

# Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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## Third session

New York, 29 April–10 May 2019

### Summary record (partial)\* of the 19th meeting\*\*

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Friday, 10 May 2019, at 10 a.m.

*Chair:* Mr. Syed Hussin ..... (Malaysia)

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the Review Conference (*continued*)

Any other matters

Closure of the session

\* No summary record was prepared for the rest of the meeting.

\*\* No summary record was issued for the 18th meeting.

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*The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.*

*The discussion covered in the summary record began at 11.20 a.m.*

### **Adoption of the final report and recommendations of the Preparatory Committee to the Review Conference (continued)**

1. **The Chair** said that subsequent to the adoption of the final report of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference, one additional delegation had informed the Secretariat of its participation in the Committee. In the absence of any objections, he would add that delegation to the list of participants and amend paragraph 9 of the final report accordingly.

2. *It was so decided.*

3. **The Chair** said it was his understanding that the revised version of the draft recommendations contained in document NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/CRP.4/Rev.1 did not command consensus. He had therefore decided to issue the document as a Chair's working paper, entitled "Recommendations by the Chair to the 2020 NPT Review Conference" (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/WP.49), which he was submitting under his own responsibility, without prejudice to the position of any delegation or to the final outcome of the 2020 Review Conference.

4. He had also prepared a document entitled "Reflections of the Chair of the 2019 session of the Preparatory Committee" (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/14), to be issued under his sole responsibility. It built on a practice initiated by the Chairs of the first two sessions of the Preparatory Committee and contained his own personal views on the current situation as to the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, particularly in the context of the mandate of the third session of the Committee. He hoped that it would be of assistance to the Committee going forward.

### **Any other matters**

5. **Mr. Hwang** (France), speaking also on behalf of 89 other countries, said that the statement he was delivering concerned the North Korean nuclear challenge and was open for endorsement by all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. He requested that it be annexed to the final document of the Review Conference.

6. The endorsing countries deplored the grave and undiminished threat to regional and international peace and security posed by the ongoing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles programmes that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had developed and continued to develop, in violation of the relevant

Security Council resolutions. They welcomed the two summits between the United States and that country as well as the three inter-Korean summits held in 2018, which had helped to reduce tensions and re-establish dialogue. They also welcomed the reaffirmed commitment of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to achieve complete denuclearization, while noting that the steps it had taken fell short of that declared intention. They encouraged it to avoid any provocation and called on it to continue discussions on denuclearization with the United States.

7. They urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to take concrete steps to abandon all its nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and related programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and to immediately cease all related activities in accordance with all relevant Security Council resolutions. It was only by taking such concrete steps that they would ensure the preservation of regional and international peace and security and also preserve the international non-proliferation regime, of which the Non-Proliferation Treaty remained the cornerstone. They remained determined to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and the Treaty.

8. They reaffirmed that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea could not and would never have the status of a nuclear-weapon State in accordance with that Treaty. They continued to urge it to comply fully with all its obligations under all relevant Security Council resolutions and to return at an early date to the Treaty and IAEA safeguards. They reaffirmed that they would faithfully and scrupulously implement the relevant Security Council resolutions and called on all Member States to fully enforce Security Council sanctions. To that end, they undertook to further strengthen international cooperation.

9. **Mr. Wood** (United States of America), delivering a statement contained in document NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/12 on behalf of his country and 51 other countries, said that, as parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, they were deeply concerned about the continued non-compliance of the Syrian Arab Republic with its IAEA safeguards agreement under the Treaty in connection with its construction of an undeclared nuclear reactor at Dair Alzour. Nearly eight years had passed since the IAEA Board of Governors had found that the failure of Syria to declare that reactor constituted such non-compliance. It also continued to be a cause of concern that the IAEA Director General had found that the Dair Alzour reactor had features comparable to the gas-cooled, graphite-moderated reactor at Yongbyon, in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

10. They regretted that Syria had failed to respond to the IAEA Director General's calls for it to cooperate with the Agency in connection with unresolved issues arising from its non-compliance. They noted with concern the IAEA Director General's confirmation that Syria had not engaged substantively with the Agency regarding the nature of the site or other related locations since June 2008. That country's non-compliance with the IAEA safeguards agreement remained a serious concern and constituted non-compliance with article III of the Treaty.

11. They stressed that full compliance with obligations under the Treaty was at the heart of the shared security benefits enjoyed by all parties to the Treaty and that addressing issues of non-compliance was essential to upholding the Treaty's integrity and maintaining the credibility of the IAEA safeguards system. Compliance with non-proliferation obligations was also a critical component of efforts to advance regional security and arms control.

12. They echoed the call of the IAEA Director General and Board of Governors for Syria to cooperate with IAEA fully and without further delay in connection with all unresolved issues related to the Dair Alzour site and all related locations and to provide IAEA with access to all information, sites, material and persons necessary for the Agency to resolve all outstanding questions so that it could provide the necessary assurances as to the exclusively peaceful nature of that country's nuclear programme.

13. **Mr. Zhang** Junan (China) said that the early denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was a common expectation of the international community and would be in the interests of all parties. China hoped that the parties concerned would cherish hard-won gains in the development of dialogue and the easing of tensions. States parties to the Treaty should play a constructive role in that regard. China continued to believe that the Preparatory Committee was not an appropriate forum for the settlement of the question of the Korean Peninsula.

14. **Mr. Yermakov** (Russian Federation) said that the main takeaway from the current session of the Preparatory Committee was that not a single State party had called into question the viability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a cornerstone of the international security system. The Treaty offered a harmonious solution in support of non-proliferation, disarmament and cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It was also a unique example of effective multilateral diplomacy and collaboration by States parties seeking to address global international

challenges. Although the Chair's recommendations could not be adopted by consensus owing to the mounting differences among the States parties, the session had set the right tone for constructive discussions at the 2020 Review Conference. Having detailed its priorities in several statements and working papers, his delegation was hopeful that other States parties would take a similarly constructive approach.

15. All States parties had the indisputable right to promote their positions, even if those positions were fundamentally at odds with the non-proliferation regime. In fact, his delegation welcomed it when the so-called Western democracies defended such positions, because in doing so they revealed their true faces. During the session, the representatives of a number of States had spoken openly against efforts to address critical challenges to the normal operation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including the bringing into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the convening of a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons, and the consistent implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Several members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had espoused the odious view that the inclusion of non-nuclear-weapon States in nuclear training exercises was somehow compatible with the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime.

16. It was quite a different matter, however, when the United States blatantly disregarded its basic organizational obligation to the United Nations under the 1947 Agreement between the United Nations and the United States of America regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations and illegally interfered with the composition of national delegations by delaying the issuance of visas to representatives of Member States seeking to attend events held at the United Nations in New York. Specifically, several official representatives of the Russian Federation had been unable to take part in the current session of the Preparatory Committee – a situation that was entirely absurd and inadmissible in the context of multilateral diplomacy. The founders of the United Nations could not have predicted that the very country bestowed with the honour of hosting the Organization's Headquarters would so cynically profane the spirit and letter of the Charter of the United Nations. In doing so, the United States was undermining the Charter and discrediting the Secretary-General and the Secretariat, which were responsible for ensuring that United Nations events ran smoothly, regardless of location.

17. The Russian Federation demanded that the United States carry out its responsibilities unconditionally and ensure that Russian representatives were granted access

to all United Nations events being held in the United States, including the upcoming 2020 Review Conference. If all members of the Russian delegation to the Conference had not been issued the required one-year multi-entry visas by the end of 2019, the Secretariat would need to find a more hospitable location to host the sessions of the Disarmament Commission, the First Committee and the Review Conference. He asked that the Secretary-General personally take note of the matter and closely monitor the situation to ensure that the United States did not take illegal measures against official representatives of States Members of the United Nations.

18. **Mr. Hallak** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that his delegation was surprised by the statement delivered by the representative of the United States on behalf of several States. The conclusion drawn by the Board of Governors of IAEA and presented in 2011 the report by the Agency's Director General in 2011 had been based on open-source stories fabricated by known intelligence services and contained allegations characterized using words such as "likely", thus falling short of the standard for evidence required under the Agency's working methods. Moreover, the Board of Governors had adopted the conclusion by a vote, with a large number of member States voting against.

19. The allegations against his country ignored the fact that in his report to the Board of Governors, the former Director General at the time had indicated that the information concerning the Dair Alzour site had not been provided to it in a timely manner and that force had been used before the Agency had been given an opportunity to establish the facts in accordance with its responsibilities under the Treaty and the safeguards agreement of Syria.

20. His Government had cooperated fully with IAEA, allowing Agency inspectors to visit the Dair Alzour site that the Israeli air force had attacked, to move freely throughout the area and to collect environmental samples. It had been flexible and serious about resolving outstanding issues, readily responding to Agency queries and communicating with the Agency in 2011 to agree on a plan of action to resolve those issues. The United States and other countries, not Syria, were to blame for the failure to implement the plan, as they had pressured IAEA not to do so, in the service of the agenda of political blackmail uncovered by Wikileaks.

21. According to the Agency's 2018 report on the implementation of IAEA safeguards, his country's declared nuclear materials remained within the scope of peaceful activities. The report stressed that Syria had

fulfilled its legal obligations under the safeguards agreement and the Treaty in a timely manner.

22. The immoral manner in which the United States shielded Israel from accountability for its aggression was an egregious example of that country's irresponsible policies, which had wreaked havoc on the region, ranging from the invasion of Iraq and the destruction of Libya to the mobilization of hordes of global terrorists against Syria. To his dismay, both the Security Council and IAEA had failed to condemn the military attack by Israel on his country and the refusal by Israel to cooperate with the Agency.

23. Israel had formally claimed responsibility for the attack on the Dair Alzour site. It was therefore incumbent upon Israel to work with IAEA to uncover the truth about the pollution caused by that attack and the presence of anthropogenic uranium at the site. Without the cooperation of Israel, the aggressor, any discussion of the matter would be futile.

24. It was unacceptable that, fifty years on, flagrant violations of the Treaty persisted and elicited no response. His Government therefore demanded that the non-compliance of the United States with the Treaty be addressed. The transfer by the United States of its nuclear weapons to the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States, including Germany, Italy, Belgium, Turkey and the Netherlands, amounted to non-compliance on the part of all the countries involved. States in whose territorial waters United States nuclear weapons had been placed must also remedy that violation of the Treaty.

25. Against the backdrop of such widespread non-compliance, the statement delivered by the representative of the United States was the height of hypocrisy; some of the States on whose behalf the statement had been delivered hosted United States nuclear weapons while others engaged in military nuclear cooperation with Israel, in violation of their Treaty obligations and the outcomes of previous Review Conferences. The actions of the United States demonstrated that it was the State party that had violated the nuclear non-proliferation regime most often. The forthcoming Review Conference must address that non-compliance resolutely.

26. The allegations made by the United States against his country lacked credibility, given that it was conspiring with others against Syria. If the United States was as serious about upholding the Treaty as it purported to be, it would have compelled Israel to accede to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State and place its facilities under IAEA inspection, instead of objecting to the initiative to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East or threatening to veto that initiative.

27. **Mr. Wood** (United States of America), responding to remarks made by the representative of the Russian Federation, said that he must again refute the repeated assertion that the United States and other NATO countries were in violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by virtue of their nuclear-sharing arrangements. The Russian Federation was well aware that those arrangements had been duly taken into account in the negotiation of the Treaty. It was high time that particular page was turned. On the question of United States visa requirements, the Preparatory Committee was not the appropriate forum to address it. He referred the representative of the Russian Federation to the Committee on Relations with the Host Country, while stressing that the United States took its obligations as host country very seriously and discharged them in accordance with the law and with the Headquarters Agreement.

28. Responding to remarks made by the Syrian representative, he said that the repeated questioning of the factual basis of IAEA findings regarding the Dair Alzour reactor was unsubstantiated and politically motivated. The May 2011 report by the Agency's Director General, providing an extensive overview of the factual basis for the belief that the facility in question was in all likelihood a nuclear reactor, could be consulted on the IAEA website. The United States had full confidence in the independent technical assessments of IAEA.

29. **Mr. Patriota** (Brazil), speaking on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, said that, while a consensus set of recommendations would have been preferred, a step had been taken in the right direction by the Committee, thanks to the generally constructive tone that had prevailed throughout its meetings, the overall engagement of its members and the Chair's balanced conduct of the proceedings. His delegation was confident that progress would continue to be made towards a successful outcome in 2020.

30. **Mr. Yermakov** (Russian Federation), speaking in exercise of the right of reply to comments made by the representative of the United States, said that he had levelled no accusations against the United States during the current session. The United States had the right to use the forum provided by the United Nations to communicate its national position, including its refusal to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, although it had initiated that treaty and the ratification of the treaty had been a stated priority of the previous Administration. The United States had also withdrawn from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, an agreement of the utmost importance that had been another one of its initiatives. It had also worked in

various ways to undermine the convening of a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons, despite having sponsored the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. The United States was also of the view that the participation of the member States of NATO in preparations for nuclear strikes against the Russian Federation strengthened the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime.

31. Although he was convinced that the absolute majority of States parties to the Treaty did not agree with that position, the purpose of his previous statement had been to draw attention to the utter failure of the United States to engage in diplomacy and dialogue, stooping instead so low as to deny visas to delegates seeking to attend events held at United Nations Headquarters. In the absence of arguments with which to defend its position, the United States had resorted to using methods that were inadmissible under the Charter. It was high time to put an end to attempts by the United States to undermine events organized by the United Nations, while hiding behind a committee that met biannually and that had been unable to resolve the situation.

32. The United States never had and never would have the right to dictate its position to other States or to the Secretariat on organizational matters. If the United States was unable to fulfil its host country obligations to the United Nations, the Secretariat needed to find other venues for its events, which were designed to bring countries together, not divide them. The 2020 Review Conference should be conducted responsibly, in full cognizance of its significance, and all delegations should be able to engage in discussions of the key aspects of the Treaty.

33. **Mr. Hallak** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that the United States regime was attempting to distort and manipulate the facts, as was its wont, and accusing certain States in order to divert attention from its own violations of the Treaty and from the Israeli nuclear arsenal; to prevent the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East and to shield Israel from scrutiny for its failure to accede to the Treaty. The conclusion of the Board of Governors had been put to a vote and opposed by several States, indicating that no consensus had been reached on the veracity of that conclusion and, if anything, demonstrating that the United States was responsible for the fabrication on which it had been based.

34. The representative of the United States had sidestepped the subject of his Government's non-compliance with the Treaty by alluding to a so-called understanding, which the Treaty did not

provide for. Article I of the Treaty explicitly stipulated that each nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty undertook not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

35. There were numerous examples of United States non-compliance with various elements of article I of the Treaty alone. It would be unacceptable to celebrate the Treaty's fiftieth anniversary at the forthcoming Review Conference without addressing that non-compliance. The United States and other countries appeared to be signalling their intent to ensure the failure of the 2020 Review Conference as they had done at the 2015 Review Conference.

#### Closure of the session

36. **Ms. Nilsson** (Sweden) said that her delegation welcomed the resolution of the procedural issues around the nomination of the President-designate of the Review Conference and appreciated the constructive atmosphere of the meeting. The future of the Treaty could not be taken for granted. As States parties continued to prepare for the 2020 Review Conference, they must seek common ground as a matter of renewed urgency, given the challenges of the current global security environment. They must therefore engage in dialogue to find ways of overcoming their differences, having regard to the commitments assumed at the previous three Review Conferences, which must be preserved and implemented.

37. **Ms. Dallafior** (Switzerland) said that the difficulties besetting the review process highlighted the challenges to be met to arrive at a positive outcome. Her delegation was encouraged by a number of elements that had emerged; many exchanges had been constructive and had pointed to considerable convergence in some key areas. First, there had been a commonly held view that the Treaty was essential for global security and likewise a readiness to affirm that it must remain a cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Second, the outcomes of the previous Review Conferences had been seen as a fundamental *acquis* that needed to be implemented and built upon: they were a floor, not a ceiling. Third, only by means of a balanced approach across all three pillars of the Treaty would progress be possible, with sustained attention to each of them. Such elements of convergence

should guide the preparations for the 2020 Review Conference.

38. **Mr. Wood** (United States of America) said that the regional and other consultations and the close coordination between the members of the Bureau during the current review cycle had set the standard for future review cycles. The particularly daunting nature of the challenge to reach an agreement on consensus recommendations for the 2020 Review Conference was reflected in the fact that it had not yet been achieved. Indeed, in the past few days, the States parties had drawn further apart rather than closer together, so that the Chair's working paper could not serve as a basis for the deliberations of the Conference. Nevertheless, efforts to secure an agreement among all States parties could not be abandoned but must be carried forward to ensure that the Treaty would last a further 50 years. To that end, the parties must focus on shared goals and interests and not on divisive, unrealistic agendas. The Treaty must be implemented and upheld; it had made the world safer and more prosperous by limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons and by serving as a foundation for nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

39. **Mr. Takamizawa** (Japan) said that his delegation welcomed the adoption of the procedural decisions, including on the nomination of the President-designate of the Review Conference, thereby allowing the States parties to concentrate fully on substantive matters over the following 12 months. Efforts should be made to narrow the divergence of views on the implementation of the Treaty.

40. Several points called for further consideration and discussion. First, practical measures were needed to implement article VI of the Treaty. Transparency in regard to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and a fissile material cut-off treaty together with verification mechanisms were important parts of the building blocks that States parties would be able to support. Second, disarmament and non-proliferation education as well as diversity and the integration of a gender perspective were important cross-cutting issues. Third, on regional issues, the entire international community should engage proactively with the issue of the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, given its impact on the non-proliferation regime. Issues relating to North Korea and to Iran also merited further attention. Fourth, Japan supported IAEA efforts to make its safeguards more effective and efficient. Fifth, the holding of regional workshops on peaceful uses of nuclear energy would be valuable in lending momentum to the run-up to the 2020 Review Conference. Japan

would continue to make every effort for the success of that Conference and encouraged all States parties to ensure high-level participation in that event, to demonstrate the international community's strong commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

41. **Mr. Prongthura** (Thailand), speaking on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), said that while no agreement had been reached on consensus recommendations, the discussions had been conducted in a respectful and constructive manner and had paved the way for the States parties' deliberations in 2020. ASEAN reiterated its call to all States, especially nuclear-weapon States, to show good faith, promote mutual understanding, enhance trustworthy cooperation and ensure responsible collective actions towards a world without nuclear weapons.

42. **Mr. Penaranda** (Philippines) said that States parties had shown a commendable spirit of engagement. The election of the President-designate of the forthcoming Review Conference had been an encouraging achievement. Proposals that strengthened the Treaty process by improving working methods merited the consideration of States parties. Both innovation and continuity would be needed to keep the Treaty process robust and effective and to ensure that the Committee's working methods remained fit for purpose for the next five decades of the Treaty. More importantly, the resumption of positive engagement between concerned nuclear-weapon States to address bilateral issues pertaining to arms control and disarmament, along with other constructive steps undertaken by nuclear-weapon States – even if they did so outside the Treaty process – would be critical in setting the stage for a successful Review Conference in 2020. It would be equally vital to build trust and confidence among States parties, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, by engaging in open, transparent and inclusive dialogue. His delegation was heartened by the desire expressed by States parties for the 2020 Review Conference to aim for a level of ambition befitting the Treaty's fiftieth anniversary.

43. **Ms. Pico** (Cuba) said that she regretted that the third session of the Preparatory Committee had been unable to adopt substantive recommendations by consensus. Her delegation had worked actively, holding to its principled position that nuclear disarmament must be the highest disarmament priority. The positions expressed at the session and the impossibility of adopting recommendations had demonstrated once again that there remained a gap between the rhetoric and good intentions of certain nuclear-weapon States and the actual commitments they were willing to make.

44. At the 2020 Review Conference, States parties must take one more step in assessing the implementation of the Treaty and agreeing on a timetable with tangible, well-defined actions to eliminate nuclear weapons. Efforts must be made to attain tangible results and ensure that agreements reached were not deferred any longer. The action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference and the Chair's reflections on the state of the Treaty should serve as the point of departure for the forthcoming Review Conference. Approaches that were a pretext to preserve the status quo and delay indefinitely the prohibition and complete elimination of nuclear weapons could no longer be accepted. Cuba therefore called for States to sign and ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons as an effective nuclear disarmament measure that would contribute to the irreversible and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons.

45. Regrettably, the agreements reached at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences had not been implemented, owing to the lack of political will on the part of certain States, including nuclear-weapon States and States that considered themselves protected by the so-called nuclear umbrella. Her delegation hoped that the 2020 Review Conference would be different and that the necessary progress would be achieved.

46. **Mr. Al-Fatlawi** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that while the Treaty had a successful record on non-proliferation, its performance in the area of nuclear disarmament had been a complete failure and remained the Treaty's chronic affliction, in dire need of immediate attention. Non-nuclear-weapon States were frustrated by the lack of progress on nuclear disarmament owing to the reliance upon such meaningless notions as "strategic stability" and "creating the conditions for nuclear disarmament", which had been advanced for decades as delaying tactics. Over the years, the graciousness and patience of non-nuclear-weapon States had been abused and repaid with bullying, as exemplified by the nuclear policy of the United States. After 50 years of non-compliance with the explicit legal obligation under article VI, that Government now planned to spend \$1.2 billion on its nuclear arsenal, was threatening non-nuclear-weapon States with nuclear weapons and had shamelessly neglected the commitments it had made at previous Review Conferences. In 2015, the United States had indicated that the illegal and illegitimate interests of Israel, a State that was not a party to the Treaty, were more important than those of the 189 States parties and their decisions adopted by consensus on establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

47. The 50 years of non-compliance must come to an end, hence the need for the 2020 Review Conference to focus on negotiating and concluding a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons and to start implementing all unimplemented decisions adopted at previous Review Conferences, including the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. Promoting the full realization of the inherent right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should be another priority issue. The Islamic Republic of Iran would cooperate fully with all delegations willing to work to achieve the objective of nuclear disarmament.

48. **Ms. Mxakato-Diseko** (South Africa) said that her Government, a fervent believer in the spirit and intent of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, had supported its indefinite extension 25 years earlier. As the anniversary of that decision approached, it was incumbent upon States parties to demonstrate that it had been the right thing to do and to bolster the Treaty's credibility and legitimacy by ensuring that the review process continued to deliver credible outcomes that gave the sense that the Treaty was being implemented. South Africa stood ready to work with all States parties to that end.

49. **Mr. Hallak** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that the 2020 Review Conference would face great challenges; States parties must put an end to the continued violations of and non-compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, particularly articles I and II. As the Treaty's credibility was being tested, the Review Conference must agree on practical and effective measures to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

50. **Ms. Jáquez Huacuja** (Mexico) said that the Chair's reflections on the state of the Treaty would provide an important starting point for States parties as they prepared for the 2020 Review Conference, which was primarily an opportunity to review factual information on the implementation and functioning of the Treaty, and less so a forum to voice support for one opinion or another.

51. **Ms. Wood** (Australia) said that States parties should read the Chair's authentic, forward-looking, honest and brief reflections on the state of the Treaty. The tone of the document was precisely what States parties would need as they prepared for the 2020 Review Conference.

52. **Mr. Grossi** (Argentina) said that his work as President of the forthcoming 2020 Review Conference would begin immediately. As the third session of the Preparatory Committee had revealed that States parties

continued to hold divergent views on aspects of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, he would embark on an ambitious campaign of consultations throughout the world that would involve not only States parties but also technical support organizations, nuclear operators and civil society organizations, with a view to strengthening the Treaty. He was heartened by the shared conviction that no one would benefit from a weakened Non-Proliferation Treaty.

53. **The Chair** said that he had made every effort to align the competing views of States parties in an impartial and transparent manner. The genuine desire of all States parties, their affiliations and substantive positions notwithstanding, to strengthen the Treaty, could be translated into a common vision for the future of the Treaty. It would be necessary to intensify efforts in order to bridge the differences in views successfully. He was pleased that States parties had worked together to resolve the procedural matters ahead of the 2020 Review Conference.

54. After the customary exchange of courtesies, **the Chair** declared the third session of the Preparatory Committee closed.

*The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.*