

temporary nature—indeed, three months—was to use his best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions". The mediator, in the meantime, was to "use his best endeavours with the representatives of the communities" and with the Governments concerned to achieve the peaceful solution and agreed settlement to which I have already referred. Not only did the mediation called for in the Security Council meet with no success but it also proved impossible to resume the search for an agreed solution in full measure.

110. Thus the hopes and expectations of 1964 are yet to be fulfilled. After nearly eight years, the solution of the Cyprus problem is still not in sight, conditions on the island remain precarious and I have to come once more before the Security Council—in fact for the twentieth time—to recommend a further extension of the mandate of UNFICYP. It is obvious that this situation cannot continue indefinitely, to the detriment of the people of Cyprus and as a lingering threat to international peace and security.

convinced that, given the necessary goodwill, the Cyprus problem is capable of solution. It is my earnest hope that, in accordance with the principles of the Charter, the parties to this problem will soon find it possible, in the interest of the well-being of the people of Cyprus and the cause of international peace and security, to make those necessary compromises and accommodations without which no settlement can be achieved.

112. In concluding this report, I wish to express my deep appreciation to the Governments which have provided contingents and personnel for UNFICYP and to those which have made voluntary contributions for the support of the operation. I also wish to pay tribute to my Special Representative, to the Force Commander and to all the officers and men of UNFICYP as well as its civilian staff. They have continued to carry out with exemplary efficiency and devotion the important task assigned to them by the Security Council.

ANNEX

[Map showing the deployment of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus on 1 December 1971. See page 55.]

DOCUMENT S/10403*

294 722

Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of his Special Representative to the Middle East

[Original: English]
[30 November 1971]

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INTRODUCTION

1. By its resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, the Security Council affirmed the principles and provisions which should be applied in establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East and requested me to designate a special representative to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with these provisions and principles. I designated Ambassador Gunnar V. Jarring of Sweden as my Special Representative and submitted progress reports from time to time to the Security Council on his efforts.¹⁷

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8541.

¹⁷ Ibid., *Twenty-second Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1967*, document S/8309; *ibid.*, *Twenty-third Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1968*, documents S/8309/Add.1 and 2; *ibid.*, *Supplement for July, August and September 1968*, document S/8309/Add.3; *ibid.*, *Supplement for October, November and December 1968*, document S/8309/Add.4; and *ibid.*, *Twenty-fifth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1970*, document S/9902.

2. By its resolution 2628 (XXV) of 4 November 1970, the General Assembly, after expressing its views on the principles which should govern the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, called upon the parties directly concerned to resume contact with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General with a view to giving effect to Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and requested me to report to the Security Council within a period of two months, and to the General Assembly as appropriate, on the efforts of the Special Representative and on the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

3. In accordance with my responsibilities under Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and with the request contained in General Assembly resolution 2628 (XXV), I submitted to the Security Council on 4 January 1971 a comprehensive report [S/10070] on the activities of the Special Representative up to that date. Subsequently, on 1 February and 5 March, I submitted further progress reports [S/10070/Add.1 and 2] on his activities.

4. In view of the fact that the General Assembly is about to debate again the situation in the Middle East and of the request contained in General Assembly resolution 2628 (XXV) that I should report to it as appropriate on the efforts of the Special Representative and on the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), I am arranging to have my report of 4 January 1971 available to the Members of the General Assembly; I am also submitting the present report on the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) to both the Security Council and the General Assembly in order to give a more comprehensive account of the activities of the Special Representative at the beginning of 1971 than that given in documents S/10070/Add.1 and 2 and to bring that account up to date.

I. THE HOLDING OF DISCUSSIONS UNDER THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE'S AUSPICES (JANUARY-MARCH 1971)

5. It will be recalled that at the close of 1970 it was possible to arrange for the resumption of the discussions under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring with Israel, Jordan and the United Arab Republic for the purpose of reaching agreement on a just and lasting peace between them.

6. Ambassador Jarring resumed his discussions with the parties at Headquarters on 5 January 1971 and pursued them actively. He held a series of meetings with the representatives of Israel (including meetings with the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister during a brief visit to Israel made from 8 to 10 January 1971 at the request of that Government), of Jordan, and of the United Arab Republic. In addition, he held meetings with the Permanent Representative of Lebanon, which is also one of the States directly concerned with the Middle East settlement.

7. At an early stage in these meetings Israel presented to Ambassador Jarring, for transmission to the Governments concerned, papers containing its views on the "Essentials of peace". Subsequently, the United Arab Republic and Jordan having received the respective Israeli views, presented papers containing their own views concerning the implementation of the provisions of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

8. During the remainder of January, Ambassador Jarring held further meetings with the representatives of Israel, Jordan and the United Arab Republic, in the course of which he received further memoranda elaborating the positions of the parties. Unfortunately, these indicated that the parties held differing views on the order in which items should be discussed. More importantly, each side was insisting that the other should be ready to make certain commitments before being ready to proceed to the stage of formulating the provisions of a peace settlement.

9. On the Israeli side there was insistence that the United Arab Republic should give specific, direct and reciprocal commitments towards Israel that it would be ready to enter into a peace agreement with Israel and to make towards Israel the various undertakings referred to in paragraph 1 (ii) of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). When agreement was reached on those points, it would be possible to discuss others, including the refugee problem; such items as secure and recognized boundaries, withdrawal and additional arrangements for ensuring security should be discussed in due course.

10. The United Arab Republic continued to regard the Security Council resolution as containing provisions to be implemented by the parties and to express its readiness to carry out its obligations under the resolution in full, provided that Israel did likewise. However it held that Israel persisted in its refusal to implement the Security Council resolution, since it would not commit itself to withdraw from all Arab territories occupied in June 1967. Furthermore in the view of the United Arab Republic Israel had not committed itself to the implementation of the United Nations resolutions relevant to a just settlement to the refugee problem.

11. The papers received by Ambassador Jarring from Israel and Jordan relating to peace between these two countries showed a similar divergence of views. Israel stressed the importance of Jordan's giving an undertaking to enter into a peace agreement with it

which would specify the direct and reciprocal obligations undertaken by each of them. Jordan emphasized the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and expressed the view that the essential first step towards peace lay in an Israeli commitment to evacuate all Arab territories.

12. Ambassador Jarring felt that at this stage of the talks he should make clear his views on what he believed to be the necessary steps to be taken in order to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), which the parties had agreed to carry out in all its parts. He reached the conclusion, which I shared, that the only possibility of breaking the imminent deadlock arising from the differing views of Israel and the United Arab Republic as to the priority to be given to commitments and undertakings—which seemed to him to be the real cause for the existing immobility in the talks—was for him to seek from each side the parallel and simultaneous commitments which seemed to be inevitable prerequisites of an eventual peace settlement between them. It should thereafter be possible to proceed at once to formulate the provisions and terms of a peace agreement not only for those topics covered by the commitments, but with equal priority for other topics, and in particular the refugee question.

13. In identical aide-mémoires handed to the representatives of the United Arab Republic and Israel on 8 February 1971 Ambassador Jarring requested those Governments to make to him certain prior commitments. Ambassador Jarring's initiative was on the basis that the commitments should be made simultaneously and reciprocally and subject to the eventual satisfactory determination of all other aspects of a peace settlement, including in particular a just settlement of the refugee problem. Israel would give a commitment to withdraw its forces from occupied United Arab Republic territory to the former international boundary between Egypt and the British Mandate of Palestine. The United Arab Republic would give a commitment to enter into a peace agreement with Israel and to make explicitly therein to Israel, on a reciprocal basis, various undertakings and acknowledgements arising directly or indirectly from paragraph 1 (ii) of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). [For the full text of the aide-mémoires, see annex I below.]

14. On 15 February, Ambassador Jarring received from the representative of the United Arab Republic an aide-mémoire in which it was indicated that the United Arab Republic would accept the specific commitments requested of it, as well as other commitments arising directly or indirectly from Security Council resolution 242 (1967). If Israel would give, likewise, commitments covering its own obligations under the Security Council resolution, including commitments for the withdrawal of its armed forces from Sinai and the Gaza Strip and for the achievement of a just settlement for the refugee problem in accordance with United Nations resolutions, the United Arab Republic would be ready to enter into a peace agreement with Israel. Finally the United Arab Republic expressed the view that a just and lasting peace could not be realized without the full and scrupulous implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and the withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from all the territories occupied since 5 June 1967. [For the full text of the United Arab Republic reply, see annex II below.]

15. On 17 February, Ambassador Jarring informed the Israeli representative of the contents of the United Arab Republic reply to his aide-mémoire.

16. On 26 February, Ambassador Jarring received a communication from the representative of Israel, in which, without specific reference to the commitment which he had sought from that Government, Israel stated that it viewed favourably "the expression by the United Arab Republic of its readiness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel" and reiterated that it was prepared for meaningful negotiations on all subjects relevant to a peace agreement between the two countries. Israel gave details of the undertakings which in its opinion should be given by the two countries in such a peace agreement, which should be expressed in a binding treaty in accordance with normal international law and precedent. Israel considered that both parties, having presented their basic positions, should now pursue the negotiations in a detailed and concrete manner without prior conditions.

17. On the crucial question of withdrawal on which Ambassador Jarring had sought a commitment from Israel, the Israeli position was that it would give an undertaking covering withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from "the Israeli-United Arab Republic cease-fire line" to the secure, recognized and agreed boundaries to be established in the peace agreement; Israel would not withdraw to the pre-5 June 1967 lines. *[For the full text of the Israeli paper, see annex III below.]*

18. On 28 February, Ambassador Jarring informed the United Arab Republic representative of the contents of the Israeli communication. The latter held that it was improper for the Israeli authorities to have responded to his Government's reply, which had been addressed to Ambassador Jarring and would have full effect only if the Israeli authorities gave the commitment requested of them by Ambassador Jarring.

19. In accepting the United States proposal for renewed discussions under Ambassador Jarring's auspices *[see S/10070, paras. 33 and 34]*, the parties had agreed that they would observe strictly, for a period of 90 days from 7 August 1970, the cease-fire resolutions of the Security Council. In response to the recommendation of the General Assembly in resolution 2628 (XXV), the cease-fire had been extended for a further period of three months. In my report of 1 February submitted as that period was expiring, I appealed to the parties at that stage of the discussions, to withhold fire, to exercise military restraint and to maintain the quiet which had prevailed in the area since August 1970.

20. In response to that appeal, the Foreign Ministry of Israel, in a communiqué released in Jerusalem on 2 February, announced that Israel would observe the cease-fire on a mutual basis; in a speech to the National Assembly on 4 February, the President of the United Arab Republic declared the decision of the United Arab Republic to refrain from opening fire for a period of 30 days ending on 7 March.

21. In submitting my report of 5 March 1971, I commented as follows:

"Ambassador Jarring has been very active over the past month and some further progress has been made towards a peaceful solution of the Middle East question. The problems to be settled have been more clearly identified and on some there is general agreement. I wish moreover to note with satisfaction the positive reply given by the United Arab Re-

public to Ambassador Jarring's initiative. However, the Government of Israel has so far not responded to the request of Ambassador Jarring that it should give a commitment on withdrawal to the international boundary of the United Arab Republic.

"While I still consider that the situation has considerable elements of promise, it is a matter for increasing concern that Ambassador Jarring's attempt to break the deadlock has not so far been successful. I appeal, therefore, to the Government of Israel to give further consideration to this question and to respond favourably to Ambassador Jarring's initiative.

"To give time for further consideration and in the hope that the way forward may be reopened, I once more appeal to the parties to withhold fire, to exercise military restraint and to maintain the quiet which has prevailed in the area since August 1970." *[S/10070/Add.2, paras. 14-16.]*

II. FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS (MARCH-NOVEMBER 1971)

22. In response to my appeal, the Israeli Government once again made clear its willingness to continue to observe the cease-fire on a basis of reciprocity. The President of the United Arab Republic, in a statement to the nation on 7 March 1971, declared that his country no longer considered itself further committed to a cease-fire or to withholding fire. This did not, however, mean that political action would cease.

23. On 11 March, the Israeli representative informed Ambassador Jarring that his Government was awaiting the reaction of the United Arab Republic Government to the Israeli invitation in its reply of 26 February to enter into detailed and concrete discussions. When that statement of the Israeli representative was brought to the attention of the United Arab Republic representative, he maintained that his Government was still awaiting an Israeli reply to Ambassador Jarring's aide-mémoire.

24. Subsequently, the talks under Ambassador Jarring's auspices lapsed. He therefore left Headquarters to resume his post as Ambassador of Sweden in Moscow on 25 March.

25. Although he returned to Headquarters from 5 to 12 May and from 21 September to 27 October and has held certain consultations elsewhere, he has found himself faced with the same deadlock and with no possibility of actively pursuing his mission.

26. Indeed, during much of this time the promotion of agreement between the parties was the object of two separate initiatives, first, an effort by the United States of America to promote an interim agreement providing for the reopening of the Suez Canal, which has not, so far, achieved any positive results, and, secondly, a mission of inquiry conducted by certain African Heads of States on behalf of the Organization of African Unity, which is still in progress as this report is being prepared. Both initiatives were described to Ambassador Jarring and myself by the sponsors as designed to facilitate the resumption of Ambassador Jarring's mission. Nevertheless, while they were being pursued, they obviously constituted an additional reason for him not to take personal initiatives.

27. In the introduction to my report on the work of the Organization I expressed certain views on the situation in the Middle East. After recalling the responses of the United Arab Republic and Israel to Ambassador Jarring's initiative of 8 February, I said

that I continued to hope—as I still do—that Israel would find it possible before too long to make a response that would enable the search for a peaceful settlement under Ambassador Jarring's auspices to continue.

28. After noting the relative quiet which has continued to exist in the area, I went on to say:

"It is not possible to predict how long this quiet will last, but there can be little doubt that, if the present impasse in the search for a peaceful settlement persists, new fighting will break out sooner or later. Since the parties have taken advantage of the present lull to strengthen considerably their military capabilities, it is only too likely that the new round of fighting will be more violent and dangerous than the previous ones, and there is always the danger that it may not be possible to limit it to the present antagonists and to the confines of the Middle East.

"I see no other way to forestall such a disastrous eventuality than by intensifying the search for a peaceful and agreed settlement. I believe there is still a chance of achieving such a settlement. I do not overlook the formidable difficulty of the problems to be tackled, but there exist several important assets on the side of peace efforts as well. The Security Council's cease-fire resolutions of June 1967 and its resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, if implemented simultaneously and fully, should provide the framework for achieving a peaceful and agreed settlement of the present conflict. To promote agreement for such a settlement, we are fortunate to have the services of Ambassador Jarring, who is uniquely qualified for this almost impossible task.

"Ambassador Jarring has clearly defined the minimum conditions that are required to move the peace talks ahead and, until those conditions are met, it is hard to see what else he can do to further his efforts. Steps to ensure that those conditions are met must be taken by the parties concerned and, failing this, by the Security Council itself or by States Members of the United Nations and, particularly, the permanent members of the Security Council, both because of their special responsibility within the United Nations and of their influence on the parties concerned."¹⁸

29. Recent developments have added to the urgency of my remarks. It therefore seems to me that the appropriate organs of the United Nations must review the situation once again and find ways and means to enable the Jarring mission to move forward.

ANNEXES

ANNEX I

Aide-mémoire presented to Israel and the United Arab Republic by Ambassador Jarring on 8 February 1971^a

I have been following with a mixture of restrained optimism and growing concern the resumed discussions under my auspices for the purpose of arriving at a peaceful settlement of the Middle East question. My restrained optimism arises from the fact that in my view the parties are seriously defining their positions and wish to move forward to a permanent

¹⁸ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 1A, paras. 221-223.

^a In presenting the aide-mémoire, Ambassador Jarring added the following interpretation:

"I interpret practical security measures in the Sharm el Sheikh area for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran to mean arrangements for stationing a United Nations force in the area for this purpose."

peace. My growing concern is that each side unyieldingly insists that the other make certain commitments before being ready to proceed to the stage of formulating the provisions to be included in a final peace agreement. There is, as I see it, a serious risk that we shall find ourselves in the same deadlock that existed during the first three years of my mission.

I therefore feel that I should at this stage make clear my views on what I believe to be the necessary steps to be taken in order to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), which the parties have agreed to carry out in all its parts.

I have come to the conclusion that the only possibility to break the imminent deadlock arising from the differing views of Israel and the United Arab Republic as to the priority to be given to commitments and undertakings—which seems to me to be the real cause for the present immobility—is for me to seek from each side the parallel and simultaneous commitments which seem to be inevitable prerequisites of an eventual peace settlement between them. It should thereafter be possible to proceed at once to formulate the provisions and terms of a peace agreement not only for those topics covered by the commitments, but with equal priority for other topics, and in particular the refugee question.

Specifically, I wish to request the Governments of Israel and the United Arab Republic to make to me at this stage the following prior commitments simultaneously and on condition that the other party makes its commitment and subject to the eventual satisfactory determination of all other aspects of a peace settlement, including in particular a just settlement of the refugee problem.

1. Israel

Israel would give a commitment to withdraw its forces from occupied United Arab Republic territory to the former international boundary between Egypt and the British Mandate of Palestine on the understanding that satisfactory arrangements are made for:

- (a) Establishing demilitarized zones;
- (b) Practical security arrangements in the Sharm el Sheikh area for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran;
- (c) Freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal.

2. United Arab Republic

The United Arab Republic would give a commitment to enter into a peace agreement with Israel and to make explicitly therein to Israel, on a reciprocal basis, undertakings and acknowledgements covering the following subjects:

- (a) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency;
- (b) Respect for and acknowledgement of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence;
- (c) Respect for and acknowledgement of each other's right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries;
- (d) Responsibility to do all in their power to ensure that acts of belligerency or hostility do not originate from or are not committed from within their respective territories against the population, citizens or property of the other party;
- (e) Non-interference in each other's domestic affairs.

In making the above-mentioned suggestion I am conscious that I am requesting both sides to make serious commitments but I am convinced that the present situation requires me to take this step.

ANNEX II

Aide-mémoire presented to Ambassador Jarring by the United Arab Republic on 15 February 1971

The United Arab Republic has informed you that it accepts to carry out—on a reciprocal basis—all its obligations as provided for in Security Council resolution 242 (1967) with a view to achieving a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. On the same basis, Israel should carry out all its obligations contained in this resolution.

Referring to your aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971, the United Arab Republic would give a commitment covering the following:

1. Termination of all claims of states of belligerency.
2. Respect for and acknowledgement of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence.
3. Respect for and acknowledgement of each other's right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.
4. Responsibility to do all in their power to ensure that acts of belligerency or hostility do not originate from or are committed from within the respective territories against the population, citizens or property of the other party.
5. Non-interference in each other's domestic affairs.

The United Arab Republic would also give a commitment that:

6. It ensures the freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal in accordance with the 1888 Constantinople Convention.
7. It ensures the freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran in accordance with the principles of international law.
8. It accepts the stationing of a United Nations peace-keeping force in the Sharm el Seikh.
9. To guarantee the peaceful settlement and the territorial inviolability of every State in the area, the United Arab Republic would accept:

(a) The establishment of demilitarized zones astride the borders in equal distances;

(b) The establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping force in which the four permanent members of the Security Council would participate.

Israel should, likewise, give a commitment to implement all the provisions of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). Hence, Israel should give a commitment covering the following:

1. Withdrawal of its armed forces from Sinai and the Gaza Strip.
2. Achievement of a just settlement for the refugee problem in accordance with United Nations resolutions.
3. Termination of all claims of states of belligerency.
4. Respect for and acknowledgement of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence.
5. Respect for and acknowledgement of each other's right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.
6. Responsibility to do all in their power to ensure that acts of belligerency or hostility do not originate from or are committed from within the respective territories against the population, citizens or property of the other party.
7. Non-interference in each other's domestic affairs.

8. To guarantee the peaceful settlement and the territorial inviolability of every State in the area, Israel would accept:

(a) The establishment of demilitarized zones astride the borders in equal distances;

(b) The establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping force in which the four permanent members of the Security Council would participate.

When Israel gives these commitments, the United Arab Republic will be ready to enter into a peace agreement with Israel containing all the aforementioned obligations as provided for in Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

The United Arab Republic considers that the just and lasting peace cannot be realized without the full and scrupulous implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and the withdrawal of the Israel armed forces from all the territories occupied since 5 June 1967..

ANNEX III

Communication presented to Ambassador Jarring by Israel on 26 February 1971

Pursuant to our meetings on 8 and 17 February, I am instructed to convey the following to you, and through you to the United Arab Republic.

Israel views favourably the expression by the United Arab Republic of its readiness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel and reiterates that it is prepared for meaningful negotiations on all subjects relevant to a peace agreement between the two countries.

The Government of Israel wishes to state that the peace agreement to be concluded between Israel and the United Arab Republic should, *inter alia*, include the provisions set out below.

A. Israel

Israel would give undertakings covering the following:

1. Declared and explicit decision to regard the conflict between Israel and the United Arab Republic as finally ended, and termination of all claims and states of war and acts of hostility or belligerency between Israel and the United Arab Republic.

2. Respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the United Arab Republic.

3. Respect for and acknowledgement of the right of the United Arab Republic to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.

4. Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from the Israel-United Arab Republic cease-fire line to the secure, recognized and agreed boundaries to be established in the peace agreement. Israel will not withdraw to the pre-5 June 1967 lines.

5. In the matter of the refugees and the claims of both parties in this connexion, Israel is prepared to negotiate with the Governments directly involved on:

(a) The payment of compensation for abandoned lands and property;

(b) Participation in the planning of the rehabilitation of the refugees in the region. Once the obligation of the parties towards the settlement of the refugee issue has been agreed neither party shall be under claims from the other inconsistent with its sovereignty.

6. The responsibility for ensuring that no war-like act, or act of violence, by any organization, group or individual originates from or is committed in the territory of Israel against the population, armed forces or property of the United Arab Republic.

7. Non-interference in the domestic affairs of the United Arab Republic.

8. Non-participation by Israel in hostile alliances against the United Arab Republic and the prohibition of stationing of troops of other parties which maintain a state of belligerency against the United Arab Republic.

B. United Arab Republic

The United Arab Republic undertakings in the peace agreement with Israel would include:

1. Declared and explicit decision to regard the conflict between the United Arab Republic and Israel as finally ended and termination of all claims and states of war and acts of hostility or belligerency between the United Arab Republic and Israel.

2. Respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Israel.

3. Respect for and acknowledgement of the right of Israel to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries to be determined in the peace agreement.

4. The responsibility for ensuring that no war-like act, or act of violence, by any organization, group or individual originates from or is committed in the territory of the United Arab Republic against the population, armed forces or property of Israel.

5. Non-interference in the domestic affairs of Israel.

6. An explicit undertaking to guarantee free passage for Israel ships and cargoes through the Suez Canal.

7. Termination of economic warfare in all its manifestations, including boycott, and of interference in the normal international relations of Israel.

8. Non-participation by the United Arab Republic in hostile alliances against Israel and the prohibition of stationing of troops of other parties which maintain a state of belligerency against Israel.

The United Arab Republic and Israel should enter into a peace agreement with each other to be expressed in a binding treaty in accordance with normal international law and precedent, and containing the above undertakings.

The Government of Israel believes that now that the United Arab Republic has through Ambassador Jarring expressed its willingness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel, and both parties have presented their basic positions, they should now pursue their negotiations in a detailed and concrete manner without prior conditions so as to cover all the points listed in their respective documents with a view to concluding a peace agreement.

DOCUMENT S/10405

Letter dated 1 December 1971 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[1 December 1971]

I have the honour to transmit herewith for the information of the members of the Security Council the text of a White Paper entitled "Rhodesia: Proposals for a Settlement"¹⁹ presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs on 26 November 1971. This contains the text of the proposals which I told the Council on 25 November that I should make available as soon as possible. As several delegations have told me that they would find it convenient to have this and other information available in the working languages, I should be grateful if you could arrange for the translation and circulation of this letter and its enclosure.

(Signed) C. T. CROWE

*Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
to the United Nations*

RHODESIA: PROPOSALS FOR A SETTLEMENT

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RHODESIA

Report on discussions with the régime since November 1970

The five Principles

1. Successive British Governments have been prepared to grant independence to Southern Rhodesia if certain essential requirements were met. These formed the basis of discussions with the Rhodesians during 1963 and 1964 and were subsequently formulated as the Five Principles. They are:

1. The principle and intention of unimpeded progress to majority rule, already enshrined in the 1961 Constitution, would have to be maintained and guaranteed.
2. There would also have to be guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the Constitution.
3. There would have to be immediate improvement in the political status of the African population.
4. There would have to be progress towards ending racial discrimination.
5. The British Government would need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.

Previous negotiations

2. A series of negotiations conducted by the previous Administration with the Rhodesians failed to reach an agreement in accordance with these Principles.⁽¹⁾ Contacts were finally discontinued in May 1969.⁽²⁾

Subsequent developments in Rhodesia

3. In a referendum in June 1969 the predominantly European electorate in Rhodesia endorsed proposals for a republican form of Government and a new Constitution. Shortly afterwards the Governor, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, obtained The Queen's permission to resign and both the British residual mission in Salisbury and its counterpart in London were withdrawn. The Republican Constitution had no legal status, but it was brought into effect by the Rhodesians on 2 March, 1970. Its main provisions are summarised at Annex A.

Her Majesty's Government's policy

4. When the present Government took office in June 1970, they confirmed their determination to seek a just and sensible solution to the Rhodesian problem in accordance with the Five Principles. For they recognised that while sanctions and international ostracism were having some effect on the economic situation in Rhodesia these measures had not brought about, nor seemed likely to bring about, the political changes that were confidently expected at the outset. Moreover, it was evident that the prospects for the African population as a whole could only deteriorate if the present situation remained unchanged. The economic, social and political advance of the Africans could take place

¹⁹ London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1971, Cmnd. 835.

(1) Cmnd. 3159, Cmnd. 3171 and Cmnd. 3793.

(2) Cmnd. 4065.