

2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Implementation of the action plan agreed at the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Report submitted by Poland

Pursuant to the request of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and in line with action 20 of the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted at the 2010 Review Conference, Poland submits its report, which outlines the steps and measures undertaken to implement all the provisions of the Treaty. The present report updates the information provided in Poland's report to the first Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference. It has been structured according to the reporting template in the working document of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative on transparency by non-nuclear-weapon States parties submitted at the 2015 Review Conference.

Action number

Examples of information to include (if applicable)

Nuclear disarmament

1	Summary of national policy on nuclear disarmament, including any relevant initiatives and actions which serve to illustrate the policy.	Poland strongly encourages all nuclear-weapon States to continue, in good faith, their efforts aimed at achieving the long-term objective of eliminating nuclear weapons.
	Membership in regional and/or multilateral groups that promote nuclear disarmament.	Poland welcomes the ongoing implementation of New START, extended for further five years as agreed by its parties in February 2021. Poland supports the ongoing talks in the frame of the strategic stability dialogue between the Russian Federation and the United States and encourages them to advance further steps in line with the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency.



<i>Action number</i>	<i>Examples of information to include (if applicable)</i>
	<p>Since 2010, Poland has taken an active part in the work of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative. The main goal of the Initiative is to take forward the consensus outcomes of the 2010 Review Conference and jointly advance the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation agendas as mutually reinforcing processes.</p> <p>The Initiative submitted a number of working papers during the 2020 Review Conference cycle, calling for concrete steps towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. The papers refer to such issues as the reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear arsenals, the enhancement of the reporting mechanism as a key transparency measure, the fissile material cut-off treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.</p>
2	<p>National policy on irreversibility, verifiability and transparency, including any relevant initiatives and actions which serve to illustrate the policy.</p> <p>Support for relevant General Assembly resolutions that support irreversibility, verifiability and transparency.</p> <p>Poland attaches the utmost importance to the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of its treaty obligations.</p> <p>Together with the member States of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, Poland has been promoting, in particular, the issue of transparency in nuclear disarmament. To this end, the Initiative submitted two working papers to the 2017 and 2018 Preparatory Committees with a new reporting template that can be used by all States parties to provide information on the implementation of the 2010 action plan.</p> <p>The issue of transparency was brought to the attention of nuclear-weapon States on numerous occasions, including during the meetings of the Initiative with the five permanent members of the Security Council and in the working papers on transparency that the Initiative submitted during the current review cycle.</p> <p>In March 2015, Poland joined the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification. Future nuclear disarmament agreements will require high-level expertise, which is necessary to fulfil all the commitments related to the total dismantlement of nuclear weapons. Poland was a Co-Chair of one</p>

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	<p>of the working groups during the first two phases of the Partnership and attended the meetings of other working groups. Poland remains involved in the current works of the Initiative.</p> <p>Since 2019, Poland has participated in the Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament meetings. The initiative is focused on improving the security environment, reducing risks related to nuclear weapons and advancing further progress on nuclear disarmament.</p>
3	<p>(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States) Not applicable.</p> <p>Summary of unilateral measures to reduce national stockpiles of nuclear weapons.</p> <p>Summary of bilateral measures to reduce national stockpiles of nuclear weapons.</p> <p>Summary of multilateral measures to reduce national stockpiles of nuclear weapons.</p>
4	<p>(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States) Not applicable.</p> <p>Current information on aggregate numbers of deployed nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles as per the most recent reporting through the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START).</p> <p>Summary of recent inspections of facilities through New START.</p> <p>Summary of any meetings of the Bilateral Consultative Commission established by New START.</p> <p>Summary of bilateral meetings to discuss future nuclear reduction agreements.</p>
5 (a)	<p>(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States) Not applicable.</p> <p>Information on the overall reductions in the national nuclear weapons stockpile since the last Non-Proliferation Treaty report (if applicable)</p> <p>Information on the overall reductions in the national stockpile of delivery vehicles since the last Non-Proliferation Treaty report (if applicable)</p>

<i>Action number</i>	<i>Examples of information to include (if applicable)</i>
	<p>Aggregate information about reductions during the five review cycles since the Non-Proliferation Treaty was indefinitely extended: 1995–2000, 2000–2005, 2005–2010, 2010–2015 and 2015–now</p>
5 (b)	<p>(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States) Not applicable.</p> <p>Information on the current stockpile of all types of nuclear warhead and their delivery vehicles, including deployed and non-deployed, strategic and non-strategic, and those awaiting dismantlement, as well as their locations.</p> <p>Information should be provided in the following categories for both nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles. For nuclear warheads: (i) total number of nuclear warheads under the control of the reporting State, including those awaiting dismantlement, (ii) aggregate number of nuclear warheads in stockpile (both deployed and non-deployed, but excluding those awaiting dismantlement), (iii) number of strategic nuclear warheads, (iv) number of non-strategic nuclear warheads, (v) number of strategic deployed nuclear warheads, (vi) number of non-strategic deployed nuclear warheads, (vii) number of strategic non-deployed nuclear warheads, (viii) number of non-strategic non-deployed nuclear warheads.</p> <p>For delivery vehicles of nuclear warheads: (i) total number of delivery vehicles under the control of the reporting State, including those awaiting dismantlement, (ii) aggregate number of delivery vehicles in stockpile (both deployed and non-deployed, but excluding those awaiting dismantlement), (iii) number of strategic delivery vehicles by type (missiles, aircraft, submarines, artillery, others), (iv) number of non-strategic delivery vehicles by type (same as above), (v) number of strategic deployed delivery vehicles by type (same as above), (vi) number of non-strategic deployed delivery vehicles by type (same as above), (vii) number of strategic non-deployed delivery vehicles by type (same as above), (viii) number of</p>

*Action number**Examples of information to include (if applicable)*

non-strategic non-deployed delivery vehicles by type (same as above).

Information on current stockpiles of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

Information should be provided in the following categories: (i) aggregate amount of plutonium produced for national security purposes/nuclear weapons purposes (in metric tons), (ii) aggregate amount of high-enriched uranium produced for national security purposes/nuclear weapons purposes (in metric tons), (iii) amount of fissile material declared excess for national security purposes/nuclear weapons (in metric tons).

(Note: nuclear weapons purposes are a subcategory of national security purposes, which includes military purposes other than nuclear weapons, such as for naval fuel.)

5 (c) (Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States) Not applicable.

Measures taken, or in the process of being taken, to diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies.

Information on the scope and focus of policy reviews, either scheduled, underway or completed, relating to nuclear weapon stockpiles, nuclear doctrine or nuclear posture.

5 (d) (Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States) Not applicable.

Summary of discussions on policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons and eventually lead to their elimination, lessen the danger of nuclear war and contribute to the non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons.

5 (e) (Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States) Not applicable.

Measures taken, or in the process of being taken, to reduce the operational readiness of the reporting State's nuclear arsenal.

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	<p>Summary of efforts to engage Non-Proliferation Treaty non-nuclear-weapon States on reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons.</p>
5 (f)	<p>(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States) Not applicable.</p> <p>Measures taken, or in the process of being taken, to reduce the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.</p>
5 (g)	<p>(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States) Not applicable.</p> <p>Summary of any unilateral, bilateral or multilateral confidence- and security-building measures to enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence as well as those measures put in place with regard to nuclear weapons.</p>
6	<p>Support for the establishment of a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to deal with nuclear disarmament, including through support for relevant draft Conference programmes of work, Non-Proliferation Treaty working papers and/or General Assembly resolutions.</p> <p>Participation in any working groups on nuclear disarmament.</p> <p>During its presidency of the Conference on Disarmament, Poland worked actively and constructively to reach consensus on the establishment of a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work, notably by submitting, on 28 June 2016, a document with the proposed programme of work.</p>
7	<p>Support for the establishment of a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to discuss effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, including through support for relevant draft Conference programmes of work, Non-Proliferation Treaty working papers and/or General Assembly resolutions.</p> <p>Poland supports the discussion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work. In our view, such a discussion should be comprehensive and include an assessment of the implementation of and compliance with existing negative security assurances.</p> <p>Poland is a member of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, which produced a working paper entitled “Nuclear-weapon-free zones and negative security assurances” for the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference. That paper stressed the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in receiving unequivocal and legally binding security assurances.</p>

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8	<p>(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States) Not applicable.</p> <p>Description of unilateral, bilateral and multilateral security assurances provided to Non-Proliferation Treaty non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.</p>
9	<p>(For all States)</p> <p>National efforts to support the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties.</p> <p>Support for relevant General Assembly resolutions and/or Non-Proliferation Treaty working papers that support the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.</p> <p>Name of the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty to which your country is party.</p> <p>Poland supports the development and establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones freely established in accordance with the universally agreed principle mentioned in the relevant guidelines agreed by the Disarmament Commission.</p> <p>Poland was in favour of General Assembly resolutions on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in concerned regions (most recently, resolutions 75/30, 75/33, 75/41 and 75/67).</p> <p>As part of the European Union, Poland supported all efforts (such as workshops and seminars) aimed at facilitating a conference on the weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the Middle East which took place from 18 to 22 November 2019 in New York.</p> <p>(For nuclear-weapon States)</p> <p>(Not applicable)</p> <p>Summary of efforts (including current status and future prospect) to ratify the relevant protocols of nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties or to remove any reservations on the ratification of such protocols.</p> <p>Current status of consultations and cooperation on entry into force of the relevant protocols of nuclear-weapon-free zones.</p>
10	<p>(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States) Not applicable.</p> <p>Current status of signature and ratification (including dates of signature and ratification) of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and summary of efforts to complete the ratification of the Treaty (if applicable).</p> <p>Summary of efforts to encourage Annex 2 States to sign and ratify the Treaty.</p>

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11	<p>Date of signature and ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.</p> <p>Current status of the reporting State's policy on the moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions.</p> <p>Poland signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty on 24 September 1996 and ratified it on 25 May 1999.</p> <p>Poland supports maintaining the moratorium on nuclear test explosions.</p>
12	<p>Confirmation that the commitment was met to report at the 2011 Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (Article XIV Conference) on progress made towards the urgent entry into force of that Treaty.</p> <p>Summary of reports made at the subsequent Article XIV Conferences on progress made towards the entry into force of the Treaty.</p> <p>As a member State of the European Union, Poland contributed to the European Union reports on the progress made towards the urgent entry into force of the Treaty.</p>
13	<p>Activities to promote the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at the national, regional and global levels, in particular a summary of efforts to encourage all States that have yet to do so to sign and ratify the Treaty (for example, positions on General Assembly resolutions; participation in Article XIV Conferences or ministerial meetings in support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; participation in Non-Proliferation Treaty working papers and/or national, regional and multilateral activities).</p> <p>Summary of national efforts to fully implement the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (for example, national legislation or policies).</p> <p>List any nationals who participate in the Group of Eminent Persons of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.</p> <p>As a member State of the European Union, Poland supported all relevant European Union statements, positions, initiatives and financial contributions aimed at facilitating the entry into force of the Treaty, in particular Council of the European Union decision 2015/1837 of 12 October 2015 on European Union support for the activities of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in order to strengthen its monitoring and verification capabilities and in the framework of the implementation of the European Union Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.</p> <p>The Political Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland participated in the ninth ministerial meeting in support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in September 2018. Poland was represented at a high political level at the Conferences convened in accordance with article XIV of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty that took place in 2019 and 2021.</p> <p>During the 2020 Non-Proliferation Treaty review cycle, Poland, together with the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative partners, submitted a working</p>

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14	<p>document on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.</p> <p>Poland also supported the most recent General Assembly resolution on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, resolution 75/78.</p> <p>Poland does not host any International Monitoring System stations. However, Poland is committed to the strengthening of the verification regime of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. We undertook internal efforts to mobilize a group of national experts that can support the work of the Organization.</p> <p>Summary of national efforts to construct, complete and/or certify International Monitoring System stations.</p> <p>Summary of national efforts to help the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization strengthen its verification regime (for example, workshops, seminars, training, exercises, voluntary funding contributions and/or in-kind contributions).</p> <p>Summary of national efforts to help develop the Organization's on-site inspection capabilities.</p>
15	<p>Support for launching negotiations on a treaty to ban the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, including through support for relevant draft Conference on Disarmament programmes of work, General Assembly resolutions and/or Non-Proliferation Treaty working papers.</p> <p>Poland supports the launch of negotiations on a treaty to ban the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. This was reflected by voting in favour of General Assembly resolution 71/259, which, inter alia, called for the establishment of a high-level fissile material cut-off treaty expert preparatory group to make recommendations on substantial elements of a future fissile material cut-off treaty.</p> <p>Summary of contributions to the Group of Governmental Experts on the subject.</p> <p>In 2017 and 2018, a Polish representative was a member of the above-mentioned group and took part in its work.</p>
16	<p>Information on any current status and future plans, including amount and timeframe, to: (i) declare to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) any fissile material designated as no longer required for military purposes; (ii) place such material under IAEA or other relevant international verification; and/or (iii) arrange for the disposition of such material.</p> <p>Not applicable.</p>

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17	<p>Information on the status of the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements to ensure the irreversible removal of excess fissile material.</p> <p>Proposals and/or statements made in support of the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements to ensure the irreversible removal of excess fissile material from military stockpiles by nuclear-weapon States.</p>	<p>Poland, together with the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, submitted a working paper to the 2013 Preparatory Committee entitled “Wider application of safeguards in the nuclear-weapon States”, which included a recommendation to nuclear-weapon States to consider placing “excess” nuclear material under IAEA verification in such a manner as to make it irreversible. The Initiative’s working paper submitted to the 2015 Review Conference also covered that issue.</p>
18	<p>Information on any current or future plans to dismantle or convert to peaceful uses facilities that produce fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes.</p> <p>Confirmation that domestic nuclear facilities do not produce fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.</p>	<p>Poland has never had facilities for the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. None of the Polish domestic facilities produce or are suitable for producing fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.</p>
19	<p>Any cooperation among Governments, the United Nations and civil society aimed at increasing confidence, improving transparency and developing efficient verification capabilities related to nuclear disarmament.</p> <p>Summary of national, regional and international efforts to promote greater transparency, confidence and efficiency in the verification of nuclear disarmament.</p>	<p>Poland, together with members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, presented three working papers devoted to the issue of transparency to the 2017, 2018 and 2019 Preparatory Committees. The papers encouraged nuclear-weapon States to agree on a standard reporting form to meet their disarmament reporting obligations, and presented a reporting template to be used by all States and concrete proposals to enhance national reporting.</p> <p>Since 2015, Poland has been a member of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification and has contributed to its work by participating in working groups and by chairing one of them during the first two phases. Poland remains involved in the current works of the Initiative.</p>
20	<p>Year and official document symbol of regular reports on the implementation of article VI, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 decision entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament” and the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.</p>	<p>Poland has been regularly reporting on its activities to implement its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty to each Review Conference. The previous report was submitted to the 2017 Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/3).</p>

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21	<p>(For nuclear-weapon States)</p> <p>(Not applicable)</p> <p>Any agreed standard reporting form and determined reporting intervals.</p> <p>Summary of efforts to agree on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals for the purpose of voluntarily providing standard information without prejudice to national security.</p> <p>(For non-nuclear-weapon States)</p> <p>Summary of efforts to encourage the nuclear-weapon States to agree on a standard reporting form and an appropriate reporting interval.</p>
22	<p>Summary of efforts to promote education on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation (for example, contributions to the report of the Secretary General, adding the subject to school curricula, seminars, conferences, exhibitions, partnerships with civil society, public events, social media events and contests).</p> <p>Poland, with the support of other countries and the Office for Disarmament Affairs, organized a side event entitled “United Nations Study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education – What’s Next?”, which took place on 3 October 2016 at the margins of the First Committee. The purpose of the side event was to bring together the co-authors of the “United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education”, as well as other stakeholders, with the aim of looking back at what has been achieved since 2002 and taking a new fresh look at the future of disarmament and non-proliferation education in the digital age.</p>
Nuclear non-proliferation	
23	<p>Summary of efforts to promote universal adherence to the Treaty.</p> <p>Poland, during bilateral talks with countries that are not parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, has been regularly calling upon those countries to join the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. These calls were also made in statements delivered in relevant multilateral forums.</p>
24	<p>Summary of safeguards agreements concluded with IAEA, such as a comprehensive safeguards agreement, additional protocols and/or modified small quantities protocols.</p> <p>Poland ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty on 12 June 1969, and it came into force on 5 May 1970.</p> <p>The comprehensive safeguards agreement between Poland and IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection</p>

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	<p>with the Treaty entered into force on 11 October 1972. Moreover, in order to ensure the highest possible level of transparency, the additional protocol to the agreement between Poland and IAEA was ratified on 5 May 2000. Following Poland's accession to the European Union, the safeguards agreement concluded between the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and IAEA, as well as the corresponding additional protocol, came into force for Poland on 1 March 2007. As a result, the previous comprehensive safeguards agreement and the additional protocol were suspended. Poland continuously supports the strengthening of IAEA and Euratom safeguards systems and believes that the agreement between Poland, Euratom and IAEA, as well as the additional protocol thereto, represents the highest current verification standards for safeguards and non-proliferation.</p>
25	<p>Summary of efforts to conclude or implement a comprehensive safeguards agreement, or to facilitate and encourage others to do so.</p> <p>Poland has been consistently encouraging States that have not yet done so to conclude or implement comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with additional protocols. Poland considers such agreements and protocols to represent the current verification standard. Poland constantly stresses this in statements delivered in relevant multilateral forums, inter alia, in the Board of Governors of IAEA, of which it is a member (2020–2022).</p>
26	<p>Summary of national efforts to comply with non-proliferation obligations.</p> <p>Examples of initiatives, including through Non-Proliferation Treaty working papers, that promote high international standards of compliance.</p> <p>Summary of IAEA conclusions on the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.</p> <p>Poland remains unequivocally committed to its obligation under article II of the Treaty, namely, not to transfer, manufacture or receive control over nuclear weapons. The trade, import, export, acquisition, brokering or transport of weapons of mass destruction, whether nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or their components, through the territory of Poland are explicitly prohibited under Polish law. In this respect, the Atomic Law of 29 November 2000 with subsequent amendments (including a major amendment in November 2019), and the Law on Foreign Trading in Goods, Technologies and Services of</p>

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27	<p>Summary of national steps taken to address cases of non-compliance with non-proliferation obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including the implementation of sanctions regimes imposed by the Security Council or statements in relevant international forums, such as the General Conference or the Board of Governors of IAEA.</p> <p>Strategic Importance to the Security of the State and to Maintaining International Peace and Security of 29 November 2000, as amended in August 2019, deserve a mention. In addition, the Polish Criminal Code provides for criminal sanctions against any person who, in violation of international law, produces, stockpiles, acquires, sells or transports weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear weapons) or other means of combat, or conducts research aimed at producing or using such weapons.</p> <p>IAEA confirms compliance by Poland with its non-proliferation obligations.</p> <p>Poland abides by the highest standards of compliance with its non-proliferation commitments and obligations, and cooperates fully with IAEA. Poland calls upon all States to cooperate fully with IAEA and to comply with their international safeguards obligations. In January 2017, Poland provided an extrabudgetary contribution for IAEA to carry out verification activities in support of the joint plan of action of the five plus one group and the Islamic Republic of Iran.</p> <p>Poland condemned the sixth nuclear test conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in September 2017 by both issuing a national statement and supporting declarations made as part of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative. Poland submitted information on the measures it had undertaken in order to implement the provisions of Security Council resolution 2375 (2017).</p>
28	<p>Date of signature and entry into force of an additional protocol to an agreement with IAEA.</p> <p>Summary of efforts to implement the additional protocol or to encourage and enable others to do so.</p> <p>The additional protocol to the safeguards agreement between Poland and IAEA entered into force on 5 May 2000. Since 1 March 2007, Poland is a party to the additional protocol concluded between European Union member States, Euratom and IAEA (INFCIRC/193/Add.8). Poland continuously supports the strengthening of IAEA and Euratom safeguards systems and believes that the agreement between Poland, Euratom and IAEA and the additional protocol represent the current</p>

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		verification standard for safeguards and non-proliferation.
29	Summary of national, regional and/or multilateral efforts to promote or assist other States in concluding or implementing a comprehensive safeguards agreement.	Not available.
30	Summary of support for efforts to apply safeguards more widely in nuclear-weapon States (for example, Non-Proliferation Treaty working papers).	The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative presented a working paper entitled “Nuclear safeguards standards under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” to the 2018 Preparatory Committee.
31	Efforts to amend or rescind an existing small quantities protocol.	Poland has never had a small quantities protocol.
32	Summary of efforts to review and evaluate IAEA safeguards.	Not available.
33	Summary of the status of payment of assessed contributions to IAEA. Summary of extrabudgetary, voluntary and/or in-kind contributions to IAEA.	Poland regularly pays its assessed contributions to IAEA. The payment covers a contribution to the regular budget and to the Technical Cooperation Fund.
34	Summary of contributions to the development of an international technology base to help improve IAEA safeguards.	Not available.
35	Summary of efforts in export control regimes (for example, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee and the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies) and other arrangements (for example, domestic legislation or bilateral agreements) that help to ensure that nuclear-related exports do not lead to proliferation.	As a member of both the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee, Poland implements its obligations under article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty by controlling its exports in accordance with the provisions of the article, according to which each State party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material; or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material is subject to the safeguards required by the article. Poland also cooperates in the framework of the information exchange system aimed at providing the States members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group with national control system refusals regarding dual-use products. Polish responsibilities

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36	<p>Summary of the implementation of nuclear export control lists in domestic export control legislation and/or regulations.</p>
37	<p>Summary of efforts to show that the compliance record of a recipient State is taken into account in making nuclear export decisions.</p>
38	<p>Support for the legitimate right of States to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, such as by providing a list of developing States with which nuclear cooperation agreements have been completed.</p>

under article III, paragraph 2, are also fulfilled through participation in the European Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items.

Poland is the Chair of the Nuclear Suppliers Group for the period 2021–2022 and will host the plenary meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group in June 2022.

Poland participates in the Missile Technology Control Regime and implements its guidelines, which restrict the proliferation of the means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons.

Poland continues to strengthen its borders against the possible illicit transfer of vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials.

Poland pays special attention to the nuclear export control of strategic and dual-use items. The administrative requirements related to nuclear exports are outlined in the Act on foreign trade in goods, technologies and services of strategic importance to the security of the State and to maintaining international peace and security (last amended in August 2019) and corresponding regulations.

Poland applies the legislation of the European Union which is based on IAEA information circulars 254/Part 1 and Part 2.

Decisions on nuclear export to any country are based on the status of the safeguards agreement between IAEA and the recipient State.

Poland is not a significant exporter of nuclear technology or nuclear material. Poland does not have agreements in the field of the peaceful use of nuclear energy and technology with developing countries.

For other nuclear cooperation agreements concluded by Poland, please see action 51.

<i>Action number</i>		<i>Examples of information to include (if applicable)</i>
39	<p>Summary of the key policy criteria considered when determining whether to engage in nuclear cooperation with a State.</p> <p>Efforts to facilitate international cooperation and the transfer of nuclear technology.</p>	<p>Two different policy criteria are considered when determining whether to engage in nuclear cooperation with a State, both of which are crucial.</p> <p>The first criterion is a high level of nuclear expertise and state of nuclear power development in the State that would make nuclear cooperation attractive to Poland in various aspects of the Polish nuclear power programme, such as industry involvement, human resources development and radioactive waste management.</p> <p>The second criterion is to be a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and comply with all relevant international obligations under the Treaty, as well as under other relevant international conventions.</p>
40	<p>Summary of efforts to strengthen the physical protection of nuclear facilities, in particular by the national regulatory agency.</p> <p>Summary of efforts undertaken to implement commitments made as part of the Nuclear Security Summit process.</p>	<p>Poland has been an active participant in the Nuclear Security Summit process since the first meeting in Washington, D.C., in 2010. Since 2016, we have been a member of the Nuclear Security Contact Group. Poland has taken concrete steps to minimize the threat of nuclear terrorism and to strengthen nuclear security. Detailed information on the subject has been provided through the Nuclear Security National Progress Report, submitted during the last Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C., in 2016. Poland continues to participate at a high level in the IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security series.</p> <p>Nuclear safety and security issues are of utmost importance for Poland, which is a party to all relevant multilateral legal instruments, in particular those created under the auspices of IAEA. Poland finished the conversion of the Maria research reactor from high-enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium in 2014, thus contributing to enhancing nuclear security.</p> <p>Poland actively participated in the process aimed at amending the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and ratified its amendment on 1 June 2007. Poland also participated in the work of the</p>

*Action number**Examples of information to include (if applicable)*

	<p>Preparatory Committee for the Conference of the Parties to the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and will participate in the above-mentioned Conference scheduled for the week of 28 March 2022.</p> <p>The IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service mission was conducted in Poland in 2016. Poland is at an advanced stage of implementing the recommendations stemming from the mission and will request a follow-up mission to take place in 2024. Poland has also announced to IAEA its willingness to provide experts to IAEA Advisory Service missions. Polish expert to participate in a mission in November 2021.</p> <p>In 2019, Poland hosted an Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan mission to identify and prioritize its nuclear security needs and develop an action plan for the implementation of nuclear security activities.</p> <p>Poland also hosted a national threat assessment and design basis threat workshop in March 2020. The workshop was held as a result of the recent revision of the Atomic Law Act, which incorporated strengthened provisions relating to nuclear security, particularly with regard to the development of a national design basis threat. A task force was set up to develop the design basis threat, which will be completed before the end of 2021.</p>
41	<p>Summary of efforts to apply the IAEA recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected)).</p> <p>Timeline for any national reviews of physical protection policies and practices that have been planned or accomplished.</p> <p>Poland actively participates in IAEA activities related to the preparation or revision of Nuclear Security Series publications through participation in the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee.</p> <p>Following the 2016 International Physical Protection Advisory Service mission, follow-up action included a review of the existing legal framework and the identification of amendments necessary to ensure full compliance with the latest international recommendations and good practices, with due consideration to IAEA Nuclear Security</p>

<i>Action number</i>	<i>Examples of information to include (if applicable)</i>
	<p>Series documents, including the Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5). An upcoming revised regulation on the physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities will incorporate the guidance from INFCIRC/225/Rev.5. A major revision of the provisions relating to physical protection and nuclear security in the Atomic Law Act is planned for 2022.</p>
42	<p>Summary of progress in signing, ratifying and implementing the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.</p> <p>Summary of efforts to promote the ratification and implementation of the amended Convention.</p> <p>Poland ratified the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material on 1 June 2007.</p>
43	<p>Summary of steps taken to implement the principles of the revised IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.</p> <p>Summary of steps taken to implement the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.</p> <p>Poland has implemented the principles of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and of the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.</p> <p>Poland has established an effective national legislative and regulatory system of control over the management and protection of radioactive sources. The system has been successively improved in accordance with international recommendations and achievements in this field.</p>
44	<p>Summary of efforts to strengthen national capabilities against the illicit trafficking of nuclear material.</p> <p>Summary of efforts to provide assistance to other States to strengthen national capabilities against illicit trafficking of nuclear material (for example, the Nuclear Security Summit and the G-8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction).</p> <p>Information about participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative.</p> <p>Information about participation in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.</p> <p>Poland maintains a complex radiometric control system at the country's borders. Due to the fact that Poland is geographically located at the intersection of main transit routes, it plays an important role in preventing illicit trafficking. In recent years, the radiometric control system has been modernized thanks to the cooperation between Poland and the United States in the framework of the Second Line of Defense Program. In the event of an incident involving nuclear or other radioactive material or data being obtained from the detection system, a special report is submitted to the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database. Poland has provided reports to the</p>

<i>Action number</i>	<i>Examples of information to include (if applicable)</i>
<p>Summary of any reports provided in accordance with Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).</p> <p>Status of participation in the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database.</p>	<p>Database from the very beginning of its existence.</p> <p>Poland has also taken concrete actions with respect to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by non-State actors. We promote effective practices that implement Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and actively participate in the Proliferation Security Initiative, hosting a regional workshop and table-top exercise in May 2019 with the aim of reviewing and discussing a range of activities and practices associated with the effective implementation of weapons of mass destruction counterproliferation operations under the Proliferation Security Initiative. Poland was the principal actor in the exercise, but the scenario was developed to highlight and indicate the role played by the international community and regional partners and neighbours. The workshop, held in Janów Podlaski, close to the eastern border of Poland (and the European Union), was intended to engage the countries of the Nordic, Baltic Sea and Central and Eastern Europe regions. The participants were security officers with decision-making responsibilities related to counterproliferation, border security policy and implementation. The workshop contributed to the enhancement of regional counterproliferation cooperation by allowing partners to exchange information and best practices regarding operational weapons of mass destruction interdiction procedures and capabilities through briefings, a scenario-based table-top exercise, a round-table discussion and a field trip to border crossings.</p> <p>Poland is also involved in the work of the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.</p> <p>In 2016, Poland finalized the review of national regulations concerning non-proliferation. The result is the national interdiction mechanism, which is the decision matrix in the event of the need to interdict the shipment of weapons</p>

<i>Action number</i>	<i>Examples of information to include (if applicable)</i>
	<p>of mass destruction. The main goal of the comprehensive review was to ensure that Polish authorities are well prepared to stop entities, in particular non-State actors, from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.</p> <p>Poland is also a member of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. In 2017, the Polish delegation actively participated in the Vigilant Marmot workshop organized under the Initiative. The workshop was focused on addressing challenges in adopting or updating national legal frameworks to effectively prosecute nuclear terrorism offences and to fulfil obligations under international legal instruments against radiological and nuclear terrorism.</p> <p>Poland has participated in all Nuclear Security Summits. Since 2016, we have been a member of the Nuclear Security Contact Group, which facilitates the cooperation of interested countries in the field of nuclear security.</p> <p>Poland submits regular reports to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004).</p>
45	<p>Summary of progress in signing, ratifying and implementing the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.</p> <p>Poland ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism on 8 April 2010.</p>
46	<p>Summary of efforts to establish and maintain a State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material.</p> <p>Summary of cooperation with IAEA on the accounting and control of nuclear materials.</p> <p>Poland fully cooperates with IAEA and Euratom in their safeguards verification activities carried out in connection with nuclear facilities and nuclear material present in Poland.</p> <p>The first approach to the establishment of a State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material began in the 1970s when the comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA entered into force. Since then, strengthening measures have been applied to national regulatory controls of nuclear material.</p> <p>Currently, IAEA carries out the following types of inspections: interim and physical inventory verification and unannounced and short-notice random inspections. Based on its own criteria and decisions</p>

<i>Action number</i>	<i>Examples of information to include (if applicable)</i>
Peaceful uses of nuclear energy	and the arrangement agreed between Poland and IAEA, the Agency carries out complementary access visits.
47 Summary of the types of peaceful uses of nuclear energy being pursued nationally (for example, power generation, mining, medical uses and agricultural uses).	<p>There are currently no nuclear power plants in Poland. One research reactor, Maria (with a total capacity of 30 MW), is located at the National Centre for Nuclear Research in Świerk, near Warsaw. The reactor is one of the leading producers of medical radioisotopes (molybdenum-99) in the world. The National Centre for Nuclear Research is also a producer of, inter alia, various types of nuclear accelerators.</p> <p>As in most developed countries, nuclear technologies are used in Poland in the medical sector (for example, hospitals) and for various types of industrial applications (for example, material checks, food sterilizations and environmental protection).</p>
48 Summary of the national policy on nuclear cooperation.	<p>Poland, as a country that is preparing to develop a nuclear power programme, relies to a large extent on the experience of countries with developed nuclear power programmes.</p> <p>The exchange of experience and other cooperation in some cases is executed on the basis of the memorandums of cooperation that the former Minister of Economy/Minister of Energy signed with counterparts in Japan, the Republic of Korea, the United States and the People's Republic of China.</p> <p>The bilateral cooperation takes the form of study visits, conferences, seminars and fellowships.</p> <p>Poland is also developing cooperation within the scope of national industry involvement, mainly through the organization of trade missions abroad.</p>
49 Summary of national, regional and/or multilateral efforts to assist developing States through the IAEA technical cooperation programme.	Polish nuclear institutions are open to supporting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in developing States. Each year, several fellows and scientific visitors from developing States come to Poland via technical cooperation programmes to

Action number	Examples of information to include (if applicable)
50	<p>Summary of the types of nuclear cooperation undertaken nationally, in particular in developing States (for example, natural resources, medical, agricultural, power generation, safety and security and technical training).</p>
51	<p>List of the total number of nuclear cooperation agreements in place or awaiting implementation.</p> <p>List of the total number of countries with which nuclear cooperation agreements are in effect (see actions 37 and 38).</p>
52	<p>Summary of any voluntary or in-kind contributions made to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund.</p> <p>Summary of efforts to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, accountability and transparency of the Fund.</p>
53	<p>Summary of efforts in the IAEA Board of Governors Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee.</p> <p>Summary of efforts to improve the design, implementation and oversight of the Technical Cooperation Fund.</p>
54	<p>Summary of any national position on funding for the Technical Cooperation Fund.</p> <p>Rate of attainment on assessed voluntary contributions to the Fund.</p> <p>Extrabudgetary contributions to IAEA for technical cooperation.</p>
55	<p>Summary of any voluntary or in-kind contributions to the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative.</p>

get familiar with the knowledge and experience of Polish nuclear institutions, including research and the industrial and medical applications of nuclear energy.

See action 49 above.

Nuclear cooperation agreements in place: 4 (with Japan, the Republic of Korea, the United States and the People's Republic of China).

The National Liaison Officers, National Liaison Assistants and National Counterparts of Poland take part in managing the Fund through technical cooperation at the level of the European region. The planning and implementation of technical cooperation cycles is strictly followed and supported by national liaisons and counterparts through technical cooperation regional meetings of the National Liaison Officers.

Poland observes the work of the Board of Governors Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee. On a yearly basis, the Polish delegation meets with technical cooperation representatives to discuss the design, implementation and oversight of the Technical Cooperation Fund in national and international contexts.

In the past decade, Poland has transferred the full amount of its voluntary contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund each year (€697,075 in 2019, and €679,831 in 2020).

Not available.

Action number	Examples of information to include (if applicable)
56	<p>Summary of efforts to provide technical training on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to other States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.</p> <p>Polish institutions regularly host IAEA fellows from other member States. In 2018, 14 IAEA fellows and, in 2019, 12 IAEA fellows were hosted by Polish institutions. The topics of the fellowships were medical applications, industry applications and research reactors.</p> <p>Poland organizes IAEA training courses and workshops in different technical areas. In 2018, there were eight such events and, in 2019, there were three events hosted by Polish institutions.</p>
57	<p>Title and date of key national legislation on nuclear energy.</p> <p>Date of ratification of a safeguards agreement with IAEA, as well as an additional protocol (see actions 24 and 28, as applicable).</p> <p>Title of legislation and regulations for nuclear energy.</p> <p>Confirmation of the application of IAEA safety standards and security guidance, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the Amendment thereto and/or the domestic application of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.</p> <p>The Atomic Law Act of 29 November 2000 with later amendments (last substantial amendment in 2019) is the main national legislation related to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear technologies.</p> <p>The comprehensive safeguards agreement between Poland and IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty entered into force on 11 October 1972. The additional protocol to the agreement between Poland and IAEA was ratified on 5 May 2000. It was subsequently superseded by the safeguards agreement concluded between Euratom and IAEA, as well as the corresponding additional protocol, which came into force in Poland on 1 March 2007.</p> <p>Polish nuclear law requires that IAEA safety standards and nuclear security guidance be taken into account when establishing national requirements.</p> <p>The requirements of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material were incorporated into the national law before the Amendment entered into force.</p> <p>The Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources was incorporated into domestic law through:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 20 February 2007 on the terms for import into the territory of the Republic of Poland, export from the territory of Poland and transit through the territory of nuclear materials,

<i>Action number</i>	<i>Examples of information to include (if applicable)</i>
	<p>radioactive sources and equipment containing such sources</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 21 October 2008 on granting licences and permits to import into the territory of Poland, export from the territory of Poland and transit through the territory radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel • Atomic Law Act of 29 November 2000 with later amendments • Regulation on the security of radioactive sources, awaiting signature by the Prime Minister (October 2021) <p>The Atomic Law Act is supplemented by over 50 implementing regulations, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 31 August 2012 on nuclear safety and the radiological protection requirements that must be fulfilled by a nuclear facility design • Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 11 February 2013 on requirements for the commissioning and operation of nuclear facilities • Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 27 December 2011 on periodical safety assessments of a nuclear facility • Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 25 May 2021 on the emergency plans for radiation emergencies • Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 4 November 2008 on physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities • Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 14 December 2015 on radioactive waste and spent fuel management
58	<p>Summary of efforts to develop multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle.</p> <p>In the context of the development of the Polish nuclear power programme, Poland is actively involved in the work of two international organizations related to the development of the nuclear fuel cycle: the International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation and the European Repository Development Organization.</p>

*Action number**Examples of information to include (if applicable)*

		<p>The International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation provides a forum for cooperation among participating States to explore mutually beneficial approaches to ensure that the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes proceeds in a manner that is efficient and meets the highest standards of safety, security and non-proliferation.</p> <p>The European Repository Development Organization is a European organization that aims to address the common challenges of safely managing the long-lived radioactive waste in member countries and facilitate collaboration on nuclear waste disposal.</p>
59	<p>Status with regard to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.</p> <p>Status with regard to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material could be reiterated (see actions 42 and 45).</p>	<p>Status with regard to the:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Convention on Nuclear Safety: party to the Convention, entry into force on 24 October 1996 • Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident: party to the Convention, entry into force on 24 April 1988 • Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency: party to the Convention, entry into force on 24 April 1988 • Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management: party to the Convention, entry into force on 18 June 2001 • International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism: party to the Convention, entry into force on 8 April 2010 • Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material: party to the amended Convention, ratification on 1 June 2007, entry into force on 8 May 2016
60	<p>Summarize how international best practices on nuclear safety and security have been implemented nationally.</p> <p>Summarize any peer reviews conducted by the IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review</p>	<p>Poland hosted the IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service mission in 2013. A follow-up mission to verify the national implementation of the findings was hosted in 2017. All Integrated Regulatory Review Service</p>

<i>Action number</i>	<i>Examples of information to include (if applicable)</i>
	<p>Service and how its recommendations are being implemented.</p> <p>Summarize any contributions to the IAEA Nuclear Security Series.</p> <p>Summarize any contributions to or reviews by the IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service teams.</p> <p>Summarize any participation in or contributions to workshops by non-governmental organizations, such as the World Institute for Nuclear Security.</p> <p>recommendations and suggestions are considered closed or have been closed on the basis of progress made and confidence in their effective completion. A new mission is scheduled for 2023.</p> <p>The National Atomic Energy Agency participates in the development of the IAEA safety standards for the peaceful use of nuclear energy through work in the Nuclear Safety Standards Committee, the Radiation Safety Standards Committee, the Waste Safety Standards Committee, the Transport Safety Standards Committee and the Emergency Preparedness and Response Standards Committee.</p> <p>The National Atomic Energy Agency also participates in the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee and contributes to the development of IAEA Nuclear Security Series publications.</p> <p>Poland hosted the International Physical Protection Advisory Service mission in 2016 and is implementing its recommendations and suggestions. The National Atomic Energy Agency contributes to the work of the Service by providing team members.</p>
61	<p>Summarize any national efforts to reduce the use of high-enriched uranium in civilian nuclear programmes and/or convert nuclear facilities to the use of low-enriched uranium.</p> <p>Summarize any international assistance provided to other States to reduce the use of high-enriched uranium in civilian nuclear programs.</p> <p>All the spent high-enriched uranium fuel was shipped to the Russian Federation. Only low-enriched nuclear fuel is left within the territory of Poland. See response to action 40.</p>
62	<p>Summarize national regulations on the transport of radioactive materials, noting, in particular, the implementation of the updated IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials (No. SSR-6, 2012).</p> <p>Poland has implemented the Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials (2012 edition, No. SSR-6). Poland established an effective national legislative and regulatory system of control over the management and protection of radioactive sources in the transport of dangerous goods belonging to Class 7. The system has been successively improved in accordance with international recommendations and achievements in this field. Moreover, Poland has signed and implemented</p>

Action number	Examples of information to include (if applicable)
63	<p data-bbox="477 663 948 884">List the date of signature and ratification of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and/or the Convention on Third-Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy.</p> <p data-bbox="477 905 948 961">List the title and date of adoption of any national legislation on nuclear liability.</p> <p data-bbox="984 262 1458 638">international agreements according to the safe transport of dangerous goods, including the European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road, the Regulations concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Rail, the European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Inland Waterways and the agreements of the International Civil Aviation Organization.</p> <p data-bbox="984 663 1271 688">Status with regard to the:</p> <ul data-bbox="995 714 1469 1373" style="list-style-type: none"> <li data-bbox="995 714 1430 804">• Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage: not party to the Convention <li data-bbox="995 825 1469 947">• Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage: party to the Convention, accession on 23 January 1990, entry into force on 23 April 1990 <li data-bbox="995 968 1458 1121">• 1988 Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention: party to the Convention, entry into force on 27 April 1992 <li data-bbox="995 1142 1398 1264">• Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage: ratification by Poland on 21 September 2010 <li data-bbox="995 1285 1469 1373">• Convention on Third-Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy: not party to the Convention <p data-bbox="984 1394 1458 1451">Title and date of adoption of any national legislation on nuclear liability:</p> <ul data-bbox="995 1476 1469 1675" style="list-style-type: none"> <li data-bbox="995 1476 1469 1501">• Atomic Law Act of 29 November 2000 <li data-bbox="995 1522 1469 1675">• Regulation by the Minister of Finance of 14 September 2011 on a guaranteed minimum amount of the compulsory civil liability insurance of the nuclear facility's operator
64	<p data-bbox="477 1703 948 1793">National position on attacks on or threats against safeguarded nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes.</p> <p data-bbox="984 1703 1458 1890">Poland abides by the decision adopted by consensus at the General Conference of IAEA on 18 September 2009 on the prohibition of armed attack or threat of attack against nuclear installations, during operation or under construction.</p>