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FURTHER REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE QUESTION
OF SOUTH AFRICA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolutions 772 (1992) and 894 (1994) of 17 August 1992 and 14 January 1994, respectively. It is the first report on the United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA) under its expanded mandate to observe the elections in South Africa and covers the first quarter of 1994. It highlights the preparations for the election, and updates UNOMSA activities to monitor violence and defuse tensions. It also focuses on the work of the UNOMSA teams throughout the country.

II. PROGRESS OF THE TRANSITIONAL PROCESS

A. Political process

2. After more than three years of protracted negotiations, the multi-party process had produced, in September 1993, drafts of four basic bills and later a fifth one, which were formally enacted into law by Parliament. The Acts are the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) Act, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) Act, the Independent Media Commission (IMC) Act, the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) Act, and the Electoral Act. By January 1994, negotiations on the interim Constitution were completed and an agreed text was enacted by Parliament. It has not yet been promulgated, however, as negotiations to bring all parties into the election process have continued. The interim Constitution will, however, have to be promulgated and brought into force before 26 April, to allow the election to take place.

3. The transitional structures are operational and have pressed ahead with their tasks. The major problem facing them is the non-participation of some political parties on the grounds that the interim Constitution is unacceptable to them. Thus, attempts have been made to ensure the participation of those parties which form the Freedom Alliance (particularly the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the White right-wing parties) in the transitional process and the April elections.

4. In recent months, such efforts have intensified and have involved trilateral negotiations between the Government, the African National Congress (ANC) and the Alliance. On 3 February 1994, the Government presented a package of proposed amendments that could have led to an agreement ensuring participation by the Alliance. When that failed, Mr. Mandela announced, on 17 February 1994, unilateral concessions by ANC which consisted of a package of amendments to the interim Constitution. The Government supported Mr. Mandela's proposals. The Multi-Party Negotiations Council was convened on 22 February and approved the amendments, which were adopted by Parliament on 2 March 1994.

5. Although many felt that the amendments addressed the concerns of the Freedom Alliance, Chief Buthelezi's IFP rejected the amendments almost immediately, as did his allies in the Alliance. Pressure by the Government, the business community and foreign visitors and diplomats to try to bring the Freedom Alliance and Chief Buthelezi in particular into the process continued throughout the reporting period. In a new effort, Mr. Mandela met Chief Buthelezi in Durban on 1 March 1994. A joint statement released after the meeting stated that the parties had agreed to explore with their principals the possibility of international mediation to resolve the constitutional deadlock. As a consequence, IFP registered provisionally for the elections. However, the provisional registration of IFP lapsed following its failure to submit a list of candidates by the extended deadline, 16 March 1994.

6. On 2 March 1994, I wrote to President De Klerk, Mr. Mandela and Chief Buthelezi, emphasizing that the outcome of the meeting was a positive development and reiterating United Nations support for their efforts to resolve all outstanding issues impeding the peace process.

7. ANC and IFP established a special task group to strengthen peace committees and improve communication between them to work out the modalities for the international mediation. The task force met several times and it was announced that agreement had been reached on the terms of reference for the mediation and the names of the mediators. It was later stated that more talks would be needed to finalize agreement on the terms of reference.

8. A meeting planned for 18 March between Mr. Mandela and King Goodwill Zwelethini did not take place amid fears for Mr. Mandela's safety as the venue was changed from a private to a public one, in the presence of several thousand Zulus. There was also a feeling on the ANC side that a public meeting would not afford an opportunity to discuss in depth the legal and constitutional matters of concern to the King. The King, nevertheless, went ahead with his public meeting and made pronouncements which have been interpreted by some as a unilateral declaration of an independent Zulu kingdom. IFP officials have since stressed that the King was not calling for secession.

9. Nevertheless, King Zwelethini's intervention in favour of the restoration of the sovereignty of the Zulu kingdom has complicated the situation. However, the Government and ANC remain firmly committed to a united South Africa.

10. The situation with respect to the other members of the Freedom Alliance has changed dramatically. In Bophuthatswana, IEC attempted, without success, to persuade the leadership to join the process, as had my Special Representative

earlier. The intransigence of the homeland administration led to an uprising which culminated in its overthrow and the death of 60 people. TEC and the Government moved quickly and took over the administration of the homeland to restore order and to prepare for the elections. Two co-administrators were appointed to run the territory until the elections.

11. Following the Bophuthatswana crisis, the leader of Ciskei resigned and was replaced by administrators appointed by TEC. The right-wing alliance has also broken up following the ill-fated intervention of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) in Bophuthatswana. General Constand Viljoen, one of the leaders of the Volksfront, resigned from the Alliance and registered a new party, the Freedom Front. The rift resulted from disagreements over what options, military or peaceful, to adopt as a way of attaining the objective of establishing a volkstaat ("people's State").

B. Political violence

12. Since my last report, the number of political fatalities has declined. Records show that the deaths in January, February and the first half of March 1994 numbered approximately 600, contrasting with a peak of 605 deaths in July 1993 alone. The national monthly average of politically related fatalities has decreased from 366 in 1993 to 286 in early 1994. However, there is still an average of some 10 deaths per day, many of them women and children.

13. The figures of the South African Human Rights Commission on political violence also show that 95 per cent of the political fatalities in the past year have occurred in the Pretoria, Witwatersrand and Vaal and the Natal/KwaZulu areas. This estimate is even higher than those given in previous reports.

14. Recent peace initiatives helped reduce the death toll in Pretoria, Witwatersrand and Vaal from 142 in January to 69 in February. In the East Rand, months of arson and bloodshed have subsided with the deployment of the South African Defence Force (SADF) to work with the South African Police. SADF was deployed in response to repeated calls by community leaders and ANC to withdraw the Internal Stability Unit from the area, following allegations that that Unit was implicated in the escalation of violence.

15. Political fatalities in Natal/KwaZulu are much higher than anywhere else. They have averaged 161 per month and show no sign of decreasing. Violence has spread from the townships and urban areas to the rural parts of KwaZulu, like Richmond, Creighton and Bulwer in the Natal Midlands.

16. The townships of Umlazi and KwaMashu, just outside Durban, have been centres of major IFP-ANC conflict, where there have been allegations of police partisanship. Disturbances in the townships have caused the displacement of families and are deterring workers from travelling to work. Fear that IFP will ultimately go for an all-out disruption of the elections has increased the likelihood of even higher levels of violence.

17. On 28 March 1994, several thousand Zulu royalists, said to be IFP supporters, demonstrated in the streets of Johannesburg. The march went out of

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control and shooting erupted in several parts of the city, resulting in the death of 53 people. Several hundreds more were wounded.

18. The four international observer missions in South Africa (United Nations, Organization of African Unity (OAU), Commonwealth and European Union) issued a statement deploring those events and strongly urging political leaders not to permit marches that were not properly planned and in which their supporters were carrying weapons. They said that the Government, the parties and the security forces shared responsibility for failing to act together to prevent the violence. They also pointed out that violence frustrated the work of IEC, which was labouring to establish the infrastructure needed to put the vote within reach of all South Africans who wished to exercise that right.

19. On 31 March 1994, President De Klerk declared a state of emergency in the whole province of Natal/KwaZulu, including the self-governing territory of KwaZulu. ANC welcomed the initiative while Chief Buthelezi deplored it.

20. In Bophuthatswana, the extreme right-wing was blamed for random killings during the recent disturbances. The extreme right-wing continues to make open threats to disrupt the election and has been blamed for several incidents of political violence.

C. Transitional arrangements

21. Last December, TEC recommended the appointment of Justice Johann Kriegler as Chairperson of IEC. Ten other commissioners, a wide range of personalities from various professions and political orientations, but unanimously respected for their integrity and dedication to duty, were appointed some days thereafter. Further, five additional, non-South African commissioners were appointed, four of them from lists provided by the United Nations and the Commonwealth Secretariat.

22. The two Directorates of IEC in charge of the organization of the elections and monitoring of the electoral process were in place from early January 1994. The Chief Director for Administration was appointed in late December 1993 and the Chief Director for Monitoring in early January 1994. Because of inevitable practical problems associated with the establishment of an organization as large and complex as IEC, it has taken some time for the central organizations of the administration and monitoring directorates to become fully operational.

23. The task facing IEC is considerable. In recent decades, fewer than 3 million voters were permitted to participate in elections at the national level. In the April elections, up to 23 million persons are eligible to vote. This increase has critical administrative and logistic implications for IEC. It has to recruit and train an estimated 150,000 electoral officials. The staff will have to satisfy minimal educational requirements and need to be conversant in the main national and local languages. In addition, the work of IEC has been rendered more complex by the decision to use two ballots - one for voting for the National Assembly, the other for the provincial legislature - as well as by the complications in the timetable for party registration and for the lodging of

party lists. Finally, violence, notably in the Pretoria, Witwatersrand and Vaal and the Natal/KwaZulu areas, poses a major challenge.

24. The Independent Media Commission has issued guidelines for broadcasters and commercial and interim licensees. Its broadcast directorate monitors the radio and television stations of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) as well as other (commercial) broadcasting licensees. It is responsible for ensuring that party election broadcasts are allocated to national and regional parties based on a proportional formula and will be broadcast from 26 March to 24 April, ending 48 hours before the elections. The publications directorate of IMC monitors State publications and other public communications resources, making sure that they are not used to advance the electioneering aims of any political party.

25. Through its complaints directorate, IMC will examine complaints lodged by political parties or contraventions by broadcasters identified by its own media monitoring. Thus, it has established that the following two complaints represented a serious impediment to the attainment of free and fair elections and has referred them to IEC and TEC for appropriate action: (a) Radio Pretoria's decision to allow calls to be issued to AWB Wenkommando members to congregate "in full combat kit" at AWB offices at Ventersdorp for action in Bophuthatswana; and (b) the complaint by the Freedom of Expression Institute concerning the harassment of journalists in Bophuthatswana during the recent crisis in that homeland.

26. The eight-member board of the Independent Broadcasting Authority was named by TEC on 16 March. An autonomous and permanent body, IBA will draw up a code of conduct for radio stations, investigate cross-ownership and examine the financial implications of deregulation for SABC.

III. ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN SOUTH AFRICA

A. Deployment and logistics

27. Following the approval by the General Assembly of the budget for the financing of the expanded UNOMSA 1/ on 31 January 1994, high priority was given to the deployment of observers and support staff and the simultaneous creation of the necessary support and logistic improvements, including transport, communications and accommodation. As at 24 March 1994, 611 international staff, including 200 United Nations Volunteers, have been deployed in 9 provinces and 56 subprovinces. An additional 1,278 United Nations electoral observers will be trained at three different venues from 21 to 23 April 1994 before they are deployed to the provinces two days before the elections. The deployment of 600 additional observers, foreseen in paragraph 92 of document S/1994/16, does not at this time seem to be a realistic target. The actual number will be significantly lower.

28. With regard to transport, extensive surveys were undertaken and contracts finalized with various car rental companies. A total of 1,320 vehicles will be available during the electoral period. Some Governments have made a small but

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most welcome number of vehicles available for periods leading up to and during the elections.

29. Most of the communications equipment required to install a country-wide communications system (2 Earth satellite stations, 65 repeaters and radios) has arrived and is being installed. The two Earth satellite stations will be installed in Johannesburg and Durban as soon as they are received by UNOMSA. As a result, the communications system has been partially operational since 1 April 1994, and is expected to be fully operational shortly.

30. UNOMSA offices are established in seven provincial cities over and above Johannesburg and Durban and in two subprovincial centres, totalling 11 offices. The locations were selected to correspond with provincial and subprovincial centres of IEC. Office furniture and equipment has been procured either on the basis of buy-back arrangements, or on a rental basis. This should have the effect of reducing the overall cost of the Mission.

31. The Mission has not chartered a communications and liaison aircraft on a full-time basis. The commercial airline coverage of South Africa permits virtually all official travel by air. To cover future ad hoc or urgent requirements, the Mission has entered into a contract with a local charter firm for a small block of flying hours to be used as required. It is foreseen that the deployment of the international observers will be accomplished primarily by bus. In those few cases where air travel is required, it will be accomplished using the regular commercial scheduled airlines. UNOMSA is currently seeking to charter eight light helicopters and one small fixed-wing aircraft for use over the three-day election period. These will be used for medical and casualty evacuation, rapid response to problem areas and evacuation if required. UNOMSA has also chartered two light helicopters, equipped with radio repeaters, to be flown during the election to provide enhanced radio communications in potential trouble areas.

B. Consultations of the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General

32. My Special Representative for South Africa, Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, arrived in the country soon after he was appointed on 16 December 1993. He returned to New York early in the new year for consultations and assumed his post in Johannesburg on 27 January 1994.

33. Since his arrival in South Africa, Mr. Brahimi has had consultations with the leaders of the main political parties on the preparations for the elections, the general political situation and the expanded mandate of UNOMSA. The leaders with whom he met included State President F. W. de Klerk; Mr. Nelson Mandela, President of ANC; Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, President of IFP; Mr. Clarence Makwetu, President of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC); Mr. Zach de Beer, leader of the Democratic Party; General Constand Viljoen, leader of the Freedom Front; and Mr. Lucas Mangope of Bophuthatswana. The question of security during the elections in general, and safety of observers in particular, was high on the agenda of all the discussions held by my Special Representative.

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34. My Special Representative has had regular discussions with Judge Johann Kriegler, Chairperson of IEC, and his fellow commissioners on the electoral process. He has also held consultations with Dr. Antonie Gildenhuys, Chairperson of the National Peace Secretariat, and Judge Richard Goldstone, Chairman of the Commission of Inquiry into Public Violence and Intimidation.

35. My Special Representative has also had a series of consultations with visiting dignitaries and foreign diplomats, including the Prime Minister of the Netherlands, the Secretaries-General of OAU and the Commonwealth, the Foreign Minister of Sweden, the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations, the Canadian Minister of Latin American and African Affairs, as well as parliamentary delegations from a number of countries.

36. At the invitation of the Secretary-General of OAU, my Special Representative attended the tenth ordinary session of the OAU Ad Hoc Committee of Heads of State and Government on Southern Africa, held at Harare on 19 March 1994. The session focused on recent developments in South Africa, especially the situation in Natal/KwaZulu and the preparations for the forthcoming elections. While in Harare, Mr. Brahimi exchanged views with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, current Chairman of OAU, President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and President Sam Nujoma of Namibia, as well as with the Foreign Ministers of participating countries.

C. Peace promotion and monitoring

37. UNOMSA teams continue to follow rallies and other public events, investigate instances of intimidation and related complaints and work closely with national peace structures and with regional and local peace committees. However, the lack of commitment on the part of political parties has caused many of the regional and local peace committees to become dysfunctional or even defunct.

38. It appears that in many areas of the country peace structures are no longer considered to be relevant vis-à-vis the transition process. Part of the malaise is due to the fact that political leaders at the national, provincial and local levels are focusing almost entirely on election campaigning, thereby pulling strong representatives out of the peace structures. Additional factors include the competition between the National Peace Secretariat and IEC for scarce human resources (i.e., trained monitors), and a pervasive feeling that the peace structures will not be needed after the elections. As a result, more and more, UNOMSA is working directly with various groups within the community, including churches, non-governmental organizations and the security forces.

39. The Goldstone Commission has, within the past few months, issued two major findings. The first emerged in the Commission's fourth interim report, dated 6 December 1993, and identified the existence of hit squads within the KwaZulu Police Force. The second was an interim report on criminal political violence by elements within the South African Police, the KwaZulu Police and IFP, dated 18 March 1994.

40. The Goldstone Commission has expanded its investigation units from 5 to 15 to cover the entire country. Another expansion of the Commission's function relates to the investigation of violence associated with political activities which IEC will refer to it. This arrangement has become necessary because IEC does not have its own investigating units.

D. Monitoring of the electoral process

41. In accordance with the recommendations made in my report of 10 January 1994 (S/1994/16), an Electoral Division has been established as one of the two operating arms of UNOMSA. In the earliest stages of its work, the Electoral Division focused on developing strategies and plans for the performance of the tasks to be executed. As part of that process, it was decided that the monitoring of voter education, laws relating to the media and legal processes relating to the election would predominantly be handled centrally.

42. The Public Information and Media Analysis Section of UNOMSA in Johannesburg, with the assistance of UNOMSA provincial officers, monitors the major national, regional and local press and weekly and monthly magazines in English and Afrikaans. Activities of major political parties are reflected in a reasonably objective and generous fashion by the media in South Africa. In all, the print media is lively with electoral columns, editorials, supplements and voter education materials. Within the recognized constraints, it could be considered fair.

43. The structures envisaged for effective coordination of the election observation activities of the various intergovernmental organizations have also been put in place. The Coordinating Committee, consisting of the heads of the four major intergovernmental organization missions, chaired by my Special Representative, has met regularly ever since its first meeting on 31 January 1994. So has the Technical Task Force, which consists of the heads of the electoral structures of the four missions and is also chaired by UNOMSA. Finally, the Joint Operations Unit has been established as a permanent working group, and its staff are in place.

44. Priority has been given by the Joint Operations Unit to the implementation of training programmes. A team of about a dozen observers was assembled to develop appropriate training materials and strategies. Training has been given to staff members of the mission, including those from the United Nations Volunteers programme. Sessions have also been conducted for staff of the other intergovernmental organizations and preparation is virtually complete for the training of those observers who will arrive in the period immediately prior to the election.

45. In terms of its primary task of observing the actions of IEC and its organs in all aspects and stages of the electoral process, verifying their compatibility with the conduct of a free and fair election under IEC and the Electoral Acts, UNOMSA has been in constant contact with IEC since its establishment. This process has been facilitated by the important step taken by IEC in endorsing a policy of transparency in all of its operations. By decision of the Coordinating Committee, IEC has been invited to be represented at

meetings of that Committee and the Technical Task Force, and that invitation has been taken up on many occasions. The presence of IEC representatives at the Technical Task Force meetings has permitted the effective coordination of the technical assistance being provided to IEC by the various intergovernmental observer missions. UNOMSA representatives on the Task Force have also had the opportunity to raise concerns regarding the electoral process in a constructive manner, and to make suggestions on approaches to problems which might be considered. IEC has invariably responded positively to such representations.

46. UNOMSA has also been pursuing its mandate in the area of voter education, making an assessment of the adequacy of the voter education effort of IEC and of the non-governmental organizations on the basis of a number of approaches, including analysis of information received from major voter education implementing organizations; observation of the work of and liaison with staff of the Voter Education Department of IEC; assessment of the coverage being effected nationwide through media initiatives; and analysis of feedback received on voter education initiatives from UNOMSA observers in the field.

47. Using these approaches, an ongoing evaluation is being made concerning the adequacy of the voter education coverage in terms both of substantive information imparted to the potential electorate and of geographical coverage. Particular attention is being paid to verifying that coverage of the rural areas, marginalized communities in urban areas and certain sectors of the population, for example women, farm workers and illiterate people, has been adequate. As gaps in coverage are identified, whether geographic or among specific population groups, they are drawn to the attention of IEC or of relevant voter education implementing organizations.

48. In relation to the issuing of identity cards to voters, UNOMSA field staff have been provided with guidelines for the assessment of the quality of the work of temporary voter's card issuing centres. Those guidelines form the basis for regular reports being provided on a fortnightly basis until the elections. UNOMSA has also sought information on survey data that could serve to define the extent of any shortage of appropriate documentation in respect of specific groups of voters.

49. Finally, guidelines have been developed and promulgated for the assessment by UNOMSA observers of the choice of voting stations made by IEC, this being a critical factor in ensuring that voters are able to vote in an environment free of intimidation and in conditions that ensure free access to voting stations. While delays in the finalization of the IEC list of proposed voting stations have somewhat held up this process, it is planned that all voting station sites will have been visited by early April 1994.

50. There is a growing number of reports about voter intimidation. The voter education campaigns should give additional emphasis to convincing voters of the secrecy of their vote.

51. Some farmers and factory owners that have permitted voting stations to be set up on their properties are said to be intimidated. It is also reported that some party supporters have had their houses burned by their rivals, or have been

hounded out of town. Reports of such incidents were mainly from Natal/KwaZulu, the Eastern Cape and Northern Transvaal.

52. The Electoral Act provides for legal adjudication against parties whose supporters disrupt political gatherings or intimidate voters. Under this provision, the National Party and the Democratic Party have each filed separate complaints with IEC against ANC; and ANC against IFP. A number of incidents have been reported, including lock-outs, intimidation, heckling and stoning at political gatherings, and it is feared that, if allowed to continue unchecked, they may result in more violence and higher casualties.

53. ANC in recent weeks has publicly warned supporters to desist from disrupting meetings of rival political parties. It has threatened disciplinary action against any of its members who may infringe the Electoral Code of Conduct.

IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS

54. The past three months have witnessed intensive efforts by concerned political parties and the Government of South Africa to establish the transitional structures agreed to in the multi-party negotiations to help level the political playing field and create conditions for free and fair elections. As noted above, all the major structures - TEC, IEC, ICM and IBA - were established and became operational during the reporting period.

55. TEC and the Government of South Africa have progressively moved towards a modus operandi, where they work in tandem in the preparation for the election. A large proportion of the 26 parties which took part in the multi-party negotiating process are currently in TEC. Despite the strenuous efforts that have been made to ensure that all parties take part in the elections scheduled from 26 to 28 April 1994, it would seem that IFP, the Conservative Party and most of the extreme right-wing parties will not do so.

56. IEC has accomplished much since it was established in December 1993, but there is still much more to be done. For example, IEC has informed UNOMSA that the timetable for the appointment of IEC field staff has been subject to significant slippage, the net effect of which will be that District Electoral Officers will be appointed only a matter of weeks, perhaps days, before the poll. This will give them very little time to prepare for the election and, in particular, to select polling staff and to ensure that they are properly trained.

57. Of further concern has been the identifying of voting stations. Partly because of delays in the deployment of its field staff, IEC has been forced to rely on information obtained from various sources relating to potential voting station sites, and a significant proportion of the sites identified in that manner have proved to be unavailable. This has led to a deferral of the originally planned date for the gazetting of proposed voting sites, which has hampered the detailed planning by IEC of polling logistics and staff deployment. It has also hampered UNOMSA planning, through the Joint Operations Unit, for the deployment of observers.

58. Problems in establishing a field structure and identifying voting stations have also resulted in delays in the production of comprehensive plans for the secure consolidation, packing, warehousing and distribution of critical electoral equipment and materials, and the secure movement and storage of ballot boxes and other sensitive equipment and materials in the course of the polling and immediately prior to the counting.

59. In addition, owing to the complex political situation and persisting tensions, the Government and its security departments and the political parties have not given IEC all the help and cooperation needed in formulating a comprehensive and appropriate contingency plan for the security of voting stations, voters, monitors and international governmental and foreign non-governmental observers. In this connection, the National Peace-Keeping Force, which was to be 10,000 strong, will not be able to deploy more than 3,000 to 4,000 personnel.

60. All of these issues have been discussed, and continue to be discussed, with IEC. UNOMSA is satisfied that IEC fully appreciates them, and is seeking to ameliorate matters. I call on all concerned to extend their full cooperation to IEC so as to ensure that the necessary arrangements are finalized soon.

61. Political violence continues to pose a grave threat to the electoral process. Of particular concern is the opposition to the electoral process by IFP, especially in Natal/KwaZulu, and by the extreme right wing in areas it claims constitute the volkstaat. Intimidation, violence and provocation should not be permitted to deny the people of South Africa their legitimate right to join the community of democratic States. In order to ensure free and fair elections in South Africa, I urge all concerned to eschew violence and to participate peacefully in the political process and respect everyone's right to vote or not to vote. It is important that the Government provide IEC with all necessary help in formulating a comprehensive and appropriate contingency plan for the security of voting stations, voters, monitors, and international governmental and foreign non-governmental observers.

62. Following the Security Council's approval of an expanded mandate for UNOMSA by its resolution 894 (1994) of 14 January 1994, high priority was given to the timely and full deployment of the Mission. My Special Representative assumed his post in Johannesburg on 27 January 1994. By 24 March, a month before the elections, all the United Nations observers and support staff called for in the operational approach elaborated in my last report had been deployed in all the provinces and subprovinces. The training programme and deployment plan for the additional observers who will arrive in the country two weeks before the elections have been finalized.

63. It is incumbent upon all the people of South Africa to ensure the success of the long and arduous process they have embarked upon to transform South Africa into a non-racial, democratic and united country through free and fair elections. On the basis of the operational approach approved for it by the Security Council, UNOMSA will continue to assist the people of South Africa in their efforts to usher in a new era of peace and democratic governance.

64. In conclusion, I should like to pay tribute in particular to the Commonwealth, the European Union and OAU for the contributions they have made to the collaborative international effort in South Africa. I should also like to express my appreciation for the cooperation and assistance they have extended to me and to my Special Representative with respect to the mandate entrusted to me by the Security Council regarding South Africa.

Notes

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