



# Security Council

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## Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan

### I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 11 of Security Council resolution 1590 (2005), in which the Council requested me to keep it regularly informed of progress in implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, respect for the ceasefire and the implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS). The report also provides an assessment of the overall situation in the country since the previous report to the Council, dated 12 September 2006 (S/2006/728).

### II. Implementation of the major elements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement

2. Two years after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed on 9 January 2005, implementation has not progressed as effectively as was hoped. While the basic constitutional framework envisaged in the Agreement is in place, some of the political and security institutions are functioning, and the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) have continued to assert their commitment to full implementation; in reality, both parties have proved reluctant to take the difficult steps required to move towards sustainable peace, and critical aspects of the Agreement remain well behind schedule. Of central concern, the principles of the Agreement related to political inclusion and "making unity attractive" have yet to be fully upheld, and much remains to be done if the parties are to achieve their ambitious goals set out in the Machakos Protocol and in subsequent protocols.

#### Security aspects

3. The period under review witnessed the most serious violation of the ceasefire since 2002. In Malakal, Upper Nile, heavy fighting between elements of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) from 27 to 30 November killed at least 150 people, including civilians. The conflict erupted after a long-running dispute over the commissionership of a county in neighbouring Jonglei State triggered a series of skirmishes between the SPLA Joint Integrated Unit contingent and SAF-aligned other armed groups. Fighting then escalated into a full-scale confrontation between SPLA forces and SAF. The



UNMIS-chaired Ceasefire Joint Military Committee played a key role in bringing the fighting to a halt, and the parties subsequently withdrew to their pre-conflict positions. While the city remains tense, Joint Integrated Unit forces involved in the fighting have been rotated out of the area, and a buffer zone is being monitored by joint patrols, including UNMIS observers.

4. Redeployment of the parties' armed forces continues, although delays in the formation of Joint Integrated Units are now holding up the redeployment of SPLA forces from the transitional areas, originally to have been completed in the second quarter of 2007. With the SAF redeployment deadline of 9 July 2007 approaching, both parties face considerable challenges if redeployment is to be accomplished as agreed in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Both parties continue to maintain a substantial armed presence in sensitive oil-rich areas, including Upper Nile, and the 1 January 1956 border area remains highly militarized.

5. On 18 November, President Al-Bashir called for better cooperation between NCP and SPLM on security matters, particularly the problem of other armed groups, and stressed the need for the Joint Integrated Units to function in order to secure the border areas and oil installations. The failure to integrate other armed groups into existing military structures and to create functioning Joint Integrated Units, as required under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, has left the parties facing a growing security problem, where militia violence as witnessed in Malakal can easily erupt and spiral out of control.

6. Elsewhere in Southern Sudan, unidentified armed men, allegedly belonging to SAF-aligned militia groups, were also held responsible for attacks on arterial roads outside Juba in October and December, killing some 75 people.

7. At the same time, recent months have witnessed increased instability in Northern and Southern Kordofan States, where civilian discontent has led to strike action, and attacks by armed militia groups and tribal violence represent a growing security threat. While some of the violence has spilled over from neighbouring Darfur, tribal disputes and other armed group activities further fuel tensions. For example, in the area of Meiram, south of Abyei, clashes between SPLA forces and SAF related to the integration of erstwhile other armed groups resulted in the displacement of approximately 2,000 people.

8. Efforts to resolve the problem posed by other armed groups remain stymied by mistrust between the parties, as reflected in the state of the Other Armed Groups Collaborative Committee. While its members met regularly during the reporting period, it remained mired in disputes over its rules of procedure, and there is as yet no plan to deal with armed militia groups that are aligned with SAF but that are reluctant to redeploy north of the 1 January 1956 border by 9 July 2007.

9. At the same time, the formation of Joint Integrated Units continued to be delayed, owing in part to a lack of logistical support for moving troops, a shortage of working and living accommodations and irregular and insufficient budgetary assistance. Efforts by the Joint Defence Board to agree to a single doctrine and training programme have foundered, partly over cultural and religious differences. In several areas, poorly disciplined Joint Integrated Unit elements were responsible for deteriorating security. Disputes over the payment of salary arrears to SPLA members of Joint Integrated Units triggered demonstrations in Juba on 9 December. While the presidency should take the steps necessary to provide a regular budget to

the Units, there is also a need for bilateral donors to step forward and assist the Units to perform the security functions envisaged in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and for the parties to be open to such assistance.

10. More positively, the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee and Area Joint Military Committees played an important role during the reporting period, helping to de-escalate tension between forces on the ground. This was critical during the Malakal crisis, during which the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee convened emergency sessions, on 29 November and 3 December, facilitating an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of forces. The body, which is chaired by UNMIS, has proved to be a highly effective forum for frank discussion between the parties, as well as the mechanism for resolving military violations of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. I commend the Chairman of the Committee and its members for the positive role the mechanism is playing.

### **Political aspects**

11. During celebrations marking the second anniversary of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Juba on 9 January, President Al-Bashir and First Vice-President Kiir publicly aired their grievances over the failures of each other's party to implement key aspects of the Agreement. The accusations traded are a direct result of the parties' lack of success in effectively using the joint mechanisms set up in the Agreement to resolve contentious issues. I am hopeful, however, that this open stocktaking might revitalize the two leaders' determination to overcome their difficulties, and I very much welcome the strong commitment of both leaders to the Agreement.

12. Some welcome progress was made on the legislative agenda. The National Constitutional Review Commission drafted several important bills for consideration by the National Assembly, including those required to establish the long-overdue National Human Rights Commission and National Civil Service Commission. Other critical commissions, including the National Electoral Commission and the Commission for the Protection of the Rights of non-Muslims in the National Capital, also have yet to be established.

13. The National Assembly has now passed a political parties law and the National Civil Service Commission Act. Meanwhile, consultations on a draft elections bill are at an early stage, and the work of the Population Census Council has also been proceeding slowly. More must be done to accelerate the work of the Council, whose national census is critical not only for the electoral process, but also for long-term development planning.

14. The Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly has approved a number of bills relating to the criminal code. However, commissions on land, the civil service, human rights, anti-corruption, relief and rehabilitation and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration have yet to be formally established, although commissioners have been appointed to many of them. While six southern states signed their constitutions into law during the reporting period, the Ministry of Justice of the Government of National Unity declared the moves unconstitutional. Meanwhile, in Southern Kordofan State, the presidency resolved a lengthy deadlock over the draft constitution, which was eventually signed into law in December.

15. There are particular concerns over the slow progress of the technical ad hoc border committee, which is supposed to demarcate the 1 January 1956 border between north and south. The committee has completed its review of maps and started work with local communities; it has not, however, begun physical demarcation. Consensual demarcation of this border would go a long way to resolving a number of potentially serious Comprehensive Peace Agreement problems, including the redeployment of military personnel, the distribution of oil revenues, the formation of Joint Integrated Units and, later, preparations for elections.

16. The Abyei issue remains extremely contentious and has been referred to a joint high political committee of the parties. However, despite appeals to the presidency for guidance, no progress has been made. On 9 January 2007, First Vice-President Kiir appealed to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), as well as the IGAD Partner's Forum, to assist the parties in implementing the Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Abyei Area.

17. On the ground in Abyei, a temporary relaxation of freedom-of-movement restrictions has made the entire region accessible to the United Nations. This has assisted its monitoring efforts and humanitarian activities, as well as inter-tribal negotiations and other reconciliation activities. I urge the authorities to continue to allow the Mission and all United Nations personnel to carry out their important tasks throughout the region.

18. The Ceasefire Political Commission met on 28 September and 9 November, although without the full participation of its international members. The Commission has failed to gain traction as a decision-making body, and it has rarely been able to resolve issues referred to it by the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee. Meanwhile, the Assessment and Evaluation Commission also met regularly during the reporting period and received special briefings from the Central Bank on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, legislative transformation and the work of the border committee.

### **Wealth-sharing aspects**

19. On the wealth-sharing agenda, the parties reached agreement on rules of procedure for the National Petroleum Commission. They also agreed to establish an independent technical secretariat of the Commission, which should help to ensure complete impartiality concerning the distribution of oil revenues. However, increasing concerns arose regarding the displacement of populations in areas of oil exploration. Provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, requiring consultation with and compensation of populations affected by resource exploitation are not systematically understood or enforced in Southern Sudan, with serious consequences for human rights and environmental protection.

20. A new national currency was launched on 9 January, marking the second anniversary of the signing of the Agreement. The new Sudanese pound will initially be distributed in Southern Sudan, replacing the multiple currencies currently in circulation. This is a big step forward, and I congratulate both parties on this achievement.

21. The roll-out of the new national currency will have an important impact on economic recovery and reconstruction. Donor support will be critical to making this

effort a success. Assistance will be especially required to sensitize the public and to support the timely and efficient distribution of the new currency.

### **III. Implementation of other peace processes in the Sudan**

22. On 14 October, the Eritrean-mediated talks between the Sudanese Government and the Eastern Front rebel movement culminated in the signing of the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement. So far, implementation has progressed slowly, due in part to the failure of the Eastern Front to present a list of nominees for the posts allocated to it under the Agreement. However, the state of emergency was lifted in Kassala State and Red Sea State one week after the signing, and the Agreement was passed into law by the National Assembly on 6 November. Its incorporation into the Constitution is pending discussions between NCP and its allies regarding the allocation of parliamentary seats.

23. Peace talks between the Government of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) continued sporadically under the mediation of the Government of Southern Sudan. The Juba talks led to an extension of the ceasefire until 28 February 2007. However, late in the reporting period, LRA made it clear that it would no longer accept the Government of Southern Sudan as mediator and wished to relocate the talks. I regret this delay. I am, however, confident that my Special Envoy for the LRA-affected areas, former Mozambican President Chissano, will play an important role in assisting the parties to this conflict to resolve their bitter 20-year struggle. I strongly urge the parties to remain committed to finding a peaceful solution quickly.

24. As noted in the report on the latest events in Darfur (S/2006/1041), the security situation in the region remains extremely volatile, as civilian populations continue to be targeted in violation of international humanitarian and human rights law. In recent months, tens of thousands of people have been forced to flee their homes, and the total number of internally displaced persons has reached its highest level since the conflict flared up in 2003. While fighting has continued amid shifting factional allegiances, efforts to conclude local ceasefire arrangements were undermined by continued aerial bombardment of rebel positions by the Government. Violence also surged along the Chad-Sudan border, as Chadian armed opposition groups launched attacks from Darfur into Chad. Meanwhile, implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement made only halting progress.

25. UNMIS is currently working to finalize the implementation of the "light support package" of assistance to the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS). The first part of a three-phase approach that will culminate in a hybrid African Union/United Nations mission in Darfur, the package includes United Nations military and police advisory personnel, as well as material and equipment for AMIS. On 26 December, the tripartite mechanism established by the United Nations, the African Union, and the Government of National Unity to facilitate implementation of the three-phase approach resolved several outstanding issues, including the attire of United Nations military and police personnel deployed under the light support package, who will wear their national uniforms, blue berets and African Union armbands.

26. The United Nations and the African Union held a final round of consultations in Khartoum from 18 to 20 January to finalize the "heavy support package", the

second step of the three-phase approach. The package, which includes a range of force enablers, three formed police units, civilian personnel and mission support items, was transmitted to President Al-Bashir on 24 January in separate letters from African Union Chairperson Konaré and the Secretary-General. It is expected that the tripartite mechanism will also facilitate the implementation of this package. The African Union and the United Nations held additional consultations from 22 to 24 January on their hybrid operation. The consultations focused on the basic requirements of the operation, including its essential characteristics such as mandate, force size and command and control arrangements.

#### **IV. Implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan**

##### **Political support and reconciliation**

27. As part of its good offices mandate to help resolve ongoing conflicts in the Sudan, UNMIS worked with politicians and local communities in Southern Sudan to promote the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Southern Sudan Interim Constitution. Peace and reconciliation efforts continued, especially following tensions in Juba, Rumbek and Malakal. In Abyei, UNMIS undertook a three-day helicopter peace mission with Misseriya and Dinka Ngok traditional leaders to promote peaceful coexistence along nomadic migration routes. In the peace process between the Government of Uganda and LRA, UNMIS provided aviation support to Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Team patrols as well as flights to the assembly areas for the parties or associated individuals when necessary.

28. UNMIS also remained actively engaged in the efforts to find a political solution to the conflict in Darfur (see S/2006/1041). Further to the high-level discussions held in late November in Addis Ababa, UNMIS and the African Union are working to chart a course to re-engage the non-signatories to the Darfur Peace Agreement in the political process. UNMIS has also held events throughout Darfur to disseminate the Agreement and plan for the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation. Meanwhile, my new Special Envoy, Jan Eliasson, visited the region, and will be working closely with the African Union over the coming weeks and months to move the peace process forward.

##### **Military deployment and activities**

29. As at 10 January, 94 per cent of mandated UNMIS military personnel (9,322 out of a total of 9,831) had been deployed, including 579 United Nations military observers, 181 staff officers and 8,514 troops from troop-contributing countries. While team sites have now been established throughout the Mission's area of operations, planning is under way to set up three additional sites at Raga in Western Bahr Al Ghazal, Talodi in Southern Kordofan and Baw in Blue Nile State. In line with the Security Council's request to reduce the military component, taking into account progress made on the ground, UNMIS has now fully withdrawn the Nepalese component that had been based in eastern Sudan, and is also adjusting its number of military observers from 750 to 625.

30. The military component continues its monitoring and verification activities throughout its area of operations. The increased tension where other armed groups

continue to operate and the growing number of violent clashes has stretched the force in some areas, especially where additional team sites have been established. The force has increasingly played a proactive arbitration and humanitarian role in resolving other armed group and ethnic clashes in the Malakal region and elsewhere. It also provided river transport and escort for a Government of Southern Sudan investigative and reconciliation committee having the task of resolving an intra-tribal dispute in Jonglei State.

31. At the same time, the military component has been undertaking civil-military cooperation tasks in support of local communities, including the building and equipping of a medical clinic, the construction and grading of roads and the building of ablution facilities. With the start of the dry season, temporary repairs to sections of the Ed Damazin-Dindirou-Kurmuk road by UNMIS force engineering assets assisted in the return of refugees from Ethiopia. Wherever possible, local labour is trained to carry out such tasks, enabling individuals to gain vocational training and experience.

### **Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration**

32. The parties have made some progress on the planning of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes. The National Council for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Coordination, decreed by the presidency in February 2006, finally met in December. It requested the submission of a comprehensive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme for the north and the south, and started to give much-needed attention to the problem of the armed militia. The Council is key to creating a favourable political and operational environment for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. It should now establish appropriate eligibility criteria for entry into the programme and oversee the ongoing registration of members of SAF and SPLA.

33. There continues to be modest progress in the interim disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, focusing on special groups (women, children and the disabled). During the reporting period, 211 children were demobilized and reunited with their families, the majority of which are enrolled in school and benefit from community-based child protection network programmes. Continued national and international support is required to strengthen the northern and southern Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commissions in order to better implement the interim programme and plan for the next phase of the programme focusing on SAF, SPLA and the other armed groups.

34. In planning for the main disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, UNMIS supported the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission in the pre-registration of 60,477 soldiers and members of other armed groups for voluntary disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. This included 22,026 regular SAF soldiers, 17,000 members of the Popular Defence Forces, 5,000 disabled soldiers and 16,451 members of other armed groups aligned with SAF. In the south, SPLA continues to finalize its list of combatants. Once the lists have been completed, UNMIS will assist the two Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commissions in verifying the numbers. Eventual acceptance into the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme needs to be based strictly on properly formulated eligibility criteria established by the National Council.

Proper vetting during the planning stage will yield significantly better results when the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme commences.

### **Electoral assistance**

35. With the midterm elections set for 2008 or 2009, UNMIS is starting to build its capacity to meet the technical assistance requirements in support of electoral preparations. As noted above, the requisite electoral legislation remains to be passed. The Mission's electoral activities have thus far focused on tracking and monitoring progress in developing the legal framework for elections, particularly the draft elections law, rules for the registration of political parties and the establishment of the National Electoral Commission, as required by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. A mechanism for coordination of international assistance was established in early December, which will aim to identify areas of cooperation and optimize resource allocation among donors and international partners.

### **Police**

36. As at 5 January, UNMIS had deployed 662 United Nations police officers from 44 countries, who are currently stationed at 19 team sites, representing 93 per cent of the authorized strength.

37. UNMIS continued to support the development of the Southern Sudan Police Service, working with the newly established Police Development Committee (PDC), including through the registration of police officers. During the reporting period, the Mission began to implement its strategy of co-locating its police advisers with local police forces. By early December, 74 United Nations police advisers were based at 27 local police stations in Southern Sudan, and additional advisers were located at 8 police stations in the transitional areas, proactively assisting local counterparts to perform their duties and carrying out on-site training activities. Senior United Nations police advisers were also attached to senior Southern Sudan Police Service officers responsible for planning. UNMIS is widening its community policing programmes, including within transit camps for internally displaced persons.

38. The Mission has also worked to deepen its engagement with the police service in northern Sudan. In December, UNMIS, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the police service signed a letter of collaboration enabling the provision of police training in northern Sudan. The Government of National Unity Ministry of Interior also agreed to establish a Police Development Committee to coordinate cooperation with United Nations police and donors. Detailed training needs and requests to donors can now be discussed in the Police Development Committee forum, and the Governments of Norway and Denmark have already offered assistance. As noted in previous reports, other donors are strongly urged to come forward to assist in this critical aspect of the UNMIS mandate.

### **Human rights**

39. UNMIS continued active human rights monitoring during the reporting period. Particular human rights abuses occurred during the hostilities in Malakal, when SAF, its allied armed groups and SPLA failed to discriminate between combatants and non-combatants and used disproportionate violence resulting in a high toll on civilians. Meanwhile, chronic concerns over the proliferation of weapons, the

continuing existence of other armed groups, weak command and control among armed elements and a lack of rule of law added to the insecurity, which continues to expose civilians to unnecessary and unpredictable violence.

40. Particular concerns surround the displacement of civilians associated with oil development. An UNMIS analysis of the impact of oil exploration found that companies were employing environmentally unsound methods. Hazardous waste is regularly dumped into civilian water supply areas, while roads to oil installations destroy farmland and livelihoods. At the same time, commitments under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement relating to consultation and compensation for land confiscation and displacement are not being implemented.

41. UNMIS continued to support the formation of human rights mechanisms provided for in the Agreement and held a number of workshops over the reporting period. In Southern Sudan, UNMIS supported commissioners appointed to the Southern Sudan Human Rights Commission, including in the development of enabling legislation and an annual budget and in strategic planning. Work was adversely affected by the expulsion of a staff member in October.

#### **Rule of law**

42. UNMIS continued to support parties, parliamentarians and civil society engaged in law reform, including through the organization of workshops and seminars. In that connection, UNMIS supported a seminar on parliamentary oversight of the security sector ahead of the upcoming debate on a new security bill and provided technical assistance in the drafting of the Khartoum State children's bill. The Mission also provided substantive advice to the drafting of the prison services bill for Southern Sudan. UNDP continued to provide capacity-building support to legal professionals, including paralegals, lawyers, police, prosecutors, judges and prison service personnel.

43. In response to a request by UNMIS, the Governments of Ghana and Kenya have offered to assist in training Southern Sudan prison staff in Accra and Nairobi. In November, UNMIS initiated the establishment of a Prisons Development Committee in Juba to provide policy direction to prison officials regarding reform in Southern Sudan. In collaboration with Government of Southern Sudan authorities, the Mission has started registering all staff of the Prisons Service of Southern Sudan and is providing training on minimum standards for the treatment of prisoners and on basic prison management.

#### **Public information**

44. UNMIS Radio (Miraya/Mirror FM) continued to build listenership in the south. Repeater stations are now operating in Wau and Malakal. Miraya FM is also producing programmes on the Comprehensive and Darfur Peace Agreements for rebroadcast on some state radio stations in the south, in Southern Kordofan and, in cooperation with AMIS, in Darfur. The United Nations station is also assisting southern state radio stations through quick-impact projects and technical advice. Plans to boost listenership through short-wave radio and via a website with audio capability are ongoing. However, despite regular meetings with the Government, UNMIS still has no agreement to broadcast.

45. UNMIS has continued to provide public information support to AMIS with the loan of staff and equipment, website support and presentations on the Darfur Peace Agreement. This support will build with the recruitment of additional public information staff within the light support package. In the south, regular CPA presentations and workshops with community leaders on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement have continued, along with United Nations police and military training in the dissemination of information on the Agreement. In the north, in spite of positive interaction with some individuals and universities on issues pertaining to the Agreement and the role of UNMIS in the country, there remains an overall reluctance on the part of northern institutions and individuals to embrace the United Nations message.

#### **Humanitarian assistance**

46. The 2007 United Nations and partners' workplan was launched in Geneva on 14 December. The workplan focuses on continued support for the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, expanded recovery and development activities, an increased emphasis on reintegration initiatives for returning populations and the continued provision of humanitarian assistance. The total cost of assistance is some \$1.26 billion for humanitarian activities and \$560 million for recovery and development. Relative to 2006, the workplan reflects an increased focus on the delivery of an assistance package for the reconstruction and economic development of the Sudan.

47. In October, violence along roads east of Juba in Southern Sudan severely impeded access for aid workers. The clashes in Malakal in November led the United Nations to relocate temporarily 230 non-essential United Nations and non-governmental organization personnel. Civilian displacement also occurred and, although many people have returned, some civilians still seek help to move north. Humanitarian agencies rapidly undertook the disposal of bodies, the provision of water points and chlorine and the restocking of hospital medicine and supplies in the aftermath of the ceasefire.

48. In Darfur (see S/2006/1041), humanitarian access was significantly curtailed and aid workers were increasingly targeted. Because of ongoing fighting, humanitarian staff frequently had to be relocated temporarily, and organizations' operational capacities and access to populations were seriously reduced. However, mortality rates in Darfur have dropped for the second consecutive year, and malnutrition rates remain under control.

#### **Protection of civilians**

49. As noted above, widespread insecurity continued to adversely affect civilian protection. During the fighting in Malakal in November, UNMIS personnel worked to identify and refer emergency needs of the civilian population and to establish casualty figures and damage assessments. Elsewhere, the reporting period saw rising tensions within ethnic and tribal communities and placed at-risk civilian populations out of the reach of humanitarian assistance. Protection staff provided early warning and analysis of those issues and forged joint responses with agencies and non-governmental organizations through protection working groups.

50. Children continue to be associated with armed forces and groups. United Nations field teams identified scores of child soldiers in the ranks of the Pibor

Defence Forces in Jonglei State and in the Southern Sudan Defence Forces in Upper Nile State. Targeted efforts to sensitize stakeholders in the affected areas were stepped up in Pibor. Child protection staff facilitated the release of children in Wau and remain on standby as efforts to demobilize children in Bentiu proceed. Meanwhile, despite assurances to the former Emergency Relief Coordinator that it would release its considerable number of women and children, the Lord's Resistance Army has shown no sign of doing so. Work was adversely affected by the expulsion of a staff member in October.

51. The situation in Darfur diverted valuable protection resources from the chronic problems in Southern Sudan and the transitional areas. In Darfur, advocacy on protection issues has been ill received by the local authorities, and dialogue has become increasingly confrontational, as witnessed in particular by the ejection of the Norwegian Refugee Council. As non-governmental organizations reduced their protection activities, joint United Nations protection working groups sought to maintain accurate reporting and identify alternative channels for assistance.

### **Returns**

52. The start of the dry season in November marked the beginning of the 2006/07 return season. In an unprecedented development, the Government of National Unity, the Government of Southern Sudan, UNMIS and the United Nations country team agreed to a single joint plan for the organized return of some 200,000 internally displaced persons. By December 2007, the three parties aim to return 150,000 people from Khartoum and other northern states and a further 48,000 people from other locations to Southern Sudan and Blue Nile State. In a demonstration of the seriousness of their commitment, the Government of National Unity and the Government of Southern Sudan have together contributed \$51 million towards the operation, \$24 million of which has already been allocated by the Government of Southern Sudan. This operation is seen by all parties as a significant step forward.

53. In greater Khartoum, the United Nations pursues its efforts to monitor the conditions of internally displaced persons through community-based mechanisms, specific assessments and dialogue with the competent authorities. In Darfur, as the dry season begins, state authorities have begun to apply pressure on the United Nations to begin returns. This year the context in Darfur makes returns even less appropriate than in 2006. However, the United Nations continues to engage the Government and has agreed to jointly assess areas to which returns may be feasible, in accordance with existing policies.

### **Mine action**

54. Landmines and unexploded ordnance continue to present a major threat to the population in many parts of the Sudan, as well as to United Nations and non-governmental organization personnel operating on the ground. Although severely hampered by rains at the beginning of the reporting period, UNMIS mine action teams have made steady progress. Over 9.5 million square metres of suspected dangerous areas have been cleared, as well as some 2,500 anti-personnel mines, 1,000 anti-tank mines and some 500,000 pieces of unexploded ordnance and small arms ammunition. UNMIS and the United Nations Children's Fund provided mine-risk education to more than 950,000 people. UNMIS provided briefings on

landmine safety to over 6,200 Mission staff, agencies and non-governmental organizations and trained more than 200 staff as trainers.

55. UNMIS mine action teams continued to work on roads and in communities that have been prioritized in the Nuba Mountains, Juba, Rumbek, Wau, Yei, Malakal, Ed Damazin, Darfur and Kassala. For the first time, a United Nations mine action team was able to survey the roads around Hameshkoreib in eastern Sudan after the SPLA withdrawal and identified several dangerous areas for further clearance. All five UNMIS demining contingents from Bangladesh, Cambodia, Egypt, Kenya and Pakistan have commenced operations. Demining activity, which is a prerequisite for further development activities in the Sudan, requires continuous support from the international community.

### **Economic recovery and reconstruction**

56. Economic recovery and reconstruction is a critical activity in Southern Sudan and the transitional areas. The United Nations has increased its programming significantly in support of Government counterparts and local actors, including through the multi-donor trust fund for Southern Sudan. The trust fund has approved projects worth \$235.3 million to support Government capacity-building, reform of the judiciary, health, education, water and sanitation, infrastructure development, livestock and the census. There are also projects planned for support for the states, agriculture, the rule of law, HIV/AIDS programmes and private sector development. Although progress in the transitional areas has been slower, the World Bank reports that over 40 per cent of total national multi-donor trust fund project commitments are earmarked for those areas (\$38 million out of about \$90 million total). Specific programmes focusing on capacity-building and basic social services for Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States are currently under development.

57. Although the delivery of these and other peace dividends has been offset by slower than expected disbursement through the multi-donor trust funds, the achievements made so far in Southern Sudan give cause for optimism. These include an expansion of markets and an increase in trade, with a significant reduction in the cost of basic items in key locations, such as Juba. The opening of roads has also led to an increased movement of people and investment in the private sector in Southern Sudan. There has also been significant progress in establishing key Government functions and bodies, although functions relating to payroll, procurement and treasury systems have yet to become fully operational. The roll-out of the new national currency in 2007, which will focus in the initial stages on the south, will give a further boost to private sector development. Overall, economic indicators relating to growth, inflation and foreign direct investment remain strong.

58. Further to the signature of the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement, the 2007 United Nations and partners' workplan includes a focus on recovery and development of the eastern states, including alignment with priorities set out in the Agreement and the Government's five-year plan. Progress in Darfur with respect to the joint assessment mission came to a halt because of the prevailing insecurity. The assessment mission will be concluded when conditions improve.

### **Gender**

59. In connection with the upcoming elections in 2008-2009, the Gender Unit initiated an assessment of the technical support needs of prospective women

candidates from political parties in both the north and the south. In Southern Sudan, UNMIS has been promoting implementation of the 25 per cent quota for women stipulated in the Southern Sudan Interim Constitution. The Unit is also strengthening dialogue and cooperation with the AMIS gender office. In Darfur, UNMIS continues to advocate for effective mechanisms to prevent and respond to gender-based violence. Training activities targeting mission personnel and national partners were also undertaken, including for police personnel of the Government of Southern Sudan. The Unit also conducted activities to mark the sixth anniversary of the adoption by the Security Council of its resolution 1325 (2000).

### **HIV/AIDS**

60. The HIV/AIDS Unit conducted further training of HIV/AIDS peer educators, bringing the total number of trained educators to 154, and sensitized 2,000 peacekeepers. Voluntary confidential counselling and testing services were offered to 70 Mission personnel. Through its six regional HIV committees, the Unit helped to sensitize some 61,690 members of the uniformed services and the general population in the Sudan in 2006. UNMIS also organized workshops throughout the Mission area marking World AIDS Day.

### **Conduct and discipline**

61. During the reporting period, 29 new cases of misconduct were reported to the conduct and discipline team, two of which were classified as serious misconduct and referred to the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) for investigation. Delays in reporting the outcome of OIOS investigations need to be addressed to build confidence and avoid impunity. The conduct and discipline team also continued its activities to ensure that all Mission personnel complied with the United Nations code of conduct for the Sudan. Newly deployed civilian staff, military observers and police personnel received briefings on United Nations standards of conduct and the United Nations policy of zero tolerance for sexual exploitation and abuse. UNMIS, United Nations agencies and international non-governmental organizations began a joint assessment of southern communities' perceptions and risk factors conducive to misconduct.

62. At the end of the reporting period, allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse were levelled at UNMIS personnel in Juba. I wish to make clear that I will not tolerate this behaviour within the United Nations. The zero-tolerance policy, meaning zero complacency and zero impunity, will be strictly enforced. I pledge that all allegations will be followed up systematically by relevant United Nations mechanisms, working with local authorities and other partners, including troop-contributing countries, to ensure that this kind of behaviour is rooted out wherever it exists. When necessary, strong disciplinary action will be taken. In this connection, I would call upon all peacekeeping partners, including members of the press, to come forward with any information they may have in their possession to help us deal with the problem.

### **Civilian staffing**

63. UNMIS continues to face serious problems in recruiting and retaining well-qualified international and nationally recruited staff members. The Mission carried out aggressive recruitment campaigns for international and national staff with the

assistance of Department of Peacekeeping Operations recruitment teams, as well as staff temporarily assigned from other missions. As a result, civilian staff strength rose to 827 international staff (out of a total of 1,139 posts), 2,229 national staff (out of a total of 3,342 posts) and 177 United Nations Volunteers (out of a total of 231 posts).

## **V. Challenges in mandate implementation**

64. UNMIS continues to face considerable challenges in carrying out its mandate and daily tasks. Since its inception, the Mission has had to operate in an atmosphere of opposition on the part of some political forces to the multidimensional mandate given to it by the Security Council in its resolution 1590 (2005). The Government's overall attitude towards the Mission has been considerably amplified as a result of the intense discussions that have unfolded over recent months concerning a possible United Nations peacekeeping role in Darfur. UNMIS regularly faces bureaucratic obstacles from the authorities, an alarming number of crises and forced evacuations from its offices in Darfur and in Southern Sudan, a latent terrorist threat and multiple mission support and logistical problems due in part to the difficult environment in which the Mission operates, as well as the increasing demands supporting its growing role in Darfur.

65. On 22 October, the Government informed my predecessor that it had decided to "terminate" the mission of Special Representative Jan Pronk and requested him to leave the Sudan within 72 hours. The United Nations strongly protested that decision and made it clear that only the Secretary-General could decide on the tenure of his Special Representatives. The unfortunate episode amplifies the imperative to resolve existing issues through dialogue and consultation. Mr. Pronk later returned to the Sudan for a short farewell visit prior to the expiration of his contract at the end of the year.

66. There are other concerns about the commitment to the letter and spirit of the agreement that governs relations between the Mission and the Sudanese authorities. On 26 September, two staff members, while monitoring demonstrations at Khartoum University, were detained and threatened, and United Nations equipment was confiscated by unidentified security personnel. They were subsequently declared *personae non gratae* and required to leave the Sudan. I specifically appeal to the Government of National Unity to allow those two staff members back into the country in a spirit of good faith and understanding.

67. Meanwhile, recurring restrictions on local freedom of movement hindered the work of both UNMIS, in parts of its area of operations south of Khartoum, and other United Nations and non-governmental organization partners in Darfur, which were often not authorized to operate without travel permits from the authorities.

68. At the same time, delays in clearing UNMIS materiel through customs continued to create serious problems for the Mission, which have occasionally left the military component short of vital rations and communications equipment. Despite frequent discussions with the Government, no lasting solution to this problem has been found.

69. In the context of the intense international focus on Darfur, as well as the daily challenges faced by UNMIS on the ground, the Mission has at times found it

difficult to assist the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in carrying out their considerable commitments. The sheer size of the country, as well as the lack of transport and communications infrastructure on the ground, have stretched United Nations support mechanisms and require the decentralization of some functions from Khartoum to the regions. I have initiated preliminary steps in that direction by appointing a senior official who will be responsible for coordinating all Mission activities in Southern Sudan and representing the Head of Mission on a day-to-day basis with the Government of Southern Sudan. The implications of this decentralization, which would delegate increased levels of authority to the field, will be met from existing resources for the immediate period. Any future changes having an impact on current administration and support structures will be reflected in future reports to the Security Council and subsequent budgetary submissions.

## **VI. Financial implications**

70. The General Assembly, by its resolution 60/122 B, appropriated the amount of \$1,079,534,400, equivalent to \$89,961,200 per month, for UNMIS for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007. Should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of UNMIS beyond 30 April 2007, the cost of maintaining the Mission until 30 June 2007 would be limited to the amounts approved by the Assembly.

71. As at 31 October 2006, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for UNMIS amounted to \$524.0 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at that date amounted to \$2,541.8 million.

72. Reimbursement of troop- and contingent-owned equipment costs have been made for the period up to 31 October 2006, in accordance with the payment schedule.

## **VII. Observations**

73. While the parties have achieved significant progress in implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, much remains to be done if they are to establish an inclusive and constitutional democracy in which unity is made attractive to voters in Southern Sudan. On the second anniversary of the Agreement, I am concerned that the “spirit of Naivasha”, which resulted in a historic agreement two years ago, has been somewhat elusive, especially in recent months, and that the consensus created by the accords has been overshadowed by distrust and uncertainty.

74. The recent crisis in Malakal is a reminder that the hard-won Agreement is not yet stable or self-sustaining, but needs constant encouragement. Mistrust between the parties remains a serious obstacle, potential spoilers still exist and the war in Darfur has diverted international attention and support from implementation of the Agreement. In the context of rising tensions in the region, peace in Southern Sudan needs renewed and sustained attention. The coming year should be a year of increased focus on the Agreement to protect the gains made so far and to give the Sudan a stable basis on which to move forward. I pledge my personal commitment to this goal.

75. In that regard, there is a critical nexus of security issues where progress is required if peace is to hold in 2007. By 9 July, SAF must complete its redeployment north of the 1 January 1956 border. While redeployment of SPLA is predicated on the formation of Joint Integrated Units, this is now behind the schedule set out in the Agreement. The parties need to resolve this issue and keep to their redeployment commitments. Importantly, the redeployment targets do not apply only to regular forces, but also to other armed groups aligned with the parties.

76. The violence in Malakal underscored not only the need for other armed groups to be integrated as a matter of priority, but also that Joint Integrated Units do not yet function as the foundation of a possible future national army and as guarantors of security and stability. The need to ensure security around sensitive areas, including oil installations, is particularly pertinent. Unfortunately, there remains an acute security dilemma for both parties over the management of strategic areas. There is significant risk that what happened in Malakal could happen in other areas of Southern Sudan.

77. Both parties must cease using militias as proxy forces and make the integration of other armed groups a top priority. Building on the commitment to a joint solution agreed during President Al-Bashir's visit to Juba in November 2006, the parties should establish the ad hoc incorporation and reintegration committees provided for in the Agreement and work in earnest through the Other Armed Groups Collaborative Committee and the National Council for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Coordination for the integration or demobilization of all armed militias. As noted in paragraph 33 above, international support for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration mechanisms will continue to be critical to implementation.

78. Equally urgent is the agreement of a joint doctrine and training programme for Joint Integrated Units. As the Sudanese Armed Forces depart Southern Sudan, the ability of the Units to provide security will be critical. If the Units are not integrated, professional and well regulated, they risk becoming part of the problem rather than part of the solution. The Joint Defence Board has previously requested help from the international community to develop the Joint Integrated Units. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement also specifically states that the parties would call upon the international community to provide technical, material and financial support to assist in forming and training the Units. I call upon Member States with experience and expertise in security sector reform to urgently second experts to assist UNMIS in this area, working with the Joint Defence Board to develop an integrated programme of assistance.

79. I urge the parties to begin in earnest the demarcation of the 1 January 1956 border and to agree the status of Abyei. It must be recognized that if the border issue is not resolved expeditiously, it might be difficult to verify full redeployment in July 2007. Where it is required, the international community should provide financial and technical support to the technical ad hoc border committee.

80. The commitment of both parties to develop professional and accountable police services in line with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is a most welcome sign. The Police Development Committee in Southern Sudan and the newly created Police Development Committee in the north are important forums that bring together the respective police experts from the Sudan, the United Nations, non-governmental organizations and representatives of donor countries. I encourage

the Committees to work energetically to identify training and logistical needs and urge donors to liaise closely with them to ensure that capacity-building assistance to the police is well coordinated and targeted.

81. Some of the central institutions within the Comprehensive Peace Agreement need to be more effective than they have been so far. One such institution is the Assessment and Evaluation Commission, which has a critical oversight function over the Agreement and has been given the task of supporting the parties in their commitment to “make unity attractive”. Equally, the Ceasefire Political Commission must function more effectively, and the parties should use the planned review of its activities to revitalize this important forum in 2007. It is recognized that UNMIS could play a more prominent role within the Assessment and Evaluation Commission, and I intend to actively support this. So too should the broader international community, and especially those countries with an interest in Sudanese peace and development, become more active in both Commissions, as well as outside their framework.

82. Despite the public airing of disagreements during the celebrations marking the second anniversary of the Agreement, there seems to be a generally improved partnership in recent weeks between NCP and SPLM, which has enabled progress on important areas, like the National Petroleum Commission. I am concerned, however, that the parties still appear reluctant to tackle resolutely difficult issues in the institutions provided for in the Agreement, preferring instead to resort to informal discussions. If the Agreement is to take deeper root, more must be done to improve transparency in political decision-making and to improve the capacity of all parties to participate in the political process. Donor support in building the capacity of political parties and parliamentary institutions will also remain essential.

83. It is time to begin the process of ensuring that conditions are in place for a free and fair electoral process, expected in 2008 or 2009. The enactment of electoral legislation and the establishment of the Electoral Commission are long overdue. I hope that the parties will move forward rapidly with the creation of the Commission, which will then need the political, financial and technical support of donors to prepare for the polls.

84. Two years after the signing of the Agreement, it is particularly crucial to provide tangible benefits of peace to the people of the Sudan. In its resolution 1590 (2005), the Security Council urged rapid delivery of an assistance package for the reconstruction and economic development of the Sudan. In practice, progress has been slower than expected, especially in Southern Sudan. I welcome the discussions now under way with the Government of Southern Sudan and other key stakeholders to establish a “second window” for the multi-donor trust fund for Southern Sudan, which would be administered by the United Nations and which would emphasize expeditious implementation in areas of urgent need. At the same time, the wider exploitation of resources in Southern Sudan must be carried out responsibly, so that accelerating economic development results in a genuine peace dividend for the population at large.

85. International concern with the situation in Darfur in the past two years has, understandably, diverted significant attention, as well as human and financial resources, away from implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. In this respect, Darfur is not just a human tragedy, it also reflects negatively on the central precept of the Agreement, that Sudanese unity should be made attractive to

Southern Sudanese voters. A swift, peaceful resolution to the conflict in Darfur could go a long way towards restoring trust between the parties to the Agreement. Conversely, the longer the conflict drags on, the harder it will be to persuade the Southern Sudanese that their best interests lie within a united Sudan.

86. It is also crucial to remember that the Agreement is the bedrock and foundation of all subsequent agreements, including the Darfur Peace Agreement. Therefore, sustained international support for this complex Agreement will be indispensable. I am convinced that 2007 should be a year of renewed support and engagement on the Agreement. As a centrepiece, I fully support the recent announcement by IGAD that it, as sponsor and mediator of the Agreement, plans to convene a major meeting to assess implementation of the Agreement in July 2007.

87. While calling for additional support for the Agreement, I request that both parties continue to give their full support to the United Nations in its efforts to assist them in implementing the Agreement. As I begin my term as Secretary-General, I want to assure both parties that the Organization will remain an entirely impartial arbiter, committed to bringing peace and development to all the Sudanese people. In return, I ask for fairness from both parties, for dialogue and mutual understanding and for a commitment to assist the United Nations in carrying out its mandated role.

88. In conclusion, I wish to thank all United Nations personnel in the Sudan for their tireless service in support of the Agreement and for helping to resolve the conflict in Darfur. Thanks to their efforts, the United Nations is ready to further assist the Sudanese people and authorities in implementing their historic agreements.

## Annex 1

## Military and police component as at 31 December 2006

Country	Military component								Civilian police	
	Observers		Staff officers		Troops		Military subtotal			
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Argentina	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	11	—
Australia	5	1	5	4	—	—	—	—	8	2
Bangladesh	22	—	29	—	1 499	—	1 550	—	18	1
Belgium	5	—	—	—	—	—	5	—	—	—
Benin	7	—	—	—	—	—	7	—	—	—
Bolivia	15	—	—	—	—	—	15	—	—	—
Bosnia and Herzegovina	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1
Botswana	5	—	—	—	—	—	5	—	—	—
Brazil	14	—	—	—	—	—	14	—	3	—
Burkina Faso	7	—	—	—	—	—	7	—	—	—
Cambodia	15	—	1	—	135	—	151	—	—	—
Canada	14	1	6	1	—	—	20	2	2	—
China	14	—	11	—	428	7	453	7	7	2
Croatia	—	—	5	—	—	—	5	—	—	—
Denmark	10	—	6	—	—	—	16	—	2	—
Ecuador	20	—	—	—	—	—	20	—	—	—
Egypt	18	—	22	—	781	15	821	15	2	—
El Salvador	5	—	—	—	—	—	5	—	4	1
Fiji	8	—	—	—	—	—	8	—	4	3
Finland	—	—	2	—	—	—	2	—	2	—
Gabon	6	—	—	—	—	—	6	—	—	—
Gambia	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4
Germany	31	—	4	—	—	—	35	—	5	—
Ghana	—	—	3	—	—	—	3	—	35	6
Greece	4	—	2	—	—	—	6	—	—	—
Guatemala	8	—	—	—	—	—	8	—	—	—
Guinea	14	—	—	—	—	—	14	—	—	—
India	21	—	26	—	2 576	4	2 623	4	26	2
Indonesia	13	—	—	—	—	—	13	—	—	—
Jamaica	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	2
Jordan	12	—	7	—	—	—	19	—	21	—
Kenya	5	1	11	—	780	32	796	33	18	2
Korea	7	—	—	—	—	—	7	—	—	—
Kyrgyzstan	6	3	—	—	—	—	6	3	1	—
Malawi	6	—	1	—	—	—	7	—	—	—

Country	Military component									
	Observers		Staff officers		Troops		Military subtotal		Civilian police	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Malaysia	8	—	3	—	—	—	11	—	10	—
Mali	14	—	—	—	—	—	14	—	—	—
Moldova	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—
Mongolia	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—
Mozambique	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—
Namibia	9	—	—	—	—	—	9	—	1	—
Nepal	8	2	5	—	—	—	13	2	49	1
Netherlands	7	—	2	—	—	—	9	—	6	—
New Zealand	2	—	1	—	—	—	3	—	—	—
Nigeria	13	—	5	1	—	—	18	1	50	3
Norway	17	—	9	—	—	—	26	—	4	—
Pakistan	23	—	20	—	1 538	—	1 581	—	42	—
Paraguay	6	—	—	—	—	—	6	—	—	—
Peru	12	—	—	—	—	—	12	—	—	—
Philippines	6	—	—	—	—	—	6	—	56	—
Poland	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—
Romania	12	—	—	—	—	—	12	—	—	—
Russian Federation	15	—	3	—	120	—	138	—	11	—
Rwanda	15	—	7	—	254	—	276	—	24	—
Samoa	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	17	—
South Africa	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	—	—
Sri Lanka	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	13	1
Sweden	3	—	2	—	—	—	5	—	9	1
United Republic of Tanzania	9	—	2	—	—	—	11	—	2	—
Thailand	14	1	—	—	—	—	14	1	—	—
Turkey	—	—	4	—	—	—	4	—	28	—
Uganda	9	—	—	—	—	—	9	—	17	2
Ukraine	8	—	—	—	—	—	8	—	21	1
United Kingdom	—	—	3	—	—	—	3	—	—	—
United States	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	7	2
Uruguay	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—
Vanuatu	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	—
Yemen	16	—	—	—	—	—	16	—	3	—
Zambia	15	2	7	—	303	39	325	41	21	—
Zimbabwe	13	2	2	—	—	—	15	2	25	8
<b>Total per gender</b>	<b>579</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>217</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>8 414</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>9 200</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>597</b>	<b>45</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>592</b>		<b>223</b>		<b>8 511</b>		<b>9 311</b>		<b>641</b>	

