
Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Summary record of the 4th meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 30 April 2019, at 3 p.m.

Chair: Mr. Syed Hussin (Malaysia)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.05 p.m.

General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee (continued)

1. **Ms. Mudallali** (Lebanon) said that while reaffirming the lofty aspirations of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the States parties should not lose sight of the Treaty's ultimate objective, namely, eliminating nuclear weapons once and for all. In that connection, Lebanon welcomed the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which helped States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in fulfilling their disarmament commitments.

2. The previous year had been abysmal for disarmament prospects, with the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty) falling by the wayside and nuclear-weapon States defending the centrality of nuclear weapons in their security strategies and military doctrines and justifying the existence of such weapons as vital to global security. Moreover, no progress had been made in bringing about the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, with the ongoing reluctance of Annex 2 countries to ratify it.

3. The only way to prevent the use of nuclear weapons was by eliminating nuclear arsenals. To that end, States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty must establish specific time frames for the fulfilment of the disarmament obligations assumed at the previous three Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; their inability to do so had contributed to the failure of the 2015 Review Conference. In addition, international arrangements must be made to provide non-nuclear-weapon States parties with assurances that nuclear-weapon States would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them.

4. The right of States parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, a right enshrined in the Treaty, was one of its pillars and would have a positive impact on sustainable development.

5. The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East was all the more necessary as the region was beset by conflict and terrorist threats. Despite the numerous resolutions adopted at successive Review Conferences calling for the convening of a conference on the establishment of such a zone, it was regrettable that the international community had failed

to make progress on that sensitive matter. That failure was largely due to Israel, which persisted in boycotting the conference and keeping its nuclear arsenal and programmes outside the scope of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. She recalled that the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference was an integral part of the deal to extend the Treaty indefinitely, and that that resolution and all other relevant resolutions remained valid and mandatory until the desired objectives were attained, including the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

6. **Mr. Al-Dobhany** (Yemen) said that his delegation welcomed all initiatives to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons, including the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 2017. Along with all the other Arab States, Yemen had acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Their demonstrated commitment to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation stood in stark contrast to the defiant refusal by Israel to accede to the Treaty and place its nuclear activities – the cause of a power imbalance in an already unstable Middle East – under the IAEA safeguards regime. Moreover, its rejection of all international initiatives to implement the Non-Proliferation Treaty and make the Middle East a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction threatened to plunge the countries of the region into a potentially devastating arms race. The failure to implement the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and the resulting delay in establishing such a zone would have significant repercussions for regional security, which hinged on ridding the Middle East of weapons of mass destruction.

7. His delegation welcomed General Assembly decision 73/546, in which the Assembly tasked the Secretary-General with convening a conference to negotiate a binding agreement to establish a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, with the active participation of all countries in the region, in particular, Israel. The Preparatory Committee and the 2020 Review Conference should support the convening of that conference.

8. The peaceful use of nuclear energy was an inalienable right of States parties under the Treaty which must not be subject to political restrictions. It was imperative to ensure full compliance with IAEA safeguards and strengthen the Agency's role.

9. **Mr. Bin Momen** (Bangladesh) said that the 2020 Review Conference must address the key issues of the Non-Proliferation Treaty across all three pillars. The continued existence of nuclear weapons meant that there

was an ever-present risk that, whether by accident or by design, they could be used. Equal importance should therefore be placed on the urgent pursuit of both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

10. Bangladesh remained committed to the full implementation of the Treaty and had signed all major multilateral disarmament treaties, in line with its constitutional obligations. Nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction sowed misery and caused insecurity. Nevertheless, nuclear weapons were still being made, modernized and stockpiled in large numbers. Collective action was needed to reverse the situation.

11. A nuclear war would cause irreversible damage to the planet and humankind. The risk of nuclear weapons and fissile material falling into the wrong hands was an even greater cause for concern. Nuclear-weapon States should therefore fulfil, in good faith, their obligations under article VI of the Treaty, and comply with their commitments in line with the practical steps set forth in the action plan of the 2000 Review Conference. All States parties to the Treaty must build upon the achievements of the 2010 Review Conference through the action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference.

12. Bangladesh had legitimate interests in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. It had begun construction of its first nuclear power plant, in conformity with the IAEA safeguards verification regime, and attached great importance to IAEA standards and technical cooperation on nuclear safety and security.

13. The Secretary-General's disarmament agenda, *Securing Our Common Future: An Agenda for Disarmament*, was welcomed for its comprehensive approach and specific action points, as was the transparency shown by the Office for Disarmament Affairs in monitoring its implementation. Bangladesh would contribute to advancing certain aspects of the Agenda in accordance with its national priorities.

14. Bangladesh continued to support the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and urged all parties to remain engaged in order to build upon the gains made. Ongoing efforts to resolve the nuclear issue in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were encouraging, despite the negative outcome of the summit meeting held in Hanoi in February 2019.

15. The adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons constituted a significant step towards the delegitimization of nuclear weapons and

strengthened the Non-Proliferation Treaty, particularly article VI. The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was an essential step towards achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. The remaining Annex 2 States that had not yet ratified that Treaty were therefore strongly urged to do so. Negotiations must also begin, without any further delay, on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The establishment of a legally binding instrument to provide assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States was also important. Furthermore, nuclear-weapon-free zones were critical to the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime.

16. Bangladesh hoped that the 2020 Review Conference would further strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime and was ready to work with all partners to ensure its success.

17. **Mr. Ke** (Cambodia) said that since its adoption, the Non-Proliferation Treaty had been key in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons; it affirmed the right of all parties to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and required them to pursue general, complete and irreversible nuclear disarmament. However, little progress had been made towards achieving that goal

18. At the 2020 Review Conference, delegations should show increased political will, flexibility and cooperation in order to achieve the results envisioned in the Treaty, which remained the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime. Effective implementation of the Treaty was crucial to ensure the proper use of nuclear-weapon technology; all States parties should therefore renew their commitment to comply with its obligations on the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

19. Having signed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which served to strengthen international peace and security, and the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which could further promote global nuclear disarmament efforts, Cambodia called upon other countries to do the same. At the regional level, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was committed to preserving Southeast Asia as a nuclear-weapon-free zone and would continue to encourage nuclear-weapon States to sign the Protocol to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok).

20. Although regrettable, the failure to reach a substantive agreement at the 2015 Review Conference should not prevent progress towards fruitful outcomes

at the 2020 Review Conference. Cambodia stood ready to work with all partners towards full implementation of the Treaty.

21. **Mr. Mlynár** (Slovakia) said that for almost fifty years the Non-Proliferation Treaty had been the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. All three pillars of the Treaty were equally important and it was crucial to promote its universalization. Ensuring the success of the 2020 Review Conference was a shared responsibility; Slovakia would spare no effort in its contribution.

22. Slovakia was committed to achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons. To that end, it supported a progressive approach that took into account the prevailing security environment, comprising mutually reinforcing legal measures and practical instruments. The engagement of all nuclear-weapon States was crucial and there were no shortcuts to Global Zero. Initiatives that took into consideration the current situation while encouraging practical dialogue would be welcome.

23. The deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament for over half the period since its establishment was regrettable and its urgent revitalization was vital for treaty-based nuclear disarmament. Slovakia continued to support the immediate commencement of negotiations in that body on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices, on the basis of the report of the coordinator of consultations on the most appropriate arrangement to negotiate such a treaty (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein.

24. The Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was a crucial element of the disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. All States that had not yet ratified the Treaty, especially the remaining Annex 2 States, should do so without delay. For its part, Slovakia had been actively helping to build the capacities of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, including its verification regime.

25. It was disappointing that the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was on the brink of collapse. However, a disarmament treaty that was only respected by one party was unsustainable. The remaining three months in the life of the treaty were the last opportunity for dialogue and a return to compliance, in order to preserve the treaty. The Russian Federation had a special responsibility in that respect.

26. The Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further

Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty) was highly important. Both parties involved were encouraged to further reduce their arsenals and to pursue discussions on confidence-building, transparency, verification activities and reporting.

27. Slovakia supported the continuation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, as long as Iran continued to fulfil its commitments thereunder. It welcomed the progress made thus far and emphasized the need to continue ensuring full and effective implementation throughout the life of the Plan of Action. It also supported the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and full implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions. Recent summit meetings had helped in that regard. Slovakia was committed to maintaining the pressure on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and called upon that country to avoid reverting to its provocative stance.

28. The use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes was a priority for Slovakia; the prevalence of nuclear power in the country demonstrated its strategic importance at the national level. The safe and sustainable use of nuclear energy would play an important role in combating climate change, meeting the objectives of the Paris Agreement and addressing socioeconomic challenges, including through the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. Evidently, all activities related to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy must be accompanied by high levels of nuclear safety. Accordingly, Slovakia subscribed to the safety objectives of the European Atomic Energy Community to prevent accidents and avoid radioactive releases.

29. IAEA played a central role in enhancing global nuclear safety, including through the revision of safety standards and lessons learned from its peer reviews and advisory services. Slovakia fully supported the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme and the non-discriminatory services provided by the Agency to its member States.

30. Slovakia hoped that the current session would lead to the strengthening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime, while also laying the groundwork for a successful outcome at the 2020 Review Conference. It stood ready to cooperate with other delegations in achieving that objective.

31. **Mr Moraru** (Republic of Moldova) said that with one year left until the 2020 Review Conference, the Treaty was facing serious challenges and progress on the non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament agendas was inadequate. Moreover, nuclear weapons had a more

prominent role in security policies and their development remained indispensable to the strategic planning of certain countries, including some States parties to the Treaty. In terms of proliferation, the nuclear programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea posed significant challenges and risks to the Treaty.

32. All States parties must pursue policies that were fully compatible with the Treaty. The 2020 Review Conference must produce a clear commitment by States parties to comply with all Treaty obligations and adopt concrete measures to increase global efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and responsible development of the uses of nuclear energy. Furthermore, it must advance the achievement of the goal of complete nuclear disarmament, reaffirming a united front against nuclear weapons in all circumstances. Weapons of mass destruction could not be condemned in certain instances while being allowed to exist in others.

33. The preservation of the central role of the Treaty depended on promoting its universalization, strengthening the non-proliferation regime, supporting the maintenance of nuclear-weapon-free zones and establishing new such zones, including in the Middle East, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the region concerned. Also essential was the entry into force of the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the commencement of negotiations on a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty in the Conference on Disarmament. Universalization and strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system, including the additional protocol, was another priority that should be reaffirmed during the next review cycle.

34. His delegation agreed with the prevailing view that the extension of the Treaty in 1995 did not justify indefinite possession of nuclear arsenals. Such possession would continue to fuel their proliferation and maintain nuclear dangers. The Republic of Moldova therefore supported the working papers submitted to the Preparatory Committee that emphasized the urgency of the implementation of article VI, as well as those that highlighted the humanitarian consequences and associated risks of nuclear weapons.

35. The adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was an effective measure that complemented the Non-Proliferation Treaty and strengthened existing disarmament and non-proliferation regimes. The existential threat posed to humanity by nuclear weapons must motivate the identification of effective measures, to be reflected in the outcome document of the 2020 Review Conference, for the achievement of a world free of nuclear weapons.

36. **Mr. Wenaweser** (Liechtenstein) said that The fifty years following the establishment of the Treaty had exposed both its achievements and its shortcomings. The Treaty was the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament architecture and had proven its value for international security by providing a sound basis for addressing complex non-proliferation issues, such as the Iran nuclear crisis. Efforts aimed at achieving nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament should be rooted in international law, as embodied in the Treaty.

37. However, while the Treaty had made the world a safer place, it could not be taken for granted, owing to the lack of progress in its implementation. Its strength depended on the unswerving commitment of States parties to implement its provisions. Liechtenstein took its obligations under the Treaty seriously and had, since the last review cycle, been the subject of a broader conclusion by IAEA under the additional protocol to its comprehensive safeguards agreement.

38. His delegation also believed that non-proliferation went hand in hand with disarmament, and that lack of progress, or even backtracking in the disarmament pillar, potentially hindered advancements in non-proliferation. Such a link appeared to be underestimated by those advocating the modernization and upgrading of nuclear arsenals and the lowering of thresholds for the use of nuclear weapons, in contravention of article VI of the Treaty.

39. The abrogation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty put the implementation of article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty at risk. Furthermore, the absence of any serious attempt to solve the dispute surrounding the Nuclear Forces Treaty within the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was a violation by both parties of the good-faith obligation contained in article VI.

40. The signs of a new nuclear arms race put the Treaty at risk, undermining its authority at a time when its universalization should be promoted, thereby limiting the ability of the review process to deliver. In a polarized and challenging security environment, States parties should seek to build confidence through the Treaty. The review process offered an opportunity for urgently needed progress on disarmament and other areas.

41. Liechtenstein strongly supported the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which strengthened the Non-Proliferation Treaty by setting out new, concrete perspectives on nuclear disarmament, thereby helping to fulfil the obligations contained in its article VI. The majority of States agreed that the clear legal prohibition contained in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear

Weapons was an effective measure. Liechtenstein hoped that further measures, particularly from those who could directly contribute to nuclear disarmament, would be reflected in the outcome of the review process.

42. **Mr. Bahr Aluloom** (Iraq) said that the only way to prevent the disastrous humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons was to work towards the universal ratification of international instruments on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty, with the ultimate aim of ridding the world of such weapons. Iraq complied with all relevant treaties and conventions, and had taken a number of legislative and procedural measures that had enabled it to fulfil its commitments in that area. It had also voted to adopt the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

43. It was incumbent upon all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to implement its three pillars – namely, disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy – in a balanced manner. Nearly five decades on, such balance remained elusive, with non-proliferation measures being taken to the detriment of disarmament measures. Consequently, the Treaty remained flawed, as evidenced by the failure of nuclear-weapon States to take tangible action to uphold their disarmament obligations.

44. Effective measures of nuclear disarmament must continue to have the highest priority, as acknowledged in the final document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held in 1978 (A/S-10/4) and in the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, where the Court stated that the threat or use of nuclear weapons was contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict.

45. In exchange for upholding the obligation to refrain from developing and possessing nuclear weapons, States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty had the inalienable right to use nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes.

46. **Mr. Rai** (Nepal) said that the prospects for multilateral disarmament seemed bleak. The United Nations Disarmament Commission had recently concluded its annual session without being able to adopt its agenda, let alone a substantive report, and the Conference on Disarmament was in need of revitalization. The very existence of humanity was at stake. The current session of the Preparatory Committee would therefore be critical in ensuring the success of the 2020 Review Conference, which would be an

appropriate way of celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

47. The three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty were interrelated and mutually reinforcing and needed to be implemented in a balanced, comprehensive and non-discriminatory way. It was also important to ensure the effective implementation of the 13 practical steps set out in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and the 64-point action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference. Nuclear-weapon-States should abide by the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability of nuclear weapons with a view to their total elimination. The modernization and upgrading of those weapons and their delivery systems should be halted; they were antithetical to the spirit of the Treaty and should have no place in security doctrines. Nepal hoped that the world would one day be free of nuclear weapons and had therefore welcomed the adoption in 2017 of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. His delegation urged all countries that had not yet done so to sign and ratify that treaty for its early entry into force, to complement the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

48. Nepal supported the general and complete elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, in a time-bound manner. That was the only guarantee against the use or threat of use of such weapons and would begin with the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which barred their further development, modernization and proliferation. Nepal also favoured an early conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty.

49. Nuclear-weapon States should give unconditional, non-discriminatory and legally binding security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances. At the same time, the inalienable right of States to acquire and use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes under article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be honoured and the least developed countries should benefit from technical cooperation in that regard.

50. Convinced that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions was a stepping stone to complete disarmament, as envisioned by the Non-Proliferation Treaty, his delegation was concerned about the lack of progress towards the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East, pursuant to the 1995 resolution on the region. Its establishment should be seen not as a stumbling block but as a building block for the success of the 2020 Review Conference. Noting lastly that development and disarmament were

interconnected and interdependent, he said that the effective implementation of the letter and spirit of the Treaty would ensure a peaceful world where the global community could comfortably fulfil its developmental aspirations.

51. **Mr. Bohn** (Germany) said that in the current unstable security environment, efforts must be redoubled to strengthen multilateralism, with a viable arms-control architecture at its core. All treaties and arrangements must be fully implemented by all parties to serve their purpose. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was one of the biggest success stories of multilateral diplomacy. Without it, far more States would currently have nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear arsenals would not have been drastically reduced from their cold war levels. Still, despite the achievements witnessed over five decades, progress in nuclear disarmament had come to a standstill. For the Treaty to be sustainable, a 360-degree approach was required for its implementation. To tackle the current proliferation crises, continued unity and resolve were essential. In the case of North Korea, for example, only by credibly embarking on the path to complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization could it regain the trust of the international community. Germany supported the efforts of the United States to achieve progress to that end and, as Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1718 \(2006\)](#), would work hard to make sure that the sanctions imposed on North Korea by the Council were fully and duly implemented.

52. Germany also remained committed to the preservation and continued full and effective implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which was a key contribution to the nuclear non-proliferation architecture, so long as Iran fully upheld its commitments in that regard. Through tight restrictions on that country's nuclear programme and the IAEA monitoring and verification regime, the most robust in the world, it ensured that that programme served only peaceful purposes. It was thus an important asset for security in the region, in Europe and beyond. At the same time, Iran must strictly comply with all provisions of Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), including those pertaining to its ballistic missile activities and transfers of arms and missile technology.

53. Nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament were mutually reinforcing objectives and must therefore be pursued alongside each other. Further reductions in nuclear arsenals and in the role of nuclear weapons should not be prevented by challenges in the security environment, even though such reductions did not automatically increase stability and security.

However, over the past decades, reductions and limitations of nuclear stockpiles had crucially contributed to stability and security. Limitations of the two biggest strategic arsenals not only contributed to European security but also stabilized the global nuclear order. Effective arrangements like the New START Treaty should therefore be preserved and, where necessary, developed further.

54. The risk of unintentional nuclear escalation was currently believed by many experts to be higher than at any time since the end of the cold war, particularly in view of the as-yet-inadequate understanding of cyberthreats and the risks to nuclear security and nuclear systems from artificial intelligence. Germany had therefore recently hosted a first expert conference aimed at better understanding the complex interrelation between technology and arms control.

55. In an unstable environment, risk-reduction and confidence-building measures were urgently needed and included, in particular, enhanced transparency. A meaningful dialogue on nuclear doctrines, not only among nuclear-weapon States but also and especially between them and non-nuclear-weapon States, would also help reduce ambiguities and contribute to stability. The former should also seek to reaffirm or tighten their negative security assurances and find ways of reducing the role of nuclear weapons in their strategies and doctrines.

56. Germany supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and remained fully attached to the goal of ultimately achieving a world free of nuclear weapons, particularly through the development of robust and credible verification procedures. His delegation encouraged efforts to clear the way for all nuclear-weapon States to sign the Protocol to the Treaty of Bangkok. Germany was also committed to the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in the Middle East

57. His delegation highly appreciated the invaluable work of IAEA. It remained fully committed to the right of each State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, science and technology, including the freedom to decide on its own energy mix. Germany, for its part, had taken the decision to phase out its own nuclear power generation by 2022, in view of the inherent risks and long-term costs of nuclear power production. It would nevertheless continue to play an active role in nuclear decommissioning and waste management, as well as in related research and knowledge management.

58. Looking forward to a successful outcome to the current review cycle, he said that it would require wholehearted diplomatic commitment, a sense of realism and some restraint on all sides. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was viable only as a whole, with three equally important pillars, which together formed the basis for the almost universal support it enjoyed. It should be possible to fully renew support for it in 2020 and to lay the groundwork for its preservation in the future.

59. **Mr. Carazo** (Costa Rica) said that universal nuclear disarmament must be pursued as a matter of urgency, as the only way of ensuring international peace and security. The mere existence of nuclear weapons was a constant threat to international peace and security and to humanity as a whole. The continued possession of nuclear weapons was a spur to greater proliferation. Not only did nuclear weapons not guarantee security, they also harmed it. It was therefore regrettable that commitments both to nuclear disarmament and to non-proliferation were not being duly translated into reality.

60. There had been a general decline in international security and relations among nuclear-weapon States, hand in hand with a rhetoric of renewed confidence in nuclear weapons and doctrines of deterrence. His country was greatly concerned that those countries continued to rely on such weapons in their security doctrines and policies and in their military strategies. Costa Rica, together with other States and civil society, had therefore promoted the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which filled a gap in international law on weapons of mass destruction by clearly prohibiting such weapons and strengthening Non-Proliferation Treaty rules, in particular article VI.

61. Nuclear weapons were the most destructive and inhumane weapons ever developed. The catastrophic and lasting effects of the detonation of a single nuclear weapon on human health, environment, climate, food production, cybersecurity and socioeconomic development could not be effectively countered by any State or group of States. Humanitarian and security considerations were not mutually exclusive; the international community must continue to support and give urgent attention to the humanitarian approach to the impact of nuclear weapons.

62. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was an essential part of the nuclear disarmament architecture and all States parties were equally responsible for its full implementation. As the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, the Treaty required compliance by all States parties with all their

obligations and commitments, without delay and without conditions, and the effective and balanced implementation of its three pillars, including article VI. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy offered opportunities for building trust and cooperation among States, while risk reduction and international verification of nuclear disarmament were vitally important for States that had renounced nuclear weapons as a means of security.

63. As a State party to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), Costa Rica recognized the importance of nuclear-weapon-free zones in preventing the horizontal and vertical proliferation of such weapons, building regional trust and security and reducing the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines. It accordingly gave its strong support to the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East. Proactive discussions were needed to reach a consensus in that regard and thereby avoid a deadlock in the rest of the Committee's deliberations.

64. The international community had the responsibility to reach meaningful agreement that would ensure the success of the Review Conference, especially at a time of increasingly threatening rhetoric, when the mere maintenance of the disarmament status quo was becoming ever more dangerous for international security. In addition, it was important to build on the previous review processes. The 2010 Review Conference had reaffirmed the continuing validity of the 1995 and 2000 outcomes. Those commitments, including the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference, would remain valid until fully implemented.

65. Nevertheless, the 2010 review had been a source of considerable concern among the majority of States parties owing to the lack of progress towards nuclear disarmament. It was also regrettable that it had not been possible in 2015 to overcome differences among the parties. That should be a wake-up call for the successful preparation of a meaningful and productive Review Conference in 2020, which would hinge largely on the extent to which nuclear-weapon States met their commitments. His delegation accordingly urged them all to be guided by good faith and sound judgment in their deliberations and negotiations, as the only way of strengthening the institutional disarmament and non-proliferation architecture for global governance and peace.

66. **Mr. Al-Nesf** (Qatar) said that the 2020 Review Conference would require States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to address the flaw that had allowed some States to renege on their disarmament

commitments. Fifty years after the entry into force of the Treaty, its article VI remained a major source of contention. A genuine commitment must be made and a clear timetable adopted, to capture the political will that States had demonstrated by adopting the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 2017.

67. The near-universality of the Non-Proliferation Treaty should not hinder international efforts to promote universal ratification thereof, as its objectives could not be attained if any States opted to remain outside the Treaty regime. Nuclear cooperation between certain States parties and non-States parties to the Treaty was contrary to the objectives of the Treaty and encouraged such non-States parties to continue to remain outside the Treaty.

68. Most of the commitments set forth in the package of decisions and resolutions adopted in 1995, chief among them the resolution on the Middle East, had yet to be implemented. Some had tried to hinder the implementation of that resolution, forgetting that it had been an integral part of the agreement to extend the Treaty indefinitely.

69. Establishing a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East remained vital to security in the region and an international obligation incumbent upon all States parties to the Treaty, in particular the three States parties that had sponsored the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

70. The inalienable right of States parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes remained a core element of the Treaty and the review process, hence the need to foster international cooperation in that area without discrimination or conditions and to allow for the exchange of materials, equipment, technologies and expertise between States parties.

71. The failure to implement the three pillars of the Treaty in a balanced manner remained its greatest flaw, as the grand bargain that underpinned the Treaty rested upon the equal, interrelated and mutually reinforcing nature of those pillars. In the intervening decades since its adoption, the focus on the non-proliferation pillar had outpaced progress on the disarmament pillar, while restrictions on the right of States to acquire nuclear technology for peaceful purposes continued to grow.

72. The considerable existential challenges facing the 2020 Review Conference could only be surmounted if all States showed genuine political will to ensure the success of the Treaty. Qatar would continue to support international efforts to that end.

73. **Mr. Rattray** (Jamaica) said that the current international security environment reflected a world in turmoil. A mix of traditional and contemporary security challenges was putting at risk long-standing efforts to maintain international peace and security, particularly in the face of the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction. Against that background, the current preparations for the 2020 Review Conference were of even greater significance. The Non-Proliferation Treaty, born out of the shared commitment to non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and complete and general disarmament, was still as relevant as it had been at its inception. Its survival depended on the equal consideration and implementation of all its three pillars, particularly the obligations set out in its article VI to pursue negotiations in good faith.

74. Every effort must be made to ensure compliance with the IAEA comprehensive safeguards. The Agency was critical to the effective implementation of the Treaty and to supporting the framework for the exercise of the inalienable right of developing countries to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Jamaica had been working closely with IAEA in that regard and would continue to do so, pursuant to article IV of the Treaty.

75. In accordance with its article VII, significant progress had been made in the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, the first densely populated region to be so designated, were committed to the preservation of that status, enshrined in the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Jamaica continued to support the call for the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East and hoped that the conference to be convened to that end later in the year would help to pave the way for it.

76. His delegation remained opposed to continued reliance on nuclear weapons as part of security and military doctrines, given the catastrophic humanitarian impact of such weapons; they caused indiscriminate and unacceptable harm; they had socioeconomic costs and environmental implications that negatively impacted current and future generations. It was also more likely that they might fall into the hands of non-State actors, in view particularly of new and emerging technologies. Jamaica therefore supported the universalization and effective implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, to prevent terrorist groups from accessing and using weapons of mass destruction. Jamaica also continued to support the full and effective participation of women in all decision-making relating to nuclear disarmament. The application of a gender-sensitive approach to the disarmament agenda was critical to

achieving sustainable peace and development. He noted, in addition, that women and girls were disproportionately affected by ionizing radiation.

77. Multilateral engagement remained central to ongoing efforts to advance the objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. His delegation therefore joined the call for the universalization of the Treaty and for greater efforts to ensure that its abiding principles and obligations were upheld. It had likewise been actively engaged in the negotiations that had culminated in the successful adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. That instrument complemented the Non-Proliferation Treaty in advancing the overarching cause of disarmament in general and nuclear disarmament in particular, the urgency of which had been reinforced in the Secretary-General's disarmament agenda, *Securing Our Common Future: An Agenda for Disarmament*. Jamaica hoped that the narrative against that treaty would be transformed to highlight the positive contribution it could make to the goals of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

78. Notwithstanding the relevance of those two treaties, the international community must recognize that gaps remained in the disarmament architecture. Jamaica supported, in particular, all initiatives to halt the production of fissile material and eliminate existing stocks and hoped that progress would be made towards the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. His delegation encouraged Annex 2 States to take the requisite action to that effect.

79. **Mr. Duarte Lopes** (Portugal) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty had for almost 50 years been the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and remained a crucial multilateral instrument, contributing to international peace and security. However, in the face of rising global and regional tensions, the world was at risk of a new arms race; those trends needed to be reversed. Portugal called for the preservation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and underlined the need to extend the New START Treaty and negotiate further nuclear arsenal reductions. The well-documented catastrophic consequences of the use of nuclear weapons should reinforce the international community's commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons.

80. While all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty were obliged to strive for that ultimate goal, nuclear-weapon States had special responsibilities under its article VI to completely eliminate their nuclear arsenals. A process of gradual reduction of nuclear weapons, taking into account legitimate national and international security concerns, was the best approach to

ensure sustainable progress. Despite the deterioration of the international security environment, further concrete steps towards nuclear disarmament were possible and would contribute to building trust among States parties and to promoting strategic stability.

81. Collective engagement was needed to ensure the universalization of the Treaty. Further priorities were the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. Other practical measures should include the establishment of robust nuclear disarmament verification mechanisms, the universalization of the safeguards regime and the promotion of greater transparency and risk reduction measures. It was also necessary to bring about the complete and internationally verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the relevant Security Council resolutions should be implemented. Portugal also encouraged all parties to implement the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which had been serving its purposes, as confirmed by IAEA. The international community must also continue to seek the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.

82. The current meeting and the 2020 Review Conference were opportunities to strengthen the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and make it fit for purpose. Portugal intended to play a constructive role in strengthening the necessary dialogue to build trust and prepare the way for the success of that Conference.

83. **Mr. Alrowaiei** (Bahrain) said that his country, after ratifying the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1988, had contributed to international disarmament efforts through effective and open participation in international and regional forums, out of a belief in the importance of achieving the noble goals of the Treaty. Bahrain believed that the acquisition, development and stockpiling of nuclear weapons represented a serious threat to international peace and security and an obstacle to a safe world for all. For those reasons, the country supported the pivotal role played by the IAEA safeguards system, which was of crucial importance for strengthening mutual trust and advancing the aims of the Treaty.

84. All States enjoyed the right to the peaceful use and broad application of nuclear energy, provided that they complied with nuclear security assurances and did not threaten international peace and security. Bahrain looked forward to increased knowledge-sharing and technology transfer between industrialized States and

developing States, which would ensure safety and security and promote science and technology.

85. Despite good faith efforts, the 2015 Review Conference had failed to issue a final document. It was therefore imperative for parties to work together to overcome their differences and find common ground, in order to ensure the success of the Review Conference.

86. Bahrain stressed the importance of establishing a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, in accordance with the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. It also drew attention to General Assembly decision 73/546, in which the Secretary-General was tasked with convening a conference for the negotiation of a binding treaty on the establishment of such a zone. The 2020 Review Conference and the third session of the Preparatory Committee should issue constructive conclusions to support the elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

87. **Mr. Mero** (United Republic of Tanzania) said that only the complete elimination of nuclear weapons could ensure that they would never be used again in the world. His country was accordingly in the process of signing and ratifying the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which, rather than undermining the Non-Proliferation Treaty, complemented and strengthened the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The United Republic of Tanzania was fully committed to the objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as demonstrated by its ratification both of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba) and of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and attached equal importance to its three pillars.

88. His delegation supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements among States of the region concerned; they served not only to strengthen peace and security but also to build confidence among States. Such a zone needed to be established in the Middle East as a matter of urgency. Noting the reluctance of nuclear-weapon States to provide assurances to States that had formally renounced nuclear weapons that they would not use or threaten to use such weapons against them, it called on those States to honour their obligation and conclude a legally binding agreement on negative security assurances.

89. The United Republic of Tanzania reaffirmed the inalienable right of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes without discrimination. Export controls on materials, equipment and technology, although obligatory for any party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty,

unfairly affected developing countries and prevented them from acquiring the science and technology useful for development.

90. Although not among the members of the Conference on Disarmament, his country shared their frustration on many issues. In particular, negotiations must take place without further delay on a nuclear-weapons convention, a fissile material cut-off treaty, peaceful uses of outer space and negative security assurances. It was also time to consider ways of enhancing the multilateral character of the negotiation machinery. He concluded by expressing appreciation of the contribution made by IAEA to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament through its safeguards system and verification activities; it should be offered the human resources and financial support needed to perform its functions.

91. **Ms. Byrne Nason** (Ireland) said that Ireland remained fully committed to working with all States parties to make progress across the three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but was mindful that the future relevance and effectiveness of the Treaty depended on its ability to concretely deliver on its original bargain. For too long, its disarmament pillar had been neglected; that had undermined the Treaty itself and put it in a state of heightened jeopardy. It was imperative that all State parties reaffirm their commitment not only to article VI but also to all the consensus-based outcomes collectively achieved. That reaffirmation should be the starting point, not the end goal, of the 2020 review cycle.

92. The deteriorating international security environment must not be an obstacle to progress on disarmament, which could, on the contrary, help to ease tensions. The nuclear-weapon States had a responsibility to respond to the international community's demand for concrete progress on their legally binding disarmament obligations and to make every effort to prevent a new arms race.

93. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was a dynamic instrument requiring adaptation to meet the challenges presented by an increasingly complex and uncertain international environment. The working paper on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/WP.44) highlighted a number of issues that had not traditionally been considered in the context of the Treaty. Similarly, the working paper on gender issues (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/WP.48) introduced a new perspective and enriched the discussions. Her delegation encouraged all delegations to step outside the traditional, one-dimensional security

approach to nuclear weapons and to engage with those emerging issues in a pragmatic and positive way.

94. A workable legal framework had finally been put in place for the total elimination of nuclear weapons through the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which Ireland was about to ratify. Despite the concerns of a small number of States that the new treaty could undermine the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Ireland was confident that it reinforced the Treaty, particularly since it reaffirmed it as the cornerstone of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Her delegation called on all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to engage constructively with the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and to move beyond the hostile rhetoric that had recently characterized much of the nuclear disarmament debate. They must realize that, whatever their different paths, they all shared the same desire for a world free of nuclear weapons.

95. Ireland welcomed the Secretary-General's disarmament agenda, *Securing Our Common Future: An Agenda for Disarmament*: it offered an opportunity to break the stalemate and could facilitate the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. Ireland had indicated its intention to champion three of the actions outlined in the Agenda, including action 1 on facilitating dialogue for nuclear disarmament.

96. Her delegation was particularly concerned about the stalemate around the long-overdue full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and would be promoting informal discussions during the current session on potential ways of making progress. Ireland hoped that consensus recommendations for the 2020 Review Conference could be agreed on at the current session. At a minimum, her delegation urged States parties to resolve all remaining procedural issues for that Conference, including the nomination of its President-designate. The short time available in 2020 should be dedicated to a serious review of substantive concerns and not be consumed by procedural issues.

97. **Mr. Pham Hai Anh** (Viet Nam) said that his delegation continued to support the Non-Proliferation Treaty. With nearly 15,000 nuclear warheads in the world and enough fissile material to produce over 100,000 more, the mere existence of such weapons posed a direct threat to world peace. Their use, whether intentionally, by accident or through miscalculation, as well as the threat to use them, endangered international peace and security. The Treaty could, however, only continue to be the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime if it

was implemented in its entirety and equally across all its three pillars. The Treaty review process should contribute to that end.

98. The Treaty had produced many tangible results: the majority of States, including his own, had assumed numerous non-proliferation obligations and had taken action to that end; the regime for safe and secured peaceful applications of nuclear energy had been strengthened. Similar progress in respect of nuclear disarmament and negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States must be achieved.

99. Viet Nam called upon all States and the international community to join in further strengthening the non-proliferation regime through the universalization and implementation of all relevant agreements, including those of IAEA, and Security Council resolutions. Nuclear-weapon States should take immediate measures to fulfil their obligations under article VI of the Treaty and provide negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. Viet Nam also called on States signatories of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons to expedite their ratification of that important instrument and called on other States to accede to it.

100. The right of States to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes must be upheld, but needed to be exercised in a safe, secure and transparent manner. His country was one of some 20 States parties to almost all international treaties on nuclear safeguards, security and safety and supported the role of IAEA in that regard, particularly its international cooperation and technical support activities. Viet Nam called on other States to join the Agency's conventions on nuclear safety and on early notification and assistance in the case of nuclear accidents. Viet Nam also, like other countries members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, called on all nuclear-weapon States to join as soon as possible the Protocol to the Bangkok Treaty to ensure its effective implementation. His delegation reiterated its support for active participation in the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction later in the year.

101. Viet Nam firmly believed in a nuclear-weapon-free world and urged all countries to further the non-proliferation and disarmament agenda by overcoming their differences and resuming substantive work in the Conference on Disarmament and the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

102. **Mr. Bessedik** (Algeria) said that while the Non-Proliferation Treaty had been largely successful in restricting the possession of nuclear weapons to a

small number of States, its ultimate – but as yet unfulfilled – goal remained the total elimination of those weapons. The Treaty, as the cornerstone of the world's collective security, should be implemented by States in its entirety, including all obligations related to disarmament and non-proliferation.

103. In recent years, little progress had been made towards nuclear disarmament. Notwithstanding the provisions of article VI of the Treaty and the commitments and pledges emanating from the preceding Review Conferences, including the 13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament adopted at the 2000 Review Conference and the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference, nuclear weapons were still incorporated as a deterrent into many States' military and security doctrines. Nuclear weapons could be eradicated only through the ratification of a treaty to prohibit their use, stockpiling or development. In the meantime, nuclear-weapon States should provide legally binding assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States that they would not use or threaten to use such weapons against them.

104. Algeria had been quick to sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, adopted by the General Assembly in 2017, as the first legally binding international instrument of its kind. That treaty added value to and complemented existing law in the area of disarmament and would support the efforts of many countries to eliminate nuclear weapons. It was also important for every State, especially the Annex 2 States, to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Algeria was honoured to have been selected, along with Germany, to preside over the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty that would take place in 2019 in New York.

105. The provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty restricting the possession of nuclear weapons to the five nuclear-weapon State parties had, along with inspection processes and IAEA safeguards, had been effective over the previous decades. Non-proliferation was the responsibility of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike, as a fundamental step on the way to the full eradication of nuclear arsenals. Additional obligations over and above those clearly set out in the Treaty should not be imposed on non-nuclear-weapon States.

106. The Treaty not only addressed security issues but also fostered development and international cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In accordance with its article IV, States parties had the inalienable right to develop, research and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; any restrictions on the transfer of relevant

knowledge and equipment to developing countries must therefore be lifted.

107. Nuclear-weapon-free zones around the world had been key to furthering the goals of disarmament and non-proliferation and had enhanced regional and international peace, security and stability. Algeria was therefore concerned about the obstacles that continued to prevent the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. All must work together to strike the proper balance among the three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and bolster its credibility, as well as to find innovative solutions to the enormous challenges to disarmament and non-proliferation. Political will and flexibility were needed to arrive at consensus-based recommendations for achieving a world free of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction.

108. **Mr. Koba** (Indonesia) said that there was still an imbalance in the implementation of the three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to the increasing detriment of the disarmament pillar. The major nuclear-weapon States were continuing to enhance their nuclear-weapons programmes and to assign them greater importance in their respective military doctrines, thereby further undermining trust in the prospect of implementation of article VI of the Treaty. With regard to the peaceful use pillar, the Preparatory Committee at its current session should reaffirm the validity of article IV to ensure that no State party was limited in the exercise of its right to research, produce and use nuclear energy and technologies for peaceful purposes.

109. Much momentum had been lost at the 2015 Review Conference. The disarmament machinery had become politicized, reflected in the fact that neither the Conference on Disarmament nor the United Nations Disarmament Commission had produced any concrete results since 1996 and 1999 respectively, while, in the First Committee of the General Assembly, the topics of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament had increasingly required a vote.

110. At the bilateral level, the claim that the two biggest nuclear-weapon States had dismantled thousands of their nuclear weapons under their bilateral strategic agreement was yet to be verified transparently. In addition, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was currently paralyzed, while the New START Treaty was set to expire in 2021, thus removing all limits on the two major nuclear arsenals for the first time since 1972. That reality had made it difficult to assess the progress made in the implementation of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference and had also prevented any gains in transparency and confidence-building.

111. In such a context, the consistent compliance of Iran with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, confirmed by 14 IAEA reports, was particularly welcome. Indonesia had full confidence in the Agency as a credible and capable organization for nuclear disarmament verification, and particularly in its independence, impartiality and professionalism. Moreover, successful non-proliferation efforts were inseparable from the application of IAEA safeguards. His delegation called on all nuclear-weapon States, including States not parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to place their nuclear facilities within the full scope of IAEA safeguards.

112. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was a major development in global efforts towards the total elimination of such weapons and complemented the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It reinforced that Treaty and addressed the concern about the catastrophic humanitarian impacts of any use of nuclear weapons, and was an effective legal measure under article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Indonesia also continued to attach importance to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and called for its earliest possible entry into force and universalization. His delegation hoped that the conference on facilitating its entry into force, to be held later in the year, would be a concrete contribution to that end.

113. A positive step towards the objectives of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation was the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Indonesia accordingly called on all concerned parties to redouble their efforts to convene the long-awaited conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

114. **Mr. Al-Frayan** (Saudi Arabia) said that his country had been among the first to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement, as it believed that global peace and security could not be achieved as long as nuclear weapons existed. The Treaty was the cornerstone of the non-proliferation and disarmament architecture, and the realization of its aims and purposes was contingent on its universal ratification, with new signatories acceding as non-nuclear States. Saudi Arabia called on the international community to exert pressure on Israel, the only non-signatory in the Middle East, to ratify the Treaty as a non-nuclear State and to place all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA comprehensive safeguards regime, in accordance with Security Council resolution [487 \(1981\)](#).

115. The 1995 resolution on the Middle East was an integral part of the outcomes that had led to the

indefinite extension of the Treaty and was considered to be in force until its aims were achieved. Saudi Arabia was concerned by the failure of the nuclear-weapon States to comply with the resolution, which called for the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East.

116. Saudi Arabia welcomed the adoption of General Assembly decision 73/546, in which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to convene a conference for the negotiation of a binding treaty on the creation of a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region and provided that all decisions emanating by the conference be taken by consensus by the States of the region. Saudi Arabia stressed that the outcomes of the current session of the Preparatory Committee and of the 2020 Review Conference should clearly support the convening of such a conference and urged all parties invited to the conference to participate.

117. All States had the fundamental right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy under the supervision of IAEA and in accordance with its standards and practices. Saudi Arabia endorsed the calls to facilitate the transfer of technology, expertise and equipment related to the peaceful use of atomic energy, as such transfer served human interests and promoted nuclear power as an environmentally friendly energy source. Saudi Arabia also urged leading nations in the sphere of nuclear energy to facilitate the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries.

118. Saudi Arabia had ratified the Convention on Nuclear Safety in recognition of the fact that atomic energy must be used in keeping with the highest security standards. Aware of the risks presented by nuclear reactors, even when used for peaceful purposes and especially in cases where those reactors failed to meet safety standards, Saudi Arabia was concerned about the Bushehr nuclear reactor in Iran, which lay on an active geological fault line only 200 km from the shores of the Arabian Gulf. Any radiation leakage would pose an imminent threat to the region's air quality, food supply and water desalination plants. Saudi Arabia hoped that the international community, the United Nations and IAEA would urge Iran to sign the Convention, and it encouraged IAEA to report regularly on States' preparedness in addressing potential leakages at nuclear reactors.

119. Cooperation between IAEA and States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty was important in order to prevent nuclear proliferation and parties must comply with their obligations under that Treaty and with the comprehensive safeguards agreements. The

development by Iran of its nuclear capabilities, particularly given its history of sabotage in the region and its support for terrorist groups with strategic weapons and missiles, was a source of great concern. Saudi Arabia hoped that the international community would take more decisive action against Iran in order to achieve the overarching goals of the Treaty and promote international security.

120. **Mr. Hallak** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that his country had ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968 out of its conviction that the possession of nuclear weapons by any State, particularly in the Middle East, was a grave threat to humanity and to international and regional peace and security. Furthermore, Syria had been proactive in calling for a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and, during its membership in the Security Council in 2003, had submitted a draft resolution to that effect. However, that initiative had been blocked by the United States, which had threatened to use its veto in order to allow Israel to continue to shirk its international responsibilities.

121. The world was facing increased dangers related to the development, modernization and stockpiling of nuclear weapons and the prospect that they would be used by one of the nuclear-weapon States. The United States was in violation of article I of the Treaty by deploying nuclear weapons on the territories of five North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries and in the territorial waters of six States, including in the Mediterranean Sea. It had also violated its obligations by engaging in nuclear cooperation at all levels with Israel, which was not a party to the Treaty, and by announcing in its Nuclear Posture Review that it would establish, equip and modernize its nuclear testing centres. The 2020 Review Conference must work to put an end to those violations to preserve the credibility of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

122. The 1995 resolution on the Middle East was an integral part of the package of decisions and resolutions that had led to the indefinite extension of the Treaty. While the countries of the region were preparing to adopt practical steps towards the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, Israel, with unconditional support from its allies the United States and other Western countries, still refused to ratify the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State. The conference which was supposed to have been held in 2012 on the establishment of such a zone had never taken place because it had been thwarted by the United States, in deference to Israel. In addition, the adoption of the draft final document of the 2015 Review Conference had been blocked because it contained initiatives related to

the establishment of that zone. His delegation considered the 1995 resolution to be an integral part of the Treaty and called for its full implementation. It also considered that the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference remained in effect.

123. The 2020 Review Conference must affirm the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East; universal ratification of the Treaty; immediate negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear weapons instrument; negotiations on a legally binding international instrument on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States; a balanced approach to the disarmament and non-proliferation pillars of the Treaty; and implementation of the provisions of article IV of the Treaty, which reaffirmed the inalienable right to acquire and use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, without discrimination or restriction.

124. **Mr. Necula** (Romania) said that over the previous 50 years the world had become a safer place, mainly because of the contribution of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to strengthening international peace, stability and security. It was the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and its relevant provisions remained the way forward for achieving nuclear disarmament and using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Romania remained committed to upholding and preserving its integrity and called on all parties to work together towards the goal of achieving its universality and enhancing its implementation across all its three pillars, which were equally important and mutually reinforcing.

125. The Treaty still remained the best tool for global efforts to achieve a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the principle of undiminished security for all. Cooperation was needed, as was due attention to the international security environment. For there to be real and lasting progress on disarmament, all parties must work together towards a security environment more conducive to arms control and disarmament. The goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world must be achieved in an effective, verifiable and irreversible manner, through a progressive approach based on pragmatic, realistic measures. Such measures should include the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty.

126. IAEA played an indispensable role with regard to nuclear non-proliferation. Romania would continue to support its activities and to contribute substantially and constructively to its work. It encouraged all countries to respond to the Agency's needs in a constructive and

mutually beneficial way. Romania, for its part, had stepped up its efforts to promote the universalization without delay of the comprehensive safeguards agreement and the additional protocol. The Agency's independent and professional approach to the verification and monitoring of States' nuclear-related commitments deserved recognition and further support.

127. Romania believed in the power of effective multilateralism and international cooperation and remained committed to upholding and fully implementing, in letter and spirit, current arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation agreements. In recent years, however, the international security architecture had been under severe strain. Together with its allies and partners, Romania had repeatedly raised concerns about the non-compliance of the Russian Federation with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, but had received no credible response or seen any sign of genuine transparency. It therefore fully supported the decision of the United States to suspend its obligations under that instrument and called on the Russian Federation to return to full and verifiable compliance with the treaty and also with other equally important non-proliferation and arms-control agreements. Romania continued likewise to be concerned about the development of nuclear and ballistic programmes and underlined the need for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to take concrete and credible steps to demonstrate a genuine political will to achieve complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization.

128. His delegation looked to the Committee to reaffirm the validity and importance of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference and to pave the way, at its current meeting, for a positive outcome at the 2020 Review Conference.

129. **Mr. Callis** (Chile) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was indeed the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime and that, without it, the collective security situation would have taken a very different turn. The maintenance of international peace and security was the bedrock of his country's foreign policy, requiring a wide-ranging, transparent and democratic multilateral dialogue in order to arrive at comprehensive agreements aimed at achieving general and complete disarmament and the non-proliferation of every kind of indiscriminate weapon.

130. The Preparatory Committee at its current session was responsible for laying the final groundwork for a 2020 Review Conference that could not be allowed to fail. For Chile, the Final Document and action plan of the 2010 Review Conference remained fully applicable.

The 2020 Conference would not only be an opportunity to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, reaffirm its continuing relevance and achieve real progress towards its goals, but would also be the first Review Conference since the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The international community was expecting from the Committee some concrete steps towards the fulfilment of commitments freely assumed.

131. The Committee should reaffirm the inalienable right of States to develop, produce and use nuclear energy without discrimination or double standards, in accordance with articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty, and reiterate the undertaking by all States parties thereto to facilitate participation in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

132. The Treaty continued to be an effective curb on proliferation. Chile was one of an overwhelming majority of non-nuclear-weapon States that complied strictly with their obligations under the Treaty. Accordingly, nuclear-weapon countries increasingly had the same responsibility to meet their obligations not only to transfer nuclear knowledge and technology but also to progress towards nuclear disarmament. The world had changed since the entry into force of the Treaty, ushering in possibilities for advances and new approaches in respect of nuclear disarmament that deserved to be highlighted.

133. The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was a crime against humanity and a violation of international law, including international humanitarian law and the Charter of the United Nations. His delegation reiterated its profound concern about the existence of nuclear weapons and the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would be triggered by their use or detonation. Chile reaffirmed its commitment to the non-utilization of nuclear weapons in any circumstances, which could only be effectively guaranteed through their prohibition and complete elimination within a clearly defined time frame. He drew attention to the large number of States that had acceded to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, regarded from the outset as an instrument that would complement and strengthen the implementation and credibility of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. His delegation would continue to seek common ground with other countries so as to encourage those that shared the goal of prohibiting such weapons to accede also to that treaty; it was convinced that they would do so once they had overcome their reliance on nuclear deterrence. The banning of nuclear weapons was an essential step

towards their total, complete and irreversible elimination. It was a matter of concern that the main nuclear-weapon States continued to give importance to those inhumane weapons in their doctrines, security policies and military strategies.

134. He reiterated his country's commitment to participating constructively in the work of the Preparatory Committee at its current session, in the hope that, through the political will of delegations and the contribution of civil society organizations, the goals they all shared would be advanced. No effort should be spared to ensure the success of the 2020 Review Conference.

Statements made in exercise of the right of reply

135. **Mr. Eberhardt** (United States of America), responding to comments made by the Syrian representative, said that such outrageous charges could not remain unanswered. It was false to say, on the basis of the nuclear policy of NATO, that the United States was violating article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The nuclear arrangements of NATO had preceded the Treaty and had been well understood before its entry into force. For more than four decades, they had not been an issue, until one State party had sought by that means to distract attention from its own bad behaviour, just as Syria was currently trying to do. As for the baffling accusation that the Nuclear Posture Review of the United States called for the establishment of nuclear testing centres, he did not understand what was being referred to. The United States had not conducted any nuclear test since the 1990s and, as a free, open and democratic society, could not do so without everybody knowing about it. It was also almost laughable that a State that used weapons of mass destruction – chemical weapons – against its own people was calling for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of such weapons. Moreover, Syria continued to violate IAEA safeguards and refused to cooperate with the Agency in seeking to address the matter.

136. **Mr. Hallak** (Syrian Arab Republic) said it was surprising that the only State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty that had used nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction should use the occasion of the current meeting to raise the question of chemical weapons. However, since the representative of the United States had raised the subject, perhaps he would talk to the Committee about the 25 chemical weapons laboratories administered by his country outside its territory.

137. As for the question of the possible establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, the Syrian Arab Republic

in 2003, when it had been a member of the Security Council, had proposed a draft resolution to that effect. That proposal had come to nothing under the threat of a veto by the United States. The main opponent to the establishment of such a zone was Israel, supported by a few other States, most notably the United States of America. The United States worked closely with Israel in every respect, and particularly in the nuclear sphere, exchanging nuclear expertise and material with that country. It was consequently in violation of article I of the Treaty.

138. As for IAEA, his Government had cooperated with the Agency outside the safeguards agreement and allowed its inspectors to visit the sites concerned. The question to be asked was why Israel refused to cooperate with IAEA and why it refused to provide any information about the type of ammunition it had used in its attack on the military installation of Dair Alzour in September 2007. His delegation also wished to know why the United States had prevented the release of satellite images of that attack.

139. **Mr. Eberhardt** (United States of America) said that the assertion by the representative of Syria that there was any nuclear-sharing between his country and Israel was false. It was true, however, that the United States supported Israel. It did so because that country was a strong, vibrant democracy and a beacon of light in the region. If one day the Syrian regime could rise to the same standards of democracy, then the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction might become possible.

140. **Mr. Hallak** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that the representative of the United States had just acknowledged his country's cooperation with Israel. That should be duly noted as a violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Referring again to the Dair Alzour site, he read out a passage from a book by the former IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei concerning the hypocrisy of Israel in its bombing of that site. Any country with any information as to the nuclear nature of that installation had been requested by the then IAEA Director-General to comply with its obligation to provide such information to the Agency, but none had done so.

141. The United States, for its part, violated numerous international arms treaties, including the Treaty under discussion, as well as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. That should be borne in mind in the context of what the representative of that country had referred to as "bad behaviour" by the Syrian Arab Republic.

The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m.