



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/827
4 October 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

PROGRESS REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION (UNAVEM III)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 25 of Security Council resolution 1064 (1996) of 11 July 1996, in which the Council, inter alia, requested me to report by 1 October 1996 on the progress made by the Government of Angola and the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) towards meeting the goals and timetable agreed between them. It covers major developments since my last report, dated 27 June 1996 (S/1996/503).

II. POLITICAL ASPECTS

2. Since the extension of the mandate of UNAVEM III on 11 July 1996, my Special Representative, Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, in close collaboration with the representatives of the three observer States (Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States of America) has conducted intensive consultations with the Government and UNITA. Several senior officials of the observer and other concerned States visited Angola to urge the parties to move the peace process forward. However, despite these efforts, the progress achieved towards the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol has been disappointing.

3. The Joint Commission continued to meet regularly to review the implementation of the monthly calendar of agreed tasks. On 22 August, the representatives of the three observer States issued a statement urging the Angolan parties to work vigorously towards the fulfilment of their commitments. On 4 September, I addressed a letter to the President of UNITA, Mr. Jonas Savimbi, expressing serious concern at the persistent delays and postponements in the implementation of the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol.

4. Many observers expected that the Third Extraordinary Congress of UNITA, held at Bailundo from 20 to 27 August 1996, would give the necessary impetus to the peace process; however, those hopes were short-lived. Although the Congress adopted resolutions reaffirming the transformation of UNITA from an armed opposition to a political party and its commitment to implementing the Lusaka

Protocol, it did not take the decisions required to facilitate the settlement of major outstanding issues, such as the completion of the formation of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) and the extension of State Administration throughout the country. The Congress also rejected the Government's offer to Mr. Savimbi of one of the two vice-presidential posts, stating that UNITA needed his guidance during its transformation from an armed opposition to a political party. Moreover, the Congress expressed reservations about the proposed review of the Angolan Constitution, especially with regard to the electoral law, on which the parties had reached agreement earlier.

5. On 4 September, the Political Bureau of the governing party, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), issued a communiqué expressing its dismay at UNITA's rejection of the Government's offer of a vice-presidential post for Mr. Savimbi, and called on the Government to request the Joint Commission to declare null and void the provision of the Lusaka Protocol which envisaged a special status for Mr. Savimbi. It also called for the suspension of talks on constitutional revisions. In response to a note from the Government delegation, on 12 September the Joint Commission reaffirmed the legal validity of the special status guaranteed to the President of UNITA and stated that, as an integral part of the Lusaka Protocol, that provision could be amended only by joint agreement of the signatories to the Protocol. The Joint Commission also requested UNITA to present counter-proposals regarding the special status for its President. On 1 October, UNITA submitted proposals for the special status of Mr. Savimbi as the President of the largest opposition party.

6. In order to fulfil the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol regarding the transformation of Vorgan into a non-partisan radio station, UNITA has pledged to complete the necessary legal and administrative formalities by presenting the pertinent documents to the Government. However, it has not so far done so. With regard to the United Nations radio, the Government has granted to UNAVEM III additional airtime on the national radio and television which the Mission has been using without restriction.

7. In view of the strained political climate, my Special Representative presented the two parties with a "Mediation Document", formulated in consultation with the representatives of the observer States, which outlined all outstanding military, police and political tasks. He called on both parties to take concrete measures to fulfil those tasks before 20 September. However, despite the promises made by the parties, in particular by UNITA, only marginal progress has been achieved so far.

8. Efforts are under way to convene a fifth meeting between President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi, this time on Angolan territory. The Joint Commission expects that the two leaders will address a number of pressing issues, particularly the special status for the President of UNITA, the extension of State administration throughout the country, the free circulation of people and goods, the return of UNITA deputies to the National Assembly, the formation of the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation, and the assumption by UNITA officials of their posts at the national, provincial and local levels. The controversial issue of the repatriation of mercenaries also remains to be settled.

/...

9. In an attempt to accelerate the pace of implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, a summit meeting of the States members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) was held at Luanda on 2 October. The meeting, which was held under the auspices of the newly-created SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, was attended by the heads of State of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe, by the Prime Minister of Swaziland and by the Deputy Prime Ministers of Lesotho and Mauritius. The leader of UNITA was also invited to participate, but he declined the invitation in spite of repeated efforts by a number of heads of State and by myself to persuade him to attend. In a final communiqué, the participants expressed their concern at the slow progress of the peace process and their regret at the failure of Mr. Savimbi to attend the summit. They believed that his presence would have contributed to the reinvigoration of the peace process. They called upon the Security Council to take into consideration the latest actions by UNITA and urged it to adopt measures, within the framework of resolution 864 (1993) of 15 September 1993, to oblige UNITA to fully and urgently respect the deadlines established by the Council. The summit called on the international community to continue to provide support to the peace process at this critical stage.

III. MILITARY ASPECTS

A. Status of the ceasefire and deployment of UNAVEM III

10. Despite strenuous efforts by my Special Representative, only limited progress has been achieved during the past three months in implementing the military aspects of the Lusaka Protocol. Many deadlines set by the Joint Commission have not been met, particularly for the tasks to be implemented by UNITA. Expectations which were raised in June and July for the expeditious completion of the quartering of UNITA troops, the selection of its soldiers for incorporation into the Angolan Armed Forces and the demobilization of ex-combatants, have also been disappointed.

11. However, the ceasefire continues to hold throughout the country, with the exception of tensions in the diamond-producing provinces of Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul. During the period under review, 55 ceasefire violations were reported, only 8 of which could be confirmed after investigation by UNAVEM III. All of them involved either unauthorized movement of troops or restrictions on UNAVEM III activities. On 8 September, the so-called "UNITA police" detained a UNAVEM III helicopter and its crew in Bié province. On 15 September, a United Nations aircraft was temporarily prevented by UNITA from leaving Bailundo. On 21 September, UNITA denied permission for another United Nations aircraft to conduct investigation activities in the area of Chitembo. These actions deserve strong condemnation.

12. The Angolan Armed Forces have completed 61 withdrawal movements from forward positions to the nearest barracks, and subsequently corrected all except one of the withdrawals which had been declared unacceptable by UNAVEM III; consultations aimed at finding a mutually agreeable solution to this case are continuing. In a welcome development, an agreement was concluded on the withdrawal of Government troops from the sensitive Lunda provinces. It is important to conclude this exercise as soon as possible.

/...

13. As at 27 September, the strength of UNAVEM III military and police personnel stood at 7,264. During the period under review, several contingents underwent rotations and the Mission started to prepare contingency plans for the phased downsizing of its formed military units, in conjunction with the completion of major tasks envisaged in the Lusaka Protocol. My recommendations in this regard are contained in the observations section of this report.

B. Quartering of UNITA troops

14. As at 27 September, the number of UNITA personnel registered in the 15 quartering areas stood at 63,189, which exceeds the figure of 62,500 initially declared by UNITA to be the strength of its military forces. It is also expected that an additional 1,700 UNITA troops (including 300 deployed in Cabinda) will be quartered, and that some 5,500 troops will be incorporated into the Angolan National Police. While more personnel are expected to be inducted into the quartering areas, the number of desertions, which have now reached 11,500, remains particularly worrying. The UNITA leadership has promised to return many of these personnel to quartering areas. This undertaking should be implemented promptly and in good faith.

15. The continued presence of "UNITA police" in areas vacated by their troops is also a matter of serious concern. UNAVEM III is insisting that these personnel be quartered without delay. Unless they are, it will be impossible to extend State administration throughout the country as foreseen under the Lusaka Protocol. With the official closure of all quartering areas as from 15 September, UNAVEM III has initiated an extensive verification operation regarding the presence of armed elements, and weapons in their possession, in the areas vacated by UNITA troops.

16. After several unexplained postponements, UNITA finally handed over to UNAVEM III substantial quantities of weapons in the southern, northern and north-eastern parts of the country. However, despite repeated promises by the UNITA leadership, the overall quality of the weapons and ammunition surrendered remains low. Moreover, only 28,762 personal weapons and 3,969 crew-served weapons have been surrendered to the United Nations, while a total of 24,867 troops have registered in the quartering areas without weapons as at 27 September. The UNAVEM III Force Commander is preparing a comprehensive report to the Joint Commission on this crucial issue. It is imperative that UNITA do everything possible to dispel doubts about its full cooperation in this process, and to declare formally that it has quartered all its troops and surrendered all available weapons.

17. In coordination with United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations, the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit continued extensive food distribution and health and sanitation programmes for the quartered troops and 120,000 of their dependants accommodated in satellite camps. While special civic training programmes focusing on demobilization and social reintegration of ex-combatants have been launched in the camps, humanitarian organizations have carried out over 130,000 medical examinations and follow-up treatments. However, the protracted presence of large numbers of people in quartering areas is a source of growing concern. Some UNITA personnel have been in these areas

/...

for almost one year. This imposes an additional burden on international humanitarian operations in Angola and could create a serious threat to the peace process. It is therefore crucial to commence an orderly demobilization process before the beginning of the rainy season and to concentrate dwindling resources on social reintegration activities. The transfer to the Government of responsibility for the management of the quartering areas (which should become demobilization centres) should be effected as soon as possible.

C. Formation of the Angolan Armed Forces

18. Despite the efforts of the United Nations, little progress has been recorded in the formation of the Angolan Armed Forces as envisaged in the framework agreement reached between the Government and UNITA in May. The process has been beset by numerous problems and, as at 27 September, only about 4,000 of the 26,300 UNITA personnel to be incorporated into FAA have been selected. Although selection teams were deployed to almost all quartering areas, UNITA continued to procrastinate on this issue.

19. Five of the 10 UNITA commanding officers expected to join FAA, including Chief-of-Staff General Arlindo Chenda Pena "Ben Ben", arrived in Luanda on 9 September and were well received by their FAA colleagues. However, notwithstanding numerous assurances, the arrival in Luanda of the remaining five UNITA generals did not materialize by 3 October, raising renewed doubts about UNITA's intentions.

D. Demining and road rehabilitation

20. Specialized non-governmental organizations, the United Nations-contracted demining company MECHEM, the Angolan demining brigades trained by the United Nations, and UNAVEM III military engineers continued to expand their activities throughout the country. While much progress has been achieved in this vital area, demining operations in some provinces were still hindered by restrictions. In Malange province, MECHEM's operations were stopped by UNITA for almost two months at the Cuiji River, while at the Cune River UNITA prevented United Nations military engineers from carrying out their demining activities. These restrictions are unacceptable, and UNITA must immediately desist from such practices and allow demining activities to proceed as mandated.

21. The casualties caused by anti-personnel mines in Angola continue unabated. A section of the strategic Malange-Saurimo road had to be closed temporarily following a mine explosion which resulted in two fatalities and in injury to four members of the Zimbabwean contingent. The Luena-Lumege road was closed after a mine incident on 10 August. On 22 September, four members of the Brazilian contingent were seriously injured in a mine explosion at Chicaunda. In addition, MECHEM had to repeat its mine-sweeping operations on the Saurimo-Luena road after old mines were discovered there. In the meantime, the United Nations has been able to step up road rehabilitation and bridge reconstruction, with a total of 32 bridges launched since the beginning of the operation. Many of these bridges are the property of UNAVEM III contingents. It would seem justified for the United Nations to absorb the costs of leaving

/...

them in place, as an additional contribution from the international community to the economic rehabilitation of Angola.

22. So far, the United Nations Central Mine Action Training School has trained over 300 Angolan nationals, thus enhancing the capacity of the National Institute for the Removal of Unexploded Ordnance (INAROE). Four Angolan demining brigades have been deployed to 4 of the country's 18 provinces. The fifth group of deminers has completed its training, and a sixth is receiving instruction. However, the overall programme of strengthening the national capacity has fallen behind schedule owing to poor cooperation of the parties and shortage of adequate equipment and demining supervisors. At the beginning of 1997, this programme is expected to be transferred to INAROE, technical support being provided by the Department of Humanitarian Affairs of the Secretariat and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The Department intends to use for this purpose resources available for Angola in the Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance and to launch an appeal for further funding. I recommend that the equipment provided for the school and for the brigades be transferred in due course by UNAVEM III to the Department of Humanitarian Affairs and UNDP in order to support INAROE.

IV. POLICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

23. UNAVEM III has been able to intensify the activities of its civilian police component, now deployed at approximately 40 sites. This component monitors the neutrality of the Angolan National Police, the state of law and order and the free circulation of people and goods, and performs other tasks envisaged in the Lusaka Protocol. It has also verified the quartering of 5,458 officers of the Angolan rapid reaction police in 13 areas and has monitored the adaptation of their weapons to their new mission. In most rapid reaction police barracks this adaptation has been carried out in a satisfactory manner but, in three quartering sites, units are still equipped with mortars, rocket launchers and armoured personnel carriers. However, the Government has now informed UNAVEM III that the adaptation has been implemented. Little progress has been achieved in the training of UNITA personnel designated to serve as bodyguards for its leadership; only 28 have commenced Government training courses and, of the projected 184 bodyguards, 102 have yet to be selected.

24. The Government launched the programme for the disarmament of the civilian population ahead of schedule; the operation, which began on 1 July, has been carried out in nine major urban centres, including Luanda. So far, the results have been modest, with 1,669 firearms and over 9,000 rounds of ammunition recovered, in addition to a number of rocket launchers, grenades, mortars and other matériel. While it is encouraging that these operations have been proceeding in a coordinated manner and under close UNAVEM III monitoring, the need to introduce incentives in the form of "buy-out" programmes has become increasingly obvious. The United Nations is also urging the Government to start collecting weapons in the possession of members of its Civil Defence Corps, who serve in almost all provinces.

25. Together with the UNAVEM III Human Rights Unit, the civilian police component has monitored and investigated alleged abuses of human rights. It is

/...

of particular concern that these remain persistent, many of them being perpetrated by armed elements against civilians. The number of allegations of human rights violations reported to UNAVEM III has increased in recent months. This may be due to heightened awareness of the population following a nationwide programme of workshops and seminars organized with the assistance of the United Nations.

26. In cooperation with United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations, UNAVEM III human rights monitors continued to promote improvement of conditions in detention centres. UNAVEM III also held a series of human rights workshops for quartered UNITA elements and, at the request of the Angolan authorities, formulated a plan of action to reform the judicial system. This plan has now been approved by the Government and is being discussed with donor countries. Increased international attention and assistance to Angola in the area of human rights continue to be a major factor in the advancement of the peace process.

V. HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

A. Relief and rehabilitation

27. During the reporting period, humanitarian activities continued to expand to newly-accessible areas, many projects focusing on the transition from emergency assistance to rehabilitation. Activities related to therapeutic feeding, water and sanitation and the rehabilitation of health posts are now being implemented in many areas which have been deprived of assistance for several years. Seeds and tools for the 1996/97 emergency agricultural campaign, including major contributions from the European Union and the Overseas Development Administration of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, are already being delivered to the country. The beneficiaries of this programme will include internally displaced persons, returnees, war-affected populations, and demobilized soldiers. The programme is expected to cover a total of 305,000 families identified by non-governmental organizations operating in the countryside, as well as some 67,500 demobilized soldiers.

28. The prospects for the next planting season depend largely on the free circulation of people and goods. The presence of newly planted mines along some secondary roads which were previously considered safe is raising serious concerns among humanitarian agencies responsible for the distribution of agricultural assistance. Following the increase in rehabilitation activities, and in response to the partial failure of the 1996 harvest, the World Food Programme is distributing throughout Angola an average of 9,000 metric tons per month compared with 6,000 metric tons at the beginning of the year.

29. There is serious concern that the resettlement of internally displaced persons, which was expected to take place on a large scale prior to the 1996/97 agricultural season, did not materialize. They continue to be reluctant to resettle in their areas of origin without adequate security guarantees. As a result, over 1.2 million such persons will remain dependent on food aid for another 12 months.

/...

30. In August 1996, a series of security incidents involving humanitarian organizations and, in particular, the arrest and harassment of humanitarian personnel, resulted in the loss of material and equipment designated for populations in need. On some occasions, the free circulation of people and goods was also hindered, particularly in Moxico province. Similar problems were reported in some parts of Lunda Norte, Malange and Uíge provinces. This trend is of great concern, particularly to humanitarian organizations implementing projects in remote areas, and has led to a decrease of humanitarian activities in those areas.

B. Demobilization and reintegration

31. After delays, the adoption on 16 August by the Council of Ministers of the National Programme for Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants marked an important step towards the commencement of the demobilization process. This programme comprises a set of complementary projects aimed at facilitating the short-, medium- and long-term socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants. It also includes additional support schemes, such as the Government's Special Reinstallation Subsidy, the Fund to Support the Reinsertion of Ex-Combatants into Civilian Society, and the National Service for Reconstruction. Programmatic links are also being established with activities planned by the World Bank, bilateral donors and international development agencies. The current financial commitment of the Government to the programme is in excess of US\$ 70 million. This effort deserves encouragement and urgent support from the international community.

32. Although the start of the demobilization of approximately 8,000 under-age soldiers was officially announced by the Joint Commission on 26 August, the process was not formally launched until 24 September. The United Nations and international humanitarian organizations will play an important role in assisting the Government to issue demobilization cards and kits, provide transportation and perform other tasks.

33. The Community Referral Service for ex-combatants, which is run by the Institute for the Socio-Professional Reintegration of Ex-Combatants and UNDP, has now been established in six key provinces and is expected to be operational in 12 provinces within the next few weeks. The Referral Service, together with the Quick Impact Project mechanisms, will provide the demobilized with information and counselling services while facilitating their reintegration into civilian society. A special humanitarian assistance package is also being prepared to support the families of those UNITA soldiers who will be incorporated into FAA. However, the daunting tasks that lie ahead should not be underestimated since approximately 100,000 ex-combatants, including 35,300 former FAA personnel, must be demobilized.

VI. SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASPECTS

34. Angola continues to face a critical economic situation. Because of Government overspending, the country continues to face a serious budget deficit. The level of price subsidies, especially for petroleum products, remains high.

/...

The Government recently initiated policy measures, including a decree which would end the commercial operations of the Central Bank, adjustments in interest rates aimed at encouraging domestic savings, increased taxation of the national petroleum corporation, and the adoption of restrictive credit policies.

35. The Government asserts that the "neo-liberal monetarist policy" which it intermittently pursued in 1995 has failed, and it intends to control the prices of staple commodities in official and unofficial markets. At the same time, all importation has to be made under strict Government licensing and subject to fixed foreign currency exchange ceilings. The new system of foreign exchange is determined administratively by the Central Bank in an attempt to maintain stability in the local currency. In the meantime, the economic situation is leading to distortions in prices caused by the different sources of supply of goods and services, both official and illegal, and many observers believe that present conditions may lead to rationing of basic foodstuffs. It should be noted that the Government has neither indicated the duration of its policy of direct intervention in the markets nor articulated medium-term or long-term economic goals.

36. Many external development partners of Angola were of the opinion that the installation of the new Cabinet in June 1996 would enhance dialogue with them, as well as facilitate quick microeconomic decisions, and they have been carefully watching recent developments. Several evaluation missions led by senior officials of UNDP, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have visited Angola in the last few months. In September 1996, the Angolan Minister of Planning visited Washington, D.C., where he held productive discussions on the Government's new economic policies. Nevertheless, for the reasons described above, bilateral donors, including those who pledged funds at the Round Table Conference held in Brussels in 1995, and international development agencies continue to be cautious about committing funds.

VII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

37. By its resolution 50/209 B of 7 June 1996, the General Assembly appropriated an amount of \$169,188,500 gross (\$165,984,100 net) for the maintenance of UNAVEM III for the period from 1 July to 31 December 1996, to be assessed on Member States at a monthly rate of \$28,186,410 gross (\$27,664,010 net), subject to the extension of the mandate of UNAVEM III by the Security Council.

38. By the same resolution, the General Assembly requested me to provide updated cost estimates for the period from 1 January to 30 June 1997, no later than 1 November 1996, for its consideration at its fifty-first session. Should the Council decide to extend the mandate of UNAVEM III, the cost of maintaining the Mission during the extension period will be within the monthly rate indicated in the preceding paragraph.

39. As at 23 September 1996, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNAVEM special account for the period since the inception of the Mission amounted to \$151.3 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at 23 September 1996 was \$2,044.0 million.

/...

VIII. OBSERVATIONS

40. While the ceasefire is holding and the parties continue to profess their commitment to the Lusaka Protocol, the lack of significant progress in the peace process over the past three months is a source of serious concern. Nearly two years after the signing of the Protocol, the continuing delays and unfulfilled promises, particularly on the part of UNITA, in implementing the successive timetables for the completion of key military and political issues are no longer acceptable. Despite the persistent efforts of my Special Representative, the observer States and other Member States concerned, the implementation process is substantially behind schedule and the lack of mutual trust between the Government and UNITA continues to jeopardize the attainment of lasting peace in Angola.

41. UNAVEM III is currently the largest United Nations peacekeeping operation and requires considerable human, material and financial resources. At a time when funds for peacekeeping are scarcer than ever and all expenditures of the Organization are being closely scrutinized, it is becoming increasingly difficult to generate international support for operations which do not enjoy the full cooperation of the conflicting parties. In the case of Angola, the pattern has been one of grudging compliance with the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol, with protracted delays and last-minute concessions. This trend cannot continue and the parties, especially UNITA, must now decide whether they will implement in good faith all the outstanding provisions of the peace agreements.

42. The failure by Mr. Savimbi to attend the SADC summit held at Luanda on 2 October was unfortunate. His participation in the summit would have provided a good opportunity for a meeting on Angolan soil with President dos Santos to resolve key outstanding issues, to provide a much-needed impetus to the peace process, and to establish long-term stability in the country. I hope that such a meeting can be held in the near future. The two parties to the Lusaka Protocol bear a special responsibility not only to their own people, but also to the international community, which expects the Government and UNITA to demonstrate a renewed spirit of cooperation leading to national reconciliation. If UNITA genuinely feels that Mr. Savimbi cannot assume a vice-presidential post, it is incumbent on it to make a meaningful counter-proposal as soon as possible. UNITA must also ensure the earliest arrival in Luanda of all its generals for integration into FAA, the return of deserters to quartering areas, and expeditious selection of its soldiers for incorporation in FAA, so as to begin large-scale demobilization before the start of the rainy season. It is essential that these, and other pressing tasks outlined in this report, be accomplished urgently in accordance with a clear and precise calendar.

43. The demobilization and reintegration process is at a critical juncture: to support the demobilization of approximately 100,000 ex-combatants, the humanitarian community will have to increase its activities and donors will need to come forward with additional resources. Only 27.4 per cent of the costs of the demobilization and reintegration programmes are currently covered, and, unless the donor community provides the indispensable additional resources in the near future, the process will come to a halt.

/...

44. Rehabilitation of rural communities is another important aspect of the peace process. Adequate funding of high-priority projects is needed to absorb the large number of refugees, displaced persons and former combatants. I strongly urge the donor community to maintain its support for the peace process by providing the required support for demobilization and reintegration and by fulfilling pledges made at the 1995 Brussels Round Table Conference.

45. The date envisaged for the completion of the mandate of UNAVEM III in the Security Council resolution by which the Mission was established, namely 8 February 1997, is fast approaching. Plans for the orderly and phased drawdown of the Mission are being finalized. Despite the considerable delays which have occurred, it should still be possible for UNAVEM III to fulfil most of its mandated tasks by February 1997. It is therefore my intention to initiate the downsizing of the Mission by withdrawing some infantry and support units by the end of December 1996. I am confident that the members of the Security Council will agree that further troop reductions should be made in accordance with the progress achieved in implementing the remaining provisions of the Lusaka Protocol. I shall present in my next report a detailed schedule for the drawdown of formed military units of UNAVEM III, as well as recommendations regarding the role the United Nations should continue to play in Angola to consolidate the peace process.

46. The response of the international community to Angola's continuing need for support will depend on the concrete actions the Angolan parties take in the coming weeks. Unless serious progress is made in several key areas before the expiration of the current mandate of UNAVEM III on 11 October, I recommend that the Council consider only a short extension of the mandate, perhaps until 11 December, so that it can keep the situation in Angola under close review and respond appropriately to continuing delays, especially by UNITA, in compliance with the Lusaka Protocol. If, on the other hand, certain pressing commitments are honoured in the next few days, in particular the arrival of all UNITA generals in Luanda and acceleration of the selection of UNITA soldiers and their incorporation into the national army, the Security Council may wish to consider a longer extension of the mandate.

47. In closing, I should like to pay tribute to my Special Representative and all staff of UNAVEM III, as well as to the personnel of United Nations programmes and agencies and of non-governmental organizations for their commendable efforts to further the cause of peace and national reconciliation in Angola, under challenging conditions.

/...

Annex

UNAVEM III: Military and civilian police personnel
(as at 25 September 1996)

Country	Military observers	Civilian police officers	Staff officers	Troops <u>a/</u>	Total
Algeria	7	-	-	-	7
Bangladesh	10	21	11	209	251
Brazil	20	10	35	1 046	1 111
Bulgaria	8	15	-	-	23
Congo	8	-	-	-	8
Egypt	11	15	1 <u>b/</u>	-	27
France	8	-	12 <u>b/</u>	-	20
Guinea-Bissau	18	3	-	-	21
Hungary	10	8	-	-	18
India	20	8	50	1 030	1 108
Italy	-	-	4 <u>b/</u>	-	4
Jordan	20	20	3 <u>b/</u>	-	43
Kenya	10	-	-	-	10
Malaysia	20	20	3 <u>b/</u>	-	43
Mali	10	15	-	-	25
Namibia	-	-	6	203	209
Netherlands	12	10	8 <u>b/</u>	-	30
New Zealand	6	-	9 <u>b/</u>	-	15
Nigeria	20	21	-	-	41
Norway	5	-	-	-	5
Pakistan	10	-	15 <u>b/</u>	-	25
Poland	5	-	-	-	5
Portugal	11	21	14	311	357
Republic of Korea	-	-	6	198	204
Romania	-	-	23	872	895
Russian Federation	10	-	2	158	170
Senegal	10	-	-	-	10
Slovakia	5	-	-	-	5
Sweden	23	10	2 <u>b/</u>	-	35

/...

Country	Military observers	Civilian police officers	Staff officers	Troops <u>a/</u>	Total
Ukraine	5	-	8	203	216
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	-	-	1	-	1
United Republic of Tanzania	-	3	-	-	3
Uruguay	10	14	44 <u>b/</u>	813	881
Zambia	10	15	23	496	544
Zimbabwe	<u>22</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>810</u>	<u>894</u>
Total	<u>344</u>	<u>251</u>	<u>320</u> <u>c/</u>	<u>6 349</u>	<u>7 264</u>

a/ Including military police.

b/ Including military specialists in the UNAVEM III demining school and in Quartering Area Administration.

c/ The total figure does not include the five demining experts seconded by Germany.

S/1996/827

English

Page 14
