

2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Nuclear non-proliferation

Working paper submitted by China

1. Strengthening the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and eliminating nuclear proliferation risk are the inherent requirement of preserving the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which are conducive to promoting international and regional peace and stability and serve the common interests of the international community.

The current international security landscape is undergoing complex and profound changes, and new issues and challenges keep emerging in the realm of nuclear non-proliferation. More efforts should be made by the international community in the following aspects:

Firstly, to uphold the vision of building a community with a shared future for mankind and foster a favourable security environment. Countries should take an integrated approach to address both the causes and symptoms of nuclear proliferation issues, uphold the vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security, create an international and regional environment featuring fairness, justice and universal security, so as to eliminate the root causes of nuclear proliferation.

Secondly, to practise true multilateralism with a view to resolving nuclear proliferation issues through political and diplomatic means. We should firmly support the United Nations-centred international system and the international order based on international law, faithfully implement the multilateral agreements and relevant Security Council resolutions, resolutely oppose unilateral withdrawal from agreements, the imposition of unilateral sanctions and long-arm jurisdiction, as well as the threat of using force.

Thirdly, to oppose double standards and uphold the authority and effectiveness of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. The Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations should be complied with in a comprehensive, faithful and balanced manner. States that have not yet joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty should do so as non-nuclear-weapon States as soon as possible, and place all of their nuclear facilities under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in accordance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty provisions. All parties should support the IAEA performance of safeguards duty in a fair, objective and impartial manner, and promote the universality of the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols.



Fourthly, to stick to the principle of fairness and balance in addressing the relationship between nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Any measure for prevention of nuclear proliferation should not undermine the legitimate rights of States to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, nor hinder the international cooperation on nuclear-related materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes. Meanwhile, any proliferation activities carried out under the pretext of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be prohibited. We should pay high attention to the unbalanced supply and demand of nuclear materials in certain country and take effective measures to address this issue.

2. China remains committed to strengthening the authority, universality and effectiveness of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime with the Non-Proliferation Treaty as its cornerstone. China firmly opposes any form of nuclear weapons proliferation, fulfils its international non-proliferation obligations in a faithful and comprehensive manner, and strictly implements the relevant Security Council resolutions.

China has spared no efforts to strengthen and improve its national nuclear non-proliferation system. In December 2020, the Export Control Law of the People's Republic of China entered into force, further strengthening China's non-proliferation and export control system.

3. China has actively participated in international non-proliferation cooperation and made unremitting efforts in promoting the political and diplomatic settlement of relevant regional hotspot issues.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is an important outcome of multilateral diplomacy endorsed by Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) and a key pillar for upholding the international non-proliferation regime and peace and stability in the Middle East. The full and effective implementation of the JCPOA is the only effective way to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue. Parties should stick to the overall direction of dialogue and negotiations, build consensus, properly handle differences on the basis of mutual respect, refrain from any action that may further escalate tensions, so as to get the JCPOA back on the right track at an early date. As the party that withdrew unilaterally from the JCPOA, the United States should completely reverse the wrong policies adopted by its former administration, demonstrate necessary goodwill and flexibility, and actively respond to Iran's reasonable and legitimate concerns on sanctions lifting and other issues. Iran should resume full compliance with its nuclear commitments in the JCPOA on this basis. China would remain committed to upholding the authority and effectiveness of the JCPOA and Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), and play a constructive role in promoting the political and diplomatic settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue. Meanwhile, China would firmly safeguard its legitimate rights and interests.

China always stays committed to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, upholding peace and stability there and resolving the issue through dialogue and consultation. Continued dialogue and détente serve the common interest of the international community. Parties should continue to follow the dual-track approach of pursuing denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and establishment of a peace mechanism, take phased and synchronized actions, and explore effective ways to address the concerns of all parties in a balanced manner. As dialogue between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States is deadlocked, the effective way forward is for the Security Council to invoke the rollback terms of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea-related resolutions at an early date and ease sanctions against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, so as to create a positive atmosphere for the resumption of dialogue and consultation. The United States should immediately take practical measures to abandon the hostile policies

towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, lift sanctions and provide security guarantees to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and refrain from taking any action that may lead to an escalation of tensions.

China is gravely concerned about and firmly opposed to the nuclear-powered submarine cooperation among the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia. The trilateral cooperation on nuclear-powered submarines undermines regional peace and stability, and constitutes serious risks of nuclear proliferation in contravention of the object and purpose of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The naval nuclear propulsion reactors and their associated nuclear material to be transferred by the United States and the United Kingdom to Australia cannot be effectively safeguarded under the current IAEA safeguards system. And therefore there is no guarantee that such nuclear material will not be diverted by Australia to the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The issue of safeguards on the naval nuclear propulsion reactors and their associated nuclear material of a non-nuclear-weapon State has a direct bearing on the integrity and effectiveness of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and thus is closely related to the interests of all IAEA member States. It stands to reason that all IAEA member States should participate in the discussion of this issue, in order to seek a solution that is acceptable to all sides. For that purpose, China proposes that a special committee open to all IAEA member States be established to deliberate on the political, legal and technical issues related to the safeguards on naval nuclear propulsion reactors and their associated nuclear material of a non-nuclear-weapon State, and submit a report with recommendations to the Board of Governors and the General Conference of IAEA.
