

**Security Council**

Distr.: General
16 July 2004

Original: English

Letter dated 16 July 2004 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit to you a report from the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, regarding the events which occurred in Ituri, in the north-eastern part of the country, from January 2002 to December 2003.

I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate my grave concern about the continuing human rights abuses in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in particular the impunity with regard to crimes committed against the citizens of that country. As the Security Council has noted in several of its resolutions and presidential statements pertaining to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, impunity must be brought to an end, and perpetrators of crimes such as those highlighted in the attached report brought to justice.

I should be grateful if you would make this letter and the report available to the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. **Annan**

Special report on the events in Ituri, January 2002-December 2003

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Abbreviations

AFDL	Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo
APC	Armée populaire congolaise
ASADHO	Association africaine de défense des droits de l'homme
FAC	Forces armées congolaises
FAPC	Forces armées du peuple congolais
FIPI	Front pour l'intégration et la paix en Ituri
FLC	Front de libération du Congo
FNI	Front nationaliste intégrationniste
FPDC	Forces populaires pour la démocratie au Congo
FRPI	Front de résistance patriotique de l'Ituri
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Network
MLC	Mouvement de libération du Congo
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MSF	Médecins sans frontières (Doctors without Borders)
PRA	People's Redemption Army
PUSIC	Parti pour l'unité et la sauvegarde de l'intégrité du Congo
RCD	Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie
RCD-K/ML	RCD-Kisangani/Mouvement de libération
RCD-N	RCD-National
UPC	Union des patriotes congolais
UPDF	Ugandan People's Defence Forces

I. Summary

1. The Ituri district, located in the Orientale Province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, currently has one of the world's worst — and for a long time largely ignored — human rights records. Based on the investigations carried out by MONUC and other human rights entities, it is estimated that 8,000 civilians, probably more, were deliberately killed or were the victims of indiscriminate use of force from January 2002 to December 2003. The exact number of female victims of rape or sexual slavery is impossible to estimate at this time. Countless women were abducted and became “war wives”, while others were raped or sexually abused before being released. More than 600,000 civilians have been forced to flee their homes. Thousands of children aged from 7 to 17 were drawn forcibly or voluntarily into armed groups, placing their very lives at risk and depriving them of a childhood. In addition, entire villages — belonging to all the different ethnic groups — were destroyed, including health and education facilities, housing and other infrastructure.

2. These abuses have been carried out with total impunity by all Ituri armed groups and several non-Ituri groups (MLC, RCD, RCD-ML, RCD-N). In addition, the pre-transition Government in Kinshasa and the Governments of Rwanda and Uganda all contributed to the massive abuses by arming, training and advising local armed groups at different times.

3. The European Union-led Interim Emergency Multinational Force (Operation Artemis), and then the MONUC Ituri Brigade with a mandate from the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, have been instrumental in reducing the intensity of the conflict and the capacity of the local groups to operate. However, ending the violence and abuses, bridging the gaps between communities to install and extend a lasting peace, and establishing structures to strengthen human rights protection and reduce the total impunity enjoyed by the perpetrators remain major challenges, which the international community must assist the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to address. Though there have been timid attempts to restore some kind of State presence in Ituri through the deployment of a small group of judges and police, neither currently has the capacity to maintain law and order in the district. It is therefore of vital importance that MONUC continues to have a Chapter VII mandate to ensure security.

4. There have long been tensions and conflict between the Hema and Lendu communities in the district, fuelled by bad governance. The latest conflict — which has provoked so many of the abuses — was sparked off by a particular land dispute in 1998 when some Hema *concessionaires*¹ took advantage of the weakened State apparatus to illegally enlarge their estates to the detriment of neighbouring mostly Lendu agriculturalists.² The agriculturalists revolted when law enforcement agents came to evict them and in response they tried to destroy the land of the Hema *concessionaires*. Initially starting to the north of Bunia, this violence gradually

¹ The *concessionaire* is the person who rents a concession from the State. The concession is defined by law as a contract by which the State recognizes the right of an individual or organization, under conditions defined by law, to use a piece of land or a building belonging to the State. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, all land belongs to the State.

² The first conflict erupted in the *collectivité* of Walendu Pitsi, located in Djugu territory.

extended to the whole of Ituri district. Moreover, while spreading through the district, the conflict quickly turned into a confrontation opposing the two communities, the Hema and the Lendu. This conflict would not have reached such a level of violence without the involvement of national Congolese players, as well as of foreign Governments. The Ugandan army, already present in Ituri since late 1998, fuelled the conflict by initially supporting some Hema notables and allegedly bombed hundreds of Lendu villages. Some Lendu traditional authorities created self-defence units. Believing that a Hema conspiracy existed against them, the Lendu militias began attacking Hema villages solely on account of their ethnicity. They also benefited from external support to organize themselves, from either the Congolese (pre-transition Government, rebel movements) or individual Ugandan officers.

5. The conflict entered a new phase of violence at the end of 2001 with the intensification of ethnically targeted attacks on villages, including killings, torture, rape of civilians, looting of homes, and destruction of social infrastructure. When the Hema militia UPC took over Bunia, first in August 2002 and again in May 2003, they adopted an ethnic cleansing policy, to empty the town of its Lendu and Bira populations, as well as the “non-Iturian” Nande community, which was a commercial rival to the Hema businessmen. Hundreds of Lendu villages were completely destroyed during attacks by Ugandan army helicopters together with Hema militia on the ground.

6. Different rebel faction leaders struggling for political power in Ituri have continued to profit from the ethnic resentment originally created by the land dispute. A series of splits, from 1999 to mid-2003, have in fact resulted in Bunia, the capital of Ituri, being the stage for repeated power struggles and skirmishes. At each stage in the fragmentation of the rebel groups, new militias were recruited loyal to one or another commander or faction leader. Often half of the militias were children. They were deployed not only to fight each other but also to whip up insecurity in the countryside and seize strategic localities and commercial opportunities. Ugandan army commanders already present in Ituri, instead of trying to calm the situation, preferred to benefit from the situation and support alternately one side or the other³ according to their political and financial interests.

7. The chiefs of armed groups took over the roles traditionally held by administrators, businessmen, traditional chiefs and law enforcement officers. They appointed “public officers”, collected local taxes, sold the natural resources of their area of control, arrested civilians, judged them and in some cases executed them. The competition for the control of natural resources by combatant forces, exacerbated by an almost constant political vacuum in the region, has been a major factor in prolonging the crisis in Ituri. Those resources have also been of continued interest to foreign business networks in the region. One source of revenue for rebel groups has been the sale of concessions to foreign businesses.

8. By the end of March 2004, at the time of finalization of this report, MONUC had been able to lessen the inter-ethnic conflict of Ituri, acting to enforce peace and to restore the rule of law. Since taking over from Operation Artemis on 1 September 2003, the MONUC Ituri Brigade has implemented its Chapter VII mandate by consolidating its positions in Bunia, carrying out search operations which resulted in

³ Ugandan authorities alternately supported and provided weapons to RCD-ML, MLC, RCD-N, UPC, PUSIC, FNI and FAPC.

the declaration of Bunia as a weapon-free zone, and establishing seven outposts, north, north-east, south and south-east of Bunia (Iga Barrière, Bogoro, Mongbwalu, Marabo, Tchomia, Mahagi and Kpandroma). MONUC continues to implement security measures such as patrolling and launching military operations in different parts of Ituri.

9. To reinforce the rule of law and ensure public order, MONUC has detained suspects including the Chief of Staff of FNI, Mathieu Ngudjolo, and several senior military personnel of UPC, including Aimable Saba Rafiki and Etienne Nembe. Those actions were taken given the lack of local judicial and security structures, including a functioning judiciary and prison facility. On 14 January, MONUC transported to Bunia 12 out of 20 judicial personnel appointed by the Transitional Government. The judges took their oath of office on 28 January 2004, thereby allowing them to work legally in Bunia. A minimum judicial capacity has thus been restored in Bunia.

10. However, since mid-January 2004, FNI and UPC, as well as FAPC, a militia located along the Ugandan border in Aru, have become increasingly aggressive towards MONUC and the civilian population. In mid-January 2004, as many as 200 civilians were killed in Gobu, located on the edge of Lake Albert. By the end of March 2004, MONUC was still investigating the incident with the aim of ascertaining the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. This was the most serious mass killing since the events of Kachele in October 2003. After the incidents in Gobu, militias conducted several attacks on MONUC aircraft and patrols, the most serious being the killing on 12 February of a MONUC military observer in an ambush by unidentified militia elements on a convoy of vehicles returning from a multidisciplinary investigation 20 km north-east of Bunia.

11. This report has been drafted by the MONUC Human Rights and Child Protection Sections. It examines more closely the background to the conflict and gives details of many cases of massacres and other abuses often committed during attacks on villages. It includes information about political killings, harassment of political opponents, and the recruitment and use of children in armed groups from January 2002 to December 2003. The report also highlights the total impunity with which the armed groups have committed these atrocities. It is not intended as a political analysis of the situation, and is by no means a complete record of abuses in the area, given the scale of violations and also the constraints on carrying out such investigations, including continuing security concerns.

II. Introduction: the Ituri district

12. The region of Ituri is a district of the Orientale Province, bordering Uganda, with a population of 3.5 million to 5.5 million — no census has been carried out for years. The population is made up of 18 ethnic groups, including the Lendu and its southern sub-clan, the Ngiti; the Hema and its northern sub-clan, the Hema/Gegere; the Bira, the Alur, the Ndo Okebo, the Lugbara, the Mambissa and the Nyali. Population figures vary greatly, but the Alur consider themselves the largest ethnic group, which would represent up to 25 per cent of the Ituri population, followed by the Lendu. No reliable population census by ethnic grouping is available at this

time. The city of Bunia, which had approximately 100,000 inhabitants before the conflict,⁴ is said to have doubled, owing to displacement created by the conflict.

13. Ituri district, with its capital at Bunia, is composed of five territories: Aru, Mahagi, Mambasa, Djugu and Irumu. Each territory is divided into several *collectivités*.⁵ The Hema/Gegere and Lendu groups are concentrated in Djugu territory, while the Hema and Ngiti groups are found in Irumu territory. The territory of Djugu, where the conflict erupted, is composed of 10 *collectivités*⁶ — three Lendu, three Hema and four of other ethnic groups — plus the city of Mongbwali, which has a special administrative status. Djugu territory is the richest and most densely populated territory, with around 700,000 persons. The territory of Irumu, embroiled in the conflict by the end of 2001, is composed of 12 *collectivités* — one Ngiti (Walendu Bindi), and four Hema (Bahema Sud, Bahema Boga, Bahema Mitego and Bahema d'Irumu); the remainder are of other ethnic groups.⁷ The Administrator of a territory is appointed by the Government, but works very closely with the traditional chieftains of each *collectivité*. The Administrator reports to the Governor of the province, based in Kisangani, who is the only one with the power to remove the Chief of the *collectivité*.

14. The population of Ituri is for the most part agriculturalist, with a significant minority engaged in livestock raising, fishing and commerce. Generally speaking, the Hema are perceived to be associated with livestock raising, while the Lendu are perceived to be associated with agriculture. The Hema population of Bahema Boga, in Irumu territory, is agriculturalist, however. During the Belgian colonial era, some Hema were favoured, notably through access to either the religious hierarchy or the education system, and given much wider access to managerial functions, while the Lendu were overwhelmingly treated as manual labour. In fact, the colonial administration accentuated social inequalities between the ethnic groups in the region through its ethnic “favouritism” in almost all fields, including the administration and the Catholic clergy. As a result, some Hema remained as the elite in Ituri upon the collapse of the colonial State.

15. The power struggles and ethnic prejudices became entangled with the land issue. Most of the land of the Lendu *collectivités* of Walendu Pitsi and Walendu Djatsi are divided into concessions belonging to a select few Hema community members who employed Lendu manual labour. However, in the poorer and rural areas, both Hema and Lendu communities generally coexisted peacefully, and intermarriage was common.⁸ The concessions belonging to the colonialists but

⁴ This figure is given by the former Mayor of Bunia town, Gilbert Sugabo Ngulabo, who was in office until May 2003.

⁵ The *collectivités* are administrative sub-districts with a traditional chieftain, who exercises authority over the population in his area on the basis of tribal/ethnic allegiances. Chieftains are hereditary among the Hema, Bira and Alur groups but elected among Lendu and Ndo Okebo groups. The *collectivités* are divided into *groupements*, and *groupements* into *localités*.

⁶ Walendu Pitsi, Walendu Djatsi, Walendu Tatsi, Banyari Kilo, Mambisa, Mabendi, Ndo Okebo, Bahema Banywagi, Bahema Nord and Bahema Badjere.

⁷ Other *collectivités* are Andisoma (Bira population), Baboa-Bokoe, Babelebe, Banyari-Tchabi, Basili, Mobala and Wales Vonkutu.

⁸ A statement of a Hema woman quoted by IRIN and reported by Jacques Depelchin, a rebel official involved in reconciliation efforts in 1999, summarizes the situation: “War is not between Hema and Lendu, but between the rich Hema and the rest of us”.

located in Lendu *collectivités*, mostly in the territory of Djugu,⁹ were utilized according to an agreement between the two parties, where the foreign *concessionnaires* would have access to the land in return for special fee paid to the traditional Chief of the *collectivité*.¹⁰ In 1973, when the foreign *concessionnaires* were forced to leave, they entrusted their Hema managers with the task of taking care of their land, hoping to come back once the “Zairianization” was over.¹¹ After a while, since the foreign *concessionnaires* were not authorized to come back, the managers registered the concessions in their own names. This phenomenon was accelerated after President Mobutu’s appointment as Minister of Agriculture in 1969 of Zbo Kalogi, a Hema, who had considerable influence on the distribution of Iturian concessions to Hema. This succession of events led to a common Lendu perception that the Hema population was the rich, educated class that not only had unjustly accumulated land and control of commerce, but also constituted the administrative class, with greater access to wealth, education and political power.

16. Ituri’s natural wealth has driven the conflict in the district. Apart from the region’s farmland and forests, most notably coffee plantations, and valuable cross-border trade, Ituri is the home of the Kilo Moto gold field, one of the world’s largest. Of added interest are potential large oil reserves in the Lake Albert basin. The competition for control of resource-rich centres such as Mongbwalu, Gety and Mabanga (gold fields) and Aru, Mahagi, Tchomia and Kasenyi (wood, fishing, customs revenues) by the combatant forces and their allies — Uganda, Rwanda and the Kinshasa authorities — has been a major factor in the prolongation of the crisis since they provide those who control production and export with very considerable profits.

III. Background to the conflict

17. During the year 1997, several Hema/Gegere *concessionnaires* extended the limits of their territory by bribing the land authorities and getting the registration certificates without obtaining the *attestation de vacance* delivered after a vacancy investigation carried out by the local land authorities as requested by law. This illegal act was given a legal patina by being secretly lodged with the court. In 1999, after the two-year statute of limitations on the appeal against the *attestation* had run out, the petitioner went to the Tribunal de Grande Instance in Bunia and obtained an enforcement order to evict the population living on that illegally acquired territory, if necessary using military force. Had these evictions been executed, they would have resulted in a total of 200,000 Lendu inhabitants having to leave their land and homes. Evictions were never fully carried out by law enforcement forces because the Lendu revolted and destroyed and occupied many estates as a result.

18. These local problems would not have turned into massive slaughter without the involvement of national and foreign players. In 1998, the Ituri district was taken over by the RCD rebel movement, supported by the Ugandan and Rwandan armies.

⁹ Djugu is by far the richest agricultural area of Ituri.

¹⁰ Obligations included the paying of special taxes to the local authorities, paying for local labour and taking care of social infrastructures.

¹¹ The Zairianization was a policy based on the appropriation of all goods belonging to foreign nationals and their transfer to Congolese nationals as administrators of the goods in the name of the State.

When RCD split into RCD-Goma, backed by Rwanda, and RCD-ML, backed by Uganda, Ituri came under the control of RCD-ML. Since then, Ituri has been at the crossroads of all the eastern players, both Congolese and foreigners: RCD-ML, MLC and its proxy RCD-N, as well as the Ugandan army. In 2002, RCD-Goma made an alliance with UPC, following contacts between this militia and Kigali. Simultaneously, the pre-transition Government supported some rival militias through Beni. Moreover, at the end of 2002, MLC and RCD-N coordinated part of their offensive against RCD-ML with UPC. The lasting involvement of national and foreign players has enabled the various Ituri militias to obtain supplies and to increase the number of combatants. This interaction has led to a regularly increasing level of violence against the civilian populations of Ituri since 1999.

19. In 1999, when the land dispute erupted, Ituri was under the control of the rebel RCD-ML movement and its ally UPDF. In May 1999 six land disputes emerged, one after the other, in the *collectivité* of Walendu Pitsi.¹² Witnesses interviewed by MONUC stated that, under the leadership of the Savo family, the *cessionnaires* began to organize militias around Fataki. They imposed a fund-raising system on the Hema/Gegere businessmen. Two prominent Hema/Gegere businessmen who were opposing the fund-raising were murdered. As the collegial leadership of this militia was expecting violence, all of the Hema *cessionnaires*, by the end of May 1999, contracted squads of UPDF soldiers to protect their land. On 29 May 1999, important Hema families reportedly paid Captain Kyakabale, the UPDF sector commander,¹³ the alleged amount of \$12,000 for a punitive action to be undertaken against the populations occupying their concessions and surrounding areas in the *collectivité* Walendu Pitsi, and to arrest the Administrator of Djugu territory, Christian Dhedonga Nganga-Lolo, because of his refusal to sign the *attestation de vacance* a posteriori.¹⁴ Christian Dhedonga Nganga-Lolo was arrested by UPDF the same day together with Longbe Chabi, the traditional Chief of Walendu Pitsi, the President of the *Conseil de collectivité* and five other local notables, and they were kept in a container in Bunia airport. Apart from the Administrator, who was accompanied by Congolese police, they were all reportedly tortured because of their refusal to sign the *attestation de vacance*. They were subsequently released. Later, the Lendu Chief of the *groupement* of Pitsi, Chief Djiba, was allegedly executed on the orders of one of the Hema *cessionnaires*. UPDF carried out its first attacks on the village of Loda, located between Fataki and Libi, in the night of 29 to 30 May 1999, burning it down and burning alive several elderly persons and women locked in their houses. Later, the villages of Lubea, Buba, Giba, Linga, Ladejo, Petro and Arr were reportedly all destroyed by UPDF forces under the command of Captain Kyakabale, who was reportedly paid by Lobo Tasoro, and several Hema *cessionnaires*. UPDF, together with Hema militias, continued their punitive

¹² On 12 April 1999, land dispute between Kadjo Singa and the population of Gonsenge in the concession of Leyina; on 14 May 1999, land dispute in the Leyina concession, where witnesses interviewed by MONUC alleged that the Singa family paid UPDF to attack the Lendu on its land, as a result of which 20 civilians were killed; May 1999, land dispute between the *cessionnaire* Abisayi (Hema) and the population of the locality of Londju (Lendu); May 1999, land dispute among the *cessionnaire* Yasona (Hema) and the Lendu population of Laudjo; 1 May 1999, land dispute between the Savo family (Hema) and the Lendu population of Sanduku in the concession of Bidha; 28 May 1999, land dispute between the *cessionnaire* Uguro and the population of Lomba, in the locality of Tsupu Libi, *chef lieu* of Walendu Pitsi.

¹³ Captain Kyakabale subsequently left UPDF and took refuge in Rwanda.

¹⁴ In spite of the fact that he was a Hema like the estate owners.

actions, burning down villages of first the *collectivité* of Walendu of Pitsi, then of Walendu Djatsi, from 1999 to the end of 2001.

20. The new administrative authorities paid little attention to the deteriorating situation and the Governor of the time, Adele Lotsove, a Hema/Gegere installed by General Kazini of UPDF in June 1999, took action to put down the Lendu revolt using UPDF soldiers. Some Lendu tried to request justice by legal means, as the tribunals in Bunia found in favour of the *concessionnaires* who had bribed them generously. Subsequent efforts to contain the increasing inter-community violence were frustrated by individuals from both communities interested in the continuation of the conflict. Moreover, several *concessionnaires* were able to profit from the conflict to increase their land, since the Lendu living close to their estates were evicted and their villages destroyed.

21. The *collectivité* of Walendu Tatsi where the Hema and Lendu communities were living in peace became involved in the conflict only late in 2001.¹⁵ In 2002, important Hema South families were reportedly involved in financing the involvement of UPDF in attacking the *collectivité* of Walendu Bindi, the only Ngibi *collectivité* located in Irumu territory. Hundreds of localities were destroyed by UPDF and the Hema South militias. Meanwhile, the Lendu were organizing themselves into armed groups to take revenge. The Ugandan military trained thousands of Hema youth in Ituri and in Uganda. After 2002, others were reportedly trained in Rwanda. However, the Hema militiamen were not the only ones to carry weapons; in some Hema localities such as Mandro and Bogoro each family was reportedly given weapons to defend itself. This was one of the reasons given by Lendu combatants to justify the massacre of civilians suspected of carrying weapons.

22. The Institut supérieur pédagogique and the Catholic Church of Bunia had been the locus of the power struggle between the Hema intellectual elite and other ethnic groups for some time. For example, while the Institute was under the direction of Tharcisse Pilo Kamaragi, from 1993 to 1997 until the arrival of AFDL, most of the non-Iturians, who constituted the majority of the teaching staff, were forced to leave and all new posts were allocated to Hema/Gegere professors to the detriment of other groups. According to testimony offered by several intellectuals living in the Mudzipela area of Bunia, some well known Hema/Gegere professors at the Institute were reportedly holding regular secret meetings, sometimes together with Hema/Gegere militia members, in order to decide strategies to create ethnic hatred. The same sources indicated that the killing of some 200 Lendu inhabitants of Mudzipela on 19 January 2001 was organized and even directed by the same group with the

¹⁵ According to sources in the administration of Walendu Tatsi, a total of 257 localities were burned down from 2000 to the end of 2002 alone. It appears that virtually all localities of Walendu Pitsi were already burned down in 1999.

complicity of UPDF under the command of Edison Muzora.¹⁶ The Catholic Church is often named by the inhabitants of Bunia as “pro-Hema”. This perception dates to the period of Leonard Dhejju, the Hema Bishop of Bunia,¹⁷ who not only favoured his own ethnic group within the Church but who had also reportedly been in close contact with Hema militia commanders.¹⁸ His activities allegedly included transferring money collected from members of the Hema community to their own bank accounts in a private bank in Kigali and negotiating with the Rwandan authorities to buy weapons and obtain military training for Hema militia members in Rwanda. Bishop Dhejju was reportedly present at the first meeting between Chief Kawa and the Rwandan military authorities in June 2002. Bishop Dhejju was asked to resign by the Vatican in 2002, and he is now living in Kigali. Following the decision to remove Bishop Dhejju, Monseigneur Mosengwa Basinya arrived in Bunia on 7 April 2002 with a newly named Apostolic Administrator of Nande ethnicity, Janvier Kataka. While the Church was preparing to officially announce the leadership change, the largely Hema audience became aggressive and the installation of the Apostolic Administrator was forcibly delayed. On 11 April, Archbishop Mosengwa, together with a group of priests, were taken hostage by a group of Hema youth including some brought from Katoto village by the businessman Liripa Savo. The day after, the Archbishop left together with the new appointee.

23. Having fled to the bush after the destruction of their villages between 1999 and 2001, the Lendu people of Djugu, and later those of Irumu, chose to take justice into their own hands. Their reprisals resulted in the massacre of thousands of innocent Hema civilians. They replaced their arrows and machetes from the first period of the conflict with modern weapons that they were able to buy mostly from Uganda, using the illegal mining revenues of the Mongbwalu gold field. They also received weapons from the Kinshasa government via some members of RCD-ML hailing from Ituri, and some Ugandan authorities. One well known Ugandan supporter and reputed weapon-provider of Lendu combatants was Colonel Peter Karim, an Alur official of UPDF. Otherwise, most of the UPDF officers continued to support UPC.

¹⁶ On 19 January 2001, the day after an attack launched by Lendu militia on UPDF forces based in Bunia airport reportedly to destroy the helicopter bombing their villages, an organized massacre of Lendu inhabitants was carried out in Mudzipela. Each Lendu family was visited, house by house, by Hema of Bunia and approximately 250 persons were killed, mostly by sticks with nails distributed before the attack, and their houses set on fire. Several witnesses from Mudzipela gave the names of Hema professors of the Institut supérieur pédagogique of Bunia as the organizers, and the chief of the operations was reportedly also a professor. Among the victims were also several Lendu professors and students of the Institute. Since this incident, all Lendu have left Mudzipela: there are neither Lendu students nor teachers at the Institute. Just before the massacre, Colonel Muzora reportedly said in a public speech: “From now on, we can start killing Lendu”.

¹⁷ Monseigneur Dhejju, a Hema/Gegere, was the Bishop of Bunia from 1976 to 2002. He was accused of having favoured his own ethnic group, giving the Church land of Mudzipela to members of the Hema/Gegere tribe from the villages and nominating only Hema or Hema/Gegere priests. It is as a result of his action that Mudzipela, originally inhabited by Bira, began to be a Hema neighbourhood. Also, several students of theology who had successfully finished their studies were never appointed, apparently because they were not Hema. When he was forced to resign by the Catholic hierarchy, there were only 6 Lendu and 2 Bira priests out of 49 priests appointed by him. Among the priests that he appointed there were also sons of the Hema militia chiefs.

¹⁸ The Bishop of Goma has reportedly very close links with the Rwandan authorities. He was the

24. In August 2002, UPDF forced the RCD-ML military forces out of Bunia. As UPC was temporarily in a position to benefit from supply from both Uganda and Rwanda, it was able to attack and to take control of the Mahagi territory. UPC then benefited from its alliance with the Aru-based militia of Commander Jérôme Kakwavu, a former RCD-ML officer. The Mahagi territory then suffered from massive human rights abuses, included destruction of villages, forced recruitment of child soldiers by UPC and Jérôme's militia, as well as sexual violence that UPC notably resorted to in order to terrorize the local elite and population. As a consequence of this spillover into Mahagi territory, some Alur notables tried to create a militia, FPDC. The plan failed, however, because of the reluctance of the business community to fund it and, above all, the active opposition of the Mahagi bishop, himself an Alur. Unlike the Catholic clergy in Bunia, throughout the conflict the diocese of Mahagi was instrumental in conflict management initiatives as well as preventing armed mobilization within the Mahagi territory.

25. The Lendu attacks became more cruel and destructive after March 2003, when the support of UPDF for the Hema was terminated. Moreover, after UPDF expelled UPC from Bunia, the Lendu militias took over stocks of ammunitions and weapons from UPC. The Lendu youth created self-defence militia groups to protect their villages, which often lacked any organized hierarchical structure. Even after the creation of FNI, several Lendu or Ngiti militia groups kept their independence and often refused to obey the orders of their supposed FNI hierarchy to cease the hostilities. The combatants forced everybody to be part of the militia, including women and children. Some community leaders tried to resist while others became part of the armed groups. Some Lendu elderly advised reviving the old methods of taking special drugs, wearing amulets and eating some parts of the human body to give supernatural forces to the combatants. These methods rendered the militia members more cruel and inhuman.

26. The other ethnic communities such as the Bira, Alur, Nyali, Lugbara, Kakwa, Ndo Okebo and Lese, who were not directly involved in the conflict, were forced to take sides and/or were attacked by both parties, who accused them of sheltering the enemy. This polarization reduced the possibility of continuing to implement local conflict management initiatives. The various militias were not only terrorizing and abusing the populations, they were also intentionally preventing local initiatives from defusing tensions or containing violence. The Bira community, whose territory includes Bunia, lost the chief of their Andisoma *collectivité*, Chief Dieudonné Bulamuzi. Several hundred civilians, including the intellectual elites, were killed, and health structures, including the largest one at Nyankunde, were destroyed. The Nyali community, whose territory includes the Kilo Moto gold field, were attacked by both sides. They lost most of their social infrastructures and many were forced to leave their villages to go into hiding in the bush.

27. **Role of Uganda.** Uganda claimed on several occasions to be in Ituri to defend "its legitimate security concerns" and to be acting for reconciliation and the protection of civilians. However, although in some cases UPDF did intervene to halt fighting between opposing forces, its commanders were responsible for the creation of almost all of the armed groups, training their militias — sometimes even in Uganda — selling weapons and even lending their soldiers to rich Hema to massacre Lendu civilians and destroy villages in Walendu Tatsi in 1999. UPDF also carried

one who introduced Bishop Dhejju to them.

out widespread bombing and destruction of hundreds of villages from 2000 to 2002 in the Lendu/Ngiti *collectivités* of Walendu Pitsi and Walendu Bindi. The same UPDF commanders also became businessmen who traded in the resources of Ituri. In four years, seven Ugandan sector commanders were sent to Ituri: Captain Kyakabale, Lieutenant Colonel Arocha, Colonel Charles Angina, Lieutenant Colonel Edison Muzora, Colonel Fred Seka Mwenge, Major Muhozi and Kale Kayura. Only Charles Angina and Kale Kayura left without serious allegations being levied against them. Uganda supported first RCD,¹⁹ then MLC and RCD-ML. It was also directly involved in the creation of UPC and in the training and arming of its militia.

28. Uganda reconsidered its support to UPC because of close ties between UPC and Rwanda, around December 2002. To counter that alliance, Uganda supported several other Ituri armed groups. UPDF was involved in the creation of FIPI, a platform including PUSIC, FPDC and FNI/FRPI. However, that Front did not last long and de facto came to an end in February 2003 after the attack on Bogoro by FNI. In March 2003, FAPC was created with direct Ugandan support. In March 2003 UPDF commanders also supported FNI/FRPI, which assisted them in removing UPC from Bunia. Following its commitment to the Luanda Agreement, UPDF withdrew from Ituri in May 2003. Since then, it has continued to give open support to PUSIC and FAPC, both spun off from UPC in order to weaken it.

29. **Role of Rwanda.** On 6 January 2003, RCD-Goma, a Congolese rebel movement supported by Rwanda, announced an alliance with UPC. Rwanda had become involved in the Ituri crisis much earlier, however. The Chief of Staff of the Rwandan army, James Kabarebe Kagunda, was reportedly the biggest advocate of Rwandan support to Hema militia and was in contact with Chief Kawa, who negotiated the arms supplies in June 2002. Rwanda reportedly supplied arms by airdrop to the UPC camps located in Mandro, Tchomia, Bule, Bulukwa and Dhego and sent military experts to train Hema militias, including child soldiers. Moreover, some UPC elements (estimated at 150) went for training in Rwanda from September to December 2002. On 31 December 2002, Thomas Lubanga visited Kigali for the first time. Kigali also facilitated the transport to Ituri of PRA elements, earlier trained in Rwanda, and used some Kinyarwanda-speaking Congolese to organize this support. One ex-UPDF sector Commander of Ituri, Colonel Muzora, who had left the Ugandan army to join the Rwandan forces, was seen by several witnesses in the UPC camps, mainly to orient the newcomers from Rwanda. Practically all witnesses interviewed by MONUC believe that Rwandan nationals occupied posts in UPC military commands. MONUC obtained testimonies about adults and children being trained in Rwanda and being sent through Goma, in 2002 and 2003, to fight in Ituri with UPC.²⁰ It also appears that, when Thomas Lubanga and other high-ranking UPC officers fled from Ituri in March 2003, they were evacuated by air to Rwanda. Arms and ammunition were then supplied from Rwanda to UPC by air before UPC retook Bunia in May 2003. On 11 and 12 May 2003, two aircraft landed

¹⁹ Both Uganda and Rwanda initially supported RCD (1998-1999) before it began to splinter into different factions, a phenomenon reflecting the end of the Uganda-Rwanda alliance in the conflict.

²⁰ In September 2002, 107 children and adults were allegedly airlifted from Tchomia to Kigali airport and driven to the Gabiro training centre. They were reportedly trained in artillery skills and returned to Ituri in November of the same year. On their way back, they landed in an Antonov (often based in Goma) at Bunia airport. Each of the trained combatants was given a sub-machine gun. An officer known as "Safari" led this operation.

at Dhego — not far from Mongbwalu — from Rwanda, with grenades, rocket-propelled grenades, mortars and ammunition. The first of the aircraft was also carrying back Lubanga and Bosco from Kigali.

30. **Role of the Kinshasa Government.** Until 2002, the pre-transition Government in Kinshasa was hardly involved in Ituri. Its first delegation arrived in Bunia in August 2002, after a visit to Kampala. During a second visit, on 29 August 2002, the Minister for Human Rights, Ntumba Lwaba, was abducted by Hema militia and freed only after three days in exchange for the release of Lubanga and several UPC members who had been arrested in Kampala and transferred to Kinshasa. Early in 2002, the involvement of the Kinshasa Government centred on military assistance that it provided to RCD-ML in Beni. Kinshasa sent trainers, weapons and also some military elements, allegedly amounting to four battalions, in support of APC, which reportedly was sending weapon supplies from Beni to Lendu militia. FAC and APC were also named by eyewitnesses and victims as parties in some attacks on Hema villages. It is alleged that, in the last three months of 2002, some military supplies may also have been sent directly to the Lendu militia, notably to Rethy, in Djugu territory.

31. The political initiative of the Transitional Government to calm the tension in Ituri has focused on the deployment of some judicial and police personnel and sending official delegations. There have also been a number of press statements. Apart from the delivery of a humanitarian aid shipment early in 2004, humanitarian aid from the Government to the Ituri victims has been negligible. More concrete actions and active engagement would be needed to find a solution to the ongoing crisis. It was planned that the first brigade of the new national army would be deployed in Ituri before June 2004. However, there are no guarantees that these troops will receive regular payments and supplies.

IV. Methodology of the investigation

32. For the special report on Ituri, MONUC carried out a total of nine investigations. More than 1,600 persons were interviewed, including victims, eyewitnesses, community leaders, intellectuals, health workers and children associated with armed groups. Additional written testimonies were received from eyewitnesses and victims through local non-governmental organizations. Witnesses and other sources were heard in private interviews, so as to keep their accounts confidential and not expose them to risks of retaliation. Whenever possible, alleged perpetrators and chiefs of armed groups were confronted with allegations raised against them. Several field visits were made, to Bunia, Nyankunde, Mambasa, Bogoro, Mandro, Lipri, Bambu, Kobu, Drodoro, Kasenyi, Tchomia, Mahagi, Aru, Ariwara, Zumbe, Boga, Koga, Katoto, Fataki, Kachele, Kilo and Marabo, all located in Ituri. MONUC travelled twice to the Beni area and three times to border areas in western Uganda. In Beni, they received testimonies of displaced persons from Ituri located in Oicha, Erengeti, Butembo and Beni; the first visit took place after the Mambasa events of late 2002, the second after the Bunia events of May 2003. In Uganda, MONUC travelled to the areas of Rwebisengo, Ntoroko and Paidha and interviewed hundreds of Iturian refugees. Several military and political leaders were also met in Kinshasa.

33. Until the arrival of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force in June 2003, MONUC personnel had very limited access to Ituri. Therefore the information on the human rights situation was gathered through short-term investigation missions to a limited number of localities. After the opening of a MONUC office at Bunia in June 2003, the human rights and child protection presence facilitated the investigations but security restrictions did not allow them to cover each incident of gross human rights violations that occurred in Ituri. Even after the deployment of the Ituri Brigade in different parts of Ituri allowed greater access, some areas are still inaccessible. However, MONUC investigated most of the ethnically targeted attacks on villages, acts of mass killing and mass destruction of property and social services that occurred in different parts of Ituri, as well as extrajudicial executions, abductions of or threats against selected persons such as administrators, non-governmental organization workers, journalists, teachers and businessmen that occurred in Bunia, Aru and their surroundings. The Child Protection Section of MONUC has been focusing on the recruitment and use of children associated to armed groups.

34. To cover the reporting period as thoroughly as possible, MONUC has also made use of reports written by national and international non-governmental organizations and United Nations agencies on the issue of gross human rights violations and their analysis. When an incident has not been investigated directly by MONUC, the source of the information will accordingly be noted.

V. Most serious human rights abuses committed in Ituri district from January 2002 to 31 December 2003

35. All of the armed groups have committed war crimes, crimes against humanity and violations of human rights law on a massive scale in Ituri. Unarmed civilians have been deliberately killed, contrary to article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, often solely on the basis of their ethnicity. Attacks on villages have been accompanied by the killing of several thousands of civilians, widespread looting and destruction of housing and social structures, abduction of civilians, including women for sexual slavery, rape and torture (see section A below).

36. Lendu combatants engaged in inhumane acts such as mutilation and cannibalism, often under the effect of drugs prepared by their traditional healers. They abducted children and women for forced labour and sexual slavery. According to two eyewitnesses who were released, Lendu combatants told them that they were not killing Hema children but giving drugs to “transform them into Lendu”. Hundreds of Hema women were sexually abused and forced into working for the combatants. Many children and women of Hema origin were never released (see section A).

37. UPC forces shelled hundreds of Lendu villages without making any distinction between armed combatants and civilians. Some villages in Djugu territory were the object of repeated attacks when the inhabitants returned and rebuilt during calmer periods. Each time that they took control of Bunia — August 2002 and May 2003 — UPC forces conducted a manhunt for Lendu, Bira, Nande and non-Iturians whom they considered opponents: many persons were killed and many others disappeared or chose to leave Bunia. UPC soldiers also committed large-scale rape in the

different areas of the town, sometimes abusing girls as young as 12 (see sections A and C).

38. Both Hema and Lendu militias repeatedly attacked localities belonging to other ethnic groups, often bordering their own *collectivités*, for different reasons: in the Nyali territory of Banyari Kilo to have access to the gold mines; in Mahagi and Aru for the customs taxes; and, in other localities, just to punish them for having agreed to host the party considered to be the enemy (see section B).

39. All of the armed groups have recruited and trained children to turn them into combatants. According to some estimates, 40 per cent of each militia force could be composed of children under 18 years of age. Given the uncertain figures for the total strength of the armed groups, it is impossible to give accurate figures for children. Current estimates suggest 6,000 children in armed groups, with several thousand others possibly involved in local defence groups. Children have been used as combatants but also as labour in the illegal exploitation of natural resources. Girls have been forced into domestic labour and sexual slavery. Throughout the Ituri conflict, there have been a number of allegations that Uganda and Rwanda have been involved in aiding and abetting Ituri armed groups to recruit and train children (see section D).

40. Some 8,000 civilians lost their lives as a result of deliberate killing or indiscriminate use of force from January 2002 to December 2003. More than 600,000 have been forced to flee from their homes. The area bordering Uganda and North Kivu hosted thousands of extremely vulnerable refugees and internally displaced persons.

A. Ethnically targeted attacks

41. During attacks on localities occupied by the ethnic groups of the opposite side and often hosting a UPC battalion or a local Lendu militia group deployed for the “protection” of civilians, fighting between the armed groups would most often be intense and of short duration. Attackers often ended up killing civilians, destroying homes and social infrastructures, abducting women for sexual abuse and looting the entire village. Lendu militias and UPC justified their actions, stating that all civilians were part of the armed groups since most of them were given weapons for self-protection. The attacks described below illustrate some of the most serious incidents, but the list is not exhaustive. Several other attacks were orchestrated by both sides, with hundreds of civilian victims, for example in Mahagi, Komanda, Dungu, Ambé, Gety, Mitega and Fataki.

***Collectivité* of Walendu Bindi: mass killing and destruction of hundreds of localities**

42. From 9 February to 24 April 2002, UPDF based in Gety, together with Hema and Bira militia groups, carried out large-scale operations against the Lendu villages of the Boloma, Bukiringi, Zadhu, Baviba and Bamuko *groupements*, all located in the *collectivité* of Walendu Bindi, in the territory of Irumu. Mass killings continued for another two weeks after the visit on 4 April of the then Governor of Ituri, Jean-Pierre Lompondo Molondo, with Colonel Peter Karim, from UPDF, who was sent by Kampala to investigate abuses committed by UPDF soldiers. Both called upon UPDF to end the hostilities. A local non-governmental organization reported a total

of 2,867 civilians killed,²¹ and 77 localities completely destroyed, together with all social infrastructures, resulting in the displacement of 40,000 civilians. The *collectivité* of Walendu Bindi, located in the southern part of Ituri, had not been involved in the conflict until late 2001.²²

43. Early in 2002, UPDF was deployed in Gety, the main town of the *collectivité*, reportedly at the request of the Hema South families accusing the Lendu of allegiance with the Ugandan rebellion. The military operations were not carried out by the UPDF command based in Bunia, however, but by military who came directly from Uganda and who were under the command of Colonel Arocha, now appointed to Bundibujjo, in western Uganda bordering Ituri district.²³ The sector Commander Fred Seka Mwenge, based in Bunia, was reportedly not involved in the operation. The operations on Lendu villages were carried out by UPDF based in Gety together with Hema militia members from Bogoro, Kagoro, Boga, Mitego, Kyakurundu and Bukiringi and Bira militias from Talolo. One eyewitness from Gety named a certain Madilu as one of the UPDF commanders.

Mabanga: ethnic cleansing of a mining town

44. Mabanga, in the *collectivité* of Mambisa, territory of Djugu, was a multi-ethnic town because of its gold fields, which attracted non-Iturian gold traders and workers. On 28 August 2002, after an attack by Lendu militias, the local Hema/Gegere militia forced the non-Iturians to fight with them to repulse the attackers. Witnesses interviewed by MONUC stated that, when the reinforcements came from Iga Barrière, their Commander, T'Sirba Rene, stated that he had seen non-Iturians among the Lendu forces and gave the order to eliminate the non-Iturian population.

45. MONUC obtained a number of first-hand witness accounts of the attack. The father of one victim reported how his son was killed, his body mutilated and his head and arms brandished around the town. It appears that as many as 150 people may have been deliberately killed. The chief of operations, T'Sirba Rene, originally from Mabanga, was living in Iga Barrière.²⁴ UPDF had a military camp in Mabanga; the Ugandan army did not intervene to stop the killing of civilians but gave refuge to those who were able to reach the camp. Some 2,000 civilians, who sought refuge in the Ugandan camp, were escorted to Bunia the day after the event.

²¹ The most serious mass killings were the following: on 10 February 2002, attack on the localities of Tsarukaka, Nombe, Tsubina and Kagaba with 173 civilians killed; on 15 February 2002, attack and destruction of the localities of Kagaba, Rudjoko, Biro, Kapalayi and Kinyamubaya with 120 civilians killed; on 21 February 2002, attack on Bukiringi with 220 civilians killed; on 14 March 2002, attack on the locality of Sadji/Kaguma A with 146 civilians killed; on 29 March 2002, massacre of the population of Gety by UPDF based there with 109 civilians killed.

²² In January 2001, several attacks were carried out on localities of Walendu Bindi by APC forces together with UPDF when Lubanga was Minister of Defence, mostly to destroy the localities and their social infrastructures. One UPDF helicopter based in Bunia was used to bomb the localities. The *collectivité* had a calm period from February 2001 to February 2002.

²³ Colonel Arocha was Chief UPDF Sector Commander of Ituri from August 1999 to June 2000, when he was replaced by Colonel Charles Angina.

²⁴ T'Sirba Rene was condemned to death in 2002 by the Tribunal de Grande Instance of Bunia for the assassination of the Director of the Mabanga gold field, Lodju Niro.

Bunia: ethnically targeted massacres for the control of the capital city

46. Early in August 2002, the hostilities between RCD-ML and UPC that had begun in March 2002 with the arrival of Governor Jean-Pierre Lompondo reached the point of direct confrontation for the control of the town. Jean-Pierre Lompondo had been sent to Bunia by Mbusa Nyamwisi of RCD-ML as chief of military operations and Governor of Ituri, to thwart the UPC leader, Thomas Lubanga. The refusal by Mbusa of the nomination of Bosco by Lubanga as deputy chief of operations had created further tension. The fighting between the two forces ended with the withdrawal of RCD-ML from Bunia to Beni after UPDF and UPC on 9 August, shelled the residence of Governor Lompondo. UPC and its ally UPDF and the Ngiti/Lendu militias both killed civilians, many of them targeted only because of their ethnicity.

47. On 7 and 8 August, UPC militias and civilian vigilante groups under the command of Bosco roamed mostly the neighbourhoods of Mudzipela, Bigo I, II and III and Saio, killing those suspected of belonging to “opposing” ethnic groups. In Mudzipela, they completely destroyed all houses belonging to Bira, Lendu and Nande community members. Around 110 civilians, mostly Bira, Lendu and Nande were killed. According to several witnesses who testified to MONUC, UPC killed selected individuals according to a pre-established list. They also attacked Lendu civilians from Lipri market, located at 15 km from Bunia. The Lendu militias counter-attacked Mudzipela and killed dozens of Hema civilians as an act of revenge. UPC continued the killing of Bira, Lendu and Nande in Kolomani and the centre of Bunia until 10 August 2002.

48. While the fighting was going on for the control of Bunia town, Lendu militias attacked the farm of John Tibasima Ateenyi, the Hema Vice-President of RCD-ML, located in Lengabo, approximately 20 km from Bunia. According to Human Rights Watch, they killed 32 Hema workers and their families who were on the farm, mostly with machetes.²⁵

49. On 9 August, UPDF and UPC attacked Governor Lompondo’s residence using heavy weapons. The day before, all ethnic groups of Bunia, including a large number of Lendu, had fled to the Governor’s residence hoping that APC forces based there would protect them. Jean-Pierre Lompondo and APC troops fled on foot towards Beni, while UPC massacred the civilian population around the Governor’s house, as well as near the main hospital in the Bigo neighbourhood and near the central prison. Around 80 persons were killed at the Governor’s house alone. Several mass graves were discovered later by MONUC, including two near the Governor’s house and others near the prison and the hospital. UPC and UPDF, taking advantage of the chaos in the town, also conducted large-scale looting operations. UPC closed all the roads out of Bunia erecting roadblocks and summarily executing several civilians who were trying to flee the town. On 9 August 2002, UPC took complete control of Bunia and established an ethnically based government with very few non-Hema members. From the first day of its

²⁵ See Human Rights Watch, *Ituri: “Covered in Blood”: Ethnically Targeted Violence in North-eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo*, July 2003. Available from <http://www.hrw.org>. Path: Publications/by country/Democratic Republic of the Congo.

reign, UPC launched a manhunt in the town, looking for Lendu, Bira and non-Iturians.²⁶ The total number of victims of the fighting for the control of Bunia was never known exactly. However, taking into consideration the accounts of eyewitnesses, at least 300 persons lost their lives, killed mostly by UPC, but also by Lendu militias. The fighting also displaced 10,000 families, according to the humanitarian agencies present in Bunia. Most of the Nande community left Bunia for Beni in the following weeks. UPC extended its control in all directions, stabilizing its forces in Nyankunde, and taking the Mahagi-Aru area in the north.

Songolo: massacre of mostly women and children

50. Songolo, located in the *collectivité* of Walendu Bindi, hosted an important number of Ngiti from Nyankunde who were targeted and eventually driven out by the Chief of the *collectivité* of Andisoma, throughout 2001 and early 2002. In August 2002, UPC troops came to relieve UPDF in Nyankunde. The aim of this move was apparently to launch attacks on the bordering Ngiti localities. UPC reportedly requested the assistance of the Bira community in attacking the Ngiti.

51. On 31 August 2002, at 7 a.m., a group of some 500 UPC soldiers together with around 50 Bira attacked Songolo. According to a witness, most of the males were not in the village. The attackers used mortars and rockets before entering the village. After a short fight with Lendu forces, the attackers went into houses, reportedly guided by Bira civilians, to kill the inhabitants. Many civilians, mostly women, children and the elderly, were killed in their sleep. The attack lasted nine hours. According to witness statements collected by MONUC, the attackers looted the village and the health centre of Songolo and left with hundreds of cattle. It is difficult to estimate the number of victims killed. According to Human Rights Watch, around 140 persons were killed, mostly women and children.²⁷ Survivors who returned to Songolo after the attack to bury the bodies did a survey among the population and found that 787 people were missing. Up to now, it has not been possible to establish how many were killed and how many simply ran away. According to a Congolese non-governmental organization, UPC abducted 12 civilians.

Nyankunde: “ethnic cleansing” of Bira, Hema and Hema/Gegere groups

52. During and after an attack on Nyankunde and its neighbouring towns and villages carried out jointly by Ngiti, APC and Mai-Mai on 5 September 2002, more than 1,000 people may have been victims of deliberate killing because they belonged to the Hema, Hema/Gegere and Bira ethnic groups. Nyankunde and apparently many of the 45 localities making up the three *groupements* (Loy-Banigaga, Chini Ya Kilima/Sedzabo and Sidabo/Bagabela) of the *collectivité* of Andisoma suffered destruction, looting and massive displacement.

53. Before the devastating attack of 5 September 2002, Nyankunde, the main town of Andisoma, mostly populated by Bira, was a major centre because of its commercial activities and its well-equipped hospital, the Centre médical évangelique, which hosted several international staff and provided high-quality and specialized care in the region. According to a census done by the local administration between 2001 and 2002, around 21,000 people were living in the

²⁶ For specific killings, see section B.

²⁷ See Human Rights Watch, *Ituri: “Covered in Blood”* ...

collectivité, 14,000 of whom were in Nyankunde. Since September 2002, several thousand have been displaced to camps in North Kivu and the premises of the hospital, the Institut d'enseignement médical and the Institut supérieur des techniques médicales, as well as several other educational and religious institutions, have been looted and abandoned.

54. Tension had been high between the Ngiti population and the Bira and Hema of Nyankunde. Throughout 2001 and 2002, the Ngiti were targeted with acts of intimidation and other abuses. They were eventually forced out of Nyankunde. Ngiti attacks on Nyankunde and other Bira villages in the *collectivité* of Andisoma during the same period further fuelled hatred between the three ethnic groups and were followed by bloody reprisals, such as the alleged indiscriminate bombing by UPDF of Ngiti positions after the Ngiti attack on Nyankunde of January 2001. It is reported that the Chief of the *collectivité*, Dieudonné Bulamuzi, accused of being pro-Hema, boarded a UPDF gunship during those reprisal attacks. The attack of 5 September 2002 followed the bloody aggression by UPC forces, reportedly assisted by Bira elements, on 31 August 2002 on neighbouring Songolo, mostly populated by Ngiti (see paras. 50 and 51).

55. A few days before the attack of 5 September, a five-member high-level delegation from Nyankunde, composed of Chief Bulamuzi, the Medical Director of the Centre médical évangélique and others, had travelled to Bunia to alert MONUC about the risk of a bloodbath in Nyankunde. MONUC did not have the means or the mandate to take any preventive action at the time.

56. The attack was apparently launched from three different directions, Singo, Songolo and Atele. From 5 September to mid-month, Ngiti combatants — many of whom were former inhabitants of Nyankunde — systematically sought and killed Bira, Hema and Gegere individuals, mostly with machetes, spears and arrows. The combatants were wearing civilian clothes, appeared overexcited by drugs and were wearing vials and *fétiches* on their chest. MONUC obtained several accounts of mutilation of victims' bodies (notably the throat and the heart were removed) by Ngiti combatants. Apparently these parts of the bodies are used for *fétiches*.

57. The hospital of Nyankunde, the Centre médical évangélique, was not spared. Killings and looting were carried out in the hospital compound from the very first day of the attack. On 10 September, Colonel Kandro Ndekote, the Ngiti commander, led a search and arrest operation in the hospital. That operation resulted in the detention in inhumane conditions of some 100 people who were hospital staff or had sought refuge there. According to some sources, the number of people arrested at the hospital could be higher. It is alleged that many of the detainees were subsequently executed extrajudicially or disappeared after being forcibly taken to Bavi, located between Singo and Olongba, and other Ngiti bases. The fate of the others is unknown, but there are fears that they were executed extrajudicially.

58. From 80 survivors' statements gathered by MONUC, it appears that mainly Ngiti forces were responsible for the killings. APC committed widespread looting and extortion, but according to witness accounts intervened at least on a number of occasions to prevent killings or allow the evacuation of survivors. According to a high-ranking APC officer and other reliable sources, APC Commander Faustin Kakule negotiated and agreed on the details of the attack on Nyankunde with the Ngiti Commander, Colonel Kandro. There is no certain information about the terms of the agreement. However, Commander Faustin claimed to some hospital staff that

he had requested that the hospital not be attacked. APC Commander Bisima from Komanda reportedly visited Nyankunde, including the Centre médical évangélique, on 10 September, but left on the same day. APC Commander Hilaire is also reported to have been involved in the attack.

59. MONUC conducted separate interviews with more than 15 people who had collected corpses for burial in Nyankunde. The few burials, conducted very much in a hurry given the prevailing insecurity, were limited to some parts of Nyankunde and were not completed by 12 September, when hundreds of the inhabitants of Nyankunde who had sought refuge at the hospital were eventually allowed to leave the town. According to witness accounts, it appears that several hundred bodies were found lying in the streets and in the houses. Most of them appeared to be civilians and many of them had died of machete wounds. In most cases, no graves were dug and most of the bodies were thrown into latrines. In some cases, bodies were burned. Individuals from Ngiti villages, including Gety, Songolo and Aveba and wearing Red Cross aprons also carried out burial of bodies. Their leader was heard saying that they had to bury the bodies quickly so that nobody could claim that there had been “genocide” in Nyankunde. According to reports, the Ngiti Red Cross may have buried or burned hundreds of bodies.

60. MONUC has obtained some 800 names of victims of alleged deliberate killings or forced disappearance in Nyankunde and neighbouring villages. At the time of the attack on 5 September, Nyankunde was under the control of UPC forces, which had entered Nyankunde after the departure of UPDF troops in July 2002. According to consistent reports, the Ngiti attackers quickly overwhelmed UPC and the fighting in the streets did not last long. This reduced the number of civilians who might have been victims of stray bullets. Scores of civilians were also apparently abducted and forced to carry the loot to Ngiti villages, including Songolo, Singo, Bavi, Bolo, Gety, Kagaba and Atele. Their exact number is unknown. It appears that at least 100 of them were killed in Singo. More than 10 people from Nyankunde who had sought refuge in nearby Marabo allegedly disappeared after being captured on the orders of Colonel Kandro in the aftermath of the attack. Some 70 people were allegedly killed in villages of the *groupement* of Musedzo and in Mambesu (*groupement* of Mayarabu), both in the *collectivité* of Mobala, which were attacked on the same days.

61. To date, none of those alleged to be responsible for the mass killings in the *collectivité* of Andisoma in September 2002 has been brought to justice. After September 2002, APC Commander Faustin was reportedly arrested in Beni and detained by APC for letting his troops desert. He was subsequently released and he is reportedly still a member of APC. The Ngiti Colonel Kandro was allegedly killed during the sharing of the loot that followed the attack on Nyankunde. However, other commanders such as Commander Matata are reportedly still leading Ngiti militias in Irumu.

Bedu-Ezekele: scorched earth operation in 24 villages

62. Bedu-Ezekele, a Lendu *groupement*, located in the *collectivité* of Walendu Tatsi, was attacked several times from January 2001 to March 2003. Several persons were killed and all of its 24 localities were destroyed at each attack. Zumbe, well known as one of the headquarters of the Lendu militia, is part of this *collectivité*, which may explain the repetition and intensity of the attacks. The attackers were

reportedly UPDF forces under the command of Muzora, together with Hema militias from Bogoro, Mandro, Tchomia, Kasenyi and Bunia under the command of Chief Kawa.

63. In 2002 and 2003, the *groupement* experienced a total of 11 attacks with 445 civilian victims of killing, according to a Lendu teacher who took notes of each event. The most serious attacks occurred on 15 and 16 October 2002, when Hema militias, together with UPDF from Bogoro, attacked Zumbe and stayed there for 48 hours. From Zumbe, the attackers burned all the surrounding villages, killed around 125 civilians and planted several anti-personnel mines.

Bogoro: mass killing of civilians and destruction of the entire village

64. Bogoro, a Hema village, was a strategic place for UPC who had a military camp in the middle of the town. Bogoro is located on the Bunia-Kasenyi main road. The presence of UPC therefore prevented the Lendu communities of Walendu Bindu from using the road to reach Bunia. The Lendu (FNI) Chief of Staff at the time, Mathieu Ngudjolo, who admitted to having organized the attack on Bogoro and Mandro, told MONUC human rights investigators that his forces carried out the military operations in order to dislocate UPC military forces, which had been shelling the Lendu villages around Bogoro for several months.²⁸ According to MONUC investigations, however, the Lendu attack was not confined to military targets but also appeared to be a reprisal operation against the Hema civilian population.

65. On 24 February 2003, Bogoro was attacked by Lendu and Ngiti militias at 5.30 a.m. The aggressors came from four directions: Kasenyi, Gety, Nyankunde and Mission. They were reportedly wearing green military combat clothes and civilian clothes, and used machetes, spears and arrows but also heavy weapons, such as mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, light machine guns and rocket launchers. UPC soldiers had their camp around the school and called the civilian population to seek refuge inside it. Some people were able to reach the camp, others were killed while fleeing. When UPC forces ran out of ammunition, they opened a corridor through which they fled, together with some civilians; others left in the direction of Kasenyi. The Lendu/Ngiti militias reportedly continued killing and looting after UPC abandoned the village. According to the testimony of 100 survivors, around 260 persons were killed and another 70 are missing. Among the victims, 173 were under the age of 18.

66. MONUC human rights investigators who travelled to Bogoro on 26 March 2003 saw that most of the buildings and houses on the main road had been destroyed or burned. They also had a discussion with the Lendu chief of operations still in control of the town, Commander Dark from FNI, who refused to grant permission for a thorough visit of Bogoro including the place where the killings allegedly occurred. According to the Ugandan officials, the reason for his refusal was the existence of unburied bodies in the vicinity of the local school. Commander Dark

²⁸ This information was confirmed later, during a visit to Zumbe on 23 December 2003, by the inhabitants of Zumbe and Zekele, two Lendu localities that were attacked and completely destroyed by Hema militia from Bogoro.

informed the team that he was under the order of Commander Germain Katanga, the officer in charge of military operations in the south of Bunia.²⁹

67. According to child soldiers who took part in the operation on the UPC side, the aggressors were Lendu North, Ngiti from the south, APC and some Ugandan soldiers. Two of the children claimed to have heard Ugandan Swahili through a radio communication and to have witnessed the killing of Ugandan military. Other victims reported having heard soldiers speaking Portuguese. These elements were thought by some to be FAC special forces who had been trained in Angola.

Lipri, Bambu, Kobu: operation *Chikana Namukono*

68. On 13 January 2003, around two UPC battalions coming from Mongbwalu arrived in Nyangaraye at around 5.00 a.m. They forced the population out of their homes and forced 15 to go into the chapel. They reportedly chopped all of them to death with machetes and burned their bodies. Eyewitnesses were able to identify two victims, one of them a child. From Nyangaraye, UPC began carrying out its military operation called *Chikana Namukono*³⁰ under the command of Salumu Mulenda. UPC first took control of Lipri and Kobu on 18 February 2003.

69. From 18 February to 3 March 2003, UPC militias carried out a large-scale military operation against the villages located between Lipri and Nyangaraye. The first attack lasted until 23 February; 15 villages were destroyed and most of their inhabitants killed.³¹ Witnesses reported that, on 24 February, the UPC Commander, Salumu Mulenda, sent a written message — a copy of which was provided to MONUC — to Lendu notables in the area and Lendu militia leaders, including traditional Chief Djatsi, and the militia commander Kabuli, inviting them to a pacification meeting. On 25 February when the Lendu leaders, accompanied by 50 persons, came to attend the meeting in Bule, they were all arrested and brought to Kobu during the night. The prisoners were then taken behind the UPC camp in Kobu with their hands tied and were attacked with machetes, knives and wooden sticks. Only two persons, one of them met by MONUC, were able to run away; all of the others were confirmed killed. According to the persons who buried the bodies, there were 47 victims. They reportedly found another 53 corpses in the bush around Kobu and buried them in two other mass graves. In the following days, UPC continued its manhunt in the Jicho forest. Another 92 persons were reportedly killed in the forest, most of them dismembered with machetes. During the last days of February, UPC attacked another eight villages³² using the same methods of killing civilians, looting and burning all the houses. During this operation, Bambu, the headquarters of the Kilo Moto gold mining company, was attacked several times: all the offices of the company, the main hospital of the region, all religious structures, the orphanage and the schools were looted and all electronic devices, archives and medical equipment destroyed.

70. MONUC human rights investigators were able to visit Lipri, Bambu and Kobu on 3 April 2003. The team saw several villages on the way that were burned and deserted, visited the place where 47 persons were killed in Kobu and interviewed

²⁹ Commandant Germain is the current Chief of Staff of FNI/FRPI.

³⁰ In Lingala this means “to take with hands”.

³¹ Lipri, Ndrè Chupka, Dhepka, Tsili, Ndjaza, Mbidjo, Ngbachulu, Kpaki, Bukpa, Djuba, Bemu, Nduy, Ngaru, Ndalua and Thali.

³² Jicho, Buli, Ngabuli, Pili, Athe, Bakpa, Lambi and Widde.

around 90 victims of abuse or eyewitnesses of killings. The interviewees gave the team the names of 250 victims, but more victims were identified by another investigation team in May 2003, and still more during the investigations in the Beni area in November 2003. Operation *Chikana Namukono* resulted in the killing of at least 350 persons and the complete destruction of 26 localities.³³ Around 60,000 civilians were forced to flee to the relative safety of the surrounding bush, and the number of those who died of hunger and sickness remains unknown.

Mandro: attack and mass killing in a stronghold of UPC

71. Mandro, located in the *collectivité* of Bahema Banywagi, is the birthplace of Chief Kawa. The village was known from the first period of the conflict as a stronghold of UPC and was the location of a military and training camp for newly recruited children. The Lendu population suspected several attacks on their villages as coming from Mandro. According to corroborating testimonies, Mandro was attacked several times by Lendu since the beginning of 2003 but the UPC forces were able to push them back and hold the town.

72. On 4 March 2003, early in the morning, the Lendu and Ngiti attack on UPC military positions in Mandro lasted for no more than a few hours. The armed groups succeeded in overrunning Mandro and attacked civilians, killing some 168 persons according to the testimonies received by MONUC in Mandro and Bunia. According to the Chief of the *groupement*, the attackers kidnapped several young men and girls, who were forced to carry the looted goods. Since the attack did not last long, few houses were looted but the UPC military camp was completely destroyed. The aggressors were reportedly Lendu militias from Zumbe and Loga. Interviewed later in Bunia, the former FNI Chief of Staff, Mathieu Ngudjolo, acknowledged having organized the attack with the Ngiti in order to stop UPC operations against Lendu villages. According to him, each person in Mandro was a combatant in possession of a weapon.

Bunia: chasing of UPC by UPDF and Lendu militias

73. On 6 March 2003, reportedly responding to an attack by UPC on their forces based in Ndele, UPDF drove UPC out of Bunia and took control of the town with the assistance of Lendu armed groups.³⁴ On 6 and 7 March 2003, during and after fighting between UPC and UPDF in Bunia, several civilians were killed, houses and shops were looted and civilians were wounded by gunshots. According to the inhabitants of Bunia, fighting between UPC and UPDF began around 6 a.m. and lasted until the end of the same day. Stray bullets reportedly killed several civilians; others had their houses shelled. There were also selected killings of Hema civilians who were known to have financed UPC and selected looting of shops belonging to Hema businessmen in the market area of Bunia.

³³ According to a reliable local non-governmental organization, the number of civilians killed during the operation is much higher.

³⁴ On 6 January 2003, UPC signed a military alliance with RCD-Goma. In the following weeks, RCD-Goma started airlifting troops and weapons to UPC territory. On 23 January, UPC formally requested Uganda to withdraw from Ituri. Chief Kawa, who had already defected from UPC in November 2002 and moved to Uganda, expressed a desire for Uganda to remain in Ituri. He became the new ally of Uganda and he was supported by Uganda as leader of the newly created FIPL.

74. The local Red Cross buried a total of 54 soldiers and 17 civilians but informed MONUC that Ugandan forces had buried their nationals. Local non-governmental organizations carried out investigations into the events on 12 March 2003 and compiled a list of 52 civilians killed, 30 others injured, 15 houses completely destroyed, 60 others including offices of the non-governmental organizations Coopi, Aciar, J-plus, Hellenique and Cemif were completely looted. Eyewitnesses accused UPDF of being directly involved in the looting of the town. The situation was brought under control by UPDF on 8 March. Hema community members who had fled started to come back. The local Red Cross buried the bodies from 6 to 12 March 2003.

Drodro: killing of hundreds of civilians

75. Drodro, well known for its parish and its well built social infrastructure, is part of the territory of Djugu, *collectivité* of Bahema Nord, approximately 80 km from Bunia. After its forced withdrawal from Bunia, UPC and its leader Thomas Lubanga relocated first in Bule, then in Blukwa and Drodro. On 3 April 2003, because of this presence and also as part of a revenge operation, Drodro parish (located in Duma village) and the surrounding villages of Dhassa (Largu), Nyali, Dzathi, Kiza, Ngazba, Jissa, Kpatiz, Koli, Lera, Ndjala and Kpaluma were attacked between 5.45 a.m. and 8 a.m. by Lendu militias. The attackers killed both military and civilians using AK-47 and Kalashnikov rifles but also machetes, spears and arrows. A team composed of personnel of MONUC and personnel of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights travelled to the affected areas, and received testimonies of survivors, eyewitnesses, family members and church and administrative authorities, who reported the killing of 408 civilians, the serious injury of 80 others, 48 of them still in the local hospital at the time of the investigation, and the destruction by fire of 150 houses and shops. Two forensic experts who accompanied MONUC and examined one of the several mass graves in Largu confirmed that killings had happened. The team saw other mass graves in Largu, Nyali and Jissa.

76. The attackers were reportedly Lendu combatants from the surrounding Lendu villages of Andu, Jukr, Masumbuko, Tsoro, Ango and Asso. Some eyewitnesses reported that they saw also soldiers wearing green uniforms and camouflage uniforms. According to a Congolese human rights organization, the presence of Lubanga and Edison Muzora, a former UPDF commander who had joined the rebellion, during the second half of March 2003 in Drodro would explain the alliance between Lendu militias and UPDF. This version was rejected by UPDF, who stated that at that date UPDF troops were in Bule, 30 km from Drodro, and was not responsible for the Drodro killings.

Bunia, return in strength of UPC and mass flight of the population

77. On 6 May 2003, under pressure from the international community, the last UPDF soldier left Bunia, after a long presence of four and a half years.³⁵ Approximately 20,000 civilians, mostly Hema and a few from other ethnic groups, followed them towards Uganda fearing an attack by Lendu combatants. From the first day of their departure, the city was the scene of fierce fights between UPC and the Lendu militias, which lasted until MONUC was able to broker a ceasefire

³⁵ UPDF entered Bunia in November 1998.

agreement, on 17 May. Fighting in various neighbourhoods caused hundreds of civilian casualties, systematic looting of buildings and destruction by fire of around 1,000 dwellings. Following the ceasefire, the two parties agreed to withdraw their forces to their respective military headquarters in the town. This situation lasted until 27 May, when UPC drove the Lendu combatants out of Bunia. Thereafter, human rights abuses continued to be committed on a smaller scale.

78. Two investigations were carried out into the events by two different MONUC teams, one in Bunia at the beginning of June 2003 and the second in the camps of internally displaced persons in the Beni area in November 2003.³⁶ The team interviewed 311 eyewitnesses and family members of victims. A total of 563 cases of deliberate killings have been reported to MONUC, 260 of them by UPC and 303 by Lendu combatants. Other victims were killed by non-identified perpetrators. The Lendu combatants reportedly committed several ethnically motivated killings of Hema and other ethnic groups somehow associated with them, while UPC apparently killed at random, although possibly targeting non-natives and some professions like police officers and taxi drivers. According to a source, UPC killed several dozen Lendu civilians in Simbilyabo and buried them secretly.

79. Particularly heavy casualties were reported in the Mudzipela area of Bunia, considered to be a safe heaven for Hema civilians, and the Lumumba area, which is the city centre. The killing of around 16 Hema civilians and two Hema priests on 10 May 2003 by the Lendu militia in the compound of Nyakasanza church is an example of ethnically motivated killing. According to corroborating testimonies of Lendu and Hema survivors of the massacre, some hundreds of Lendu combatants arrived at 10 a.m. and penetrated the compound after a short fight with the national police. Both Hema and Lendu internally displaced persons had sought refuge in the church and were housed in two different halls. After killing two Hema priests in their rooms, the combatants penetrated the hall containing Hema civilians and one of them massacred 12 adults and 4 children. The combatants visited the room containing the Lendu but only took their money. The reason for this particular massacre was apparently to take revenge for the killing of the Ngiti priest Father Boniface Bwanalongo by UPC in November 2002 in Mongbwalu. Furthermore, Father Aimé, one of the Hema priests killed, was publicly known to be a UPC supporter and had been seen several times driving UPC officials in the church vehicle.

80. The team received reports of 18 cases of rape, some of the victims being as young as 11, committed by UPC soldiers, after the ceasefire was signed. Most of the victims were abducted while they were out to look for food or water, and were taken to military places or private houses for sexual abuse.

81. Looting started in the town as soon as the Ugandan forces left, carried out first by Lendu combatants then by UPC elements. They were later joined by civilians who profiteered from the situation, resulting in systematic looting of private houses and business premises with no distinction of ethnic affiliation. The market place was completely devastated. During visits to the neighbourhoods, in addition to the looted dwellings, the MONUC team saw a considerable number of shops and houses destroyed by fire. Some thousand houses were set on fire.

³⁶ Investigations were carried out in camps in Erengeti, Oicha, Butembo and Beni.

82. The MONUC team received reports of numerous cases of threats or intimidation committed by UPC elements once they had total control of the town. This is one of the main reasons behind the reported fleeing of around 200,000 people from Bunia and the surrounding villages from 8 to 14 May 2003. The inhabitants left Bunia mainly using two roads. One group took the road to Beni via Komanda and another took the route Medu-Bole-Beni, passing through the forest. One group of Lendu fled to Gety and another to Zumbe. According to humanitarian agencies, around 74,000 civilians reached the Beni area, passing through Komanda, at the beginning of June 2003. The total of the new internally displaced persons as a result of the May events in Bunia was reportedly 180,000 persons.

83. On their way, the group that took the road towards Komanda was attacked in Chayi by UPC, all their belongings were looted and an unknown number of civilians were killed. The group that took the road towards Medu and Bole was stopped by Ngiti combatants who killed the Hema civilians who were part of the group. A Nande survivor met by MONUC reported the summary execution at Longba on the basis of ethnic origin, of 13 civilians, mostly Hema and those thought to be Hema, because of their facial type, by the combatants and their Commander, Matata Banaloki Justin, known as Cobra. The same witness added that the bodies of the victims were mutilated and certain organs extracted and eaten by the combatants. An important number of Hema were reportedly killed also near Olongbo and Masini.

Tchomia: mass killings and abduction of civilians in two different attacks

84. Tchomia used to be a big trading centre of around 12,000 persons, located in the *collectivité* of Bahema Banywagi in the territory of Djugu on the shore of Lake Albert. The locality was also host to an important PUSIC military camp.³⁷ According to the Hema authorities, the area around Kasenyi and Tchomia, both located by Lake Albert, became subject to insecurity after the capture of Bogoro by Lendu militia at the end of February 2003.

85. On 31 May 2003, Tchomia was attacked around 5 a.m. and the operation lasted until 1 p.m. The attackers, allegedly from Zumbe and Loga, approached the town from three directions and attacked first the military camp and then the civilian population using rocket-propelled grenades, rifles, mortars, spears, machetes and axes. They spoke Kiswahili, Kilendu and Lingala. The attackers openly asked victims about their ethnic origin, which suggests that their objective was to kill only men from the Hema ethnic group. The majority of the victims identified the attackers as being Lendu combatants, with some APC and FAC soldiers. The MONUC human rights investigators who travelled to Uganda to interview witnesses drew up a list of 96 victims, mostly of summary executions, including 30 patients who were killed in the hospital beds and 6 victims of abduction. The assistant to the Administrator of the territory of Kasenyi, who came to Tchomia with Chief Kawa on the day of the attack, stated that they buried a total of 250 corpses. Chief Kisebo of Kasenyi stated that a militiaman called Naydo affiliated with the Lendu militia of Zumbe carried out the operation.

86. According to corroborating information received by MONUC later, in Beni and Kinshasa, after UPDF left Bunia they based themselves in Tchomia with the intention of organizing a new attack on Zumbe together with PUSIC. UPDF was still

³⁷ PUSIC was formed only in October/November 2002. The militia was previously under UPC.

reportedly in Tchomia on the day of the attack, contrary to their previous statement according to which they left around 20 May, and a large number of UPDF soldiers were reportedly killed as a result of the attack.

87. On 15 July 2003, Tchomia was attacked for the second time around 5 a.m. by the same attackers, coming from Zumbe. The attackers killed some 11 civilians, since the town was almost emptied after the first attack.

Katoto: killing of civilians during several attacks

88. Katoto, a Hema village, is located some 25 km north of Bunia, in the *collectivité* of Bahema Nord, in the territory of Djugu. The village suffered from two severe Lendu attacks in June 2003. On 7 June, 104 people were killed, according to local authorities and eyewitnesses. On 20 June, a new attack reportedly left 32 more people killed and an undetermined number of displaced people. It appears that Katoto had a population of 17,000 before the attacks and was afterwards reduced to around 7,000. The attacks came from FNI militias led by commanders Ngakpa, Nyanya, Ngerey, Kame and Lonu, among others, principally from the locality of Loga, some 10 km north-west of Katoto.

Kasenyi: mass killing and abduction of civilians

89. Kasenyi, a fishing town of around 8,000 inhabitants according to the traditional chief of the place, located on the shores of Lake Albert in the *collectivité* of Bahema Sud, in the territory of Irumu, was the site of an important PUSIC military camp. The town was attacked twice, on 11 June and 23 July 2003, by Ngiti combatants seeking to dislodge the PUSIC soldiers there.

90. On 11 June 2003, Kasenyi was attacked around 6 a.m. by Ngiti militias, reportedly together with some APC and FAC elements. The attackers first dislodged PUSIC forces and subsequently attacked the civilians in the town. MONUC received testimonies on the killing of more than 80 civilians and the abduction of 30 others. A victim, who was abducted and taken to Zumbe, reported that the chief of the operations was called Mumbere, a Lendu who had taken a Nande name. On the road to Zumbe, the victim witnessed the execution by machete of six persons because they were not able to continue walking. The victim was kept in Zumbe for one week. He later moved with two Alur hostages to Beni, accompanied by 200 persons, both Lendu militia and APC soldiers. According to the witness, the journey from Zumbe to Beni had been organized with the aim of bringing ammunition given by RCD-ML. The father of the two Alur hostages came to Beni to take his children away together with the witness and brought them to Ntoroko, Uganda. On 23 July 2003, Kasenyi was attacked for the second time by Lendu combatants. MONUC received testimonies on the killing of 16 civilians and the abduction of 4 others.

Fataki: killing and abduction of civilians in two attacks

91. Fataki, the administrative centre of Djugu territory, was inhabited by around 16,000 persons of mostly Hema origin before the conflict. Fataki was the target of two serious attacks during July 2003, the first on 19 July and the second on 31 July. The attack of 19 July resulted in the killing of 51 civilians, the abduction of 50 others, the displacement of hundreds more and the destruction of many buildings, including the orphanage, two convents, the hospital and the school buildings. The attack of 31 July was more deadly: around 71 people were identified as having been

killed, including seven survivors of the first attack who were in the hospital.³⁸ As a result of the two attacks, around 10,000 civilians fled the area.

92. The attackers were identified by the survivors as being Lendu combatants alone, in the first attack, and Lendu combatants with FAPC members in the second one. After the second attack, the Lendu militia stayed in the town for a while and killed a few survivors who came to look for their belongings. The combatants and FAPC reportedly continued to abduct civilians during August 2003.

Kachele: mass killing of civilians

93. Kachele is a small Hema village located in the *collectivité* of Bahema Badjere, in the territory of Djugu. On 6 October 2003, between 5 and 10 a.m., Kachele and the surrounding villages of Lôkô, Bû, Luguba and Lutsiko were attacked by Lendu militias from the nearby villages of Laudju and Petro. A total of 65 civilians were killed, 42 of them children, and another 26 injured.

94. A MONUC investigation team arrived at the scene of the incident the day it occurred to verify facts, gather evidence and comfort and assist the population. The following day, a new mission, including human rights observers, continued the inquiry, drew up lists of victims, gathered new evidence, interviewed survivors and visited a number of mass graves. Immediately after the attack, the Ituri Brigade was deployed to Bule and has been conducting several foot patrols in the area from which the attackers allegedly came. They have already found evidence of the existence of armed elements and weapons; they also found traces of the withdrawal from Kachele to the Petro area, which confirms the origin of the attack.

B. Other mass killings

95. Both Hema and Lendu combatants attacked territories belonging to other ethnic communities for different reasons: in some cases to punish them for having hosted enemy combatants, in others, because they took one side or the other in the conflict. Some towns, such as Mongbwalu, Mahagi and Aru, were attacked for control of their natural or financial resources. Regardless of the reasons for the attack, both Lendu and Hema militia parties committed similar types of exactions: mass killing of civilians, destruction of social infrastructures, looting of goods, abduction of women for sexual slavery and forced labour.

96. The only attack that can be considered different from the rest is the one named *Opération effacer le tableau* carried out by MLC and RCD-N forces with the direct assistance of UPC in the area of Mambasa (see paras. 105 ff. below).

Walu: killing of civilians, destruction of social infrastructure

97. On 11 May 2002, the village of Walu, located in the *collectivité* of Babelbebe in the territory of Irumu, was attacked by Hema militias from 5 a.m. to 1 p.m. The attackers completely burned social infrastructures, including two schools and three health centres. They killed civilians who were not able to flee. Once the attack was over, the population came out of hiding to bury the bodies. One of the eyewitnesses,

³⁸ The real number of deaths may be higher but, owing to the displacement caused by the attack, the investigators were able to reach only some of the survivors.

who was present at the burials, reported having counted 42 bodies, including that of the Chief of the village. The village was attacked a second time a few days later by the same militia, who killed four more civilians. The militia reportedly came from Mazangina, Kabarole and Sota and was under the command of Kisembo, the Chief of Kabarole.

Mongbwalu: a town to conquer for its natural resources

98. Mongbwalu, an important gold mining centre, was the second most populated town in Ituri after Bunia, with around 80,000 inhabitants before the conflict. Though located in the Nyali *collectivité* of Banyari Kilo, the majority of its inhabitants were of Lendu origin. Lendu moved to Mongbwalu to work for the Kilo Moto gold mining company as labourers beginning in the 1980s. The Lendu families were concentrated on the outskirts of the town, in the Camp Sayo area, where the workers compounds were located, while the Hema were living in the *cité* (town centre). The town changed hands frequently in a series of attacks and counter-attacks. During the attack of June 2002 by Hema militia and some bribed APC elements, RCD-ML was still in control of the town.

99. On 11 June 2002, Lendu workers left the workers camp and sought safety on the hill where an armed camp of Lendu was located, as they had been informed that “something” would happen. The same day, the Chief of the *cité*, Taga Mpigwa Atenyi, a Hema, reportedly made a speech in which he stated: “tomorrow we’ll have our coffee in the Lendu area of the town.”

100. On 12 June 2002, the Lendu quarters of Mongbwalu were attacked by APC soldiers based there, together with Hema inhabitants of the town. APC had been bribed by rich Hema with the aim of emptying Mongbwalu of its Lendu population. The attack lasted from 3 a.m. to 7 a.m. The attackers killed an unknown number of Lendu civilians, threw them into the roadside ditches and set fire to Lendu homes. The chief of the Hema militia was Bakambu, called *le maître* because he had been a teacher in the nearby Bambu mines. Towards the end of the attack, the Lendu combatants arrived from their encampment. They destroyed Hema homes and killed approximately 100 Hema civilians in an act of revenge. The majority of the Hema had enough time to flee to hide in the APC camp and so were saved. The Governor of the time, Jean-Pierre Lompondo, sent a new APC commander, Papi Yani, to replace his bribed former one, Commander Alemi. Meanwhile, the notables of the Nyali community, the traditional rulers of the *collectivité*, went to see the Lendu combatants to propose a peace plan. The Lendu accepted their proposal on condition that the Hema population leave Mongbwalu for Watsa and Ariwara. The Hema left and the Nyali population stayed with APC and Lendu civilians and militia members. This first Hema operation to recover Mongbwalu and its gold mines was reportedly financed by Lombe, who had a gold board in Bunia, and by Mandefu, Kazana and Labomba, all businessmen. Mongbwalu was attacked again in August 2002 by UPC forces, but they were pushed back by Lendu combatants and APC. However, UPC was determined to gain control of the town and went to look for stronger allies such as MLC, present in the Watsa area.

101. On 8 November 2002, UPC began its operation by shelling Mongbwalu with heavy weapons. An eyewitness met by MONUC went to the Lendu camp to seek protection at that time. While there, the witness saw a wounded Lendu combatant returning from Watsa who said that UPC was advancing under the command of

Bosco. Lendu combatants were able to repulse this first attack and succeeded in capturing a young UPC militia boy. According to the boy, UPC had prepared a big operation after receiving assurance of MLC assistance to take Mongbwalu and to make it the headquarters of Lubanga. From 9 to 17 November 2002, APC went to fight on the road to Watsa to stop the advance of MLC forces.

102. On 20 November 2002, UPC and MLC jointly attacked Mongbwalu, using heavy mortars and other explosive devices. The fighting lasted for two days and resulted in the killing of around 200 civilians and the destruction of infrastructures. UPC took control of the town on 24 November 2002. According to Human Rights Watch, an unknown number of civilians, who tried to hide in a church called *Mungu Samaki* located in Sayo, were followed by UPC and MLC soldiers.³⁹ The UPC soldiers found them in the church and slaughtered them. Other civilians were captured and imprisoned in a military camp, where they were later killed. During its stay, UPC tried to exploit the gold mines. They called on the Lendu to return because they had the expertise in gold digging. Since the Lendu refused to go back, they forced the remaining Nyali population and the Hema who went back to work for them. Mongbwalu was then occupied by Lendu militias of FNI, when UPC lost the backing of Uganda in March 2003.

Nizi: mass killing of civilians

103. Nizi, located in the *collectivité* of Mambisa in the territory of Djugu, was a wealthy mining village with 20,000 inhabitants before the conflict. On 11 October 2002, Lendu combatants from Bambu and Mabanga attacked Nizi. UPC had a military camp in Nizi and the Lendu were accusing the inhabitants of Mambisa of being pro-Hema. According to a local non-governmental organization, a total of 320 bodies were buried. The persons who buried them were able to identify 69 of them.

104. The village was attacked again on 20 July 2003 around 10 a.m. by Lendu combatants of FNI from Bambu. The attackers killed 22 civilians and abducted 15 others. The number of victims was limited, owing to the arrival of the Multinational Force, which was able to stop the aggression and arrest four Lendu combatants. On 23 August, Nizi was attacked again by combatants from Zanzi mountain, who abducted 12 persons and killed 2 of them on their way to their military camp of Mbao.

Mambasa: *Opération effacer le tableau*

105. Mambasa is a medium-sized town on the road to Beni, located in the territory of Mambasa, inhabited by approximately 25,000 people. As Mambasa was not affected by the conflict raging in the territories of Djugu and Irumu, its inhabitants had maintained a fairly decent standard of living. Thousands of internally displaced persons from Ituri had moved to Mambasa, which was then considered safer than the rest of the Ituri district.

106. On 12 October 2002, the forces of MLC and RCD-N, with the assistance of UPC, attacked the town for the first time. The aim of the operation, called *Opération effacer le tableau*⁴⁰ was apparently the control of the whole RCD-ML area, notably the Beni airport and the economically active area of Beni-Butembo. With the

³⁹ See Human Rights Watch, *Ituri: "Covered in Blood" ...*

⁴⁰ Operation "Clean the blackboard".

Mambasa attack, the region witnessed a new scale of violence characterized by a premeditated operation and the use of looting, rape and summary execution as tools of warfare.

107. The MLC and RCD-N forces remained in Mambasa, after taking it for the first time, from 12 to 29 October 2002, after which the RCD-ML forces were able to push them out. They were able to retake the town again on 27 November 2002 and stayed until 5 February 2003; a month later, on 30 December 2002, a ceasefire agreement was brokered by MONUC in Gbadolite.

108. During those two periods, the MLC and RCD-N forces, although under different command, committed serious human rights abuses such as summary executions, systematic rape, systematic looting and acts of cannibalism. After Mambasa, similar abuses were also systematically carried out in the villages south of the town and between Komanda and Eringeti, with the involvement of UPC. The number of rape cases — mainly young girls or women between 12 and 25 years old — also rose to an alarming level.

109. MONUC interviewed a total of 502 eyewitnesses and family members of victims from 3 January to 20 January 2003; they reported the killing of 173 civilians, both adults and children, in Mambasa, Komanda and on the two roads to Beni. The reported cases included 12 incidents of cannibalism. Most of the victims from Mambasa and neighbouring areas were reportedly killed by MLC or RCD-N soldiers, whereas the majority of victims from Komanda were reportedly killed by UPC elements. The incidents targeted mainly the Nande population to which Mbusa Nyamwisi, President of RCD-ML, belongs, and later also Pygmy populations, who were accused of assisting APC.

110. The first operation, which lasted from 12 to 29 October 2002, was carried out under the MLC command of Colonel Freddy Ngalimu, alias Grand Mopao. The second operation was carried out under the MLC command of Colonel Widdy Ramses Masamba, alias *Roi des imbeciles*,⁴¹ and lasted from 27 November 2002 to the end of January 2003, when the last MLC elements left Mambasa. Both commanders were under the command of General Constant Ndima, located in Isiro.⁴² General Ndima reported directly to the MLC Chief of Staff, General Amuli. He reportedly took the order from General Amuli to replace Freddy Ngalimu with Colonel Ramses. According to an MLC informer, Colonel Ramses is very close to General Amuli, a Hema from Ituri.

111. Just after the preliminary findings were made public by MONUC, the MLC authorities agreed to conduct an inquiry into the events. The report of the team was the basis for the trial of 27 suspects from the MLC forces. The trial of the 27 individuals accused by MLC of involvement in the atrocities in and around Mambasa began on 18 February and lasted until 25 February. The United Nations

⁴¹ Widdy Ramses Masamba was appointed in November 2003 as the chief of the Kindu-based seventh military region.

⁴² Several sources reportedly stated that General Ndima's nickname was *effacer le tableau* and they reported that he was part of a group known as *effacer le tableau* established in 2001 during the existence of FLC. The battalion called *effacer le tableau* was well known for its tough personnel and the way it behaved in war time. After the break-up of FLC six months later, the battalion reportedly remained in Isiro, and some of its companies were sent on tough missions like the invasion of territories lost in Mambasa.

High Commissioner for Human Rights stated clearly that the trial was both illegal and illegitimate.

112. Beyond the constitutional issue of its legitimacy, four additional issues about this trial need to be pointed out. First, the admission as evidence of self-incriminating statements made by defendants held incommunicado during police or military questioning. Second, the obvious disparity between the charges and the sentences handed down. For instance, the charge of rape carried a maximum prison sentence of 13 months. The charge for deserting the armed forces, which routinely is punishable by death, most surprisingly carried 39 months in this “court martial”. Third, no one was charged with any of the horrendous crimes against humanity and war crimes, such as murder, group rape and cannibalism, referred to in the MONUC report on the events in Mambasa (see S/2003/674). Fourth and finally, since the sentencing, a wave of arrests of defence witnesses who had testified on behalf of the accused has begun.

***Collectivité* of Banyari Kilo: constant insecurity and summary executions**

113. The *collectivité* of Banyari Kilo, in Djugu territory, has been changing hands between Hema and Lendu militias because of the attraction of its Kilo gold mines. UPC entered the area around January 2002 and stayed there until March 2003. While there, UPC organized several attacks on Lendu localities. When they were chased away by UPDF and Lendu militias in March 2003, Nyali inhabitants, considered by Lendu as having hosted UPC, were harassed and killed.

114. On 15, 17 and 23 May 2003, Lendu combatants from Nyangaraye and Ngotochu attacked the localities of Batata, Kilo, Itende and Lisey. They killed around 50 civilians and abducted 28 girls. All the villages on the routes Sindoni-Kilo and Kilo-Mongbwalu were destroyed and deserted by their inhabitants after several Lendu militia attacks. At least half of the population of Banyari Kilo, around 40,000 according to the Chief of the *collectivité*, went into hiding in the forest of Madombo and Kirongazi during May and June 2003. Five health centres located in Kilo, Itende, Kabakaba, Kilo-Etat and Kilo-Mission and one maternity centre in Kilo-Mission were forced to close because they were almost completely looted.

Nioka: mass killing and rape of civilians, serious destruction of social infrastructure

115. Nioka, a small town of 20,000 persons of mostly Alur origin, is located in the *collectivité* of Pandoro, in the territory of Mahagi. Nioka was first occupied by UPC, then by FAPC under Commander Jérôme Kakwavu following the split with the former in September 2002. According to a witness, the Alur community had been paying FAPC to protect them by giving them livestock. However, most of the FAPC soldiers left on 28 May 2003. A certain Dilo from Nioka decided to gather together all the inhabitants who had received some military training and organized an armed group of 15 militia members. On the day of the attack, it was reportedly FAPC that fired first with rocket-propelled grenades into the barracks housing the new militia members, probably with the aim of fighting a newly created armed group.

116. On 10 June 2003, Nioka was attacked from 5.30 a.m. until around 2 p.m. by Lendu militias from Kpandroma and Livo. The militia killed around 55 civilians according to the testimonies provided to MONUC by victims. Another 60 civilians were abducted to carry the loot first to Livo, then to Kpandroma. According to an

abducted girl, several girls were forced into sexual slavery. Only 56 of the hostages were released, most of them after payment by their family members. Three days later, the inhabitants went back escorted by FAPC to bury the dead. They reportedly buried 70 bodies, several of them in one mass grave in Nioka. The Lendu militia visited Nioka several times after this first attack to finish looting and burning all of the buildings.

117. A certain Lego was reportedly the chief of the operations. Floribert Ndjabu, the leader of FNI at that time, confirmed that the operation was conducted by Lego and his 40 followers, without the consent of the FNI authorities of Kpandroma. He added that Lego and 20 of his men were executed after this operation by FNI in Kpandroma.

C. Political killings, abduction and forced displacement of suspected opponents

118. The militia groups of Ituri executed, abducted, arrested or forced to flee persons they thought to be political opponents, as well as judges, intellectuals of enemy ethnic groups, journalists and members of non-governmental organizations. MONUC was able to carry out investigations into such abuses only in Bunia and Aru, while they were under the authority of UPC and FAPC, respectively. This does not mean that the other armed groups did not also commit political killings, abductions and forced displacement of opponents.

1. Political killings, enforced disappearances, illegal arrest and forced displacement of selected persons by UPC

119. Soon after taking power in August 2002 in Bunia and later in other parts of Ituri, UPC launched a campaign of manhunts, with summary executions, arbitrary arrests and forced disappearances. According to several witnesses, UPC had a pre-established list of persons to eliminate in Bunia.⁴³ UPC Commanders Bagonza, Kisembo, Chief of Staff, and Aimable Saba Rafiki, Chief of Security, reportedly directed the operation in Bunia. Those who were informed in time and were able to go into hiding had their houses destroyed by fire and their belongings looted, which suggests a desire to chase them for good. Among the victims were political opponents, intellectuals, businessmen, religious leaders, journalists and administrators of mainly Bira, Lendu and Nande origin, non-Iturians but also a few moderate Hema. In August and September 2002 alone, more than 100 people reportedly became victims, in Bunia town, of this campaign.⁴⁴ A new campaign was launched in May 2003, with the return of UPC to Bunia. This time, the victims were mostly non-Iturians. Some professions such as taxi drivers and police officers were specifically targeted.

120. Among the victims of the UPC manhunt campaign in August 2003 were Ileri Kuba, a 70-year-old Lendu, retired parliamentarian; Nasser Nbuna, 65-year-old non-Iturian, a former member of parliament; M. Ngura, Alur, *Chef des Travaux* of the Institut supérieur pédagogique together with his daughter; M. Mateso, Lendu

⁴³ The list was reportedly drawn up by the Hema extremists of Bunia town, including the extremist intellectuals of the Institut supérieur pédagogique.

⁴⁴ The number was given by Human Rights Watch in *Ituri: "Covered in Blood"* ...

director of discipline of the high school of Kigonze; Reverend Basimaki Byabasaija, an Anglican church minister; Eric Duandro Akobi, a 38-year-old Protestant minister and theology student; Monaco Mbaduale, a 25-year-old Lendu student of the Institut supérieur pédagogique; Ngure Gabriel Ukumu, a 45-year-old Alur administrative secretary of Radio Candip; Selian, a Bira journalist of the same radio; Malili, a police officer from Isiro; Giselaïne Bofende, a Topoke worker of the non-governmental organization ABC. Several Lendu were also abducted, and taken to the houses of Bosco, Bagonza or Lubanga. Their fate is unknown to date.⁴⁵

121. Several traditional chiefs and administrators were killed in the interior of the district mostly for not collaborating with UPC: Nobamuzi, Chief of the *collectivité* of Babelebe, killed in December 2002; Matata, Chief of the *collectivité* of Basili, killed in July 2002; Mundukukuwe, Chief of the *collectivité* of Baboa Bokowe, killed in December 2002; Bulabato Aloise, Chief of the *groupement* of Chendabo, killed in mid-2002; Fundi Kusu, Administrator of Bambu, killed in June 2002; Richard Bokalala Elanga, RCD-ML Administrator of Djugu territory, killed on 11 May 2002.⁴⁶

122. **Chief Dieudonné Bulamuzi Binmangili**, the 52-year-old traditional Chief of the *collectivité* of Andisoma, was forcibly abducted in Bunia on 5 September 2002. Earlier that same day, when Nyankunde was attacked by a coalition of Ngiti and APC, Chief Bulamuzi was able to escape with a member of the judiciary police. The two were able to reach Bunia by passing through Sota, Masabo and Badiya. In each place, they informed the UPC elements of the attack and requested military assistance. Witnesses interviewed by MONUC stated that, when he reached Bunia, Chief Bulamuzi was taken to the UPC headquarters; he was interrogated by Commander Kisémba and apparently tortured; Kisémba accused him of being aware of the Ngiti attack on Nyankunde. Chief Bulamuzi's condition was very serious when he was taken home. Witnesses further stated that, around 6 p.m., six UPC elements, including Jaguar from the Senga family, arrived and took Bulamuzi away again. A few minutes after they left, the family heard a gun shot. When they went out, they saw blood just outside the gate but no body. The same day, the UPDF commander, who had been informed, went to see UPC commanders Kisémba and Bagonza for some explanation. They told him that Chief Bulamuzi had been beaten because of his complicity with the Ngiti and sent to hospital. The body has never been returned to the family. Instead, the whole Bulamuzi family, being under constant threat, decided to leave Bunia.

123. **Adriko Johnson**, a 33-year-old Lubara, assistant Mayor of Bunia and member of UPC, disappeared on 29 September 2002. It appears that Mr. Johnson left his home on 29 September 2002 in the afternoon and never returned. The following day, his brother-in-law found out that he had last been seen on his motorcycle near the UPC military camp. All the efforts of the family members to have UPC launch an investigation were frustrated. His body has never been found. It appears that one possible reason for his disappearance could be the fact that he had given refuge in his house, in August 2002, to Lendu civilians when UPC troops were searching for

⁴⁵ Some names listed by local non-governmental organizations are: Claude, 30, son of Valéry; Zakayo, 24; Claudine, 22; Loba, 48; Ndalo, 29; Justin, 28; Edward Wamba, 54; and Pierre Minzi Kakado, 30.

⁴⁶ Reportedly by UPDF soldiers under the command of the Hema political elite.

Lendu. Adriko Johnson had also apparently publicly criticized the targeting and killing of Lendu and Ngiti.

124. **Abbé Boniface Bwanalonga**, the Ngiti Roman Catholic priest of Mongbwalu parish, was arrested shortly after UPC captured Mongbwalu, on 20 November 2002, together with two nuns. The nuns were later released. When they went back to bring food to the Abbé, the UPC combatants refused to give them permission to see him and chased them away. Abbé Bwanalonga has not been seen since. The disappearance of the Abbé was very badly received by the Lendu/Ngiti community who held him in high esteem. They later justified the killing of Abbé Ngona of Nyakasanza as an act of revenge for the killing of Abbé Bwanalonga.

125. **Joseph Eneko Nguaza**, 47-year-old Alur Governor of Ituri, appointed by UPC with the aim of gaining wider support using his well-respected personality, was killed on 21 November 2002. The Governor was based in Aru and was delaying his departure for Bunia. Meanwhile, he announced that he was dissociating himself from UPC and initiated peace talks with different groups. UPC sent a delegation headed by Floribert Kisembo, then Chief of Staff of UPC, to bring the Governor to Bunia. On 21 November, before leaving for Bunia, the Governor set out for Mahagi to install a new territorial administrator. Just before his departure, the then UPC Commander in Aru, Jérôme Kakwavu, changed the Governor's bodyguards and driver. The delegation was ambushed 8 km from Mahagi. Except for two bodyguards who managed to escape, all the passengers were killed: Governor Eneko, his driver, his secretary, the Chief of the Public Office and five other guards. According to the testimony of local residents, obtained by Human Rights Watch, the attackers were UPC soldiers.⁴⁷ According to the testimony provided to MONUC by two witnesses who lived in Aru at the time of the event and who had met the two survivors, the operation was organized by Commander Jérôme, who received a considerable sum for his services.

126. **Jacques Kabasele**, the 43-year-old President of the Tribunal de Grande Instance of Bunia, from Kasai, was arrested on 11 November 2002 by UPC, accused of having contacts with their enemies. The judge was arrested by two persons from the *Direction générale de migration*, which was under the command of Rafiki, and taken to the prison of that unit. He was kept there for two days without any formal charges. On the third day, a team came to interrogate him, mainly on his contacts with Beni, Kinshasa and the outside world. They also told him that the order to arrest him came from Lubanga himself. He was not physically threatened but was kept there for 18 days and then released without charge. After his release, he was threatened and left Bunia in April 2003.⁴⁷

127. **Honoré Musoko**, a lawyer and president of the Bunia-based human rights non-governmental organization Justice Plus, tried to defend several victims abused by UPC authorities. He also worked for a short period as Minister of Justice under Jean-Pierre Bemba. He was accused of working with former Governor Jean-Pierre Lompondo and of being an enemy of UPC. Honoré Musoko was forced to flee the region in November 2002, but UPC authorities raided his organization, Justice Plus, on 5 February 2003, after he gave an interview to an international radio network on the human rights situation in Ituri. The UPC authorities then went to the office of Bunia Business Communications, owned by Musoko, arrested two workers and

⁴⁷ See Human Rights Watch, *Ituri: "Covered in Blood" ...*

seized the equipment. One of the members of Justice Plus who was also an officer of Bunia Business Communications was given refuge in the MONUC offices until UPC sent a letter stating that he had freedom of movement. The offices of Justice Plus were visited again by UPC in May 2003, all documents and materials looted and its members forced to go into hiding.⁴⁷

128. MONUC also received testimony from eight victims of harassment, five Bira, one Nande, one Ngiti and one Topoke, who were forced to leave Bunia. These victims are mostly intellectuals, journalists, teachers and civil servants. All were reportedly on a list of persons to be eliminated and six of them had their houses set on fire by UPC elements; the parents of the Ngiti victim were killed after he left Bunia. They all left Bunia between May and September 2003 and have not come back since.

129. There have also been several cases of harassment of humanitarian workers and church members, with the aim of halting the delivery of humanitarian assistance to members of "rival" ethnic groups. According to Human Rights Watch, there have been more than 30 cases where humanitarian workers have been arrested, threatened, beaten, or expelled from the area.⁴⁷ In some cases, UPC soldiers have arrested aid workers who have refused to provide them with food and medicines. UPC expelled even the representative of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat from Bunia in November 2003, for protesting against the illegal arrest of humanitarian workers. Priests also came under threat when they tried to assist Lendu civilians. On 15 January 2003, the parish of Nioka, where a centre for malnourished children had been set up with the assistance of an international non-governmental organization, was attacked by four UPC elements and one Hema called Jabu. The foreign priests working in the centre were arrested and beaten and the centre completely looted.

130. **Mark Deneckere**, a Belgian priest of the congregation Missionnaires d'Afrique, was expelled in early 2003 for having helped a group of displaced Lendu. In his testimony to Human Rights Watch,⁴⁷ Father Mark stated that the Lendu came to seek refuge in August when UPC was attacking Lendu inhabitants of Bunia. UPC got angry when the international press picked up the story. They said they had not been informed that 120 Lendu had been given refuge by the Missionnaires d'Afrique. On 11 February 2003, the priest was called in for interrogation. UPC accused him of helping the Lendu and of giving them weapons. On 14 February, Father Mark was given 48 hours to leave Ituri.

131. MONUC received reports of numerous cases of summary executions, threats or intimidation committed by UPC elements when they again took total control of Bunia in May 2003. The intimidations targeted mainly the non-natives, the Bira, the Nande, the few Lendu left in town, some businessmen, journalists, taxi drivers and police officers. UPC also attacked the non-Iturian civil servants, accusing them of being pro-Lendu. Even after the installation of the Ituri Brigade, the selected killings continued, committed by UPC elements dressed in civilian clothes during the night. The level of violence created the biggest mass exodus in the history of Bunia, forcing around 200,000 persons from Bunia and the surrounding villages nearby to flee their homes.

132. A number of members of the national police and taxi drivers stated to MONUC that the members of their profession were victims of targeted summary executions by UPC soldiers. The taxi drivers, in majority non-Iturians, were indeed accused of

having driven Lendu out of the town, while the national police officers, most of them non-Iturians, were considered to be pro-Lendu. From 6 May 2003 to the end of the month, 11 police officers and 12 taxi drivers were apparently victims of summary executions by UPC.

2. Political killings, illegal arrest and forced displacement of selected persons by FAPC

133. After September 2002, a former RCD-ML commander, Jérôme Kakwavu, took over Aru in the name of UPC.⁴⁸ Disagreements between UPC and Jérôme appeared at an early stage, regarding control of the significant financial benefits of the territory, where there is an important market at Ariwara where gold, diamonds and timber can be traded and there are two tobacco companies and the Aru Customs, the last safe exit point from Ituri. Finally Jérôme left UPC, created FAPC on 6 September 2002 and extended his area of influence to Mahagi after reaching an agreement with FNI.

134. In the territory under FAPC control, Aru and also Mahagi, since UPC was driven out in March 2003, mass violence appears to have been limited. However, there were allegations of killing either to get rid of potential opponents or to maintain control over part of the economic activities.

135. In August 2003, MONUC human rights investigators were able to visit first Aru and Ariwara and, the day after, Mahagi, all under the control of Commander Jérôme. They spoke to a few victims but they were always followed by the civilian intelligence officers and told not to ask questions about security. In Uganda, investigators met with well-informed sources from Aru who reported the illegal arrest of two civilians by Jérôme. According to their testimony, which corroborates information received from other independent sources, the population under the control of Jérôme is living under serious psychological threat, with no way of showing opposition; the few who tried to oppose him were all executed.

136. On 22 May 2003, a group of FAPC elements under Commander Raymond Isala tried to overthrow Jérôme. The coup failed reportedly thanks to the assistance of UPDF Commander Justus Basisira, based in Arua, Uganda, who intervened with one platoon. On the same day, the commander of the airport, Jean Ngoyi Mwanawasa, was arrested by Jérôme, brought before a so-called tribunal and killed in the presence of Commander Justus. After this attempt, Jérôme declared that he would kill anybody who had been close to Raymond Isala. Two civilian victims who were close to the commander decided to leave Aru on the same day for Arua, together with Commander Idris Bobale. During the days that followed, the two victims, Commander Idris and his two body guards were all abducted in Ugandan territory on different days by a group composed of Jérôme's militia and elements of Ugandan military intelligence and put in a military jail under the command of Justus Basisira. They were kept in jail for 18 days without interrogation until 10 June, when they were told they would be set free. However, on the same day, Commander Ali, Jérôme's chief of military intelligence, arrived, accompanied by a Ugandan intelligence officer called Chris, and took them by force back to Aru to be put in a container with other detainees. The container that was used as a detention facility had also housed the former Administrator of Aru, Kanyi Lubara, for a period of two

⁴⁸ Commander Jérôme claims to be Banyamulenge but it is more likely that he is a Banyarwanda from North Kivu, in Rutshuru territory.

months. The Administrator was released after paying enough money to appease Jérôme. The two civilian victims and Commander Idris were called the day after by Jérôme, stripped naked and flogged. After being tortured, the three men were put back in the container and given no food or water for four days. On the fifth day, the Ugandan Commander Justus came back and took the two civilian detainees back to Arua. The victims were kept another two days in jail in Arua and released with no explanation. The bodyguards of Commander Idris who were taken out of the jail in Arua by Commander Justus to be brought back to Aru never reappeared and Commander Idris stayed in the container. As of December 2003, Idris was still in custody.

137. According to credible sources, Commander Justus of UPDF is paid by Jérôme to serve his interests. He is also policing Arua and catching military defectors from FAPC to take them back to Aru. MONUC has obtained the names of three such ex-FAPC who were reportedly brought back by Commander Justus and killed by Jérôme.

D. Children associated with armed groups

138. The information on children associated with armed groups was gathered during special investigations, as part of MONUC regular monitoring and advocacy work, through preliminary interviews with more than 200 children associated with armed groups, with partner organizations, during field visits, including to a small number of military camps, and interviews with military and other authorities. It is far from being a complete picture of the presence and use of children given the very limited, uneven and at times complete lack of access to children in the different groups and to their communities, both to obtain and to corroborate information. Taking testimony from children is also particularly sensitive. Nevertheless, as has been reported and witnessed many times, there can be no doubt that all of the armed groups have systematically recruited, used and abused children — ranging from 7 to 17 years old — throughout the district of Ituri.⁴⁹

139. The Democratic Republic of the Congo has ratified both the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Optional Protocol thereto on the involvement of children in armed conflict. Obligations under those international instruments, further defined under the terms of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and ILO Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour, ban the recruitment of anyone under 18 years of age into the military forces of a State party. The Protocol also bans any armed group found within the national territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo from recruiting any child below the age of 18. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, ratified by the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 30 March 2002, defines as a war crime the conscription or enlistment of children under the age of 15 into national armed forces or armed groups and their active participation in hostilities.

140. Presidential Decree Law 66 of December 2000 and article 184 of the Interim Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo brought these international obligations into the realm of domestic law, although recruitment has yet to be

⁴⁹ The youngest child associated with an armed group interviewed by the Child Protection Section of MONUC, in Tchomia in September 2003, was a 7-year-old boy who claimed that he had served for some time with PUSIC.

criminalized. The Luanda Agreement of 6 September 2002, concerning the resolution of the Ituri conflict and establishing the Ituri Pacification Commission, expressly recognized these international and national obligations to children associated with the armed groups in Ituri, including minimum protection measures for children found among the various armed groups. In April 2003, the Ituri Pacification Commission, within its peace agreement, made a solemn appeal to respect those national and international obligations through the creation of conditions for an environment facilitating the demobilization of those children.

1. A profile of children associated with armed groups in Ituri: fighting for survival

Children became soldiers because they were orphaned, sought vengeance or did not have anyone to care for them. Etienne Nembe, Chief of Intelligence, UPC (interview, 2003)

If I had to give a weapon to a two-year-old [to defend his community] I would do so. Chief Kawa, PUSIC (interview, 2003)

Many children decide to enrol because they lost their parents after the massacres. Everyone was obliged to resist, even women and children. Commander Banga, FNI/FRPI (interview, 2003)

[Children] were looking for protection or support when they joined [my] troops. Commander Jérôme Kakwavu Bukande, FAPC (interview, 2003)

141. As already indicated, all of the armed groups in Ituri have recruited children into their ranks over the past few years. Although the exact number of children is unknown, child protection partners believe that, as a conservative estimate, at least 40 per cent of each militia force are children below the age of 18, with a significant minority below the age of 15. Contacts and requests for information on the number of minors in each armed group have been made on a systematic basis since March 2003 but have not so far yielded accurate information, including in the context of the Comité de concertation des groupes armés. Groups that have recruited children into their ranks are often hesitant to give child protection agents reliable information on the full extent of child participation in their forces, and indeed at times have clearly given blatantly false information. For example, FAPC insisted to the MONUC Child Protection Section in an interview on 28 December 2003 that they had gathered all of their children at Aru. When the team travelled later that day to another FAPC-controlled area 100 km to the south at Kandoy, it was presented with four child members of the platoon stationed there. In addition, obtaining a fixed number of children associated with Ituri armed groups proves a difficult task, as the armed groups have divided and regrouped around the shifting political and military exigencies of the region throughout the conflict. A number of the children interviewed recounted how they had passed from one group to another at different times, some even alleging that they were first recruited by AFDL in 1998. Others claimed they started with FLC or APC before moving on to other groups.

142. The presence first of the multinational force (Operation Artemis) in June 2003 and its subsequent replacement by the MONUC Ituri Brigade had an impact on the number of children in armed groups by reducing the level of conflict and facilitating the release of children. It is difficult to know how many have been released by the armed groups as not all went through any kind of process, but some progress has been made (see paras. 156-158 below). Few new reports of recruitment have been

received over the past few months. Nevertheless, current estimates suggest that there are still several thousand children — possibly around 6,000 — in UPC, FAPC, FNI, FRPI, FPDC and PUSIC, with many more attached to loosely formed local defence forces or militia. In addition, the former APC also has numerous children in its ranks, though most are not in Ituri. In December 2003, MONUC interviewed several mothers who said that their children had joined APC in Ituri after the massacres of September 2002 in Nyankunde and remained in APC ranks in and around Beni.

143. Recruitment into all armed groups has been both “voluntary” and through abduction, often as the children were in the markets or in the streets where they were forced to get into trucks and taken away. UPC recruitment drives took place regularly throughout 2002 and early 2003. FAPC was reportedly recruiting as late as July 2003 around Aru and Mahagi. PUSIC also recruited in 2003, including in September according to some reports. During the frequent attacks on civilian settlements perpetrated by militia of one ethnicity against another, children and families were thrown into the logic of survival at any cost. FNI/FRPI Commander Augustin Ngabo-Tchepo stated that, in the Bambu area of Djugu territory, almost all the children of Bambu were recruited during the series of attacks on Bambu (in January/February 2003). Furthermore, the massive recruitment and utilization of children of all ethnicities on the part of RCD-K/ML in Ituri prior to the Hema-Lendu schism left large numbers of children at risk of re-recruitment by the forces that controlled their home areas at the time.

144. The scope of this report does not include examining in detail the (often complex) reasons why children joined armed groups in Ituri. As stated in interviews with children who have been released they include basic survival, the desire for revenge, especially for the killing of family members, adventure, and ethnic-based reasons. Whatever the reasons, the term “voluntary” must be treated with caution given the extremely limited options available. Whether “volunteer” or forced recruits, most children interviewed said they soon became disillusioned with the extreme conditions in the training camps and on the battlefield. The child’s choices to remain or leave at that moment were even more restricted. Even for children released from an armed group, the risk of re-recruitment remains, although for the time being there has been a reduction in the level of conflict.

145. When renewed fighting broke out in Ituri in 2003, most of a group of 163 children who had been repatriated from a Ugandan training camp and reintegrated into their families were cut off from protection agencies. According to the testimony of SOS-Grand Lacs at the time, 130 were reportedly re-recruited by UPC and sent into fighting units.⁵⁰ The Child Protection Section spoke with one of the children who returned from the UPDF camp at Chakwanzi in 2003. According to the child, “... in 2003, after the attacks on the [South Hema] town of Bogoro, I went back into the UPC under Commander Germain”. He was 12 years old at the time.

146. FNI/FRPI, although based in village units and having apparently demobilized a large majority of their child recruits into their home villages with the help of aid agencies, are not immune to the practice of re-recruitment of children. A child protection agency official alleged that FNI may still be using former FNI children in local defence forces, designed to protect their home villages from attack. The official further stated that FNI/FRPI know very well that, if the security situation

⁵⁰ See Human Rights Watch, *Ituri: “Covered in Blood” ...*

deteriorates, they will be able to call up these child ex-combatants and reintegrate them into their militia.

2. Training of children

147. Once recruited, whether forcibly or voluntarily, children were either trained in organized camps or in ad hoc sites in villages and towns. The attached map shows the locations of 28 training camps and 9 military bases, used by FNI/FPRI, UPC, APC, PUSIC and FAPC, where children were either seen being trained or themselves claimed to have been trained over the past two years. The training lasted from several days to several months depending on the capability of the armed group and/or its foreign backers. As a rule, the Lendu/Ngiti militias (FNI/FRPI) seem to have been offered a summary training either in their home villages or nearby, given that recruitment tended to be community-based and according to operational needs. Kpandroma and Zumbe were, however, known to be regular training sites for FNI/FRPI. UPC, PUSIC and FAPC were provided with military advisers and undertook the establishment of more stable camps. By all accounts, training conditions were generally physically gruelling and extremely hard, in terms of food rations and punishment regimes (children cited death threats, beatings and in one case an execution). At times trainers were minors themselves.

148. Rwandan and Ugandan trainers were also said to have been present in some of the camps, such as those at Mandro, Rwanpara and Montawa. In a number of cases, children were reportedly transferred to Uganda or Rwanda for specialist training with adults, the first such large-scale training (of APC child recruits) by Uganda occurring in 1999. The best known case is that of some 163 UPC children, cited above, who were located undergoing training in Uganda and returned and reintegrated into their families in Ituri by UNICEF in 2001. As late as July 2003, there were allegations of PUSIC transferring more than 200 children from Tchomia to UPDF training camps in Rwebisengo County and at Kibuku in Uganda. While PUSIC claimed that the children were taken for security and/or educational purposes, several boys and a girl interviewed subsequently alleged that they had received military training before being returned to the Democratic Republic of the Congo to fight in September 2003. Likewise, allegations that children were taken to Rwanda, for example in September 2002, for training in artillery have also been received from different sources. This is in clear violation of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, which condemns recruitment, training and use across national borders.

3. Use of children in combat and attacks

149. On completion of training, children were frequently used in hostilities, depending on the military of the time. Sending children into battle constitutes potential violation of their right to life, survival and development. There is little precise or complete verified information so far regarding the names and numbers of children who have died or suffered injuries as a result of taking part in hostilities in Ituri. Most children interviewed told of having been sent to fight in various battles in 2002 and 2003. Testimonies of individual children report losses of other children, for example in Dele and Nyankunde (September 2002); Irumu (November 2002) including a 10-year-old; Kasenyi (2003); Marabo, Tchai (December 2002/January 2003); Bambu (February 2003); Bule (March 2003); Bogoro (March 2003); Drodoro (April 2003); and Linga (September 2003). Once conditions allow, further research

needs to be done on this issue to document individual cases in detail, if only so that the families can be informed, but also as part of the documenting of violations committed by those who recruited the children in the first place.

150. In some cases, children did not necessarily take part in the fighting itself but in subsequent pillaging. This was particularly true in the case of attacks by Lendu/Ngiti groups; examples include an FNI attack on Tchomia on 31 May 2003 where women and children carried loot back to their bases in Zumbe and Loga; and in April 2003, when Lendu militia, accompanied by women and children, completely pillaged houses and other buildings and took away many items, as well as cows, goats and other animals.

4. Presence and use of girls in armed groups

151. All of the armed groups in Ituri recruited girls (very often forcibly) into their ranks, although few have been brought forward for official separation. Once released, a climate of denial, shame and fear prevents many of them from seeking assistance. Tenuous links with military commanders sometimes persist even after release. The girls have played a range of roles. Trained to handle weapons they have taken part in combat and worked as escorts and domestics.

152. For many, however, entry into an armed group meant being subjected to sexual abuse. A number of accounts indicate that the sexual abuse started in the training camps, with instructors being responsible, and persisted throughout the training. It should be noted that two girls interviewed by MONUC said that the presence of women officers in the respective training camps protected them from sexual abuses at the time. In some cases, sexual abuse, when it did occur, was of limited duration or was carried out in a sporadic manner, with different perpetrators depending on the situation at hand. Other girls were subjected to a more regular pattern of sexual abuse, effectively repeated rape, over longer periods, assigned to one military officer for example. These girls are commonly referred to as “war wives”. In many ways the girls suffer a double jeopardy, many reportedly serving both as fighting elements in active combat and concomitantly being used to satisfy the sexual appetites of their commanders. Some, however, were reportedly abducted solely for use as sexual slaves.⁵¹

153. One witness stated that girls as young as 14 were abducted, apparently for sexual purposes, by members of FNI at Lulu, Goda, Vissa and Kakro villages in Djugu territory beginning in September 2003. One commander reportedly told the villagers that it was on his orders that the girls were taken, stating “... the soldier who takes a girl, that’s his pleasure; the girl is his ... he will come to pay the dowry later ...”. There is little information about the current whereabouts of these girls. A 15-year-old girl allegedly abducted in April 2002 in Luguba by UPC described how she was handed over to a commander “as his wife” as soon as she arrived at Bule training camp. In October and November 2003, the Child Protection Section received information that UPC forcibly abducted girls in another part of Djugu territory. On one occasion, a witness reported that a woman was beaten to death trying to prevent her 15-year-old daughter from being forcibly taken. In the same community, on 30 November, two girls, aged 14 and 15, were reportedly taken from

⁵¹ The Cape Town Principles of 1997 identify any girls used as sexual slaves or “war wives” as child soldiers for identification purposes, whether or not they received previous training of a military nature.

their homes by military of the same unit, to be used as sexual slaves. One of the kidnapers was reportedly an adolescent of Bira ethnicity, aged 18. On 10 June, Lendu militias reportedly abducted at least seven girls as war wives during an attack on Nioka, where an FAPC group was based.

154. The deployment of international troops in Ituri in mid-2003 facilitated the release of some adolescent girls and access to support programmes to help them deal with some of the consequences. Even while members of armed groups, some of them had required medical and even hospital treatment for the consequences of violent abuse. Others are now child-mothers. But it is likely that many still remain within the groups. The question of the status of the undoubtedly numerous war wives is a serious one, as many traditional beliefs dictate that once a girl is sexually “taken” by a man, she is his property. The issue simply becomes one of payment to the family of a dowry. An FAPC colonel stated in an interview with the Child Protection Section on 9 November 2003, referring to these girl victims of abduction and sexual abuse within his ranks, that there would be “... difficulties in taking these girls out of these forced ‘marriages’”.

5. Use of children by armed groups in the exploitation of natural resources: a vicious circle

155. In December 2003, the Child Protection Section visited the Kilo-Etat and Iga Barrière/Nizi areas, where there are gold fields, the latter controlled by UPC militia and the former by FNI. In the UPC-controlled Iga Barrière area, the former headquarters of the Kilo Moto Mining Company, the Section staff saw that three quarters of a mine pit team were under 18 years of age, most being between 11 and 15. Sources at the site alleged that the children present in the mine were all active or former child soldiers who worked on behalf of their UPC commanders. At Kilo-Etat, an FNI commander acknowledged that he had 12 children in his armed group, the youngest of whom was 11 years old, and also that there were “a lot of child soldiers” at Bambumines (nearby). These preliminary reports merit further investigation to assess the extent of the use of children associated with armed groups in exploiting minerals, the profits of which are subsequently used to purchase weapons, some of which almost certainly end up in the hands of children.

6. Prospects for separating children from armed groups

156. Child protection partners and UNICEF have been actively participating in the planning for disarmament and reinsertion programmes for the Ituri armed groups. Since the start of the Ituri pacification process, the installation of the Ituri Interim Administration and the arrival of the multinational force in June 2003, representatives of armed groups have been changing their attitudes with regard to children. UPC and later FAPC began unilateral separation of minors from the camps without prior arrangements with child protection partners. FNI have sent many children directly back into their home communities, where a measure of school access has been provided to the children. Sixteen UPC commanders, without following procedures, reportedly released scores of children in November, telling them to go to Bunia where they were led to believe that a “school for child soldiers” had been set up. Many of them turned up at MONUC offices or one of the Transit and Orientation Centres. The PUSIC leadership even established a transit facility for former child combatants in the vicinity of Chief Kawa’s residence in Tchomia.

Identification of local partners for child protection and reintegration work in the different communities is ongoing.

157. The first formal family reunifications from transit care facilities in Ituri started in September/October 2003. With improved access and communications, contacts between community networks have facilitated family-tracing activities. MONUC and the Comité de concertation des groupes armés have carried out verification missions to proposed *regroupement* sites, sometimes with child protection partners. Official figures of minors received are however far short of the real situation, owing perhaps to the deterrent factor of possible future criminal proceedings. In many instances, children have been demobilized and sent back to school by the communities who mobilized them in the first place. UPC commanders released children without letting them go through any formal process or transit facilities.

158. Prospects for the children still associated with armed groups in Ituri, and even those already released, will depend very much on the development of security, access to all parts of the district, and to the start of a viable disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan for adults. This is important, as the investigation team spoke to a number of children demobilized from armed groups in Ituri who expressed extreme reluctance to return to their home villages for fear of re-recruitment by armed groups who still exercise control over the local population, often through intimidation and terror. A child protection worker in Ituri stated the situation plainly to the Child Protection Section in Bunia: "Even where disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of children is going well, such as in the FNI areas, it is clear that, should the situation turn bad, these armed groups know exactly where these children are and will certainly use them".

VI. Conclusion and recommendations

159. Despite the disengagement of foreign forces from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the establishment of the Transitional Government and the integration of all of the armed groups into the new Congolese national army, Ituri remains a battlefield for the proxies of Rwanda, Uganda and Kinshasa. The security conditions improved by the end of 2003 only thanks to the Operation Artemis, the subsequent deployment of the Ituri Brigade under Chapter VII, and progress towards restoration of the rule of law resulting from the efforts of MONUC in cooperation with members of the international community. For security to stabilize and become sustainable it is now time for the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to assume its responsibilities and assert its authority.

160. As a result of the robust action of the Ituri Brigade, some of the local warlords revised their policies, and created new alliances to actively resist the pacification efforts of MONUC. This volatile situation does not encourage the large number of internally displaced persons who are still in camps in Bunia and elsewhere in Ituri, as well as in North Kivu and Uganda, to return to their places of origin, where their homes and social structures are often completely destroyed or occupied by military elements.

161. To bring real peace to the region and end human rights abuses several issues need to be addressed together by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the international community, including:

- (a) Continuation of a robust implementation of the MONUC mandate under Chapter VII of the Charter;
- (b) State control over natural resources to end their exploitation;
- (c) Full restoration of State authority, with adequate police, competent and impartial administration and military capabilities;
- (d) Intervention of the State to revise the land law and all existing land certificates;
- (e) Full implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, beginning with the children;
- (f) Rebuilding of public infrastructure and repair of private housing;
- (g) Information campaigns to encourage the return of communities to their places of origin;
- (h) Restoration of local conflict management initiatives with the aim of rebuilding trust and reconciliation among all the inhabitants of Ituri.

Annex I

Armed and political groups involved in the Ituri conflict

A. Ituri armed groups

None of the Ituri armed groups can be considered an armed wing of a political movement, as they were originally created as military movements. The political wings were an afterthought, created to facilitate their integration into the local and national structures and negotiations, and to be used as an interface with the international community.

Union des patriotes congolais (UPC)

Initial leader: Thomas Lubanga

Current leaders: Lubanga for UPC-Lubanga group
Floribert Kisembo for UPC-Kisembo group

Ethnic composition: Predominately Hema North/Gegere

UPC was created as an embryo in January 2001, with funding from a large Gegere business community and the support of Uganda. Later, it enlarged its influence to some Hema South, notably Chief Kawa Panga Mandro. However, personal rivalries, as well as the Hema North monopoly of key positions, led to a split in September 2002. UPC began existing officially only in mid-2002, when Lubanga left RCD-K/ML and initiated the battle for control of Bunia. UPC eventually took control of Bunia in August 2002 with the help of the Ugandan army. It turned to Rwanda for support and formed an alliance with RCD-Goma in January 2003. Having turned from Uganda politically, it was ousted from Bunia by the Ugandan army in March 2003 but fought its way back into the town in May. After the departure of Lubanga for Kinshasa in August 2003, the Chief of Staff, Commander Kisembo, announced early in December 2003 that he was the new leader of UPC. This resulted in a split: those responding to Kisembo and located in Bunia and those responding to Lubanga represented in Ituri by his new Chief of Staff, Bosco.

Parti pour l'unité et la sauvegarde de l'intégrité du Congo (PUSIC)

Initial leader: Chief Kawa Panga Mandro

Current leader: Chief Kisembo Bitamara*

Ethnic composition: Predominantly Hema South

PUSIC was created in October/November 2002 by the former UPC member Chief Kawa. Its militia receives its supplies mainly from Uganda, as part of its proxy strategy. Uganda tried to merge it with FNI and FPDC, under the umbrella of FIPI. That has totally failed. PUSIC allied itself with UPC against the Lendu in Bunia in May 2003, but that alliance of convenience lasted only a few days. During June 2003, Chief Kawa spent two weeks in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, having been introduced to Colonel Al-Qadhafi by President Museveni, during which time he converted to Islam and is now reported to be receiving large monetary

* At the time of writing of the present report.

contributions from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. PUSIC is reportedly increasingly involved in arms trafficking across Lake Albert.

Forces populaires pour la démocratie au Congo (FPDC)

Current leader: Thomas Unencan (a Member of Parliament during the Mobutu era)

Ethnic composition: Predominantly Alur

FPDC was created in October 2002 by Uganda. It comprises mostly Alur from Mahagi with the support of Alur exiled in Paidha, Uganda, to counter UPC. Around 500 Congolese Alur received a brief military training in Uganda, close to Mahagi territory. It was supported by Uganda as part of the FIPI coalition, which did not last long. The military branch of the movement was dislocated by FAPC, which took the control of the Mahagi area with the support of FNI at the end of June 2003.

Forces armées du peuple congolais (FAPC)

Current leader: Commander Jérôme Kakwavu Bukande (a Banyarwanda from North Kivu)

Ethnic composition: Mostly non-Iturians

FAPC was created in March 2003 as the political umbrella for Commander Jérôme's battalion in control of Aru territory. Commander Jérôme has changed alliances several times, moving from FAC to RCD-K/ML, to RCD-N, to UPC, before creating his own group with the support of Uganda. Following an arrangement to share security and income in Mahagi together with FPDC and FNI, FAPC attacked its "partners" and claimed control over the town and the territory at the end of June 2003. Commander Jérôme remains in touch with Ugandans while claiming to be loyal to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Front nationaliste intégrationniste (FNI)

Initial/current leader: Floribert Ndjabu

Ethnic composition: Predominantly Lendu North

FNI was created at the beginning of 2003 as the political umbrella of the Lendu armed groups located mainly in Kpandroma and Rethy. The party claims broad support from the Lendu community in its efforts to oppose UPC. FNI has benefited from military training and support from RCD-K/ML and, through it, from Kinshasa. During 2001-2002, one of the Ugandan factions is likely to have supplied this group with light automatic weapons on an irregular basis. FNI established alliances with the Lendu militia groups based in Lipri and Zumbe as well as with the Ngiti FRPI and participated in the political negotiations of the Ituri Pacification Commission as the Lendu party representing the entire Lendu community. In the field different geographical armed groups seem to keep their independence, however. Supported by Uganda as part of the FIPI coalition, it joined the Ugandan army in driving UPC from Bunia in March 2003.

Front de résistance patriotique de l'Ituri (FRPI)

Current leader: Commander Germain Katanga

Ethnic composition: Predominantly Ngiti/Lendu South

FRPI was launched in November 2002 as the political umbrella of Ngiti armed groups mainly from Gety, Bogoro and Songolo. Ngiti militia initially benefited from the support of Ngiti defectors from APC. They have also received occasional support from one faction of the RCD-K/ML. FRPI joined the Ugandans in driving UPC from Bunia in March 2003 and, together with FNI, briefly controlled Bunia in May 2003. Since then, FRPI has created an alliance with FNI and one of its commanders, Germain, was appointed Chief of Staff of the united militia.

Front pour l'intégration et la paix en Ituri (FIPI)

Composition: Platform of three ethnic-based parties

A coalition of three parties, PUSIC, FNI and FPDC, created in December 2002 with Ugandan support. Its main objective was getting rid of UPC, with no apparent programme. After the attack on Bogoro by FNI, the coalition collapsed.

B. Regional political groups**Mouvement de libération du Congo (MLC)**

Current leader: Jean-Pierre Bemba

Ethnic composition: Mixed ethnic groups

MLC, originally backed by Uganda, was based in Gbadolite. The movement tried twice to enter Ituri: in 2001 Jean-Pierre Bemba moved to Bunia as the President of the short-lived FLC coalition of Ugandan-backed rebel groups, and in 2002 MLC attacked Mambasa in western Ituri with the aim of taking control of Beni, but was forced to withdraw after a ceasefire agreement signed under the auspices of MONUC. MLC has an alliance with RCD-N and has occasionally fought alongside UPC. MLC was part of the inter-Congolese dialogue and its leader, Jean-Pierre Bemba, has one of the posts of Vice-President.

Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie-Kisangani/Mouvement de libération (RCD-K/ML)

Current leader: Mbusa Nyamwisi

Ethnic composition: Predominantly Nande

RCD-K/ML was launched in September 1999 in Kampala when Wamba dia Wamba split from RCD-Goma. After several splits, and a short-lived alliance with MLC, because of leadership struggles, Mbusa Nyamwisi eventually took control of the movement. The RCD-K/ML military wing is the Congolese People's Army (APC). RCD-K/ML was part of the inter-Congolese dialogue and its leader is now Minister for Regional Cooperation. RCD-K/ML was involved directly in the Ituri conflict via MLC, then on its own and also providing a link for the pre-transition Government. It left Bunia in August 2002 after it was defeated by UPC and UPDF. After that date, it continued its support to Lendu militia groups.

Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie-National (RCD-N)

Current leader: Roger Lumbala

Ethnic composition: Mixed ethnic groups

Based currently in Isiro and Watsa, in the neighbouring Haut-Uele, RCD-N was initially supported by the Ugandans in exploiting the diamond riches of Bafwasende. In 2001 and 2002, RCD-N became a political movement with the assistance of Jean-Pierre Bemba to act as a politico-military front and provide a second support group (proxy) for MLC during the inter-Congolese dialogue. It has never had a military capacity of its own.

Annex II

Chronology of main political events and incidents of gross violations of human rights in Ituri, 1998 to 2003

1998

- 30 January 1998 Report on the situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Roberto Garretón (E/CN.4/1998/65 and Corr.1).
- 2 August 1998 RCD rebels launch armed rebellion against the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Laurent-Désiré Kabila. Uganda and Rwanda back the rebels. The movement rapidly takes control of much of the eastern part of the country.
- November 1998 UPDF establish a base in Bunia.
- November 1998 Another rebel movement, MLC, is created in Equateur Province under Jean-Pierre Bemba with Ugandan backing.

1999

- 8 February 1999 Report on the situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Roberto Garretón (E/CN.4/1999/31).
- April 1999 Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, the first President of RCD, moves to Kisangani as the movement starts a series of splits.
- May 1999 UPDF Captain Kyakabale appointed Bunia sector commander.
- 16 May 1999 A new RCD (Goma faction) leader is named: Emile Ilunga. The Goma and Kisangani factions of RCD ally themselves with Rwanda and Uganda, respectively.
- June 1999 Following abusive and illegal extension of the concessions, the Lendu revolt against the Hema estate owners and attack their estates. UPDF supports the estate owners. The collectivity of Walendu Pitsi is completely destroyed by UPDF. Bombardment of hundreds of Lendu villages by UPDF in the three Lendu communities of Djugu. Local non-governmental organizations denounce indiscriminate and disproportionate bombing, of which between 5,000 and 7,000 people are victims.
- 18 June 1999 Adèle Lotsove, a Hema, appointed Governor of Ituri and Haut-Uele (two districts in the vast Orientale Province) by UPDF. She is later widely criticized for inflaming the situation and for her partisan handling of subsequent peace talks.
- 5 July 1999 Lotsove announces the formation of the “province” of Kibali-Ituri.
- 10 July 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement is signed in Zambia by the six States involved in the conflict. The rebel MLC signs on 1 August. RCD rebels sign on 31 August.

6 August 1999	The Security Council authorizes the deployment of United Nations liaison personnel in support of the Lusaka Agreement.
September 1999	Military operation in Ame, <i>collectivité</i> of Walendu Pitsi, by UPDF under Captain Kyakabale. Lendu civilians are killed on the bridge over the River Aruda.
14 September 1999	Major attack by Lendu forces on Dhendro, a Hema village located in the <i>collectivité</i> of Bahema Nord; 416 Hema reported killed.
18 September 1999	The RCD-Kisangani faction is renamed RCD-ML. Wamba is confirmed President, with Bunia as his stronghold. Mbusa Nyamwisi and Jacques Depelchin are appointed prime minister and local administration minister, respectively.
18 October 1999	“Province” of Ituri splits from Haut-Uele district.
October 1999	A United Nations assessment mission declares the human rights and humanitarian situation in Ituri “catastrophic”, estimating over 100,000 internally displaced persons and scores of villages burned to the ground. Estimates of deaths range from 5,000 to 7,000.
October 1999	RCD-ML appoints Jacques Depelchin as the chairman of a peace and security commission with the aim of promoting dialogue and reconciliation among the parties.
21 October 1999	First mission of United Nations liaison personnel to Bunia.
November 1999	Divisions between Wamba and Nyamwisi become more serious. Nyamwisi takes control of Beni.
28 November 1999	Slaughter by UPDF soldiers of 10 Lendu peasants who come to sell their food products at the market of Bambumines, <i>collectivité</i> of Banyari Kilo.
End of November 1999	Confrontations between Lendu combatants and UPDF soldiers based in Bambumines, the shopping centre of Kobu. Thousands of Lendu peasants leave their villages to take refuge in Bambumines, which they regard as a secure refuge because of the presence of the office of the gold mines of Kilo Moto.
1 December 1999	Killings of Lendu at Bambu, <i>collectivité</i> of Banyari Kilo; 300 civilian deaths reported.
13 December 1999	According to ICRC, up to 150,000 people are displaced as a result of fighting in Ituri.
December 1999	According to Wamba, Captain Kyakabale of UPDF is dismissed for “hiring out soldiers to Hema leaders”. He is replaced by UPDF Lieutenant Colonel Arocha.
16 December 1999	Wamba dismisses Lotsove and replaces her with Ernest Uringi Padolo, an Alur.
20 December 1999	The Depelchin Commission publishes its report and a draft treaty for the pacification of the region.

December 1999	The human rights organization of the DRC, ASADHO, in <i>Rapport de l'Asadho sur le conflit inter-ethnique Hema-Lendu en territoire de Djugu dans la Province Orientale</i> , accuses Captain Kyakabale of massive human rights violations.
December 1999	The former President of Botswana, Ketumile Masire, is appointed to serve as facilitator of the inter-Congolese dialogue provided for in the Lusaka Agreement.
2000	
January 2000	MSF reports 180,000 internally displaced persons in Ituri. Humanitarian organizations attempt to gear up in a period of relative calm.
18 January 2000	Report on the situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Roberto Garretón (E/CN.4/2000/42).
24 January 2000	MONUC announces first phase of deployment of liaison officers to Bunia.
29 January 2000	MSF-Holland suspends all operations in Ituri and says that growing distrust among the population towards MSF with regard to its neutrality has led to a violent attack on an MSF team.
End of January 2000	The entire community of Walendu Djatsi is engulfed in inter-ethnic war. Many Lendu villages are set on fire by Ugandan soldiers. More than 1,000 Lendu are allegedly killed. The Lendu organize and create a military camp in Mbau.
February 2000	A report by the human rights group ASADHO says the conflict was sparked off in April 1999 when Hema landowners evicted Lendu farmers from land adjoining theirs, with the support of RCD-ML and the Ugandan authorities. ASADHO claims that Ugandan soldiers were actively involved in the killing of Lendu.
24 February 2000	The Security Council expands MONUC mandate in resolution 1291 (2000).
March 2000	MONUC deploys liaison officers to Bunia.
24 March 2000	A United Nations inter-agency assessment mission finds humanitarian situation "close to catastrophic".
April 2000	Ugandan authorities replace Colonel Arocha with Colonel Charles Angina.
4-10 June 2000	Heavy fighting breaks out between Ugandan and Rwandan forces in Kisangani.
August 2000	Training of Hema militia members in Uganda, in the camp of Kyakwanzi. In six months, 750 militia members are trained. Thomas Lubanga and Chief Kawa are reportedly among the trainees.
August 2000	The conflict gradually reaches the <i>collectivité</i> of Walendu Tatsi where several villages are burned, including the main town of Masumbuko.
September 2000	A group of Lendu seek refuge in the church of Lita located in Walendu Tatsi because of military operations in the region. Hema militiamen, accompanied by UPDF based in Katoto, enter the church and massacre the civilians.

5 November 2000	UPDF appoints a new sector commander. Colonel Angina is replaced with Colonel Edison Muzora.
20 November 2000	Divisions in RCD-ML come to a head. Nyamwisi and Tibasima remove Wamba from power in the “November putsch”. Uganda appears to give up protecting Wamba. Meanwhile splits in RCD-ML produce several militias and two new factions: RCD-ML dissident Roger Lumbala starts a movement called RCD-National and, in Beni, Governor Bwanakawa Nyonyi sets up the short-lived RCD-Populaire.
2001	
December 2000-January 2001	Hema dignitaries of Irumu travel to Kampala to convince President Museveni to deploy three battalions in the <i>collectivité</i> of Walendu Bindi. Once on the ground, UPDF battalions target hundreds of villages, schools, dispensaries and parishes. Many die as a result of indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks.
6 January 2001	Lendu Ngiti militias attack Nyankunde town, killing some 50 persons, mostly Hema civilians, and displacing thousands.
January 2001	The RCD-ML power struggle results in Governor Uringi and Depelchin being expelled from Bunia. Wamba remains in Kampala.
15 January 2001	At least 3,500 people, mainly Hema, in the territories affected by the conflict seek refuge over the border in Uganda.
16 January 2001	President Laurent-Désiré Kabila is shot dead. Joseph Kabila succeeds him.
18 January 2001	Ngiti militias from Irumu attack the UPDF base at Bunia airport in order to destroy the Ugandan helicopters, which they believe took part in the bombardment of Ngiti villages in Walendu Bindi. Several Ugandans are allegedly killed during the operation.
19-21 January 2001	An organized massacre of Lendu inhabitants is carried out in the Mudzipela area of Bunia. Each Lendu family is visited house by house by Hema of Bunia, and approximately 250 persons are killed, mostly by nail-studded sticks distributed before the attack, and their houses are set on fire.
16 January 2001	A new rebel alliance, FLC, is formed after weeks of talks in Kampala. It combines Bemba’s MLC, RCD-ML and Lumbala’s RCD-National. Bemba is to lead the group while Nyamwisi is appointed Vice-President and Tibasima Minister for Mines and Energy. Wamba rejects the deal.
1 February 2001	Report on the situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Roberto Garretón (E/CN.4/2001/40).
February 2001	A major peace meeting is held in Bunia. A peace agreement is signed by Hema and Lendu community leaders. Bemba, now the most senior rebel leader in the region, states: “The militia will have to be disarmed and dispersed.” A follow-up commission is to monitor and move the process forward.

20 February 2001	The United Nations estimates 140,000 displaced in Ituri.
27 February 2001	Dual Hema and Lendu deputy governors are appointed by FLC.
March 2001	Human Rights Watch publishes a 50-page report entitled <i>Uganda in Eastern DRC: Fuelling Political and Ethnic Strife</i> , alleging that Ugandan soldiers had involved themselves in the conflict and had “blatantly exploited Congolese wealth for their own benefit and that of their superiors at home”.
29 March 2001	Bemba announces an agreement reached with the Mai-Mai militia and arrangements for the demobilization of the Ugandan rebels of ADF and NALU.
12 April 2001	The United Nations Panel of Experts issues its first report on the exploitation of resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, concluding that the Governments of Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda profited from the conflict by looting gold and other precious minerals, diamonds, timber, ivory and tax revenues.
26 April 2001	Six ICRC workers, four Congolese, one Colombian and one Swiss, are killed on the road between Djugu and Fataki. All international humanitarian agencies halt their activities. A group of Hema professors from the Institut supérieur pédagogique are alleged to have been among the organizers. Hema militias are alleged to have executed the killing.
9 May 2001	Colonel Mohammed Buli Bangolo, from Equateur Province, is appointed Governor of Ituri by FLC.
4 June 2001	Fighting between Bemba’s and Nyamwisi’s troops breaks out in Beni. Nyamwisi’s forces appear to win. FLC starts to disintegrate, and Nyamwisi and Bemba part company by August, dividing the territory into spheres of influence in August. The Nyamwisi faction becomes known as RCD-Kisangani/ML, and Wamba continues to claim legitimacy as leader of the original RCD-ML.
11 June 2001	Uganda establishes a judicial commission of inquiry, which later becomes known as the Porter Commission, into allegations of the exploitation of natural resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
27 June 2001	Humanitarian agencies resume work in Ituri.
27 June 2001	Nyamwisi and RCD-National of Lumbala announce an alliance. Lumbala is named as part of Nyamwisi’s delegation to the inter-Congolese dialogue but remains allied to Bemba.
July 2001	UPC is created with Thomas Lubanga as leader. Lotsove is reportedly a co-founder. The party comes to prominence only a year later.
18 August 2001	Wamba’s rump factions of RCD-ML ally themselves with Bemba’s alliance, FLC, possibly to secure participation in the upcoming inter-Congolese dialogue.

November 2001	Colonel Fred Seka Mwenge is appointed new UPDF commander.
11 November 2001	RCD-K/ML sets up as a separate party under Nyamwisi with Tibasima as Vice-President.
21 November 2001	Bemba's MLC withdraws troops from Bunia, citing "confusion" in RCD-ML and RCD-K/ML.
28 November 2001	Appointment of Iulia Motoc as Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo by the Commission on Human Rights.
December 2001	RCD-K/ML attempts to broaden its base by including Thomas Lubanga as Minister for Defence and bringing back Wamba and Uringi.
December 2001	Joseph Eneko Nguaza, from Aru, is appointed Governor of Ituri.
2002	
January 2002	Bemba and Lumbala make territorial gains against the RCD-K/ML, taking Isiro, Watsa and Bafwasende.
January 2002	Clashes reported for the first time between Alur and Lendu in Nioka, to the north of Bunia. Ugandan media report 50 deaths. The Alur and Lendu had previously been regarded as not hostile to one another.
1 February 2002	Ugandan Defence Minister Amama Mbabazi remarks that the situation in Bunia is explosive and calls on the United Nations to send troops to take control of the area.
2 February 2002	Jean-Pierre Lompondo Molondo from the Kasai is appointed Governor of Ituri by Nyamwisi. Lubanga is sidelined from the military control of RCD-K/ML.
9 February 2002	Hema militias and UPDF attack Gety. They destroy houses and allegedly kill 35 civilians.
19 April 2002	ICD Sun City peace meetings adjourn after reaching a wide agreement, but defer key provisions on power sharing. Both Wamba and Nyamwisi attend as representatives of RCD-ML. Lubanga starts to split from RCD-K/ML and initiates the creation of UPC.
17 May 02	Attack by Hema militia on Walu, <i>collectivité</i> of Babalebe, Irumu territory. A witness reports to MONUC having buried 42 bodies.
19 May 2002	A delegation from Kinshasa, including the Ministers of the Interior and Human Rights, visits Ituri. The Minister for Human Rights, Ntumba Lwaba, says that three years of fighting have led to 20,000 deaths.
May 2002	Humanitarian agencies estimate 500,000 people are displaced in Ituri.

June 2002	The first UPC delegation, including Chief Kawa, meets Rwandan authorities.
7 June 2002	Lendu militia attack Hema militia training camp at Mandro and claim to have killed Rwandan trainers.
10 June 2002	Heritage Oil Corporation announces it has signed an agreement with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to explore oil opportunities in a vast swathe of the north-eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, including eastern Ituri.
9-12 June 2002	Following an attack by APC and Hema militias, Lendu forces agree not to attack Nyali provided that the Hema population leaves.
12 June 2002	The former Prime Minister of Senegal, Moustapha Niasse, appointed United Nations Special Envoy to help to advance the inter-Congolese dialogue.
13 June 2002	Lubanga and others arrested in Kampala and transferred to Kinshasa. At the same time, UPDF officers maintain close contact with the UPC movement in Bunia.
Early July 2002	Scores of people die in fighting in Bunia between RCD-K/ML and a militia supporting Lubanga. UPDF allegedly back Lubanga.
28 July 2002	The Institut supérieur pédagogique is empty, most of the Hema students having left for the military training camp in Mandro. They will stay there for two weeks. The students will then be organized, formed in patrols, and some of them will be given weapons.
30 July 2002	Peace agreement between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo signed in Pretoria.
Beginning of August 2002	Deployment of UPC in Nyankunde.
6-9 August 2002	Fighting starts between UPC and APC in Bunia. UPDF supports UPC. Some 300 civilians are killed.
9 August 2002	Governor Lompondo and APC are chased out of Bunia, and UPC takes control of the city. UPC and UPDF continue to kill, plunder and destroy houses belonging to the ethnic group they wish to remove.
9-28 August 2002	Several military operations carried out by UPC against Lendu localities of Lipri, Zumbe, Penyi, Loga, Za and Ezekere. Villages are burned down and a large number of civilians killed, including Chief Pilo of Ezekele.
14 August 2002	Mbusa Nyamwisi agrees to withdraw his troops from Irumu in order to facilitate a negotiated approach, and states that there will be no counter-attack against Bunia.
18 August 2002	Cross-roads between Beni, Bunia and Komanda taken by UPC.
23 August 2002	Fighting between Ngiti and UPC in Komanda. High numbers of civilians are reportedly killed.

23 August 2002	Mission report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and a member of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances: note by the Secretary-General (A/57/349).
August 2002	Kidnapping and summary execution of Lendu and Bira civilians in Bunia and its surroundings. Other Bira and Lendu intellectuals have their houses burned but succeed in escaping to North Kivu.
31 August 2002	Military operation of UPC, from Nyankunde, against the Lendu locality of Songolo. The group finds mostly children and women and reportedly massacres around 140 of them.
27-29 August 2002	UPC attack is launched against the non-Iturian population in the gold mine of Mabanga, 32 km from Bunia. Around 150 civilians are killed.
29 August 2002	Human Rights Minister Ntumba Lwaba visits Bunia to bolster peace talks under way in Kinshasa. He is taken hostage by Chief Kawa in Mandro. The kidnapping is resolved with the release of nine UPC prisoners, including Lubanga, from Kinshasa's custody.
August 2002	In Boga, a Hema militia is organized in the city, with a majority of youths including minors.
1 September 2002	Community leaders at the Kinshasa peace talks demand the departure of the Ugandans and their replacement by a police force. Ntumba Lwaba alleges Rwanda is moving forces into Ituri in preparation for the departure of UPDF.
2 September 2002	A UPC government is formed in Bunia with Lotsove as Finance Minister, Jean-Baptiste Dhetchuvi as Foreign Minister and Eneko as Governor.
5 September 2002	A coalition of APC, Lendu, Ngiti and Mai-Mai militias attack Nyankunde, target Hema and Bira ethnic groups, and allegedly kill more than 1,000 people in the town and neighbouring villages.
6 September 2002	Luanda Agreement signed between Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. A 100-day timetable is set for UPDF withdrawal after the establishment of the Ituri Pacification Commission.
10 September 2002	Special report of the Secretary-General notes that, in the Ituri district, 200,000 people have been killed since June 1999, 500,000 newly displaced, and that 60,000 of those displaced are in Bunia; UPC have captured important towns on the Mahagi-Bunia-Beni axis and reduced the RCD-K/ML power base.
16 September 2002	APC and Lendu militia from Kpandroma, <i>collectivité</i> of Djugu, launch an attack against Mahagi, 53 km from Bunia.

29 September 2002	Interim report on the situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Iulia Motoc (A/57/437).
7 October 2002	UPC elements occupy Mahagi.
15 October 2002	The second report of the Panel of Experts on the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo accuses UPDF of continuing to provoke ethnic conflict for economic gain, particularly in Ituri.
October 2002	Humanitarian agencies encounter difficulties in securing permission to land flights in Bunia from UPC which controls it. Relations between UPC and humanitarian agencies remain strained.
20 October-10 November 2002	UPC launches several military operations against the Lendu localities of Nombe, Kagabe, Songolo, Androzo, Pinga, Singo, Mongbwalu and Tseletsele. Hundreds of localities are burned down and an unknown number of civilians massacred.
22 November 2002	The former Governor of Ituri, Joseph Eneko Nguaza, is killed in an ambush 20 km from Mahagi, together with eight representatives of Iturian <i>collectivités</i> .
November 2002	Stalemate with regard to the Ituri Pacification Commission due to insistence of Lubanga that Ituri be recognized as a province, not a district. Kinshasa refuses.
End November-end December 2002	MLC together with RCD-N and UPC attack Mambasa, conduct systematic looting, rape and killing of hundreds of civilians. The operation is known to the population as “ <i>effacer le tableau</i> ”.
December 2002	UPC reportedly organizes a sizeable military operation in Mongbwalu with the assistance of MLC and finally succeeds in seizing Mongbwalu.
17 December 2002	Comprehensive peace deal signed at inter-Congolese dialogue talks in Pretoria.
20 December 2002	Creation of FIPI; including PUSIC, FPDC and FNI/FRPI in Ariwara.
31 December 2002	MLC, RCD-N and RCD-ML sign a ceasefire agreement under the auspices of MONUC in Gbadolite.

2003

6 January 2003	RCD-Goma announces that it has formed an alliance with UPC.
6 January 2003	Rethy and Kpandroma captured by RCD-K/ML and Lendu militia during operations against UPC.
15 January 2003	UPC attacks Nioka and destroys the nutritional centre for children established by an international non-governmental organization. They arrest and beat priests accused of assisting the Lendu population.

17 February-6 March 2003	UPC attacks the Lendu localities of Lipri, Bambu and Kobu, in the <i>collectivité</i> of Banyari Kilo, and burns down all surrounding villages.
21 February 2003	The Secretary-General, in his thirteenth Report on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2003/211), notes widespread insecurity, massive displacement and severely restricted humanitarian access in Ituri; displacement of 100,000 persons in the north-east since October 2002; ongoing human rights violations; ongoing fighting between Hema and Lendu aligned groups; and difficulties in monitoring by MONUC due to security conditions.
24 February 2003	Ngiti attack Bogoro, <i>collectivité</i> of Bahema Sud. Execution of around 350 civilians.
4 March 2003	Jérôme Kakwavu creates a new rebel group, FAPC.
6 March 2003	Fighting breaks out between UPDF and UPC in Bunia. UPC is chased out of Bunia.
17 March 2003	Attack on Drodro Catholic compound results in deaths of 17 students.
20 March 2003	The Security Council in resolution 1468 (2003) requests Secretary-General to increase presence of MONUC in the Ituri district and to monitor developments on the ground.
2 April 2003	Final Act of the inter-Congolese dialogue is signed in Sun City.
3 April 2003	Lendu attack on Drodro results in killing of some 400 civilians.
4-14 April 2003	First meeting of the Ituri Pacification Commission in Bunia.
7 April 2003	Joseph Kabila is formally sworn in as President for the transitional period.
15 April 2003	Report on the situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Iulia Motoc (E/CN.4/2003/43).
6 May 2003	UPDF troops leave Bunia.
10 May 2003	Killing of 2 priests and 16 civilians in Nyakasanza church, Bunia, by Lendu militia.
14 May 2003	Two MONUC military observers reported missing at Mongbwalu (bodies recovered on 18 May).
6-16 May 2003	Fighting breaks out between Lendu militias and UPC. Some 500 civilians are reportedly killed. Most of the population of Bunia flees the city.
17 May 2003	Ceasefire is negotiated by MONUC between UPC and FNI.
23 May 2003	Kilo, Itende and Lisey, in the <i>collectivité</i> of Banyari Kilo, are attacked by Lendu combatants from Nyangaraye; 35 villages are reportedly set on fire.

24 May 2003	Signature of a ceasefire agreement between FNI and UPC under the patronage of Joseph Kabila and Amos Namanga Ngongi, Special Representative of the Secretary-General.
27 May 2003	UPC drives FNI troops out of Bunia.
30 May 2003	The Security Council by resolution 1484 (2003) authorizes the deployment of an Interim Emergency Multinational Force in Bunia until 1 September 2003 to provide protection and security to civilians.
31 May 2003	Attack against Tchomia by Lendu and Ngiti militias with the alleged support of APC and FAC. Some 90 civilians are killed.
5 June 2003	The European Union Council by decision 2003/432/CFSP authorizes Operation Artemis in accordance with the mandate set out in resolution 1484 (2003) and establishes the logistics (France is the framework nation, Major General Neveux is appointed Commander).
10 June 2003	Following a Lendu attack on Nioka, the town is destroyed; according to investigations carried out by MONUC, some 60 civilians are killed.
11 June 2003	Lendu and Ngiti militias attack Kasenyi and kill at least 80 civilians.
12 June 2003	Operation Artemis begins; 400 soldiers deployed in Bunia and 500 in Entebbe for logistical support.
19 June 2003	Ceasefire agreement signed in Burundi.
1 July 2003	Transitional Government installed.
6-7 July 2003	Attack against Ambe and its surroundings by Lendu and Ngiti militias. At least 30 civilians are allegedly killed.
15 July 2003	Attack on Tchomia by Lendu and Ngiti militia results in 10 civilians killed.
19 July 2003	Attack on Fataki by FNI and FAPC; 22 civilians are allegedly killed.
23 July 2003	Attack on Kaseyni by Ngiti militia results in 16 civilians killed.
28 July 2003	By resolution 1493 (2003) the Security Council places the mandate of MONUC under Chapter VII and authorizes the Mission to take the necessary measures to protect civilians in Ituri and the Kivus.
5 August 2003	Attack on Fataki by FNI and FAPC. Perhaps as many as 100 civilians killed.
22 August 2003	Reports of massacre in the locality of Gobu, located between Mandro and Katoto. At least 23 people appear to have been killed.
End August-beginning September 2003	Reports of new attacks against the population of Fataki and Bule. First reports of the existence of forced labour camps near Fataki (Habo, Libi, Bali, Aleda, Ali and Beau Marché) run by Lendu combatants.
15 September 2003	The Multinational Force leaves Bunia and is replaced by the military elements of MONUC under the name Ituri Brigade.

15 September 2003	UPC organizes demonstrations in Bunia to celebrate its anniversary and demands that leaders arrested by MONUC be released. The demonstrations provoke incidents that result in the arrest of 74 people, and 28 the following day. Kisémbu, Rafiki and Lobo are kept under house arrest for a few days, the rest are released the following day. During the incidents caused by UPC, at least 12 people are injured.
29 September 2003	Eight police officers arrested in May 2003 are released. Kisémbu, Rafiki and Lobo organize the handover to MONUC. The police officers are transferred back to Kinshasa.
6 October 2003	Lendu forces attack Kachele, near Bule, in the <i>collectivité</i> of Bahema Badjere, leaving 65 people dead.
17 October 2003	MONUC arrests Matthieu Ngudjolo, Chief of Staff of FNI.
9 November 2003	MONUC arrests Aimable Saba Rafiki, Chief of Security of UPC.
2004	
January	Magistrates and members of the Prosecutor's Office of the Tribunal de Grande Instance of Bunia return to Bunia with the assistance of MONUC, the European Union and French Cooperation. Victims of human rights violations start lodging complaints.