

**Security Council****Distr.
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**REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS
INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON****(for the period 11 July 1986-11 January 1987)****Introduction**

1. In its resolution 586 (1986) of 18 July 1986, the Security Council decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for a further interim period of six months, until 19 January 1987. The Council also reiterated its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries; re-emphasized the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978, approved by resolution 426 (1978); called upon all parties concerned to co-operate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate; and reiterated that UNIFIL should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions. The Council requested the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned on the implementation of the resolution and to report to the Council thereon,

2. During the current mandate period, I have submitted two reports to the Security Council, following serious incidents that took place in August and September 1986 (S/18348 and S/18396 and Corr.1). These incidents were the subject of the Council's resolution 587 (1986) of 23 September 1986 and of statements by its President on 5 September (S/18320) and 31 October 1986 (S/18439).

Organization of the Force

3. As of January 1987, the composition of UNIPIL was as follows:

	<u>Military personnel</u>		
Fiji	HQ UNIFIL	6	
	Infantry battalion	612	
	Mi li tary police company	<u>7</u>	625
Finland	HQ UNIFIL	15	
	Infantry battalion	508	
	Military police company	<u>9</u>	532
France	HQ UNIPIL	32	
	Composite battalion (maintenance company, defence company, armoured escort company, bomb disposal detachment)	488	
	Military police company	<u>10</u>	530
Ghana	HQ UNIPIL	27	
	Infantry battalion	777	
	Engineer company	60	
	Military police company	<u>6</u>	870
Ireland	HQ UNIPIL	12	
	Infantry battalion	648	
	HQ Camp Command	71	
	Military police company	<u>13</u>	744
Italy	HQ UNIPIL	4	
	Hel icopter unit	<u>44</u>	48
Neoa 1	HQ UNIPIL	11	
	Infantry battalion	784	
	Military police company	<u>5</u>	800
Norway	HQ UNIFIL	34	
	Infantry battalion	676	
	Maintenance company	160	
	Military police company	<u>17</u>	887
Sweden	HQ UNIFIL	8	
	Logistic battalion	616	
	Military police company	<u>8</u>	632
TOTAL UNIPIL			<u>5 668</u>

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In addition to the above personnel, UNIFIL was assisted by 77 military observers from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). These unarmed observers are organized as Observer Group Lebanon (OGL) and are under the operational control of the Commander of UNIFIL, Major-General Gustav Håqalund.

4. During the period, important changes took place in the composition and deployment of UNIFIL.

5. Following the Government of France's decision in April 1986 to withdraw part of the logistic unit that it had provided to the Force since its inception (see S/18164, para. 9), the Government of Sweden agreed to make available additional troops to replace the departing French personnel. The hand-over took place on 8 December 1986. Logistic support for UNIFIL is now provided by a logistic branch comprising the Swedish logistic battalion, elements of the French composite battalion, the Norwegian maintenance company, the Ghanaian engineer company and the Italian helicopter unit, as well as certain civilian staff sections, notably those responsible for communications and the maintenance of civilian vehicles. The Swedish logistic battalion is responsible for transport, supply and engineering, as well as for the UNIFIL hospital in Naqoura. The elements of the French battalion are responsible for the maintenance of certain vehicles and equipment, and for bomb disposal.

6. In September 1986, about half the French infantry battalion was redeployed to Naqoura. As a temporary measure, most of the area it vacated in the north-western corner of the UNIFIL area was taken over by a reinforced Nepalese company, with some other positions being transferred to the Finnish and Ghanaian battalions.

7. A more substantive redeployment of the Force took place in December 1986 and January 1987. This was based on recommendations I had received from the Force Commander in response to instructions that he should examine any possibilities there might be for further varying the size and deployment of the Force's contingents (see S/18396, para. 20). The area previously held by the French infantry battalion was divided between the Finnish and Ghanaian battalions, with the greater part of the area being taken over by the latter. The eastern part of the sector hitherto held by the Ghanaian battalion was transferred to the Irish battalion and part of the latter's sector was in turn transferred to the Nepalese battalion. A minor adjustment was also made to the boundary between the Fijian and Nepalese battalions. In accordance with decisions previously taken (see S/18396, para. 71, various positions that were particularly vulnerable and/or of limited operational value were closed and four new positions were opened. The number of permanent positions held by the Force was thus reduced from 214 to 173. This reduction made it possible to reinforce positions that had previously been only lightly manned. The current deployment of UNIFIL is shown on the annexed map.

8. The bulk of the French infantry battalion was repatriated on 15 December 1986. One company remained and was combined with the remaining elements of the French logistic battalion to form a composite battalion whose duties include protection of the UNIFIL headquarters, in addition to the logistic functions described in paragraph 5 above. The Government of France has assured me that, when it becomes possible for the Force to deploy towards the international

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frontier, France will be **open** to any suggestions I **may make** for French **troops** to bear their share of the extra **tasks** that will then fall to UNIFIL. The Governments of Finland, Ghana and Nepal have agreed to increase their **contingents** so that **they** can **discharge** the extra functions assigned to them as a result of the redeployment. An additional 154 **Ghanaian** and 20 Finnish personnel arrived in December 1986 and a further 50 **Nepalese** soldiers will arrive in March **1987**.

9. The composite **mechanized** company, referred to in my **report** of 13 October 1986 (S/18396, **para. 9**), has now been set up as the force mobile reserve. It **comprises** elements of the Fijian, Finnish, Ghanaian, Irish and Nepalese battalions. While the **company's** base east of Qana is under construction, its components are remaining with their parent units, but they will be assembled to **begin** operations as a unit with effect from mid-January 1987.

10. The military observers of UNTSO continued to man the five observation **posts** along the Lebanese side of the Israel-Lebanon armistice demarcation line and a **post** at Chateau de Beaufort. They also maintained a mobile **team** at Tyre and operated seven mobile teams within the UNIFIL area.

11. The Lebanese army unit serving with UNIFIL maintained a **strength** of **some 128**, all ranks. The main part of the unit was stationed in Tyre and the other part was deployed in the UNIFIL area and attached to various battalions. The Force Commander continued to explore with **the** Lebanese authorities possible **ways of deploying** a unit of the Lebanese **army** to the north-western part of the UNIFIL area as a first **step** towards the return of the Government's effective authority in the area (**see** S/18396, **para. 20**). In a message to the Lebanese Minister of Defence on 31 October, I stated that the preliminary discussions had shown that this was a **very** complex matter that required careful study. All efforts had to be made to ensure that the unit of the Lebanese Army dispatched to southern Lebanon **would be** in a position to carry out effectively its important tasks.

12. In my **reports** of 18 September and 13 October 1986, I described the **steps** taken and recommended to improve the security of UNIFIL personnel (S/18348, paras. 16-18, and S/18396, paras. 5-15). Those efforts have continued with all possible dispatch. The funds made available under the crash programme to improve the protection of positions have been fully committed. Reinforced shelters and construction material procured under the **programme** have **been to arrive** and are **being** issued to the units. In addition, steps are being taken to improve the security of the headquarters compound at Naqoura by **building** a by-pass road in order to divert traffic away from the immediate vicinity of the **compound**.

13. The Force Commander has again emphasized to me the **importance** of armour for the protection of his troops and for the **operations** of the force mobile reserve referred to in paragraph 9 above. It will be recalled that the provision to the Force of 29 additional armoured vehicles was the **largest** item on the list of additional security measures which **the** Security Council approved through the statement of its President on 31 October 1986 (S/18439). It has not yet been possible to reach agreement **on the supply** of these vehicles by troop-contributing Governments, but I **am** examining ways of **meeting what** has become a pressing requirement.

14. During the current mandate period, 15 members of the Force lost their lives. Four French soldiers and an Irish officer were killed by roadside bombs; three Fijian soldiers were killed by a car bomb; and two Irish soldiers were killed by **gunfire**. A Finnish, a French, an Irish, a Nepalese and a Norwegian soldier died as a result of accidents or from other causes. In addition, 43 soldiers were wounded by hostile action. Since the establishment of UNIFIL, 139 members of the Force have died, **57** of them as a result of **firing** and mine or bomb explosions, 60 in accidents and 22 from other causes. More than 200 have been wounded as a result of hostile action or mine explosions.

Situation in the UNIFIL area

15. Israel has continued to maintain in southern Lebanon its "**security zone**", which is manned by the so-called "South Lebanon Army" (**SLA**) and elements of the Israel Defence Forces (**IDF**). The boundaries of the "**security zone**" have not been defined but are in effect determined by the positions maintained by the IDF and the SLA in southern Lebanon and the patrols they conduct between them. The "**security zone**" embraces **all** of the area adjacent to the international border, parts of the Nepalese, Irish and Finnish battalion sectors, the area of deployment of the Norwegian battalion and extensive areas to the north of the UNIFIL area. Within the UNIFIL area, the IDF and the SLA maintained a total of 21 positions, of which 18 were manned permanently. During the reporting period, the IDF vacated a position at Al Qantarrah and established a new position northeast of Yatar. The latter is currently manned by the SLA. IDF personnel have been observed in SLA positions on numerous occasions and the two forces often operate together.

16. Armed resistance **groups** continued to launch frequent attacks **against** IDF and SLA personnel and positions, **using** small arms, rocket-propelled **grenades**, rockets and mortars, as well as roadside bombs. UNIFIL recorded 11 such attacks in the second half of July, 20 in **August**, 21 in September, 6 in October, 10 in November, 12 in December 1986 and 4 in the first 11 days of January 1987. Attacks were also reported in those parts of the "security zone" which are outside the UNIFIL area of deployment. The pattern **in** the UNIFIL **area** during the **reporting** period has been for the attacks to become fewer in number but **larger** in scale. They increasingly involve armed elements **who** come from elsewhere in Lebanon and rendezvous with supporters in the "security zone" before making their assault. **In** a particularly grave incident early on 2 January 1987, a **group** of armed elements, estimated to number 40 or more, briefly captured an **IDF/SLA** position near **Brashit**, **killing** six of the defenders.

17. The SLA (and sometimes the IDF) fired frequently from their positions or when on patrol in the "security zone". The **SLA**, in particular, often fired indiscriminately into inhabited areas. During the reporting period, 15 **villages** in the UNIFIL area were affected by this practice and some, notably **Qabrikha**, Haddathah, Ayta **az Zutt**, Yatar and Siddiqin, were repeatedly targeted. **UNIFIL** has confirmed reports of four Lebanese civilians **being** killed and some 30 injured by such **firing**. UNIFIL repeatedly protested to the Israeli authorities about these incidents.

UNIFIL itself was also subjected to hostile acts by the SLA and the IDF. On more than 200 occasions, the SLA fired at or close to UNIFIL positions and vehicles. In a few cases, the firing by the SLA was in response to attacks by armed elements on its positions. But in most cases the firing against UNIFIL was both unprovoked and, apparently, deliberate. During the period under review, seven members of UNIFIL were wounded by such firing and, on 6 December 1986, an Irish soldier was killed by one of three heavy machine gun rounds fired at a UNIFIL position from an IDF/SLA position near Brashit. UNIFIL protested to the Israeli military authorities about each of these incidents and efforts were made at the political level to persuade Israel to get them stopped. The Israeli authorities were also asked to make available the results of their own investigation into the killing of the Irish soldier on 6 December 1986. The Israeli authorities said that they regretted the death and injuries caused to UNIFIL personnel and had urged the commander of the SLA to stop any firing at United Nations positions or vehicles; but the SLA commander had denied that shots were deliberately fired at UNIFIL and accused UNIFIL of having permitted armed elements to attack IDF/SLA Positions. At the time of reporting, no information had yet been received from the Israeli authorities about the results of their investigation of the 6 December incident. Firing by the SLA at United Nations positions and vehicles continues.

19. Cases of IDF fire against UNIFIL positions and vehicles were far fewer. But on the evening of 10 January 1987 an Irish corporal at a United Nations position in the village of Brashit was killed by a round fired from a Merkava tank of the IDF during heavy and unprovoked bombardment of the village. The Force Commander immediately and vigorously protested to the Israeli authorities. Information at present available suggests that this was a particularly irresponsible act. The results of the urgent investigation promised by the Israeli authorities are awaited.

20. UNIFIL also suffered casualties as a result of attacks by armed elements. The very serious incidents that took place in August and September 1986, causing the deaths of 5 UNIFIL personnel and the wounding of 31 others, have already been described in my reports of 18 September and 13 October 1986. As noted in the latter report, the attacks by armed elements against UNIFIL ceased in late September 1986. However, in a serious incident on 20 November, a car bomb exploded at a UNIFIL checkpoint on the coastal road. Three Fijian soldiers and three civilians were killed, including the driver of the car, and two Fijians and three civilians were injured. Information received by the UNIFIL command suggests that the car bomb was not originally intended for use against UNIFIL but was exploded through remote control by persons some distance away when the car was held up at the checkpoint.

21. UNIFIL was only indirectly affected by the fighting that began on 30 September between Amal and Palestinian armed elements in and around the Rashidiyah refugee camp south of Tyre and that thereafter spread to the Sidon area and Beirut. These hostilities took place outside the UNIFIL area but they have frequently interrupted traffic on the coastal road, which is an important supply route for UNIFIL. For more than two months large parts of southern Lebanon have been without electricity as a result of the hostilities. In several places, for example Tyre, the supply of running water has also been interrupted. On 29 November 1986, a Finnish soldier was injured by shrapnel from a grenade, which exploded close to the UNIFIL office in Beirut during hostilities in the vicinity of Shatila refugee camp.

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22. UNIFIL continued to co-operate with the Lebanese authorities, United Nations agencies and programmes, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and non-governmental organizations in extending assistance to the local population. Because of the friction between Amal and Palestinians, there was considerable demand for emergency relief assistance, for which the UNIFIL humanitarian office came to function as a kind of clearing house. It received funds and stored goods from humanitarian agencies, in particular the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator (UNDRO), and made them available for distribution as the need arose. In addition, many Lebanese were treated at UNIFIL medical centres and some 2,600 at the UNIFIL hospital in Naqoura, including more than 300 in-patients.

23. At the request of the Lebanese authorities, UNIFIL also provided facilities for the baccalaureate examinations, that is, the final secondary school examinations. They were held from 4 to 13 August 1986, and a follow-up examination was held from 15 to 19 November, at the Norwegian battalion headquarters in Ebel es Sagi. Some 1,400 students participated, with an average of about 200 attending each day.

Financial aspects

24. By section IV of its resolution 41/179 A of 5 December 1986, the General Assembly authorized the Secretary-General to enter into commitments for UNIFIL at a rate not to exceed \$12,125,000 gross (\$11,922,000 net) per month for the 12-month period beginning 19 January 1987, should the Security Council decide to continue the Force beyond the period of six months authorized under its resolution 586 (1986). In the event that the Council decides to extend UNIFIL beyond its current mandate period, the costs to the United Nations for maintaining the Force during the extension period will be within the commitment authorized by the Assembly in its resolution 41/179 A, assuming a maximum Force strength of 6,000 and continuance of its responsibilities.

25. In paragraphs 38 and 39 of my report of 9 April 1986 (S/17965), I described the consequences, during the previous eight years, of some Member States failing to pay their assessed share of UNIFIL costs. The financial situation of the Force has continued to deteriorate and at the beginning of January 1987 the accumulated shortfall in the UNIFIL Special Account had reached an estimated \$270 million. As a result of the continuing non-payment of assessments, reimbursement to the troop-contributing Governments has continued at the reduced rate of \$600 per person per month. I again appeal to all Member States to pay their assessed contributions in full. The United States Government has informed me that the Administration has sought from Congress a supplemental appropriation of \$21.6 million to make up part of the shortfall in the United States contribution during United States fiscal years 1986 and 1987.

26. If the Security Council decides to renew the mandate of UNIFIL, as recommended below, it would be useful to take the opportunity to correct a small anomaly that has complicated the administration of the Force. Following its establishment on 19 March 1978, its mandate has been extended for successive interim periods, each of which was continued until the 19th day of a month. As the accounts of the

Organization are updated on a calendar-month basis, it has been necessary at the end of each mandate period to **undertake a complicated process of adjusting the UNIFIL accounting** records in order to establish the cost of the Force during the mandate period just ended. In **the interest** of administrative efficiency and in order to reduce **the workload** involved in adjusting **the accounts at the end of each mandate**, it is desirable that in future the mandate should be extended until the end of a calendar month. It is for this **reason that** I recommend in **paragraph 34** below **that the mandate be extended for a period of 6 months and 12 days, so that it will end on the last day of July 1987.**

Observations

27. The **period under review has been a very difficult one** for UNIFIL. The **heavy casualties** it suffered in **August** and September (**5 killed and 31 wounded**) were **the subject** of two special **reports** by me to the Security Council and of **Council resolution 587 (1986)** of 23 September **1986, as well as of two statements by the President.** Despite considerable effort, the Force's situation did **not improve** during **the second half** of the mandate period. The Force **has had five more of its members killed** by hostile action. The fears expressed in **my earlier reports have been confirmed.** The hopes that existed in **1984 and 1985 that it would be possible** to negotiate peacefully the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from **Lebanese territory have not so far been realized.** Israel's determination to **maintain its 'security zone'** has provoked equally determined resistance from **various armed groups** in Lebanon. An **increasingly violent conflict** has resulted. UNIFIL is seriously affected **by that conflict** and during the last **six months the Force has suffered casualties at the hands of all the main protagonists - the IDF and the S.I.A., and various resistance groups** in Lebanon.

28. I **regret to have to inform** the Security Council that my efforts to **achieve progress towards** implementation of Council resolution **425 (1978) have again proved unsuccessful.** The main **problem** remains Israel's refusal to withdraw **completely from Lebanon and its insistence on maintaining the "security zone" on the grounds that this is necessary to protect Israel against attacks launched from Lebanon, a view that is rejected by the Lebanese Government.** Conditions in **Lebanon itself have also deteriorated during the period under review, particularly in the economic field, and the so-called "camps war" has been added to an already violent and complicated situation.**

29. **I and my staff** have continued consultations with **the Government of Lebanon and the other parties directly concerned on all aspects of the implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978).**

30. The Lebanese authorities **continue to insist that Israel should withdraw its forces without further delay, thus permitting UNIFIL to deploy to the international border and fulfil its mandate.** They state that continued Israeli occupation is **illegal** and contrary to United Nations resolutions, will further escalate **tension and conflict** and will **jeopardize prospects** for international **peace and security in the whole area.** In their view, Israeli withdrawal **and the restoration, with the help of UNIFIL, of peace and quiet in southern Lebanon would make an important**

contribution to the solution of Lebanon's wider problems. They **hope** that current efforts will **succeed** in making progress towards national reconciliation and rendering it possible for the Lebanese Government and Army to assume effectively their responsibilities in southern Lebanon, as well as in the rest of the country.

31. The Israeli authorities reiterate that they have no designs on Lebanese territory, that they have no desire to maintain their forces in Lebanon and that their sole concern is **that** Lebanese territory should not be used as a base for cross-border attacks against Israel. The "security zone", they say, is a temporary arrangement until such **time as the Lebanese** Government is able to take effective control of security in southern Lebanon. They point **out** that frequent **attempts** are made to infiltrate armed **elements into** Israel itself, **especially** through the eastern part of the "security zone", and Katyusha rockets are fired from Lebanon at targets in Israel. Moreover, they say, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has succeeded in re-establishing a military capability in the **refugee** camps in Tyre and elsewhere in Lebanon. The Israeli authorities say that, in these circumstances, they are not prepared to **contemplate** changing current arrangements in southern Lebanon until there has, at the very least, been a period of peace and tranquillity in all or part of the area.

32. The authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic reiterate their demand that Israel should withdraw from Lebanese territory and state that Israel's concern with its security is only a pretext for the maintenance of its occupation. They express support for Security Council resolution 425 (1978) and for the UNIFIL role in restoring peace and stability in the area.


33. I remain convinced that the situation of UNIFIL will continue to be **precarious** as long as the minimum conditions for the implementation of its mandate do not exist. Those conditions are the effective co-operation of all the parties and a **lessening** of the prevailing conflict in the UNIFIL area. Meanwhile, the Force, in accordance with its mandate to ensure that its area is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind, has been doing its best to protect the civilian **population** and to maintain peace and quiet. As the conflict between the Lebanese resistance groups and the IDF/SLA has intensified, UNIFIL personnel have been **exposed to** ever-growing dangers from both sides. Following the period in August and September when UNIFIL personnel were subjected to serious attacks by armed elements, I **am** now particularly concerned at the extent to which the SLA, and to a lesser extent **the IDF**, have in recent months repeatedly harassed UNIFIL **by** firing at or close to its positions, as described in **paragraphs** 18 and 19 above. It is understandable, **though** regrettable, that UNIFIL positions should sometimes **be** hit accidentally by cross-fire **during** clashes between the opposing sides. But it is entirely unacceptable for any of the parties to fire deliberately and without provocation at UNIFIL positions or **attack them** in any other way. I wholeheartedly condemn all such **attacks**, whatever their source, and I urge that every effort be made to get them stopped.

34. The question that now confronts the Security Council is whether it is worthwhile, in **the** present impasse and with little realistic **hope** of early **progress** towards full implementation of Council resolution 425 (1978), to extend UNIFIL for a further six months, as has been requested by the Lebanese Government in the

letter dated 6 January 1987 from the Permanent Representative to me (S/18580). The Force's difficulties are indeed great. In particular, there is a danger that its efforts, in accordance with its terms of reference, to prevent its area from being used for hostile activities will cause it to be perceived by the local population as helping to protect the "security zone" and thereby condoning the continuing Israeli occupation. For all the problems that it faces, UNIFIL nevertheless remains an important element of such stability as exists in this troubled area and the vast majority of the local population want it to stay. It plays a large part in their daily lives and they rely on it to protect them, as best it can, from harassment. I continue to believe that its withdrawal would create a critical vacuum and would lead to even greater conflict. I accordingly recommend that the Council accept the Lebanese Government's request and that, for the reason given in paragraph 26 above, the Force's mandate be extended for a period of 6 months and 12 days, that is, until 31 July 1987.

3. But, having made that recommendation, I feel obliged to emphasize two further points of great importance. First, if the Security Council accepts my recommendation, it will be essential that all in a position to help should make every possible effort to work for the fulfilment of the UNIFIL mandate; this must imply a change in Israel's position. I would also express the hope that current efforts by the various parties in Lebanon to achieve national reconciliation will succeed; these efforts are one of the few hopeful features of the present scene. Second, if the UNIFIL situation continues to deteriorate, the time may eventually come when the Council may feel that it is no longer right that the troop-contributing countries should be asked to keep UNIFIL in being. For it is they who pay the price for the international community's wish to maintain this most important United Nations peace-keeping operation - a price that is expressed both in the lives of their soldiers and in the sums of reimbursement that they do not receive because certain Member States have not paid their assessed share of the Force's costs. The steadfastness of the troop-contributing Governments in nevertheless maintaining - and in some cases increasing - their contributions to UNIFIL through all the trials of 1986 is beyond praise. The United Nations and the parties concerned owe a deep debt of gratitude to them all, and especially to those who responded so readily to the United Nations need for extra troops during the current mandate period.

36. Finally, I pay tribute to Major-General Gustav Hägglund, the Force Commander, and to all the men and women under his command and control, both military and civilian, for the courage and determination with which they have faced a very difficult period. Their discipline and bearing have been of a high order, reflecting credit on themselves, on their countries and on the United Nations.



جنوب لبنان
 黎巴嫩南部 • SOUTHERN LEBANON
 LIBAN MÉRIDIONAL
 ЮЖНЫЙ ЛИБАН • LIBANO MERIDIONAL


MEDITERRANEAN SEA

- UNIFIL HQ
- SWEDISH
- FRENCH LOG
- ITALIAN
- COMPOSITE MP COY
- DGL

0 1 2 3 4 5 km
 0 1 2 3 4 5 mi
 PALESTINE BELT GRID

The designations employed and the presentation of the material on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country or territory or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers.

ISRAEL



وزع قوة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان اعتباراً من كانون الثاني/يناير 1987
 一九八七年一月联黎部队部署情况
 UNIFIL DEPLOYMENT AS OF JANUARY 1987
 DÉPLOIEMENT DE LA FINUL AU MOIS DE JANVIER 1987
 ДИСЛОКАЦИЯ ВСООНЛ НА ЯНВАРЬ 1987
 DESPLIEGUE DE LA FPNUL EN ENERO DE 1987

- | | | | |
|---|--|--|---|
| 5-9 ● مركز مراقبة
观察所
Observation post
Poste d'observation
Наблюдательный пункт
Puesto de observación | 5-5 X حاجز طريق
路障
Road block
Post de contrôle routier
Заграждение на дороге
Barrera de caminos | 9-10 ● قاعدة
基地
Base
Base
Base | ● موقع مؤقت
临时阵地
Temporary position
Position temporaire
Временная позиция
Posición provisional |
| حدود عمليات قوة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان
联黎部队活动范围的界限
UNIFIL operational boundaries
Limites des zones d'opérations de la Force
Оперативные рубежи ВСООНЛ
Límites de las zonas de operaciones de la Fuerza | | | ⊠ وحدة لبنانية
黎巴嫩单位
Lebanese unit
Unité libanaise
Ливанское подразделение
Unidad libanesa |

- موقع لقوة الدفاع الإسرائيلية
以色列国防军阵地
Israel Defence Forces position
Position des Forces de défense israéliennes
Позиция из дильских сил обороны
Posición de la Fuerza de Defensa de Israel
- موقع لقوة الدفاع الإسرائيلية و/أو "جيش جنوب لبنان"
以色列国防军和(或)"南黎巴嫩军"阵地
Israel Defence Forces and/or "South Lebanon Army" position
Position des forces de défense israéliennes et/ou de "l'Armée du Liban du Sud"
Позиция израильских сил обороны и/или "южноливанской армии"
Posición de la Fuerza de Defensa de Israel y/o del "Ejército del Líbano meridional"

لم تبيّن المواقع الخارجة عن نطاق منطقة وزع قوة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان
 联黎部队部署地区以外的阵地未予标明
 Positions outside UNIFIL area of deployment are not indicated
 Les positions situées en dehors de la zone de déploiement de la FINUL ne sont pas indiquées
 Позиции за пределами района размещения ВСООНЛ не указаны
 No se indican las posiciones fuera de la zona de despliegue de la FPNUL