

Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Summary record (partial)* of the 5th meeting

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Wednesday, 25 April 2018, at 10 a.m.

Chair: Mr. Bugajski (Poland)

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Committee (*continued*)

* No summary record was prepared for the rest of this meeting.

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The discussion covered in the summary record began at 12.05 p.m.

General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee (continued)

1. **Ms. Majali** (Jordan) said that the world was neither safer nor more secure than it had been at the time of negotiation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Nuclear weapons continued to pose a threat and non-proliferation and disarmament were far from being achieved. Nevertheless, the Treaty remained the foundation for international peace and security and the cornerstone of the non-proliferation and disarmament regime. The Treaty also provided a framework for ensuring the right of States parties to access nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. In that context, the goals of the Treaty could be achieved only through the balanced and comprehensive implementation of its three pillars.

2. Universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones were important steps in strengthening disarmament and non-proliferation, especially in the Middle East. The nuclear capabilities of Israel and the fact that that country's facilities were not monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continued to constitute a threat to both regional and international peace and security. Numerous resolutions and review conference outcome documents had reaffirmed the importance of the accession of Israel to the Treaty and the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. In that regard, her country regretted the failure to convene a conference on that subject in 2012, and underlined that such a zone should be established in accordance with the relevant resolutions and commitments, particularly the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference. Tangible steps towards implementing those outcomes and commitments should be established at the current session and the 2020 Review Conference.

3. States parties had a legitimate right to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in accordance with article IV of the Treaty. Those peaceful uses contributed to economic and social development and prosperity. Jordan appreciated the important role of IAEA in supporting developing countries through its technical cooperation programme, and commended the Agency for its efforts to enhance international cooperation, including with regard to its programme in Jordan.

4. Speaking on behalf of the Arab Group, she said that the adherence of all Arab States to the Non-Proliferation Treaty reaffirmed their commitment to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Those States had also placed all their nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguards system and would continue their efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament.

5. The Group believed that the possession and development of nuclear weapons posed a grave threat to both regional and international peace and security, and that the only means of preventing the use of such weapons was to eliminate them. It therefore supported the observance of the annual International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September, and welcomed the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which complemented the Non-Proliferation Treaty. A date should be set for the holding of a high-level conference on disarmament to review progress achieved in that field.

6. The Group was concerned by the lack of real progress on nuclear disarmament, including the fact that neither the 1995 resolution nor the outcomes of the 2000 and 2010 review conferences had been implemented. The failure of the States parties to reach a consensus at the 2015 Review Conference and the procrastination of the nuclear-weapon States, including with respect to the establishment of a time frame for eliminating their nuclear weapons, made it all the more necessary for all parties to fulfil their responsibilities and step up their efforts to eliminate such weapons. The Group objected to the continued adherence by those States to military doctrines that permitted the use of nuclear weapons, even against non-nuclear-weapon States, in violation of negative security assurances. It was vital to establish international measures and unconditional commitments to protect non-nuclear-weapon States from the use or threat or use of nuclear weapons.

7. In that context, the Group regretted the failure to convene a conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, as agreed in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference. At the 2015 Review Conference, the Group had sought to provide proposals to end the deadlock with respect to that issue. However, its efforts had been frustrated by three States, which had prevented the Conference from reaching an outcome on the matter. Ridding the Middle East of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction was the collective responsibility of the international community. The Arab Group had done everything within its power and urged other groups to do the same, as continued inaction in that area undermined the Treaty's credibility and threatened the entire disarmament and

non-proliferation regime. The Treaty's objectives would be achieved only if its implementation was universal. In view of the fact that Israel was the only State in the Middle East that had not acceded to it, the Arab Group called on the international community to place pressure on Israel to sign and ratify the Treaty and place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.

8. A further factor on which the credibility of the Treaty depended was the balanced implementation of its three pillars. The Arab Group supported the inalienable right of States parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including as a means of promoting sustainable development.

9. **Mr. Cabrera Hidalgo** (Ecuador) reaffirmed his country's commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime, and to the Treaty's three pillars. As a country that promoted peace, justice and social equality, Ecuador supported the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there existed an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control; that conclusion was more relevant than ever. States neither would, nor could, abandon their common but differentiated responsibilities in the face of the limited progress on non-proliferation and the lack of any progress on nuclear disarmament.

10. In view of the risks posed to all humanity by the continued existence of nuclear weapons, and the fact that all States were responsible for preventing their use, Ecuador was proud to have participated in negotiations concerning the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, and to have signed that Treaty on the day it had opened for signature. The Treaty represented an essential step towards disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons as it complemented and strengthened the existing non-proliferation and disarmament architecture, closing a legal loophole by expressly prohibiting nuclear weapons, as had previously been done with respect to chemical and biological weapons. Ecuador once again encouraged all States, including nuclear-weapon States, to sign and ratify the Treaty, thus facilitating its swift entry into force.

11. It was important to remember the declaration made by all States in the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament that nuclear arms weakened rather than strengthened international security. The international environment had become more complex and uncertain since the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference. For that reason, it was necessary to reaffirm that nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament

were a priority for the international community. States must be vocal about their concerns regarding attempts to distort that clear and unwavering goal, including claims that nuclear disarmament depended on the creation of conditions that were presently only a long-term prospect.

12. The progress that had already been achieved must not be reversed. It was important to defend and preserve the still valid agreements reached at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 review conferences. Ecuador therefore reiterated its call for compliance with the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference, and expressed its willingness to achieve a positive outcome to the current session.

13. **Mr. Duong Chi Dung** (Viet Nam) said that his country's foreign policy was based on the principles of independence, sovereignty, diversification and multilateralization, combined with active regional and international integration. Viet Nam advocated peace, cooperation and development, and supported multilateral non-proliferation efforts with a view to the total elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law. He therefore called for the accession by more States to the relevant international instruments, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

14. While it was necessary to ensure the balanced implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty's three pillars, he stressed that it was vital to accelerate progress on nuclear disarmament and therefore called for the effective implementation of the relevant Treaty provisions, particularly article VI. With regard to non-proliferation, he was encouraged by promising signs of progress in relation to the nuclear issue in North-East Asia, and looked forward to firmer commitments and the more vigorous implementation of regional treaties on nuclear-weapon-free zones, which would provide security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. He called on nuclear-weapon States to accede to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone and the protocol thereto, and on all States parties to implement the outcomes of the 1995 Review Conference, including the 1995 resolution.

15. Viet Nam supported the inalienable and equal right of all States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and appreciated the support and technical assistance provided by IAEA to States parties, particularly developing countries, to ensure that they were able to do so in a safe, secure and peaceful manner. Viet Nam

would continue to cooperate closely with the Agency in that area.

16. The most effective means of contributing to the success of the review process was for States parties to individually and collectively fulfil their Treaty commitments. For its part, Viet Nam spared no effort in meeting its obligations under the Treaty and relevant Security Council resolutions. Political will, negotiation in good faith, transparency and inclusiveness were also important in ensuring the success of the review process, as were improved working methods, synergy and better coordination between the Chairs of each Preparatory Committee session. The joint efforts and renewed commitments of States parties would ensure the success of the 2020 Review Conference.

17. **Mr. Purevsuren** (Mongolia) said that nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation required particular attention in light of the many challenges the global non-proliferation regime and nuclear disarmament process had faced in recent years. One such challenge was the failure of the States parties to adopt an outcome document at the 2015 Review Conference, which highlighted the need for more concerted efforts and, most importantly, greater flexibility in order to achieve a meaningful outcome to the 2020 Review Conference. It was also important to ensure the implementation of the outcome documents of the 1995, 2000 and 2010 review conferences; otherwise, the holding of review conferences would be meaningless.

18. The only viable way to maintain the vitality of Non-Proliferation Treaty was to give equal priority to its complementary pillars. The current stalemate over nuclear disarmament underlined the need for progress in the implementation of article VI of the Treaty. The vigorous implementation by the nuclear-weapon States of their unequivocal commitment to nuclear disarmament would significantly bolster the non-proliferation pillar. It was essential that all disarmament measures should be transparent, irreversible and verifiable. Mongolia called on the nuclear-weapon States to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their military doctrines and lower the operational status of nuclear weapon systems in order to reduce the risk of nuclear catastrophe. The Treaty's provisions, particularly article VI, had been strengthened by the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which would contribute to fulfilment of the Non-Proliferation Treaty's objectives.

19. If the credibility of the arms control regime was to be maintained and strengthened, disarmament and non-proliferation must be given equal priority. The

Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was one of the key components of efforts to achieve non-proliferation, since it prevented the further development of nuclear weapons. Therefore, the entry into force of that Treaty was imperative if the non-proliferation regime was to be effective and viable. The Treaty had already proven its worth, one of its greatest assets being its effective verification mechanism. Mongolia was proud to be hosting four monitoring stations as part of the International Monitoring System. However, until the Treaty entered into force, the global regime prohibiting nuclear testing would remain fragile. The conclusion of a legally binding instrument on security assurances was also essential to reinforce the confidence of non-nuclear-weapon States in multilateral mechanisms, and should be pursued as a matter of priority.

20. The peaceful uses of nuclear energy should also be at the forefront of efforts to strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Mongolia commended the work of IAEA in verifying compliance with non-proliferation commitments and supporting States parties in exercising their inalienable right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The Agency's technical cooperation programme was an indispensable part of its mandate and had a positive influence on the implementation of the Treaty and the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. It was clear from the outcomes of technical cooperation projects in Mongolia that IAEA projects made a significant contribution to scientific progress and the sustainable socioeconomic development of recipient countries.

21. Nuclear-weapon-free zones and the status of Mongolia as a nuclear-weapon-free State made a major contribution to disarmament and non-proliferation. In addition to reinforcing the Treaty, such zones built confidence among the States located within them, thus strengthening both regional and global peace and security. One of the foreign policy objectives of Mongolia was to contribute to the international community's efforts in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation.

22. The unique history of the Conference on Disarmament as the international community's only multilateral forum for negotiating disarmament provided impressive examples of the negotiation of international instruments that were complex in both nature and scope. However, the dismal failure of the Conference to adopt a programme of work had seriously undermined its role. The establishment of subsidiary bodies pursuant to Conference decision CD/2119, adopted in February 2018, would enable the Conference to engage in substantive discussions for the first time in

over 20 years, although it was not a substitute for the adoption of a programme of work; rather, it would facilitate attainment of that objective. Technical discussions must continue until the Conference's programme of work was adopted.

23. The potential transfer of weapons of mass destruction to non-State actors who would be prepared to deploy them under any circumstances remained a dire threat that must be addressed, including through Security Council resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#). That resolution provided a solid basis for the improvement of national controls by providing for assistance in the implementation of its provisions, and Mongolia was pleased to have been one of the first States to receive such assistance.

24. In conclusion, he reaffirmed his country's enduring commitment to strengthening Non-Proliferation Treaty norms.

25. **Mr. Kadiri** (Nigeria) said that the world was no safer now than in the past. Nuclear weapons remained a major threat to humanity and international peace, especially since they had become far more powerful over the years. The current existential threat that those weapons posed was unacceptable, and States parties must work concertedly to avert the catastrophic consequences of their use or the threat of their use. They must therefore ensure that the current session produced targeted outcomes and seize the opportunity to reaffirm their commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was a pivotal instrument in achieving their collective goal of eliminating nuclear weapons.

26. The harnessing of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and human progress in line with article IV of the Treaty remained a priority. It was vital to protect the inalienable right of States parties to use nuclear energy to meet basic needs such as power generation, food security, health care, water management and environmental sustainability.

27. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation were mutually reinforcing. Indeed, nuclear disarmament remained the only effective path to non-proliferation. Nigeria had demonstrated its enduring commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons through its implementation of a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol, its ratification of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, its sponsorship of General Assembly resolution [63/41](#) (2009), entitled "Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems", and its signature of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which complemented the Non-Proliferation Treaty and strengthened the disarmament pillar.

28. As a member of the De-Alerting Group and the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, Nigeria supported the measures proposed by those groups to increase transparency in nuclear disarmament, decrease the operational readiness of nuclear weapons, facilitate the entry into force of the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and commence negotiations regarding a ban on the production and stockpiling of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.

29. The non-nuclear-weapon States must be given assurances against the threat of use of nuclear weapons under a legally binding framework. To preserve the mutual trust necessary to safeguard existing assurances, the moratorium on nuclear testing should be maintained. Nigeria supported the growing focus on the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, an element firmly anchored in the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and reflected in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference. It also continued to welcome any step taken by nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear stockpiles, and expected those States to fulfil their legal obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. Nigeria encouraged those States that were not parties to the Treaty to reject or cease, as applicable, the development and testing of nuclear weapons, and in that regard welcomed the recent diplomatic initiatives relating to the Korean Peninsula.

30. Nuclear-weapon-free zones represented a genuine step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. Nigeria fully supported the establishment of such zones in all regions, including the Middle East. No nation would be safe in the event of an act of nuclear terrorism, and with that in mind, Nigeria supported all efforts to promote nuclear security. It was a party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and other relevant instruments, and continued to make every effort at the regional and international levels to prevent nuclear terrorism.

31. Given the irrefutable benefits of nuclear disarmament, the Conference on Disarmament must overcome its inertia. Furthermore, States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and all States Members of the United Nations, must demonstrate commitment to disarmament. Nigeria was firmly committed to meeting its Treaty obligations and would engage constructively in the current session.

32. **Mr. Klymenko** (Ukraine) said that despite ever-changing international circumstances, the Non-Proliferation Treaty had retained its value over the past fifty years. In November 1994, Ukraine had set an

example by abandoning its nuclear capabilities and acceding to the Treaty.

33. Regrettably, however, the credibility and effectiveness of the non-proliferation and disarmament pillars of the Treaty had been seriously undermined. The violation by the Russian Federation of the Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine's Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Budapest Memorandum) had damaged the entire United Nations-based security system. He underlined the obligation of nuclear-weapon States set out in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference to fully respect their existing commitments with regard to security assurances. Moreover, the Russian Federation had seized Ukrainian nuclear facilities, installations and materials located in Crimea in violation of the IAEA statute. His country was concerned by evidence that the Russian Federation had deployed nuclear weapon delivery systems and renovated relevant infrastructure on Ukrainian territory in Crimea. Such actions by the Russian Federation as a nuclear-weapon State posed a direct threat to the global non-proliferation regime, significantly undermined the tireless efforts of the international community to eliminate nuclear weapons, threatened international security and increased the risk of a global arms race. Those actions were particularly serious given that the international security landscape was already facing considerable challenges, including the nuclear and ballistic missile programmes of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In that context, he underscored the importance of Security Council resolution [2371 \(2017\)](#).

34. Ukraine continued to support the concept of negative security assurances as a practical means of reducing insecurity, which was considered to be one of the key motives for developing nuclear weapon capabilities, and was seeking the adoption of an international legally binding agreement that would ultimately replace the Budapest Memorandum. Such an agreement must provide reliable guarantees of peace and security, including military support in the event of a threat to territorial integrity. The agreement should also include provisions on the procedure to be followed by the international community in responding to the encroachment by a nuclear-weapon State on the sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of a non-nuclear-weapon State.

35. Complete and irreversible nuclear disarmament was the only way to protect humanity from the deadly consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. However, there was no quick solution to such disarmament, and the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear

Weapons was only one step in the right direction. Disarmament required a long-term approach involving practical steps and effective disarmament measures to be taken by the international community in a transparent, non-discriminatory, verifiable and irreversible manner, in order to build a system of mutually reinforcing instruments for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons. In that respect, his country called for the universal implementation of the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the entry into force of which would constitute a tangible step towards attaining that goal. While the existing voluntary moratoriums on nuclear weapon tests were valuable, they were no substitute for a binding global ban. The conclusion of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices was also a priority. Negotiations on that treaty should begin immediately within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament.

36. Ukraine attached great importance to the global implementation and continuous improvement of the highest standards of nuclear security. Over the past four years, it had significantly strengthened its national system for the physical protection of its facilities and materials by developing, at all nuclear power plants, comprehensive plans of action in case of a crisis.

37. In the context of the global strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Ukraine was committed to the implementation of Security Council resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#), its comprehensive safeguards agreement and its additional protocol, and contributed to international initiatives such as the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the work of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.