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**Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review  
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the  
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

Distr.: General  
21 May 2019

Original: English

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**Third session**

New York, 29 April–10 May 2019

**Summary record of the 3rd meeting**

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 30 April 2019, at 10 a.m.

*Chair:* Mr. Syed Hussin. . . . . (Malaysia)

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*The meeting was called to order at 10.15 a.m.*

**General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee** (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Barton** (United Kingdom) said that since its entry into force, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had helped to spread the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, minimize the proliferation of nuclear weapons and provide the framework for nuclear disarmament. The United Kingdom had reduced the number of warheads in its arsenal by more than half since the height of the cold war.

2. Nevertheless, challenges remained. The nuclear programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea posed a regional and global threat. The United Kingdom encouraged that country to engage in further dialogue with a view to decreasing tensions on the Korean Peninsula and urged it to take steps towards complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization.

3. The United Kingdom supported the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Although the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had reported that Iran remained in full compliance with its Treaty obligations, significant concerns remained with respect to its ballistic missile programme, which was destabilizing for the region. Iran continued to conduct ballistic missile-related activities that were inconsistent with Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) and had worrisome implications, including the consequences of proliferation from Iran to Yemen and elsewhere in the region.

4. The United Kingdom called on the Russian Federation to return to full compliance with its obligations under the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty). It was regrettable that the Russian Federation, as part of a broader pattern of behaviour, had continued to deny its violations of that treaty, had refused to provide a credible response and had taken no clear steps to return to full compliance. Those violations eroded the foundations of effective arms control and posed significant risks to European security.

5. Those recent changes in the international security environment gave rise to concerns that States might use their nuclear capabilities to threaten the United Kingdom or its vital interests. Although the independent nuclear deterrent capability of the United Kingdom remained essential to its security, the country was committed to the long-term goal of a world without

nuclear weapons and would continue to work with all parties that shared that goal.

6. The success of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which remained a fundamental part of the international rules-based system, depended on self-restraint on the part of all its signatories. Accordingly, States should bear in mind that they must all work together to ensure the success of the 2020 Review Conference. The United Kingdom supported the convening of a high-level segment and endorsed the idea of a consensus-based outcome, which would require at the very least agreement on the agenda and on the President-designate of the 2020 Review Conference.

7. To demonstrate its commitment to the review cycle, the United Kingdom had submitted a draft national report to the Preparatory Committee in which it outlined its work on nuclear disarmament verification and domestic safeguards and set out in a transparent manner its operational policy and doctrine. All States parties were welcome to provide feedback on the draft in advance of the 2020 Review Conference. The United Kingdom would present its nuclear sector policy, which set out how the country would reduce the cost of building new reactors, at a side event, and with Nigeria, would host a discussion on how the Treaty and the work of IAEA contributed to the expanding use of nuclear energy and technology.

8. **Ms. Higgie** (New Zealand), speaking on behalf of the De-Alerting Group, said that the issue of decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems (de-alerting) had been under discussion in various international forums for years. Since its establishment in 2017, the Group had repeatedly called for the de-alerting of nuclear-weapon systems as a risk reduction measure and as a step towards nuclear disarmament. As long as nuclear weapons existed, they carried the risks of inadvertent launches due to technical failure; operator error; misinterpretation of early warning data; false reports from early warning systems; and use by rogue military units, terrorists or cyberattackers. Those risks were multiplied when nuclear weapons were placed on high alert. It was also widely acknowledged, including by former military leaders from States with the largest nuclear arsenals, that de-alerting was of most value during periods of heightened tensions.

9. The history of nuclear accidents and near-accidents, particularly in States with the largest arsenals, showed that the concern was not misplaced. The United States and the Russian Federation, for example, had in previous decades received erroneous information from early warning systems or had

misinterpreted warning data. Although disaster had been averted, continued reliance on good fortune was not sufficient.

10. It was regrettable that some nuclear-weapon States seemed to have dissociated themselves from their earlier acknowledgment of the risks of high alert, asserting instead that de-alerting could create dangerous deterrence instabilities and lead to a rush to re-alert in a crisis or conflict. However, keeping nuclear weapons on high-alert status ran counter to the commitment to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines; to recognize the legitimate interests of non-nuclear-weapon States in further reducing the operational status of those systems; and to take concrete measures to de-alert. States should comply with those obligations in order to enhance international stability.

11. The De-Alerting Group agreed with the view presented in the Secretary-General's disarmament agenda, *Securing Our Common Future: an Agenda for Disarmament* that nuclear-weapon States should be able to reduce the operational readiness of their nuclear-weapon systems, as there was strong international support for such a step. The Group had submitted a working paper to the Preparatory Committee ([NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/WP.23](#)) highlighting the consideration of the issue of de-alerting at previous Review Conferences, including as part of the 13 practical steps for nuclear disarmament and pursuant to action 5 (e) of the action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

12. The Group called for agreement at the 2020 Review Conference on concrete measures to be taken during the 2020–2025 review cycle. With respect to the implementation of article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Group recommended that steps be taken to address the significant risks of high alert levels; that steps be taken to rapidly reduce operational readiness; and that regular, standardized and comprehensive reports on that issue be submitted during the 2020–2025 review cycle.

13. **Mr. Webson** (Antigua and Barbuda), speaking on behalf of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), said that the Community's member States had a long-standing policy of supporting the total elimination of nuclear weapons, in line with the three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The commitment of those States to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation was embodied by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (the Treaty of Tlatelolco), which had been ratified by all States in the region. The Treaty of Tlatelolco had

established the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and had instituted the world's first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely populated region, which had strengthened regional security and provided a model for similar zones around the world.

14. Nuclear weapons were not useful deterrents, but rather fostered insecurity and false defensiveness that increased the likelihood of proliferation, which had a potentially devastating impact on all. As small island developing States, CARICOM countries recognized that their strategic location, marine borders and socioeconomic realities rendered them potential soft targets of nuclear terrorism. In the light of the international security environment, States should commit to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its various outcome documents, and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their security doctrines. They must also ensure that their work in the Preparatory Committee was based on cooperation and constructive dialogue. Collective security and national security were not mutually exclusive, especially when it came to nuclear weapons.

15. CARICOM had firmly supported the universalization and full effective implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Its near-universality was a meaningful indication of the international commitment to nuclear disarmament. States that had not yet acceded to the Treaty should do so and should place their facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.

16. At the previous Review Conferences, most non-nuclear-weapon States had expressed dissatisfaction with the failure of nuclear-weapon States to meet their obligations under the Treaty. There was currently cause for optimism, however, as the General Assembly had in 2017 adopted the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The constructive engagement of the vast majority of States parties throughout the process to ban nuclear weapons was an outgrowth of their compliance with their obligations under article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons had been negotiated as a response to deep concern by States regarding the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. CARICOM was convinced that nuclear weapons should never be used again under any circumstances, and it urged all States to sign and ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons to ensure its entry into force.

17. The most important nuclear safety issue for CARICOM States remained the cross-border movement of radioactive materials in the Caribbean region. The

trans-shipment of nuclear waste through the Caribbean Sea posed grave threats to the environment and to the economic sustainability of the region. Accordingly, all member States of CARICOM had concluded safeguards agreements with IAEA and some had also signed additional protocols with the Agency.

18. Nuclear-weapon States should undertake and report on actions consistent with achieving and maintaining a nuclear-weapon-free world. Such actions could include the ending of modernization programmes, the establishment of time-bound programmes to eliminate nuclear weapons, the ending of all forms of nuclear testing, the removal of nuclear weapons from security doctrines and the promotion of transparency regarding nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

19. **Mr. Oskarsson** (Iceland) said that some of the key agreements underpinning global disarmament efforts since the end of the cold war were being tested by new security challenges and glaring examples of non-compliance. Although the Non-Proliferation Treaty was the most successful instrument in the history of nuclear arms control and disarmament, preserving its integrity and global validity was a challenge. Any attempt to dismantle or weaken the Treaty, which was the cornerstone of the policy of Iceland with respect to nuclear disarmament, was unacceptable.

20. The rogue behaviour of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was the most immediate threat to the non-proliferation regime and undermined global security. Iceland hoped that that country would return to compliance with its international obligations, including returning to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and IAEA safeguards arrangements, and welcomed the strong diplomatic efforts of the United States in that regard. Another threat to non-proliferation was the looming expiration of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Iceland reiterated its call to the Russian Federation to return to full compliance with that treaty, which was an important part of the rules-based order in global arms control. In addition, the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty) should be extended. Iceland also supported the continuation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action as an important contribution to the rules-based non-proliferation regime.

21. Nuclear-weapon States had a special responsibility when it came to the disarmament pillar of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but slow progress on that front should not discourage States from seeking to strengthen other supporting mechanisms, such as the Missile

Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and, most importantly, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, whose success would be assured when it was ratified by all Annex 2 States. The commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty would also support non-proliferation arrangements.

22. Advances had been made in the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty with respect to the peaceful application of nuclear technology and the increasing acceptance by States of the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol. However, greater effort was needed to ensure an active and equal role for women in disarmament efforts, in line with Security Council resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#). In addition, more energy, creativity and resources were needed when it came to both nuclear and conventional disarmament and arms control.

23. **Mr. Grossi** (Argentina) said that the Chairs of the first and second sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference had correctly concluded in their working paper that the Non-Proliferation Treaty continued to be of central importance for its States parties, as it underpinned their juridical and political efforts on non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Furthermore, his delegation shared the conclusion of the working paper that, in the interests of continuity, cooperation and consistency, the issue of the nomination of the President-designate and other officials of the Review Conference must be resolved during the current session of the Preparatory Committee. Although his candidacy had been endorsed by the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States more than two years prior, the other necessary steps had been dragging on for far too long. The refusal to confirm the candidate that had been endorsed by his region was difficult to understand and affected the entire preparatory process. Indeed, past experience, statements made at the second session of the Committee and broad consultations by the Presidents of the previous Review Conferences all confirmed that there was broad consensus on the importance of designating the officials of the Conference as soon as possible. Any further delay was neither logical nor reasonable.

24. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was the cornerstone of the disarmament and non-proliferation regimes. The issues contemplated in the Treaty had evolved over the years, reflecting a juridical and political framework that provided the international law underpinnings for the policies of both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. Given the unique international context surrounding that framework, it was imperative to find

the best ways of keeping it up to date in order to achieve the ultimate goal of verifiable, transparent and irreversible denuclearization. Over the years, the Treaty had been instrumental in helping to prevent the escalation of international conflicts through the use of nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, that achievement in global peace, security and stability could not be taken for granted, but demanded an ongoing commitment to sustaining the international agreements behind it.

25. Like the rest of the international community, Argentina welcomed the announced interruption of nuclear testing and of the missile programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It hoped that the dialogue between that country, the Republic of Korea, the United States, China and the Russian Federation would lead to more ambitious and verifiable agreements. The signing and ratification by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the return of IAEA inspectors to the country would be seen as positive gestures towards the region and the international community. In addition, Argentina trusted that IAEA would be able to confirm that Iran continued to fulfil its obligations, and called on all interested parties to continue their efforts to arrive at mutually agreed solutions in all areas of the disarmament and non-proliferation agenda.

26. Despite diverging views among States parties regarding the pace of implementation of some elements of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, such as those related to disarmament, without it, the world would be worse off; most activities related to safeguards and peaceful uses of nuclear technology would not exist; and unilateralism would prevail in international nuclear security. The 2020 Review Conference would be an opportunity to recommit to the goals of the Treaty. The review itself was imperative, especially since the 2015 Review Conference had ended with no agreed conclusion. Efforts must be made to ensure that the review process was not held hostage by side issues that diverted attention from the important mandate of the Conference.

27. Following the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident, countries had taken actions that had substantively improved nuclear safety and security. A renewed global interest in nuclear security had led to high-level initiatives such as IAEA conferences and the nuclear security summits. Such international actions had been unimaginable only a few years prior. In addition, safeguards systems had been modernized and integrated, and legal, technological and political solutions to outstanding issues were being sought in cooperation with States members of IAEA.

28. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy had increased, with applications for medicine and health, agriculture and the fight against climate change, and technological advances had been made with regard to small modular reactors, which were under construction in Argentina and beginning to be licensed in other countries. The peaceful uses of nuclear technology had spread geographically, with new countries signing on to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme. Developing and developed countries alike were undertaking more advanced initiatives, including building research reactors and new nuclear power plants.

29. As President-designate of the 2020 Review Conference, he planned to call for a series of regional consultations to survey a range of views and find ways to promote tangible progress during the 2020 Review Conference.

30. **Ms. Wronecka** (Poland) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty had become an essential part of the modern security regime and the ultimate point of reference when it came to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. It had even been said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was in many ways as important as the Charter of the United Nations itself.

31. Poland, a long-standing supporter of non-proliferation, had tried to advance that goal in a pragmatic and credible manner. As Chair of the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference, it had worked in close cooperation with the Netherlands, the Chair of the first session, and, after the conclusion of their tenures, both Chairs had taken stock of their work in the inter-Chair working paper on conclusions and recommendations for the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference.

32. The only way to arrive at a world free of nuclear weapons was through effective, verifiable and irreversible disarmament, which required that all States work together and be convinced of the security benefits of disarmament. Unfortunately, the current security situation was not conducive to nuclear disarmament. The Russian Federation, for example, continued to violate the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and unless it verifiably destroyed all its 9M729 (SSC-8) missiles, it would bear the sole responsibility for ending that treaty, a development that would have negative implications for European security.

33. Although the darkest scenarios about nuclear proliferation envisioned in the past had not materialized, they had not fully evaporated either, as exemplified by the actions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In addition, Iran must continue to fulfil all its

nuclear-related commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Poland supported the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards systems, including through universal adherence to the comprehensive safeguards agreement and the additional protocol as the verification standard.

34. Poland, a supporter of peaceful uses of nuclear energy worldwide, had updated its own plan to implement a nuclear power programme. The aim was to diversify the country's sources of electricity in a manner that ensured a secure energy supply and minimized the negative impacts of the energy sector on the environment.

35. **Ms. Bolaños Pérez** (Guatemala) said that her country remained committed to the objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and promoted universality and full compliance with all of its provisions. It was therefore concerned at the millions of dollars spent each year to maintain and modernize nuclear arsenals and develop new weapons. In the current complex global peace and security setting, nuclear disarmament was more urgent than ever. Given the lack of progress on that front, it was necessary to strengthen partnerships and restore confidence between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. Furthermore, nuclear-weapon States must continue to comply with their Treaty obligations, increase transparency in their processes and redouble efforts to achieve complete and verifiable disarmament. The non-proliferation and peaceful uses objectives of the Treaty were being met. Compliance with the Treaty, including its article VI, was not subject to any conditions and was not optional for States parties.

36. Her delegation was deeply concerned about the impact of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, which constituted a crime against humanity and a violation of international law. The only effective assurance against the use of such weapons was their prohibition and elimination in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner, within a clearly defined timeframe.

37. Guatemala was a strong advocate for and signatory to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. It was a State party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which had established the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely populated area and had served as a model for other such zones. Her delegation welcomed General Assembly decision 73/546 on convening a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and encouraged all

States in the region to participate actively in the conference. It was also pleased to note that the fourth Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia would be held in 2020.

38. Fifty years after the entry into force of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, no progress was being made in the disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. In fact, non-compliance with multilateral agreements had led to setbacks. Guatemala therefore supported the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and welcomed the compliance of Iran and the crucial role played by IAEA in verification and the implementation of its safeguards agreement. Her delegation regretted any action that threatened to undermine the implementation of the Plan of Action, which was vital for regional and global security. Additionally, there was an urgent need to begin negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty in the Conference on Disarmament. Her delegation also welcomed the actions taken with respect to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and urged continued dialogue in the quest for a peaceful and definitive solution. That country must suspend testing of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.

39. Although the 2020 Review Conference faced complex challenges, the international community must prove that it was capable of building on past progress and not be content with merely reiterating commitments agreed upon in previous meetings, the deadlines for which could not continue to be postponed indefinitely. In order to provide much needed continuity, the President-designate of the 2020 Review Conference must be nominated without delay.

40. **Ms. Sulaiman** (Brunei Darussalam) said that the inability to produce a final document at the 2015 Review Conference spoke volumes about the ever-growing tensions among States concerning disarmament and non-proliferation. States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty must rise above their differences and present a united front, as the Treaty's effectiveness depended heavily on their commitment to fulfil their obligations. They must also continue to implement the outcome documents adopted at previous Review Conferences.

41. Brunei Darussalam had long abided by policies that prohibited the development, acquisition or proliferation of any weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, and recognized the potentially disastrous humanitarian and environmental impacts of their use. Her country had therefore signed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 2018. Furthermore, nuclear-weapon-free zones played an important role in reinforcing the Non-Proliferation

Treaty and contributing to confidence-building. The Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok) had been integral in promoting peace, security and stability in the region. As a State party to that treaty, Brunei Darussalam hoped that all nuclear-weapon States would promptly accede to the Protocol thereto. Her delegation also welcomed the convening of the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.

42. Her Government supported the right of States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to access and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. It recognized the central role played by IAEA in establishing safeguards and verification mechanisms and urged all States parties to apply the highest safety and security standards. In that connection, Brunei Darussalam was part of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy. At the national level, after meeting the necessary infrastructure requirements and undergoing IAEA inspections, the Brunei Cancer Centre had begun to provide nuclear medicine services in a safe manner.

43. The international community must strive to lower tensions and bridge gaps in the lead-up to the 2020 Review Conference. While reaching consensus was seldom without challenges, sincere dialogue and a desire for compromise could advance the nuclear disarmament agenda. The Treaty could only flourish through multilateral action and genuine concerted efforts, and Brunei Darussalam would continue to engage constructively in that process.

44. **Mr. Srivihok** (Thailand) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was facing growing challenges amid heightened tensions between States, the threat of non-State actors and the mixed blessing of rapid advancements in science and technology. The international community must not allow such challenges to distract from the urgency of its work. The current international security context also gave cause for concern. The modernization of nuclear arsenals, the development of low-yield nuclear weapons and advancements in weapon delivery systems demonstrated that horizontal and vertical proliferation continued unabated and that the tradition of placing nuclear weapons at the centre of security doctrines had gained even more ground. A nuclear deterrence policy did not guarantee the absence of war but rather the absence of trust, as exemplified by the recent breakdown of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the current state of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. His delegation called on all relevant stakeholders to

enhance trust in one another and to continue to fully implement those agreements. Thailand also supported the diplomatic efforts being made on the Korean Peninsula and hoped that trust and goodwill would grow to include further dialogue and concrete actions towards sustained peace and complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization in the region.

45. Although nuclear-weapon States had reaffirmed their unequivocal commitment to the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals at the 2000 Review Conference, reductions had slowed to a virtual standstill and disarmament seemed a distant goal. His delegation called on all States to sign and ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons without delay and welcomed the opportunity to engage in meaningful dialogue in that regard. The 2010 Review Conference had mandated early consultations for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, and the First Committee had adopted a related decision in 2019. His delegation therefore hoped that those consultations would take place in the near future and would lead to the eventual establishment of such a zone. Furthermore, as the depositary of the Treaty of Bangkok and the current Chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Thailand was committed to engaging with nuclear-weapon States for the full and effective implementation of that treaty.

46. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and the basis upon which to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. States must remember their shared commitments to peace, security and a world free of nuclear weapons and come together without delay to exercise the political will necessary to sustain the Treaty and ensure its success.

47. **Mr. Phansourivong** (Lao People's Democratic Republic) said that the continued existence of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, remained a matter of serious concern for international peace and security. As long as nuclear weapons existed there was a risk of accidental, mistaken, unauthorized or intentional detonations, with potentially catastrophic effects for both humans and the environment. The international community must redouble its efforts to ensure the total elimination of nuclear weapons, which was the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of such weapons. It must also undertake effective measures in good faith to fill the legal gap in prohibiting and eliminating nuclear weapons, in order to fully implement article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Although the three pillars of the Treaty were meant to



be implemented equally, nuclear disarmament was lagging behind.

48. The Lao People's Democratic Republic had signed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and hoped that it would soon enter into force. In addition, his delegation encouraged States that had not yet done so to sign and ratify the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which had been adopted more than two decades earlier but remained ineffective. His Government attached great importance to the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, which strengthened global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and enhanced regional and global peace and security. It also strongly supported preserving Southeast Asia as a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. Having signed the IAEA additional protocol, his Government recognized the significant role that the Agency played in advancing nuclear non-proliferation and promoting nuclear safety and safeguards as well as the peaceful use of nuclear technology.

49. **Mr. Gafoor** (Singapore) said that nuclear-weapon States must do more to fulfil their disarmament commitments under article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference. Transparent and genuine dialogue was essential to build trust between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. Singapore supported the entry into force of the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and strongly urged all countries, particularly Annex 2 countries, that had not yet done so to sign and ratify that treaty. Progress must also be made toward concluding a fissile material cut-off treaty. The global nuclear non-proliferation regime continued to be threatened by the rise of non-State actors and the misuse of nuclear technology, material and dual-use items for unsanctioned military purposes. His delegation strongly encouraged all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty that had not yet done so to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols with IAEA.

50. The nuclear and ballistic missile programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea remained a source of concern for the international community. That country should return to the Treaty and fully comply with its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions. Singapore supported constructive engagement and dialogue to promote peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. In addition, IAEA had verified that Iran had consistently fulfilled its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action since its implementation. Iran should continue to apply the additional protocol to its safeguards agreement on a provisional basis, pending its entry into

force. His delegation urged all parties to the Plan of Action to continue their dialogue.

51. Given its belief that nuclear-weapon-free zones were the building blocks for global nuclear non-proliferation, Singapore reaffirmed its commitment to the Treaty of Bangkok and encouraged the nuclear-weapon States to sign and ratify the Protocol to that treaty without reservation. His delegation also welcomed efforts to achieve genuine and lasting peace in a nuclear-weapon-free Middle East through open and constructive dialogue involving all relevant parties. The inalienable right to the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology was inherently linked to a responsibility to uphold nuclear safety and security.

52. His delegation hoped that the current session of the Preparatory Committee could facilitate constructive dialogue in support of concrete, time-bound and verifiable action to ensure that the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime remained relevant and could deliver on its promise. In order for the 2020 Review Conference to be successful, it was important to resolve all procedural matters and quickly nominate the President-designate of the Conference.

53. **Mr. Auza** (Holy See) said that the Holy See remained deeply concerned about the obstacles facing the international community in addressing the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons. International relations could not be held captive by military force, mutual intimidation and the parading of stockpiles of arms. In 2017, the Holy See had signed and ratified the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which would promote rather than distract from the goal of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Nonetheless, it still needed to be strengthened in some areas, including the designation of a competent international authority or authorities to negotiate and verify the irreversible elimination of nuclear-weapons programmes.

54. The two parties to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty must take prompt action to resolve compliance concerns and resume negotiations without delay in order to prevent the treaty from lapsing in August 2019. They should also meet to resolve similar issues relating to the New START Treaty before its expiration in early 2021. Withdrawal from legally binding commitments to eliminate an entire category of missiles and establish limits on delivery systems and warheads could not help to advance international stability or sustain the fragile balances that the world had worked so hard to achieve since the end of the Second World War. Nuclear-weapon States, including those not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, must



engage in dialogue to establish a ceiling on the nuclear-weapons systems of individual States as well as binding limitations on all nuclear weapons and delivery systems globally.

55. States in the Middle East that had not yet done so should promptly ratify the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and all States in the region should urgently negotiate a zone free of nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass distraction and ballistic missiles, as envisioned in the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. The Test-Ban Treaty and the Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone should figure prominently in the 2020 Review Conference. Furthermore, the Holy See welcomed and strongly encouraged all efforts to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. Ratification of the Test-Ban Treaty by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would attest to its firm commitment to cease nuclear testing and to return to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. A reintroduction of IAEA safeguards would also provide proof of its quest for a shared and lasting solution to benefit the entire region.

56. The possession and maintenance of nuclear weapons fostered distrust based on a deterrent threat of mutually assured destruction, which could never provide the basis for fraternity, solidarity and cooperative security. The Holy See appealed to all States to continue their efforts to sustain and implement the Treaty.

57. **Mr. Vieira** (Brazil) said that the 2020 Review Conference would provide an opportunity to assess the health and status of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the current deteriorating international security environment. States parties would have to consider whether they could still agree to further the implementation of the Treaty in a manner that helped to achieve its objectives across the three pillars, particularly the disarmament pillar. The engagement of Treaty members with the review process and the Treaty itself would be tested as the global security landscape was being undermined by allegations of non-compliance and the abandonment of key arms control agreements and commitments, especially on the part of the major powers that should be setting the example.

58. While some States basked in the notion that the Treaty was a great success, in that only four countries outside its purview had acquired nuclear weapons since its entry into force, his delegation considered those to be four countries too many. After the significant reductions in nuclear-weapon arsenals from the peak numbers of the cold war, progress on disarmament had come to a grinding halt; nuclear-weapon States were reversing

course and displaying an alarming urge to modernize and expand the role of nuclear weapons in their national defence policies and security doctrines. The international community should not take for granted the remarkable success achieved under the non-proliferation pillar. The greater the perception that international and regional security environments were no longer safe, the greater the risk of further proliferation. All parties to the Treaty were obliged to negotiate nuclear disarmament in good faith and had taken an oath to work towards achieving a world free of nuclear weapons.

59. The network of bilateral, regional and multilateral instruments that supported and complemented the Treaty must be preserved, reinforced and expanded. Brazil had ratified the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty over 20 years earlier, but other Annex 2 States still refused to do so. It had contributed technically and substantively to the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty, presenting a proposal to the Conference on Disarmament in 2010 on a framework agreement approach. In the context of the group of governmental experts on nuclear disarmament verification convened in 2018 and 2019, Brazil had also put forward a proposal to establish a group of scientific and technical experts on nuclear disarmament verification under the auspices of the Conference. It had participated actively in the negotiation and adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Those few States that insisted on opposing that treaty should bear in mind that it would not stand in the way of any serious alternative efforts on their part to pursue nuclear disarmament.

60. With regard to the non-proliferation and peaceful uses pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Brazil and Argentina had built a unique relationship based on cooperation and mutual trust, underpinned by the work of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials. Brazil was developing a multipurpose reactor in partnership with Argentina to significantly increase domestic capabilities for isotope production and research. It was also developing its first nuclear-powered submarine in full compliance with its obligations under the Treaty and its safeguards agreements with both IAEA and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency.

61. The current Preparatory Committee had a responsibility to make recommendations for the 2020 Review Conference. Regrettably, the nomination of the President-designate had been artificially delayed by issues that bore no relation to the Committee's work. The international community must reiterate its past commitments, particularly those agreed to by consensus in 1995, 2000 in 2010, and seek to address current

concerns with actionable measures. Renewed comprehensive dialogue on disarmament was needed to jointly assess current nuclear strategic stability and risk factors and consider the necessary steps to move towards a world without nuclear weapons.

62. **Ms. Wallström** (Sweden) said that the world was facing the most challenging global security environment since the height of the cold war, characterized by a severe lack of mutual trust. As disarmament was being replaced by the modernization of arsenals, key international treaties were being left hollow or were being improperly implemented. The common goal of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons remained frustratingly remote, and civil society continued to struggle to raise awareness of the issue. The convening of the current session was proof that States parties had the will to begin making real change towards building trust and ensuring disarmament. They must find ways to turn back the so-called Doomsday Clock from its current setting of two minutes to midnight. Reversing that negative trend would be a top priority in her Government's foreign and security policy for years to come.

63. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was a crucial platform and its future could not be taken for granted. Nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States alike must engage urgently, fully, pragmatically and politically in identifying the common ground necessary for a successful outcome to the 2020 Review Conference. A good point of departure would be universal recognition of the fact that the three pillars of the Treaty were closely interlinked and mutually reinforcing. Furthermore, concrete disarmament commitments must be a part of any consensus package. In that connection, Sweden would host a ministerial-level meeting in Stockholm in June 2019 with a view to mobilizing political support for an ambitious yet realistic agenda. That agenda should include a reaffirmation of the Treaty's position as the cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime as well as the continued validity of previous commitments; an unequivocal condemnation of the use of nuclear weapons; a proposed package of measures covering all three pillars of the Treaty, including outstanding commitments related to article VI; and improvement of the Treaty process in order to provide a framework for systematic follow-up in the years beyond 2020. She hoped that the meeting in Stockholm could help to unlock disarmament diplomacy and break the vicious cycle of recent years.

64. The international community must identify common ground on disarmament. The traditional step-by-step approach included several long-standing

items, such as an agreement on a fissile material cut-off treaty, the entry into force of the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and a global legally binding agreement on negative security assurances. The realization of any of those items would be a landmark achievement and their continued relevance should be recalled at the 2020 Review Conference. However, States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty must provide actionable steps, or stepping stones, for the Review Conference. The focus of such steps should be on reducing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies and doctrines, particularly by strengthening negative security assurances; reviving and building on the fruitful interaction and cooperation between nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States on disarmament verification; enhancing transparency with regard to arsenals and fissile material stocks; and designing measures to reduce the risks of intentional or unintentional nuclear use.

65. In addition to addressing real short-term concerns, the purpose of the stepping stones would be to build trust and confidence and help to unlock current diplomatic blockages in the disarmament process. Given that the United States and the Russian Federation possessed the largest arsenals, they should assume their responsibilities and take immediate steps to rebuild a constructive arms-control relationship. A crucial first step would be to save the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, for which the Russian Federation must verifiably demonstrate full compliance. She also urged the United States and the Russian Federation to agree on a five-year extension to the New START Treaty and negotiate a successor regime in the lead-up to 2026.

66. Multilateralism must be at the centre of efforts as delegations came together to set the stage for the 2020 Review Conference. A world free of nuclear weapons could only be achieved by building trust, delivering on commitments and exercising brave political leadership.

67. **Mr. Ovsyanko** (Belarus) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was a key element of the non-proliferation regime and of the international security system as a whole. The Treaty's success depended on striking a balance between its three mutually reinforcing and inseparable pillars: disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

68. Having given up its nuclear weapons 25 years earlier, Belarus remained convinced that the achievement of general and complete nuclear disarmament was the primary strategic goal of the Treaty. The impetus driving the processes of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation had been lost,

however. Decisive measures needed to be taken to strengthen the Treaty and other global and regional instruments in the areas of non-proliferation, security and stability aimed at advancing the cause of general and complete nuclear disarmament.

69. Belarus had been among the first countries to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, convinced that its early entry into force was critical for the achievement of nuclear disarmament. It was therefore troubling that the value of that treaty was being increasingly called into question while major international players were confronting one another with increasingly inflammatory rhetoric. Noting that the fate of that treaty was contingent on the political will of certain States, he called on them to take measures to bring it into force.

70. The Non-Proliferation Treaty review cycle would help to bridge the differences between States parties, including with regard to nuclear-weapon-free zones. It was regrettable that the resolution on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference had not been implemented. Such a zone was also lacking on the European continent. Belarus believed that it was important for nuclear-weapon States to provide to non-nuclear-weapon States assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The time was ripe for the elaboration of an international legally binding agreement on unequivocal and unconditional security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

71. IAEA played an important role in ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through its safeguards system. It was essential that such a system be objective, depoliticized and technically sound, and founded on agreements concluded between the Agency and its member States.

72. Belarus supported the commencement of negotiations on the development of a legally binding instrument concerning the production of fissile material. It also commended the Nuclear Suppliers Group for continuing to lead global efforts to develop international rules for the transfer of nuclear dual-use goods and to adapt those rules in response to established and emerging threats in the field of non-proliferation.

73. His delegation was prepared to work constructively with all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to ensure the success of the current review cycle and to enable the achievement of a universally supported outcome at the 2020 Review Conference.

74. **Ms. Natividad** (Philippines) said that through the hard work and engagement of States parties, the current session could build on previous meetings and enable the 2020 Review Conference to deliver concrete outcomes. Progress must be guided by the commitments made under the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference and the 13 steps agreed at the 2000 Review Conference. However, discussions should not focus on a review of those commitments, but rather on a review of their implementation. At the current session, the parties should demonstrate a mutual determination to commit to the three pillars of the Treaty while also establishing new measures for the achievement of complete nuclear disarmament.

75. The Philippines was concerned that recent developments had led to a deepening of the mistrust among States parties to the Treaty; some of those developments had been used to justify the role of nuclear weapons in certain national defence and security doctrines, with the mobilization of significant resources to develop more advanced weapons systems. Also concerning was the lowering of the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons and the acquisition of more advanced nuclear arms by States, undermining the principles underpinning the Treaty. The risk of a nuclear detonation continued to loom. The Philippines therefore called on the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their commitments to the Treaty with sincerity and on relevant parties to reconsider their withdrawal from or suspension of critical landmark agreements, particularly the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

76. The Philippines had voted for the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which highlighted the political will of a resounding majority of States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to establish a legal instrument in accordance with its article VI and to strengthen the nuclear disarmament pillar. The work of IAEA was commendable and the Philippines supported universal adherence to its comprehensive safeguards system and additional protocol, as well as the strengthening and expansion of its Technical Cooperation Programme.

77. States parties to the Treaty should approach the current session and the 2020 Review Conference in a positive manner in order to achieve tangible results. The Philippines had contributed to working papers seeking to address key points in the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference. Moreover, several initiatives had been put forward relating to potential practical outcomes, notably the work of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative on transparency and reporting, the strengthened review process, de-alerting,

disarmament education and a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

78. Nuclear-weapon-free zones and Mongolia played an important role in reinforcing the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation framework, which could be further enhanced through stronger cooperation among such zones and with nuclear-weapon States. The critical importance of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East meant that all parties involved in working to establish a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons must maintain and enhance their dialogue and engagement to that end.

79. It was concerning that a President-designate had not yet been nominated for the 2020 Review Conference; the early completion of that process would help to ensure the success of the Conference. Efforts towards increased gender balance in relation to disarmament processes and the Non-Proliferation Treaty were commendable. Related initiatives could be pursued through collaboration with partner States, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and research institutes.

80. The Philippines stood ready to play its part in ensuring a successful outcome to the Review Conference, which would offer an opportunity to reflect on the principles and the collective will that had enabled the adoption of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

81. **Mr. Molnár** (Hungary) said that over the past five decades, the Non-Proliferation Treaty had proved to be the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime. The 2020 Review Conference offered an excellent opportunity to preserve and strengthen the integrity of the Treaty. The comprehensive action plan of the 2010 Review Conference provided States parties with a good basis for recommitting to its objectives.

82. With regard to disarmament, article VI of the Treaty continued to serve as the foundation for the ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. However, that goal could not be achieved without taking into account the complex global security environment. Progress on nuclear disarmament could only be achieved by focusing on areas of common ground, and that in turn would require an inclusive and progressive approach consisting of practical steps that involved the engagement of nuclear-weapon States. Those steps included the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons; progress on disarmament verification; and immediate commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty in the Conference on Disarmament.

Hungary welcomed the report of the high-level fissile material cut-off treaty expert preparatory group and looked forward to contributing to the work of the group of governmental experts to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament and that of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification.

83. In respect of non-proliferation, proliferation risks must be addressed effectively to preserve the Treaty's credibility. The role of the IAEA comprehensive safeguards system was crucial in that regard.

84. Hungary urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to return to compliance with its obligations under the Treaty and IAEA safeguards and hoped that recent diplomatic efforts would help in fulfilling that objective. It also supported the goal of the international community to ensure that the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran remained peaceful. Meanwhile, despite its imperfections, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action offered the most effective means of ensuring that the nuclear programme of that country was exclusively for peaceful purposes.

85. Hungary was in favour of establishing a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, including their delivery systems, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by those States.

86. As a country with an effective peaceful nuclear programme, Hungary recognized the inalienable right of all States parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. At the same time, it was committed to nuclear safety and security and actively participated in various initiatives and forums that played a supplementary but important role in that regard, including the Nuclear Security Contact Group, of which it became the Convener in 2018.

87. **Mr. Marafi** (Kuwait) said that his country's firm position in support of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation stemmed from its adherence to international instruments. The Non-Proliferation Treaty's credibility must be reinforced and its efficacy protected, especially in the light of current developments. All States were responsible for preserving the Treaty and working together to ensure the success of the upcoming Review Conference.

88. Given that recent alarming developments, including the announcement by certain nuclear-weapon States that they would continue to develop and modernize their nuclear arsenals and would incorporate nuclear deterrence policies into their military doctrines,

the Preparatory Committee must, at the current session, take a strong stance and formulate clear mechanisms to tackle those issues within the framework of the Treaty. Kuwait strongly condemned nuclear testing, which undermined the safety of humanity, and rejected any provocation that would threaten international security. Kuwait supported the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as well as its universal ratification, particularly by nuclear-weapon States.

89. Compliance by non-nuclear States with their non-proliferation obligations attested to their belief in the dangers of nuclear weapons. Such compliance must continue, and the Treaty must be ratified by all States. Kuwait had contributed to Arab efforts to implement the 1995 resolution which had called for the convening of a conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. However, owing to a lack of seriousness and political will on the part of the sponsors of that resolution and Israel, the conference had been indefinitely postponed. Against that background, Kuwait affirmed that the 1995 resolution remained in effect until its aims and purposes were achieved.

90. Kuwait adhered to the outcomes of the Review Conferences of 1995, 2000 and 2010 and welcomed the adoption by the General Assembly of decision 73/546 on convening a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons. Before the end of the year, a conference on the matter should be held, with the participation of all concerned States, particularly the three sponsors, to ensure that the 2020 Review Conference would help to strengthen the Treaty and lead to full nuclear disarmament and a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons.

91. Kuwait welcomed the efforts that had led to the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which would complement, but not replace, the disarmament regime until nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction were fully eliminated. Achieving that fundamental goal would fulfil the human aspirations of international peace and security.

92. **Mr. Yelchenko** (Ukraine) said that his country supported a multilateral approach to disarmament and the international security agenda. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was a cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. However, the military aggression by the Russian Federation violated the key principles of the Treaty and challenged its effectiveness. Consequently,

the need to strengthen and universalize the Treaty had only increased.

93. A key element of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation was universalization of the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which should be signed and ratified by all States. Voluntary moratoriums on nuclear weapons tests played a necessary but insufficient role and would never replace the legally binding nature of that treaty. Another key element was a fissile material cut-off treaty, which should be negotiated and concluded. During its presidency of the Conference on Disarmament, Ukraine had strived to reach consensus on that issue and on others of equal importance in order to pave the way for the adoption of the programme of work of the Conference. The deadlock within the Conference in that regard was deeply regrettable. Its work towards a fissile material cut-off treaty should be resumed as soon as possible.

94. Ukraine supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones worldwide, which would lead to the total elimination of such weapons. The volatile situation in the Middle East meant that the establishment of such a zone in that region should be a priority. The IAEA safeguards system was fundamental to the non-proliferation regime and the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Ukraine was firmly committed to the IAEA safeguards regime and supported its universalization.

95. The violation of the Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine's Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Budapest Memorandum) by the Russian Federation, a nuclear-weapon State and permanent member of the Security Council, had damaged the entire United Nations-based security system. The decision by Ukraine to renounce its nuclear weapons and accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1994 had been largely based on international security assurances, particularly those contained in the Budapest Memorandum. The obligation of nuclear-weapon States to fully respect their existing commitments with regard to security assurances was set out in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference.

96. Another significant challenge faced by the non-proliferation regime was the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty crisis, which was a consequence of non-compliance by the Russian Federation with the provisions of the Treaty. As such, the decision by the United States to withdraw from that treaty was justified; in turn, the decision of the Russian Federation to suspend its participation demonstrated the cynical nature of Russian policy. Increasing militarization of the

occupied Crimea by the occupying State and the development of Russian nuclear capabilities in that region were deeply concerning, threatening not only Ukraine, but the entire European continent and beyond.

97. That flagrant violation of international law had been addressed by the General Assembly at its seventy-third session, particularly through the adoption of its resolution 73/194, in which it had stressed that the presence of Russian troops in Crimea was contrary to the national sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine and undermined the security and stability of neighbouring countries and the European region. In the resolution, the Assembly had also expressed its grave concern over the progressive militarization of Crimea by the Russian Federation as the occupying Power, and had also expressed concern over reports of the continuing destabilization of Crimea owing to transfers by the Russian Federation of weapon systems, including nuclear-capable aircraft and missiles, weapons, ammunition and military personnel to the territory of Ukraine, and urged the Russian Federation to stop such activity.

98. **Mr. Meza-Cuadra** (Peru) said that Peru had maintained a long tradition of promoting disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control and was a party to international regimes in those areas. At the time of the current session, a bleak picture was emerging due to the paralysis of the disarmament machinery in its diverse forums.

99. It was necessary to work with determination to achieve general and complete disarmament under strict international control and the total prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. The full and effective implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was therefore a priority now more than ever. Peru maintained its firm support for the full application of the three pillars of the Treaty and emphasized the importance of its universality. Therefore, it urged all States that had not yet acceded to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States to do so.

100. Given its belief that nuclear weapons simply should not exist, Peru had signed the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and hoped that all countries would follow suit, especially those with nuclear arsenals. That instrument would promote the objectives of nuclear disarmament and help all States parties to the Treaty and other arms control and disarmament agreements in fulfilling their obligations thereunder.

101. Reductions in nuclear arsenals would strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In that regard, nuclear-weapon States should comply with article VI of

the Treaty and adopt concrete measures to revitalize the regime. Obtaining legally binding negative security assurances during the denuclearization process was essential. The suspension of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was therefore regrettable. Dialogue should be resumed to resolve the differences between the countries involved and to achieve agreements based on the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency.

102. Peru was deeply concerned by the violations and challenges facing non-proliferation regimes in recent years, particularly those pertaining to nuclear arms, which constituted the most serious threat to international peace and security. That threat included the challenge posed by the nuclear programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Peru called on States to adhere promptly to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, whose entry into force depended upon ratification by the remaining Annex 2 States. Furthermore, it was essential to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system. Peru hoped that all States would sign an additional protocol with the Agency and that negotiations leading to the prohibition of fissionable material would commence in the Conference on Disarmament.

103. All States parties had the inalienable right to develop and conduct research on nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. In that connection, Peru supported the work of IAEA, particularly with regard to verification and safeguards. Peru benefited from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in various fields, including medicine and agriculture, and was grateful for the cooperation of IAEA on several aspects, including nuclear safety.

104. His delegation was firmly committed to the objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and hoped that the 2020 Review Conference would lead to concrete and satisfactory results. To fulfil that mission, Mr. Grossi should be nominated as President-designate of the Conference without delay.

105. **Mr. Panayotov** (Bulgaria) said that to ensure a smooth preparatory process, the current session must address all procedural issues, including nominating the President-designate of the Review Conference as soon as possible. Despite numerous challenges, the Non-Proliferation Treaty had proven its relevance over the past fifty years, remaining the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the framework for nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

106. Advances in nuclear disarmament were only possible within the framework of the Treaty. All States

parties must do their part, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, which had a special responsibility in that regard. Building trust and confidence was indispensable in achieving tangible progress. A constructive, realistic and gradual approach must be taken, based on practical and implementable measures, in order to strengthen the disarmament and non-proliferation regimes.

107. One key element was the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty which, as an Annex 2 State, Bulgaria had signed and ratified. All States were called upon to do the same without further delay, particularly the remaining Annex 2 States. Commencing negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a fissile material cut-off treaty was another immediate priority. Furthermore, initiatives on nuclear disarmament verification were vital for building confidence and achieving a world free of nuclear weapons.

108. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty made a significant contribution to Euro-Atlantic security; however, compliance from both parties was required to ensure its sustainability. As such, the Russian Federation should return to full and verifiable compliance before 2 August 2019, in order to preserve the Treaty. Moreover, both parties should further reduce their nuclear arsenals and should agree on the extension of the New START Treaty beyond 2021.

109. Proliferation posed a significant threat to global peace and security. The nuclear and ballistic missile programmes of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were of particular concern. That country should engage in negotiations that would lead to complete, irreversible and verifiable denuclearization. His delegation called on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to fully comply with the Non-Proliferation Treaty and all relevant Security Council resolutions.

110. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was highly important in contributing to regional peace and security. However, the ballistic missile programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran was cause for serious concern. His delegation urged that country to fully comply with Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

111. The IAEA comprehensive safeguards system was key to addressing proliferation risks and implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Promoting and striving for the highest standards of safety and security in the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes was crucial; Bulgaria supported the essential role of IAEA in promoting those standards, and participated in various initiatives to develop international cooperation in nuclear energy applications.

112. **Ms. Gorely** (Australia) said that the collective commitment to the Treaty had prevented a global nuclear arms race and contained the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It had strengthened the taboo against the use of nuclear weapons in conflict and established a powerful framework for working towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. The Treaty had enabled the international community to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technologies. However, it required strengthening across all its three pillars, which was a challenge within a competitive international security environment, and opinions diverged as to the most effective path towards disarmament.

113. The nuclear and ballistic missile programmes of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea challenged the Treaty, as well as global and regional security. The complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of that country was required, in accordance with multiple Security Council resolutions. While dialogue was welcome, Australia was committed to maintaining pressure until concrete steps were taken towards denuclearization. Furthermore, continued compliance by Iran with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was critical in providing the international community with assurances regarding its nuclear programme.

114. The goal of nuclear disarmament should be pursued through a progressive and practical approach involving concrete steps, including bringing into force the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; commencing negotiations for a fissile material cut-off treaty; developing robust techniques for verifying disarmament commitments; and ensuring that safeguards regimes remained strong and appropriately resourced. There was also scope for further collaborative work to reduce nuclear risks.

115. Security concerns must be addressed in order to advance nuclear disarmament, and nuclear-weapon States must be persuaded to reduce and ultimately eliminate their arsenals. An extension to the New START Treaty would significantly contribute to that objective. The Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament initiative proposed by the United States was also welcome.

116. Australia actively participated in two cross-regional groups of States that worked to promote and strengthen the Treaty: the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative and the Vienna Group of Ten. Those groups illustrated that diversity was an asset that promoted progress towards shared goals. Their working papers, including those on transparency and strengthening the review process, were also commendable. Intentions to propose recommendations



and address procedural matters at the current session were welcome, notably the nomination of the President-designate of the 2020 Review Conference.

117. Australia supported the full participation and leadership of women in all three pillars of the Treaty. Despite improvements, significant gender disparity in the review process remained.

118. All parties to the Treaty had the right to develop, research, produce and use nuclear energy and must apply the highest standards of safety, security and safeguards. The Treaty was key in ensuring that the benefits of nuclear energy and technology were shared. Australia also remained a strong supporter of the role of IAEA in helping enjoy the peaceful benefits of nuclear technology while also safeguarding against nuclear proliferation.

119. The Treaty was a common good that should be nurtured and strengthened. Australia would continue to be active and pragmatic in seeking common ground and creative ways forward.

120. **Mr. Jurgenson** (Estonia) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was the foundation of global efforts to pursue nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Its role as a core multilateral instrument of international security and stability must therefore be strengthened and upheld.

121. Estonia was committed to pursuing the goal of a world without nuclear weapons in a pragmatic and responsible way. It therefore supported the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference and had concrete steps across all three pillars of the Treaty that remained valid and provided a basis for work during the current review process. Furthermore, negotiations of a fissile material cut-off treaty should be commenced in the Conference on Disarmament. Estonia welcomed the recommendations by the high-level fissile material cut-off treaty expert preparatory group in that regard. The continued full and effective implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was a key element of the global non-proliferation and security architecture.

122. Despite the legitimate interest of non-nuclear weapon States in receiving security assurances from nuclear-weapon States, the Russian Federation had violated its commitment under the Budapest Memorandum to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty had contributed to international security and stability for decades. The Russian Federation must therefore address its violation of that treaty in a substantial and transparent way and return to

compliance as soon as possible. Estonia also encouraged the United States and the Russian Federation to extend the New START Treaty and to continue their discussions on confidence-building measures and the further reduction of their arsenals.

123. At the current session of the Preparatory Committee, States parties should reflect on practical progress on many aspects of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference, including the commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, the prompt entry into force of the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the development of cooperation on nuclear disarmament verification and increased transparency measures. Focusing on common goals and engaging constructively would help States parties to achieve a successful outcome at the 2020 Review Conference.

124. **Mr. Kelapile** (Botswana) said that the stakes in the international peace and security arena had never been so high, nor had there ever been such great focus on the issue of disarmament. Botswana was committed to working towards the success of the current session and the 2020 Review Conference.

125. The failure of the 2015 Review Conference to reach consensus was regrettable and should not be repeated at the 2020 Review Conference. All delegations must therefore display the political will to tackle non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was a cornerstone of nuclear disarmament and the maintenance of international peace and security. In that regard, Botswana welcomed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which contributed to the existing body of international law and the international security regime and strengthened the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

126. The grave dangers posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction meant that their total elimination was the only guarantee against their use or threat of use. The calamitous humanitarian consequences of atomic bombs should compel all rational beings to strive towards a nuclear-weapon-free world. Avoidance of human suffering should take precedence over the acquisition of such weapons under the pretext of strategic defence. Security assurances must be provided to non-nuclear-weapon States by nuclear-weapon States, which must rethink their defence strategies accordingly.

127. Botswana supported the establishment of zones free of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. Several international treaties made an important contribution to that goal, including the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of

Pelindaba), which reaffirmed Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone and prohibited the stationing and testing of nuclear explosive devices on the African continent. Other regions should work towards similar arrangements in the interests of collective peace and security.

128. A balanced implementation of all three critical pillars of the Treaty was required. The benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including in agriculture, medicine, science and technology, should be enjoyed by all countries. The Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission were critical platforms for dialogue on the peaceful uses of nuclear technology.

129. The complexity of the global security situation, compounded by the desire expressed by non-State actors to acquire nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, required the urgent attention of all States. To address emerging and existing threats to global peace and security, all relevant United Nations resolutions must be implemented, including Security Council resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#). All delegations were encouraged to engage in discussions towards successful preparations for the 2020 Review Conference.

*The meeting rose at 1 p.m.*