

2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Nuclear disarmament

Working paper submitted by Egypt

Overview

1. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was devised to promote three main pillars in parallel, comprising nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the inalienable right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The ultimate objective of the Treaty is the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and conditions for its full realization depend upon its full implementation along with the realization of its universality. Forty-five years after the Treaty's entry into force, following the indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995, that objective is far from realized, and the poor implementation record of Treaty obligations continues to challenge its *raison-d'être*, requiring action to bring about the full implementation of the Treaty as an important requirement to its effectiveness, credibility and the realization of its collective objectives.

2. In that context, the Treaty was originally created to have a duration of 25 years, during which nuclear-weapon States were expected to eliminate their nuclear arsenals and realize the objectives stipulated in article VI. The nuclear-weapon State status was seen under the Treaty as a transitional status. All the obligations under the Treaty represent an integral package of commitments, the implementation of which, along with relevant decisions adopted at Review Conferences, would collectively contribute to its effectiveness and the realization of its objectives.

3. The resolution on the Middle East and the decision entitled "Principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament", adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference as part of the indefinite extension package, highlighted the essential foundation that the goals of universality and nuclear disarmament represent for the indefinitely extended Treaty, its effectiveness and credibility.

4. Furthermore, the "13 Practical Steps" by all nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament, adopted at the 2000 Review Conference, remain unimplemented, but also remain valid in the context of the unequivocal undertaking by nuclear-weapon States to eliminate their nuclear arsenals and in implementing



obligations under the Treaty. While action 5 of the Plan of Action adopted at the 2010 Review Conference clearly refers to the implementation by nuclear-weapon States of the 13 Practical Steps, no progress has been realized in that regard to date.

5. The 2010 Plan of Action identified specific actions that nuclear-weapon States have to take in order to promote nuclear disarmament, including actions 20 and 21 on reporting on implementation and transparency measures. Along with other relevant action points, those remain to be implemented.

6. As with each of the other main pillars of the Treaty, the implementation of commitments in the field of nuclear disarmament had to be linked to progress in other more overarching goals, namely treaty universality, a crucial objective to which the decision on the indefinite extension of the Treaty was linked.

7. Nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing elements, and each of the objectives would be of limited value if implemented without the other.

8. Through conferences convened in Oslo in March 2013, in Nayarit, Mexico, in February 2014, and in Vienna in December 2014, the humanitarian consequences process managed to bring to the attention of the international community, more than at any other time, that nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons remain not only core obligations of nuclear-weapon States under the Treaty, but also are urgent requirements of international humanitarian law and action that are to be expected from the civilized international community in the twenty-first century.

9. The Government of Egypt has therefore strongly endorsed the negotiation of a nuclear weapons convention that would aim at the realization of the total and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, under effective multilateral verification and control. The 2010 Plan of Action mentioned the convention as a viable route to nuclear disarmament and the 2015 Review Conference needs to build on that. If necessary, a first step towards that objective can be the negotiation of a treaty banning the manufacture, possession, transfer and use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

10. In that regard, the role of the Conference on Disarmament as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body within the United Nations system is to be preserved and utilized. It is of critical importance that the Conference on Disarmament, while moving forward on a legal instrument banning and/or seeking to totally eliminate nuclear weapons, should begin negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or fissile material cut-off treaty, in accordance with the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, within an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work.

11. In order for a fissile material cut-off treaty to contribute to nuclear disarmament, it should cover all existing fissile material stocks and should create conditions under which nuclear-weapon States will not be able to produce more nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Actions required by the Conference

The Conference should review the implementation of obligations of nuclear-weapon States in the field of nuclear disarmament, under the Treaty, taking into account relevant obligations adopted at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, and decide on necessary measures for the full implementation of Treaty obligations. In that context, the Conference should:

1. Recall existing nuclear disarmament obligations emanating from the Treaty, as well as related measures agreed at Review Conferences, that are yet to be implemented, reaffirm such obligations and recognize that the lack of implementation undermines the effectiveness of the Treaty, its credibility and the potential for the realization of its eventual universality.
2. Reaffirm the mutually reinforcing relationship between nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, both vertical and horizontal, confirming that progress on nuclear non-proliferation remains unsustainable without parallel progress in nuclear disarmament.
3. Confirm that the indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995 was not in any way foreseen as a way to freeze the existing lack of implementation of obligations in nuclear disarmament, and reconfirm that the implementation of such obligations remains guided by the overall package of resolution and decisions adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, including in particular the decision entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”, which highlighted nuclear disarmament, Treaty universality and non-cooperation with States that are not party to the Treaty in the nuclear field as essential principles for the indefinitely extended Treaty.
4. Reconfirm the importance of the implementation of the unequivocal undertaking of nuclear-weapon States in the field of disarmament, including the 13 Practical Steps, which have to be implemented consistent with such undertakings.
5. Note with regret that the elements of the 2010 Plan of Action on nuclear disarmament remain far from implemented, and call for their implementation without any further delay.
6. Welcome the humanitarian consequences process, confirming its recognition of the unacceptably hazardous, fully indiscriminate nature of any possible use of nuclear weapons, either by design or error, and note that the existing capacity of the international community to address any consequences of a use of nuclear weapon remains very limited.
7. Express regret for the slow pace of nuclear disarmament efforts, and recognize the unprecedented urgency of the total elimination of nuclear weapons as reflected by the findings of the humanitarian consequences process. Express understanding that the current slow-paced step-by-step approach, without a specified time frame, exposes the international community to potentially unactable humanitarian risks, and therefore call upon all nuclear-weapon States to pursue nuclear disarmament at a much faster pace, with a larger scope and within a given time frame to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
8. Recall decisions taken at previous Review Conferences on diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that such weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination,

note that nuclear-weapon States have achieved little progress in that regard, and note that actions are needed on their behalf, individually and collectively, including in the context of military alliances, to eliminate practices of nuclear sharing and to realize that nuclear deterrence runs contrary to their nuclear disarmament obligations under the Treaty as well as to its overall aspirations, and call on nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their obligations in that domain.

9. Realize the urgency of launching negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a treaty banning nuclear weapons, as a first step in efforts to initiate negotiations in the Conference on a nuclear weapons convention, which would aim at the realization of the total and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, under effective multilateral verification and control.

10. Recognize the importance of reaching an agreement on a comprehensive and balanced programme of work by the Conference on Disarmament, which, while moving forward on a legal instrument banning and/or seeking to totally eliminate nuclear weapons, should begin negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or fissile material cut-off treaty, in accordance with the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, allowing the consideration of all issues comprehensively and effectively.

11. Affirm that in order for a fissile material cut-off treaty to effectively contribute to its nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives, it must cover all existing fissile material stocks, placing such materials under safeguards, in order to prevent any further production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
