the contrary, fighting between the former Seleka and the anti-Balaka continued in several parts of the country as did targeted inter-communal killings that contributed to the misleading framing of the crisis in CAR as a religious conflict. The deployment of MISCA troops alongside the French forces (under operation SANGARIS) prevented worse from happening but did not stop the killing of civilians. The interim government was facing a number of structural problems that needed immediate attention: state coffers were empty, civil servants had not been paid for several months, the administration was not functioning because of internal displacement and the slow deployment of international troops¹⁶.

Political agreements

19. Contestations around the legitimacy of the current transition have the potential to derail the Transitional Government as they touch upon the sensitive issue of representation in a context of increased identity politics. The country has a long history of failed transitions and weak peace agreements. Since Bozizé's seizure of power in 2003, rebellions have mushroomed in the CAR followed by a series of agreements that, according to several actors, have not seriously been implemented. Bozizé's fall can among others be blamed on his lack of political will to implement political agreements and to seriously engage in DDR.

Four main agreements were signed between Bozizé's government and different rebel groups.

- The first one was signed in Sirte (Libye) with the *Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain* (FDPC) on 2 February 2007;
- The second one was signed on 13 Avril 2007 with *Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement* (UFDR);
- The 3rd accord was signed with the *Armée Populaire pour la Restauration de la Démocratie* (APRD) on 9 May 2007.

¹⁶ It took the European Union about 3 months between the decision to deploy and the actual deployment of 800 soldiers to the CAR (EUFOR-CAR). The first soldiers only arrived in April 2014 and took control of the Bangui airport in order to allow the French troops to deploy elsewhere within the country.

- In order to harmonise all these agreements a 4th one was signed in Libreville in June 2008 between the government and the 3 rebel groups¹⁷.

¹⁷ For a good analysis of peace agreements signed between 2007 and 2008, see Alphonse Zozime Tamekamta (2013), *Gouvernance, rebellions armées et déficit sécuritaire en RCA. Comprendre les crises centrafricaines*. Note d'Analyse du GRIP, pp. 2-5

Annex 3: Neighbouring countries' contributions to the implementation of resolutions 2127 (2013) and 2134 (2014)

A. Cameroon

1. The CAR shares a 800 km long land border with Cameroon that culminates in a tri-border zone with Chad in the North and another one with the Republic of Congo in the south. This western border is vital for the CAR as it is the passing point for all goods entering and exiting the country.¹

2. Since the renewed outbreak of violence in December 2013, Cameroon has received 80,004 refugees from the CAR bringing the total number of CAR refugees in Cameroon to about 191,265 people.² Cameroon is the country with the highest amount of refugees from CAR.

3. Among those fleeing the violence since March 2013 has also been a minority of ex-FACA who were duly disarmed and cantoned in various sites in Bertoua and Douala. Around 150 ex-FACA were concerned.³ These soldiers remain in Cameroon in expectation of a return to the CAR once conditions for the reform of the army have been put in place. Before being asked to leave Cameroon where he had sought refuge after leaving his country and where he had stayed for a couple of months President Bozizé was actively pursuing his objective of 'restoring the constitutional order' by attempting to stage a counter-coup. President Bozizé arrived in Cameroon on a helicopter of the CAR army that was seized by Cameroonian authorities in expectation of their retrocession to CAR.⁴

4. Cameroon has taken a number of measures to implement resolutions 2127 (2013) and 2134 (2014): It has tightened up controls in the border area with the CAR, a region already considered as a priority security area because of intense activities of *zarguin*s and other armed groups in the region. Having ratified the Kinshasa Convention, Cameroon has also undertaken additional steps to control the circulation of small arms and light weapons in the country. An Inter-ministerial Committee has been set up that is comprised of all departments affected by the crisis in the CAR.⁵ The aim of this Committee is to coordinate the Government's responses to the crisis and improve much-needed inter-departmental communication. Cameroon has also tightened up the screening of goods arriving at the Douala seaport and destined to the CAR.

¹ The Cameroonian port of Douala is the nearest access the CAR has to the sea.

² Since the 1990s Cameroon has received successive waves of refugees fleeing war, widespread insecurity and hunger in the CAR. See UNHCR, Central African Republic Situation; UNHCR external Regional Update 15, 9-15 May 2014.

³ Meetings with Cameroonian government authorities and diplomats, Yaoundé, April 2014.

⁴ Meeting with a diplomat in Yaoundé, April 2014; meeting with Foreign Ministry officials in Yaoundé, April 2014.

⁵ Those are the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Finance, Territorial administration and decentralization (chair), Interior and finally Customs and the Presidency.

5. Through CEMAC and ECCAS Cameroon has also participated in regional diplomatic, security and financial efforts to settle the crisis and implement Security Council resolutions. In addition to providing 850 military and police troops to MISCA.⁶ Cameroon has also contributed its share of financial support to the Transitional Government⁷.

6. However, Cameroon faces several challenges in fulfilling its duty of implementing resolutions 2127 (2013) and 2134 (2014): The difficulty to monitor movements across the long and porous CAR-Cameroon border is certainly one of the most important. The limited capacity of the police and the army in terms of vehicles to patrol, well-trained manpower and the chronic problem of lack of fuel make any systematic border control difficult. There are, however, some exceptions to this. The Brigade d'Intervention Rapide (BIR), a well equipped, trained and motivated elite corps within the army has often been called to the rescue of overwhelmed regular troops⁸. However the 10,000 strong BIR is currently very occupied on Cameroon's western border where Boko Haram has been abducting European and Chinese nationals from Cameroon, posing new challenges to Cameroonian security agents. In some instances, the BIR has also been deployed within national parks to confront increasingly armed poachers.

B. Gabon

7. The Republic of Gabon doesn't border the CAR and has not been affected by refugee flows like its northern neighbours⁹. No movements of arms have been recorded into or from the country as a consequence of the crisis in the CAR.¹⁰ Gabon has mediated successive crises in the CAR until it handed over to the RoC and has provided a substantial amount of diplomatic and financial resources in the past. Today, the country provides 850 military and police personnel to MISCA.

8. As poaching has intensified in Central African, Congolese and Cameroonian forests, the Republic of Gabon has increased its border monitoring activities because the forest that runs across the four countries is regarded as a common good.

C. The Republic of Congo (RoC)

9. The RoC has a common border with the CAR in the north. About 16,000 refugees have arrived from the CAR since December 2013. A small number of these refugees

⁶ MISCA's Military Commander, General Tumeuta, is from Cameroon.

⁷ CEMAC and ECCAS countries have all contributed 5 billion CFA francs (about 10 million USD) to help paying salaries in the CAR and partly fund MISCA.

⁸ Meeting with an official from the National Police of Cameroon, Yaoundé, April 2014.

⁹ According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, around 200 CAR refugees have been registered in Gabon; meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Gabon, Libreville, 24 April 2014.

¹⁰ Meeting with the Minister of Defense and the Army Chief of staff, Libreville, April 2014.

were armed and have subsequently been disarmed and cantoned in refugee camps in Impfundo, Betou, Pointe-Noire and Brazzaville¹¹.

10. At the political and diplomatic level, the RoC has taken over the mediation of the crisis from Gabon and chairs the International Contact Group on the CAR (ICG-CAR). Congo also maintains the highest amount of military and police personnel (roughly 1000) within MISCA and provides the political head of the mission. Both at the regional and bilateral levels, the Government of Congo has often assisted the CAR authorities financially. The RoC was the first ECCAS' country to provide 10 million USD assistance, which helped paying the salaries of CAR civil servants in March 2014 at a time when social expectations about the new transitional Government were very high.

11. Similar to Cameroon, the RoC has put in place a ministerial concertation framework aimed at coordinating the country's actions regarding the crisis in the CAR. It is headed by the RoC Presidency.

12. For the RoC, the tri-border zone between Cameroon, Congo and the CAR is problematic because of increased poaching activities that deplete the country's forests of valuable resources. In general, the RoC's assessment of the crisis in the CAR is that it has the potential to spill across the border and sow divisions in a country that slowly recovers from its civil war of the late 1990s.

13. Measures taken by the Congolese Government to implement resolutions 2127 (2013) and 2134 (2014) include increased monitoring of the border and the screening of all arms movements. However, due the fact that the border zones are covered with dense forest, the RoC struggles to monitor all movements and admits that there are multiple unknown footpads that could be used by violent entrepreneurs. Some officials also think that a better management of Congo's border with the CAR could start with the proper demarcation of the border, a step that is to be understood in the framework of long-term conflict prevention¹².

¹¹ Meetings with government officials, Brazzaville, May 2014.

¹² Meetings with officials at the Interior Ministry, Brazzaville, May 2014.

Annex 4: Other armed groups

1. The Panel received five reports of incidents in the region of Paoua (Ouham-Pendé province) from 1 December 2013 to 30 April 2014 involving a group described as composed of armed elements formerly part of the *Front Populaire pour le Redressement* (FPR), formerly commanded by Chadian rebel Abdelkader Babba Laddé, with a total of 26 casualties, including civilians, and hundreds of incidents of destruction of properties.

2. In the same region, an armed group called *Révolution et Justice* (RJ), commanded by Armel Bedaya alias Armel Sayo,¹ with the rank of Captain in the FACA, and who is known as the son-in-law and bodyguard of former President Ange-Félix Patassé, is responsible for the killing of four civilians on 28 January 2014, an intrusion into a humanitarian compound on 4 March 2014, and an attack on MISCA troops in the district of Ngaoundaye, bordering Cameroon, on 26 April 2014, which resulted in the death of four Cameroonian soldiers and the destruction of one military truck.

3. According to the Panel's database, an armed group identified as part of the *Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain* (FDPC) of Abdullaye Miskine,² formerly allied with Armel Bedaya,³ is allegedly responsible of the killing of one civilian during a clash with French forces in the vicinity of Zoukombo (Nana-Mambere province) on 2 April 2014, located twenty kilometres from Garoua-Boulai, and for one incident of looting of property committed on 14 April 2014 in the same area. During a mission to the region, the Panel was told that attacks on international forces by FDPC are happening on a regular basis, and were described as involving most of time around 20 fighters either by foot or on motorbikes.⁴

4. In the Vakaga and Bamingui-Bangora provinces, the presence of individuals bearing distinctive signs of Janjaweds from the Dafur region of Sudan was confirmed by multiple sources and institutional contacts of the Panel. Also, the Panel documented one incident of an attack against humanitarian aid workers in Ndele involving alleged Janjaweds militiamen.

5. Lastly, concerning the activity of small groups associated with the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), its presence was reported in the regions of Haut-Mbomou, Mbomou, Haute and Basse-Kotto, the Panel documented in its database two killing of civilians, eight incidents of kidnapping of civilians (including 5 cases where the victims were released within approximately 48 hours), and three cases of looting and destruction of properties. The LRA has been moving during the past year deeper into the CAR territory, in reaction to increasing military pressure from African Union-Regional Task Force (AU/RTF).

¹ See annex 4.1.

² Abdullaye Miskine is included in the annex of US President Obama's executive order blocking property of certain persons contributing to the conflict in the Central African Republic released on 13 May 2014.

³ See annex 4.2.

⁴ Meeting with international forces, Bêloko, 26 April 2014.

Annex 4.1: Armel Bedaya Sayo and “Révolution et Justice”

*Armel Bedaya Sayo delivering a speech to “Révolution et Justice” troops
(screenshots of a video allegedly taken in January 2014)*



Armel Bedaya Sayo with youths belonging to "Révolution et Justice" during a joint humanitarian operation with MISCA and UNHCR, on 31 March 2014



Annex 4.2: Abdullaye Miskine and Armel Bedaya Sayo

*Abdullaye Miskine (left) and Armel Bedaya Sayo
(picture allegedly taken in 2013)*



Annex 5: Anti-Balaka - Structure and dynamics

History

1. The appellation “anti-Balaka” first appeared in the district of Bossangoa (Ouham) in mid-September 2013, following coordinated attacks conducted in the outskirts of Bossangoa on 6 and 7 September 2013 by militia then described by media as “pro-Bozizé armed men”.¹ The armed insurgency against Seleka troops then spread to the districts of Bouca (Ouham), Boali, Bossembélé and Bessempélé (Ombella-Mpoko).

2. As confirmed to the Panel by multiple sources, including anti-Balaka, and institutional contacts, FACA and *Gendarmes* personnel loyal to former President François Bozizé² were then recruiting youths from local communities from the Baya area (Ouham and Ombella-Mpoko provinces), some of them already part of hunting groups or self-defence militias called “archers”, created mainly in the mid-2000s in response to the activities of “coupeurs de route” or “zaraguinas”³, but also in the region of Garoua Boulai (border town between Cameroon and the CAR) and Zongo (DRC), a city located opposite to Bangui, on the DRC side of the Oubangui river.⁴

3. On 5 December 2013, around a thousand militia men conducted a coordinated attack by foot on Bangui, coming from at least three directions (international airport, Boy-Rabe/Cité Jean XIII neighbourhoods and Zongo), while groups of youth from the 4th and 8th arrondissements of Bangui, strongholds of the “Coalition Citoyenne d’Opposition aux Rébellions Armées” (COCORA) and “Comité d’Organisation des Actions Citoyennes” (COAC) created by former President Bozizé in December 2012 to track down supporters of the Seleka in Bangui, were also erecting barricades and harassing former Seleka troops in the capital.

4. At the same time, the “Haut Conseil de Résistance et du Redressement National”, commanded by a nephew of Bozizé, Rochael Mokom alias ‘Colonel Rocco’,⁵ and Mike Stève

¹ « Centrafrique: des villages autour de Bossangoa sous le contrôle d’hommes armés pro-Bozizé », RFI, 8 September 2013, <http://www.rfi.fr/afric/20130908-centrafrique-villages-autour-bossangoa-sous-contrôle-hommes-armés-pro-bozizé/>, accessed on 15 April 2014; see also annex 5.5 on Bossangoa.

² François Bozizé was added on 9 May 2014 to the list established and maintained by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the CAR.

³ Armed banditry in the region of northern Cameroon, southern Chad and north-west of the CAR has been extensively documented by researchers, in particular Louisa Lombard and Marielle Debos, and human rights organisations, notably Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.

⁴ According to UN sources in DRC, anti-Balaka groups continue to pose a security threat in the region of Zongo.

⁵ Also brother of Maxime Mokom, military coordinator of the CLPC, Colonel “Rocco” was killed on 11 May 2014 while driving a motorbike together with Camille Lepage, a French photojournalist.

Yambété, founder of the COAC with the rank of Lieutenant in the FACA,⁶ based out of the region of Garoua Boulai, led its first military offensive on Cantonnier, on the other side of the border, and Bêloko,⁷ clashing with former Seleka troops commanded by General Saïd Souleymane, of Sudanese origin, based in Bouar (Nana Mambéré province), who was eventually killed on 21 January 2014 while former Seleka troops were withdrawing towards southern Chad and eastern CAR. According to a diplomatic source in Yaoundé, the Cameroonian territory has been used by former President François Bozizé and his supporters to prepare the offensive on Bangui.⁸

Current status

5. The Panel classifies the anti-Balakas in four different categories:

- The first group, named “*Coordination nationale des Libérateurs du Peuple Centrafricain*” (CLPC), is based out of the Boy-Rabe neighbourhood of Bangui and operates in the north of the city, up to the town of Damara,⁹ and is issuing identification badges to its members, including in Carnot.¹⁰ It is coordinated at the military level by Thierry Lébéné, alias ‘Colonel 12 Puissances’,¹¹ a former FACA, and at the political level by a businessman named Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona,¹² former Youth and Sports Minister of the last Bozizé’s government, founder of the COCORA and president of the CAR Football federation.¹³
- The second group, which representation has shifted from Joachim Kokaté, adviser to the Primer Minister of the Transition with the rank of Captain in the FACA,¹⁴ to Sébastien Wénézoui, a 33 years-old engineer related to François Bozizé’s daughter Joséphine Kéléfio. The group, known as the “group of the anti-Balakas from the south”, is headed by the Chief-Corporal of the FACA Alfred Yekatom alias ‘Rombhot’ and FACA Lieutenant Gilbert Kamezoulai, and operates mainly in the southwest of the capital, out of the neighbourhood of PK9, and the towns of Bimbo, Bérengo, Pissa and Mbaiki (Lobaye province), racketing transport of goods and passengers as observed by the Panel.¹⁵

⁶ Steve Yambété was according to several sources still jailed in Yaoundé, Cameroon, at the time of drafting, after being arrested on 17 January 2014 by Cameroonian authorities for attacking the Ecobank agency in Bêloko, alongside the *Gendarmerie* Sabe and Rochael Mokom.

⁷ See also annex 5.1.

⁸ Meeting with a diplomatic source, Yaoundé, 16 April 2014.

⁹ See annex 5.2.

¹⁰ See annex 5.3.

¹¹ Meeting with ‘Colonel 12 puissances’, 22 March 2014.

¹² Meeting and telephone conversation with Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona, Bangui, 3 and 20 May 2014.

¹³ <http://fr.cafonline.com/association/central-african/information>, accessed on 28 May 2014.

¹⁴ Meetings and telephone conversation with Joachim Kokaté, Bangui, 20 March, 26 April and 3 May 2014.

¹⁵ Meeting with ‘Rombhot’, Mbaiki, 21 April 2014; meeting with ‘Rombhot’ and Kamezoulai, Bimbo, 26 May 2014; see also annex 5.4.

- The third category regroups local armed militias, mainly located in the south-west of the country (Mambere-kadei, Sangha Mbaere and Lobaye provinces), like in Guen and Gadzi,¹⁶ but also in some neighbourhoods of Bangui where 72 anti-Balaka groups were identified.¹⁷ In Bangui, former *Armée Populaire pour la Restauration de la République et la Démocratie* - APRD - commander Jean-Jacques Larma alias 'Larmassou', has reportedly control of a neighbourhood south of the airport, although the CLPC claimed that 'Larmassou' was a fake anti-Balaka. He was arrested on 28 February by 'Colonel 12 puissances',¹⁸ and freed under unclear circumstances.
- The fourth group, whose command structure is mainly composed of FACA and *Gendarmes* of Baya origin, is the backbone of the original military insurgency against Seleka, and does not have any political figurehead. It still controls directly the road from Cantonmier (border post with Cameroon) to Bangui, and more specifically the towns of Bouar (Nana Mambéré province), Bozoum (Ouham Pendé province), and Bossangoa (Ouham province), Bossembélé and all the checkpoints from Boali to the PK 12 neighbourhood of Bangui (Ombella-Mpoko province). The Panel obtained information that troops were gathering during the months of March and April 2014 in the area of Ben Zambé (Ouham province), place of origin of Bozizé's family located east of Bossangoa, where the presence in a training capacity of Teddy Bozizé, François Bozizé's adoptive son, with the rank of Captain in the FACA, was eyewitnessed by individuals interviewed by the Panel.¹⁹

6. The idiosyncratic complexity of the structure of the anti-Balaka is reinforced by the fluidity which characterizes the relationship between its different components. For example, Ngaïssona and Wénézoui claim to represent 'Rombhot', or to control the anti-Balaka groups in Boda and Bouar. Also, Minister Leopold Narcisse Bara, officially appointed by the Transitional Head of State as a representative of the anti-Balaka movement, but not recognised as such,²⁰ is perceived as being behind the initiative of the Reconciliation Minister, Antoinette Montaigne, that led to the election on 15 May 2014 of Sébastien Wenezoui, former CLPC deputy

¹⁶ See also annex 29.

¹⁷ Meeting with a transitional government official, Bangui, 27 May 2014.

¹⁸ Meeting with 'Colonel 12 Puissances', op. cit.; meeting with a confidential source member of the anti-Balaka, Bangui, 24 March 2014; see also Tweet from @lesamisdesiloe on 28 February 2014: #Centrafrique RNL - Thierry Libéré alias 12 puissances responsable Anti balaka a arrêté lieutenant Jean Jacques Larma après enquête, accessed at <https://twitter.com/lesamisdesiloe/status/439388030324191232> on 28 May 2014.

¹⁹ Meetings with local authorities, anti-Balaka representative, UN officials and international forces, Bossangoa, 30 April 2014; see also case study on Bossangoa, in annex 5.5.

²⁰ Meetings with anti-Balaka political and military leaders, March-May 2014.

spokesperson, as general coordinator of the anti-Balaka movement. The leader of the CLPC, Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona, has qualified this election as a “farce”.²¹

7. The initiative of the Government seems to have weakened Ngaïssona's group, with a disparate coalition of groups henceforth under the banner of Wénézoui, which main common ground appears to be opposition to Ngaïssona and the Baya ethnic group. Several defections of senior commanders of the CLPC, including its former military coordinator and nephew of former President Bozizé, Maxime Mokom, brother of ‘Colonel Rocco’, were reported to the Panel on 27 May 2014, in connection with the election of Wénézoui as representative of the “anti-Balaka from the South”. At the same time, Yvon Konaté's vehicle was targeted by a grenade attack in the neighbourhood of Cité Jean XIII in Bangui.

8. The Panel also documented the significant presence in the chain of command of the above-mentioned different groups of personnel from the CAR Armed Forces (FACA) – including from the Presidential Guard, e.g. Yvon Konaté – and the *Gendarmerie*, who are still in some cases on the pay-roll of the current Government, and of individuals who were closely connected to former President François Bozizé and his family. The CAR Transitional Authorities have identified 89 members of the FACA within the group commanded by ‘Rombhot’ only,²² and the Panel obtained independently information that the first and fourth group are largely commanded and trained by FACA officers and non-commissioned officers, *Gendarmes* and some police officers.

9. In addition, the Panel was able to confirm information that the fourth group was at the time of writing the one carrying out the military offensive on the front line in the area of Ben Zambé, in particular in the town of Bouca, under the command of Andilo Ngaïbona alias ‘Angelo’, and in the town Dékoa, with reinforcements coming from the towns of Bozoum and Bossembélé, clashing on a regular basis with the forces of Brigadier-General Alkhatim Mahamat, appointed in Ndélé as deputy chief of staff of the “new” Seleka.

10. However, the Panel could not confirm the involvement of ‘Angelo’ in the region of Grimari, where troops of both Alkhatim and Brigadier-General Ali Daras (of Peulh origin) are regularly involved in clashes with groups of anti-Balaka, as observed by the Panel on 20 May 2014.²³ According to a military source, the groups of anti-Balaka attacking Grimari and Bambari would be partly coming from the district of Kouango (Ouaka province), at the border with DRC.

Relationship with Transitional Authorities

11. The Transitional Head of State, Ms. Samba-Panza, met for the first time at the end of January 2014 with representatives of the anti-Balaka, which was followed by a split between

²¹ Telephone conversation with Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona, 20 May 2014; Press communiqué number 11, received on 18 May 2014.

²² Meeting with a Defence official, Bangui, 23 April 2014; see also annex 5.4.

²³ During its road mission to Bambari, the Panel could observe of group of 20 anti-Balakas coming out of the bush by foot on the road from Grimari to Bambari.

Ngaïssona, Kokaté and Bara. The first was accused of promoting the interest of the Baya ethnic group only, the second of switching affiliations too frequently²⁴ and the latter was denied any form of legitimacy over the anti-Balaka, and suspected of promoting Bozizé's return.

12. However, the Authorities then decided to exclude Ngaïssona's group from the political process, appointing Bara as Minister of Youth and Kokaté as an adviser to the Primer Minister, leading coincidentally to a peak of violence in Bangui in March 2014.²⁵ Similarly, the level of violence in the capital reduced drastically after the issuance of a press communiqué by Ngaïssona on 4 April 2014, calling for a cease-fire and restoration of peace.²⁶

13. On 17 April 2014, the Head of State of the Transitional Authorities met again with a dozen of representatives of anti-Balaka groups in Bangui, at the Presidency. Following the meeting, Ngaïssona was arrested by the MISCA, in accordance with an arrest warrant issued by CAR judicial authorities, then handed-over to the Gendarmerie, and subsequently placed under judicial supervision by the Prosecutor's office in Bangui. This indicates further that Transitional Authorities and the international community have difference of views with regard to the strategy towards anti-Balaka leadership, as outlined in the executive summary of this report.²⁷

14. Lastly, the Panel obtained information that a group of anti-Balaka represented at a reconciliation meeting organised by a Christian INGO was during the same week involved in violent clashes on 25 May 2014 with Muslim self-defence militias based in the PK5 neighbourhood of Bangui.

15. According to an official from the CAR Defence Ministry, the current Government is planning to implement with the anti-Balaka a strategy based on a memorandum of understanding, which would be signed by Ngaïssona and the CAR Defence Minister. This document, not yet signed at the time of writing, would include more specifically a process of registering, demobilization and reintegration of members of the anti-Balaka into their communities of origin.²⁸ However, this approach may change in light of recent events.

²⁴ For example, on 24 February 2010, Joachim Kokaté was appointed 'coordinator' of the "*Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix*" (CPJP) of Abdoulaye Issène, now coordinator of the "new" Seleka; see annex 5.7.

²⁵ See annex 5.6.

²⁶ See annex 5.8.

²⁷ Meeting with judicial authorities, Bangui, 25 April 2014.

²⁸ Meeting with an official from the CAR Defence Ministry, Bangui, 3 May 2014.

Annex 5.1: Anti-Balakas in Cantonnier, Bêloko and Bouar (Nana Mambéré province)

1. The Panel observed presence of anti-Balaka elements at the main Bêloko-Garoua Boulai border crossing between the Central African Republic and Cameroon. From the village of Cantonnier, located at the border, these forces control an illegal border crossing just south of the official border. They were initially part of the “*Haut Conseil de Résistance et du Redressement National*” and composed mainly of former FACA officers who fled to Cameroon after the Seleka coalition seized power in Bangui.

‘Colonel’ Aron Wilibona (center, pointing his shotgun at the camera) and Rochael Mokom alias ‘Colonel Rocco’ (right, with the cap), after taking over Cantonnier, in January 2014 (screenshot from a video obtained by the Panel from a confidential source)¹



2. This crossing is used to smuggle petrol and other merchandise, which is subjected to illegal taxes. The crossing is also used to smuggle ammunition (see also chapter III). In addition, forces also intervene whenever customs officers seize illegal imports of ammunition and drugs hidden in vehicles using the official border crossing, creating havoc to put pressure to release goods.

¹ Video archived at the UN.

Pick-up truck vehicle mounted with a light machine-gun, Cantonnier, January 2014 (source: ibid.)




3. Anti-Balaka elements with FACA background in Bêloko told the Panel on 27 April 2014 that “Colonel” Aron Wilibona was still in command of the anti-Balaka from Cantonnier/Bêloko to Bouar, capital of the province of Nana Mambéré.

Anti-Balaka in Cantonnier in front of a vehicle with painted inscriptions mentioning “Hibou-Rouge” and “Balaka”, making reference to the “Patrouilles Hiboux” (‘owls patrols’), nicknames of the “Compagnies éclairs”, special units of the Police based in Bangui and accused of tracking opponents to former President Bozizé at night (source: ibid.)



Annex 5.2: Mission order from Thierry Lébéné, alias 'Colonel 12 Puissance', instructing a group of anti-Balaka to patrol the road from Damara (Ombella-Mpoko province) to Sibut (Kémo province)



Annex 5.3: Identification badges delivered by the “*Coordination nationale des Libérateurs du Peuple Centrafricain*” (CLPC)

*Badge of the anti-Balaka coordinator in Damara
(recto and verso – photograph taken by the Panel in Bangui on 23 March 2014)*



*Badge of a chief of post in Bangui
(copy provided by international force to the Panel on 2 May 2014)*



*Badge of an anti-Balaka fighter in Carnot (Mambere-Kadei)
(photograph taken by the Panel in Carnot on 26 April 2014)*



Annex 5.4: Alfred Yekatom alias 'Colonel Rombhot'

1. Anti-Balaka forces operating under FACA Chief-Corporal Alfred Yekatom alias 'Colonel Rombhot' exercise a significant degree of control over road transport into Bangui from the southern transport axis linking the country with Cameroon. On the 107 kilometre stretch of road between Bangui and Mbaiki (Lobaye province), the Panel observed the presence of Rombhot's forces at seven different checkpoints, starting from PK 9, i.e. nine kilometres from Bangui city centre. In the towns of Cékia and Pissa, Rombhot's forces are in uniform, identify themselves as FACA, and operate alongside regular forestry, police and road maintenance agents. Rombhot personally perceives part of the taxes collected, which amounts to about 200 USD per barrier per week.

*'Colonel Rombhot' and his 'sister',
during a meeting with the Panel in Pissa, on 24 April 2014*



2. Rombhot's forces also tax river transport on the Ubangi towards the Republic of Congo. Between Mongoumba, located at the Congolese border, and Bangui, Rombhot's elements force engine boats and dugout canoes carrying agricultural goods and passengers to come to shore to perceive taxes. His forces are also present at the port of Kolongo on the south end of the capital, where river traffic into Bangui from the south generally arrives.

Annex 5.5: Case study: Bossangoa (Ouham province)

1. The Panel conducted a two-day road mission to Bossangoa between 30 April and 1 May 2014, to interview United Nations officials, a representative of a local anti-Balaka group, local authorities and international forces. The Panel also met with religious authorities from Bossangoa in Bangui on 23 April 2014.

2. Bossangoa has played a key role in the crisis. As the capital of the Baya's region, it represents a symbol of the former regime of François Bozizé, and the region is commonly depicted as his family's stronghold and the berth of his power.

3. The region of Bossangoa is where the first military operations against forces of the former Seleka coalition were planned and conducted in early September 2013, during which killings of scores of civilians were also reported. In retaliation, many villages perceived by the Seleka as supporting the insurgency were burnt down by Seleka forces based out of Bossangoa, causing also civilian casualties.¹

4. Seleka forces in Bossangoa were at that time commanded by Général Yaya, who was killed in Bangui on 5 December 2013, and his deputy, Colonel Saleh Zabadi, who is currently the zone commander in Batangafo under the authority of Brigadier-General Alkatim Mahamat based in Sido.

5. According to analysis of satellite imagery conducted by UNOSAT (see annex 5.5.1), 227 buildings were probably destroyed in Bossangoa before 5 December 2013, and 1,007 buildings were destroyed between 5 December 2013 and 28 February 2014. Testimonies obtained by the Panel in Bossangoa and Bangui from eyewitnesses and local authorities describe three different waves of destruction:

- Before 5 December 2013: most of the destruction and lootings of properties were conducted by forces of General Yaya, in retaliation of the attacks carried out by anti-Balakas in the outskirts of Bossangoa;
- Between 5 December 2013 and 22 January 2014: the destruction of buildings was related to the attack of anti-Balaka groups on Bossangoa on 5 December 2013 in retaliation of actions of Seleka fighters; and
- Between 22 January and 28 February 2014: almost all the destructions of buildings was committed by local groups associated with the anti-Balaka,

¹ Human Rights Watch reported extensively on atrocities and sectarian violence committed by both sides in the region of Bossangoa between September and November 2013: "They came to kill", 19 December 2013, <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2013/12/18/they-came-kill>; Amnesty International also reported on the events of September 2013: "Human Rights Crisis Spiralling Out of Control", 29 October 2013, <https://www.amnesty.org/fr/library/info/AFR19/003/2013/en>

targeting more specifically the neighbourhood of Boro that is predominantly inhabited by Muslims, which appears now almost completely destroyed (see photographs below, and also inset in annex 5.5.1 and more photographs taken by the Panel in annex 5.5.2).

Boro neighbourhood, Bossangoa, 30 April 2014



6. The anti-Balaka local group in Bossangoa is based in the neighbourhood of the Evêché and is commanded by 'Kéma', who was appointed in mid-April 2014 and coming from Ben Zambé. His deputies are reportedly 'Dorassio' and 'Dangba', and the spokesperson of the movement is called "André".² They do not carry identification badges and according to local authorities, the chain of command is loose and the leadership not in full control of the force.

7. According to local sources, the local anti-Balaka force in Bossangoa, which is approximately 250-strong, has a close relationship with the group in Ben Zambé, although it does not participate in the military operations currently conducted in Bouca and Dékoua. However, the adoptive son of former President Bozizé, Teddy Bozizé, has been spotted on a regular basis since mid-April on a motorbike coming back-and-forth to Bossangoa.

² The Panel could not meet with the main military leaders of the anti-Balaka in Bossangoa on 30 April 2014, as all of them were out of town and not reachable on their cellphones.

8. The interface between the anti-Balaka and international actors is handled by a community liaison officer, a Pastor named 'Bertin', based at the Liberté neighbourhood, and 'Rocky', a local businessman described as holding influence and money, who lives and operates a garage close by the main WFP warehouse located in front of the Evêché.

9. According to an anti-Balaka representative, there are actually no "anti-Balaka" in Bossangoa but only youths organised in self-defence groups without any identified leadership. As a representative, his role is to liaise between the youths and external actors. However, despite his claim, the Panel could observe the inscription "anti-Balaka" on destroyed houses owned by members of the Muslim community in the Boro neighbourhood (see photograph below).

Boro neighbourhood, Bossangoa, 30 April 2014



10. The group of anti-Balakas in Bossangoa is also reportedly responsible of several incidents targeting the humanitarian community, including an attack on humanitarian aid workers on 20 March 2014, an abduction of one humanitarian aid worker on 1 April 2014, and an attack on humanitarian aid workers on 27 April 2014.³


³ See also the Panel's database of incidents.

11. However, the Panel could not observe any checkpoint on the road between the towns of Bossembélé (Ombella-Mpoko province) and Bossangoa, and no armed elements were spotted in Bossangoa during the Panel's mission. According to locals, this was related to the successful implementation of the "*mesures de confiance*" (confidence-building measures) since the arrival of the French forces on 6 April 2014.

Annex 5.5.1: Destruction in Bossangoa area, Ouham, CAR — UNOSAT

**DESTRUCTION IN BOSSANGOA AREA,
OUHAM, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC**

Analysis with WorldView-2 Data Acquired 22 January 2014 and 5 December 2013 and WorldView-1 Data Acquired 28 February 2014



**Annex 5.5.2: Photographs of the Boro neighbourhood taken by the Panel,
Bossangoa, 30 April 2014**



Annex 5.6: Attack on international forces and UN convoy by anti-Balakas in Bangui on 25 March 2014 (screenshots from a video taken by the Panel)

Explosion of a grenade next to French forces armoured personnel carriers



Anti-Balakas attacking an UN convoy with stones and arrows






Anti-Balaka arming his bow with an arrow and targeting an UN convoy



Annex 5.7: Joachim Kokaté, 'coordinator' of the CPJP



Annex 5.8: Press communiqué number 9 of the “*Coordination nationale des Libérateurs du Peuple Centrafricain*” (CLPC)



ANTIBALAKA

COMITE DE DIRECTION

N° 022 /ATB/14.

COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE N° 9

Dans le cadre de la recherche des voies et moyens de sortie de crise en République centrafricaine, et tenant compte de l'urgence nécessitant la restauration de la paix et de la sécurité dans notre pays, le Coordonnateur Général du Mouvement des Patriotes Antibalaka, Monsieur Patrice Edouard NGAÏSSONA, en attendant d'entrer en négociation avec les Autorités gouvernementales, prend l'engagement solennel en ce jour, 04 Avril 2013, de déclarer la fin de toutes hostilités sur toute l'étendue du territoire national.

A cet effet, le Coordonnateur national du Mouvement des Antibalaka, demande impérativement à tous Chef des bataillons des Patriotes Antibalaka, de veiller à l'observation scrupuleuse de la présente décision. Ils doivent instruire tous les patriotes Antibalaka, afin que ceux-ci regagnent leur base respective.

Il s'agit ici de donner une chance à la paix et à la sécurité, seule condition sine qua non pour une relance des activités socio-économiques en vue du développement national.

Fait à Bangui, le 04 Avril 2014



Le Coordonnateur Général

Handwritten signature of Patrice Edouard NGAÏSSONA

Patrice Edouard NGAÏSSONA

Annex 6: Seleka - Structure and dynamics

1. The Seleka coalition was dissolved by former President Michel Djotodia¹ on 13 September 2013, and subsequently 3,437 soldiers were integrated on 10 October 2013 into the Central African armed forces (FACA) by a decree of former Defence Minister Bertrand Mamour.²

2. In Ndélé and Bria, the Panel could meet with the zone commanders, known as Seleka, but presenting themselves as Colonel of the FACA appointed by Presidential decrees.³ In fact, most of the senior officers of the former Seleka wear the distinctive characteristics of the Central African Army, e.g. the red beret, the flag of the CAR as a badge or the “Forces centrafricaines” insigne.

3. It is the understanding of the Panel that the administrative situation of the soldiers integrated by decree on 10 October 2013, and of the senior officers appointed or promoted by Presidential decree under Djotodia’s regime, needs to be clarified by the Transitional Authorities.⁴

Current status

4. On 11 May 2014, military and political leaders of the former Seleka concluded a conclave in Ndélé (Bamingui-Bangoran province), which led to the following two substantial outcomes:

- Formation of a new military structure, referred to by the Panel as the “new” Seleka, headed by Brigadier-General Joseph Zoundeko (former UFDR Chief of Staff, from the Goula ethnic group), with two deputies (Brigadier-Generals Alkhatim Mahamat and Adam Kanton Yacoub) (see photograph in annex 6.2 and organogram in annex 6.3); and
- Establishment of a temporary political coordination structure, headed by Abdoulaye Issène (President of the CPJP, from the Rounga ethnic group), with Rizigala Ramadane as deputy coordinator (UFDR) (see chart in annex 6.4).

Dynamics

5. The Panel could obtain copy of the first version of the final recommendations distributed after the conclave, stating that the international community should “facilitate the process of

¹ Michel Djotodia is included in the annex of the executive order blocking property of certain persons contributing to the conflict in the Central African Republic released on 13 May 2014; .

² See annex 6.1.

³ Meeting with Seleka zone commanders, Ndélé, 10 April 2014, and Bria, 15 May 2014.

⁴ Meeting with Defence official, Bangui, 3 May 2014.

partition of the country".⁵ According to participants and observers present at the conclave,⁶ the drafting of the recommendations was coordinated by General Zacharia Damane (UFDR, of the Goula ethnic group), who was heading the organisational committee of the conclave.

6. General Damane admitted to the Panel that the first communiqué recommending the partition was not distributed "by mistake", as claimed by the political leaders of the coordination structure, but was the result of an agreement amongst the military leaders of the "new" Seleka. He also explained that the partition may happen in case the requirements outlined as "recommendations" by the "new" Seleka are not met.⁷

7. Another senior member of the coordination structure confirmed to the Panel⁸ that the political leaders of the former Seleka had to convince their military counterparts to reverse their position and issue a second communiqué reaffirming the commitment of the "new" Seleka to maintaining the territorial integrity of the Central African Republic and ensure its national unity. They also consider that some prominent military leaders, in particular affiliated with the UFDR or close with Nouredine Adam (former strongman of the Seleka, leader of the CPJP-Fondamentale, and listed by the Committee for targeted sanctions),⁹ are currently pushing for the partition of the CAR.¹⁰

8. Moreover, military leaders involved in the cantonment of Seleka forces following the imposition of the "*mesures de confiance*" (confidence-building measures) by French forces in Bangui in December 2013, most notably General Issa Issaka, who signed as the representative of the former Seleka the memorandum of understanding with the Transitional Authorities regarding the relocation of cantoned fighters outside Bangui, and Colonel Abdulkarim Moussa, are absent from the structure of the "new" Seleka and considered now as "sidelined".

9. Therefore, the expected outcome of the conclave might not yet be forthcoming, neither from the perspective of the international community in terms of having a single partner for future discussions, nor from the perspective of most of the political leaders of the former Seleka who wanted to take over the leadership of the "new" Seleka permanently. Furthermore, the fact that Brigadier-General Alkhatim appears as the main winner of the restructuration of the former Seleka gives the impression once again that military activism leads to political gains.

10. In addition, the establishment of its military head-quarters in Bambari have modified a fragile balance of powers in a key town, where gold production generates significant incomes, and sparked great tension amongst troops loyal to Ali Daras and Damane.

⁵ See annex 6.5.

⁶ Meetings, Bangui, 14 and 16 May 2014.

⁷ Meeting with General Damane, Bambari, 22 May 2014.

⁸ Meeting, Bangui, 17 May 2014.

⁹ Nouredine Adam was added on 9 May 2014 to the list established and maintained by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the CAR.

¹⁰ Telephone conversation, Bangui, 20 May 2014.

Annex 6.1: Decree (last page) of former Defence Minister Bertrand Mamour integrating 3,437 Seleka into the FACA (original copy archived at the UN)

SN: 2514
du 10/10/13

3420 Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	ZONDORO	ETIENNE	N° Mle	201324438
3421 Soldat de 1 ^{re} Classe	ZONWA	JEAN-PIERRE	N° Mle	201324439
3422 Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	ZOUA	GUY-ROGER	N° Mle	201324440
3423 Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	ZOUABA	YOUSSEF- MAX	N° Mle	201324441
3424 Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	ZOUANGBA	FREDERIC-LE-PLY	N° Mle	201324442
3425 Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	ZOUBAIROU	BAKAB	N° Mle	201324443
3426 Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	ZOUBINGUI	CHRISTELABRE-DIMU-BENI-COME	N° Mle	201324444
3427 Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	ZOUCKBA-ZAKARIA	DAMANE	N° Mle	201324445
3428 Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	ZOUMBEIDA	ADRIOT	N° Mle	201324446
3429 Soldat de 1 ^{re} Classe	ZOUNDECKO	SEVERIN	N° Mle	201324447
3430 Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	ZOUNDEKO	JOSEPH	N° Mle	201324448
3431 Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	ZOUNDEKO	DIDIER	N° Mle	201324449
3432 Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	ZOUNDI	GEDAS RODRIGUE	N° Mle	201324450
3433 Soldat de 1 ^{re} Classe	ZOUNGUERE	BIENVENU	N° Mle	201324451
3434 Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	ZOUNONGO	MAXIMEN	N° Mle	201324452
3435 Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	ZOUNOUA	LETICA	N° Mle	201324453
3436 Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	ZOYONDOKO	DEYA	N° Mle	201324454
3437 Soldat de 1 ^{re} Classe	ZOYONDOKO	SIDICK-NESTOR	N° Mle	201324455

Art 2 : Le contrat d'engagement souscrit par les intéressés pourra être résilié de plein droit par le Ministre de la Défense Nationale.

Art 3 : La présente Décision sera enregistrée, notifiée aux intéressés et communiquée partout où besoin sera.

DESTINATAIRES
 -Cabinet Militaire
 -I.G.A.N
 -D.G.I.A.N
 -D.G.R.H
 -Tous Corps et Sces FACA
 -Intéressés
 -Majr. de Garnison
 -Archives & Chrono

BANGUI, le 10 OCT 2013


Général de Brigade
Bertrand MAMOUR

Annex 6.2: Photograph taken in Ndélé of the newly appointed senior leadership of the “new” Seleka


Brigadier-General Joseph Zoundeko (Chief of Staff, left), Brigadier-General Alkhatim Mahamat (First Deputy, center) and Brigadier-General Adam Kanton Yacoub (Second Deputy, right)




Annex 6.3: Organogram of the military leadership of the “new” Seleka



Annex 6.4: Organogram of the provisional political leadership of the “new” Seleka



Annex 6.5: First version of the final recommendations to the international community initially distributed in Ndélé by the military leaders of the “new” Seleka



Annex 7: French forces clashing with Seleka forces of General Alkhatim



Sangaris : attaque par un groupe lourdement armé au Nord-Ouest du pays

Mise à jour : 06/05/2014 12:24

Le 5 mai 2014, dans l'après-midi, en République Centrafricaine, à environ 450 km au Nord-Ouest de Bangui, la force Sangaris a été attaquée par un groupe lourdement armé, d'un volume d'une quarantaine d'individus qui étaient engagés dans un raid entre Bémal, au Nord du pays, et de Boguila. Une partie du groupe armé qui composait cette colonne adverse a été détruite, d'autres attaquants se sont repliés. Il n'y a pas de blessé parmi les soldats français.

Ces combats ont débuté alors qu'un détachement de la force Sangaris conduisait une mission de reconnaissance depuis Bossangoa vers Paoua, ville située dans l'extrémité Nord-Ouest de la RCA. Cette mission visait à reconnaître cette zone difficile d'accès, dans laquelle de nombreuses exactions étaient rapportées depuis une dizaine de jour, et à y rétablir la situation sécuritaire avec la MISCA.




A moins d'une centaine de kilomètres au Sud de Paoua, au niveau de la localité de Boguila, les éléments de tête de la force Sangaris se sont déployés, sur renseignement, pour protéger le village de Boguila et barrer la route à une colonne de pick-ups et de motos transportant des individus lourdement armés.

Le groupe armé adverse a immédiatement engagé le combat manœuvrant avec agressivité semblant décidé à s'emparer de la position des éléments français.

Ces combats, ont duré plus de trois heures et ont cessé à la tombée de la nuit. Face à l'agressivité de l'adversaire, la force Sangaris a fait usage de son armement lourd, incluant missile anti-char et mortier. La décision a également été prise d'engager un appui aérien d'avions de chasse, en provenance de Ndjamena.

Les patrouilles ont repris ce matin autour du village de Boguila, il n'est pas encore possible de déterminer avec précision les pertes adverses. Néanmoins plusieurs véhicules ont été détruits et plusieurs individus armés tués. L'adversaire a rompu le contact et semble s'être exfiltré. L'identité et l'appartenance de cet adversaire est à ce stade difficile à déterminer avec précision. Il pourrait néanmoins s'agir des éléments de la bande armée qui est à l'origine des exactions rapportées dans la région depuis plusieurs jours. La force Sangaris maintient son dispositif de contrôle du village de Boguila.

Annex 8: Map of the diamond deposits and Seleka rebel activity in the CAR as of 23 March 2013



Annex 9: Names of collectors associated or formerly associated with buying offices in
Carnot with which the anti-Balaka want to negotiate protection arrangements

- SODIAZ: Sidi
 - ADEPT ROUSE
 - ADRAZ B. Justin
 - AIR Idi
 - Bureau Adeline
 - ~~Maitlo~~

**Annex 10: Artisanal miners working in Axmin's Ndassima gold exploration concession
(photograph taken by the Panel on 23 May 2014)**



Annex 11: Seleka forces of General Ali Daras at Ndassima gold mining site



Annex 12: Stocks of arms, ammunition and trophies in the depot of the Ministry of Water and Forests prior to being looted

MINISTÈRE DES EAUX, FORÊTS,
CHASSE ET PÊCHE
DIRECTION DE CABINET
DIRECTION GÉNÉRALE DES ÉTUDES, DE LA
PLANIFICATION, D'APPUI JURIDIQUE
ET DES RESSOURCES
DIRECTION DES AFFAIRES JURIDIQUES
ET DU CONTENTIEUX
SERVICE DU DÉPÔT ET DE LA POUDRIÈRE
N° 1/1987/CDRCAB/DGEPAR/DIA/CSDP

REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE
Unité-Dignité-Travail

**SITUATION DES ARMES, MUNITIONS ET TROPHÉES A LA POUDRIÈRE CENTRALE
AVANT LE PILLAGE**

I – ARMES DE GUERRE DISPONIBLES A LA POUDRIÈRE CENTRALE

- Cent trente cinq (135) AK 47 + 270 Chargeurs ;
- Deux (02) MAS 36 Sans munitions ;
- Un (01) G 3 sans munitions ;
- Quatre (04) grenades en bon état ;
- Une (01) grenade moisie ;

II – ARMES AK 47 MISE EN SERVICE

➤ Résidence du Ministre	2
➤ Service de garde au Ministère	2

➤ Aide-Camp DU Ministre de l'Environnement.....1

➤ Coordonateur BMC.....1

III- MUNITIONS DE GUERRE

- ❖ 6.000 (Six mille) munitions de 7,62 court
- ❖ 1.514 (Mille Cinq Cent Quatorze) de 7,62 long

IV- ARMES DE CHASSE

- ❖ Quinze (15) armes de chasse calibre confondues en état moyen
- ❖ Treize (13) armes de chasse complètement rouillées
- ❖ Vingt deux (22) armes de chasse (ancienne sarsie)
- ❖ Six (06) armes de chasse rayée (MOZER)

VI- ARMES DE CHASSE ARTISANALE

- ❖ Vingt (20) armes de chasse artisanale à détruire
- ❖ Six (06) crosse à bois
- ❖ Quatre Vingt Treize (93) munitions de chasse) détruire

VII- POINTES D'IVOIRE ET DIVERS

7-1- POINTES D'IVOIRE

- ❖ Soixante trois (63) pointes d'ivoire
- ❖ Cinquante une (51) pointes d'ivoire (WWF)

- ❖ Cinquante Six (56) défenses de phacochères

7-2- **DIVERS**

- ❖ Trois tronçonneuse marque STIHL guide 120
- ❖ Sept (07) grumeliettes
- ❖ Deux (02) guides
- ❖ Cinq (05) peaux de crocodile
- ❖ Une (1) de panthère
- ❖ Une (1) de Bongo

Fait à Bangui, le

27 JAN 2013

Le Chef de Service de Dépôts et de
la Régularité

LE CHIEF DE
SERVICE
DÉPÔTS ET RÉGULARITÉ

Lt Alfred Modeste SEPAMIO MBAT

Annex 13: Other natural resources

Timber

2. Industrial logging and timber exports have continued all through 2013 to date, although at a slightly lower pace compared to 2012. Log exports were down 2 per cent, while sawn wood exports declined by 23 per cent.¹ Timber is officially exported to European and Asian destinations through Cameroon, using the border crossings of Garoua-Boulai and Kenzou. Besides industrial logging, illegal artisanal exploitation surged while the Seleka were in power in non-attributed forest areas, as well as industrial concessions close to Bangui, some of which was exported illegally to Chad.²

3. Logging trucks operating between concession areas and Cameroon were systematically subjected to illegal tax levying during the Seleka's time in power.³ Illegal taxes levied by Seleka forces at checkpoints along transport routes within CAR amounted to about 70 USD per truck.⁴ Calculating from an average monthly export volume in 2013 of 15,000 m³ and an average load of 30-40 m³ per truck, per month Seleka would have fetched 30,000 USD of revenues per month from the timber industry.⁵ In addition some logging companies paid Seleka commanders protection money of up to 6,000 USD per month for their facilities in Bangui.⁶

4. Since the departure of Seleka forces from the southwest of the CAR at the end of January 2014, illegal taxation of logging trucks by armed forces reduced. However, anti-Balaka forces also demand payments haphazardly at checkpoints. The Panel confirmed the presence of anti-Balaka forces under commander Alfred Yekatom "Rombhot", alongside the *Gendarmerie*, at Pissa, Mbaiki and Boda in Lobaye province, where trucks to practically all forestry concessions pass coming from Bangui. Rombhot's soldiers levy up between 2 and 10 USD on each truck at the three checkpoints.⁷ In addition, a forester told the Panel that within his concessions local unidentified anti-Balaka youths occasionally steal chainsaws and petrol for sale.⁸

Cattle

5. With the departure of Seleka forces from the west of the Central African Republic at the end of January 2014, Muslim and Peuhl cattle owners have come under siege of anti-Balaka forces and have either been killed or forced to flee. On the road between Guen and Carnot, the Panel observed anti-Balaka elements in the possession of cattle they claimed to have recuperated

¹ Interview with timber trade expert in Bangui, 19 May 2014.

² Interview with forest guard and official in the Ministry of Water, Forest and Environment in Bangui, 21 April 2014.

³ Multiple Interviews truck drivers and forestry agents in Bangui, Mbiaki and Boda, 19-21 April 2014.

⁴ Interview with timber trade expert in Bangui, 23 March, 2014.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Interview with forester in Bangui, 21 March 2014.

⁷ Interviews with truck drivers and forestry agents in Bangui, Mbiaki and Boda, 19-21 April 2014.

⁸ Interview with forester op. cit.

from the forest.⁹ All along the road meat is smoked to be transported by motorbike to Carnot and onwards by truck to Bouar and Bangui.

Oil

6. On 7 March 2014, the Minister of Mines, Energy and Waterworks signed a ministerial order cutting-up non-attributed oil-blocks D-G into sub-blocks of 500 square kilometres, with the view to enable entry of more exploration companies.¹⁰

7. A map was attached to the ministerial order showing attribution of blocks A and B to Poly Technologies Inc (PTI), a Beijing-based company wholly owned by the Government of China (annex 13.1). Block B was attributed to PTI in joint venture with Doha based company IAS by a Presidential decree signed by Bozizé in 2007.¹¹ For block A the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) was granted a prospecting licence in January 2011, which was never publicly announced.¹² CNPC carried out seismic tests in the area of Boromata in Bamingui-Bangoran province up until February 2013 when Seleka fighters forced its workers out.¹³ It is unclear when the CNPC licence was transferred to PTI. In March 2012 a third oil block C, in the southeast of the country, was awarded to the South African firm Dig-Oil (see annex 13.2).

⁹ Interview with anti-Balaka cattle herders and motorbike drivers on the road between Guen and Carnot, 26 April 2014.


¹⁰ Arrête no 005/14/MMEH/DIRCAB/DGP portant découpage du domaine pétrolier de la République Centrafricaine en blocs et sous-blocs surfaces, 7 March.

¹¹ <http://www.energy-pedia.com/news/general/ias-wins-exploration-bid->, accessed on 4 May 2014.


¹² <http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1798133564&Country=Central+African+Republic&topic=Economy&subtopic=Current+policy&subsubtopic=Economic+policy.+Oil+exploration+is+to+resume+in+north-eastern+CAR>, accessed on 3 May 2014.

¹³ <http://www.africaintelligence.com/AEM/spotlight/2013/02/05/the-oil-stakes-in-an-armed-conflict.107943013-EVE>, accessed on 6 May 2014.

Annex 13.1: Oil blocks in northern Central African Republic as per 7 March 2014



Annex 13.2: Map of oil block in the Central African Republic before 7 March 2014



Annex 14: Arms and ammunition in circulation in CAR

1. The panel developed lists of arms and ammunition in circulation in CAR based on samples collected by international forces. The lists within this annex will serve as a baseline to monitor the implementation of arms embargo.

2. Currently, based on the Panel's observation and information collected, the typology of custody of weapons in CAR can be presented as follows:

Entity	Estimated holding
Government forces FACA, police and Gendarmerie	- about 110 rifles - 3 ammunition stores secured by MISCA
Cantoned elements of Ex Seleka in 3 sites in Bangui	individual arms kept by combatants under confidence building measures
Seleka not cantoned	Not known
FACA associated with anti Balaka	Individual arms and few light weapon
Anti balaka	Military arms and hunting rifles, grenades and machete
Other armed entities	Not known
Civilian for self-protection and hunting	Military arms and hunting rifles
Collected by impartial forces	Around 1100 small arms and a number of light weapon

Picture of containers of ammunition in Bosembele looted after the arrival of Seleka in March 2013.¹



¹ See "Centrafrique: à Bossembele, les fantômes du régime de Bozizé hantent encore la ville", RFI, 08 April 2013, accessed at <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130408-centrafrique-bossembele-fantomes-regime-bozize-sont-encore-presents/>

Sangaris discovered, on 11 February after the cantonment of former Seleka, abandoned containers of ammunition north of Bangui that were looted (left)². Mortar shells 60 to 120 mm not useable without mortar tubes were left behind on the open, while small arms and grenades have probably been taken by anti Balaka (right)³.



² Screenshot from France 24 international news.

³ See "Sangaris : la force se déploie en province", Website Ministère de la défense, 11 February, accessed at <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/actualites/sangaris-la-force-se-deploie-en-province>

List of arms and military equipment found in CAR**Rifles**

AK type (see profile)
 AR-15 A2 Cal 223
 CS/LS 06
 FAL 50.00
 HK-G3 A3
 HK MP-5 SD3
 Galil AR
 Lee-Enfield
 MAS 36
 MAT 49
 Mauser
 M-16 A1
 R4 Vector
 SAR 80
 STEYR AUG
 SVD
 Type 85
 UZI

Light Machine Gun

AA-52
 Browning M1919 A4
 MAG-58
 Model 68
 PKM
 Type 56
 Type 56-1
 Type 67-2C
 Type 80
 Type 81
 Vector MG 4
 VZ 59

Medium Machine Gun

Type 54
 Type 85
 W-85

Heavy Machine Gun

KPVT
 Type 58
 ZPU-1
 ZPU-2
 ZPU-4
 ZU-23/2

Grenade Launcher

AGS 17
 ARSENAL UGBL
 GP 25
 HK-69 / GPZ-1
 M 79
 MILKOR MGL
 QLZ 87
 Zastava M-93

Multiple rocket launcher

AT-4 M136
 BM 21
 LAW M-72
 RBR64 M80
 RPG-7
 RPO-A
 Type 63
 Type 69

Mortars

60 mm WW90L
 60 mm NIMIR
 81 mm B 499
 M 37
 Type 67

Recoilless rifle

SPG-9
 106 SR M40 A1

APC

FV 107 FERRET
 BRD-2
 BTR-152
 OT-90
 RATEL-90
 VAB

Vehicles

RDLVS Gecko
 SAFIR 106 mm M40A1
 SAMIL-20 HUNTER
 TOYOTA LC Serie 70

List of ammunition found in CAR**Mortar Shells**

Mle 44
M48
M49A3
M61
M73
OF-D
O-832-DU
PP87
PP-93
Type 63
Type 832

Propelled Grenades

DZP1C
F-7
PG-7L
PG-7M
PG-7S
PG-7V
PG-9
Type 63
Type 69
Type 69-3
R-107

For Grenades launchers

Arsenal RHE-F
Arsenal RHV-HEF
DFS 87-35 HE
ENERGA
FI AP 34-52
HEAT 83
M 433 HEDP
M-60 AC
Super ENERGA

Hand Grenades

DF-37
F1
F1 V2
M-26 T
OF-37
RG-4
82-2

Mines

M-19
TC6

Cartridge

See Profile Annex 16

Annex 15: Profile of type of assault-rifles found in the CAR

1. Pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 2127 (2013), MISCA and the French forces launched a disarmament exercise in some areas of the CAR. The Panel inspected the arms collected and developed a profile of models of AK rifles found in CAR.
2. The aim of the profile is to establish a baseline of this type of arms in circulation in the country. It will be updated regularly and could be used by the panel and MINUSCA to identify potential violations of arms embargoes in cases where new type of weapons is discovered.
3. The profile shows that there are 20 different models of AK-type rifles in circulation in CAR, which were produced in ten countries.

Profile of AK models found in CAR


















Annex 16: Profile of arms cartridges found in the CAR

Background

1. Pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 2127 (2013), MISCA and the French forces launched a disarmament exercise in some areas of the CAR. The Panel inspected the arms collected and developed a profile of cartridges found in CAR.
2. The aim of the profile is to establish a baseline of ammunition in circulation in the country. It will be updated regularly and could be used by the panel and MINUSCA to identify potential violations of arms embargoes in cases where new type of weapons is discovered.


Analysis


3. The profile shows that the ammunition found in the CAR was produced by 41 different manufacturers from 16 countries, over a period of 52 years, from 1961 to 2013, and includes calibres from both former "Western"- and "Eastern"-bloc states. The profile includes 116 lots representing manufactures and year of production of which 29.3 per cent were produced in France up to the year 1990, 26.7 per cent in China up to 2011 and 9.5 per cent in Sudan up to 2013. It is to be noted that these percentage figures represent the diversity of the ammunition profile rather than its volume.











Profile of cartridges found in CAR


Manufacturer: Belgium / FN				
Calibre	8x60mm	7.62x51		
1				
Markings	FN 8x60 S	FN 77		
Year manufactured	Not known	1977		
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014		
Manufacturer: Bulgaria / 10				
Calibre	7.62x39			
2				
Marking	10 69			
Year manufactured	1969			
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014			
Manufacturer: China / 41				
Calibre	14.5x114	14.5x114		
3				
Marking	41 95	41 07		
Year manufactured	1995	2007		
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014		
Manufacturer: China / 61				
Calibre	7.62x39	7.62x39	7.62x39	7.62x39
4				
Marking	61 74	61 87	61 95	61 97
Year manufactured	1974	1987	1995	1997
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014

Manufacturer: China / 61				
Calibre	7.62x54R	7.62x54R	7.62x54R	
5				
Marking	61 71	61 80	61 90	
Year manufactured	1971	1980	1990	
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	
Manufacturer: China 71				
Calibre	7.62x54R	7.62x54R	7.62x54R	
6				
Marking	71 73	71 90	71 98	71 01
Year manufactured	1973	1990	1998	2001
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014
Manufacturer: China / 71				
Calibre	7.62x39	9		
7				
Marking	71 98	71 11		
Year manufactured	1998	2011		
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014		
Manufacturer: China / 81				
Calibre	7.62x54R	7.62x39		
8				
Marking	81 90	81 97		
Year manufactured	1990	1997		
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014		



Manufacturer: China / 270				
Calibre	7.62x39			
9				
Marking	270 74			
Year manufactured	1974			
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014			
Manufacturer: China / 351				
Calibre	7.62x54R	12.7x108		
10				
Marking	351 78	351 76		
Year manufactured	1978	1976		
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014		
Manufacturer: China / 539				
Calibre	7.62x39			
11				
Marking	539 72			
Year manufactured	1972			
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014			
Manufacturer: China / 811				
Calibre	7.62x39			
12				
Marking	811 08			
Year manufactured	2008			
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014			












Manufacturer: China / 911				
Calibre	7.62x39	7.62x39	7.62x39	
13				
Marking	911 76	911 77	911 78	
Year manufactured	1976	1977	1978	
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	
Manufacturer: China / 945				
Calibre	7.62x54R	7.62x54R	7.62x54R	
14				
Marking	945 07	945 09	945 10	
Year manufactured	2007	2009	2010	
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	
Manufacturer: China 9121; 9611, 9631				
Calibre	7.62x39	7.62x54R	12.7x108	
15				
Marking	9121 86	9611 77	9631 05	
Year manufactured	1986	1977	2005	
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	
Manufacturer: Former Czechoslovakia bxn				
Calibre	7.62x39	7.62x39	7.62x39	7.62x39
16				
Marking	bxn 62	bxn 68	bxn 72	bxn 73
Year manufactured	1962	1968	1972	1973
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014

Manufacturer: Former Czechoslovakia / bxn				
Calibre	7.62x39	7.62x54R	7.62x54R	7.62x54R
17				
Marking	bxn 80	bxn 65	bxn 66	bxn 87
Year manufactured	1980	1965	1966	1987
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014
Manufacturer: Former Czechoslovakia / CZO				
Calibre	14.5x114			
18				
Marking	CZO 55			
Year manufactured	1955			
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014			
Manufacturer: Egypt /10				
Calibre	7.62x54R			
19				
Marking	٨٠٤٢٥ ١٠			
Year manufactured	1980			
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014			
Manufacturer: France LM				
Calibre	7.5 x54	7.5 x54	5.56x45	5.56x45
20				
Marking	LM 65	LM 77	LM 1.86	LM 90
Year manufactured	1965	1977	1986	1990
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014

Manufacturer: France LM				
Calibre	7.5x54	7.5x54	7.5x54	7.5x54
21				
Marking	LM 1-61	LM 1-67	LM 1-70	LM 3-71
Year manufactured	1961	1967	1970	1971
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014
Manufacturer: France LM				
Calibre	7.5x54	7.5x54		
22				
Marking	LM 3-72	LM 4-74		
Year manufactured	1972	1974		
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014		
Manufacturer: France TE				
Calibre	7.5x54	9x51	9x51	12.7x99
23				
Marking	TE 7.5 S	TE 9 F	S TE	TE S
Year manufactured	1971	1974	1983	1987
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014
Manufacturer: France SF				
Calibre	7.5x54	9x51	9x51	9x51
24				
Marking	SF 84	SF 57	SF 81	SF 82
Year manufactured	1984	1957	1981	1982
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014

Manufacturer: France SF				
Calibre	7.5x54	7.5x54	7.5x54	7.5x54
25				
Marking	SS 2.70	SF 81	Sf 2.83	SF 84
Year manufactured	1970	1981	1983	1984
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014
Manufacturer: France SF				
Calibre	5.56x45	5.56x45	5.56x45	12.7x99
26				
Marking	SF 1 78	SF 83	SF 84	SF 4-87
Year manufactured	1978	1983	1984	1987
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014
Manufacturer: France FNM, VE				
Calibre	7.5x54	5.56x45	5.56x45	
27				
Marking	VE 2 40	FNM 83	FNM 89	
Year manufactured	TBC	1983	1989	
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	
Manufacturer: Iran				
Calibre	7.62x51	7.62x54R	12.7x108	14.5x114
28				
Marking	7.62x51 97	7.62x54 01	12.7 03	14.5 81
Year manufactured	1997	2001	2003	1981
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014

Manufacturer: Israel / IMI				
Calibre	5.56x45			
29				
Marking	IMI 07			
Year manufactured	2007			
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014			
Manufacturer: Romania				
Calibre	7.62x39	7.62x54R	14.5x114	14.5x114
30				
Marking	22 70	21 76	21 77	21 78
Year manufactured	1979	1976	1977	1978
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014
Manufacturer: Saudia Arabia				
Calibre	7.62x51			
31				
Marking	7.62 1405			
Year manufactured	1985			
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014			
Manufacturer: South Africa				
Calibre	5.56x45	7.62x51	7.62x51	12.7x99
32				
Marking	86 13	90 12	90 22	92 14
Year manufactured	1986	1990	1990	1992
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014

Manufacturer: Sudan / من (TBC)				
Calibre	7.62x51	7.62x51		
33				
Marking	١٩٨٠ من	١٩٨٢ من		
Year manufactured	1980	1982		
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014		
Manufacturer: Sudan /				
Calibre				
34				
H Marking	2 39 011	2 39 12	1 39 13	
Year manufactured	2011	2012	2013	
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	
Manufacturer: Sudan /				
Calibre	7.62x51	7.62x51	7.62x51	
35				
Marking	SUD 51 97	SUD 51 98	Su 1 51 01	
Year manufactured	1997	198	2001	
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	
Manufacturer: Sudan /				
Calibre	7.62x54R	7.62x54R	7.62x54R	
36				
Marking	54 05	54 07	07 54	
Year manufactured	2005	2007	2007	
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	

Manufacturer: Sweden /				
Calibre	7.62x54R			
37				
Marking	Mar 2014			
Year manufactured	Not Known			
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014			
Manufacturer: USA				
Calibre	.280			
38				
Marking	RP 280 REM	RP 20AUTO		
Year manufactured	Not Known	Not Known		
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014		
Manufacturer: Former USSR / 60 and 711				
Calibre	7.62x39	7.62x39		
39				
Marking	60 74	711 74		
Year manufactured	1974	1974		
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014		
Manufacturer: Former USSR / 188				
Calibre	7.62x54R	7.62x54R	12.7x108	12.7x108
40				
Marking	188 72	188 74	188 73	188 79
Year manufactured	1972	1874	1973	1979
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014

Manufacturer: Former USSR / 188, 3				
Calibre	12.7x108	14.5x114		
41				
Marking	188 80	3 74		
Year manufactured	1980	1974		
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014		
Manufacturer: Former Yugoslavia / ППТ				
Calibre	7.62x51	7.62x54R	7.62x54R	7.62x54R
42				
Marking	ППТ 03	ППТ 1986	ППТ 1988	ППТ 1989
Year manufactured	2003	1986	1988	1989
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014
Manufacturer: Zimbabwe / ZI				
Calibre	7.62x39			
43				
Marking	ZI 96			
Year manufactured	1996			
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014			
Manufacturer: Not Known				
Calibre	14.5x114	14.5x114		
44				
Marking	87 3.	9 52		
Year manufactured	1986	1952		
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014		

Lists of Markings

Marking	Manufacturer	Head stamp picture
FN	Belgium	1
10 NN	Bulgaria	2
41 NN	China	3
61 NN	China	4, 5
71 NN	China	6, 7
81 NN	China	8
270 NN	China	9
351 NN	China	10
539	China	11
811	China	12
911	China	13
945	China	14
9121 NN	China	15
9611 NN	China	15
9631 NN	China	15
Bxn NN	Former Czechoslovakia	16, 17
CZO NN	Former Czechoslovakia	18
ع ٢ ج	Egypt	19
LM NN	France	20, 21, 22
TE NN	France	23
SF NN	France	24, 25, 26
VE NN	France	27
7.62x51 NN	Iran	28
12.7 NN	Iran	28
14.5 NN	Iran	28
IMI NN	Israel	29
22 NN	Romania	30
21 NN	Romania	30
Swords palm	Saudia Arabia	31
12/13/14 /22bottom	South Africa	32
س	Sudan	33
N 39 NN	Sudan	34
SUD 51 NN	Sudan	35
SU N 51 NN	Sudan	35
N 54 NN	Sudan	36
norma	Sweden	37
R.P	USA	38
60 NN	Former USSR	39
188 NN	Former USSR	40, 41
3 NN	Former USSR	41
IIITY NN	Former Yugoslavia	42
ZI NN	Zimbabwe	43

Annex 17: Removal of markings and serial numbers from AKMs

1. The Panel observed four cases of removals of markings and serial numbers from one Soviet-made AKM model. These rifles were observed at three different locations in Bangui, within collected weapons by MISCA and Sangaris and with cantoned former Seleka.
2. Their markings were certainly removed to hide the origin of the weapons, which might have been smuggled to the CAR potentially in violation the arms embargo. The Panel is investigating these cases.



Marking erased on an AKM held by a cantoned former Seleka



Fire selector indication of Soviet origin



Marking erased on an AKM collected by MISCA



Marking erased on an AKM collected by SANGARIS



Annex 18: Smuggling of hunting ammunition in violation of the arms embargo


Background

1. On 27 April 2014, the Central African Republic customs supported by a unit of MISCA seized a box of ammunition smuggled into the Central African Republic at its main land crossing point with Cameroon, (Garoua Boulay-Beloko). The Panel was conducting a field visit to this border crossing during the same day and was informed of this seizure and could therefore document this case and take photographs of the seized materials (See below).
2. The director of customs in Beloko informed the Panel that the box of cartridges was hidden inside a bag of onions carried by a woman and a child who managed to escape at the time of the seizure. The Panel learned from other sources of another seizure of 64 boxes of 25 hunting cartridges calibre 12, which occurred in mid-February 2014 and that alleged anti-Balaka elements threatened customs agents to release the seized boxes. MISCA intervened and confiscated the ammunition.
3. The Panel is aware of cases of original cartridges designed for smaller game being modified to allow more effectiveness against larger game or human beings. The process consists of removing the original smaller lead and replacing it with artisanal pellets made from lead made of battery electrodes or by inserting a single artisanal large projectile to mimic shotgun slugs. The process is still rudimentary and might improve over time to achieve the expected effect (see pictures below).

Investigation

4. The cartridges were made in Spain by MAXAM Outdoors, S.A. In response to the Panel's letter dated 30 April 2014, MAXAM Outdoors, S.A. informed that the ammunition mentioned above were part of a lot of 528,000 cartridges of 12-00 Redstar and Rio 20 sold to SAMT (Armes Transports et Munitions SARL) in Yaoundé, Cameroun, and shipped on 9 January 2014. A bill of lading and an end user undertaking for exclusive use in Cameroun are below.
5. In a letter dated 9 May 2014, the Panel requested from SAMT, the list of entities and individuals that have bought large quantities of hunting cartridges from January 2014 to date. SAMT sent to the Panel a list of 26 clients who bought this type of cartridges. The Panel has also sent a letter to the Permanent Mission of Cameroon to the United Nations requesting a visit to discuss this case and other arms related issues and awaiting a response.

Bill of lading indicating the shipment of ammunition

 MAERSK LINE		BILL OF LADING FOR OCEAN TRANSPORT OR MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT		SEAL: MAFU BA No: 951253142
Shipper: MAXAM OUTDOORS,S.A AV. PARTENON 16-18 28042 MADRID ESPAÑA		Booking No: 951253142		Export references E4779
Consignee (except bills of lading issued "to order", "to order of" named Person or "to order of holder"): ARMES ET MUNITIONS TRANSPORT SARL BP 147 YAOUNDE CAMEROUN		Issued under (see clause 22) ARMES ET MUNITIONS TRANSPORT SARL BP 147 YAOUNDE CAMEROUN		S/C CONTROL 30239
Vessel (see clause 1, 11, 12) GLUECKEBURG		Voyage No: 1402		Place of Receipt, Applicable only when document issued as Multimodal Transport B/L (see clause 1) Nanclares de Oca
Port of Loading Bilbao		Port of Discharge Douala		Place of Delivery, Applicable only when document issued as Multimodal Transport B/L (see clause 1)
PARTICULARS FURNISHED BY SHIPPER				
Kind of Packages, Description of goods, Marks and Numbers, Container No./Seal No. 1 Container Said to Contain 2112 BOXES UN0012, CARTRIDGES FOR WEAPONS, INERT PROJECTILE, CLASS 1.4S NET EXPLOSIVE CONTENT: 845KG 528.000 UNITS 2112 BOXES GROSS WEIGHT: 24.264 KGS NET WEIGHT: 22.903 KGS MSKU4217896 ML-ES2342696 20 DRY 8'6 2112 BOXES 24264.000 KGS 20.000 CBM SHIPPER'S LOAD, STOW, WEIGHT AND COUNT FREIGHT PREPAID SD/CY Consignee Ref: ORDER E4779 First Notify Ref: null Inward Forwarders reference null		VOLUME 24264.000 KGS		Measurement 20.000 CBM
(These particulars are declared by Shipper, but without responsibility of or representation by Carrier (see clause 14).)				
Freight & Charges Basic Ocean Freight Inland Haulage Export Export Intermodal Fuel Fee Examination Service Dangerous Cargo Service Documentation fee - Origin Terminal Handling Service- Orig		Intentionally masked		Collect
Carrier's Receipt (see clause 1 and 14), total number of containers or packages received by Carrier: 1 container Number & Sequence of Original Bills: THREE/3		Date of Issue of B/L Madrid 2014-01-13		Date of Receipt of Goods by Carrier 2014-01-09
Declared Value (see clause 7.3)		Shipped on Board Note (Local Time) 2014-01-09		
Signed for the Carrier: A.P. Huber - Maersk A/P, loading as Maersk B/L				
Maersk Spain, SLU As Agent for the Carrier				
This transport document has one or more numbered pages				

End user undertaking certifying that the ammunition "will be used solely for civil use purposes" and will not be sold or re-exported to any other country from Cameroon

S.A.M.T
Sarl ARMES ET MUNITIONS - TRANSPORTS
Vente et Réparation Armes - Munitions et Articles de chasse

END - USER UNDERTAKING

DATE: 04 december 2013

We Armes et Munitions - Transport, certify that we are

1.- The end user ☐

2.- The importer/Consignee of the goods: x ☒

to be supplied by MAXAM OUTDOORS S.A.

We further certify that the goods are sporting shotgun cartridges and will be used solely for civil use purposes and will not be sold or re-exported to any other country from CAMEROUN.

We further certify that the goods will not be used for any purpose connected with chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, or missiles capable of delivering such weapons. Neither will the goods be re-exported or otherwise re-sold or transferred if it is known or suspected that they are intended or likely to be used for such purposes; and that the goods, or any replica of them, will not be used in any nuclear explosive activity or unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activity. Products will not be sold nor re-exported to a third party without previous consent from the Spanish Authorities.

Yours sincerely

NAME AND STAMP OF THE COMPANY

Armes et Munitions - Transport

NAME AND POSITION OF THE UNDERSIGNER

AUTIN Nicole - Directrice


ARMES ET MUNITIONS
Transport s.a.r.l
BP 147 YDE / Douala 22221533

SARL au Capital de 4 000 000 FCFA - RC : RH-810 - N° contribuable : M067600000030Y
Yaoundé - B.P. : 147 - Tél./Fax : +237 22 22 15 23 • Douala : B.P. : 13174 - Tél./Fax : +237 33 43 11 39
E-mail : armes_munitions@yahoo.fr

Photographs of seized ammunition



Box containing 250 cartridges



Label indicating manufacturing entity:

- Made in EU - Spain by
MAXAM Outdoors
- Address: Avda. del Partenón, 16 bajo
28042 Madrid



Lot number: #C1312149#

Use of hunting ammunition by anti-Balaka combatants



Top:
Hunting cartridges modified by removing the original pellets (lead shots) and replacing them with bigger artisanal shots (seized from anti-Balaka in Carnot).

Bottom
Hunting cartridges modified by inserting machine gun cartridge 7.62x54R shown on the left (seized from anti-Balaka in Bouar)

Annex 19: Legal framework of the arms embargo regime

1. The Security Council, by paragraph 54 of resolution 2127 of 5 December 2013, and by paragraph 40 of resolution 2134 of 28 January 2014, decided with regards to the arms embargo that initially from 5 December to 27 January 2015, all Member States shall immediately take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the CAR, from or through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of:

- a) arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned;
- b) technical assistance, training, financial or other assistance, related to military activities;
- c) the provision, maintenance or use of any arms and related materiel; and
- d) the provision of armed mercenary personnel whether or not originating in their territories.

2. The Council established the following standing exemptions to the arms embargo in resolutions 2127 (2013), 2134 (2014) and 2149 (2014):

- a) supplies intended solely for the support of or use by MICOPAX, MISCA, BINUCA and its guard unit, the AU-RTF, and the French forces deployed in the CAR (paragraph 54 (a) of resolution 2127 (2013));
- b) protective clothing, including flak jackets and military helmets, temporarily exported to the CAR by United Nations personnel, representatives of the media and humanitarian and development workers and associated personnel, for their personal use only (paragraph 54 (c) of resolution 2127 (2013));
- c) supplies of small arms and other related equipment intended solely for use in international patrols providing security in the Sangha River Tri-national Protected Area to defend against poaching, smuggling of ivory and arms, and other activities contrary to the national laws of CAR or CAR's international legal obligations (paragraph 54 (d) of resolution 2127 (2013));
- d) supplies intended solely for the support of or use by the European Union operation (paragraph 40 of resolution 2134 (2014); and
- e) supplies used by MISCA, MINUSCA, EUFOR RCA, the AU-RTF and the French forces operating in the CAR for the implementation of their mandates (paragraph 37 of resolution 2149 (2014)).

3. Finally, the Council decided in its resolution 2127 (2013) that an advance approval by the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 57 of the same resolution is required for exemptions to the arms embargo for:

- a) supplies of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use, and related technical assistance or training (paragraph 54 (b) of resolution 2127 (2013));

- b) supplies of arms and other related lethal equipment to the CAR security forces, intended solely for support of or use in the CAR process of Security Sector Reform (SSR) (paragraph 54 (e) of resolution 2127 (2013); and
- c) other sales or supply of arms and related materiel, or provision of assistance or personnel (paragraph 54 (f) of resolution 2127 (2013).

Annex 20: Support to the CAR Security Sector Reform (SSR)

A. Support approved by the Committee

1. Support to the CAR SSR process is currently limited to the Police and *Gendarmerie* for public order operations in Bangui. Since its establishment, the Security Council Committee on the CAR has approved the provision of eleven pick-up trucks, the provision of 48 rapid-response vehicles, equipment and materials for two projects in the CAR for a total of 730 CAR police officers. The Committee has also approved two in-country training modules, each for the duration of eight weeks that would benefit around 250 members of the CAR security forces.
2. The Committee has approved the transfer by French forces to the CAR internal security forces of 51 individual arms from the stockpile of weapons seized during the disarmament operations carried out by SANGARIS. However, the Panel observed that at least six assault-rifles were transferred in April by the *Gendarmerie* component of the French forces to local security forces in Bria (Hautte-Kotto) before the Committee's approval, in addition to the provision of training.

On 31 March 2014, UNDP and BINUCA handed over 11 pick up truck vehicles to Central African Police and Gendarmerie¹



3.

¹ See "L'ONU remet 11 véhicules aux policiers et gendarmes de Centrafrique", 31 March 2014, PNUD/CAR website accessed on 24 May 2014 at http://www.cf.undp.org/content/car/fr/home/presscenter/actualites/2014/03/1_ouu-remet-11-vehicules-aux-policiers-et-gendarmes-de-centrafri/

B. Stockpile management

1. The Panel noted that stockpiles of arms and ammunition in Bangui are secured by MISCA and French forces under the confidence-building measures (*mesures de confiance*) implemented by the international forces. MISCA is securing three ammunition sites originally belonging to Government forces in Bangui.
2. The Panel noted the absence of proper physical security and stockpile management as well as record keeping for FACA ammunition secured by MISCA. Moreover, the three sites where FACA ammunition is stored are located within population centres in Bangui and hence present risks especially due to the poor quality of storage and the presence of large quantities of obsolete ammunition. The Mine Action Section of MINUSCA and its partners have made contributions to improve stockpile management, safety and awareness and assisted to destroy 742 artisanal rifles collected by Sangaris.

*Cutting of artisanal rifles collected by Sangaris from 20 to 25 March 2014 in Bangui
(photographs taken by the Panel)*



Annex 21: Cases of non-compliance

1. The Panel noticed cases of non-compliance with the embargo regime, which were addressed with the concerned parties. It concerns provision of training, assistance and equipment to the CAR defence and security forces without prior approval of the Security Council Committee on the CAR.

2. On 31 March 2014, BINUCA and UNDP handed over to the police forces of the CAR eleven pick-up truck vehicles. The Panel sent a letter on the issue which prompted a *post facto* request for exemption from UNDP to the Committee, which was granted on 14 May 2014. On 1 May 2014, a large quantity of equipment and accessories including military-style uniforms, was donated by Togo to the Police and *Gendarmerie* of the CAR during a ceremony in Bangui. In this connection, the Panel sent a letter to the Government of Togo on 6 May 2014 to obtain further information, but to date no reply has been forthcoming.

3. With regard to assistance and training, Sudan provided basic infantry training to around 170 soldiers from the CAR in a Sudanese training centre north of Khartoum between 8 November 2013 and 5 March 2014. The Panel learned that sixty of these recruits returned to Bangui in April 2014 while the rest headed to Birao (Vakaga province) and presumably joined the former Seleka according to one General of that group. The Panel sent a letter requesting further information on this training to the Government of Sudan on 2 May 2014, but no reply has been forthcoming.

4. On 5 May 2014, the Panel sent two letters to the Governments of Morocco and Senegal, whose countries are the major providers of training for CAR defence and security personnel. Morocco confirmed that 34 military trainees who were in the country before 5 December 2013 (the imposition of the arms embargo) were still present in May 2014. Senegal, where about 20 FACA trainees are believed to be still present, has not yet replied to the Panel's letter. The Panel has also obtained information that small numbers of military trainees are also still present in Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, France and Niger. The Panel is in the process of informing those countries that exemption requests should be transmitted to the Committee in connection with these trainings.

5. With regards to support to the CAR SSR process, the Committee has approved so far all requests for the provision of equipment and training to the Police and *Gendarmerie*.¹ However, the Committee reiterated that the provision of training by international forces is exempted from the measures imposed by paragraph 54 of resolution 2127 (2013) only in the context of support given by MISCA for its contribution to the reform of the security sector in coordination with MINUSCA.

¹ See annex 20.

Annex 22: Case Study I: Killing of an ICRC Staff in Ndélé

1. On 8 March 2014, three armed men killed an International Committee staff member of Cameroonian nationality in the town of Ndélé. At the time of the incident, the ICRC staff member was lodged at the Catholic mission quarters with three other ICRC staff members; the other three were unharmed. The incident happened in the context of civil unrest that was taking place in the town on the day of the incident, but clearly amounts to a violation of International Humanitarian Law.¹
2. The Panel conducted a comprehensive investigation of the incident by contacting witnesses and by visiting the town of Ndélé on 10 April 2014.

Background

3. The town of Ndélé is located in the northeast of the CAR in the prefecture of Bamingui-Bangoran. The town has approximately 51,000 inhabitants; 60 per cent are Christians and 40 per cent are Muslim². The grand majority of the population belongs to the Goula and Runda ethnic groups; a considerable percentage of the population is of Chadian origin.
4. Being close to the Chadian border, Ndélé is a town where commercial and migration routes intersect. Sudanese and Chadian individuals, armed and non-armed, pass through this town.
5. Ndélé has been under the control of the former Seleka since they took power in March 2013³. As per accounts from several sources consulted by the Panel, the security situation in Ndélé has always been volatile. Banditry has been common phenomenon in the area for decades. During the period when the former Seleka was in power (March – December 2013) the security situation improved according to several sources, there was a reduction of robberies, car hijackings and other crimes, but since December 2013 and during the past five months the situation has deteriorated.
6. Since December 2013 different factions of the former Seleka have been present and in control of the town. Mainly CPJP and UFDR, but none has absolute control of the town. These different factions have been cohabitating on relatively good terms for the past few months apart from isolated incidents. There is no clear and unique command and control in Ndélé and its surroundings.

¹ ICRC Press Release, 8 March 2014; <http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2014/03-08-central-african-republic-icrc-staff-member-killed.htm>.

Jeune Afrique, <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/actu/20140308T221625Z20140308T221554Z/>; and Reuters, Red Cross worker killed in Central African Republic, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/08/us-centralafrican-idUSBREA270PV20140308>

² According to Government institutions and humanitarian organizations.

³ Interviews conducted by the Panel with a wide variety of sources as well as the field visit conducted by the Panel on 10 April 2014 confirm this statement.

7. There was no significant change of local authorities in Ndélé in December 2013 when former Seleka was pressured to give up power in Bangui. The Préfet, Sous-Préfet and COMZONE remained in place.
8. Nevertheless it is noteworthy to mention that the Chadian contingent of MISCA evacuated the Préfet, Mr. Bernard SENDEO OKAPE on 26 January 2014 due to security threats he had received from armed men based on accusations that he was supporting the anti-Balaka forces.

Humanitarian situation

9. Presence: The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (WASH⁴), food security and protection); *Médecins Sans Frontières* (MSF) (health); *Première Urgence – Aide Médicale Internationale* (PU-AMI) (health and food security); as well as the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) (education and protection), have on-going humanitarian operations in N'Dele and surrounding areas. The Lutheran World Foundation (LWF) recently closed its operations in the area. Since November / December 2013 all organizations have decreased their operations and number of staff in Ndélé, mainly due to the volatile security situation. Various humanitarian actors have expressed their precautions of deploying either expatriates or national staff ('impats') who are white or non-Muslims to Ndélé as a mitigating measure to be able to operate in an insecure environment.
10. Needs: Potable water remains the main humanitarian need for the population of Ndélé.
11. IDPs: Approximately 5,000 IDPs mainly integrated within host community, no existing IDP sites. All IDPs belong to the Muslim community.
12. Previous incidents reported in 2014: Attacks against humanitarian organizations

In the course of 2014 humanitarian organizations have been victim of various security related incidents in Ndélé. On 29 January 2014, unknown armed men robbed the health centre that is run by an INGO; On 31 January, the vehicle of an INGO was hijacked in the road between Ndélé and Manovo; on 14 February, the base of an INGO in Ndélé was attacked, property and money was stolen; on 25 February, another INGO vehicle was attacked and their staff robbed on the road between N'Dele and Bamingui; On 28 February 2014, after mid-night, five unknown armed men unlawfully entered the Guest House of an INGO, verbally and physically threatened the staff present and damaged some equipment; On 30 April 2014, an INGO convoy composed of four trucks with humanitarian aid for the N'Dele population was held at a checkpoint manned by Anti-Balaka militias 26 km north of Bangui. Three of the trucks were permitted to pass

⁴ WASH stands for Water, Sanitation and Hygiene services

through, but one was held behind. This truck was looted, the driver and two assistants, all of Muslim origin, were killed.⁵ The incident was widely condemned by the international community.

13. All international organizations received a death threat on 28 February 2014 through a letter that was posted in several different places of the town. The letter (see below) was signed by a group that calls themselves *Groupe des Jeunes Révolutionnaires de Bamingui-Bangoran*. According to several sources consulted and interviewed by the Panel in relation to the investigation of this incident the group is composed of few young men from Ndélé who are not directly related to the different former Seleka factions that are present in the town. However, after the posting of the letter representatives of local authorities, IDPs and former Seleka commanders present in the town held a meeting with humanitarian organizations to persuade them not to stop their operations and to assure their security. There were no more threats issued by the group, according to various sources consulted by the Panel, the group of young men were identified and approached by one of the former Seleka commanders in the town and ordered them to discontinue this type of threats. The letter was the last time (until the writing of this report) where the existence of this group had been mentioned.

Description of Events

14. On 8 March 2014 at around 09:00 hours a SANGARIS patrol of one vehicle went to the Commissariat to arrest an former Seleka Colonel INUS and hand him over to MISCA⁶. Upon their return to the base, a vehicle coming from the Gendarmerie commanded by Colonel ISA and his armed men followed them. They shot at the SANGARIS vehicle from behind to which they reacted by shooting back. The exchange of fire took place at the roundabout that leads towards the airstrip, close to the church and the commercial part of the town.
15. The SANGARIS patrol left the scene and returned to its base. The clash left four former Seleka fighters dead and two others wounded. The corpses and wounded were left in the street. The Muslim population reacted a while after the exchange of fire had ended and went to take the dead to be buried and the injured to the hospital.
16. The clash caused fear within the civilian population of the town, mostly the Christian population, some of which took refuge in the catholic church of Ndélé.

⁵ <http://centrafrique-presse.over-blog.com/2014/05/rca-apres-une-nouvelle-attaque-l-inquietude-grandit-au-sein-des-ong.html>; and

http://www.pu-ami.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1879&Itemid=28

⁶ The arrest was related to a verbal threat that Colonel Inus had made against SANGARIS in Ndélé. He had stated publicly on 7 March 2014 that if SANGARIS did not leave Ndélé within 48 hours they would be attacked. Information obtained by primary sources through interviews conducted by the Panel.

17. At around 10:00 hours, three armed men in military attire (beige camouflage) followed the crowd of civilians seeking refuge at the church. The men forced themselves into the house next to the church and fired at the ICRC staff who was residing at that house with the other three ICRC staff members and the cleaning lady.
18. According to several accounts of the incident, the three men just entered the premises and shot at the ICRC staff, no explanation was given in relation to why the other three were left un-harmed. Only one of the three-armed men fired at the moment of the incident, this is the same person who the local authorities have signalled as the perpetrator of the killing. There is no explanation of why the other two did not shoot.
19. The three armed men asked everyone inside the premises to gather at the garden in the back of the church, right after they went to the church and the other church residence premises (where three priests and a seminarist resided) and also requested everyone to gather at the garden in the back.
20. At this time, the three armed men asked the civilians who were present at the church: "where are the men?" question to which one of the priests responded that there were none left. After the armed men took the personal belongings and money from the people present and entered the priests residence to take some money, a computer and mobile phones.
21. The three armed men were not recognized by any of the individuals who were present at the moment of the incident, nor did they carry any insignia or indication to which armed group they belonged to. However all individuals interviewed and consulted in the course of the investigation indicated that these young men were related to former Seleka factions present in Ndélé.
22. After taking all the valuables they could find they left the church premises.
23. According to local authorities interviewed by the Panel in Bangui and in Ndélé, the perpetrator of the incident is a young man named Jamal AMAT. He left Ndélé the day of the incident and has been on the run since. The local authorities have been trying to arrest him for detention. The father of this individual has a money transfer business in the centre of town. There is no further information about the individual; however at the moment of writing of this report the Panel has obtained information from three confidential sources that clearly stated that the individual is closely related to the former Seleka in Ndélé.
24. The day after the incident representatives of the former Seleka present in town formally apologized to the ICRC for the incident and expressed their willingness and intention to apprehend the perpetrator, however at the moment of writing of this report this has not happened.⁷

⁷ Interview with confidential source on 10 April 2014.

25. The Panel conducted this investigation independently and did not receive any information from ICRC.

Annex 23: Case Study II: Boda – Obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance and attacks against humanitarian organizations

1. On 28 January 2014, former Seleka forces left Boda. On 29 January 2014, clashes between the Muslim and non-Muslim population erupted in town. As many as 61 civilians were killed, approximately 850 houses and shops were burned and destroyed and more than half of the population in Boda was displaced. The violence decreased upon the arrival of the SANGARIS forces on 5 February 2014 nevertheless the security situation remained fragile and unstable until the time of writing this report.
2. On 22 February 2014, a team from an INGO was forced to stop the distribution of Non Food Items (NFIs) in the town of Boda due to threats made by anti-Balaka militias. This incident amounts to a violation of International Humanitarian Law. It happened in the context of confrontations and high tensions between the Muslim and non-Muslim populations in Boda. The Panel has decided not to disclose the name of the INGO that was victim in the incident investigated in this case file to protect humanitarian operations in the country as well as future investigations of similar incidents of the Panel.
3. The CAR Panel conducted a comprehensive investigation of this incident, by interviewing sources and by visiting the town of Boda on 19 April 2014.

Background

4. Boda is located approximately 160 km south-west of Bangui in the Lobaye Prefecture. The town and small surrounding villages have approximately 45,000 inhabitants.¹ These figures include approximately 12,000 Muslims² and 30,000 non-Muslims, the remaining figure is the estimate number of people living outside the town; no reliable information is available in relation to which religious community they belong to. Since end of January 2014 most of the Muslim population is cantoned in the centre of town and the non-Muslims population resides in five IDP sites and in the forest or non-urbanized areas surrounding the town. Some of the Muslim population might still be living outside the town but there is no information on this matter available.
5. During the last couple of decades the livelihoods of the inhabitants in Boda consisted mainly of trading diamonds and to a lesser extent of agricultural production. The latter mainly for local consumption. Traditionally, individuals belonging to the Muslim community in Boda and Mbaki managed most of the diamond trade, but since the end of

¹ Evaluation Report, Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM), February 2014; OCHA figures; the number of inhabitants was calculated by the RRM team based on the statistics from the health centre in Boda.

² According to information collected by humanitarian organizations, the Muslim community in Boda is composed not only of Central Africans but also individuals of Chadian, Cameroonian, and Nigerian origin.

January 2014 these individuals have not been able to access the mines due to a lack of freedom of movement. According to primary sources of the Panel the diamond trade has partially resumed under the control of the non-Muslim community.

6. Boda has one hospital and thirteen schools (twelve public schools and one private school), one kindergarten and two maternity centres, all were closed after the eruption of violence in late January 2014 and none were operational at the time of writing this report.
7. On 28 January 2014, former Seleka forces left the town of Boda. Presence of local authorities was reduced to the Mayor, one gendarme, one policeman (both un-armed) and 15 teachers / educators, all others authorities left.³
8. According to numerous credible sources, during the time the former Seleka controlled Boda they were responsible for committing crimes against the non-Muslim population. The former Seleka having armed the Muslim population is one of the allegations received by the Panel during its investigations⁴. Nevertheless sources consulted were sound in stating that the security situation was calm during the period the former Seleka were in power. There were no reports of anti-Balaka militias in Boda before the end of January 2014.
9. On 29 January 2014, violence erupted between the Muslim and non-Muslim populations of the town. Houses and shops in and around the centre of town and the market were attacked and burned, as many as 61 civilians were killed during this event according to several sources⁵. Reports of humanitarian organizations stated that approximately 850 houses and businesses were burned between 28 January and the 5 February 2014. On 5 February 2014, SANGARIS Forces arrived in Boda.⁶
10. According to three reliable primary sources interviewed by the Panel, anti-Balaka militias arrived to Boda shortly after the eruption of violence. One or two days after 29 January

³ Interviews conducted by the Panel, Boda, 19 April 2014

⁴ It is important to note that more than one humanitarian organization has received testimony from the Muslim community that they were armed by the former Seleka and have a certain level of capability to defend themselves; which is one of the reasons why they haven't been "eliminated" or "expelled" from Boda.

⁵ Interviews conducted by the Panel in Boda on 19 April 2014; HRW <http://www.hrw.org/print/news/2014/02/12/central-african-republic-muslims-forced-flee>; Rapport d'Evaluation, RRM, Boda, Prefecture de la Lobaye, February 2014; Reuters, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/03/us-centralafrican-killings-idUSBREA121PF20140203>; Jeune Afrique, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Articleimp_ARTJAWEB20140203152234_centrafrique-flambee-de-violence-entre-chretiens-et-musulmans-pres-de-bangui.html; HRW, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/02/12/central-african-republic-muslims-forced-flee>; UN, <http://www.un.org/africarenewal/news/central-african-republic-un-rights-office-warns-worsening-insecurity-bangui>; UNHCR, <http://www.unhcr.org/hk/files/2014%20Emergency%20CAR/update%20Feb/Regional%20Update%20II%20-%20Central%20African%20Situation.pdf>

⁶ Confidential source of the Panel within a humanitarian organization.

2014, a group of about 50 young men from the non-Muslim community left Boda and went to be "trained" by an anti-Balaka commander with the nom de guerre "General 8-8" from the town of Pama (around 40 km north of Boda), they returned to Boda and partially took control of the town. The anti-Balaka militias of Boda are locals.

11. It remains unclear who exactly was responsible for the commencement of violence, the destruction of property and the killing of civilians. The Panel interviewed individuals from both communities who were present at the beginning of the violence between Christians and Muslims and each presented their own version of events. However, it is clear that both communities were armed at that time and the departure of the former Seleka left a vacuum of power that triggered the violence. Most of the crimes reported after 29 January 2014 seem to have been committed by anti-Balaka militias.
12. Since 29 January 2014, the Muslim community has been compelled to life in the centre of town with no freedom of movement, limited access to basic health and educational facilities, restricted livelihood activities and furthermore under continuous threats from anti-Balaka militias who surround the centre of town and partially control the town and its surroundings.
13. The non-Muslim population inhabits five IDP sites, they have access to the fields to cultivate and potable water, however due to their sudden forced displacement and the fragile security situation in the town they lack mainly NFIs and access to health and educational facilities.
14. The IDP sites are:⁷
 - St Michele Church: approximately 9,517 persons
 - *Sous-Préfecturale* School for girls: approximately 4,407 persons
 - Cotonaf School: approximately 3,000 persons
 - Samboli School: approximately 840 persons
 - *Préfecturale* School for boys: approximately 2,400 persons
15. After the eruption of violence between the Muslim and non-Muslim populations in Boda its market has been closed mainly due to the fact that shops were burned and destroyed and no reconstruction has taken place.

⁷ Names and figures were obtained by the Panel from OCHA and corroborated on the ground during a field visit.

16. Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) and OCHA reports show that until end of March 2014 no sexual violence cases had been reported or documented in Boda, however the lack of proper and functional health facilities as well as protection mechanisms in place could be the cause for the lack of reports.
17. Reports from various sources state consistently that the anti-Balaka militias present in Boda had not only been targeting the Muslim population, but also the non-Muslim population. A confidential report from a mission to Boda conducted by various humanitarian organizations between 12 and 14 March 2014 stated that anti-Balaka militias had confiscated mobile phones from several people in the Saint Michele Church IDP site accusing them of being in touch with the Muslim community.
18. Some Muslims have expressed their willingness to be relocated outside of Boda others want to stay. The Muslims who have expressed their willingness to be relocated seem to be the ones who are not originally from Boda, but who fled to Boda seeking protection from violence.

Description of Events: Obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance

19. On 22 February 2014, at around 1730 hours, a Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) mission conducted by an INGO to distribute NFIs for the population in need arrived in Boda.
20. The first truck of NFIs arrived in Boda's Muslim neighbourhood and delivered part of the supplies, after the truck was emptied the driver decided to take the truck to the Catholic Church Saint Michele for security reasons.
21. Once at the Catholic mission, the RRM team encountered a group of anti-Balaka militias as well as a group of representatives from the non-Muslim community. The individuals expressed their disapproval of the distribution of NFIs to the Muslim community underlining that the NFIs given to the Muslim community were of better quality than those distributed among the non-Muslim communities.⁸
22. Individuals (both civilians and armed anti-Balaka) threatened to burn the vehicles and trucks of the RRM team and to throw grenades at them if they didn't leave the town immediately and to kill the INGO director (the "white" person) claiming that white people were the cause of all the problems in the CAR. Furthermore a very distressed anti-Balaka individual approached the RRM team with a machete crying out loud: "who are the people who came to help the Muslims?".

⁸ The Panel consulted and verified with several humanitarian sources that the NFI packages were the same for both communities, same items and same quality.

23. After this incident, the RRM team took their vehicles and went to the SANGARIS base to seek advice and protection leaving the trucks, drivers and some team members behind.
24. At around 1900 hours part of the team went back to the Catholic mission to join the remaining part of the team and the trucks. At that moment the individual who claimed to be the leader of the anti-Balaka militias in Boda, 'Général 8-8', spoke to the RRM team and assured their security, nevertheless anti-Balaka elements present at the meeting point said in Sango that they would still kill them and burn their trucks if they stayed in Boda. This comment was picked up by one of the national staff of the team. The entire team returned to the SANGARIS base to spend the night there.
25. At 0500 hours on 23 February 2014, the RRM team left the SANGARIS base and held a meeting with the representatives of the non-Muslim community (some of them being the Priests) and explained that the NFI distribution had to be suspended due to the security situation, the RRM team did the same with representatives of the Muslim community and then left Boda and returned to Bangui.
26. All NFIs that were not distributed remained in Boda together with paperwork for representatives of each community to continue the distribution. NFIs were distributed to both communities by each of their representatives.
27. None of the individuals that were part of the RRM team returned to Boda until the time of writing of this report.
28. The distribution of humanitarian aid was suspended in Boda until late March 2014 when another INGO took over the activities of the previous INGO. Even though the tensions in the town continue and the unstable security situation for the civilian population remains a major concern, humanitarian aid has resumed and no major incidents have been reported since then.

Perpetrators

29. According to the investigation conducted by the Panel, the anti-Balaka Commander 'Général 8-8' is responsible for threatening humanitarian organizations and hindering the distribution of humanitarian aid to civilians in need. Information collected until the time of writing of this report indicates that the 'Général 8-8' is still in Boda and commands and controls the anti-Balaka militias in the town.
30. According to investigations conducted by the Panel, the anti-Balaka in Boda seem to be one example of a community based militia that falls under the third category mentioned in the Armed Groups Section of the report.

Photographs taken by the Panel

Households destroyed in Boda during January violence



Market area destroyed during January violence



Annex 24: ATTACKS AGAINST HUMANITARIANS IN CAR from 1 DECEMBER 2013 to 30 APRIL 2014

Date	Prefecture	ATT	K	W	D	LI	T	Summary	Source
1 December	Ouham	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	Eight (8) Ex-Seleka elements stole 16 mosquito nets on a non-violent form after six of them received treatment in a health centre run by an INGO	Panel Interview with INGO
2 December	Bangui	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	On the night of 05 December 2014, Ex-Seleka armed elements attacked the neighbourhood where the house of an aid worker was located. They entered the house and looted the premises taking with them all valuables and a vehicle. They stated that the reason for the attack was because the aid worker and the neighbours did not like Muslims.	UN Report
3 December	Bangui	Unknown	1	0	0	0	0	International Medical Corps (IMC) confirms the death of one of its national staff members in CAR, who was killed by unidentified gunmen in his home during the violent clashes in the capital Bangui on 5 December 2013.	IMC News Release through their website
4 December	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown armed men forced an aid worker to attend a patient on an aggressive manner. The staff joined them on the tent where he was and gave indications this served to ease the tension	Panel Interview with INGO
5 December	Bangui	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	On the night of 8 December 2013 at around 2100 hours a group of armed Ex-Seleka men stormed into the offices of an INGO, verbally threatened the guard and stole computers, the generator, money and destroyed documents and furniture. The perpetrators shouted to the guard that they did not want the presence of the INGO in the country and that all personnel should leave. After this, the group of armed men left. The office was then closed and activities were suspended for a few weeks. The organization was obliged to look for new premises due to the security situation.	Panel Interview with INGO
6 December	Ouham	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	0	0	INGO driver arrested by Ex-Seleka during an hour accused of conducting a survey in Moyen Sido against Ex-Seleka	Panel Interview with INGO
7 December	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	Anti-Balaka armed men prosecuting Muslims in the hospital. They aggressively asked to expel the Muslims from the hospital. MISCA replied shooting in the air. Evacuation of Muslim patients was envisaged at the moment. INGO activities hampered due to general insecurity	Panel Interview with INGO
8 December	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	Armed men chased a Muslim individual who had requested refuge in the health centre run by an INGO. INGO reported the increasing difficulty of operating in such environment	Panel Interview with INGO
9 December	Ouham	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	0	0	Ex-Seleka accused and INGO of collaborating with the Anti-Balaka and asked for their presence in the headquarters	Panel Interview with INGO
10 December	Bangui	Various	0	0	0	0	0	A Muslim civilian with his wife came to health centre run by INGO but was prevented from leaving by a crowd of civilians and armed men. They sought refuge in the INGO premises and later had to be relocated to a safer place	Panel Interview with INGO

11	December	Ouham	Various	0	0	1	0	0	In the context of an Ex-Seleka and Anti-Balaka clash in a village, aid workers had to run to the jungle to seek refuge. Civilians and non-civilians wounded and killed. Burning of houses also reported. Rockets were fired.	Panel Interview with INGO
12	December	Ouham - Pende	Anti-Balaka	0	1	0	1	0	Anti-Balaka elements stole 50,000 XAF and a mobile phone from an aid worker after beating him.	Panel Interview with INGO
13	January	Bangui	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	Ex-Seleka armed men forcibly entered the house of an aid worker, and looted the house. They stole inventory such as a fridge, television and clothes.	UN
14	January	Ouham	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	0	0	Aid worker stopped at an Ex-Seleka checkpoint who threatened him by shooting in the air. The INGO staff was held for some time and then released under the explanation that perpetrators thought it was another INGO.	Panel Interview with INGO
15	January	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	1	0	0	An unknown person threw a grenade that landed on a humanitarian agency truck parked nearby the airport IDP site after a tire problem. The truck was carrying food from the logistics base to the airport IDP site. The explosion of the grenade damaged two other tires of the truck, causing no casualties. The person suspected of throwing the grenade was reportedly arrested by Burundian soldiers.	UN
16	January	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	Unidentified armed men forcibly entered the house of an aid worker. They threatened one of the family members and looted the house. The aid worker was at the office at the moment of the incident but neighbours called to inform about what was happening. Aid worker notified Burundian MISCA troops and they immediately went to the house. They succeeded in rescuing the family member from the house, but the entire inventory and all the valuable items including cars and motorcycles were stolen.	UN
17	January	Bangui	Unknown	0	1	0	0	0	Three grenades thrown in the IDP camp near Castor health centre ran by INGO after Djotodia resignation. 15 wounded (1 aid worker) and 3 civilians dead.	Panel Interview with INGO
18	January	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	INGO team on their way back to the office was stopped by Anti-Balaka members on the road. They were demanded to identify themselves and hand over their mobile phones. Apparently the anti-Balaka were searching for Muslim contacts in the phones of the drivers and the team members with the aim of identifying and prosecuting those Muslim contacts. The INGO staff was released after few hours. The INGO no longer deploys Muslim staff to the area and has advised the staff to be careful of the type of names registered on their mobile numbers as a mitigating measure.	Panel Interview with INGO
19	January	Bangui	Unknown	1	0	0	0	0	On 14 January 2014, in Bangui in the Bibale neighbourhood, the corpse of an aid worker was discovered floating in the canal that passed under the Jackson bridge. The employee was on his way to the airport, when he was allegedly stabbed to death by Muslims in the area of the Y akrite neighbourhood. Young men marched with the body of the deceased on avenue Barthélemy Boganda to express their discontent.	UN

20	January	Kemo	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	At 0200 hours three armed men forcibly entered the compound of an INGO. The guards claim to have recognized Ex-Seleka and ran for their lives. Motorbikes were stolen.	Panel Interview with INGO
21	January	Ouham - Pende	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	1	0	Between the 15th and 17th of February, following heavy fighting in Bocaranga, Anti-Balaka elements looted shops of Muslims and also looted one (1) INGO Compound.	UN
22	January	Ouham - Pende	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	1	0	In January, a staff member of an INGO who was living at the BINUCA regrouping location point, was on his way to distribute a health kit at the Prefectural Hospital when he was intercepted on two occasions by Anti-Balaka elements. After checking the inside of the car, they verbally threatened the aid worker by saying: 'if you were carrying Muslims with you, we would kill you with them.'	UN
23	January	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	At about 0930 hours unknown perpetrators hijacked a vehicle of an INGO in the PK12 area at the outskirts of Bangui.	UN
24	January	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	1	1	Anti-Balaka armed elements physically harmed and robbed an aid worker. Mobile telephone was stolen.	Panel Interview with INGO
25	January	Nana-Mambere	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	In January, unknown quantity of food items was stolen from UN humanitarian Agency-contracted truck in the area of Beloko, when it was on the way from Cameroon to CAR. It is not clear how and by whom the theft was committed.	UN
26	January	Ouham - Pende	Unknown	0	0	1	0	0	INGO vehicle on the way to projects was threatened and thrown stones at by young armed men allegedly looking for Muslims. Vehicle and staff were let go unharmed. Vehicle was slightly damaged.	Panel Interview with INGO
27	January	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	1	1	0	On 20 January 2014, armed men entered the offices of an INGO breaking down the main entrance and robbed all the furniture, some desks, chairs and others. According to the statement of the aid worker, at this time of year the PK13 was totally controlled by the Anti-Balakas and they as well as the eyewitnesses believed that it was Anti-Balakas men who attacked the office. No civilian casualties or injuries were reported. After the incident the INGO moved to another location.	Panel Interview with INGO
28	January	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	Two unidentified armed men forcibly entered an INGO run clinic in Bangui and hit the guard.	Panel Interview with INGO
29	January	Nana-Mambere	Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	Insecurity in the border area with Cameroon has led to the suspension of trucks connecting Cameroon and Bangui. This threatens the supply to the capital, Bangui, and prevents humanitarian aid agencies from replenishing their stocks.	UN
30	January	Kemo	Various	0	0	0	0	0	Clashes between Ex-Seleka and Anti-Balaka elements in Sibut obstructed the circulation of INGO vehicles, staff and therefore hindered their humanitarian operation.	Panel Interview with INGO
31	January	Kemo	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	0	0	Ex-Seleka armed elements arrived to the INGO run health centre and threatened the staff to give preferential treatment to Ex-Seleka patients	Panel Interview with INGO

32	January	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	1	1	0	A group of armed men attacked the home of an aid worker. They first shoot at the air and after climbed the entrance gate and destroyed the side door to access the premises. The nephew of the aid worker was threatened; they stole 03 mattresses, one antenna and 5 cell phones. After their crime, they fled to an unknown destination. The aid worker requested assistance and UNDSS immediately responded with a detachment of the Moroccan Guard Unit. Upon arrival, the bandits had already disappeared.	UN
33	January	Banningui-Bangoran	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	INGO vehicle was hijacked by unknown armed men in the road N'Délé - Manovo	Panel Interview with INGO
34	January	Banningui-Bangoran	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	Armed men entered the hospital in a village of the Prefecture, ran by INGO, they stole material from the building (Mattresses, fuel and others)	Panel Interview with INGO
35	January	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	In January 2014, unknown armed elements entered the house of an aid worker in Bangui, looted the house and threatened to kidnap a relative of the aid worker. A post assessment of the neighbourhood showed considerable damage and destruction after several acts of violence committed in the area.	Panel Interview with INGO
36	January	Banningui-Bangoran	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	A group of ex-Ex-Seleka who fled disarmament from Bangui to N'délé, intercepted and stole the vehicle Land-Cruiser of the INGO as well as envelope containing money.	UN
37	January	Mambéré-Kadéi	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	Armed ex-Ex-Seleka elements arrived to a village in the Prefecture of Mambéré-Kadéi late at night, looted an INGO compound and stole two vehicles.	Panel Interview with INGO
38	January	Kemo	Ex-Seleka	0	0	1	1	0	Ex-Ex-Seleka armed men came during the night and looted an INGO compound. The door of the compound was broken down and the place was thoroughly emptied of all valuables, i.e. motorcycles, mattresses, bicycles, furniture, floor mats and recreational kits.	Panel Interview with INGO
39	January	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	1	1	0	In January 2014 in Bangui, a group of armed Anti-Balaka (two ex-FACA were recognized by neighbours according to investigations made in relation to the incident) stormed into the house of an aid worker with the intention to loot it under the pretext that the house belonged to a Muslim. Neighbours who were witnessing the event approached the armed men and explained that the owner of the house was not a Muslim, intervention that allegedly stopped the armed men from harming the premises. The Moroccan Guard Unit arrived to the scene to intervene but the armed men had already left.	UN
40	January	Bangui	Others	0	0	0	0	0	A wood vendor threatened INGO staff and stopped the passage of one of their trucks at the entrance of unknown place in Bangui. No injuries or looting reported.	Panel Interview with INGO
41	January	Nana-Mambere	Unknown	0	0	1	1	0	Armed men entered the hospital run by INGO, shooting and threatening the population and staff present. They stole one INGO vehicle.	Panel Interview with INGO

42	February	Ombella MPoko	Anti-Balaka	0	1	0	1	0	<p>A UN staff member (SM) was attacked by a Anti- Balaka when he went to visit his residence in Bangui which he had abandoned since the beginning of the crisis in December due to security reasons. When he was leaving the premises he was stopped by a group of anti-Balaka who demanded him to give them money, after he gave them all he had and left the scene. A few meters after he was stopped for the second time by another group of anti-Balaka who demanded money as well, this time the UN SM explained that he did not have any more money with him. The anti-Balaka responded by pointing a gun at him, the SM managed to escape the scene in his car, the anti-Balaka opened fire while he was fleeing, causing minor injuries to the SM and damaging the vehicle.</p>	UN
43	February	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	1	0	<p>Elements of the Moroccan Guard Unit and the UNDSS intervention team were sent to intercept in a situation at the home of a UN staff member. His house was under attack and being looted by Anti-Balaka elements in the Miskine neighbourhood. The incident happened while Anti-Balaka elements were in process of conducting a significant operation of "cleaning" Miskine neighbourhood from Muslims living in the area. All valuables were taken from the residence of the staff member.</p>	UN
44	February	Ombella MPoko	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	<p>An NGO convoy carrying humanitarian aid goods was stopped on the road between Bogangolo and Bangui for a period of more than three hours. The convoy was released and continued it's way but all communications equipment and valuable were stolen from personnel present.</p>	Panel Interview with INGO, UN
45	February	Ouham - Pende	Ex-Seleka	0	0	1	1	0	<p>On February 2014 at around midnight a group of six Ex-Seleka armed men broke into an INGO compound in a village of Ouham-Pende Prefecture and looted the compound. The attackers demanded where was the white person (implying the expatriate staff of the INGO) who managed to escape at a certain point of the incident without being noticed. The armed men robbed one vehicle, six cans of diesel, two mobile phones and 130,000 XFA.</p>	Panel Interview with INGO
46	February	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	1	0	<p>An NGO was the target of a robbery by unidentified gunmen. Pharmaceuticals and some medical material was stolen.</p>	UN
47	February	Ouham - Pende	Anti-Balaka	0	0	1	1	0	<p>The office of an INGO in a village in Ouham-Pende was pillaged by Anti-Balaka, who allegedly have taken all the material collected to Paoua.</p>	UN
48	February	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	<p>Four armed anti-Balaka forced their way into the house of an aid worker threatening the guard and the family members of the aid worker present at the time of the incident. The anti-Balaka elements took a vehicle. The aid worker called the to report the incident to the security officer of the organization who intervened and met the anti-Balaka commander who was in charge of the group (Commander Diendoumer). After negotiations the AB commander agreed to return the vehicle.</p>	UN

49	February	Kemo	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	0	0	In the month of February in the Prefecture Kemo an INGO vehicle was undertaking a humanitarian mission when the vehicle was stopped by ex-Seleka armed men. Three of the four aid workers who were inside the vehicle were kidnapped by the armed group. The three aid workers were able to escape the day after and find their way to the nearest village. All valuables and the vehicle were taken by the ex-seleka elements.	UN
50	February	Ouham	Ex-Seleka	0	0	1	1	0	Ex Seleka armed men broke into the compound of an INGOs on the night of 10 to 11 February 2014. The group forced the front gate open to get into the compound, two vehicles and money were taken	UN
51	February	Ouham - Pende	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	Ex-Seleka broke into the compound of an international NGO in Batangafo and stole a vehicle.	UN
52	February	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	Anti-Balaka armed men tried to break into the home of a UN Staff Member, with guns and machetes. Caretaker and neighbours alerted the security staff in the neighbourhood, in response the bandits attacked three people with machetes. Once the security team arrived, the bandits were gone.	UN
53	February	Bamingui-Bangoran	Ex-Seleka	1	0	0	0	0	An aid worker was stopped at a Ex-Seleka checkpoint was killed after declaring he had no money to hand over as requested by the perpetrators. The staff clearly identified himself as a humanitarian worker	Panel Interview with INGO
54	February	Mbomou	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	Three rental trucks of an INGO going from Bangui to Bangassou were hijacked by members of the Ex-Seleka. Upon arrival in Ouhango, a village 75km from Bangassou they were attacked by armed inhabitants from the village who took the trucks from the ex-Seleka men.	UN
55	February	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	Anti-Balaka armed elements obstructed and threatened INGO convoy stating that they were helping the Muslim community. The threat included to throw a grenade to the staff.	Panel Interview with INGO
56	February	Bamingui-Bangoran	Unknown	0	0	1	1	0	The Guest House of an INGO in the Prefecture of Bamingui-Bangoran was attacked and looted by unknown armed men. Money, equipment and personal items of staff were stolen	Panel Interview with INGO
57	February	Kemo	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	On February 2014, Anti-Balaka armed men blocked an inter-agency protection mission to FK12. One aid worker's vehicle was stopped between two roadblocks of armed men for many hours before being rescued. The mission did not accomplish its objective which was to assist civilian survivors of a previous attack.	UN
58	February	Ouham	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	Two Ex-Seleka armed men attacked an INGO guesthouse. Money, satellite phone and a vehicle were taken after threatening with a weapon to the expat staff	Panel Interview with INGO
59	February	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	Tensions growing and increasing number of threats against humanitarians being accused of partiality have been hindering the movement of aid workers in the city and surrounding.	Panel Interview with INGO

60	February	Lobaye	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	0	An INGO team was forced to stop a distribution of NFIs in a village in the Prefecture of Lobaye due to threats made by Anti-Balaka militias in the village. The aid workers were forced to evacuate the village before finishing the distribution of humanitarian aid.	Panel Interview with INGO
61	February	Ouham	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	0	On February 2014 in the Ouham Prefecture and INGO vehicle was hijacked by Ex-Seleka armed men. The incident took place on the Kaho - Sido axis during a transfer of patients by the said vehicle. The vehicle was returned one day after to the INGO.	Panel Interview with INGO
62	February	Bamingui-Bangoran	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	0	An INGO vehicle traveling from Bamingui to N'Dele was attacked and robbed by unknown armed men. Personal items and money from staff were stolen.	Panel Interview with INGO
63	February	Bamingui-Bangoran	Various	0	0	0	0	0	0	All international organizations received a death threat on 28 February through a letter that was posted in several different places of the town. The letter was signed by a group that call themselves <i>Group des Jeunes Révolutionnaires de Bamingui-Bangoran</i> . After the posting of the letter representatives of local authorities, IDPs and Ex-Seleka commanders present in the town held a meeting with humanitarian organizations to persuade them not to stop their operations and assure their security.	Panel Interview with INGO
64	February	Ouham	Ex-Seleka	0	0	1	1	0	0	Ex-Seleka armed men stormed the a town in the Prefecture of Ouham and killed three people, looted the city hospital and stole computer equipment, bikes and a sizeable amount of money. In addition, they took two INGOs vehicles.	UN
65	February	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	0	At around 1300 hrs, at camp Don Bosco, a team of UN staff was threatened by a dozen Anti-Balaka elements that were carrying machetes and firearms. They stopped the two vehicles that were transporting the team. The Anti-Balakas shouted threats and showcased their firearms, and even tried to take one of the passengers of vehicles out of the car. However both vehicles were able to leave the area and join the main road without further consequences.	UN
66	February	Nana-Mambere	Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	0	On February 2014 at around noon, the distribution of food by humanitarian organizations in a town in the Prefecture of Nana-Mambere generated tension within the local population. Difficulties arose due to the discrepancies between the lists of beneficiaries as well as identified fake ID holders demanding to receive aid. Threats against aid workers created a very tense situation, which eventually forced the staff to take refuge in a protected building nearby.	UN
67	February	Bamingui-Bangoran	Unknown	0	1	0	1	0	0	Five armed individuals entered the INGO expat Guest House at late hours of the night threatening the staff with weapons to leave the town. Some staff were physically harmed by the assailants. Valuables were taken.	Panel Interview with INGO
68	March	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	0	Armed men entered the INGO run hospital, physically harmed the guards and stole all the money which was meant to pay the daily salary of hospital workers.	Panel Interview with INGO

69	March	Bamingui-Bangor	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	Armed men attacked an INGO base and staff were obliged to take refuge at the MISCA base for a few days. No further details were made available on the incident.	UN
70	March	Ouham	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	Armed individuals entered the INGO Expat Guest House, threat the staff present and loot the money and the communications devices in possession of the present individuals	Panel Interview with INGO
71	March	Ouham - Pende	FPR	1	0	0	0	0	On March 2014 in a village 30 km from Pauon, an aid worker was allegedly stabbed to death by members of the RPF General Baba Laddé, which would be stationed in the area.	Panel Interview with INGO
72	March	Ouham - Pende	RJ	0	0	0	0	0	On March 2014 at around 0900 hours a group of around ten (10) armed men from RJ stormed a UN compound in a town in the Prefecture of Ouham-Pende. Guards in the compound questioned the reason for this unlawful entry to which the armed men responded that they were searching for their commander. The guard informed that he was not there, nevertheless they insisted and searched the premises. They left without further harm done.	UN
73	March	Kemo	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	At around 1530, a vehicle of an INGO with one driver on board was returning from Sibut. The vehicle was stopped by Anti-Balaka in a village about 55km from Sibut. The Anti-Balaka elements demanded to use the vehicle for transportation. The driver explained the prohibition of the use of humanitarian assets for purposes other than humanitarian operations but in any case the Anti-Balaka requested to be transported to a location not far away from the point where the vehicle was initially intercepted. After this the driver was allowed to leave without further trouble. The driver later discovered a machete in the booth that was probably left by one of the Anti-Balaka elements.	UN
74	March	Ouham	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	Four armed Ex-Seleka assaulted the village and went to the health centre, a patient run off and a Ex-Seleka shoot him but did not injure him. INGO Staff gave what they had (50000 XAF) and yelling that they may have more than that	Panel Interview with INGO
75	March	Oubella MPoko	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	INGO Convoy stopped by 16 armed anti-Balaka, threatening of throw a grenade against INGO next time	Panel Interview with INGO
76	March	Bamingui-Bangor	Ex-Seleka	1	0	0	0	0	On the 08 March 2014 three armed men killed an ICRC staff member of Cameroonian nationality in the town of N'Dele. The ICRC staff member was lodged at the Catholic mission quarters with other three staff members at the time of the incident; the other three were unharmed. The incident was investigated by Panel and perpetrator was identified.	JA090314; ICRC080314; ICRC; Open source on file: News Release 08-03-2014, Breaking and US International News, Reuters.com (Red Cross worker killed in Central African Republic); UN
77	March	Bangui	Unknown	1	0	0	0	0	On 9 March 2014, a 36-year-old volunteer with the Central African Red Cross Society, was gunned down in Bangui by unknown armed men.	ICRC0314
78	March	Bangui	Unknown	0	1	0	1	0	INGO vehicle involved in water distribution efforts was attacked, driver was stabbed and the water pump was stolen. Later demanded ransom for the pump.	UN

79	March	Nana-Grébizi	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	1	0	On March 2014, a convoy of UN vehicles, traveling from Bangui to the north was stopped at about 70km from Bangui, by Anti-Balaka elements. Amongst the staff (2 national and 2 international) was a Muslim (international staff) who was asked to get out of the car and his life was threatened. They demanded to search the vehicles but the UN staff responded that they had no right to do so. The anti-Balaka suspected that the vehicles were transporting ex-Ex-Seleka and their weapons. After negotiation the rebels took food, water and an unknown amount of money and the staff was allowed to continue.	UN
80	March	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	UN vehicle was hit by stray bullets while armed assailants attempted to attack a Muslim exiting a bank	UN
81	March	Bamingui-Bangoran	Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	MISCA intervened on an attempted robbery against an NGO	UN
82	March	Kemo	Ex-Seleka	2	0	0	0	0	Ex-Seleka opened fire on the inhabitants of Dekoa. Two volunteers for the Red Cross died and one civilian was injured.	http://www.radiodetekoua.org/societe/item/19026-tension-a-dekoa-la-population-est-en-brousse.html
83	March	Bamingui-Bangoran	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	The base of an NGO in the Prefecture of Bamingui-Bangoran was attacked and looted by unknown armed men	Panel Interview with NGO
84	March	Nana-Grébizi	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	The house of an aid worker was attacked and looted by armed men.	Panel Interview with NGO
85	March	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	Two NGO vehicles were hijacked in Bangui	UN
86	March	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	1	0	The vehicle of an NGO was hijacked by Anti-Balaka armed elements at the Boy-Rabe. The vehicle was later recovered by the intervention of humanitarian organizations	Panel Interview with NGO
87	April	Ouham	Anti-Balaka	0	0	1	0	0	A UN vehicle was stopped by Anti-Balaka elements and asked the driver to drive them to an unknown location. The driver was physically harmed because he refused to drive faster than what the armed men were asking. As a result the vehicle spun out of control and fell into a trench. The Anti-Balaka men descended from the vehicle and left the scene leaving the driver and the car behind. The driver and vehicle were later recovered by a UN team.	UN

88	April	Kemo	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	0	<p>On April 2014, a UN vehicles and trucks mission returning to Bangui were stopped by Anti-Balaka elements 15km outside Dekoa in a checkpoint and demanded information in relation to the MISCA and the ex-Ex-Seleka in Dekoa, the team leader of the mission explained that they had no information on this matter, they passed. The mission had seen a MISCA and ex-Ex-Seleka meeting in Dekoa when passing by. Around 10km further south from Dekoa the mission was stopped at another Anti-Balaka checkpoint. The Anti-Balaka elements searched the vehicles and let them pass. For the third time, 15 km further south, they were stopped by another Anti-Balaka checkpoint, this time they stopped the convoy by shooting at the air with AK47s. They requested the staff to get out of the vehicles and sit at the side of the road while they searched the vehicles. It is to be noted that the AB elements were very aggressive with the staff. They questioned extensively the staff and requested to hand over 50,000 XFA per vehicle, the staff answered that they did not have that amount of money and that the humanitarian nature of the mission prohibited to pay for this type of requests. Nevertheless they forcibly took the wallet of one of the staff members and took around 12,000 XFA, additionally they took all valuable personal belongings of all the present individuals, mobile phones and money. They were all released around two hours after and the mission arrived to Bangui without further obstruction.</p>	UN
89	April	Kemo	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	1	0	0	<p>Three trucks carrying humanitarian aid to the northern part of the country were intercepted by anti-Balaka elements 10km before Sibut. The armed anti-Balaka took 30 bags of rice of each truck and robbed all valuables from the drivers (mobile phones, money and others).</p>	UN
90	April	Ouham - Pende	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	0	<p>Armed unknown individuals assault the INGO expat guesthouse threatening the expat with arms. Cash and communication assets were stolen.</p>	Panel Interview with INGO
91	April	Kemo	Unknown	0	0	1	1	0	0	<p>On April 2014 in a village in the Kemo Prefecture at around 0100hours, a group of unidentified armed men stormed in the base of an INGO. They forced the safe of the compound and stole one Thuraya phone, several mobile phones, around 12 million XFA (two safe boxes), some electronic equipment and one vehicle. The identity of the perpetrators is unknown, but independent sources indicate it was elements belonging to an Ex-Seleka faction.</p>	UN

92	April	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	On April 2014, at 0100 hours, the house of an aid worker in Bangui was attacked by at least a dozen unknown armed men, carrying AK47s, machetes and spears. Upon arrival, the group posted a guard at each neighbouring house to control the movements of the people in the area and four (4) others went into the house of the aid worker whilst firing guns to the air. Then, by using a brick, they broke down the door of the house and demanded the keys to a motorcycle stationed outside. They also took a television, two mobile devices and a bag that contained a Motorola radio and other personal belongings. The neighbours caught two of the armed men while they were leaving with the television. The Burundian MISCA arrived to the scene and caught the two individuals. The rest of the armed men escaped the scene.	UN	
93	April	Basse Kotto	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	0	0	A team of an INGO was threatened after they refused to drive two armed Ex-Seleka men in their ambulance.	Panel Interview with INGO	
94	April	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	Armed elements came into a health centre and guardians did not dare to ask them to leave their weapons. The Anti-Balaka armed men were identified by medical staff and were taken out of the health centre.	Panel Interview with INGO	
95	April	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	An aid worker was robbed in the city centre by armed men.	UN	
96	April	Banningui-Bangoran	Others	0	0	0	0	0	A group of unidentified armed men stormed into the compound of an INGO in the Prefecture of Banningui-Bangoran and stole two vehicles. The vehicles were returned a few days later and the incident was attributed to Sudanese Janjaweed.	Panel Interview with INGO	
97	April	Ombella M'Poko	Anti-Balaka	0	1	0	1	0	In April a contracted truck to transport humanitarian agricultural material had a mechanical problem in the outskirts of Bangui. The driver decided to spend the night with the truck while waiting for help to repair the truck. During the night, four Anti-Balaka armed men spotted the truck, beat the driver and looted the contents of the truck.	Panel Interview with INGO	
98	April	Ouham	Ex-Seleka	3	0	0	1	0	On 26 April 2014 a group of Ex-Seleka armed men entered the town of Boguila located in the Sous Prefecture of Bossangoa and looted the offices of INGO and the local hospital. At the moment of arrival of the Ex-Seleka elements, a meeting of community leaders was being held in the compound where the offices of INGO and the hospital are located. Upon arrival, the armed men looted the compound, at the moment of departure and for unknown reasons two of the armed elements started shooting at the group of civilians, killing 17 of them including three INGO (3) staff. According to investigations conducted by the Panel the group of Ex-Seleka was commanded by Colonel Issa. The group of armed elements was passing by Boguila on the way to Béal and coming from Bouca.	<p>INGO: http://allafrica.com/stories/201404300989.html.</p> <p>http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/article/three-INGO-staff-among-16-civilians-killed-central-african-republic-hospital</p>	


99	April	Bangui	Government Forces	0	0	0	0	0	<p>On 26 April 2014 five trucks of an INGO were stopped by the Gendarmerie at PK12, allegedly the Gendarmerie had received information that the trucks were carrying weapons with them. The trucks were carrying humanitarian aid good for N'Dele. The Gendarmerie found a bag in the front seat of one of the trucks containing a grenade and some military attire that were confiscated and the driver of the truck was arrested. According to the one of the drivers, before they were stopped by the Gendarmerie, the truck that contained the bag had stopped to talk to someone in a Jeep. Someone from the INGO went to the site of the incident to talk to the Gendarmerie. The five trucks were released a few days later with all the humanitarian goods, the driver of the truck remains arrested at the time of writing of this report and the bag was confiscated.</p>	Panel Interview with INGO
100	April	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	<p>On 28 April a UN staff member was victim of a robbery at his house in Bangui. All valuable items were taken from the premises. No injuries or casualties were reported.</p>	UN
101	April	Ouham	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	1	0	<p>On 28 April 2014, around 0045 hours, in a village of the Ouham Prefecture an aid worker was victim of an armed robbery at his house by a group of six armed Anti-Balaka elements. Under armed threats they forced the gatekeeper to open the front door. The perpetrators first searched the room of the colleagues of the staff member, after which they searched his own room and stole a duffel bag with clothes and a sum of about 45,000 CFA francs. The perpetrators fled to an unknown destination, no physical violence was exerted on the staff member.</p>	UN
102	April	Ombella MPoko	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	1	0	<p>In April 2014 a truck part of an INGO convoy (six trucks) on the way to north west of the country carrying seeds for vulnerable population had a technical problem in the route around Bosli. While the drivers were fixing the truck, armed Anti-Balaka elements intercepted the truck and looted a significant part of the sacks of seeds and some fuel. The driver was threatened by the Anti-Balaka but was not harmed. The rest of the bags were handed over to the Police in Bosli and recuperated the next day by the service provider. The rest of the convoy arrived unharmed to the location.</p>	UN
103	April	Ombella MPoko	Anti-Balaka	3	0	0	1	0	<p>On 30 April 2014 a PU-AMI convoy composed of four trucks with humanitarian aid for the N'Dele population were held at a Anti-Balaka militias checkpoint 26 km north of Bangui. Three of the trucks were permitted to pass through but one was held behind, the truck was looted, the driver and two assistants, all of Muslim origin, were killed.</p>	PU-AMI; PU AMI Communiqué de Presse 2 May 2014; Panel Interview with INGO

TERMS OF REFERENCE

Abbreviation	Definition
ATT	Alleged Perpetrator
K	Number of Civilian Killings
W	Number of Civilian Wounded
D	Destruction of Property. 1 - Positive. 0 - Negative
LT	Looting. 1 - Positive. 0 - Negative
T	Torture. 1 - Positive. 0 - Negative
Summary	Summary of Events
Source	Source of the information


Annex 25: Graphs

Graph I – Reported incidents of obstruction of humanitarian assistance from 01 December 2013 to 30 April 2014 per province.



Source: Panel Database of Incidents


Graph II – Reported killings of aid workers from 01 December 2013 to 30 April 2014 per Province.



Source: Panel Database of Incidents


Annex 26: Reported Killings of Civilians


Graph III – Reported killings of civilians (including children and aid workers) from 5 December 2013 to 30 April 2014 per Provinces.




Source: Panel Database of Incidents

Graph IV – Average reported killings of civilians (including children and aid workers) from 5 December 2013 to 30 April 2014 indicating the alleged perpetrators.





Source: Panel Database of Incidents



Source: Panel Database of Incidents

Annex 28: Methodology

The Panel compiled a database of security incidents to that are potential violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), International Human Rights Law (IHRL) and other crimes listed in resolutions 2127 and 2143. Other security related incidents have been included as well to gain an overview of the security situation in the country and, if relevant, pursue further investigations.

Documented incidents include: killings, kidnappings and rapes of staff members of humanitarian organisations; attacks against humanitarian organisations; threats to humanitarian organisations or staff members and robberies.

The database does not contain all of the incidents that happen in the country in the period reported (From 05 December 2013 and on-going) due to limited staff resources and underreporting, particularly of incidents of violence against women, killings of civilians, hindering / hampering of humanitarian aid and attacks against humanitarian actors. Underreporting is largely due to the lack of presence of humanitarian and human rights organizations in large parts of the country, particularly in rural areas.

The database relies on primary and secondary sources of information. Primary sources convey direct and immediate knowledge of the relevant facts, e.g. direct witnesses, victims, pictures, video or audio records of the criminal fact, original documents, direct media records of instigation or other incriminating actions or objects of forensic significance. Secondary sources convey indirect mediate knowledge of the relevant acts, such as indirect witnesses (hearsay, witnesses by reference) or indirect media reports.

Incidents that are reported by a primary sources are immediately included in the database, incidents that are reported by secondary sources go through a source evaluation and corroboration process before being included. The source evaluation process takes in consideration the reliability of the source, the credibility of the information, the completeness of the report and the corroboration of the information.

For the collection of primary source material the Panel met with Heads of United Nations Agencies, Programmes and Funds, Heads of Delegations of INGOs and Directors of NGOs to the largest extent possible. The Panel requested a compilation and a detailed description of every incident where staff had been victim of attacks, threats or other incident that could fall under the pre-determined violations mentioned above. Meetings with victims and witnesses also resulted in the inclusion of certain incidents.

There is a gap of information from local NGOs, mainly due to time constraints as well as the fact that local NGOs do not systematically register the incidents that they have been victims of.

The Panel also profited from cooperation with UN Agencies that already document different types of incidents in their own databases.

A few methodological clarifications that apply to Chapters IV and V of the interim report of the UN Panel of Experts for the CAR are important to highlight:

1. Killings of aid workers have been counted without consideration whether targeted individuals were on duty or not. In one of the incidents documented in this report¹ three non-staff victims (one driver and two assistants) who were carrying humanitarian aid goods have been considered as humanitarian victims since they were part of a humanitarian operation.
2. It is important to note that sexual violence is highly under-reported in the Panel's security incident database and more research and investigation will be undertaken on this subject during the second half of the Panel's mandate. The Panel has already established relations with various humanitarian actors that document acts of sexual violence in the CAR.

¹ See annex 24.

Annex 29: Case study: Massacre in Guen (Mambéré-Kadei province)

1. One of the most serious incidents documented in the period covered by this report was the massacre in the village of Guen in the Mambéré-Kadei province.
2. On 1 February 2014, the town of Guen came under attack of anti-Balaka forces seeking to drive out the former Seleka and associates among the Muslim population.

Houses owned by members of the Muslim community destroyed and looted by anti-Balaka

(photograph taken by the Panel on 26 April 2014)



3. According to Muslim survivors, anti-Balaka leaders and local authorities interviewed, the attacking anti-Balaka forces came from the villages of Tedoa and Mbaina in the Nana Mambere province.¹ From 1 to 6 February 2014, approximately 75 civilians were killed.
4. The larger share of victims, 43 people, had, after the first spree of attacks, sought refuge in the house of a local resident. An allegation that this local resident was hiding a Seleka soldier set off the anti-Balaka to take the house under siege on 6 February and after killed 43 men. Women and children had sought refuge at the catholic mission after the first wave of attacks.

House that came under siege by anti-Balakas during the attack on Guen

¹ Panel interviews with Muslim survivors, local Anti-Balaka leaders and local government authorities, Guen, 25 April 2014.

(photograph taken by the Panel on 26 April 2014)



5. The Panel's interlocutors in Guen claim that an anti-Balaka leader of the name of 'Edmond Beïna' from the village of Tedoa had ordered the attack. Villagers in Tedoa confirmed to the Panel the presence of Beïna,² but were unable to locate him in time for the Panel to interview him.³

² Edmond Beïna has also been mentioned by HWR as one of the perpetrators of the massacre.
<http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/04/03/central-african-republic-massacres-remote-villages>; accessed on 24 May 2014.

³ Panel interviews with villagers, Tedoa, 17 April 2014.

Annex 30: Reported incidents of Sexual Violence¹

1. The Panel registered six different incidents of sexual violence from secondary sources in the CAR in the period covered by this report.
2. One case of rape was allegedly perpetrated by former Seleka elements in the town of Madja, Ouham Province.
3. Anti-Balaka forces are allegedly responsible for the rape of four women in two different incidents; on 02 January 2014 in Bossangoa two women were raped by Anti-Balaka armed men in the Liberte IDP site; furthermore on 06 February 2014 a group of Anti-Balaka armed men broke into a house in the Kokoro neighbourhood of Bangui and raped a 14 year old girl, and a 19 year old woman who were at the house at the moment of the attack, additionally the house was looted.
4. One case was reported in the village of Fode, Haut-Mbomou, where a woman was released after 18 years of LRA captivity, allegedly she was raped several times throughout her captivity.
5. One case of particular concern was reported in Bouca where allegedly a woman was gang-raped.
6. In addition UNICEF documented 26 cases of sexual violence in 25 IDP sites in Bangui during just one week in February 2014.

¹ All incidents have been extracted from the Panel Database of Incidents; see annex 28 on Methodology for details on collection of data of Sexual Violence.

