



## Security Council

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### Monthly report of the Secretary-General on Darfur

#### I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraphs 6, 13 and 16 of Security Council resolution 1556 (2004), paragraph 15 of Council resolution 1564 (2004), paragraph 17 of Council resolution 1574 (2004) and paragraph 12 of Council resolution 1590 (2005). It covers the months of November and December 2006, and January 2007.

#### II. Insecurity in Darfur

2. The security situation in Darfur has been characterized by increased violence during the reporting period. Sudanese Government forces supported by armed militia engaged in clashes with Darfur Peace Agreement non-signatory forces, especially in Northern and Southern Darfur. In their ongoing efforts to flush out non-signatory combatants, the Government of the Sudan intensified aerial bombardment of non-signatory forces positions, including civilian targets. Tension also persisted along the Sudan-Chad border. Humanitarian organizations and the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) suffered harassment and attacks, while theft and carjackings of their vehicles reached new heights in November and December.

3. The reporting period was also marked by clashes between Government forces supported by armed militia and the National Redemption Front (NRF) coalition. The clashes occurred in both Northern and Southern Darfur: in Birmaza, Sani Hayi, Umm Sidr, Sayah, Gubba, Dobo (Northern Darfur), Abu Jabre and Adilya (Southern Darfur). On 15 November, soldiers of the Sudanese armed forces and armed militia, supported by helicopter gunships, attacked several villages in the Birmaza area, killing at least three civilians, torching dozens of houses and destroying four rub halls of an international non-governmental organization (NGO).

4. The Group of 19 (G19) faction of NRF retaliated by attacking Sudanese armed forces and militia forces in several places, including Sani Hayi and Umm Sidr, and attacking Government property, including the oil installations at Abu Jabre on 26 November, which led to heavy clashes between rebels and the Sudanese armed forces. On 4 and 5 December, Government helicopter gunships and an Antonov aircraft bombed the Adilya area (Southern Darfur) in an attack on NRF forces. On 16 December, Government forces and G19 members clashed in Sayah (Northern



Darfur). Nine G19 members were killed and seven of their vehicles were destroyed. On 20 December, armed militia and Government forces launched a combined ground and air strike against a joint force of the G19 group, Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM)-Abdul Shafi and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in Gubba (Northern Darfur). In addition, they launched aerial bombardments on G19 strongholds of Hashaba and Anka (Northern Darfur) on 11 and 21 December, killing eight civilians.

5. Hostilities also broke out between armed militia and SLM-Minawi. On 3 and 4 December, members of SLM-Minawi and armed militia clashed at the El Fasher marketplace. Eight people, including one civilian, were killed in the ensuing violence and looting. On 5 December, one student was killed and two others injured by armed militia in the Al Mudarig area close to El Fasher. On 6 and 7 December, schoolboys and other citizens protested the killing at demonstrations in El Fasher, which culminated in the burning of a tent that served as a classroom in a school in El Fasher.

6. Much of the violence targeted innocent civilians, in contravention of existing ceasefire arrangements and international law. On 18 November, forces of the Government of the Sudan and armed militia attacked and burned a significant portion of the village of Buli (Western Darfur), where more than 10,000 internally displaced persons had found refuge, and looted several villages between Rowata and Bul Bul (Western Darfur). Dozens of civilians were killed and thousands displaced in the attacks. Armed militia also attacked and torched villages, causing the death of many civilians. On 2 December, five civilians were killed and many more displaced in attacks on Abu Sakeen (Northern Darfur), in which 50 houses were burned. On 4 December, armed militia attacked the settlements of Shagbuba, Bunglawy, Um Serena and Hashaba (Northern Darfur), leading to the death of two civilians. On 5 and 6 December, Government aircraft bombarded Shagbuba with ground support from armed militia and killed five civilians. On 9 December, armed men on horseback attacked a commercial vehicle convoy carrying people and medical and other supplies near Runju Runju in the Sirba area (Western Darfur). The truck was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade, and the people in the truck were shot at by the horsemen. Thirty-one civilians, including five schoolteachers, were killed in the attack.

7. On 19 December, an armed group attacked returnees in Arwa (Western Darfur) and looted 150 cows and 300 sheep. Five returnees were killed and eight injured in the attack, after which the perpetrators fled across the border to Chad. The incident occurred in the wake of the signing of a letter of understanding on 13 December, between the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration, which provides a framework for cooperation between the two organizations to help Sudanese refugees and internally displaced persons to return to their homes.

8. Tension along the Sudan-Chad border remained high during the reporting period. On 25 November, Chadian armed opposition groups, allegedly the Rally of Democratic Forces (RFD) and the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD), crossed the Sudanese border into Chad and captured the eastern Chadian town of Abéché, but were pushed back by the Chadian armed forces on the following day. The incident occurred soon after the summit held on 21 November 2006 in Tripoli, where the Sudan and Chad met under a Libyan peace initiative that

included Egypt, Eritrea and the Central African Republic. On 28 November, Chad declared itself in a “state of war” with the Sudan over the latter’s alleged support of Chadian rebels. On 12 December, fighting between Chadian armed opposition groups and the Chadian armed forces at Armankul (Western Darfur) resulted in displacement of the local population.

9. More than 24 humanitarian vehicles were carjacked or stolen in the period under review. On 7 December, three vehicles belonging to an international NGO were stolen in Khor Abeche (Southern Darfur). On 9 December, an international NGO vehicle was taken at gunpoint near Azerni (Western Darfur), while, on 11 December, three international NGO vehicles were stolen at gunpoint near Muhajariya (Southern Darfur) by armed men on camelback. On the same day, a United Nations agency vehicle that had been donated to the local Department of Health was stolen at gunpoint by Arab militiamen near the Krinding II internally displaced person camp (outside Geneina town). On 12 December, three armed men carjacked an international NGO vehicle near Ardemata (in Geneina town) and abducted the two staff members who were in it. The carjackers then drove the vehicle some distance from Ardemata, sold it to another party and released the staff members. Two international NGO vehicles were stolen in El Geneina (Western Darfur) in separate incidents on 13 and 14 December. On 18 December, armed men attacked two international NGO compounds in Gereida (Western Darfur) and brutally assaulted and raped two international NGO staff. The perpetrators also stole 12 vehicles, along with mobile and satellite phones, laptops and other electronic communication equipment.

10. International NGO staff continued to be harassed by armed groups, while armed militia and Government forces also hindered humanitarian aid delivery. On 7 December, a group of armed men forcefully entered an international NGO complex in Khor Abeche and physically assaulted several of the organization’s staff members. On 18 December, an international NGO ambulance and its Government police escort vehicle were ambushed near Khorbomba (Western Darfur) and one staff nurse was shot in the leg.

11. Government attacks on humanitarian personnel also occurred over the reporting period. On 19 January, local police and security officials raided the compound of an international NGO in Nyala and arrested 20 people, including five staff members of United Nations agencies and a number of AMIS and NGO staff. Those arrested, including United Nations staff, were subjected to physical assault and verbal abuse by the Nyala police during their arrest and detention. One female United Nations staff member was sexually abused during the arrest and several sustained serious injuries, some of which required urgent medical treatment.

12. Armed banditry continued during November and December. On 15 November, armed men looted trucks carrying World Food Programme (WFP) supplies near Kutum (Northern Darfur). On 2 December, armed militia and Government forces attacked the villages of Hilat Amar Jadeed and Lamena (Northern Darfur) during a scheduled food distribution. In Hilat Amar Jadeed, soldiers and armed men looted food and supplies and severely wounded three persons. In Lamena, witnesses reported that Sudanese Government soldiers shot at civilians, resulting in the death of at least three persons and the injury of five more, including two children.

13. Attacks on AMIS personnel, property and installations have also increased. The situation was particularly serious in Northern and Western Darfur, where

internally displaced persons and civilians attacked AMIS personnel. The following locations were targeted: the Zam Zam internally displaced person camp post on 5 December, and the AMIS headquarters near El Geneina airport on 10 December, which resulted in the death of three civilians. On 10 December, an AMIS vehicle carrying two AMIS military personnel was carjacked in El Fasher. The whereabouts of the two abducted AMIS personnel are still unknown. Two other AMIS vehicles were stolen in December: one in El Fasher on 14 December, the other in Khor Abeche on 15 December. AMIS investigations were also hindered by civilians upset by the prevailing insecurity and violence. In one instance, the AMIS investigation team that went to Sirba on 9 December to inquire into the Runju Runju incident was detained overnight by local civilians. The killing of an AMIS civilian police officer during the hijacking of an AMIS vehicle in Northern Darfur on 1 February also underscored the increasingly dangerous environment in Darfur.

### **III. Human rights and protection**

14. Security in and around internally displaced person camps continued to remain precarious, with killings, looting and harassment of internally displaced persons and gender-related crimes against female internally displaced persons. Concurrently, the number of displaced persons arriving at the internally displaced person camps increased because of the attacks. In addition, Government authorities continued to restrict the freedom of movement of United Nations personnel.

15. Violence persisted in internally displaced person camps and against internally displaced persons. On 5 December, two groups of internally displaced persons clashed in the Kalma camp (Southern Darfur), and one internally displaced person was shot dead and two others were injured. On 8 December, armed militia shot dead three internally displaced persons from the Shangil Tobayi camp (Northern Darfur), after stealing their cattle. On 19 December, armed men shot and wounded an internally displaced person at the El Sherif camp (Southern Darfur), following an attempt to steal his cattle the previous day. In a related incident, again on 19 December, armed men attacked some men in the Otash internally displaced person camp (Southern Darfur) and stole their money.

16. Female internally displaced persons faced harassment, assault and rape by members of various armed factions. On 13 November, three female internally displaced persons were raped at the Kalma camp (Northern Darfur) and, on 14 November, one woman was raped in the Tawilla camp (Northern Darfur). On 25 November, two female internally displaced persons were attacked close to the Mornei camp (Western Darfur) by three armed men who also raped them.

17. Civilians also continued to be displaced as a result of the ongoing violence. The clashes in Northern and Southern Darfur during November displaced approximately 22,000 people. The attacks on Abu Sakeen and Armankul also led to a large displacement of the local population. On 4 December, residents of Kullo (Northern Darfur) had to evacuate to the internally displaced person camp at Tawilla (Northern Darfur), following attacks on their village by SLM-Minawi members who claimed the land for themselves.

18. United Nations staff also continued to be hindered in their work by restrictions imposed by Government authorities, in violation of the status-of-forces agreement. On 16 November, upon landing in Kornoi (Northern Darfur), a group of United

Nations staff were searched and questioned by the Sudanese armed forces. On 13 December, a United Nations agency team was prevented from travelling to the Zam Zam internally displaced person camp without a humanitarian assistance coordination travel permit, and on 20 December, national security officials prevented a United Nations vehicle, with UNMIS personnel, from proceeding from El Fasher to Mallit on the same grounds. Again, on 20 December, a United Nations helicopter flight that was scheduled to transport people from El Fasher to Fanga (Northern Darfur) was refused permission because the aircraft was based in Kadugli, not in El Fasher.

#### **IV. Humanitarian situation**

19. Humanitarian aid access declined steeply in November and December owing to widespread insecurity and the theft of an unprecedented number of aid vehicles. The frequent attacks and harassment also led to the relocation of a large number of humanitarian aid workers.

20. In November, 95 per cent of the roads in Western Darfur were unusable for security reasons. In December, only two roads were certified safe for United Nations and international NGO movement in and around the El Geneina area (Western Darfur). Among the closed roads were the vital Abu Surug-Geneina commercial road and the road to Um Kher. Due to the prevailing insecurity, humanitarian organizations were unable to assess the humanitarian situation in Birmaza and Jebel Marra (Western Darfur). The theft of aid vehicles further restricted the mobility of humanitarian workers.

21. Due to the prevailing insecurity, over 400 humanitarian workers were relocated on 11 separate occasions, which affected humanitarian and emergency aid delivery to around 850,000 conflict-affected people. On 5 December, following the violence in El Fasher, 52 humanitarian aid staff, along with 82 United Nations personnel, were relocated to Khartoum. The day after the theft of vehicles on 7 December from an international NGO compound in Khor Abeche, 11 of its staff members were relocated to Nyala. Following an attempted break-in at the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) compound in Kutum (Northern Darfur) and the resultant shooting, 32 ICRC, international NGO and United Nations agency staff were relocated to El Fasher the following day, 8 December. Three international NGOs temporarily relocated 30 staff members on 9 December from Al Daien (Southern Darfur) to Nyala, due to the prevailing tensions in the area. On 19 December, 71 international NGO and NGO members were relocated to Nyala following the attack, theft and harassment of staff in two international NGO compounds in Gereida the previous night.

22. There have been 28 such relocations since the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement on 5 May 2006, which has impacted humanitarian aid to the affected populations. Notably, the largest single relocation in December from Gereida has affected humanitarian support to the Gereida camp, which is the largest internally displaced person camp in Darfur, with over 130,000 inhabitants. By November, the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance had risen to around 4 million, representing roughly two thirds of the Darfur population. On 20 November, the Southern Darfur authorities expelled the international NGO Norwegian Refugee

Council, claiming its reports of rape cases in the Kalma camp were inflated. That significantly reduced humanitarian aid activities in Southern Darfur.

23. Despite these daunting challenges, humanitarian aid workers have persisted in their effort to deliver humanitarian aid to those in need and to carry on developmental activities.

24. As a result of the ongoing conflict, 70 per cent of the war-affected population in Darfur is now dependent on external food aid and agencies like WFP that continue to deliver food aid to over 2.6 million people every month. Around 92 per cent of the target population in Darfur has been inoculated against polio. As a result of the efforts of the United Nations Children's Fund over the reporting period, 9,500 people will get access to potable water in internally displaced person camps in Southern Darfur. The maintenance of water schemes in another eight Southern Darfur internally displaced person camps during December benefited more than 130,000 internally displaced persons. Primary school enrolment in Darfur increased from 47 per cent to 63 per cent during 2006.

## **V. Implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement**

25. During the reporting period, high-level consultations on Darfur took place in Addis Ababa on 16 November, which my predecessor co-chaired with the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Alpha Oumar Konaré. Preparatory work for the convening of a conference of non-signatories and rationalization of the various initiatives to broaden the base of the Darfur Peace Agreement are ongoing. In December, further progress was made to reinforce the ceasefire mechanism, including the creation of a second chamber of the Ceasefire Commission for non-signatories.

26. The Security Council has already been apprised of the conclusions of the Addis Ababa deliberations of 16 November. The discussions resulted in a clear agreement that only a negotiated political settlement could bring the conflict in Darfur to an end. The meeting also concurred that the Darfur Peace Agreement would remain at the heart of any settlement but would need to be made more inclusive, and that the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation has a key role to play in complementing the Darfur Peace Agreement. The meeting further concluded that the political process should be all-inclusive. The conclusions recognized that the current proliferation of initiatives must be streamlined and brought under one umbrella. To that end, the conclusions indicated that the United Nations and the African Union were best positioned to lead this process and called on international partners for support whenever appropriate.

27. The Council will recall that, pursuant to the Addis Ababa and Abuja agreements of November 2006, my predecessor appointed Jan Eliasson, former Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs and former President of the General Assembly, as the Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Darfur, with the objective of re-energizing the political process. In agreement with African Union Commission Chairperson Konaré, he will undertake this challenging task in full partnership with African Union Special Envoy Salim Ahmed Salim. To help establish this close working relationship, I met with Mr. Salim and Mr. Eliasson in New York in early January to discuss the situation in Darfur and their future collaboration. During his stay in New York, Special Envoy Eliasson received briefings at the Secretariat and

held consultations with representatives of a large number of Member States, including members of the Security Council.

28. I subsequently dispatched my Special Envoy to Addis Ababa to meet with the African Union leadership and discuss the joint African Union-United Nations endeavour to re-energize the political process. Special Envoy Eliasson then visited the Sudan from 9 to 12 January. During his stay in the Sudan he held talks with President Bashir and other officials of the Government of National Unity. The Special Envoy also met with Presidential Assistant Mini Minawi, who is the head of the SLM faction that signed the Darfur Peace Agreement on 5 May 2006. The initial response of the Sudanese Government to Special Envoy Eliasson's mission was positive. President Bashir acknowledged the futility of pursuing a military option to resolve the Darfur issue and declared the Government's preparedness to enter into peace talks on Darfur on the basis of the Darfur Peace Agreement. Special Envoy Eliasson also visited El Fasher, where he received briefings from local UNMIS and AMIS leadership. He also met some representatives of the non-signatories to the Darfur Peace Agreement, as well as internally displaced person representatives. Throughout his consultations, Special Envoy Eliasson emphasized the need for the level of violence to decrease, so as to allow the political process to move forward.

29. From 29 to 30 January, I attended the African Union summit in Addis Ababa. Special Envoy Eliasson joined me in meetings on the situation in Darfur with key African member States. African Union Commission Chairperson Konaré and I agreed that our Special Envoys would visit the Sudan from 11 to 17 February. During that visit they would continue discussions with Government officials and non-signatory field commanders on the ground in Darfur.

30. With regard to strengthening ceasefire mechanisms, the Joint Commission meeting held on 12 November in Addis Ababa approved the establishment of a "second chamber" to the Ceasefire Commission. This second chamber provides a forum for AMIS to hold discussions with Darfur Peace Agreement non-signatories and impress upon them their obligation to abide by pre-Darfur Peace Agreement ceasefire obligations and to facilitate humanitarian access in their areas of control. On 24 December, the second chamber held its first meeting in El Fasher, which was attended by representatives of the Sudanese Government, SLA-Abdul Wahid and JEM, as well as AMIS and the United Nations. At the meeting, which was chaired by the AMIS Force Commander (who is the Chairman of the Ceasefire Commission), all parties welcomed the establishment of the mechanism. On 15 December, a high-level Joint Commission meeting in Addis Ababa emphasized the importance of the urgent disarmament of armed militia and other effective measures to address the issue of violence in Darfur. It also addressed ceasefire violations and took measures to ensure accountability by signatories and non-signatories alike.

31. In a related development, on 27 December, members from the three non-signatory parties, the SLM-Abdul Wahid, SLM-Abdul Shafi and G19, announced their merger into one movement known as the SLM-Non-Signatory Factions. They also announced a cessation of hostilities unless attacked and reiterated their commitment to the N'Djamena Ceasefire Agreement. The Birmaza area in Northern Darfur, where their meeting took place, was bombed, however, two days after the meeting.

## **VI. United Nations support to the African Union Mission in the Sudan**

32. The three-phased United Nations support package proposal was taken forward at the African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC) meeting held in Abuja on 30 November, when PSC endorsed the United Nations support package for AMIS and extended the mandate of AMIS for a further six months, from 1 January 2007.

33. To clarify some aspects regarding the implementation of the Addis and Abuja agreements, my predecessor wrote to President Bashir on 19 December. That letter was delivered by Ambassador Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, who visited Khartoum as my predecessor's envoy. On 23 December, pursuant to his visit, the Government of the Sudan confirmed its acceptance of the three-phased approach to peacekeeping in Darfur.

34. The Council will recall that the first phase calls for a small number of advisers to join AMIS: 105 staff officers, 33 civilian police advisers and 48 civilian staff in both substantive and support areas. The plan also calls for the provision of some assets to AMIS: 8 fly-away kits, 36 global positioning systems, 360 night-vision goggles, 36 armoured personnel carriers and some equipment for use in public information campaigns. Deployment of these personnel and assets is well under way, but must now be accelerated. There are currently a total of 81 military and police officers deployed to Darfur under the "light support package".

35. The second phase — or "heavy" package — of United Nations support to AMIS was finalized during a second round of consultations undertaken in Addis Ababa between the African Union and United Nations teams on 20 and 21 January. During the discussions, it was agreed that the United Nations will provide a number of critical enabling capabilities to AMIS totalling 2,250 military personnel, including personnel dedicated to providing static camp protection; 3 formed police units and 301 individual police advisers, for a total of 721 civilian police; and 1,136 civilian personnel to undertake substantive tasks related to the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (civil affairs, humanitarian affairs, public information, etc.) and provide support to administrative and management structures. The heavy package will also include equipment and support required for AMIS to reorganize its present structure from eight sectors to three.

36. The military capabilities include: one transport unit; four engineering units; one signal unit and one logistics unit; one level 2 hospital unit and one level 3 hospital unit; one reconnaissance unit providing three fixed-wing aircraft; one aviation unit providing six light tactical helicopters; and one aviation unit providing six utility helicopters. In accordance with the AMIS concept of operations, the six light tactical helicopters would act as force multipliers and assist in the protection of civilians at risk, AMIS and United Nations personnel, as well as equipment, installations and assets.

37. The police component of the heavy package envisages the deployment of three formed police units to complement AMIS civilian police in performing its tasks, which include: (a) protecting civilians and vulnerable communities under threat of violence, as well as United Nations and African Union personnel and facilities; (b) maintaining a 24-hour presence in internally displaced person camps; (c) performing escort duties (collection of firewood, grass and water); and (d) conducting confidence-building patrols.

38. Darfur has until recently been largely free of the threat of landmines; however, a rise in civilian casualties owing to landmines and unexploded ordnance has been registered, with four deaths and 11 injuries reported in just the first few weeks of 2007. Reports in early February also indicated that landmines may have been transported to El Geneina for use along the border with Chad and possibly on roads. AMIS has also reported unexploded ordnance in close proximity to scarce water sources and along patrol routes, posing a threat to civilians and AMIS peacekeepers. For these reasons, the second phase of United Nations support to AMIS will include a mine action component that will focus on information gathering, surveying routes used by AMIS and the local population, and explosive ordnance disposal.

39. Due to the evolving security situation in Darfur and the changes in the mandate and concepts of operations of AMIS, the requirements for the second phase of United Nations support to AMIS are significantly greater than those envisaged in the report of the former Secretary-General dated 28 July 2006 (S/2006/591). These requirements have been identified jointly by the United Nations and the African Union and, in accordance with the Addis Ababa and Abuja decisions of November 2006, reflect the deployment of the heavy package in anticipation of a hybrid African Union-United Nations peacekeeping operation.

40. An indicative preliminary breakdown of the financial implications of the second phase of United Nations support to AMIS by main categories of expenditure is provided in the annex to the present report. Following the Council's endorsement of the second phase of United Nations support to AMIS, I intend to revert to the General Assembly to obtain authorization for the financing of this second phase.

41. African Union Commission Chairperson Konaré and I sent the details of the heavy support package to President Bashir on 24 January. While President Bashir reaffirmed in his letter dated 23 December 2006 to my predecessor the readiness of the Government of the Sudan to start immediately, through the tripartite committee, the implementation of the Addis Ababa conclusions and Abuja communiqué, I have asked the President to reiterate in writing his acceptance of the heavy support package. Thus far, the President has not responded.

42. All aspects of the hybrid operation, or the third and final phase of the three-phased approach, will be finalized in close consultation with the African Union. In the meantime, specialists from the African Union Commission and the United Nations met in Addis Ababa from 22 to 24 January with the objective of determining the basic framework of the hybrid operation. In particular, the consultations focused on the basic features of the mandate of the hybrid operation, force size, command and control arrangements, and force generation and funding requirements. These consultations produced a common understanding of the essential characteristics of the hybrid operation, providing a platform for joint African Union-United Nations efforts to finalize all related operational plans.

43. In December, the tripartite committee mechanism, consisting of representatives of the Sudanese Government, the African Union and the United Nations, began functioning. The mechanism was set up to facilitate the implementation of United Nations support to AMIS. It met in Khartoum three times during the reporting period. At the last meeting on 26 December, the Sudanese Government accepted that United Nations personnel deployed to assist AMIS in Darfur would wear United Nations blue berets and AMIS armbands.

44. While efforts to implement the three-phased approach continue, it will be critical that the current partners maintain their financial support to AMIS throughout the remainder of the AMIS mandate.

## **VII. Observations**

45. The increase in violence and tension in Darfur during the months of November, December and January stretched the capacity of AMIS to the limit. The timely extension of the AMIS mandate needs to be followed by appropriate funding and staffing from the international community to enable it to function effectively. I appeal to donors to provide urgent support in all areas related to the Mission's continued operations and agreed expansion by two battalions. In addition, I appeal to Member States for urgent contributions of human resources and equipment needed for the United Nations light and heavy support packages for AMIS, in order to make possible the delivery of timely and effective reinforcements to AMIS. Of particular importance will be the enabling units described in section VI above.

46. I welcome the establishment of the second chamber of the Ceasefire Commission and the declaration of cessation of hostilities by some non-signatory groups as steps in the right direction. However, these declarations must be implemented on the ground and matched by reciprocal actions by all parties, in particular the Government of the Sudan. It is also critical that all armed militia be disarmed for the effort to succeed. I encourage the parties to use the second chamber mechanism as a means to facilitate a negotiated and inclusive political settlement to the crisis.

47. As long as violence and attacks continue in Darfur, the efforts to reach a political settlement will not succeed. I therefore call upon all parties to agree to and implement a cessation of hostilities and commit to the resumption of peace talks on the basis of the Darfur Peace Agreement. I also ask them to cooperate fully with my Special Envoy for Darfur and with the Special Envoy of the African Union in their joint efforts to facilitate a sustainable political solution.

48. I am distressed by the deteriorating humanitarian and security situation on the ground. All parties must cease violent attacks on civilians. I particularly deplore the aerial bombings by Sudanese Government forces, which have expanded to new areas since 16 January, resulting in more civilian casualties and suffering. When my Special Envoy visited Khartoum in early January, President Bashir affirmed that there can be no military solution to the conflict and reiterated his Government's commitment to a political process. In fulfilment of that commitment, I urge the Government to put an end to the aerial bombings and to take immediate action to hold accountable the perpetrators of attacks against civilians.

49. The violence of the last three months has had a further negative effect on humanitarian aid access and delivery in Darfur. The high levels of risk confronting humanitarian organizations in their day-to-day activities are becoming critical and may jeopardize the humanitarian presence in Darfur. This reinforces the urgent need for a ceasefire and an effective political process. I welcome the decision of the Government of the Sudan to extend the moratorium on restrictions for humanitarian work in Darfur by another year from February 2007. However, its "fast track" regulations must be put into practice to allow unhindered humanitarian access and to avoid the continuation of attacks and other incidents that perpetuate the killing,

displacement and general insecurity in the Darfur region. At the same time, I view the 19 January incident in Nyala, in which local police and security officials arrested and physically abused international humanitarian staff, as unacceptable, and call on the Government to ensure that the perpetrators will be held accountable.

50. During my attendance at the African Union summit in Addis Ababa on 29 and 30 January, I had the opportunity to discuss a range of issues of common interest to the United Nations and the African Union with a number of African Heads of State, including African Union Commission Chairperson Konaré. I stressed that I regard Darfur as an issue of the highest priority.

51. In my meetings with Chairperson Konaré, we discussed the urgency of obtaining a cessation of hostilities and reinvigorating the peace process in Darfur. To this end, we considered how the work of our Special Envoys for Darfur, Jan Eliasson and Salim Ahmed Salim, could best be coordinated. I stressed to Chairperson Konaré that the United Nations intends to collaborate fully with the African Union in our efforts to put the peace process back on track, and that it was important to build upon the work that the African Union has already done in that regard. We agreed that Special Envoys Eliasson and Salim would work closely together. We also agreed that they would travel to Khartoum and Darfur from 11 to 17 February, in order to hold talks with Government officials and non-signatories of the Darfur Peace Agreement.

52. In Addis Ababa, I also had the opportunity to meet and hold frank discussions with President Bashir. While our views clearly differed on the gravity of the security situation in Darfur, the President reaffirmed his Government's agreement to the three-phased approach endorsed by the 16 November high-level meeting in Addis Ababa and the meeting of the African Union Peace and Security Council on 30 November in Abuja. I view this as positive and intend to strongly encourage President Bashir to uphold his commitment.

53. We also discussed at length the final phase of the three-phased approach, or the joint African Union-United Nations hybrid operation. I reiterated the United Nations position in this regard, making it clear that it was essential to have a joint command and control structure acceptable to United Nations Member States contributing troops and police to the operation. I pointed out that United Nations financing may not otherwise be forthcoming. I also reiterated my predecessor's commitment to strive to maintain the African character of the hybrid operation as much as possible. However, I stressed that we would have to consider offers from other troop- and police-contributing countries if there was not sufficient African capacity. I look forward to receiving from the Government of the Sudan a confirmation of their readiness to implement both the heavy package of United Nations support to AMIS and the hybrid African Union-United Nations operation. In the meantime, the United Nations is proceeding with the preparatory work to implement these plans.

54. In conclusion, I appeal, in the strongest possible terms, to the Government of the Sudan and the other parties to desist from further hostilities, which destabilize the entire region and render peace an increasingly distant prospect. All parties must submit to dialogue and negotiation, and commit themselves to a non-military solution to the devastating conflict in Darfur.

## Annex

### Financial implications of the second phase of United Nations support to the African Union Mission in the Sudan

1. Further to paragraph 40 of my report on Darfur above, I wish to inform the Security Council that, based on the preliminary estimates of requirements for the full deployment of military personnel, United Nations police, formed police units and civilian personnel, the financial implication for the second phase of support that the United Nations could offer to the African Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) amounts to some \$287.9 million on a full cost basis for a six-month period.

2. This preliminary projection of \$287.9 million for the second phase of United Nations support to AMIS for a six-month period provides for a full deployment of 2,250 military personnel, 301 United Nations police and 3 formed police units, with each unit comprising of 140 formed police personnel. The projection also provides for the full deployment of 383 international and 561 national personnel, as well as 192 United Nations volunteers. Main items under operational costs in this preliminary projection of the second phase include: 1,147 units of prefabricated facilities and \$60.1 million for various construction services provided under facilities and infrastructure; the acquisition of 511 units of light, medium and heavy vehicles provided under ground transportation; six-month rental of four aircraft (Let 410), six utility helicopters (MI-17) and six tactical helicopters (MI-25); the acquisition of various communications, information technology and medical equipment; and a \$6.9 million provision for mine detection and mine clearing services.

3. An indicative preliminary breakdown of the financial implications for the second phase of United Nations support to AMIS is provided, for information purposes only, in the table below.

Table

#### **Preliminary cost estimates for the second phase of United Nations support to the African Union Mission in the Sudan for a six-month period**

(Thousands of United States dollars)

<i>Category</i>	<i>Cost estimates</i>
<b>Military and police personnel</b>	
Military observers	—
Military contingents	50 870.8
United Nations police	6 117.1
Formed police units	9 786.0
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>66 773.9</b>

<i>Category</i>	<i>Cost estimates</i>
<b>Civilian personnel</b>	
International staff	29 982.8
National staff	4 143.8
United Nations Volunteers	5 402.2
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>39 528.8</b>
<b>Operational costs</b>	
General temporary assistance	—
Government-provided personnel	—
Civilian electoral observers	—
Consultants	—
Official travel	323.4
Facilities and infrastructure	97 464.2
Ground transportation	18 249.9
Air transportation	23 710.3
Naval transportation	—
Communications	16 151.6
Information technology	9 952.3
Medical	4 769.4
Special equipment	1 101.8
Other supplies, services and equipment	9 951.5
Quick-impact projects	—
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>181 674.4</b>
<b>Gross requirements</b>	<b>287 977.1</b>
Staff assessment income	3 683.9
<b>Net requirements</b>	<b>284 293.2</b>
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	
<b>Total requirements</b>	<b>287 977.1</b>