

# Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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## Second session

23 April–4 May 2018

### Summary record (partial)\* of the 6th meeting

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Wednesday, 25 April 2018, at 3 p.m.

*Chair:* Mr. Bugajski . . . . . (Poland)

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General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory  
Committee (*continued*)

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\* No summary record was prepared for the rest of the meeting.

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*The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.*

**General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee** (*continued*)

1. **Ms. Vargas Idiáquez** (Nicaragua) said that her country was fully committed to the three pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons — nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy — and considered it necessary to make progress in all three areas in a balanced and comprehensive manner. Nicaragua had always highlighted the importance of continuing to work towards total disarmament in relation to both nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, the use of which violated the fundamental principles of international law, particularly in the area of human rights. In that regard, she expressed her country's solidarity with the heroic people of Japan and with the living witnesses of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons in that country.

2. It was unjustifiable and unacceptable that the nuclear-weapon States were investing ever greater sums in the development, modernization and testing of all types of weapons, and ever smaller sums in promoting the life and development of human beings. While millions of people suffered the effects of the economic crisis, poverty, hunger and disease, global military spending was increasing dramatically. She reaffirmed her country's support for the non-proliferation of all types of weapons of mass destruction. The total elimination of such weapons was the only way to prevent their use, threat of use and proliferation.

3. Recalling the commitment made by the Russian Federation and the United States of America pursuant to action 4 of the action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, she highlighted that reductions in the deployment and operational status of nuclear weapons could not be a substitute for irreversible reductions in and the total elimination of such weapons. She reaffirmed the importance of the application by the nuclear-weapon States of the principles of transparency, irreversibility and international verifiability in all measures related to the fulfilment of their nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments.

4. Nicaragua recognized that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was the only authority competent to verify States' compliance with their obligations under their respective safeguards agreements, and that it had a legal mandate with regard

to global disarmament through safeguards. Strict compliance with IAEA comprehensive safeguards and the Non-Proliferation Treaty were preconditions for any type of nuclear-energy-related cooperation with States that were not parties to the Treaty. States parties must therefore refrain from transferring nuclear technology and material to such States unless those preconditions were fulfilled.

5. As a State party to the first nuclear-weapon-free zone, established under the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), and as part of the "peace zone" declared by the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, Nicaragua firmly believed that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones could strengthen the non-proliferation regime and international peace and security, and make an important contribution to the achievement of nuclear disarmament. In that regard, Nicaragua regretted the failure to convene a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. Highlighting that that conference was an integral element of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference, she urged the relevant parties to hold the conference as soon as possible.

6. While the deadlock in the disarmament process was often emphasized, a solution must be found to the real problem, namely certain States' lack of political will to achieve real progress, particularly with respect to nuclear disarmament. Such a solution was necessary for the achievement of the development goals set out in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

7. **Mr. Ouadah** (Algeria) reaffirmed his country's support for the universal implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as the cornerstone of the non-proliferation and disarmament regime, and for the balanced implementation of the Treaty's three pillars. Algeria had signed an additional protocol to its comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA in February 2018, which testified to its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. It had also acceded to and signed other relevant instruments.

8. The nuclear-weapon States must comply with their nuclear disarmament obligations in accordance with article VI of the Treaty, and with their commitments in relation to the thirteen steps and the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference. The adoption of a final document at the 2020 Review Conference would depend on the extent to which States parties were able to overcome their differences and focus on core disarmament issues, the package of decisions adopted at the 1995 Review Conference and the resolution on the

Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

9. The world still faced the threat of use of nuclear weapons. According to reports, nuclear-weapon States possessed more than 14,900 nuclear warheads, 4,150 of which were ready to be used, and spent billions of dollars on modernizing and upgrading the destructive capabilities of those weapons. The only guarantee against the risk of the proliferation and use of nuclear weapons was their complete and total elimination. Accordingly, Algeria welcomed the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which highlighted the destructive humanitarian consequences of such weapons, bridged a legal gap and complemented and strengthened the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It also constituted a step towards the effective implementation of article VI to ensure the total elimination of such weapons. Pending the achievement of that objective, Algeria called for further progress and negative security assurances through the adoption of an international instrument to protect non-nuclear-weapon States from the use or threat of use of such weapons.

10. Highlighting the importance of non-proliferation in achieving the elimination of nuclear weapons, he stressed the need for the universalization and entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. It was also important to guarantee the safety and security of nuclear material, particularly in view of the increasing risk that such material might fall into the hands of terrorist groups.

11. The negotiation of a non-discriminatory and multilateral treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices should commence as soon as possible. Recent attempts to legitimize the nuclear status of States that were not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty had been a cause of great concern. Turning a blind eye to such practices would only lead to the collapse of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

12. Recalling the importance of the Treaty for the development of and international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, he reaffirmed the inalienable right of all States parties to develop and conduct research in that area, as set out in article IV of the Treaty. It was also necessary to lift restrictions on the transfer of knowledge and expertise to developing countries so that those countries could build capacity with respect to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

13. Recognizing the vital role played by nuclear-weapon-free zones in achieving nuclear disarmament, Algeria had spared no effort in contributing to the establishment of such a zone in Africa, having been the

first State to sign the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba), and emphasized the need to implement the 1995 resolution in order to avoid further failures that would undermine the Treaty's credibility. He therefore called on the sponsors of the resolution and the Secretary-General of the United Nations to make every effort to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. He hoped that the resolution would be implemented as soon as possible, and urged Israel to take practical steps to accede to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State and to place all its nuclear facilities and programmes under international monitoring and IAEA comprehensive safeguards, in compliance with the relevant resolutions.

14. **Mr. Kihurani** (Kenya) called on all States to comply with the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, regardless of their nuclear status, and, if they had not yet done so, to sign and ratify the Treaty, as its universalization was an important step towards international peace and security.

15. Kenya had joined others in supporting the adoption of the landmark Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in order to delegitimize weapons of mass destruction. While it was clear that the ban would not lead to the immediate elimination of nuclear weapons, the adoption of the Treaty demonstrated States' recognition of the fact that nuclear war would result in devastation and that every effort should be made to prevent it. To that end, the Treaty was a catalyst for a change in attitudes, opinions and moral authority, and was necessary for garnering the political will among all nations, including those possessing nuclear weapons, to reconsider their military security doctrines and work towards eliminating nuclear weapons. The Treaty also complemented the Non-Proliferation Treaty and strengthened the commitments made under article VI of that Treaty.

16. The continued modernization by some States of their nuclear arsenals and delivery systems, and the ballistic missile tests conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, served only to undermine confidence in the Treaty as a primary guarantor of international security against the threat of nuclear weapons. In that regard, Kenya commended the decision by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to cease its ballistic missile tests and dismantle its nuclear test site, which had effectively reduced tension on the Korean Peninsula. However, more work was required to build confidence and transparency between the parties concerned. Kenya was encouraged by the decision to hold diplomatic talks between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, and urged the Democratic People's

Republic of Korea to return to the Treaty. It was also important for nuclear-weapon States to comply with their Treaty commitments and to stop modernizing their nuclear weapons. That would not only be a crucial step towards disarmament, but would also assuage States' concerns regarding the threat of nuclear weapons and strengthen the Treaty's credibility.

17. The failure of the 2015 Review Conference had been yet another setback for the nuclear non-proliferation regime. While it was unfortunate that the Conference had concluded without a final document, thus perpetuating the lack of momentum on issues such as the implementation of the 1995 resolution, it was even more disheartening that the outcomes of earlier review conferences, including the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference and the thirteen steps, had only been partially implemented. Kenya therefore urged States to work towards meeting their obligations in order to build momentum towards a successful 2020 Review Conference.

18. As a State party to the Treaty of Pelindaba, Kenya recognized the value of such treaties, which had kept regions free of nuclear weapons and provided an additional safeguard against the threat that such weapons posed to humanity. If States retained their nuclear weapons, humanity's very existence would remain under threat. It was in that context that his country supported the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons to provide the countries of that region with similar protection.

19. Although the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was an important building block in the nuclear non-proliferation architecture, its implementation continued to be hampered by insufficient signatures and ratifications. Kenya therefore called on the Annex 2 States that had not signed or ratified the Treaty to do so as soon as possible.

20. His country firmly supported the inalienable right of States parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, which was an important factor in promoting sustainable development. For many developing countries, including Kenya, nuclear energy played a crucial role in increasing capacity for electric power generation and driving industrialization. The peaceful use of nuclear energy went hand in hand with States' responsibility to ensure high levels of nuclear safety. Kenya recognized the central role of IAEA in nuclear security matters, as the only widely recognized intergovernmental organization concerned with all nuclear material and facilities. In that regard, Kenya was working closely with the Agency to build public trust and confidence in the development of nuclear

technology in the country by developing a robust safety culture, including through capacity-building programmes aimed at establishing a base of well-trained human resources, the development of comprehensive legal and regulatory frameworks and the implementation of pre-feasibility study findings. Kenya hoped that all countries that used nuclear energy for peaceful purposes could do so without interference in order to facilitate greater collaboration and increase the cost-effectiveness of nuclear technology through its increased use.

21. **Mr. Madi Elfatih Ali Ibrahim** (the Sudan) said that his country had actively participated in all efforts to achieve disarmament and had been one of the first States to adhere to the relevant international instruments.

22. The Sudan had led efforts to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa and called for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, which would enable IAEA to conduct verification missions. Israel was the only State in the region that had not acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

23. The Sudan joined calls for the unconditional elimination of nuclear weapons in view of the irreversible destruction they could cause, which threatened international peace. Nuclear non-proliferation would also increase trust in and the universality of the Treaty. However, non-proliferation efforts must not prejudice the safe development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, particularly in the areas of health, industry, water and electricity, which would facilitate the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. The prohibition of nuclear testing must not extend to the fields of technology and science for peaceful uses. Countries, particularly developing countries, should not be deprived of nuclear energy as a source of clean energy for economic and social development.

24. Negotiations to resolve nuclear-related conflicts must be carried out in accordance with international law and must be transparent, de-politicized and free of exploitation and preconceived hostile positions.

25. **Mr. Mushayavanhu** (Zimbabwe) said that the commitment shown by his country and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries to the Non-Proliferation Treaty had not been matched by any demonstration by the nuclear powers of good faith or political will to disarm.

26. Zimbabwe was particularly concerned by the unbalanced implementation of the Treaty's three pillars, and by the failure of the nuclear powers to take significant action in relation to the critical issue of

nuclear disarmament. Equal weight and attention must be given to both horizontal and vertical proliferation, as well as to the other pillars, namely the attainment of complete nuclear disarmament and unfettered access to and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

27. The total elimination of nuclear weapons and the legally binding assurance that they would never be produced again was the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of such weapons, and against a possible nuclear holocaust. His country was therefore unconvinced by the notion of a “progressive approach” to nuclear disarmament. Zimbabwe had supported the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and welcomed that important milestone as the first step towards achieving the total elimination of all nuclear weapons.

28. He expressed concern at the reckless brinkmanship and inflammatory rhetoric in the conduct of international relations, especially among the nuclear powers. It was of particular concern that the sessions of the Preparatory Committee had become monotonous rituals in accordance with which the States parties met merely to observe an occasion in the five-year review calendar. Indeed, his country felt betrayed by the nuclear powers and vindicated by events since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. There was no pressure to disarm, and the non-nuclear-weapon States had no chips to bargain with and no cards to play. There was now consensus among the overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations that since 1995, review conferences had only confirmed their worst fears about the unwillingness of certain States to disarm.

29. **Ms. Dallafior Matter** (Switzerland) said that the fiftieth anniversary of the adoption of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was an opportunity to consider the road ahead with respect to the Treaty’s full implementation. It was regrettable that States parties were far from achieving all the Treaty’s objectives. Against the backdrop of a volatile situation reminiscent of the Cold War era, the Treaty must be preserved and strengthened and must continue to demonstrate its effectiveness. A successful review conference with tangible results would go a long way towards achieving those goals.

30. The current review cycle was taking place in the context of a number of challenges, but also opportunities for progress. The risk of a nuclear confrontation was clearly cause for concern, mainly in relation to the nuclear programme of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Switzerland called on that country to comply with all relevant Security Council resolutions and to return to the Treaty. In that context, Switzerland

welcomed the moratorium on all nuclear testing announced by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, as well as the emerging dialogue on its nuclear weapons programme, which it hoped would lead to a lasting diplomatic solution, and was ready to assist in facilitating such discussions if so requested by the parties.

31. The current rhetoric regarding the use of nuclear weapons was also extremely concerning. Certain nuclear-weapon States had been publicly promoting their nuclear capabilities and announcing new types of weapons, which ran counter to the commitments they had made under the Treaty. It was important to make every effort to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, halt any new nuclear arms race and avoid lowering the threshold for the use of such weapons. Rather than engaging in mutual threats, the nuclear-weapon States had a responsibility to engage in meaningful dialogue.

32. The weakening of existing norms and principles was also a source of concern. The rules-based international order helped to ensure the security of all. While it was a priority to safeguard and strengthen that order in a credible way, particularly with respect to nuclear weapons, there were signs that it was being eroded.

33. Through implementation of the joint comprehensive plan of action, IAEA had conducted extensive and rigorous verification activities, which had demonstrated compliance with the terms of the agreement. Despite that, the agreement was a source of tension. Switzerland encouraged all relevant parties to continue to comply fully with their obligations under the plan and to refrain from any action that undermined it.

34. The Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles was also encountering difficulties. Switzerland therefore called on all parties to comply with the Treaty, which was of paramount importance for stability in Europe.

35. The Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty had yet to be ratified by the Annex 2 States. The norm against nuclear test explosions must be maintained in view of its central role in the fight against vertical and horizontal proliferation.

36. There were also worrying signs that certain nuclear-weapon States were backtracking on their disarmament commitments by introducing preconditions for such disarmament. That worrying erosion of norms concerned not only nuclear weapons but also other types of weapons of mass destruction. It was not possible to remain silent in the face of such

developments. All States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty had an obligation to pursue policies that were fully compatible with the Treaty and its goal of achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world. The Treaty's provisions constituted a common road map and must be implemented.

37. The preservation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime and the fulfilment by all parties of their commitments, particularly those made in 1995, 2000 and 2010, were essential for the maintenance of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. States could build trust in a simple way: by honouring their commitments and remaining true to decisions made.

38. Switzerland did not harbour any illusions that the monumental task of creating a safe world without nuclear weapons would be easy. The goal must nevertheless be pursued relentlessly and as a priority to ensure that nuclear weapons were never used again under any circumstances. Progress towards that goal would require willingness to overcome differences in a constructive manner. Noting the view expressed by several States that current conditions were not conducive to further progress on nuclear disarmament, she said that while Switzerland accepted that the international context was not optimal, it believed that States were responsible for creating the right conditions. The lack of progress on nuclear disarmament had resulted in the development of initiatives outside the Treaty's framework. It was essential that such initiatives reinforced the Treaty as the cornerstone of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

39. Progress was not only necessary but possible. The work carried out on the verification of nuclear disarmament was proof that broad cooperation was possible. Nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States were working together on one of the most challenging issues involved in establishing a nuclear-weapon-free world, which demonstrated their shared desire to implement article VI of the Treaty. Switzerland also noted positive developments related to the disarmament mechanism. Decisions made and actions taken by the Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission provided an opportunity to address and make progress on a number of key issues, including those related to nuclear risk reduction, negative security assurances and fissile material.

40. During the current review cycle, clear progress had also been made on the third pillar of the Treaty. The Convention on Nuclear Safety had been strengthened by the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety of 2015, and the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical

Protection of Nuclear Material had entered into force in 2016.

41. The 2020 Review Conference was fast approaching. Although ensuring a successful cycle would be a challenge, it was necessary for the health of the regime. It was essential for States parties to reflect on how their various views could be brought together in a single document. Several options should be explored. For example, States parties could consider whether a single comprehensive document, approved by consensus, was the most promising approach, or whether the chances of a positive outcome would be higher if issues were addressed separately. Switzerland suggested that States should make full use of the opportunities afforded by the Preparatory Committee to develop a shared understanding of the way forward. In order to foster a constructive dialogue for the 2020 Review Conference, a number of relevant proposals had been submitted. Switzerland supported the suggestion by the Group of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament to move beyond repetitive statements and convene, within the framework of the third session of the Preparatory Committee, a meeting dedicated to interactive discussions on a number of issues.

42. **Mr. Macedo Soares** (Observer for the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean) said that his organization was the sole intergovernmental organization entirely devoted to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, which was a matter of pride for the States of the region. As the five nuclear-weapon States and the Netherlands had ratified the two Additional Protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, that Treaty was fully effective. The organization was in the process of proposing to four of those States arrangements that would resolve the issues raised by them in their interpretative declarations in relation to the Treaty.

43. It was indisputable that the five non-nuclear-weapon zones, which had been established in accordance with article VII of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and covered more than half the Earth's surface, significantly enhanced international peace and security. Nevertheless, the question of establishing such a zone in the Middle East had resulted in the failure of the 2015 Review Conference. The Preparatory Committee should take that matter into special consideration to avoid a repeat of that outcome, which had negatively affected the entire non-proliferation regime.

44. No State ignored or challenged the guidelines adopted by the Disarmament Commission in 1999, according to which a nuclear-weapon-free zone should

be established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned. That guideline was so clear that it was unthinkable that any State outside a given region might impose on the States of that region the creation of a zone free of nuclear weapons. Although there was no doubt that such a zone could be established without the participation of all States of the region concerned, as demonstrated by Latin America and the Caribbean, the process should involve all of those States. Since 1974, the 43 General Assembly resolutions on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East had been adopted by consensus, which meant by all the States in that region. The creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone did not prevent States outside that zone from contributing to its establishment. However, it should not be acceptable for such States to stand in the way of the wishes of the region concerned, as had been the case at the 2015 Review Conference.

45. Further nuclear-weapon-free zones should be created. If called upon to do so, the States parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco would undoubtedly continue to contribute the expertise they had acquired over 50 years of fulfilling the Treaty's provisions and objectives.

46. Despite the difficult global situation, there were reasons for hope. Through the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, the States parties to that Treaty, all of which were non-nuclear-weapon States, had made one of the most important contributions to the implementation of article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

47. **Ms. Fernandez Moreno** (Observer for the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials) said that the Agreement between the Republic of Argentina and the Federative Republic of Brazil for the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy of 1991, through which her organization had been established, constituted a milestone in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and was a critical non-proliferation tool between the two countries, which had promoted nuclear programmes for the region. That region was the first nuclear-weapon-free zone to have been established in a densely-populated area. The Agreement demonstrated the clear commitment of Argentina and Brazil to the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy, and recognized the sovereign right of each country to develop and use nuclear technology for its economy and social development and for the benefit of its peoples.

48. The application of the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials was based on the mutual trust between the two countries and on an

independent and robust system administered by the organization to verify that nuclear materials were not diverted towards the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

49. The organization had earned international credibility as a result of its effective, efficient and independent verification of the nuclear activities of Argentina and Brazil and the continuous political commitment of and technical and economic support provided by the two countries. That was a corollary to the establishment of a deep and lasting relationship based on mutual trust between Argentina and Brazil, and proved that cooperation, dialogue and mutual respect between countries could make a significant contribution to regional and international security.

50. Her organization was rightly considered one of the most successful initiatives worldwide in nuclear non-proliferation. Lessons learned from its experience could serve as inspiration for other regions. Since its establishment, the organization had performed more than 3,000 inspections of nuclear facilities in both countries. In 2017, it had carried out approximately 100 inspections, an average of three inspectors participating daily in inspection missions. It continued to verify the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear activities, issuing independent and reliable technical conclusions.

51. The Quadripartite Safeguards Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, the organization and IAEA included well-defined provisions on the coordination of and cooperation in activities between IAEA and the organization and, in particular, established that the parties would minimize the duplication of activities and issue independent conclusions. The successful results obtained over the years with respect to the coordination of activities between the organization and IAEA reflected the high level of understanding and cooperation between the two agencies. Within that framework of cooperation, her organization was firmly committed to continuing to promote mechanisms and means whereby IAEA safeguards could benefit from the findings and conclusions of the regional mechanism provided for in the Quadripartite Safeguards Agreement and recognized by the review conferences.

52. Her organization wished to share its experience within that framework with a view to demonstrating the added value of the regional model to non-proliferation and to highlight its commitment to maintaining its technical effectiveness, independence and international credibility in the fulfilment of its mandate. She hoped that the sessions of the Preparatory Committee and the 2020 Review Conference would reaffirm the relevance

of the model regional system established by her organization.

53. **Mr. Alsammak** (Observer for the League of Arab States) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime, provided a basis for the total elimination of nuclear weapons and guaranteed the right of States parties to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

54. He was concerned by the importance that nuclear-weapon States attached to preserving and modernizing their nuclear weapons, which sent the message that such weapons were not illegitimate, but necessary to guarantee their own security and that of their allies. Reductions in nuclear weapons were no substitute for nuclear disarmament. Nuclear-weapon States should honour their commitments and implement article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of Decision 2 of the 1995 Review Conference, as well as the relevant measures established at the 2010 Review Conference.

55. While defence doctrines based on nuclear deterrence might be considered logical at the national level, they undermined cooperation and diplomacy at the international level. Although certain nuclear-weapon States had reduced the explosive capacities of their nuclear warheads, they continued to include such weapons in their defence doctrines, claiming that they could be useful in the future, including to protect non-nuclear-weapon States. Such an approach was in violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, numerous Security Council resolutions and the unilateral declarations made in April 1995 granting positive and negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

56. The vision of a safer world free of nuclear weapons would only become a reality once the universality of the Non-Proliferation Treaty had been achieved. He therefore urged the international community to call on those States not yet parties to the Treaty to accede to the instrument without preconditions.

57. The League of Arab States welcomed the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which was an important addition to the nuclear disarmament regime and was in line with the League's own objectives, and recalled the important role played by civil society organizations in that regard. In discharging its responsibility as a regional organization, it called upon its member States to sign the Treaty.

58. The League of Arab States continued to stress the importance of developing nuclear energy for peaceful

purposes in accordance with the inalienable right of States parties established by article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in such a way that reduced the threat of nuclear proliferation and ensured compliance with the highest standards of nuclear safety and security. IAEA was the competent authority for conducting verification activities in accordance with the safeguards regime. He highlighted the Agency's crucial role in supporting States in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, particularly developing countries, and rejected any discriminatory methods that undermined the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

59. He was concerned by the lack of progress in the implementation of the 1995 resolution, which had been a key factor in the indefinite extension of the Treaty. The resolution would remain in force until its objectives had been fulfilled. The establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction depended on the political will of the countries concerned. Since 1974, the League of Arab States had been working towards the establishment of such a zone and had presented many initiatives in that regard, including its call for the convening of an international conference on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Although that call had been supported by the overwhelming majority of States parties, it was regrettable that three States — including two depositary States — had prevented agreement on a final document of the 2015 Review Conference, thus benefiting Israel, which rejected the Treaty and refused to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. Those States had failed to consider the negative impact that their decision might have on the Treaty's credibility. The League of Arab States had adopted a unified position, namely, to adhere to the decisions of the 1995, 2000 and 2010 review conferences related to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. It hoped that those decisions would be implemented with the support of the international community in a spirit of genuine and constructive cooperation, as a nuclear-weapon-free zone would be an important means of promoting transparency, peace and security at the global and regional levels.

60. It was unacceptable for States to strengthen their own security to the detriment of the security of others, particularly in the light of the many international instruments that promoted the principle of equal security for all and that imposed equal obligations on all States.

61. The League of Arab States hoped that the current and future work of the Preparatory Committee would pave the way for a successful 2020 Review Conference,



and that there would be a clear approach to establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, consistent with the decisions of the United Nations and the commitments made under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and other relevant international treaties.

62. In conclusion, the success of the Treaty depended on the extent to which its States parties, particularly nuclear-weapon States, were committed to fulfilling their obligations. He therefore hoped that the Review Conference would adopt a balanced approach to the Treaty's three pillars and avoid focusing on one pillar to the detriment of the others.

*Statements made in exercise of the right of reply*

63. **Mr. Smirnov** (Russian Federation) said that, despite having called on delegations to confine themselves to making constructive contributions related to the items on the agenda, unfounded accusations had continued to be made against the Russian Federation on issues that had long ago been clarified. His country had already given an explanation regarding the Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine's Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Budapest Memorandum) and on Crimea, which was an irremovable part of the Russian Federation. Any statements that distorted the real situation, including accusations by Ukraine, were therefore unacceptable.

64. The Russian Federation was participating in the session in a cooperative and constructive manner in order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, and would continue to work in that spirit. If necessary, however, it would defend its position calmly and patiently until such a time as its partners recognized the inadvisability of making such unsubstantiated declarations.

65. **Mr. Klymenko** (Ukraine) refuted the misleading allegations that had been made against his country during the current session by the Russian Federation, which continued to impose its false hybrid narrative on the Committee in an effort to camouflage its aggressive actions that threatened not only Ukraine but also international peace and security.

66. He once again reminded the Russian Federation that the Crimean population had not been offered a legitimate choice or a free referendum. On the contrary, the Peninsula had been illegally occupied. In that regard, he drew the Committee's attention to General Assembly resolution [68/262](#) (2014), which had been overwhelmingly backed by the international community and which clearly supported the sovereignty, political independence, unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine

within its internationally recognized borders. That resolution underscored that the referendum held on 16 March 2014 had no validity, and called upon all States, international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize any alteration of the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol.

67. With regard to the Budapest Memorandum, while it was true that the Russian Federation had not used nuclear weapons against Ukraine, which was prohibited by article V of the Memorandum, it had violated all other articles, including the commitments it had undertaken to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine; refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine; and refrain from economic coercion. He therefore urged the representatives of the Russian Federation to reacquire themselves with the document, which their country had signed at the highest level. He also urged the Russian Federation to halt its aggression against Ukraine, cease its occupation of Crimea, demilitarize Crimea and certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and begin to respect and implement international law.

68. **Mr. Smirnov** (Russian Federation) reiterated that his delegation had come to the session with a view to constructive and collaborative work on the agenda of the Preparatory Committee. Those States that wished to engage in anti-Russian rhetoric should find another forum in which to do so. However, States that wished to clarify issues of which they did not have a clear understanding were welcome to approach his delegation outside the discussions.

*The discussion covered in the summary record ended at 4.25 p.m.*