

2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

27 April 2015

Original: English

New York, 27 April-22 May 2015

Nuclear Non-Proliferation

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Overview

1. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was foreseen as a way to prevent proliferation, both horizontally and vertically, and bring about the total elimination of nuclear weapons while protecting the inalienable right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Treaty was devised to promote, in a balanced manner, three main pillars: nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the inalienable right to the peaceful uses to nuclear energy. Conditions for the full realization of Treaty objectives therefore heavily depend upon the full implementation of all its obligations, and on its eventual universality.
2. Forty-five years after the Treaty's entry into force and following its indefinite extension in 1995, key Treaty objectives remain far from realized, and the lack of implementation of a number of key Treaty obligations continues to challenge its effectiveness, credibility and the realization of its objectives.
3. While nuclear non-proliferation is an essential pillar of the Treaty, its effectiveness depends upon achieving parallel progress in the area of nuclear disarmament, noting the mutually reinforcing nature of both pillars. It also depends upon effectively promoting non-proliferation in both its horizontal and vertical aspects, in a parallel and balanced manner, consistent with Treaty obligations and those undertaken by consensus in the context of the Review Conferences.
4. While the Treaty represents the core framework of obligations and commitments that can attain the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, effective non-proliferation efforts, both globally and regionally, cannot and should not be restricted to its States parties, since the few States that are not parties to the Treaty continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and conduct nuclear activities that are contrary to the principles and objectives of the Treaty.
5. The 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons placed emphasis on conditions required to secure the effectiveness of the Treaty, now extended indefinitely, through stressing the importance of maintaining parallel progress in nuclear non-proliferation in all its



aspects, nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, while pursuing vigorous efforts to attain Treaty universality. That is evident in the prominence attached to the decision of 1995 on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament to efforts to achieve the universality of the Treaty and practical steps required to achieve it, including conditions of supply of nuclear materials and technology.

6. Paragraph 12 of the decision, referring to safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), reads: “supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of the Agency’s full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” Cooperation with States that are not party to the Treaty without respect for such conditions of supply identified in the decision undoubtedly represent a clear violation of the decision and runs contrary to the letter and spirit of the Treaty.

7. Non-proliferation efforts under the Treaty should be promoted without hampering in any way the inalienable right for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the promotion of international cooperation in that regard. In that context, non-proliferation efforts should strictly abide by comprehensive safeguards agreements as the verification standard under the Treaty and consistent with the decision.

8. The priority of the promotion of comprehensive safeguards for States that have yet to conclude such agreements within the Treaty or for those that are not States parties to the Treaty, should be preserved and respected. Understanding that it remains the sovereign right of each State to make its own decision on whether or not it should conclude an additional protocol with IAEA, it is important that the promotion of the additional protocol, as a supplementary means to comprehensive safeguards, does not in any way precede that priority.

Actions required by the Conference

The Conference should review the implementation of Treaty obligations in the field of nuclear non-proliferation, in all its aspects, taking into account relevant obligations adopted at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, and decide on necessary measures for the full implementation of the Treaty. In that context, the Conference should:

1. Reaffirm the mutually reinforcing relationship between nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects, confirming that progress on nuclear non-proliferation remains unsustainable without parallel progress in nuclear disarmament.

2. Express regret that progress in the prevention of horizontal proliferation has continued to be undermined by States that are not party to the Treaty, which operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and conduct activities that fully contradict the letter, spirit and key norms established by the Treaty.

3. Affirm that much more transparency over nuclear weapons programmes in nuclear-weapon States is required in order to verify progress in the field of

vertical proliferation and to assess progress, as well as the pace of any such progress, in the field of nuclear disarmament.

4. Reaffirm the crucial importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty to address its non-proliferation challenges effectively, both within the Treaty regime and outside it, and renew with determination the collective commitment of States parties to vigorously pursue the realization of Treaty universality.

5. Reaffirm the importance of strict observance, by individual States parties as well as supply regimes, of conditions for supply stipulated in the decision of 1995 on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, in particular paragraph 12 on acceptance of the Agency's full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices as essential requirements for any supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States.
