



## Security Council

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### Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on Angola

#### I. Introduction

1. This report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1294 (2000) of 13 April 2000, by which the Council requested me to submit to it periodic reports on developments in Angola, including recommendations about additional measures the Council might consider for promoting the peace process in the country. The report provides an update of the situation since my report of 10 October 2001 (S/2001/956).

2. The report summarizes key developments in Angola since the last report, especially developments since the death of the UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi. It also proposes adjustments to the mandate and structure of the United Nations presence in Angola, following consultations with the Government and other stakeholders in the Angolan peace process, in the context of the Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Government and UNITA on 4 April 2002, the 15-point Agenda for Peace issued by the Government on 13 March 2002 and the outstanding provisions of the Lusaka Protocol.

#### II. Developments leading to the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding

3. During the consultation undertaken by my Special Adviser for Special Assignments in Africa, Under-Secretary-General Ibrahim A. Gambari, in Luanda last December, the Government of Angola asked the United Nations to resume its role as mediator of the conflict

and to be more proactive in the peace process, including by re-establishing contacts with UNITA in support of the effort to find a political settlement to the conflict. Following the request, I wrote to the President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo, asking for his help in contacting Mr. Savimbi. The Secretariat also established contact with the Community of Santo Egidio in Rome, based on our understanding that Mr. Savimbi had made contact with the Community. In addition, we sought the support of leaders in southern Africa for our efforts.

4. Those contacts were intended to ascertain the readiness of Mr. Savimbi to resume the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. Moreover, contacts with the external missions of UNITA were established in mid-February 2002, which resulted in expressions of commitment to the Lusaka Protocol by UNITA leaders outside the country, an interest in entering into direct negotiations with the Government under the Lusaka Protocol and a readiness to observe a unilateral ceasefire to address the dire humanitarian situation in the country and to discuss the role of civil society, particularly the churches, in the peace process.

5. Mr. Savimbi was killed in combat on 22 February 2002, however, and the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) quickly established, in situ, contacts with their counterparts in UNITA with a view to achieving a cessation of hostilities and ending the war. On 13 March, the Government unveiled its 15-point Agenda for Peace, which included a cessation of all military offensives by FAA at midnight of the same date; establishment, in situ, of contacts between the field commanders of the two sides to undertake the groundwork necessary for the establishment of a

general ceasefire; demilitarization of UNITA troops and their reintegration; general amnesty for the promotion of security and national reconciliation; extension of State administration, in all its aspects, throughout the national territory; elaboration of an emergency programme of humanitarian relief for the war-affected people; resettlement of displaced persons; a national population census; and registration for the electoral process. The Government's Agenda for Peace also contained urgent appeals to the international community not to abandon the people of Angola at a critical juncture in their history.

6. The first official contacts between the commanders of FAA and UNITA forces took place on 15 March 2002 in Cassaba, Moxico Province. The Deputy Chief of General Staff of FAA, General Geraldo Sachipendo "Nunda", and the Chief of High Command of General Staff of UNITA, General Abreu Muengo Wachitembo "Kamorteiro", led their respective delegations. In a joint communiqué issued after the meeting, the two sides reaffirmed their unequivocal commitment to the Lusaka Protocol and expressed their determination to make the necessary efforts for an immediate cessation of hostilities, as well as the resolution of the pending military tasks under the Protocol. They also agreed on an agenda for the talks, which began on 20 March 2002. After two weeks of talks in Luena, Moxico Province, they signed, on 4 April, a Memorandum of Understanding on the cessation of hostilities and the resolution of other remaining issues under the Lusaka Protocol.

### **III. The Memorandum of Understanding**

7. My Special Adviser represented the United Nations at the signing ceremony and also initialled the document as a witness. However, he entered a reservation to the text, which he also stated publicly: the United Nations does not recognize general amnesty for crimes against humanity and for violations of international humanitarian law and war crimes. He also stressed that any obligation assigned to the United Nations in the Memorandum of Understanding was subject to review by the Security Council and the General Assembly.

8. The Memorandum of Understanding is intended to replace the Lusaka Protocol with regard to its

military aspects. It details the responsibilities of FAA and those of UNITA forces for the observation of the ceasefire; the quartering of UNITA soldiers and their families; and the collection and destruction of weapons. It also grants a blanket amnesty for all crimes committed during the conflict. Moreover, the Government undertook to provide assistance to UNITA forces, manage the quartering areas and select and incorporate 5,000 UNITA military forces into FAA and the Angolan police. The Government also committed itself to assisting the families of UNITA forces, estimated at 300,000, providing vocational training to UNITA combatants and reintegrating them into civilian life. The Joint Military Commission was reinstated as the main body supervising the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding. It is chaired by the Deputy Chief of Staff of FAA and includes members of the UNITA military forces, as well as military observers from the United Nations and the Troika, i.e., the United States of America, the Russian Federation and Portugal.

9. The Joint Military Commission is supported by a Technical Group composed of members of FAA and UNITA forces and observers from the United Nations and the Troika. As at 15 June, the Commission had met three times. In addition to the Central Technical Group in Luanda, it has established eight regional technical groups. Each Regional Group consists of 24 FAA and UNITA staff personnel charged with implementing the Memorandum of Understanding in their respective regions. All the quartering areas are managed by the UNITA military, but with financial and other resources provided by the Government of Angola. Although the Government declared on 7 June that the quartering process had been completed, it extended the period by a few days to give time to UNITA military personnel in isolated areas to arrive in the designated quartering areas.

10. The Government has projected a total of 262 days to complete the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding from its signing on 4 April. At the end of the period, the Government intends to initiate the second phase of the peace process, which will include the re-establishment of the Joint Commission, to be chaired by the United Nations, to implement the outstanding political issues in the Lusaka Protocol. In the consultations held between my Special Adviser and President José Eduardo dos Santos in April 2002, the Government confirmed that the second phase would be

concurrent with the first. However, the Government has underlined the need to ensure that the first phase is on track before starting the second phase.

11. Since the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding, fighting has stopped in the entire country and no violations of the ceasefire have been reported. Furthermore, as at 2 July, more than 84,000 UNITA military personnel, including 658 foreign soldiers, have arrived in 36 quartering areas accompanied by close to 240,000 family members. Initially there were severe logistical difficulties in providing food, shelter and medicine in the quartering areas. However, FAA, United Nations agencies and their humanitarian partners have steadily rectified the initial difficulties and constraints. Nonetheless, the Government and UNITA face many challenges in their efforts to consolidate peace.

## **IV. Challenges for the consolidation of peace in Angola**

### **Political-security aspects**

12. There are certain political and security challenges associated with the proper quartering, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-UNITA combatants and their families. While most of the quartering has been accomplished, keeping the quartered military forces and their families gainfully occupied and determining their future remains a major challenge. In its 15-point Agenda for Peace, the Government has pledged to give assistance to demobilized soldiers, including those from earlier conflicts (estimated at about 150,000), and also to take care of the disabled, orphans and widows. The World Bank mission to Angola, conducted from 14 May to 4 June 2002, identified three groups of former combatants needing assistance in reintegration into society: about 79,000 people from UNITA, 33,000 from FAA and 160,000 from former case loads. The Government will face a serious challenge if it is to accomplish this task without the support of the international community, especially with respect to technical and management expertise and financial resources. The international community will need to help with the integration of former combatants, including support for vocational training, employment-generation activities and reconciliation programmes. Apart from technical and managerial expertise and

advice, the United Nations can offer its good offices to help prevent or resolve conflicts that may arise.

13. Angola also faces the challenge of restoring the rule of law and normalization of State administration. For decades, the country has lived under two administrative systems — that of the Government and that of UNITA. This situation continued even when UNITA lost its conventional military capacity and control over territories. Combatants moved around the country with their families and the population in the areas under their control. The new reality demands a return to a single administrative system in the country. In the past, extension of State administration to areas formerly controlled by UNITA has sparked controversy, conflict and violence. The challenge faced by the Angolan authorities is to devise a strategy of extension of State administration in a way that promotes peace, justice and reconciliation at the regional, provincial and municipal levels.

14. The Government of Angola plans to hold general elections after the conclusion of the peace process. In his letter to me of 6 June 2001, President dos Santos requested the United Nations support in organizing the elections. Consequently, I dispatched a technical team to clarify the nature of assistance required for the electoral process. The team identified a number of challenges in organizing elections in Angola. Although peace is a necessary precondition for conducting free and fair elections, there are additional challenges that stem from the legacy of a protracted civil war. These include the need to establish an appropriate legal framework (revision of the Constitution, electoral law, and appointment of an Independent Electoral Commission), voter registration and education, confidence-building and national reconciliation programmes. Clearly, the efforts of the Government in the electoral process will need to be supported.

### **Human rights aspects**

15. The large-scale humanitarian operations in the camps for internally displaced persons, which were recently enlarged to encompass the quartering and recovery areas for ex-UNITA soldiers and their families, play an important role in preventing a return to conflict at the present time. The more complex task of organizing the return of these citizens to their former communities, while integrating many others in urban centres in the provinces, poses an even greater human rights challenge.

16. The evidence on the ground shows that some Angolans may know their rights but few know how to use the law to protect and exercise those rights. The Human Rights Division of the United Nations Office in Angola has been systematically strengthening civil society organizations such as the Bar Association and a legal aid non-governmental organization, *Mãos Livres* (Free Hands), to address this problem and provide some legal assistance. Access to legal assistance is especially difficult in Angola, however, since as much as 80 per cent of the population is without the service of legal institutions. The situation in the provinces is most critical and there is an urgent need for medium-term, as well as long-term, solutions in response to complaints of human rights abuses.

17. If peace is to be sustained and conflict averted, all Angolans need to be convinced that the State can and will protect their rights. Given the history of colonialism and civil war for almost 30 years, this may be difficult to ensure quickly without the assistance of the international community, especially in an environment where most adult citizens have been dislocated from their places of origin and do not have identity cards, which is an essential requirement for effective participation in political and civic activities.

18. While the Angolan National Police play a very important role in maintaining law and order and responding to civil disorder, the environment of war has conditioned them to discharge their duties with little concern for respect for human rights. The police force may have strong internal disciplinary structures, but violations of the rights of citizens are not targeted systematically from the top down. In many ways, the police have served as a second army — not only on the battlefield but also in the urban neighbourhoods where they have controlled guerrilla activities. While human rights awareness has been developed to a considerable degree in Luanda, there has been very little impact in the provinces. In most provinces there is limited access to courts, and few resident prosecutors and lawyers to mediate disputes. Local governments, therefore, need to be strengthened and extended to all areas since there are almost no mechanisms specifically designed to protect and promote respect for human rights in those areas.

#### **Protection and rehabilitation of children**

19. The impact of over 30 years of civil war has been particularly devastating for Angola's children and

young people, who make up the majority of the population. My Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict had the opportunity to assess this situation at first hand during his recent visit to the country (11-17 May 2002).

20. Children constitute over half of Angola's 4 million internally displaced persons and a large proportion of the population coming out of the recently accessible areas. Most children suffer from severe malnutrition, malaria, measles, diarrhoea, respiratory ailments or other preventable diseases. About 700,000 children have lost one or both of their parents, and approximately 100,000 have been separated from their families, frequently ending up in the streets of larger cities. More than 60 per cent of school-age children do not have access to schooling. Indeed, over 5,000 schools were destroyed during the war. The majority of children do not have access to any form of health care, the infant mortality rate is the second highest in the world and one third of Angolan children die before their fifth birthday. Around 60 per cent of hospitals and health centres were destroyed during the war. Decades of exposure to violence and war have left a legacy of severe psycho-social trauma among Angola's children and young people. Thousands of children were used as combatants during the war and, even at present, they are particularly vulnerable to landmines and unexploded ordnance, which contaminate many parts of the countryside. Achieving sustainable peace and development, in the long run, is also contingent on addressing the critical health, education and other needs of the present generation of Angolan children.

#### **Humanitarian aspects**

21. After three decades of warfare, the chances for a sustainable peace are higher than at any time since Angola became independent. The end of the war brings real opportunities to reduce poverty and systematically address the humanitarian needs of the Angolan people. However, the peace dividend is still far from visible to millions of people. One in four Angolans is internally displaced as a direct result of the conflict. Hundreds of thousands of people, particularly in interior regions, are in critical condition, and at least 3 million, or 30 per cent of the population, will require some form of emergency assistance in the next six months.

22. The implications of the cessation of hostilities for Angola's humanitarian crisis are noteworthy. On the one hand, the end of the war has markedly improved

humanitarian access to vulnerable populations but, on the other hand, the intensification of military activity during the final stages of the war resulted in massive displacements and extreme human suffering. Recent assessments confirm that the majority of people in newly accessible areas are in serious distress, having been deprived of social services for many years and having lost their sources of livelihood during the prolonged war. Furthermore, the Government-led quartering process has meant the concentration of more than 300,000 UNITA combatants and their families, many of whom are also in critical condition and require life-saving assistance to survive.

23. These factors have combined to create a generalized humanitarian crisis of immense proportions. In a matter of weeks after the ceasefire agreement, the number of people requiring emergency assistance swelled from 2 million to 3 million. Although the level of internal displacement has decreased following the end of the war, the number of those who can be accessed is on the increase. The number of therapeutic feeding centres for the severely malnourished increased from approximately 20 in March 2002 to more than 50 in June 2002. In contrast, the resources and capacities of United Nations agencies and their partners, which provide the bulk of humanitarian assistance, have consistently remained at levels much lower than the assessed needs. By April, only 13 per cent of the US\$ 233 million requested in the 2002 Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal had been received, increasing only to about 34 per cent by July 2002.

## **V. Current responses and continuing challenges**

24. The humanitarian community, including 100 international non-governmental organizations, 340 national organizations and 10 United Nations agencies, has moved rapidly to expand the emergency operation to cover the critical needs of acutely affected populations. At the same time, the agencies have struggled to maintain existing programmes, while simultaneously laying the groundwork for return and recovery programmes. Thousands of humanitarian personnel are involved in the operations, which cover all humanitarian sectors in 17 of the country's 18 provinces. The next six months are critical, both for the operations and for the country. Humanitarian assistance must reach millions of people to ensure the survival of

the hardest-hit communities, promote reconciliation, stabilize vulnerable populations and lay the groundwork for recovery.

25. Despite indications that the forthcoming harvest may be better than last year's, food insecurity is expected to persist, particularly for internally displaced persons who did not have access to good quality land and agricultural inputs during the last planting season. The food-supply pipeline remains precarious at this stage, and may break in October unless funding is urgently received. Funding for other emergency sectors including non-food items, health, water and sanitation and agricultural support is also urgently required. With increased access in the countryside, an efficient logistics network is a top priority. Transport service for non-food items by air and road must be expanded to ensure that emergency assistance is delivered to hard-to-reach locations. In addition, the existing passenger air service must expand to include newly accessible locations and family areas that remain inaccessible by road. In both cases, additional funds are needed. The lack of timely and comprehensive funding is the most significant constraint affecting humanitarian operations.

26. Following a countrywide assessment of some of the newly accessible areas, preliminary requirements for the United Nations and some partner non-governmental organizations for the next six months were outlined in a "bridging request" which was presented to the donor community during an assessment mission to Angola last June (see para. 41) led by my Special Adviser. The request for \$141 million is designed to cover the life-saving emergency needs of highly vulnerable people and to support the return of as many internally displaced persons as possible before the next agricultural season. A mid-term review of the appeal, which will give a more complete picture of the requirements for the rest of the year, will be presented in August 2002.

27. Given the enormity of the humanitarian tasks, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations alone will not be able to cover all the needs. The Government has made some effort to address the situation, but should do more to share the burden, including by making urgent repairs to key infrastructures such as major surface routes, bridges and airstrips, the condition of which continues to impede the delivery of humanitarian assistance. In addition, the Government should expedite customs clearance for humanitarian material and ensure prompt

issuance of visas for international personnel engaged in the delivery of relief materials.

#### **Status of assistance to families of demobilized UNITA soldiers**

28. The rapid pace at which the quartering process is proceeding and the severe nutritional and health status of a sizeable portion of this population (in some quartering areas, a 30 per cent rate of severe malnutrition has been recorded) had initially overwhelmed the implementation capacity of the Government. United Nations agencies moved quickly to assess conditions in the sites immediately after they were given permission by the Government to enter quartering areas on 24 May 2002. The approach of the United Nations and non-governmental organizations is to complement the Government's efforts by providing targeted assistance to families in the quartering areas. By early July 2002, the United Nations had assessed and delivered assistance to 34 of the 36 family quartering areas and multisectoral operations were already under way in at least 20 of those areas. Ongoing and planned activities include the establishment of health and nutritional referral systems, vaccination campaigns, the distribution of emergency food aid, water and sanitation interventions, provision of alternative education for children and distribution of agricultural tools and seeds. In addition, several key protection issues will be addressed, including the status and rehabilitation of child soldiers.

#### **Humanitarian priorities and strategies**

29. To cope with the needs of the displaced population and other vulnerable groups, United Nations agencies, including FAO, UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, WHO and ILO, in collaboration with non-governmental and international organizations, have agreed on a common approach aimed at stabilizing the conditions of the most acutely affected populations, while simultaneously undertaking community-based initiatives to facilitate the return, resettlement and reintegration of displaced populations. The agencies will work closely with the newly established National Commission for Social and Productive Reintegration of the Displaced and Demobilized. The reintegration of returnees and the return of internally displaced persons during the short term will be done in line with the Government's legal framework (*regulamento*) and the provincial

Emergency Plans of Action for Resettlement and Return currently being developed in each province. As many as 500,000 internally displaced persons will probably return or resettle during the coming months, although mine infestation, potential disputes over land abandoned for many years, the disruption of the health service network and difficult access will affect the extent and speed of the return and reintegration process.

30. The number of Angolan refugees in neighbouring countries totals approximately 450,000, including 234,238 in Zambia, 194,332 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 24,000 in Namibia and 15,430 in the Republic of the Congo. The majority of these refugees originate from the Provinces of Moxico, Uíge, Zaire and Cuando Cubango. While conditions for the organized voluntary return of refugees are not yet in place, owing to logistics and security constraints, accessibility problems and low absorption capacity in areas of return, a spontaneous repatriation movement has started, and an estimated 10,000 persons have already returned to Angola through Zaire, Uíge and Moxico Provinces. According to estimates, at least 80,000 refugees could return spontaneously before the end of 2002. To address this, UNHCR field offices are reopening in the major returnee provinces to prepare reception conditions and facilities. Local conditions permitting, UNHCR plans to start organizing, as from early in 2003, large-scale movements of return on behalf of the remaining refugees.

#### **Transition to recovery and medium-term development**

31. While there are some positive economic developments (GDP grew at a rate of 3.5 per cent in 2001 and inflation has been on the decline, slipping from 268 per cent in 2000 to 116 per cent in 2001), social indicators remain at very low levels. According to a survey released by the Government in November 2001, the rate of extreme poverty rose to 26 per cent of the population in 11 of the 17 provinces surveyed between 1995 and 2001. In addition, a study by the Government and United Nations agencies in November 2001 confirms that the HIV/AIDS prevalence rate is estimated to have nearly tripled since 1999, reaching 8.6 per cent. There is concern that the transmission rate is particularly high among specific high-risk groups. An effective response to the increasing threat of HIV/AIDS, particularly in the light of expected

population movements during the post-conflict period, is an urgent priority.

32. Together with specific post-conflict measures for the successful reintegration of returnees, including both internally displaced persons and refugees, the United Nations and the international community should focus their medium-term strategy on helping the Government to face four major challenges, namely, (1) the reduction of rural and urban poverty through policies that promote improved access of the poor to employment, land and other resources; (2) the rebuilding of the social sectors, with particular emphasis on basic social services including health and education; (3) the mounting of an effective response to the increasing threat of HIV/AIDS, taking into account population movements during the post-war period; and (4) the promotion of political participation and democratic accountability, combined with the strengthening of public administration, including systems for ensuring rigour and transparency in the management of public resources.

33. In the context of ongoing institutional reform and efforts towards greater decentralization and improved transparency, initiatives are already being undertaken to strengthen national capacity to manage public affairs, improve the delivery of public services, promote transparency, coordination and accountability, and strengthen public-private partnerships. As part of the wider Programa Global de Reforço da Capacitação Institucional e Administração da Justiça (Comprehensive Programme for Strengthening Institutional Capacity and the Administration of Justice) of the Ministry of Justice, a complementary initiative aimed at capacity-building at local levels in support of resettlement and the creation of sustainable livelihoods is being supported by two United Nations agencies. The aim is to recruit, train and field municipal justice personnel throughout the country. The Ministries of Finance, Education and Health have also taken steps towards improving the budgetary allocation mechanisms by developing a study on expenditures in the social sectors, supported by three United Nations agencies and the International Organization for Migration.

34. In addition to this initiative, two World Bank missions were fielded during May and June 2002 to help the Government prepare an Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Programme and

assess the needs for overall reconstruction and development during the immediate post-conflict period.

35. Following the Government's request, UNDP has formulated a Pilot Reintegration and Recovery Programme. The approach is based on a strategic shift from resettlement to return and reintegration of war-displaced populations. The Pilot Reintegration and Recovery Programme aims to provide material assistance to target populations and to strengthen local capacity to deliver assistance.

36. Despite the scale of domestic resources available to the Government, dependence on donor assistance has been extremely high in some specific sectors, including humanitarian assistance. Continued support from donors cannot be guaranteed, although a re-direction of expenditures by the Government towards the social sectors will make it easier to advocate for complementary funding from the international community. Many donors are still waiting to see if key strategy documents, such as the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, will provide a clear policy direction. The International Monetary Fund has been unable, under its rules, to consider lending to Angola without the successful implementation of the necessary reforms. An agreement between the Government and IMF on a Fund loan is not considered likely before 2003.

#### **Mine action**

37. Angola is one of the most heavily mined countries in the world and has one of the highest rates of landmine injuries per capita. Most mine action is undertaken by international non-governmental organizations, working effectively although with insufficient resources relative to the scope of the problem. There has been no recent assessment of the Government's capability for mine clearance and a quick response is likely to be hampered by a lack of logistics, training, and quality control. National priority setting and coordination remain poor although the Government, with UNDP support, has been working to improve this. At the provincial level, the effectiveness of coordination varies.

38. Donors report that three factors inhibit their funding of mine action, namely, (1) lack of resources committed by Government; (2) continuing use of mines and non-ratification of the Ottawa Convention; and (3) perceived management weaknesses in the national

programme. However, the Government of Angola ratified the Ottawa Convention on 5 July 2002 and has stated its intention to address the remaining issues.

39. Short-term international responses should build on existing capacities. Urgent resources are required to expand mine action and reorient current activities in line with new circumstances including, for example, increased surveys of newly accessible areas and mine risk education, coordinated by UNICEF, for returning populations. Strengthened coordination is required at national and provincial levels. Concurrent support to the national institutions is crucial in assisting the Government to determine national priorities and a longer-term strategy, including the development of its own capabilities in this field.

40. The immediate deployment by UNDP of a United Nations Mine Action Programme Manager is planned, to advise the Government and to coordinate the United Nations mine action response. Provincial field advisers will assist local authorities and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in integrating mine action into the plans of non-governmental organizations and United Nations agencies, such as UNHCR and WFP. The United Nations Mine Action Service is assisting UNDP to launch these activities. Cost estimates are \$18 million for operations and \$1.2 million for capacity-building and coordination. Exact funding requirements will be included in the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal, taking into account the results of the provincial Emergency Plans of Action for Resettlement and Return.

## **VI. The United Nations role in support of the consolidation of peace**

41. As Angola faces the challenges associated with the consolidation of peace, the country will require significant support by the international community and the United Nations in particular. To determine the extent to which the United Nations system can support Angola in this process, I requested my Special Adviser for Special Assignments in Africa to lead a multidisciplinary team comprising representatives of humanitarian and development agencies, as well as political, military, logistical and public information personnel. My Special Adviser and members of the team held meetings with government officials, including with President dos Santos, and other

stakeholders and visited some quartering areas. The findings of the team are reflected below. The Government of Angola has been consulted and has indicated its broad agreement with the concept of operations outlined below for the proposed mandate and presence of the United Nations in Angola.

### **A. Key objectives**

42. In order to support the consolidation of peace, the promotion of national reconciliation and a transition to normalcy in Angola, the United Nations system will enhance its presence and step up its operations throughout the country in a comprehensive manner. It is envisaged that this will be done in a phased manner, the initial focus to be on the continuing delivery of urgently needed humanitarian assistance throughout the country, including to internally displaced persons, and on assisting the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding, in particular the process of quartering, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants. This initial phase is expected to be relatively short, taking into account the timetable of the Memorandum of Understanding and the desire of the Government to quickly and firmly return to normalcy. While humanitarian assistance is likely to be required for a considerable period, the long-term aim of the international community would be to assist the process of reconciliation and economic recovery through peace-building. Obviously, the success of the consolidation of peace depends first and foremost on the Government of Angola, in terms of political will and the extent of the resources it is willing to commit to the process.

43. It is the Government's intention to move as quickly as possible to resolve the outstanding issues of the Lusaka Protocol. To that end, it intends to establish the Joint Commission envisaged in the Protocol as soon as the military aspects of the Memorandum of Understanding have been completed, that is, once UNITA has completely disarmed, demobilized its troops and disbanded its military organization. The United Nations is expected to chair the Joint Commission and offer its good offices to help the parties to advance the process of national reconciliation and, more generally, the consolidation of peace. A public information campaign aimed at explaining this process to the Angolan people will underpin these efforts.



## B. Main tasks

44. The main tasks before the United Nations in support of the consolidation of peace in Angola include the following elements:

- To facilitate and coordinate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to vulnerable groups, including internally displaced persons and families in quartering areas throughout the country.
- To provide technical advice and support for mine action.
- To liaise with the parties through the Joint Military Commission and other relevant bodies with regard to the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding.
- To provide technical advice to and general observation of the quartering, demobilization and reintegration process, if so requested by the Government of Angola.
- To chair the Joint Commission, once it has been established, and promote national reconciliation.
- To assist in the protection and promotion of human rights and in the building of institutions to consolidate peace and the rule of law.
- To assist in the mobilization of resources in support of the peace process, in particular through the preparation of an international donor conference.
- To help promote economic recovery through the relevant United Nations agencies.
- To provide technical advice, in accordance with the request of the Government of Angola, in preparing for and conducting the elections.

45. To achieve these tasks in the most effective manner, it will be necessary for the United Nations to establish an integrated and well coordinated presence in Angola. The United Nations would focus its work on two broad areas. The first would cover the political, human rights and military aspects and the second the humanitarian (including mine action), economic recovery and development aspects.

46. The quartering demobilization and reintegration of UNITA ex-combatants will remain the responsibility of the Government of Angola. The World Bank will be

the lead agency in assisting the Government of Angola in this process, primarily in the realm of financial assistance. At the same time the United Nations would continue discussions with the Government and the World Bank on the optimal modalities for ensuring the effective implementation of the quartering, demobilization and reintegration process and is prepared to provide advice and share its technical expertise in this field.

## C. Mandate for assisting the consolidation of peace

47. To implement the new tasks described above, the mandate of the United Nations Office in Angola, which is set out in Security Council resolution 1268 (1999), would need to be adjusted to include the following additional tasks:

- To liaise with the parties through the Joint Military Commission and the Technical Group.
- To provide advice to and general observation of the quartering, demobilization and reintegration process, if so requested by the Government of Angola.
- To chair the Joint Commission, once it has been established, and promote reconciliation through good offices.
- To assist in the development of strategies and programmes to consolidate peace.
- In the area of human rights, to provide assistance for the building of institutions in support of the rule of law and to assist the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of national reconciliation and democratization.

48. This expanded mandate would require a new mission to succeed the United Nations Office in Angola, headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General who would lead the United Nations system in Angola and ensure coordination and integration in support of the consolidation of peace. In this connection, the Special Representative would assume the lead on the provision of United Nations support for the political and military functions envisaged in the first and second phases of the peace process, and help to conclude the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. He or she would also promote, in the framework of the Memorandum of Understanding,

the coordination of quartering, demobilization and reintegration and other activities between the United Nations and the World Bank.

49. For military tasks the new mission would require an increase in personnel, including 11 military liaison officers who would liaise with both FAA and military or former military components of UNITA. In my letter of 25 June 2002, I requested that the Security Council urgently approve the deployment of these personnel in connection with the immediate tasks of the United Nations in this area, and I am grateful for the Council's positive response. I wish to report that, to date, 7 of these United Nations military personnel have already been deployed in Angola.

50. As provided for in the Memorandum of Understanding, the military personnel would take part in the work of the Joint Military Commission, the Central Technical Group established in Luanda and, as needed and as logistical and security conditions permit, in the regional technical groups. In addition, they would provide military advice to the Head of Mission. They will be based in Luanda and will visit locations in the provinces if and when required.

51. To assist the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in chairing the Joint Commission, a few political affairs officers would be required for assignment to the Commission's secretariat when it is re-established. The actual number of officers will be determined when the scope of political tasks is clearer. Some modest interpretation facilities may also be required. In order to promote enhanced coordination within the United Nations system, some of those officers would perform liaison functions with the World Bank.

52. Assistance in the promotion and protection of human rights would require the deployment of 16 additional United Nations human rights officers to key provinces, in close coordination with humanitarian personnel already on the ground in those locations. This deployment would enable the United Nations to extend the reach of its programmes to more effectively support institution-building and national reconciliation, and to assist in the promotion and protection of the human rights of refugees, internally displaced persons, ex-combatants and their families. In view of the magnitude of the problems associated with rehabilitation of children and the needs of youth, the

deployment of a Child Protection Adviser would also be considered.

53. The logistical and administrative capacity of the United Nations Office in Angola would also need to be augmented to adequately support the new mission. There would be a requirement for some additional vehicles, offices, communications equipment and support personnel. In this regard, I trust that the Government of Angola will make the necessary additional accommodation and other essential premises available to the new mission. Furthermore, the deployment of one light aircraft and one long-range helicopter would be required to ensure the necessary mobility of the military liaison and observer personnel.

54. Meanwhile, the most urgent task of the United Nations system with regard to the consolidation of peace in Angola remains the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the 3 million Angolans in need. Key priorities in this regard will be rapid delivery of food assistance to prevent hunger, support for resettlement and return, the provision of health packages and improved access to health care, an expansion of access to safe water and adequate sanitation systems, and the promotion of education and mine action. For the present, the United Nations humanitarian agencies will try to face these tasks with the current level of personnel deployed on the ground. However, significant additional resources will be urgently required from donors if the humanitarian organizations are to address the needs of vulnerable populations in an adequate manner. For the economic and recovery and development tasks, UNDP and other United Nations agencies would need to formulate mid-term and long-term programmes.

## VII. Observations

55. The United Nations has been involved for a long time in the search for peace and reconciliation in Angola. Following the signing of the New York Agreements in 1988, the United Nations helped to supervise the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and, from 1991, helped to implement the Bicesse Accords, including the general elections held in 1992. From 1994 to 1998, the United Nations assisted in the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. In recent years, the Organization has attempted to help bring an end to the fighting that escalated in 1998 as a result of the refusal by UNITA to comply with the provisions of the

Lusaka Protocol and relevant Security Council resolutions. The United Nations has also continued to deliver much-needed humanitarian assistance to an estimated 2 million vulnerable people and displaced persons, as well as to about 450,000 Angolan refugees, mostly in Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo but also in Namibia and the Republic of the Congo.

56. Since October 1999, the United Nations Office in Angola has been assisting the Angolan people in capacity-building, provision of humanitarian assistance and promotion of human rights. My Special Adviser for Special Assignments in Africa has been paying particular attention to Angola in conjunction with my Representative for Angola and Head of the United Nations Office in Angola. The signing on 4 April 2002 of the Memorandum of Understanding to complement the Lusaka Protocol marked a new era in the Angolan peace process and presented new challenges for the United Nations presence in Angola.

57. Although the people of Angola have gone through great suffering during three decades of civil war, it is encouraging to note that the prospects for long-term peace are better today than at any time before. More than 84,000 UNITA troops have been quartered with their weapons and the ceasefire is holding. The Government and UNITA have also taken responsibility for managing the peace process. However, they will need the active support of the international community to overcome the political, security, humanitarian and socio-economic challenges and to consolidate peace in the country.

58. In order to support the efforts to consolidate peace in Angola, the United Nations presence in the country, as indicated above, will need to be strengthened and better coordinated and integrated. The proposed United Nations mandate and presence would allow for the performance of the functions that have been identified above in consultations with the Government, mainly during the technical assessment mission in June. Any additional tasks for the United Nations that are not currently envisaged and that may nevertheless arise would obviously require further discussions between the United Nations and the Government, as well as authorization by the Security Council.

59. The United Nations is required to play an important role in the consolidation of peace in Angola,

given the complex and difficult tasks assigned to the United Nations by the Lusaka Protocol, the Government's 15-point Agenda for Peace of March 2002 and the Memorandum of Understanding. Accordingly the Security Council may wish to establish a new mission in Angola to succeed the United Nations Office in Angola, as outlined in the preceding section. If authorized by the Council, the new mission would be called the United Nations Mission in Angola (UNMA) and would be headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General. Under his or her overall authority, the mission would comprise two components. One would be for the political, military and human rights aspects, under the direct supervision of the Special Representative. The Resident Coordinator would be concurrently designated as Deputy and would supervise the second component, for humanitarian, economic recovery and development tasks, through the coordination of the work of the various United Nations agencies involved.

60. In view of these considerations, I recommend that the Security Council approve the mandate of the new mission in accordance with the objectives described in section VI of this report. I recommend that the mandate for the new mission should be for an initial period of six months, from 16 August 2002 to 16 February 2003, with provision for a mid-term report for the Security Council's consideration. The newly identified tasks, with appropriate resources, are expected to be of a temporary nature. However, it cannot be excluded that the process of demobilization and reintegration, and national reconciliation, may take longer than the six months envisaged and that, therefore, some of the functions described above may need to be extended to accommodate the situation.

61. In concluding, I wish to thank my Representative for Angola and the United Nations Resident Coordinator in the country for their valuable efforts, during a difficult period, to assist in promoting peace and reconciliation in Angola.