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# Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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## Third session

New York, 29 April–10 May 2019

### Summary record (partial)\* of the 6th meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 1 May 2019, at 3 p.m.

*Chair:* Ms. van Deelen (Vice-Chair) . . . . . (Netherlands)  
*later:* Mr. Syed Hussin (Chair) . . . . . (Malaysia)

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General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory  
Committee (*continued*)

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\* No summary record was prepared for the rest of the meeting.

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*In the absence of Mr. Syed Hussin (Malaysia), Ms. van Deelen (Netherlands), Vice-Chair, took the Chair.*

*The meeting was called to order at 3.05 p.m.*

**General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee (continued)**

1. **Mr. Fu Cong** (China), speaking on behalf of the five nuclear-weapon States, said that, in view of the growing number of challenges facing the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, the nuclear-weapon States had met a number of times since July 2018 in an effort to strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime. At their eighth formal conference, held in Beijing on 30 January 2019, they had reached a number of common understandings.

2. First, they had undertaken to share the responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. In that connection, they had recognized that the current international security environment faced severe challenges and that maintaining sound relations with each other was of great importance to solving global strategic problems. They had agreed to remain objective in their assessment of each other's strategic intentions, to enhance dialogue on nuclear policies and doctrines, to promote strategic mutual trust and maintain common security, and make every effort to reduce nuclear risks, in particular those stemming from misunderstanding and misjudgement. They had also pledged to safeguard the existing international arms control architecture and to comply with all international arms control agreements; they had reaffirmed their commitment to existing negative and positive security assurances and had expressed their willingness to restart consultations on the Protocol to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok), and to continue to push for the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

3. Second, the nuclear-weapon States had undertaken to jointly safeguard the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime. In that connection, they had stressed that the Treaty was the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and an important component of the international security architecture. They had reiterated their commitment to abide by all provisions of the Treaty, to promote its universality and to work to make the international security environment more conducive to further progress on nuclear disarmament. The aim was to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all, through a step-by-step process. They had agreed to make every effort to seek peaceful and diplomatic solutions to the challenges

facing the nuclear non-proliferation regime and to support the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in its efforts to strengthen the safeguards system within its mandate. They had also agreed to promote international cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; to enhance coordination and cooperation on nuclear safety and nuclear security; and to submit national reports in time for the 2020 Review Conference and work together to make the Conference a success.

4. Third, in recognition of the impact that interaction among the major countries had on the international security environment, the world order and the confidence of the international community, the nuclear-weapon States had agreed to use their cooperation platform to enhance dialogue and coordination. In that connection, they had agreed to maintain their strategic dialogue on nuclear policies and doctrines and to strengthen their coordination in the Treaty review process. They had reaffirmed their support for China to take the lead in carrying out the second phase of the work of their Working Group on the Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms, and welcomed the offer by the United Kingdom to host their next formal conference in 2020.

5. Since the January 2019 conference, the nuclear-weapon States had renewed their engagement with the States members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) regarding the Protocol to the Treaty of Bangkok. They had also engaged with non-nuclear-weapon States, including by briefing the Conference on Disarmament on the outcome of their 2019 conference, marking the first time in history that they had expressed their collective views to the members of the Conference on Disarmament. They had also met with the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative to exchange views on the Non-Proliferation Treaty review process. Their ambassadors for disarmament had also held several rounds of consultations in Geneva and had agreed to strengthen the role of the Treaty in preserving international peace and security and to support the role of the Treaty in global development through pragmatic and effective initiatives that promoted the use of nuclear energy for the benefit of all.

6. At a meeting held at the Permanent Mission of China in New York on 30 April 2019, the nuclear-weapon States had agreed to hold expert-level consultations regarding a possible joint side event to be held during the 2020 Review Conference, at which the nuclear-weapon States would discuss their nuclear policies and doctrines. They had also agreed to study ways to strengthen cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy, nuclear security and nuclear safety through a "friends of the Chair" group based in Vienna. Lastly, they had agreed to push for substantive

discussions on technical issues relating to a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in the Conference on Disarmament.

7. **Ms. Pobee** (Ghana) said that the current polarized political environment, the increasing role of non-State actors and new and emerging threats to peace and security made multilateralism a vital tool for the pursuit of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. A new nuclear arms race and the accidental use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction were real possibilities that would result in a heavy death toll, destruction and long-term damage to human health and the environment. The international community needed to urgently comply with the Non-Proliferation Treaty and other important disarmament treaties and instruments.

8. The Treaty was the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, but its higher objective of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons had proven elusive. States parties needed to reaffirm their commitment to the outcomes of the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences and implement the agreed steps and actions in order to restore the trust and confidence required to achieve meaningful progress towards general and complete disarmament. Ghana urged States parties to demonstrate the necessary political will and flexibility to overcome the difficulties that had led to the failure of the 2015 Review Conference, and called on non-State parties to sign the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. Of course, the goal of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation should not be used as a basis for denying the inalienable right of all States to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

9. The only way to ensure the total elimination of nuclear weapons was to completely prohibit them. Ghana had therefore signed and was in the process of ratifying the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which complemented and reinforced the Non-Proliferation Treaty with respect to the humanitarian and environmental impact of any use of nuclear weapons. The adoption of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty of Pelindaba) had also contributed significantly to the overall objective of a world free of nuclear weapons. Her delegation called on all stakeholders to continue to work towards making the Middle East region free of nuclear weapons.

10. In view of the importance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, all States that had not yet done so, and the Annex 2 States in particular, should sign and

ratify that treaty without delay. Negotiations should begin in the Conference on Disarmament on a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty, which would address existing stockpiles and ban future production of all fissile material, for the achievement of nuclear disarmament.

11. The United Nations played a pivotal role in addressing global challenges to the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Ghana welcomed the Secretary-General's disarmament agenda and his efforts to protect the world and future generations from the existential threat of nuclear arsenals and other weapons of mass destruction. Ghana was hopeful that States parties would not allow short-sighted interests and the pursuit of hegemonic power override the goal of achieving complete and verifiable disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. A nuclear arms race would have no winners and States should act collectively to stop it.

12. **Mr. Sukhee** (Mongolia) said that progress towards nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was essential to strengthening international peace and security. Mongolia was contributing by promoting its nuclear-weapons-free status as an effective means of ensuring national security and enhancing stability and confidence-building in its region. That status had been recognized internationally, including by the General Assembly, which highlighted it in biennial resolutions.

13. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and nuclear disarmament. States parties therefore needed to fully adhere to their obligations under the Treaty and the outcome documents of its Review Conferences. In view of the failure of the 2015 Review Conference to reach consensus on the substantive part of its final document, States parties needed to work harder during the current review cycle towards achieving nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

14. The vitality of the Non-Proliferation Treaty could only be maintained by giving equal priority to its three pillars of nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful use of nuclear energy. In view of the current stalemate over nuclear disarmament, the nuclear-weapon States needed to bolster the non-proliferation pillar by implementing article VI of the Treaty. The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was imperative for the non-proliferation regime to be effective and viable, as it would constrain the continued development of nuclear weapons and strengthen article VI. All disarmament measures should be implemented in compliance with the

principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability. In addition, nuclear-weapon States should reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their security and military policies and lower the operational status of their nuclear-weapon systems to reduce the risk of nuclear catastrophe.

15. IAEA was to be commended for its work in verifying the States parties' compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation undertakings and in supporting them in fulfilling their inalienable right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The Agency contributed to the implementation of the Treaty and to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals through its Technical Cooperation Programme, in particular through its projects on food and agriculture, geology and health.

16. **Ms. Moldoisaeva** (Kyrgyzstan) said that the use of nuclear weapons was the most serious threat facing humanity. The States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty therefore needed to take measures to prevent all aspects of proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote nuclear disarmament. The Treaty was one of the most fundamental and effective international instruments in that regard.

17. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was an effective means of achieving the goals of disarmament and non-proliferation. The Central Asian States had signed the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (Treaty of Semipalatinsk) in 2006 with the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons and achieving general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. That Treaty had helped to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, promote cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and in the environmental rehabilitation of territories affected by radioactive contamination, and enhance regional and international peace and security. The zone was unique in that it included a State that had previously possessed nuclear weapons. It was also the first such zone in the Northern Hemisphere and the first to have been established in a region that shared a long border with two States that possessed nuclear weapons. It was also notable that the five nuclear-weapon States had all signed the Protocol to the Treaty of Semipalatinsk at the same time.

18. Kyrgyzstan attached great importance to mitigating the environmental consequences of uranium mining and other activities associated with the nuclear fuel cycle and the production of nuclear weapons. In that connection, it had sponsored General Assembly resolution [73/238](#), which had been adopted

unanimously, on the role of the international community in averting the radiation threat in Central Asia. Her delegation called on all Governments and international organizations that had the relevant expertise to assist with the clean-up and disposal of radioactive contaminants and remediation of the affected areas in Central Asia.

19. Education and training played a vital role in the promotion of disarmament and non-proliferation. Kyrgyzstan was prepared to work with other interested States parties on developing practical steps for promoting the full implementation of the recommendations contained in the United Nations Study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education ([A/57/124](#)). Lastly, the multilateral disarmament mechanism, civil society, including non-governmental organizations, academia, parliamentarians and the media, all played an important role in promoting the goal of nuclear disarmament.

20. **Ms. Plepyté** (Lithuania) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty remained the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and played an essential role in the maintenance of international peace and security. The Treaty's three pillars comprised a fundamental international mechanism which had to be preserved, strengthened and universally enhanced by all means. As a non-nuclear-weapon State, Lithuania believed that an inclusive and gradual approach to nuclear disarmament was needed to create an environment that was conducive to the continuation of nuclear disarmament negotiations. That approach should be based on the principles of effectiveness, verifiability, international stability and undiminished security for all. The nuclear arrangements of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had always been fully consistent with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, having been negotiated and entered into with the primary intent of preventing the continued spread of nuclear weapons and preserving peace and stability.

21. The States parties should act more responsibly to preserve and strengthen the rules-based international system in view of the challenges facing the international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. One such challenge was the demise of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty) as a result of ongoing violations by the Russian Federation. The Russian 9M729 (SSC-8) missile system, which was nuclear-capable and difficult to detect, had been in violation of that treaty. The Russian Federation could preserve the treaty by returning to full and verifiable

compliance. The violation of the Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine's Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the Budapest Memorandum) by the Russian Federation had been another challenge. The Russian Federation had violated the commitments it had made along with the other nuclear-weapon States to respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its international borders. With regard to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Lithuania was of the view that the existing sanctions regime should be maintained until that country could demonstrate that it had reversed its nuclear ambitions.

22. Lithuania supported the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the immediate start of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Noting the important role that the Nuclear Security Contact Group played in the physical protection of nuclear and radioactive materials, she said that the security of nuclear and radioactive materials and facilities needed to be enhanced worldwide.

23. **Mr. Ten-Pow** (Guyana) said that it was unclear whether the international community was capable of forging a common path for the maintenance of international peace and security, in view of the volatility of the current international security situation. As States parties prepared for the 2020 Review Conference, responsible leadership and renewed commitment to the aims of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation were needed. Guyana was particularly concerned by the trend towards modernization of nuclear arsenals and their delivery systems and the continued use of nuclear weapons in military doctrines; recent developments indicating the possibility of a renewed nuclear arms race; and the increasing risk of a nuclear weapon being used and the devastation that would result from such use.

24. All States had a role in ensuring that full and complete nuclear disarmament was achieved. It was therefore critical that they support the effective application of the legal instruments that comprised the nuclear disarmament regime and his delegation urged responsible action in that regard. Responsible action meant taking the necessary steps to bring into force the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; ensuring that regional spaces around the world were declared free of nuclear weapons and that the countries within those spaces committed to maintaining those spaces as such. Guyana was part of such a space, established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin

America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), and supported the establishment of other nuclear-weapon-free zones where needed. Responsible action also meant being willing to bridge existing gaps in the nuclear disarmament architecture. In that regard, his delegation recognized the leadership demonstrated by the States that had enabled the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. It was an important element in the nuclear disarmament architecture and States should concentrate their efforts on seeking its universalization.

25. His delegation hoped that the prevailing international security situation would compel the States parties to provide strong recommendations to the 2020 Review Conference under all three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Lastly, he affirmed the work of IAEA in promoting the safe, secure and peaceful use of nuclear technologies, including through capacity-building in developing countries like Guyana.

26. **Mr. Tovar** (Dominican Republic) said that his country had joined the Treaty in 1968 with the hope that disarmament and non-proliferation would be achieved in the shortest possible time. Those goals continued to elude States parties. The Treaty was the cornerstone of international nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. The positive results of the 2010 Review Conference had helped to strengthen the resolve of many countries, including the Dominican Republic, to contribute constructively to the establishment of a platform for the success of future Review Conferences.

27. Since the 2010 Review Conference, military expenditure had increased and nuclear-weapon States had retained their arsenals. At the same time, States had been slow to implement the 13 practical steps for fulfilling disarmament commitments. For the upcoming session, it was imperative to address the reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons; the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; and the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Agreements between such zones and nuclear-weapon States served as a confidence-building measure at the regional and global levels, to which the Dominican Republic could attest as a party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The Conference on Disarmament should initiate discussions on a fissile material cut-off treaty that was non-discriminatory, multilateral and verifiable.

28. While States parties had the right to develop, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under article IV of the Treaty, they also had the responsibility to ensure nuclear security. His country welcomed all efforts to promote dialogue aimed at

resolving issues of common interest and recognized that IAEA had an essential role to play in that regard. Undoubtedly, the Review Conferences, as well as the current process, had contributed to the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, the first international binding legal instrument on disarmament, which could lay the groundwork for the elimination of nuclear weapons. The Dominican Republic encouraged States that had not done so to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible, as it was in the process of doing.

29. Lastly, measures needed to be taken to raise awareness of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would result from the use of nuclear weapons. Not only the participation of Governments, but also the greater involvement of civil society, should be sought. The goal of creating a platform to achieve a safe and peaceful world was achievable.

30. **Ms. Beckles** (Trinidad and Tobago) said that the total elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction would contribute significantly to international peace and security. The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was a crime against humanity and a violation of international law, international humanitarian law and the Charter of the United Nations. Nuclear weapons could not be used to settle disputes, since doing so would inevitably cause mutually assured destruction and the death of millions of people. Her Government therefore remained steadfast in its support for all efforts to bring about a world free of nuclear weapons.

31. Her delegation was hopeful that States parties would achieve tangible results at the current session of the Preparatory Committee in keeping with the commitments they had made in the outcome documents of the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences. Her country urged States that were not yet parties of the Treaty to consider joining it.

32. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons would complement current norms and reinforce existing legal instruments. It would also close loopholes that enabled States to participate in activities relating to nuclear weapons or to claim a benefit from their existence. Her Government supported that treaty and had worked with like-minded States on the articles on positive obligations set out in it.

33. IAEA was to be commended for its work in support of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Civil society and academia also played a vital role in advancing the goals of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

34. **Mr. Gallegos Chiriboga** (Ecuador) said that Ecuador was a peaceful nation. The development and use of nuclear weapons was prohibited under its Constitution. Ecuador believed that the outcomes of the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences remained valid, and that it was crucial, in view of the troubling failure of the 2005 and 2015 Review Conferences to produce outcome documents, for the 2020 Review Conference to succeed, as failure would have grave consequences for the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime.

35. The severe humanitarian consequences of a nuclear detonation, whether accidental or intentional, could not be remedied by any State or international organization. Nuclear weapons, and nuclear tests of any kind, should therefore be completely prohibited and eliminated. The National Assembly of Ecuador had recently voted to ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The entry into force of that treaty, which would complement the Non-Proliferation Treaty and would be further bolstered by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, would be an important step on the path towards the elimination of those weapons of mass destruction.

36. Ecuador called on all nuclear-weapon States to eliminate the role they accorded to nuclear weapons in their security doctrines and policies. Non-nuclear-weapon States that were covered by extended nuclear deterrence policies through military alliances should reframe their security policies. The continued improvement or development of new types of nuclear weapons was inconsistent with the obligation of States parties under the Non-Proliferation Treaty to pursue nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

37. States should give priority to complete, verifiable, irreversible and transparent nuclear disarmament, which was the only way to protect against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. They should also continue to negotiate on a binding legal instrument to provide assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. At the same time, the right of all the States parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination should be protected, in line with article IV of the Treaty.

38. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, which promoted international peace and stability, contributed significantly to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Once recognized by the General Assembly, such zones should be respected unconditionally by all States. In that connection, the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East, called

for in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference, continued to be a priority.

39. The only way to ensure that nuclear weapons would never again be used by any party, under any circumstances was to prohibit, and ultimately eliminate, them. It was therefore troubling that countries were shifting away from a multilateral to a bilateral approach to disarmament and were jettisoning international instruments that had enjoyed broad support. The 2020 Review Conference needed to succeed and issue practical recommendations.

40. **Mr. Gonzalez** (Colombia) said that a guiding principle of his Government's foreign policy was respect for legal instruments and international institutions. It had therefore promoted and supported the goal of transparent, sustained, general and complete disarmament ever since the Non-Proliferation Treaty had entered into force. The production, import, possession and use of weapons of mass destruction was also prohibited under article 81 of the Colombian Constitution.

41. International peace and security would be reinforced with the universality of the Treaty and the effective implementation of its three pillars. The current session of the Preparatory Committee was another opportunity for nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States to work together to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty and of article VI in particular. To do so, they needed to avoid politicizing multilateral scenarios involving both disarmament and non-proliferation issues. Colombia had supported General Assembly resolution [73/65](#) and believed that negotiations should begin as soon as possible on a treaty banning the production of fissile material, which would be an essential step towards nuclear disarmament and the elimination of nuclear weapons. Colombia was also a signatory to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

42. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones also helped make the world a safer place, where peace resulted from continuous cooperation and confidence-building efforts.

43. His delegation called on all States parties to do their utmost to achieve the broadest possible consensus at the current session and to enable the adoption of a document outlining both commitments and specific actions to be taken with respect to disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, based on the Final Document and the follow-on actions agreed at the 2010 Review Conference.

44. **Mr. Rivero Rosario** (Cuba) said that nuclear weapons continued to pose the greatest threat to the survival of humanity and life on planet Earth, making nuclear disarmament a matter of the highest priority. The only viable solution was the complete elimination and prohibition of nuclear weapons, in a transparent, irreversible and verifiable manner, subject to a multilaterally agreed time frame. Cuba was a staunch supporter of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and urged all States to sign and ratify it to ensure its early entry into force. It was unacceptable that nuclear-weapon States continued to modernize their nuclear arsenals, in contravention of article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to increase the role of nuclear weapons in their military doctrines, and to lower the threshold for nuclear use, including in response to so-called non-nuclear strategic threats.

45. The adoption of substantive recommendations by the Committee would help to ensure the success of the 2020 Review Conference. The mandate of the Review Conference should be fully respected and all three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be considered in a balanced manner, to ensure its legitimacy, integrity and effectiveness. The final document of the Review Conference should include practical, time-bound and action-oriented nuclear disarmament measures, as well as a call on nuclear-weapon States and States protected by a "nuclear umbrella" to comply with their obligations and to fully implement, without precondition or delay, all the commitments made at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences. In that connection, Cuba regretted the failure of the international community to convene a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction and hoped that the Preparatory Committee and the Review Conference would call for such a conference to be convened without further delay. The Review Conference should also demand that nuclear-weapon States provide irreversible security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, through a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument.

46. Cuba continued to oppose attempts to place conditions on nuclear disarmament and to legitimize the status quo. It called for an end to political manipulation on the issue of non-proliferation based on double standards and political interests. It would continue to advocate the respect of the inalienable right of States to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. All States parties to the Treaty needed to commit to facilitating the exchange of technology, materials and scientific and

technical information in support of the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

47. His Government adamantly rejected the use by the Government of the United States of new aggressive measures to arbitrarily and illegally bolster its extraterritorial economic, trade and financial blockade against Cuba. The measures, designed to suffocate the economy of Cuba and to cause the suffering of its people, also limited the inalienable right of States to engage in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Cuba called on the international community and on the citizens of the United States to rein in the irrational policy of escalation, hostility and aggression espoused by the Government of the United States.

48. The principles underlying the Treaty of Tlatelolco must prevail, in particular the commitment to resolve disputes peacefully and to permanently ban the use and the threat of use of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. Cuba would continue to support international efforts to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons and called on nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate, through specific acts, their political will to strictly comply with each and every one of their commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

49. **Mr. Bermudez Álvarez** (Uruguay) said that, as a peaceful and non-nuclear-weapon State, Uruguay reaffirmed its lasting commitment to strengthening the disarmament and non-proliferation regime. It considered multilateralism a fundamental principle of disarmament, and dialogue and negotiation fundamental instruments for achieving results. It championed the complete, irreversible, verifiable and transparent elimination of nuclear weapons, without preconditions or reservations and within a multilaterally agreed time frame.

50. Uruguay urged States that had not yet done so to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and called on nuclear-weapon States to meet their commitments under article VI of the Treaty and also accelerate the reduction of their nuclear arsenals. It also urged the remaining Annex 2 States to sign or ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty without delay and States that had not yet done so to consider becoming part of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which complemented and reinforced the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Uruguay supported the conclusion of a universal and legally binding treaty on negative security assurances and the negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones contributed to achieving the complete elimination of nuclear

weapons. The Treaty of Tlatelolco had established the first such zone in a densely populated area, inspiring the establishment of similar zones in other regions.

51. Uruguay championed the right to the peaceful use, development and transfer of nuclear energy and supported the role of IAEA in encouraging the development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. The safeguards of IAEA were a fundamental pillar of the non-proliferation regime and Uruguay had signed a safeguard agreement as well as an additional protocol with the Agency.

52. Uruguay was profoundly concerned about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and underlined the need for all States to act in accordance with international law, including international humanitarian law. Uruguay regretted the role that nuclear weapons continued to play in some national military doctrines, along with the actions by some countries to develop and modernize their nuclear weapons and associated infrastructure. Uruguay was concerned about the risks of accidental detonation or the possible use of nuclear material by terrorist groups.

53. His delegation hoped that the 2020 Review Conference could achieve an outcome that helped move things forward, rather than backward.

54. **Ms. Cerrato** (Honduras) said that it was regrettable that the 2015 Review Conference had failed to adopt an outcome document, owing to political factors that were unrelated to the Treaty. Over the years, Honduras had supported all initiatives and actions aimed at strengthening the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, along with all efforts that led to a renewal of the commitment of the international community to moving towards the elimination of weapons of mass destruction through multilateral negotiations based on the principles of verification, irreversibility and transparency. Nuclear-weapon-free zones played a vital role in rejecting weapons of mass destruction and represented a solid foundation for the universal prohibition of nuclear weapons. In that regard, Honduras was proud to be a party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which established such a zone in the Latin America and Caribbean region.

55. Her delegation was concerned about the increased risk of use of nuclear weapons, whether intentional or accidental, and the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would result. Honduras fully supported all relevant resolutions of the Security Council, whose permanent members should live up to the great responsibility given to them by the Charter of the United Nations. It also supported the handling of

tensions and threats to world peace through diplomatic negotiations.

56. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was an important step in that regard. Honduras was among 70 States that had signed that treaty and was currently in the process of ratifying it. The treaty reflected a growing concern over the risk of the continued existence and more widespread possession of nuclear weapons and the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of their use. The treaty complemented and reinforced the Non-Proliferation Treaty and other existing arms control and disarmament agreements.

57. Spending on weapons deprived people of the scarce resources urgently required to meet their basic needs and hindered the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Honduras called on weapons-producing countries to establish moratoriums on their weapons programmes.

58. It was necessary to resolve as quickly as possible the issue of the nomination of the president-designate of the 2020 Review Conference, to ensure that the members of the Bureau were in place as soon as possible.

59. **Mr. Moriko** (Côte d'Ivoire) said that, nearly 50 years after the entry into force of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, nuclear weapons continued to occupy a special place in the security arsenal of a number of States. Although the use of such weapons had diminished in recent years, the doctrine of nuclear deterrence would still continue to flourish. Some States kept up to 15,000 nuclear weapons for self-defence reasons, but that did not reflect changing attitudes and international law, which had been enhanced on 7 July with the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and which Côte d'Ivoire had been among the first countries to sign. Far from weakening the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as some had argued, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons would reinforce it, because it addressed not just the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons but the ultimate elimination of such weapons, something which no previous international legal instrument had been able to accomplish. His country urged all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty that had not yet done so to sign or ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons as soon as possible.

60. Côte d'Ivoire called on States parties to respect their obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, particularly its articles IV and VI. The right of each State to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should be protected and States should be able to leverage the enormous advantages that nuclear technology offered

for their development. In that connection, his delegation welcomed the successful cooperation with the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and IAEA, which had led to the construction of a geophysical facility and the opening in Abidjan of the first radiotherapy centre in the country for cancer treatment. His Government intended to pursue further investment in that area.

61. There was a risk that the goals of ending the arms race and achieving general and complete disarmament might never be met. The ongoing tensions between the major nuclear powers, the reinforcement and modernization of nuclear arsenals, the undermining of certain treaties on nuclear disarmament and the continued stagnation of disarmament mechanisms were not reassuring. The complete elimination of nuclear weapons remained the only guarantee against the possession and use of such weapons by non-State actors, particularly terrorists. His country invited nuclear-weapon States to provide sufficient security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States, through a universal, legally binding instrument against the use of such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

62. As the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was an essential step for advancing disarmament, Côte d'Ivoire called on the States of the Middle East to engage in inclusive negotiations that would spare that sensitive region, as well as the planet, from a humanitarian catastrophe with definite and irreversible consequences. The preservation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the achievement of a successful outcome of negotiations on North Korea remained major challenges to the strengthening of the non-proliferation pillar of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

63. It was unfortunate that the 2015 Review Conference had failed to adopt an outcome document, which undermined the transparency and credibility of the Treaty. States parties should therefore be flexible, because the universality of the Treaty could not be achieved in the absence of the necessary political will to achieve concrete results.

64. **Mr. Jaime Calderón** (El Salvador) said that nuclear weapons did not guarantee security; on the contrary, they were a threat to security and stability in various regions. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was a historic agreement which demonstrated the willingness of nuclear-weapon States to eliminate nuclear weapons as soon as possible and of other States, such as El Salvador, which had never possessed such weapons, not to pursue such weapons as a security guarantee. Universal adherence to the Treaty was an urgent priority; his delegation therefore urged States that were

not yet party to the Treaty to accede to it as soon as possible. The lack of consensus at the 2015 Review Conference was regrettable. El Salvador called for the current preparatory process to be undertaken in a constructive and consensual spirit. Only by creating agreement among all parties could the Treaty remain in force.

65. As a party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the benchmark instrument on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, El Salvador could attest to how such zones strengthened international peace and security and helped to protect human rights. His country supported the establishment of similar zones in other parts of the world.

66. The 1995 resolution on the Middle East was a key element of the peace process in that region and an integral part of the decisions that had allowed for the indefinite extension of the Treaty. Although the 2010 Review Conference had agreed on specific measures to establish a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, there had not been substantive results since that time. His delegation welcomed General Assembly decision 73/546 on the convening of a conference on the establishment of such a zone. It urged all States parties to the Treaty to maintain a positive attitude before the General Assembly on that issue, to prevent it from causing divisions in the Review Conference as had happened in 2015.

67. El Salvador was committed to multilateral efforts to promote peace, disarmament and the strengthening of security worldwide. It had complied with article VI of the Treaty, without delay or conditions, and had been one of the first States to sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. It called on all States that had not yet done so to accede to that treaty, which would reduce the threat posed by such weapons and hasten their destruction.

68. Nuclear tests undermined peace, security and international stability, threatening the lives of millions. Such tests were contrary to the goals of the disarmament and non-proliferation regimes and the requirements of the Treaty. El Salvador condemned all nuclear tests anywhere in the world and urged States to abstain from such tests and any activity aimed at developing or improving nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. It welcomed the announcement by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that it had suspended nuclear tests and was pleased that a dialogue had been initiated. His delegation hoped that the process would lead to stable and lasting peace, including the verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the

Korean Peninsula. El Salvador called again on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to return to the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime. It reiterated the importance of the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and called on States, in particular Annex 2 States, that had not yet done so to accelerate the process of signing and/or ratifying that instrument.

69. **Mr. Kalamvrezos** (Greece) said that the preservation, promulgation and universalization of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its three pillars were at the core of the global non-proliferation and disarmament architecture. Addressing them in a balanced manner must be at the centre of States parties' deliberations. Bearing in mind the principle of undiminished security for all, Greece had supported the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty. As the universalization of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty would also contribute to international peace and security, it called upon all States that had not yet done so to become parties to that treaty without delay. The complementary role of the two treaties could only add impetus to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and bolster disarmament and non-proliferation. His delegation therefore stressed the need to renew multilateral efforts and revitalize multilateral negotiating bodies, in particular the Conference on Disarmament.

70. The nuclear and ballistic missile programmes of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea remained a matter of concern. Greece supported current diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement and called on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply with its obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions. Greece supported the ongoing implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, a key element of the global nuclear non-proliferation architecture and international security. It commended IAEA for its professional, technical and impartial work in verifying the fulfilment of the nuclear commitments of Iran.

71. Given the continued increase in the use of nuclear energy, Greece placed particular emphasis on the third pillar of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and supported the vital role of IAEA in strengthening the capacity of States to develop and use nuclear energy under the most rigorous safety and security conditions. That was especially critical for volatile regions such as the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. Such an approach required full cooperation with IAEA and ample and transparent international collaboration. Multinational confidence-building could be achieved through the international assistance and peer review missions of IAEA.

72. **Mr. Denktaş** (Turkey) said that, as a country that was a party to all major international non-proliferation instruments and regimes, Turkey remained committed to the full implementation and further strengthening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and called on States that had not yet done so to accede to it. The current security environment was very complex and volatile. More than ever, constructive, inclusive and transparent dialogue was required to prevent a further erosion of the non-proliferation and disarmament architecture, as exemplified by the state of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.

73. Turkey supported systematic, progressive, verifiable and irreversible nuclear disarmament and encouraged all States that possessed nuclear weapons to take further steps in that direction. Extension of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty) would be an important step in that regard. Turkey hoped that the diplomatic process concerning the Korean Peninsula would succeed and lead to complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization. It called upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply with its international obligations in full and to return to the Non-Proliferation Treaty at an early date, including to IAEA safeguards, and to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

74. The cessation of all nuclear weapons tests would be an important step towards both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Moratoriums on all nuclear test explosions should be upheld by all. Turkey encouraged all States, in particular the remaining Annex 2 States, to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as soon as possible. Another essential step would be the commencement of negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty in the Conference on Disarmament.

75. Multilateral nuclear verification capabilities were necessary for the realization and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons. It was with that understanding that Turkey participated in the International Partnership on Verification of Nuclear Disarmament. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was also an important non-proliferation and disarmament measure.

76. A critical commitment of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference that remained pending was the convening of an international conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Turkey

reaffirmed its strong commitment to the establishment of such a zone. IAEA safeguards were a vital component of the global non-proliferation regime. States which had not yet done so should sign, ratify and implement comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols with the Agency without further delay.

77. **Ms. Blokar Drobič** (Slovenia) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was an important legal instrument for global security governance. Slovenia was fully committed to preserving effective, treaty-based international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation as key elements of security for Europe and beyond. Her country had been encouraged by the press statement issued by the Security Council on 2 April 2019 in which it reaffirmed its commitment to advancing the goals of the Treaty and underscored the viability and the mutually reinforcing character of all the commitments taken under the Treaty. That statement came at a time when the non-proliferation and disarmament architecture was being eroded. The goal of a world free of nuclear weapons needed to be achieved progressively, through the full implementation of the Treaty, which remained the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the development of nuclear energy applications for peaceful purposes. Progress had been made in all three of those areas.

78. Slovenia called for full implementation of the action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference, including in accordance with article VI of the Treaty. It called on all States, particularly Annex 2 States, to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty without delay and without preconditions. It encouraged the members of the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and both nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States to continue cooperating in a number of areas, including nuclear disarmament verification, ballistic missiles, decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons, and negative security assurances.

79. It was regrettable that no agreement had been reached thus far to preserve the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Slovenia called on the Russian Federation to return to full and verifiable compliance with its obligations under that treaty and encouraged the parties thereto to extend it beyond 2021. Existing non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control agreements and commitments needed to be upheld. States should remain open to future negotiations to strengthen or conclude new, mutually verifiable agreements, as stipulated in article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Slovenia would continue to

use its international forums and venues, such as the Bled Strategic Forum, to promote the Treaty.

80. As one of 30 States with an operating nuclear power reactor, Slovenia attached great importance to the work of IAEA, which had made a significant contribution to the implementation of the Treaty, including by monitoring and verifying the compliance by Iran with its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which Slovenia supported. Her delegation welcomed the separate summit talks held between the Republic of Korea, the United States, the Russian Federation and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, with a view to achieving complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. It called on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to return to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the IAEA safeguards system and to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

81. IAEA promoted the global nuclear safety and security framework in States to protect people, society and the environment from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation. Nuclear safety and nuclear security had been among the priorities for Slovenia within IAEA. Everyone benefited from the peaceful uses of nuclear technology for medical, industrial, agricultural and research purposes. The upcoming anniversary of the Treaty should provide additional motivation to achieve the universality of the Treaty and contribute to a world without nuclear weapons.

82. *Mr. Syed Hussin (Malaysia) took the Chair.*

83. **Mr. Al Harsha** (Libya) said that the threat of nuclear armament persisted decades after the adoption of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as a number of States retained their nuclear arsenals. Nuclear disarmament and other Treaty objectives would remain pipedreams so long as enforcing the obligation of non-nuclear-weapon States to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons took precedence over compelling nuclear-weapon States to take practical steps to disarm fully.

84. International peace and security could not be achieved if nuclear-weapon States retained their weapons or signalled the intent to use them. Only by ceasing to produce nuclear weapons and destroying nuclear stockpiles could the non-use of those weapons be guaranteed. In that connection, the role of IAEA must extend beyond preventing the military use of nuclear resources initially intended for peaceful use. The Agency should compel nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their obligations to reduce their nuclear arsenals, with a view to achieving complete nuclear disarmament.

85. The credibility of the Treaty rested upon the balanced implementation of its three pillars, namely, disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear technologies. All States had the inalienable right to the peaceful use of nuclear technologies. Both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States should therefore place their nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguards regime. Moreover, nuclear-weapon States had a duty to provide non-nuclear-weapon States with security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons through a comprehensive, legally binding international instrument. Libya commended the Agency's efforts to support States in the peaceful use of nuclear energy through its Technical Cooperation Programme.

86. General Assembly decision 73/546 concerning the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East must be implemented. His delegation hoped that the sponsors of the decision would urge States of the region to participate in the conference. The proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East imperilled regional peace and security, with Israel the only State in the region that had yet to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The international community should therefore urge Israel to accede to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State and to place its nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguards regime.

87. **Ms. Abbar** (Morocco) said that the current session was taking place amid a steadily deteriorating international situation marked by defiance of the basic principles of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Nuclear arsenals continued to be modernized, developed and placed at the centre of military and security doctrines, in contravention of the letter, spirit and purpose of the Treaty. A continuing source of frustration was the inability of the Conference on Disarmament to agree on a balanced programme of work to permit the negotiation of international instruments on nuclear disarmament, fissile material, negative security assurances and prevention of the militarization of space.

88. Nevertheless, there had been some encouraging signs in recent months, including the adoption in July 2017 of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons; the establishment of a group of governmental experts to examine the role of verification in promoting nuclear disarmament; the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to set up five subsidiary organs to lead in-depth discussions and expand areas of common ground; and the adoption of General Assembly decision 73/546, in which the Assembly called for the convening of a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. States should leverage those achievements

and momentum to put the question of general disarmament back at the centre of the international agenda and work to achieve the goals of the Treaty.

89. Balanced implementation of the three pillars of the Treaty was possible only through the universal application of all its provisions. As the Treaty remained the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, Morocco had always supported initiatives aimed at reinforcing the authority of that regime and promoting the universality of the Treaty. It had, through IAEA, laid the foundations for international cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and technology. The indefinite extension of the Treaty, in 1995, had ended uncertainty regarding the nuclear non-proliferation regime and lent it permanence. Nevertheless, the failure of the most recent Review Conference and the absence of concrete progress on nuclear disarmament demonstrated that threats to the regime remained.

90. The Treaty rested on a carefully crafted balance between rights and obligations. The credibility of the non-proliferation regime was based on maintaining that balance and on all parties honouring their commitments and obligations under the Treaty and implementing, in a transparent, balanced and irreversible manner, the conclusions of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2010 Review Conference. Unfortunately, the main goals established at those Conferences had not been achieved, increasingly sapping the confidence that States must have in the relevance of the regime. That lack of confidence had been exacerbated by the failure of the 2015 Review Conference.

91. More than 20 years after its adoption, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty still had not entered into force. Long-awaited negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty had also not yet begun. Nevertheless, Morocco welcomed the efforts being made to establish a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons, starting with the adoption of General Assembly decision 73/546. It was worth recalling that the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty had been based in part on the commitment to eliminate nuclear weapons from the Middle East through the adoption of the 1995 resolution on that region. In addition, the credibility of the Treaty rested on the ability of States parties, notably the depositaries of the Treaty, to take concrete measures to ensure that such a zone was established. The action plan of the 2010 Review Conference, which was still valid, contained the elements necessary to guide the process in a spirit of mutual respect and inclusivity.

92. Morocco reiterated its commitment to the inalienable right of States parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy and techniques for peaceful purposes, notably through international cooperation under IAEA control. Any attempt to impose conditions on that right, which was stipulated in article IV of the Treaty, was contrary to the letter and spirit of the Treaty and the IAEA statute. The Technical Cooperation Programme of IAEA played an essential role in helping States to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals and the goals of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. It was therefore important to support IAEA in ensuring access by all States to nuclear technology, which had been developed for use in such diverse and vital sectors as energy, health, water, agriculture and the environment, as well as in addressing climate change.

93. **Mr. Mardini** (Observer for the International Committee of the Red Cross) said that since 1945, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the broader International Red Cross and Red Crescent, Movement, had been calling for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. That call was based on its first-hand observation of the horrific effects of the atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and on its conclusion that nuclear weapons were generally incompatible with international humanitarian law, and that, if they were to be used again, the International Committee of the Red Cross would be incapable of bringing adequate humanitarian assistance to the survivors.

94. The adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons created a further disincentive for proliferation and represented a clear step towards implementing article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, sending a clear signal that any use, threat of use or possession of those weapons was unacceptable in humanitarian, moral and legal terms. Such a signal was needed more than ever in a world in which the risk of use of nuclear weapons was increasing. Military incidents between nuclear-weapon States were occurring with disturbing frequency. The risk that nuclear weapons could be used might be greater at the present time than during the cold war. States possessing nuclear weapons were adapting their weapons systems rather than eliminating them. In parallel, their command and control systems had become more vulnerable to cyberattacks. The erosion of the nuclear disarmament and arms control framework signalled a worrying trend towards a new nuclear arms race.

95. In the light of those disturbing developments, concerted efforts to reduce nuclear risks were urgently needed. The Non-Proliferation Treaty had been

developed in response to the devastation that would be visited upon all of mankind by a nuclear war. Most States currently acknowledged that nuclear weapons could not credibly be viewed as instruments of security. When used on even a limited scale, they would have catastrophic and long-lasting humanitarian consequences. All States parties should reaffirm the humanitarian rationale that had motivated the development of the Treaty in the first place and urgently fulfil their long-standing risk reduction commitments. They must, as a matter of urgency, commit unequivocally never to use nuclear weapons first; remove nuclear weapons from “hair trigger” alert status; commit to provide pre-notification of military exercises that might involve the launch of missiles or other vehicles associated with nuclear weapons; re-establish joint early warning centres to clarify in real time unexpected and potentially destabilizing events; and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in security policies.

96. Disarmament and non-proliferation were not just tools to maintain international peace and security; they were also critical ways of mitigating the impact of armed conflict when it occurred. That was also the aim of international humanitarian law. Respecting and ensuring respect for international humanitarian law in armed conflict, including its rules prohibiting or limiting the use of certain weapons, was a fundamental responsibility of States.

97. **Mr. Abdelaziz** (Observer for the League of Arab States) said that the current session was taking place against a complex global security backdrop, with the lack of progress in achieving nuclear disarmament resulting in a crisis of confidence. States possessing the largest nuclear arsenals had withdrawn from treaties and obligations, citing their security and that of their allies as a pretext, even as they intensified efforts to develop and modernize their nuclear arsenals and took steps to move the nuclear arms race into outer space. Such alarming developments seriously undermined the credibility of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The nuclear-weapon States must uphold their obligations under the three pillars of the Treaty. The indefinite extension of the Treaty did not absolve them of their disarmament obligations under article VI, nor did it imply that they had the consent of non-nuclear-weapon States to retain their arsenals indefinitely.

98. The continued failure to achieve universal ratification of the Treaty hindered the success of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. The League of Arab States called upon the international community to uphold its responsibility to promote universal ratification of the Treaty, especially in the Middle East. The 2020 Review Conference should request Israel, the

only country in the region that remained outside the scope of the Treaty, to accede to it as a non-nuclear-weapon State and to place its nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguards regime.

99. Given the inextricable link between the indefinite extension of the Treaty and the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction must be addressed as an integral part of the review process. Although the issue must ultimately be resolved by consensus by the States of the region, that resolution, the outcome documents of the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences and the pledge made by the depositary nuclear-weapon States that had sponsored the resolution provided an objective basis for the process, in the context of the comprehensive, negotiated deal through which the Arab States had agreed to extend the Treaty indefinitely. That pledge had been reaffirmed by previous Review Conferences, which had stressed that the resolution would remain valid until its objectives were achieved.

100. Following the failure of the 2015 Review Conference and the failed attempts to convene a conference in 2012 on the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zone, as called for in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference, the Arab States had successfully supported the adoption of General Assembly decision 73/546, in which the Assembly had tasked the Secretary-General with convening such a conference no later than 2019, in which all States of the region would participate freely and on an equal basis.

101. The Treaty enshrined the inalienable right of all States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. Any attempts to restrict that right would undermine the credibility and objectives of the Treaty. The League also recalled that all States parties had agreed at previous Review Conferences that preferential treatment be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties, particularly taking into account the needs of developing countries.

102. In order to ensure the success of the 2020 Review Conference, the Preparatory Committee should, at its current session, recommend that the final document of the Review Conference emphasize that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime and the means of ensuring the inalienable right of States parties to benefit from the peaceful uses of atomic energy; that universal ratification of the Treaty was an objective for all States parties; and that efforts to ensure the immediate and unconditional accession of all States

not parties to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States must be redoubled. In addition, the final document should express concern about the continued failure of the nuclear-weapon States to achieve progress in fulfilling their disarmament obligations, the modernization by some nuclear-weapon States of their arsenals, and the shift of the arms race into outer space. It should also affirm that the indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995 must not be interpreted as consent for nuclear-weapon States to retain their nuclear weapons indefinitely; that Israel must accede to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State and place its nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguards regime; that the 1995 resolution on the Middle East must be implemented; and that the Treaty and the United Nations were central in bringing about the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

103. Lastly, the Preparatory Committee should support the implementation of General Assembly decision 73/546, and request the Secretary-General to report to the 2020 Review Conference and to future Review Conferences and Preparatory Committee sessions on the implementation of that decision.

*The discussion covered in the summary record ended at 5.25 p.m.*