
**Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

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Chair: Mr. van der Kwast (Netherlands)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.

General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Chacón Escamillo** (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) said that, in line with its commitment to diplomacy in the interest of peace, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela condemned the production, stockpiling, use and threat of use of weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear disarmament was essential for preventing the recurrence of such horrific events as the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

2. His country's position in favour of nuclear disarmament was reflected in its Constitution, as well as in its status as a State party to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), which had established the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely populated area, and its endorsement of the proclamation of Latin America and the Caribbean as a zone of peace at the Second Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela supported the call of many Middle Eastern States for the convening of a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction (Helsinki conference), in accordance with the commitments undertaken at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Until the goal of nuclear disarmament was fulfilled, non-nuclear-weapon States must receive universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory, effective, reliable and irreversible negative security assurances from nuclear-weapon States that they would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

3. The first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference would contribute meaningfully to the deliberations at the United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination. The outcome document from that conference must not impinge on other related instruments, in particular the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which was the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, or undermine the important role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Rather, that outcome and the Treaty must complement and reinforce each other in advancing international peace and security.

4. The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons constituted a crime against humanity and a violation of international law, including international humanitarian law and the Charter of the United Nations. His country therefore supported general and complete disarmament and adherence to IAEA standards. The processes of non-proliferation and disarmament must also be conducted in a multilateral, simultaneous and non-discriminatory manner with a view to preventing the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. In that regard, the nuclear Powers must resume multilateral negotiations to accelerate progress towards the elimination of those weapons, an outcome sought by the majority of humanity. The international community must also address, in a timely and coordinated manner and without imposing double standards, the threats posed by the possession by non-State actors and terrorist groups of weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. The initiatives of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) to prohibit attempts to assist, finance, promote and participate in the activities of such actors must be strengthened.

5. Despite the significant strides made in implementing the two pillars of the Treaty related to non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, progress on the disarmament pillar remained limited, owing to resistance by nuclear-weapon States to live up to their Treaty commitments. The current session afforded the international community an opportunity to achieve a more balanced implementation of the Treaty.

6. His country supported the technical assistance provided by IAEA to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. All States that had not acceded to the Treaty must commit to using nuclear energy and technology for peaceful purposes only. They must also reject the privileges of the so-called "nuclear club", which comprised a minority of States parties and their allies intent on blocking all progress towards disarmament and espousing unpersuasive strategic doctrines in favour of the use of nuclear weapons. In that connection, efforts must be redoubled to carry out the thirteen steps agreed in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference in order to ensure the total and irreversible dismantling of all nuclear-weapon test sites and related infrastructure. The international community must work to eliminate all nuclear weapons in a spirit of mutual trust and respect.

7. **Ms. Franceschi Navarro** (Panama) said that, in an international context of increasing uncertainty, the tensions provoked by nuclear weapons represented a

great threat to humanity. The existence of such weapons was at variance with the commitments agreed under the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which were designed to guide States in their efforts to build a more secure world. Indeed, the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in the interest of global development was the only application of nuclear energy that was consistent with the 2030 Agenda. States must therefore focus their efforts on fulfilling the Sustainable Development Goals rather than contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In that regard, she recalled the statement delivered on behalf of the President of the seventy-first session of the General Assembly at the United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination, wherein it had been emphasized that great strides would be made in strengthening global security if the funds currently spent on nuclear weapons were redirected towards implementing the 2030 Agenda. As the only legally binding multilateral instrument representing a commitment by the majority of nuclear-weapon States to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, the Non-Proliferation Treaty was a critical mechanism for strengthening global security.

8. Panama had historically affirmed the illegality of the use of nuclear weapons. Although it did not produce nuclear, biological or chemical weapons itself, Panama was a signatory of multiple international and regional treaties on disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Indeed, on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the signature of that instrument, the Vice-President of Panama had advocated for dialogue to advance disarmament with a view to reducing the level of resources devoted to weapons of mass destruction. Panama had also endorsed the proclamation by CELAC of the Latin American and Caribbean region as a nuclear-weapon-free zone; it participated actively in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism; it was a member of the Nuclear Security Contact Group established at the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit; and it currently held the Presidency of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.

9. Her country supported efforts by all countries and regions to promote the universalization of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and comply with its provisions with a view to strengthening international peace and security. The international community must pursue complete, verifiable, irreversible and transparent disarmament as a matter of priority, as the total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only

guarantee against their use or threat of use. In that regard, nuclear-weapon States bore the ultimate responsibility for fully eliminating their nuclear arsenals, while States parties were collectively responsible for preventing the devastating humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons.

10. **Mr. Bin Othman** (Malaysia) said that, in preparing for the 2020 Review Conference, the international community should focus on promoting full implementation of the action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference and compliance with the decisions and resolutions of previous Review Conferences. It should also aim to bridge differing views on contentious issues. As the cornerstone of general and complete disarmament, the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime was critical to international security. All States parties must strengthen the Treaty and implement its pillars in a balanced and non-discriminatory manner. Nuclear-weapon States parties, in particular, must uphold the primacy of the Treaty and fulfil their commitments under the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference.

11. His delegation supported the ongoing work of the United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination, as it was consistent with article VI of the Treaty. The current review cycle must focus on the complementarities and positive synergies between the Treaty and the instrument envisaged. In that connection, he noted that 2016 had marked the twentieth anniversary of the advisory opinion of 8 July 1996 of the International Court of Justice, wherein it was concluded that States had an obligation to pursue negotiations on nuclear disarmament under strict and effective international control.

12. The nuclear tests carried out by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea since its withdrawal from the Treaty in 2003, as well as its persistence in developing nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, posed a serious threat to international peace and security. Malaysia therefore reaffirmed the importance of the Treaty's universalization and encouraged States that were not parties to the Treaty to accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States.

13. Strengthening existing nuclear-weapon-free zones and establishing more such zones was critical for bolstering global nuclear disarmament. Malaysia called on nuclear-weapon States to accede to the Protocol to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok) and urged all parties

concerned to implement the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and to convene the proposed Helsinki conference.

14. IAEA safeguards and verification mechanisms had a vital role to play in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Safeguards verification processes should be carried out in a professional, non-discriminatory and transparent manner, and the rules and modalities on preserving the confidentiality of safeguards-related information should be strengthened in order to ensure respect for the sovereignty of States parties.

15. Under article IV of the Treaty, States parties had the inalienable right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in conformity with safeguards agreements. States parties and the international community must ensure that the Treaty was implemented with strict adherence to the principles of transparency and non-discrimination.

16. **Ms. Mindaoudou Souley** (the Niger) said that it was regrettable that States parties had not reached a consensus at the 2015 Review Conference, particularly given the importance of the Treaty for implementing the 2030 Agenda. The current session of the Preparatory Committee must focus on finding ways to address the concerns of the parties involved and identifying a way forward.

17. The international community's awareness of the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons did not always translate into action. The risk of the unauthorized use of sensitive material remained real, particularly given the sophistication of cybercriminals, who were becoming increasingly effective at gaining access to data. The Niger supported strict adherence to all provisions of the Treaty, in particular the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, which was essential for fulfilling her country's aspirations for sustainable economic and social development.

18. Situated in an area affected by extremism stemming from poverty and its related effects, the Niger attached great importance to peace and security as a prerequisite for development and therefore set great store by initiatives aimed at ensuring the full elimination of nuclear weapons. In that regard, she expressed gratitude to the Governments of the Netherlands and Senegal for organizing a regional dialogue in Dakar in advance of the current session of the Preparatory Committee to discuss issues related to the implementation of the Treaty, in particular the role of African States, whose concerns should be more fully taken into account. She also noted with appreciation

the cooperation between IAEA and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and was grateful to them and other partners for their support.

19. In order to build a better future for the people of the Niger, government authorities at the highest level were placing science and technology, including nuclear science and technology, at the centre of their political programmes, in line with the emphasis on nuclear technology within the framework of the Sustainable Development Goals. Her Government also planned to implement a national nuclear programme across all sectors related to socioeconomic development, including the energy sector, through the introduction of nuclear energy in the national and regional energy supply mix. Those initiatives must be implemented in line with required safeguards in order to ensure their effectiveness.

20. The Niger had ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and contributed actively to global surveillance by hosting a seismic station and a national data centre, as well as a radionuclide station still under development. Her Government was fully committed to implementing Security Council resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) and was participating in the European Union Chemical, Biological Radiological and Nuclear Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative. The Government had also aligned its legal and institutional frameworks with relevant regulations through the establishment of an independent nuclear regulation and safety authority and had ratified the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba), as well as several conventions related to nuclear safety and security. The National Assembly was also in the process of adopting a nuclear law.

21. The total elimination of nuclear weapons was the best guarantee of a safe and secure world. Discussions held during the sessions of the Preparatory Committee should focus on overcoming differences and advancing the common goals of peace, security and sustainable development. To that end, States parties must strictly comply with their commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Treaty must be universalized and the role of African countries strengthened, in particular through the provision of increased support to the African Commission on Nuclear Energy. Lastly, nuclear-weapon States must pursue negotiations in good faith on general and complete disarmament and those States listed in Annex 2 to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty should take the necessary measures to ratify it without delay.

22. **Mr. Bouchaara** (Morocco) said that Morocco had consistently supported initiatives to strengthen and promote the universalization of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Treaty laid the foundations for international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under the guidance of IAEA and its indefinite extension in 1995 had guaranteed the permanence of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The failure of the 2015 Review Conference had nevertheless demonstrated the challenges that threatened the non-proliferation regime. However, continued efforts must be made to preserve and strengthen the Treaty by ensuring compliance with its provisions and implementing the decisions taken by States parties since its entry into force.

23. The inadequate steps taken to advance nuclear disarmament at the multilateral level and the failure of certain key actors to engage in the negotiations on a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons had undermined the confidence of the international community in the non-proliferation regime. Despite a number of initiatives undertaken in that regard, the nuclear disarmament obligations of States parties pursuant to article VI of the Treaty and the commitments by nuclear-weapon States to eliminate their arsenals under the Final Documents of the 2000 and 2010 Review Conference had still not been met.

24. The credibility of the non-proliferation regime was predicated on a delicate balance between the rights and obligations of States parties. Those obligations and the related commitments made at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2010 Review Conference must be upheld in a transparent, balanced and irreversible manner. In particular, efforts must be made to ensure the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, commence negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

25. To promote the universalization of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the international community must ensure the participation all States that were not parties to the Treaty in non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. Israel, which possessed military nuclear capabilities, remained the only country in the Middle East that had not acceded to the Treaty or placed all of its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. The 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences had reaffirmed the importance of accession by Israel to the Treaty as a prerequisite for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region. As the decision to extend the Treaty indefinitely in 1995 had

been closely linked to the commitment to eliminate nuclear weapons in the Middle East, the Treaty's credibility depended on the capacity of States parties, in particular the depositary States, to take concrete steps to implement the 1995 resolution.

26. Morocco attached great importance to the inalienable right of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Any attempts to impose conditions restricting that right were at odds with the spirit and letter of the Treaty. Efforts must be made to enhance access to nuclear energy through international cooperation initiatives aimed at facilitating technology transfers and the exchange of information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. As access to nuclear energy had enabled some States to reduce their energy dependence and was thus essential for sustainable development, the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme had a critical role to play in helping member States to implement the Sustainable Development Goals and the objectives of the Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. IAEA should therefore be provided with the necessary support to ensure that all States parties had access to nuclear techniques, which had a broad range of applications in areas such as energy, health, water, agriculture and the environment.

27. The risk of terrorist acts involving nuclear or radioactive materials and the trafficking of sensitive material for use in nuclear explosive devices were major sources of concern. The overarching objective of counter-terrorism efforts must be to prevent non-State actors from acquiring nuclear weapons or radioactive material. While Morocco acknowledged the efforts being made to combat nuclear terrorism, it was convinced that such acts could be best prevented by fully eliminating nuclear weapons.

28. To prevent the failure of another Review Conference, the international community must build consensus, uphold the principles of negotiation and multilateralism, and promote the primacy of law. That would help to prevent the weakening of the non-proliferation regime and fragmentation of efforts to address the threat of nuclear weapons.

29. **Ms. McCarney** (Canada) said that, despite the challenges before States parties at the current review cycle, previous successful Review Conferences had demonstrated the possibility of finding common ground and making progress on even the most divisive issues. States parties must capitalize on the current

review cycle to engage in constructive deliberations and build consensus.

30. Canada was in favour of a practical, step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament that emphasized concrete measures that could be implemented in the current international security environment, such as the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty. Canada currently served as Chair of the high-level fissile material cut-off treaty expert preparatory group, which was designed to build on the work of the group of governmental experts established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 67/53 with a view to formulating substantive recommendations for the development of such a treaty. Notwithstanding the existence of a voluntary moratorium on nuclear weapons tests and the international norm of non-testing, the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty remained essential, particularly in the light of the destabilizing nuclear tests that had been conducted by North Korea. Canada therefore called on the remaining Annex 2 countries to ratify the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty without delay.

31. IAEA safeguards agreements, in conjunction with additional protocols, constituted the current verification standard required under article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty that enabled the Agency to conclude that declared nuclear material was not being diverted from peaceful activities and that there were no undeclared nuclear activities or materials among States parties. Those States that had not yet done so must bring into force safeguards agreements and additional protocols without delay and implement effective export controls to prevent the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Canada actively contributed to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and fully supported the legitimate rights of States parties to use nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes, while underscoring that such rights went hand in hand with the responsibility to fulfil nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation obligations.

32. Together with its partners from the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, Canada encouraged all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, particularly nuclear-weapon States, to make tangible and expeditious efforts to implement the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference in order to build confidence during the current review cycle and ensure the future health of the Treaty regime. The credibility of the Treaty depended on States parties' fulfilment of their non-proliferation obligations and the response of the international community to cases of non-compliance.

33. Canada welcomed the conclusion and successful implementation to date of the joint comprehensive plan of action agreed with Iran and commended IAEA for its ongoing monitoring and verification efforts in that connection. Full implementation of that agreement would be critical to maintaining the confidence that had been built. As the continuation of IAEA activities would depend on the mobilization of extrabudgetary contributions, States parties should make additional contributions to support the Agency's work.

34. The proliferation activities of North Korea, which violated multiple Security Council resolutions and undermined the well-being of its people, demonstrated the importance of strengthening the non-proliferation regime and the danger of allowing nuclear material and technology to be diverted for military purposes. Strong and united international action, particularly by States in the Asia-Pacific region, was required to convince that country to engage in political dialogue on verifiable denuclearization. North Korea must fulfil its non-proliferation obligations and return to the Treaty. Syria must also resume compliance with the Treaty.

35. Although there had been many moments of genuine collaboration since the Treaty's entry into force, the review process was regrettably too often characterized by zero-sum dynamics, an approach that was at variance with the mutually reinforcing nature of its pillars. To achieve progress under all three pillars, namely nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, States parties must overcome their differences on contentious issues and solidify areas of consensus by fostering the flexibility and political will required to rise above repetitive and unproductive debates.

36. **Mr. Alshahman** (Iraq) said that the Government of Iraq attached great importance to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as an arms race would only provoke instability at the expense of international peace and security. The issue of non-proliferation should be given high priority in related international and regional forums. In implementing its foreign policy, his Government had consistently fulfilled its commitments under international instruments on non-proliferation and disarmament, as reflected in its adoption of a set of legislative and procedural measures designed to strengthen those regimes.

37. The failure to reach a consensus at the 2015 Review Conference had prevented participants from conducting a review of progress towards the objectives established at previous Review Conferences and had weakened international efforts to advance non-proliferation. That situation had led to the unbalanced implementation of the

Treaty's three pillars and a failure to achieve the goals of non-proliferation and the elimination of nuclear weapons. He welcomed the preliminary negotiations that had been conducted in New York in March 2017 at the United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination, and encouraged all parties involved to participate in the second cycle of deliberations to be conducted in June 2017.

38. The purpose of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was consistent with the principled position of Arab States. Given that the flexibility of those States at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference had enabled the indefinite extension of the Treaty, the depositary States of the Treaty must take steps to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, in particular by ensuring the implementation of action plan of the 2010 Review Conference. He called on the depositary States to place pressure on Israel to ratify the Treaty with a view to its universalization and to avoid applying double standards in following up on the Treaty's implementation.

39. Efforts to advance non-proliferation must focus on the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons and on fostering political will to enhance safety and security throughout the nuclear fuel cycle. In that connection, Iraq had endorsed the humanitarian pledge presented by Austria at the 2014 Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons in recognition of the threat to human life represented by the continued existence of nuclear weapons and facilities outside the safeguards scheme. It also supported the entry into force and universalization of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as a non-discriminatory and legally binding instrument.

40. The negotiations at the current session of the Preparatory Committee must go beyond taking stock of successes and failures and focus on taking practical steps to address the challenges that hindered non-proliferation and disarmament. In particular, as a country engaged in a war against terrorist groups on its own soil, Iraq called on the international community to combat nuclear terrorism and prevent nuclear material from falling into the hands of non-State actors. He concluded by welcoming the celebration of the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.

41. **Ms. Saborío de Rocafort** (Costa Rica) said that, in spite of proclamations of "never again" following failures to prevent nuclear catastrophes during the twentieth century, the international community had not

fostered the political will and confidence required to develop concrete solutions to address the threat of nuclear weapons. At the same time, the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals, the Paris Agreement and the Addis Ababa Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development had demonstrated the international community's commitment to achieve inclusive, sustainable, resilient, equitable and peaceful development. Instead of being a repetitive exercise characterized by expressions of regret for missed opportunities, the current session of the Preparatory Committee must focus on achieving a successful outcome.

42. Human security, democracy and compliance with international law depended on nuclear disarmament. Human security must replace the outdated paradigm of State security, whereby nuclear-weapon States worldwide maintained more than 16,000 high-alert nuclear warheads that were vulnerable to cyberattacks. Peace and security must be placed at the centre of policies and viewed as a global public good. That aim would not be achieved however if the proliferation and modernization of nuclear weapons persisted, if unilateral or bilateral reductions were applied to nuclear arsenals in an unverifiable and non-transparent manner, including without IAEA oversight, and if the proposed Helsinki conference continued to be postponed. Conversely, peace and security could be made a global public good through the prevention of horizontal and vertical proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and through full compliance with all relevant treaties, in particular the disarmament commitments set out in article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and in the Final Documents of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences. Efforts must also be made to uphold articles 10 and 26 of the Charter of the United Nations and to address the challenges of climate change, inequality and poverty.

43. The conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons held in Oslo, in Nayarit, Mexico, and in Vienna had demonstrated the close link between democracy and nuclear disarmament and had strengthened the will of the international community to find ways to eliminate the threat of nuclear weapons. In addition, as recognized in the advisory opinion of 8 July 1996 of the International Court of Justice, the use of nuclear weapons was at odds with the principle of proportionality and the obligation not to cause indiscriminate and unnecessary harm. The international community therefore had an unconditional obligation to ensure their total elimination. In that connection, Costa Rica welcomed the opportunity to lead the

negotiations at the United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination. In the past, formal recognition of weapons with unacceptable humanitarian consequences, such as biological and chemical weapons, had preceded their prohibition and subsequent elimination.

44. Lastly, a universal and legally binding instrument on negative security assurances must be adopted with a view to strengthening mutual confidence between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States.

45. **Mr. Hammer** (Australia), speaking on behalf of the Vienna Group of Ten, said that the Group convened prior to each Preparatory Committee session to consider what had traditionally been referred to as the “Vienna issues”, namely, peaceful uses of nuclear energy; nuclear safety, security and safeguards; export controls; nuclear testing; and withdrawal from the Treaty. The Group had submitted a working paper (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.2) that outlined the common views of its members in a series of recommendations aimed at strengthening the Treaty. Those recommendations were supplemented by background notes covering the Vienna issues.

46. The Group was committed to the universalization of the Treaty, which fundamentally contributed to international peace and security, and recognized the equal importance and mutually reinforcing nature of its pillars. All States, including those outside the Treaty, must therefore fulfil its fundamental goals, including the achievement of full and irreversible disarmament.

47. The Treaty was essential for fostering international confidence and cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which had an important role to play in the advancement of sectors such as human health, water management, agriculture, food safety and nutrition, energy and environmental protection, as well as in the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals. The use of nuclear energy must nevertheless comply strictly with safeguards and adhere to the highest standards of safety and security.

48. Notwithstanding the challenges posed by slow progress in implementing nuclear disarmament commitments and non-compliance cases, a number of recent advancements had strengthened the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regimes under the Treaty. Such developments included progress in implementing the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference; the multilateral work of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification; the establishment of the high-level fissile material cut-off

treaty expert preparatory group; and the adoption of General Assembly resolution 71/67, wherein the Secretary-General had been requested to establish a group of governmental experts to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, the increasing demand for the services of IAEA attested to the continued relevance of the Treaty regime.

49. The Group called on all participants to engage in the current Preparatory Committee session in a spirit of cooperation. The progress achieved at the current session must be built upon at successive Preparatory Committee sessions with a view to informing the deliberations at the 2020 Review Conference. The Group was proud that its working papers had been referred to in detail at previous Preparatory Committee sessions and trusted that the current working paper (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.2) would inform discussions on the Vienna issues at the current session.

50. **Ms. Rukštelienė** (Lithuania) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty yielded tangible security dividends for the international community. Its mutually reinforcing pillars should be promoted in a balanced manner and all obligations assumed under the Treaty and at previous Review Conferences should be duly implemented. Lithuania was fully committed to the Treaty’s universalization and called on those States that had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States without preconditions or further delay.

51. Achieving a world free of nuclear weapons would require the commitment of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. It was therefore essential to ensure the full implementation of article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. There was also a need to ensure full and verifiable compliance with the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty) by its parties.

52. In line with its commitment to a progressive and practical approach to nuclear disarmament, Lithuania viewed a legal ban of all nuclear weapon initiatives as alarming and counterproductive to international disarmament and security efforts. It advocated instead for the establishment of an operable protocol for achieving disarmament on the basis of a continuous and systematic approach, taking into account humanitarian and security considerations, within the existing framework of relevant treaties, institutions and commitments. The entry into force and universalization

of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty were essential for advancing non-proliferation and disarmament and the reaffirmation of its importance by the Security Council in its resolution 2310 (2016) was welcome. All States should commence negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty.

53. The international community faced serious proliferation crises that threatened international peace, security and the global non-proliferation regime. In that regard, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea must resume international negotiations and return to the Treaty and its associated safeguards agreements, and also ratify the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

54. To strengthen compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, IAEA must be entrusted with the tools and authority to provide credible assurances that States parties did not have undeclared nuclear facilities and that declared nuclear programmes were peaceful in nature. Her country supported the right of States parties to participate in the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes while upholding their obligation to reduce proliferation risks and comply with the highest international safeguards standards. In that connection, nuclear security and nuclear safety must be ensured in a coordinated and consistent manner.

55. Lithuania had contributed meaningfully to the preparations for the 2020 Review Conference. The momentum achieved by the Nuclear Security Summits, which focused on ensuring the security of nuclear materials and preventing nuclear terrorism and proliferation, should be maintained. Political will and concrete action by States parties were required to ensure the Treaty's long-term contribution to collective security, and the current session provided an opportunity to develop the gradual and methodical approach required to achieve a world without nuclear weapons.

56. **Mr. Alphyanto Ruddyard** (Indonesia) said that States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty had a responsibility to work together during the sessions of the Preparatory Committee in order to uphold its credibility and relevance and ensure a successful outcome to the 2020 Review Conference. Regrettably, important momentum had been lost at the 2015 Review Conference.

57. While Indonesia was a true believer in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the fact remained that the Treaty afforded different rights and obligations to different categories of membership. The objectives of the Treaty could be achieved only through the balanced, comprehensive and non-discriminatory

implementation of its three pillars. Strengthening the Treaty regime required action to address the imbalance in the implementation of the disarmament pillar in particular. Indeed, the Treaty enjoyed wide support because, in addition to countering proliferation, it provided a legal commitment to undertake complete nuclear disarmament and also guaranteed and supported the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

58. Some nuclear-weapon States continued to rely on nuclear weapons in their military doctrines and were modernizing, advancing and developing new types of nuclear weapons instead of disarming or eliminating them. Accordingly, in order to render the deterrence doctrine obsolete and account for the humanitarian imperative, a shift was needed from the principle of "undiminished security for all", which had provided abstract legitimation for the existence of nuclear weapons, to the principle of "increased security for all".

59. It was unfortunate that the least progress had been made on implementing the disarmament measures contained in the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference. For example, while the two largest nuclear Powers maintained that thousands of their nuclear weapons had been retired and dismantled through bilateral strategic agreements, those claims were still not verifiable or transparent. Furthermore, nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction continue to be possessed, modernized and further developed. However, a glimmer of hope for progress in the disarmament field had been provided by the decision to convene a United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination. Such an instrument and the Non-Proliferation Treaty would be mutually reinforcing in nature. Outlawing nuclear weapons would not only prevent new States from acquiring nuclear weapons but would also act as an incentive for nuclear-weapon States to expedite their commitments and obligations to nuclear disarmament.

60. Nuclear disarmament must be complete, verifiable and irreversible. In that regard, his delegation wished to highlight the fact that IAEA was a credible organization capable of performing any necessary verification tasks pursuant to its safeguards mandate. It was clear that, as part of such verification measures, additional protocols were an important tool to strengthen safeguards agreements. All States that had not yet done so should therefore conclude and to bring into force additional protocols as soon as possible.

61. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was a key element in the international regime for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and its entry into force was essential for strengthening the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. As all members of international community had a shared obligation to fulfil that objective, Indonesia called for the earliest possible entry into force of the Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty and for its universalization.

62. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones represented a positive step towards attaining the objectives of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. In that regard, all concerned parties should redouble their efforts to convene the long-awaited Helsinki conference for the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East.

63. Indonesia welcomed the continued implementation of the nuclear commitments undertaken by Iran under the joint comprehensive plan of action, including the provisional implementation by Iran of its additional protocol. It looked forward to further positive developments in that regard and trusted that the Iranian nuclear programme would eventually be treated in the same manner as that of any other non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty. All parties were encouraged to faithfully implement the joint comprehensive plan of action and the international community should maintain a positive atmosphere throughout its implementation.

64. Indonesia was fully aware of the proliferation risks involved in the development and use of nuclear energy and technologies, which were essential for human progress. Nevertheless, the inalienable right of States parties to develop and use nuclear energy and technologies for peaceful purposes must be guaranteed and in no way restricted. The full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of Article IV of the Treaty played a crucial role in achieving the objective of the Treaty. Moreover, as a fundamental principle, non-nuclear-weapons States parties to the Treaty should receive preferential treatment in benefiting from all activities related to the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

65. **Mr. Oh** (Singapore) said that the disappointing failure to adopt a final document at the 2015 Review Conference, the increasingly divisive and politicized discussions on progress across the three pillars of the Treaty, and stalled progress on convening the Helsinki conference demonstrated that there was little reason to expect a positive outcome of the 2020 Review Conference. Indeed, the frustration of the broader United Nations membership at the lack of progress on

nuclear disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States had resulted in the commencement of negotiations on a legally binding instrument to ban nuclear weapons. Despite those challenges, however, his Government still firmly believed that the Treaty was the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime and that it was more important than ever for all States parties to reaffirm and fulfil their commitments and obligations with respect to the three pillars.

66. On the issue of nuclear disarmament, the nuclear-weapon States had a special responsibility to fulfil their end of the “grand bargain” of the Treaty and to work towards the implementation of its article VI. Those States could achieve more concrete progress by fulfilling the commitments set out in the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference. The nuclear-weapon States and their allies could not dismiss the concerns of the broader United Nations membership about the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. The United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination, was an avenue to advance disarmament efforts, and all stakeholders, including the nuclear-weapon States, were urged to participate constructively in its sessions so that the interests of all parties, including their security concerns, could be meaningfully taken into account in the final negotiated instrument. Similarly, the work of the high-level fissile material cut-off treaty expert preparatory group was a positive step towards the conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty.

67. With regard to nuclear non-proliferation, his delegation called on all States parties to the Treaty that had not yet concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols thereto to do so expeditiously.

68. His Government was particularly concerned about the actions of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, including its nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches and the recent escalation of tension on the Korean Peninsula. That country must refrain from further provocative actions, comply fully with its obligations under all relevant Security Council resolutions, cooperate with IAEA to resume verification activities under full-scope comprehensive safeguards and return to the Treaty. Dialogue on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula should also be resumed to defuse tensions and create conditions conducive to peace and stability.

69. Commending the continued efforts to fully implement the joint comprehensive plan of action agreed with Iran, his delegation called on all parties

involved to fulfil their obligations and on Iran to cooperate fully with IAEA on all safeguards-related issues.

70. All States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty had an inalienable right to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and energy, particularly to support their attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals. However, such a right carried responsibilities and obligations. A strong culture of nuclear safety and security must therefore be maintained when using nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. For its part, Singapore was committed to working with the international community to support the efforts of IAEA to improve international nuclear safety and security practices, including through participation in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy and in training programmes held in collaboration with IAEA.

71. The constructive participation of all States parties in the first session of the Preparatory Committee would set a positive tone to build momentum for a successful 2020 Review Conference and dispel doubts about the legitimacy and relevance of the Treaty.

72. **Ms. Chantre** (Portugal) said that the Treaty remained the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and its article IV served as the framework for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. All States that had not yet acceded to the Treaty should do so as non-nuclear-weapon States, its three pillars should be addressed in a balanced manner and the work of the current review cycle should be conducted on the basis of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference.

73. While the threats and challenges to the maintenance of peace and nuclear security and non-proliferation were well-known, the achievements concerning the three pillars of the Treaty were undeniable and should reinforce the common determination to uphold the Treaty. The current review cycle was an opportunity for stocktaking, reflection and action.

74. Portugal fully supported the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization constituted the world's largest and most sophisticated verification system and had played a key role, for instance, in the rapid detection of the nuclear tests by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Her Government vehemently condemned such tests and missile launches, which posed a threat to

peace and nuclear security and non-proliferation. Those continuing provocations directly violated multiple Security Council resolutions and underscored the urgent need for the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

75. IAEA played a central role in achieving the aims of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and had been performing essential work for the benefit of humanity for 60 years. It was therefore crucial that States members of the Agency steadfastly supported the fulfilment of its mandate.

76. The Government of Portugal fully supported the implementation of the joint comprehensive plan of action concerning the nuclear programme of Iran, which demonstrated that complex non-proliferation challenges could be resolved through diplomacy. All parties were fully expected to fulfil their commitments under the plan of action. Conversely, her Government regretted the ongoing non-compliance and absence of progress in the context of the IAEA safeguards agreement concluded with Syria, and reiterated the request of the IAEA Director General to the Syrian authorities to fully cooperate with the Agency on all unresolved issues.

77. It was also regrettable that the Helsinki conference had yet to be convened. Constructive engagement by all parties was required so that the conference could take place as soon as possible on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region.

78. Lastly, she noted that the informal dialogue between coastal and shipping States, for which her country currently held the Chair, had been achieving progress since the early 2000s. Having taken into consideration the positive references to the informal dialogue during the previous Review Conference, the members of the informal dialogue had submitted a working paper to the current session of the Preparatory Committee ([NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.10](#)).

79. **Mr. Al-Hinai** (Oman) said that the credibility of the Non-Proliferation Treaty depended upon maintaining all three of its pillars. The threats to the Treaty were also threats to all of humanity and necessitated immediate action based on a specific timeline and under stringent international oversight. The humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons needed to be taken into consideration and his Government fully supported the conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons held in Oslo, in Nayarit, Mexico, and in Vienna.

80. Universality of the Treaty was important. Israel, as the only country in the Middle East that had not acceded to the Treaty, should therefore place its nuclear facilities under the IAEA comprehensive safeguards system in order to bolster peace and security and create a Middle East free of nuclear weapons. Similarly, the 1995 resolution must be implemented and tangible steps taken immediately to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

81. In accordance with article IV of the Treaty, States parties had the inalienable right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, such as for agriculture, industry, the environment and the water-resource management. His delegation was grateful to IAEA for the support and assistance that it provided to States parties to guarantee that right.

82. **Mr. ALKaabi** (United Arab Emirates) said that, in the light of the failure of the 2015 Review Conference to reach an outcome, it was all the more important to enter the current review cycle in a positive spirit. As the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be strengthened and progress made across all three of its pillars. His Government had always been committed to supporting efforts towards reducing the threat posed by nuclear weapons and complied fully with its international obligations in developing its own nuclear energy programme, which enjoyed wide international support and confidence.

83. The international cooperation framework must be bolstered to facilitate transfers of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and his country supported the peaceful use of nuclear technology as the right of every State party. In that regard, IAEA should also be strengthened to assist in the development of peaceful nuclear energy programmes that were safe, responsible, transparent and in compliance with comprehensive safeguards and IAEA standards. Such programmes should be subject to full verification and all international concerns addressed. Accordingly, the United Arab Emirates supported additional protocols to comprehensive safeguards agreements as important instruments that complemented the IAEA safeguards system.

84. The joint comprehensive plan of action concluded with Iran was welcome and its adoption was expected to have a positive impact on the behaviour of Iran in the region. However, the full and transparent implementation of that agreement would be essential in

order to build confidence and credibility in that country's nuclear activities.

85. While transparent measures to verify nuclear weapons disarmament should be adopted, the total elimination of such weapons was the only way to ensure their non-use or threat of use. In that context, his Government supported discussions on the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons and the negotiations under way on the prohibition of nuclear weapons. The pursuit and achievement of those shared goals and the strengthening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty would be beneficial to all States parties.

86. His delegation was strongly committed to the earliest possible entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. It strongly condemned the continued development and testing of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles by North Korea, which undermined the global non-proliferation regime and posed an increasingly grave threat both to regional stability and to international peace and security.

87. A world free of nuclear weapons required serious efforts by the international community towards the universalization of the Treaty. The United Arab Emirates therefore renewed its persistent call for States not parties to the Treaty to accede to that instrument promptly. It also reiterated its call for Israel to join the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State and to place all of its nuclear facilities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards. The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East should be a priority to achieve practical progress and prove the effectiveness of the Treaty. The current review cycle should result in serious steps to implement the agreed action plan of the 2010 Review Conference and to ensure the convening of the long-overdue Helsinki conference as soon as possible, with the participation of all countries in the Middle East.

88. **Mr. Marafi** (Kuwait) said that the reasons for the failure of the 2015 Review Conference were obvious to all States parties. They included a lack of seriousness on the part of the nuclear-weapon States in failing to abide by their disarmament obligations under the Treaty and also on the part of the States that had sponsored but not implemented the 1995 resolution. Earnest cooperation was needed by all States parties, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, in order to ensure the success of the current session of the Preparatory Committee and thereby establish the conditions for a successful 2020 Review Conference. The fact that the non-nuclear-weapon States parties were upholding their responsibilities in the area of

non-proliferation was the best evidence of the concern surrounding the dangers of nuclear weapons. In order to maintain that commitment and achieve the universality of the Treaty, all States that had not yet acceded to the Treaty should do so.

89. The 1995 resolution remained in effect until its objectives were completely fulfilled and its mechanism, adopted in 2010, should also be implemented. The aim of establishing the Middle East as a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction and subjecting all nuclear installations and programmes to IAEA comprehensive safeguards could not be abandoned and was essential to achieving peace and security in the region. His delegation therefore supported efforts to make immediate preparations for the postponed Helsinki conference to be convened. It was nonetheless important for the sponsors and organizers of that conference to offer a comprehensive vision of the steps and timeline for implementing the relevant obligations. Mere declarations of commitments to implement the 1995 resolution would not suffice. The negotiation process for that conference should be held under the auspices of the United Nations and the three depositary States of the Treaty before the 2020 Review Conference was held.

90. The credibility of the entire non-proliferation and disarmament regime was open to question because of the lack of true political will on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to reduce or eliminate their weapons. The development and possession of such weapons would not achieve international and regional peace and security; on the contrary, such actions would only increase instability. The total and permanent elimination of nuclear weapons was the only guarantee to avoid the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of their use. Disarmament could be achieved only if the nuclear-weapon States abandoned their defence strategies and doctrines based on the use of such weapons. His delegation therefore called on those States to announce that they would cease developing their nuclear arsenals and any new types of such weapons.

91. All States parties had the inalienable right to research, develop, possess and use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. While any reinterpretation of that right was entirely unacceptable, its exercise must be completely within the legal obligations of the agreements between States and IAEA. In that regard, IAEA and its Technical Cooperation Programme played a commendable role in helping to develop the relevant national capabilities of States.

92. All nuclear installations in the Middle East should be subject to the IAEA comprehensive safeguards regime. The fact that the nuclear facilities of Israel were not subject to the Agency's oversight was a threat both to international peace and security and to human safety.

93. The negotiations on a legally binding instrument to ban nuclear weapons were welcome as such an instrument would fill a legislative gap in the existing disarmament regime. All States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, should participate in those negotiations, which would complement the existing regime.

94. Lastly, his delegation reaffirmed the universality of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and called for its entry into force.

95. **Mr. Al Hussein** (Jordan) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was a principal foundation of international peace and security and a cornerstone of the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime. It was also the main reference point guaranteeing the right of parties to access nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Despite the decades of history of the Treaty, establishing a balance among its three pillars continued to be a challenge and needed to be addressed with rationality, determination and willpower. The universality of the Treaty also demanded a greater international emphasis that was impartial and non-discriminatory. Greater efforts were needed to build confidence and transparency, without double standards, in order to achieve international and regional security. The experience of the previous Review Conference and the difficulty of implementing the 1995 resolution clearly indicated a lack of political will. That also served as a warning about the danger of continuing with the current state of affairs, particularly in view of emerging dangers concerning nuclear safety and security, which required cooperation more than ever before.

96. The review process was an important opportunity to reaffirm commitments to the disarmament regime and to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including international cooperation in the service of humanity and for the benefit of future generations. In that context, the commitments agreed at previous Review Conferences must be implemented, particularly the 1995 resolution and the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference, which served as the principal foundation for the indefinite extension of the Treaty. The 1995 resolution was integrally and legally connected to the Treaty.

97. His delegation called for the universality of the Treaty and for all nuclear installations in the Middle East to be subject to IAEA safeguards. The failure of the international community to achieve concrete progress in implementing those safeguards in the region was a result of the refusal of Israel to accede to the Treaty; its refusal was also the main obstacle to building the confidence necessary to establish peace and security in the region. The lack of political will on the part of the international community in the face of the refusal of Israel to place all its nuclear facilities under the comprehensive safeguards regime permitted catastrophic risks to humanity and the environment to continue. The depositary States of the Treaty should therefore submit, before the 2020 Review Conference, practical proposals for the implementation of the 1995 resolution.

98. States parties had a legitimate right to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in accordance with article IV of the Treaty. His Government hoped to develop a fully transparent peaceful nuclear programme that satisfied all nuclear security and peaceful uses standards and would serve as a model for the region. The peaceful uses of nuclear energy contributed greatly to economic and social development and prosperity, and could be used in such areas as energy production, medicine, pharmaceuticals, agriculture and water resource management. The Jordan Research and Training Reactor had begun operation in December 2016 and would be a focal point in the region in the fields of nuclear research and training, and in the production of medical and industrial isotopes and other peaceful applications. The Synchrotron-light for Experimental Science and Applications in the Middle East (SESAME) centre, hosted by Jordan, would be officially launched under royal sponsorship in May 2017. SESAME would make Jordan and the entire region known as a centre of excellence and cooperation in scientific and nuclear research.

99. **Mr. Kaganda** (United Republic of Tanzania) said that the current session of the Preparatory Committee was important for addressing the challenges faced in implementing the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. His Government urged those States that were still outside the Treaty regime to consider acceding to it and also called for the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty following the ratification of that instrument by the remaining Annex 2 States.

100. The long-standing failure of the Conference on Disarmament to agree upon and implement a programme of work was a matter of concern, given the

need for negotiations within that forum to arrive at a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty. His delegation therefore welcomed the establishment of a high-level fissile material cut-off treaty expert preparatory group. It also welcomed the signing of the joint comprehensive plan of action concerning Iran, and reiterated that all States should have free access to nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes, without obstacles or discrimination. Iran should continue engaging constructively with IAEA within the framework of the plan of action in order to address all outstanding issues in connection with its nuclear programme.

101. Although establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East had been recognized as a priority by previous Review Conferences, the substance and modalities of an agreement to accomplish that goal were still unclear. However, such a zone would undoubtedly make a significant contribution towards complete nuclear disarmament and thereby enhance peace and security in the region. The international community should therefore continue its efforts to consult with the States of the region in order to resolve all outstanding issues.

102. In the context of the grave concern expressed by States parties at the nuclear programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which undermined peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and beyond, his delegation urged that country to promptly return to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and completely dismantle all of its nuclear-weapon programmes, including its uranium enrichment programmes, in a permanent and transparent manner and subject to credible international verification.

103. Nuclear weapons did not enjoy the support of the international community because of their devastating consequences for humanity and all forms of life. Total disarmament was the best way to avoid the humanitarian impact of nuclear detonations. Accordingly, the nuclear-weapon States must fulfil their existing obligations under the Treaty, including by downgrading the operational status of nuclear weapons and refraining from modernizing nuclear warheads.

104. His Government supported the United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination, and welcomed the progress made during the negotiations held in March 2017 in New York.

105. It was important to strengthen the verification regime through technical support. In that context, his

delegation greatly appreciated the efforts of IAEA to mobilize international support for the peaceful uses of technology and to provide capacity-building support to its member States. His delegation urged the Agency, in particular, to continue to provide scientific and technical support in such fields as human health, agriculture, food and sanitary and water resources, which brought significant benefits to the world. For instance, IAEA programmes related to radiation medicine and technology had enabled many countries to develop radiotherapy capabilities and provide better treatment to cancer patients.

106. **Mr. Adjabi** (Algeria) said that the Treaty was the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime and was the essential element contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security. Non-proliferation was a responsibility for all States parties to the Treaty, whether or not they were nuclear Powers. His delegation deeply regretted the failure of the 2015 Review Conference to adopt a final document owing to a lack of political will, despite all the efforts made by the Algerian presidency. It was also deeply concerned by the lack of achievements in implementing article VI of the Treaty and the commitments emanating from the various Review Conferences, including the 1995 resolution, the thirteen steps adopted by the 2000 Review Conference and the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference.

107. The only way to prevent the proliferation and modernization of nuclear weapons was to eliminate them definitively. In that context, his delegation renewed its support for the Humanitarian Initiative led by the non-nuclear-weapon States, which had greatly contributed to international awareness of the dire consequences of nuclear detonations.

108. While his Government had been pleased by the extensive international participation in the first session of the negotiations on a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, it regretted the boycott by nuclear-weapon States and States relying on their nuclear umbrella and urged them to attend the second session.

109. There was an urgent need for the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and its universalization; the negotiation of a non-discriminatory and multilateral fissile material cut-off treaty; as well as steps to guarantee nuclear safety and security, especially in view of the rising threat that nuclear material could fall into the hands of terrorist groups.

110. The Non-Proliferation Treaty had a security dimension, but it was also an instrument for the

development of international cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. His delegation therefore reiterated the inherent and inalienable right of all States parties to develop research and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as provided for in the preamble and article IV of the Treaty.

111. Nuclear-weapon-free zones represented a source of stability and support for regional and international peace and security. For its part, Algeria had contributed to the creation of such a zone as one of the first countries to ratify the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba). In view of the agreement that had been made to indefinitely extend the Non-Proliferation Treaty in return for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, the failure of the 2015 Review Conference was thus a source of deep regret. That failure to implement one of the pillars of the Treaty would mar its credibility and adversely affect the review process and the disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regime. The 1995 resolution remained valid, however, until its objectives were achieved. To that end, one of the first steps to be taken was for Israel to accede to the Treaty and to place all its nuclear programmes and facilities under the IAEA comprehensive safeguards regime.

112. His delegation was dismayed at the various obstacles that had prevented the convening of the Helsinki conference. In particular, it deeply regretted the obstacles posed by the only country that possessed nuclear weapons in the Middle East and was not a State party to the Treaty. As the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was encouraged everywhere in the world, it was difficult to understand why so many obstacles still prevented the creation of such a zone in the Middle East, a region that simply could not tolerate further tension and instability.

113. **Mr. Fernández Palacios** (Cuba) said that, as the use of only a tiny fraction of the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons would have catastrophic consequences for the planet and no country was immune to a nuclear attack, the objective of nuclear disarmament could not continue to be postponed and made subject to conditions. It was regrettable that, more than 40 years after its adoption, article VI of the Treaty had still not been implemented. Some States parties continued to derive a sense of power from possessing nuclear weapons, even though history and scientific research had demonstrated that using atomic energy as a weapon of war led to genocide and the annihilation of life on the planet.

114. Cuba had the political will to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons and called on nuclear-weapon States and other States protected by the nuclear umbrella to support that objective. The full prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons in a transparent and irreversible manner under strict international supervision was the only guarantee against their use or threat of use. IAEA had an important role to play in that regard. While the adoption of a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons would not, by itself, lead to disarmament, it would codify in international law the illegitimacy and illegality of nuclear weapons. The total elimination of such weapons must be ensured through a systematic approach with disarmament, verification, assistance and cooperation components, rather than through the selective application of the principle of non-proliferation.

115. Cuba was a State party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which served as a political, legal and institutional point of reference for the establishment of other nuclear-weapon-free zones. His country also reaffirmed the proclamation of Latin America and the Caribbean as a zone of peace at the Second Summit of the Heads of State and Government of CELAC held in Havana, during which CELAC member countries had declared their commitment to advancing nuclear disarmament as a matter of priority.

116. His delegation regretted the failure to convene the proposed Helsinki conference. Cuba was convinced that the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East would make a vital contribution to nuclear disarmament and represent a critical milestone in the peace process in that region. The conference should be convened at the earliest opportunity.

117. **Mr. Mohammed** (Nigeria) said that the current session of the Preparatory Committee offered a unique opportunity to review the steps taken since 2010, the last time a successful outcome had been achieved, and also a platform to restate collective commitments to the Treaty.

118. Nuclear technology remained benign and beneficial to mankind as long as it was not adapted for purposes other than peaceful uses. Nigeria supported protecting the inalienable right of all States parties to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its own nuclear programme would continue to be used for peaceful purposes only. In that connection, his country had concluded an IAEA safeguards agreement and had ratified a model additional protocol thereto. It had also ratified the Treaty of Pelindaba.

119. At the time of entry into force of the Treaty, it was hoped that all of its pillars, especially disarmament, would be pursued and achieved speedily. While the current session should focus equally on all three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, it should be noted that progress on the disarmament pillar had been less than desirable. Accordingly, there was a need to begin to outline the broader framework that would lead to complete disarmament, while also strengthening the mechanisms for international cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. It should also be noted that the ongoing negotiations on a treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons were not an attempt to undermine the Treaty, but instead were complementary to its disarmament pillar.

120. The nuclear threat from violent non-State actors was another issue that deserved serious consideration. Incessant delays in ratifying disarmament treaties and the maintenance of nuclear-weapon capabilities would not only hamper confidence-building among States but would also give terrorists the opportunity to access nuclear material and technology, the results of which would be catastrophic. The international community was already witness to the havoc that terrorists could create with conventional arms, let alone nuclear capabilities. Incidents of trafficking in nuclear materials and threats of nuclear terrorism were realities that the international community must now face.

121. Nigeria supported the growing focus on the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons that was firmly anchored in the Non-Proliferation Treaty and had been reflected in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference. It had therefore endorsed the pledge presented by Austria at the 2014 Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons. The implementation of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference remained a good basis for further deliberations. As a confidence-building measure, expectations should neither be lowered nor diminished, and the agreed terms should not be altered.

122. Noting the gesture by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their stockpiles of nuclear weapons, he said that his Government adhered to the goal of the total elimination of such weapons, and expected that those States would fulfil in good faith their obligations under article VI of the Treaty. Ultimately, their demonstration of full commitment to the principle of nuclear disarmament would lead to the achievement of the objectives of the Treaty. His delegation found immoral and unacceptable the reasons given by other States not party to the Treaty in order to justify the continued

development, testing and possession of weapons of mass destruction.

123. Nuclear-weapon-free zones played an important role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons as a step towards their total elimination, and the Pelindaba Treaty continued to play a positive role in that regard. Nigeria continued to promote the establishment of such zones in all regions, including the Middle East. It therefore called for the convening of the long-awaited Helsinki conference and encouraged all parties involved to summon the courage required to embrace the path of constructive and sincere engagement.

124. While Nigeria remained a proponent of a nuclear-weapon-free world, it took the firm view that non-nuclear-weapon States must receive legally binding assurances against the deployment of such weapons. Accordingly, a regime of negative security assurances was favoured. The moratorium on nuclear testing should also be maintained as it was crucial for preserving the mutual trust required to safeguard existing assurances.

125. For its part, Nigeria had ratified both the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. No country was safe in the event of an act of nuclear terrorism. In that regard, Nigeria called on all States not parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to accede to that instrument without preconditions and to place all existing nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards.

126. **Mr. Maruta** (Namibia) said that the three mutually reinforcing pillars of the Treaty were essential for strengthening international peace and security. The nuclear-weapon States should fully comply with their legal obligations and unequivocal undertakings to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons without further delay in a transparent, irreversible and internationally verifiable manner. The failure to reach a consensus on a final document of the 2015 Review Conference required the international community to redouble its efforts to ensure a successful outcome for the 2020 Review Conference.

127. Namibia had signed and ratified the Treaty of Pelindaba establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa and supported the calls for the establishment of another such zone in the Middle East. However, it was concerned that the related commitments in the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference had not yet been implemented and called upon the three sponsors of the

1995 resolution to ensure that the postponed Helsinki conference was convened as previously agreed.

128. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was an essential instrument for curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and advancing the goal of nuclear disarmament. The remaining Annex 2 States should therefore ratify that Treaty as soon as possible in order to bring it into force.

129. Namibia welcomed the growing emphasis on the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and, in that context, reiterated the need for all States to comply fully with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law. Any use of nuclear weapons was a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity. The total and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons was the only guarantee against the catastrophic humanitarian consequences arising from their use.

130. Namibia welcomed the adoption of the joint comprehensive plan of action concluded with Iran and called upon all parties involved to abide by the letter and spirit of the commitments agreed therein.

131. IAEA was the sole competent authority to verify compliance with obligations under safeguards agreements. All States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty had an inalienable right to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy pursuant to article IV of the Treaty. Namibia therefore supported the Agency's efforts to promote international cooperation in that regard, including for development purposes.

132. Lastly, Namibia wished to report that it was in the process of amending its small quantities protocol and would also ratify the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials in order to strengthen the nuclear verification regime.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.