

Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Chair: Mr. van der Kwast (Netherlands)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.25 a.m.

Adoption of the final report and recommendations of the Preparatory Committee to the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on its first session (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/CRP.2)

1. **The Chair** drew attention to the report of the Preparatory Committee on the work of its first session, which was contained in [NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/CRP.2](#), and suggested that the Preparatory Committee should adopt it paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 5

2. *Paragraphs 1 to 5 were adopted.*

Paragraph 6

3. **The Chair** said that paragraph 6 should be amended to reflect that 114 States parties had participated in the work of the first session of the Preparatory Committee. Georgia, Paraguay and Tunisia should be included in the list.

4. *Paragraph 6, as amended, was adopted.*

Paragraph 7

5. **The Chair** said that after the conclusion of the session, the report would be amended to reflect the actual number of meetings held by the Committee and the meetings for which there would be summary records.

6. *Paragraph 7 was adopted.*

Paragraphs 8 to 19

7. *Paragraphs 8 to 19 were adopted.*

Paragraph 20

8. **The Chair** drew the attention of the Committee to the draft decisions contained in [NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/CRP.1](#). He took it that the Preparatory Committee wished to request the Secretariat to provide for its second session an estimate of the costs of the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, including its Preparatory Committee.

9. *It was so decided.*

10. **The Chair** said that he also took it that the Committee wished to invite the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in consultation with the members of the Preparatory Committee, to nominate an official to act as the provisional Secretary-General of the 2020

Review Conference. The nomination would be confirmed by the Conference itself.

11. *It was so decided.*

12. **The Chair** said that paragraph 20 would reflect that those decisions had been taken at the present meeting.

13. *Paragraph 20, as amended, was adopted.*

Paragraph 21

14. **The Chair** said that the list of documents submitted during the first session of the Preparatory Committee, which was contained in paragraph 21, would be updated to include all documents submitted before the conclusion of the first session. The title of [NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.38](#) would also be corrected to read “gender, development and nuclear weapons”.

15. *Paragraph 21 was adopted.*

16. *The report of the Preparatory Committee as a whole, as amended, was adopted.*

Closure of the session

17. **The Chair** recalled that the draft of his factual summary ([NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/CRP.3](#)) had been circulated as a conference room paper. The final version ([NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.40](#)) would be issued as a working paper under his sole responsibility and should not be considered an official summary of the session. He did not intend to make any substantive changes to the draft text but invited delegations to comment on the document.

18. **Mr. Wood** (United States of America) said that the best way to ensure that future generations benefited from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was to focus on the shared interests of all States parties. Nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike benefited from a strong non-proliferation regime which, in combination with nuclear deterrents, served to reduce danger, enhance stability and help create the conditions for a world free from the risk of nuclear war. Unfortunately, the international security environment had been deteriorating significantly in recent years, as certain States expanded their nuclear arsenals and developed new nuclear capabilities. The greatest threat to the non-proliferation regime was the proscribed North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile programme. The pursuit of sweeping disarmament proposals that ignored the persistent international security conditions that continued to make nuclear deterrents necessary would not result in the elimination of a single nuclear warhead or improve the security of any State.

19. His country shared the long-term goals of establishing a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction and achieving sustainable peace in the region. That would require inclusive dialogue aimed at addressing the legitimate concerns of all States in the region. Furthermore, the zone must be established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region. Attempts to coerce action, encourage outside parties to intervene or hold the review process hostage would continue to fail. His delegation stood ready to support direct regional dialogue based on the principles of consensus and mutual respect.

20. The Chair's factual summary did not, and was not meant to, command a consensus. While States parties were unified in their support for the Treaty as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, they did not agree on how to achieve its goals. It was unsurprising therefore that a broader consensus was not in evidence at such an early stage of the review cycle. The Treaty had made the world a safer place by limiting the number of States that possessed nuclear weapons and serving as the foundation for nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. His delegation was committed to working with all States parties to keep the treaty strong and effective.

21. **Mr. Najafi** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that parts of the Chair's factual summary ignored positions expressed by many delegations, were unbalanced or undermined decisions and agreements made at previous Review Conferences. The text did not reflect the fact that many States parties, in particular those belonging to the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, had deplored the refusal of Israel to participate in the planned 2012 conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction (Helsinki conference), had expressed grave concern over the suspected nuclear capability of Israel, had condemned Israel for continuing to develop and stockpile nuclear arsenals and had called for a total prohibition on transfers to Israel of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material, facilities and resources or devices. Similarly, there was no mention of the calls from the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences for Israel to accede to the Treaty and place all its facilities under comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Moreover, the document did not reflect the extent of the support expressed for the negotiations on a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination, and for a number of other disarmament issues that were high priorities for many States parties. His delegation

also had reservations about the language used in reference to the joint comprehensive plan of action on the Iranian nuclear programme.

22. **Mr. Alphyanto Ruddyard** (Indonesia) said that his delegation welcomed the reference in the Chair's factual summary to the role of IAEA in disarmament verification. Given that the work of the Conference on Disarmament had been at a stalemate for more than 20 years, his delegation supported the negotiations on a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination. All States that had not signed or ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty should do so without delay. His delegation did not support any concepts or norms concerning the banning of nuclear testing other than those contained in the Test-Ban Treaty.

23. Support from regional nuclear-weapon States was needed in order to achieve the objectives of nuclear-weapon-free zones. It was therefore essential to hold consultations between States parties to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok) and the nuclear-weapon States, with a view to their early accession to the 1995 Protocol to the Treaty. His delegation reiterated its call for the international community to take a positive approach to the implementation of the joint comprehensive plan of action.

24. The statement in the Chair's factual summary that the use of nuclear energy must be accompanied by appropriate and effective levels of nuclear security was not consistent with the inalienable right of States parties to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Measures to strengthen nuclear security must not hamper international cooperation in the area of peaceful nuclear activities or undermine the established priorities of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme. Furthermore, his delegation did not agree with the statement that IAEA safeguards were functioning under financial constraints. On the contrary, the budgetary imbalance favouring safeguards over the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy gave cause for concern. While the support of extrabudgetary mechanisms such as the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative made an important contribution to the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, over-reliance on extrabudgetary funds could have a negative impact on the Agency's effectiveness, independence and long-term sustainability.

25. His delegation encouraged the Chair to further enhance his cooperation and communication with the Chairs of the upcoming sessions and with the President of the 2020 Review Conference in order to ensure

efficiency, effectiveness, coordination and continuity throughout the review cycle. His delegation remained committed to the pursuit of balanced and non-discriminatory implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

26. **Mr. Lenoir** (Observer for the European Union) said that the exchange of views during the session and the reflections by the Chair in preparation for the 2020 Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/14) had helped establish a good foundation for the next session of the Preparatory Committee.

27. **Mr. Sabbagh** (Syrian Arab Republic), referring to paragraph 103 of the Chair's factual summary, said that the implementation of IAEA safeguards in his country had been added to the agenda of the IAEA Board of Governors following the heinous attack carried out by Israel against a Syrian military installation in Dayr al-Zawr. The Director General of the Agency had stated that the attack had seriously impeded the Agency's ability to fulfil its responsibilities pursuant to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the safeguards agreement concluded with the Syrian Arab Republic, as a result of the unilateral use of force. It was regrettable that the Chair's factual summary ignored the violations of international law and the Charter of the United Nations committed by Israel, because that country enjoyed the support and protection of certain States, and instead levelled accusations against his country, the victim. Although the Syrian Arab Republic had striven assiduously to continue cooperating with the Agency, it had become pointless for the Board of Governors to continue discussing the matter because Israel continued to refuse to cooperate and to ignore demands to provide samples from the bombs used in the attack on the Dayr al-Zawr facility in order to determine whether those weapons were the source of the uranium contamination in the area. Nonetheless, his country continued to cooperate constructively with the Agency. That cooperation had culminated with the holding of a meeting between IAEA and the Syrian Arab Republic in October 2011, at which time a plan of work to resolve all pending issues was agreed upon and signed. Those facts strongly contradicted the claims by certain States that the Syrian Arab Republic was not cooperating substantially with IAEA. Those States knew very well which country was impeding the implementation of the plan of work. The Syrian Arab Republic complied fully with the safeguards agreement that it had concluded with IAEA in 1992 and had made every effort to enable Agency inspectors to carry out their work.

28. With regard to paragraphs 96 to 101, a number of States had expressed concern that the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had not been implemented because Israel had not acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Those same States had also expressed concern about the growing nuclear capabilities of Israel and its refusal to place those capabilities under Agency safeguards, as well as at the fact that it possessed a nuclear arsenal, all of which undermined security and stability in the region.

29. **Mr. Agbugba** (Nigeria) said that the Chair's factual summary should not have referred to South Sudan in the same paragraph as the other three States that were not parties to the Treaty, as its circumstances were very different. His Government and those of other regional States intended to begin discussions with South Sudan with a view to its accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba) at the earliest possible date. He called on all States in a position of influence to undertake similar processes in respect of the other States that were not parties to the Treaty.

30. Paragraph 49 of the Chair's factual summary should have reflected the calls from many States parties for nuclear-weapon States and their allies to participate in the negotiations on a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their elimination, especially since that process was being conducted in accordance with a resolution of the General Assembly and aimed to advance the objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. His delegation welcomed the reference in paragraph 14 to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear-weapon detonations and the associated risks posed by nuclear weapons.

31. **Mr. Biato** (Brazil) said that a number of changes should be made to the draft of the Chair's factual summary in order for it to better contribute to the future work of the Preparatory Committee. It should be made clear how many delegations supported the different views described in the text. Furthermore, the language of the report should not depart from consensus terms, expressions and principles. Specifically, the phrase "the principle of equal and undiminished security for all" in paragraph 13 should be replaced by "the principle of increased and undiminished security for all", a principle that had been established at previous Review Conferences. The suggestion in paragraph 27 that all States parties welcomed the increased transparency demonstrated by

nuclear-weapon States contradicted paragraphs 28 and 29, which correctly stated that delegations had highlighted the many shortcomings that remained in reporting by nuclear-weapon States. The discussion of a future treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices should mention the issue of existing stocks of fissile material, which many delegations saw as an essential aspect of the scope of any such treaty. Paragraph 53 should include a reference to the United Nations high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament to be held no later than 2018. Paragraphs 58 and 59 should not have made conditional the inalienable right of all States parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Similarly, paragraphs 77 and 112 suggested that there was a conditional relationship between nuclear security and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in contrast to the consensus wording in the IAEA General Conference resolution on nuclear security of 30 September 2016 and the 2016 Ministerial Declaration of the International Conference on Nuclear Security: Commitments and Actions. Furthermore, it was inaccurate to suggest in paragraph 67 that all States parties had agreed that a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol represented the current verification standard under the Treaty. In fact, the consensus language reflected in IAEA resolutions on safeguards was that, in the case of a State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement supplemented by an additional protocol in force, those measures represented the enhanced verification standard for that State. The language used to discuss the State-level concept in paragraph 73 should also reflect that of IAEA General Conference resolutions. Lastly, paragraph 117 should refer more extensively to articles II and III of the IAEA statute and place a greater emphasis on the role of the Agency in the promotion of the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

32. **Ms. Bolaños Pérez** (Guatemala) said that the session had reaffirmed the commitment of all States parties to implement the Non-Proliferation Treaty. While the Chair's factual summary was largely accurate, certain parts incorrectly presented certain views as having universal support. Paragraph 13 seemed to indicate that all delegations believed that article VI of the Treaty did not tie the obligation to pursue nuclear disarmament negotiations in good faith to any conditions whatsoever; however, her delegation did not take that view. Similarly, not all States parties had welcomed the increased transparency of nuclear-weapon States. Paragraphs 49 and 50 did not reflect the support of the majority of States parties for a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons and

gave a disproportionate amount of space to the opposing view held by a minority of States parties. The reference to the humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons was welcome, but stronger language would have been appreciated.

33. **Mr. Fu Cong** (China) said that while the Chair's factual summary was generally objective, it did not reflect the view of many delegations that the Conference on Disarmament was the only appropriate forum for the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty. Furthermore, the frequent use of the term "States parties" as the grammatical subject of sentences gave the false impression that the ideas being introduced were points of consensus.

34. **Ms. McCarney** (Canada) said that the Chair's factual summary was balanced and had made it clear that while delegations disagreed on the pace at which the Treaty should be implemented, they had all reaffirmed the importance of its three pillars. Her delegation welcomed the fact that the text covered the discussions on the importance of ensuring efficiency, effectiveness, coordination and continuity throughout the review cycle, including the early appointment of Chairs for sessions of the Preparatory Committee and also of the President of the 2020 Review Conference itself. Her delegation also welcomed the collaboration between the current and incoming Chairs and hoped to see further efforts to improve the systematic transmission of experience and outcomes between successive Chairs.

35. Her delegation was encouraged that the Chair's summary reflected the need to promote the equal, full and effective participation of women in the review cycle. At the 2015 Review Conference, only 26 per cent of registered representatives and 20 per cent of heads of delegations had been women. It seemed unlikely that the figures for the current session were significantly higher. The tone of the discussions had also been encouraging overall, but it would be important to focus on making progress, not only on not losing ground.

36. **Mr. Pástor Morris** (Ecuador) said that the Chair's factual summary was thorough but, as a result of the extensive use of the passive voice, did not reflect the actual balance of views. It was not clear from the language of paragraph 15 that a large number of States and regional groups had expressed strong support for the suggestion to discuss the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons in the context of the Treaty. Paragraph 27 gave the impression that an increase in transparency by nuclear-weapon States had been widely welcomed while failing

to mention that most delegations had serious concerns about the lack of transparency demonstrated by those States. Furthermore, while more than two-thirds of States parties strongly supported negotiations on a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, and many of those States had stated that the step-by-step approach to disarmament had failed, the wording in paragraphs 49 and 50 gave the impression that the two approaches enjoyed equal support.

37. **Ms. Guitton** (France) said that her delegation did not support the idea of a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons and was not participating in the negotiations, as progress towards disarmament could only be achieved through a progressive and pragmatic approach. Her Government fully complied with its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including article VI thereof, and remained committed to the collective responsibility of all States parties to uphold and strengthen the three pillars of the Treaty.

38. **Reverend Monsignor Urbańczyk** (Observer for the Holy See) said that his delegation welcomed the emphasis which the Chair's factual summary had placed on the importance of full and effective implementation of the Treaty as a common responsibility of all States parties and on the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. The delicate situation in the Korean Peninsula gave great cause for concern, given the devastating impact that the detonation of a nuclear weapon would have on the humanitarian and security situation and the stability of the international community. His delegation, which supported ongoing efforts to revive negotiations for the denuclearization of the region and the resumption of IAEA verification activities, was confident that the international community, in particular regional States, would do their utmost to create conditions for peace. Reaching a solution through negotiated diplomatic means was essential for regional peace and stability and the integrity of the non-proliferation regime.

39. The Chair's factual summary reflected the discussions and the search for compromise that had taken place during the session and would provide a solid foundation for the future work of the Preparatory Committee.

40. **Mr. Biontino** (Germany) said that the Chair's factual summary provided a full and balanced overview of the discussions that had taken place and could serve as a reference document for future discussions during the review cycle. It accurately described the constructive approach that would be

required for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

41. **Mr. Marafi** (Kuwait), speaking on behalf of the Gulf Cooperation Council, said that the Gulf Cooperation Council welcomed the Chair's factual summary and hoped that it would serve as a road map for the 2020 Review Conference. The Chair had clearly made an effort to provide balanced coverage of the discussions. The Council remained committed to cooperating with all States parties to implement the three pillars of the Treaty.

42. **Mr. Andereya** (Chile) said that he wished to clarify the position of his delegation with regard to a number of matters covered in the Chair's factual summary. First, the statement "reference was made to the importance of strong non-proliferation guarantees as being essential to creating the conditions for further nuclear disarmament" should be removed from paragraph 13, as such a condition was not contained in the Treaty. If those words were retained, the summary should also state which delegations were attempting to introduce a condition for nuclear disarmament outside the legal framework established by the Treaty. His delegation rejected all attempts by certain States to justify the delay in complying with their disarmament obligations under the Treaty through the introduction of additional conditions.

43. It was also regrettable that the Chair's factual summary mentioned calls to refer a number of important matters to the Conference on Disarmament, given that the work of the Conference had been at a standstill for 20 years. Furthermore, paragraph 36 gave the impression that all States parties had welcomed the existing *de facto* moratorium on nuclear test explosions. However, as a signatory to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, his country was in favour of a legally binding prohibition on all nuclear testing and therefore did not welcome the *de facto* moratorium. Paragraphs 49 and 50 seemed to have been drafted with a view to minimizing the enormous significance of the negotiations on a treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons, as they failed to mention that the process was supported by the vast majority of States parties.

44. **Ms. Higgie** (New Zealand) said that the Chair's factual summary would have more accurately represented the current situation and the discussions that had taken place if it had included more positive reflections on recent developments in the area of disarmament, in particular with regard to the Humanitarian Initiative and the negotiations on a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons.

45. **Mr. Ulyanov** (Russian Federation) said that the Chair's factual summary gave quite a comprehensive account of the discussions that had taken place during the session. However, it would have been impossible for any Chair to provide a summary that could satisfy everyone in such a short space of time.

46. While he understood the motivations of the delegations participating in the negotiations on a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, they had embarked upon a course that could have many unforeseen consequences, including for the Treaty regime. He therefore urged those delegations participating in the second round of negotiations to bear in mind the vital importance of not undermining the integrity and viability of the Treaty.

47. He fully shared the concerns of delegations that had mentioned the lack of progress towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The Russian Federation recognized its shared responsibility with the United Kingdom and the United States, the other sponsors of the 1995 resolution, for the lack of success achieved to date. However, for its part, the Russian Federation had always worked, and would continue to work, proactively and in good conscience.

48. It should be recalled that the decision not to convene the Helsinki conference in 2012 had been taken without the agreement of the Russian Federation. His delegation had subsequently initiated informal consultations in Geneva on the practical arrangements for convening such a conference with the participation of the majority of countries in the region; it had submitted proposals on the matter to the 2012 Preparatory Committee that had largely been incorporated into the outcome document and had received the support of all but three States parties; and it had also submitted a working paper to the current session, entitled "Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction" ([NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.31](#)), in order to stimulate the resumption of practical work. His delegation would continue its efforts to convene the conference, in close coordination with the Secretary-General, the sponsors of the 1995 resolution and the States of the Middle East.

49. **Mr. Seokolo** (South Africa) said that while the Chair's factual summary was largely a balanced reflection of the discussions held during the session, it was regrettable that the negotiations on an instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons were not mentioned earlier in the text, given that the initiation of that process was one of the most significant developments since the

2015 Review Conference. Furthermore, the draft factual summary failed to mention all of the opportunities and benefits that the adoption of such an instrument would bring, or the call from a number of delegations for all States, including nuclear-weapon States, to participate in the negotiations. The matter of the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons was not given comprehensive coverage in the text, despite the emphasis that many States parties had placed on it. The text should also have been more balanced in its discussion of nuclear security. Efforts to enhance nuclear security must not hamper international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities. Lastly, South Sudan should not be grouped together with the other States that had not acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. His delegation remained committed to the Treaty as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime.

50. **Mr. Mati** (Italy) said that the review cycle had begun on a very positive note. The Chair's factual summary provided an accurate, balanced and comprehensive overview of the discussions and would serve as a good basis for the next session of the Preparatory Committee.

51. **Mr. Rowland** (United Kingdom), reiterating his delegation's commitment to the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, said that an international ban on nuclear weapons would do nothing to achieve the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, improve the international security environment or increase trust and transparency among States.

52. **Mr. Hanney** (Ireland) said that the session had demonstrated the level of support for the rule of law and multilateralism in the international community. His delegation welcomed the strong support for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, IAEA and the joint comprehensive plan of action.

53. Speaking on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, he said that the very brief reference in the Chair's factual summary to the negotiations on the prohibition of nuclear weapons did not accurately convey the emphasis that the matter had been given during the discussions. Paragraph 15 could be improved by including the names of the international conferences that had taken place on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, a reference to the proposed treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons and a reference to the suggestion that the risks of a nuclear weapon detonation could be discussed in the context of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Paragraph 49 did not provide a balanced view of the discussions. The reference to the step-by-step approach to disarmament in paragraph

50 should be followed by a reference to the fact that other States parties did not support the idea of a sequential approach and had noted that there was no reason why those steps could not be pursued alongside the negotiation of a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons.

54. **Mr. Langeland** (Norway) said that the Chair's factual summary was a balanced reflection of the session. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was the cornerstone of international peace and security. The focus of the current review cycle should be to find common ground and points of convergence in order to promote progress on the three pillars of the Treaty.

55. **Mr. Gerschner** (Austria) said that nuclear weapons did not contribute to international stability, and arguments setting out the alleged security benefits of nuclear weapons were simply stimulating proliferation. A legally binding instrument prohibiting nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination, was fully compatible with the Non-Proliferation Treaty and would enhance security for all. Its security benefits should have been mentioned in the draft Chair's factual summary. The elaboration of such a treaty was not an end in itself, however, and would serve as a catalyst for the development of additional nuclear disarmament verification measures and a fissile material cut-off treaty.

56. **Mr. Prokopchuk** (Ukraine) said that the Chair's factual summary was generally comprehensive and accurate. With regard to the reference to the importance of existing security assurances provided by the nuclear-weapon States mentioned in paragraph 44, he reiterated that the breach by the Russian Federation of the 1994 Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine's Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Budapest Memorandum) undermined the credibility of those security assurances and thus the sustainability of the global non-proliferation regime. It was essential to renew full respect for territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders in order to foster confidence in security assurances.

57. **Mr. Eriksson** (Sweden) said that the Chair's factual summary was balanced and exhaustive. Progress was needed on all three pillars of the Treaty. Given the current security climate, efforts in the area of disarmament, including the implementation of the practical steps agreed upon in the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference and other outstanding commitments from previous review cycles, were of particular importance.

58. **Mr. Grossi** (Argentina) said that his delegation had welcomed the Chair's initiative of holding regional-level consultations prior to the session. With regard to the nature of the debate, it was encouraging to note that, despite differences of opinion concerning central aspects of the non-proliferation regime, no delegation had called into question the validity or enforceability of the Treaty. The task at hand was to begin to lay the groundwork for a successful 2020 Review Conference, on the basis of the many significant points of agreement. That would require working in a coordinated and systematic manner, as exemplified by the coordination between the outgoing and incoming Chairs of the Preparatory Committee. Comprehensive preparatory work ahead of the Review Conference could help to create the political will necessary for its success. His delegation would work to identify areas where progress was possible, cooperate in order to move forward and search for compromises.

59. **Mr. Youssef** (Egypt) said that the Chair's factual summary did not reflect the extent of the regret expressed by States parties about the failure to reach a consensus on the final document of the 2015 Review Conference or make any comments on the reasons for that failure. The fact was that certain States had not had the political will to implement the 1995 resolution. Nevertheless, his delegation welcomed the tireless efforts of the Russian Federation to implement that resolution. The text also ignored the calls that had been made by many delegations for all nuclear facilities, including those of Israel, to be placed under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. The discussion of a future treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices should also refer to the issue of stockpiles, as their existence could diminish the impact of the treaty and hinder the achievement of objectives in the area of disarmament.

60. **Mr. Al-Khairalla** (Iraq) said that States parties were clearly united in the view that the Treaty was of central importance to the strengthening of the non-proliferation and disarmament regime and should consequently be preserved, promoted and strengthened. It was one of the primary vehicles for establishing confidence in the contemporary security regime, in the face of the many challenges faced by the international community. The discussions held during the session had demonstrated the interest of delegations in issues such as the humanitarian consequences of the existence of nuclear weapons, the threat posed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the question of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. With regard to the latter, too little was being done to

convene a conference for the establishment of such a zone. Meaningful progress should be made in the near future to that end.

61. **Mr. Confiado** (Philippines) said that a great deal of work needed to be done to address the divergence of views on a number of important issues. However, that should be achievable if the openness and understanding that had characterized discussions during the session continued.

62. **Mr. Quinn** (Australia) said that his delegation welcomed the consultations, in particular the regional seminars, organized by the Chair prior to the session, as well as the move towards the early appointment of Chairs of the Preparatory Committee. While certain aspects of the Chair's summary could be improved, his delegation welcomed the very clear language on the grave and pressing problem of the challenge posed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the Treaty regime and also strongly endorsed the reflections by the Chair, which accurately described the common ground shared by all States parties. It was encouraging to see that work was progressing in a positive direction, despite the challenges ahead.

63. **Mr. Shin Dong-ik** (Republic of Korea) said that a positive start had been made to the review cycle. Delegations would have to work together to build a way forward. The Chair's factual summary was balanced and should serve as a reference document for future discussions. He was grateful to those delegations that had endorsed the statement on the nuclear challenge posed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the Treaty ([NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/13](#)).

64. **Ms. Chotikajan Tang** (Thailand) said that her delegation welcomed the consultations conducted by Chair and the positive contributions made by civil society, academia and industry to the review process. The Chair's factual summary was a comprehensive document that reflected the diverse views expressed during the session.

65. A legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons would complement and strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Furthermore, progress should be made towards the implementation of article VI of the Treaty, including by reaching a consensus on how the steps towards disarmament mentioned in paragraph 50 of the Chair's factual summary could be taken.

66. Her delegation supported the proposal for the Preparatory Committee to base its work on a rolling text so as to enable progress to be carried forward from session to session. It also backed the proposal to

increase the participation of women in the work of the Committee and, in that connection, endorsed the working paper submitted by Ireland on gender, development and nuclear weapons ([NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.38](#)). Her delegation remained committed to working with all States parties in the context of the Preparatory Committee to ensure that the 2020 Review Conference had a sustainable, meaningful, comprehensive and actionable outcome.

67. **Ms. Cabañas Vera** (Cuba) said that the Chair's factual summary was at times unbalanced. It did not accurately reflect the high level of support for matters such as the negotiations on a binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, while other views expressed by only a small number of delegations were portrayed as having received widespread support.

68. **Mr. Bugajski** (Poland) said that, as the Chair of the second session of the Preparatory Committee, he would strive to maintain the inclusiveness and transparency that had characterized the preparations for the first session and created the conditions that had led to fruitful discussion. It was evident that all States parties were in agreement as to the relevance and validity of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime. It had been useful to focus on the core principles of the Treaty at that early stage of the review cycle. The Chair's balanced and accurate factual summary would serve as a useful reference for future deliberations.

69. **Ms. Peña Araque** (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela), speaking on behalf of the Group of States parties belonging to the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, said that the Group welcomed the regional consultations that had taken place prior to the session. It was essential for the 2020 Review Conference to have a successful outcome that would result in the strengthening of the three pillars of the Treaty in a balanced and non-discriminatory manner and in further progress towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. The Heads of State and Government of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, at their XVII Conference Summit held in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in September 2016, had expressed their intention to increase their efforts to eliminate the threat to humanity posed by the existence of weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons. Those countries would therefore participate constructively in the upcoming sessions of the Preparatory Committee and the 2020 Review Conference.

70. **Mr. Bouchaara** (Morocco) said that his country was committed to working to give the 2020 Review Conference every chance of success.

71. **Mr. Adjabi** (Algeria) said that the Chair's factual summary was generally balanced but should have better reflected the views expressed by his delegation and other members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. In that regard, his delegation endorsed the comments on the text made by the representative of Brazil. The discussions on the 1995 resolution, the legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons and the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons should also have been portrayed more accurately.

72. **Mr. Kishida** (Japan) said that his delegation wished to emphasize the importance of the reflections by the Chair. It was committed to contributing to the review process and hoped that, ahead of the second session of the Committee, all States parties would work together to build upon their common achievements, whilst bearing in mind their differences of opinion, in order to sustain the momentum generated during the current session. To that end, he encouraged States parties to focus on common ground as much as possible and to work together to uphold and strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

73. **Mr. De Salazar Serantes** (Spain) said that his delegation, while noting that many complex issues remained unresolved, welcomed the constructive and cordial atmosphere that had pervaded the session. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was primarily concerned with enhancing security and stability, which was not a zero-sum game but would benefit all countries. States parties should therefore approach the review process as members of a community with shared security interests.

74. **The Chair** said that during the regional consultations that had taken place prior to the first session, States parties had expressed frustration and doubts about the future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty while also recognizing that the Treaty had served a useful purpose thus far. The failure to adopt a final document at the 2015 Review Conference and the symbolic importance of the year 2020 as the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaty had made it particularly important to achieve a solid start to the review cycle, which was why he had organized those consultations and had placed such an emphasis on inclusiveness and transparency.

75. The discussions held during the first session had been remarkably constructive, especially given the complexity of the current global climate. In the draft of

his factual summary he had striven to reflect the richness of the debate as objectively as possible, in order to provide a sound basis for further discussion and action during the review cycle.

76. He welcomed the comments made by delegations, which would contribute to the debate, and trusted that the excellent atmosphere and the open and results-based approach would be maintained during the upcoming sessions of the Preparatory Committee and at the 2020 Review Conference itself.

77. *After an exchange of courtesies, the Chair declared the first session of the Preparatory Committee closed.*

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.