
**Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

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Held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 28 April 2014, at 3 p.m.

Chair: Mr. Román-Morey (Peru)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Motta Pinto Coelho** (Brazil) said that the primary purpose of the current review cycle should be to ensure the full implementation of all three pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, so as to reduce its basic inherent asymmetry and address the imbalance between the rights and obligations of nuclear-weapon States and those of non-nuclear-weapon States. Although the non-nuclear-weapon States had kept their commitment of not acquiring nuclear weapons, the five nuclear-weapon States had failed to comply with their obligations under article VI of the Treaty, and to undertake the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. The indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995 should not be construed to mean that States could possess nuclear arms in perpetuity.

2. Unilateral and bilateral initiatives to reduce nuclear arsenals were not effective means for nuclear disarmament as they were not irreversible, verifiable or transparent, and could easily be offset by such qualitative improvements as the modernization of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, and by the inclusion of nuclear weapons in national defence doctrines. It was only through a multilateral process yielding a universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory treaty that a world free of nuclear weapons could be achieved. As long as a limited number of States considered themselves entitled to possess nuclear weapons, there would always be a risk that other States or non-State actors might try to acquire or develop such weapons. Process towards nuclear disarmament was therefore the key to the long-term sustainability of the regime and to the preservation of international peace and security.

3. Nuclear disarmament was also a socioeconomic imperative. Despite current global financial constraints, nuclear-weapon States continued to invest large sums to maintain and modernize their arsenals, half of which could be used to achieve the internationally agreed development goals on poverty reduction, thereby addressing the root causes of instability.

4. Every effort must be made to convene the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone

free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction without further delay, which had been part of the bargain which had allowed the indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995. His Government hoped that recent positive developments in the region, with particular regard to the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the accession of the Syrian Arab Republic to the Chemical Weapons Convention and ongoing dismantling of its chemical weapons, would provide impetus for that process.

5. Security reasons could not be invoked to justify nuclear deterrence doctrines and approaches. Brazil was encouraged by the outcome of the conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons held in Oslo and Nayarit, which had reinforced the need for urgent action to prevent a global humanitarian catastrophe that would result from any nuclear detonation. It also welcomed the adoption of General Assembly resolution 68/32. Although the Conference on Disarmament was the preferred forum for discussions on a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, his Government was not opposed to any negotiating process occurring within United Nations framework.

6. **Mr. Mati** (Italy) said that Italy was fully committed to nuclear disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation. The Treaty remained the cornerstone of international action, and its three pillars should be considered as mutually reinforcing. His Government had recently adopted a resolution that expanded its role in all relevant international forums in support of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation measures.

7. Italy welcomed the increased transparency shown by nuclear-weapon States, in particular the efforts made by the Russian Federation and the United States to implement the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty). It also welcomed the recent decision by the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish the informal working group, and the establishment of the Group of governmental experts to advance discussions on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT).

8. His Government supported the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, a member of the Group of Eminent Persons established by the Executive Secretary of that Treaty to help Member

States facilitate its entry into force, had attended the April 2014 meeting of the Group, and had moderated its discussions. The Group had accepted his invitation to hold its next meeting in Italy.

9. **Mr. Oh Joon** (Republic of Korea) said that the Treaty should continue to play an essential role in the maintenance of international security and its three pillars should be promoted in a balanced and mutually reinforcing manner. Challenges to the Treaty, in particular the continued development of nuclear and ballistic missile programmes by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, required swift and collective action on the part of the international community. That country's actions not only threatened peace and security but also seriously undermined the integrity and credibility of the global non-proliferation regime. The international community must make it clear that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's reckless behaviour would not be tolerated and that there would be serious consequences if that Government tried to conduct a fourth nuclear test. Efforts must be redoubled to achieve complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. That Government must abide by its international commitments and obligations and return to the Treaty and the safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

10. Strengthening the non-proliferation regime was the most effective means of responding to current challenges. As the case of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea clearly demonstrated, the abuse of the Treaty's withdrawal provision was a critical issue that needed to be properly addressed. His delegation urged all State parties to ratify the additional protocols of IAEA. His Government welcomed the negotiations between the E3+3 countries (China, France, Germany, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States) and the Islamic Republic of Iran and had made modest financial contributions to assist the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action. It hoped that the negotiating parties would reach a final-stage agreement and resolve the outstanding issues, including possible military dimensions.

11. On the issue of nuclear disarmament, his Government called on the nuclear-weapon States to step up their endeavours to dismantle their nuclear arsenals. It welcomed the United States plan to reduce its nuclear forces under the New START Treaty, and

commended the efforts of the permanent members of the Security Council to hold regular consultations on nuclear disarmament. Efforts should be made to ensure the early entry into force of CTBT and the immediate start of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. The Republic of Korea welcomed the recent conclusion of the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, and hoped that the conference on the establishment of a Middle East a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction would be convened as soon as possible.

12. Although his Government fully supported the inalienable right of all States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, it stressed that that right must be exercised in accordance with the obligations set out in articles I, II and III of the Treaty, and must be accompanied by effective safety and security measures. The Republic of Korea, as the fifth largest producer of nuclear energy in the world, was committed to sharing its experience with other countries, and had contributed over \$4 million to various projects of the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative.

13. As the host of the Nuclear Security Summit in 2012, his Government supported the global efforts to combat nuclear terrorism. At the Nuclear Security Summit held in March 2014, the President of the Republic of Korea had made a four-point proposal for strengthening global nuclear security, based on synergy between nuclear security, disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and narrowing the capacity gap among States.

14. **Mr. Estreme** (Argentina) said that his Government's commitment to the objectives of the Treaty was well known. Since 2010, there had been a number of adverse developments, including nuclear weapons testing and withdrawal from the Treaty by one State; obstacles encountered by IAEA in some countries in carrying out its verification activities; the failure to convene the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction; lack of progress by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to nuclear disarmament and in achieving universalization of the Treaty; and the fact that nuclear-weapon States had not withdrawn their reservations with respect to the protocols to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco Treaty), giving rise to uncertainty regarding the threat or use of

nuclear weapons in the area. It was also discouraging that CTBT had not yet come into force and that negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and on an instrument on negative security assurances had not even commenced.

15. Strict compliance by all countries with their obligations under the Treaty, including balanced implementation of each of the Treaty's three pillars, was the only solution to those issues. The implementation of the Treaty should take into account the security situation of all its States parties. In no event should failure by some States parties to comply with their treaty obligations serve as an excuse for other States to do the same; all such failures must be condemned. It was totally unacceptable for any State party to abandon or threaten to abandon its legally binding treaty obligations; the Treaty afforded a broad framework for solidarity, in particular with regard to protection of the security of those States that had renounced possession of nuclear weapons and were in compliance with their Treaty obligations. Failure to properly take into account the Treaty and, instead, developing new tools would not contribute to the strength of the non-proliferation regime.

16. **Mr. Boukadoum** (Algeria) said that the 2010 action plan provided a good basis on which to strengthen implementation of the Treaty. Although some measures had been taken over recent years to reduce nuclear arsenals, Algeria was disappointed in the lack of progress towards nuclear disarmament. Not only had nuclear-weapon States failed to fulfil their obligations, but the balance of the three pillars of the Treaty had been affected by the predominance of non-proliferation measures over nuclear disarmament measures, and there was a selective and discriminatory approach to access to nuclear technology for civilian purposes. In the long run the difficulties in implementation of the Treaty could undermine the credibility of the review process as well as the sustainability of the Treaty regime and its integrity. The Treaty must be implemented fully and effectively on a universal scale; the total elimination of nuclear weapons must be considered the highest priority of the international community.

17. Because the doctrines of nuclear deterrence remained a major obstacle to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, it was crucial to delegitimize such weapons. Nuclear-weapon States, in accordance with article VI of the Treaty, must ensure the complete,

irreversible and verifiable elimination of their nuclear arsenals. In that regard, his Government welcomed the High-level meeting of the General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament and the adoption of General Assembly resolution 68/32, and called for its effective implementation. In order to strengthen the global architecture for non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, adherence to CTBT should be universal. His Government welcomed the conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, which had highlighted the irreversible devastating effects of nuclear weapons. Having unwillingly been used as a nuclear testing ground in the early 1960s, Algeria was only too aware of those effects, which still persisted.

18. Efforts should be made to strengthen implementation of article I of the Treaty. Nuclear-weapon States and member States of the Nuclear Suppliers Group must refrain from cooperating with States that were not parties to the Treaty in the field of civilian nuclear technology.

19. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones constituted not only a confidence-building measure but also a concrete step towards the complete and general elimination of nuclear weapons. The establishment of the African nuclear-weapon-free zone under the Treaty of Pelindaba represented an important contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security. That example should be followed in the volatile region of the Middle East; Algeria deeply regretted that that region remained without such status and remained strongly committed to the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and the 2010 action plan. It was deeply disappointed about the postponement of a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction and called on the three sponsors of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and the Secretary-General to redouble their efforts to convene the conference before the end of 2014, with the participation of all States in the region.

20. The risk of criminal use of nuclear materials and facilities by non-State actors that were members of terrorist networks was real; Algeria had acceded to all the international legal instruments for nuclear security, and was currently strengthening its national system of nuclear security. His Government was fully confident in the mandate of IAEA and urged all States that had not yet done so to enter into comprehensive safeguards agreements. Algeria had had concluded a national

framework programme with IAEA for the period 2012-2017.

21. Algeria stressed the importance of full respect for the inalienable right of all States parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with article IV of the Treaty. Each State party, in accordance with its national requirements and its rights and obligations under the Treaty, had the sovereign right to define its own energy policy, including the inalienable right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as a vehicle for development and progress.

22. **Mr. Wang Qun** (China) said that China attached great importance to global nuclear governance and to the maintenance of international security and strategic stability. His Government accorded priority both to national development and security and to collective international security, and had proposed a five-point plan for global nuclear governance at the fifth conference of permanent members of the Security Council on nuclear non-proliferation, held in Beijing in April 2014. Firstly, the international community must make universal security its fundamental goal, and should strive to build an international environment of peace and stability and eliminate the root causes of conflicts and unrest, while fully respecting and accommodating the legitimate security concerns of each State. International relations needed to be developed on the basis of mutual understanding and trust, and disputes resolved through dialogue on an equal footing. China was firmly committed to the nuclear strategy of self-defence and believed that nuclear-weapon States should abandon nuclear-deterrence policies based on a pre-emptive nuclear strike and also undertake not to seek permanent possession of nuclear weapons. An integrated approach was needed, addressing both the symptoms and the root causes of nuclear proliferation. Non-proliferation issues should be addressed at the political and diplomatic levels, rejecting double standards. The legitimate right of each State to peaceful uses of nuclear energy must be fully safeguarded, international cooperation promoted, and assistance to developing countries increased.

23. Secondly, the five permanent members of the Security Council had a major responsibility for maintaining global peace and stability and must play a leadership role in global nuclear governance. It had been demonstrated over time that as long as those

States deepened their strategic mutual trust and enhanced their unity and coordination, nuclear issues could be addressed effectively.

24. Thirdly, multilateral mechanisms were at the core of global nuclear governance, as platforms for all States to promote peace, security and development. China was an active participant in all such mechanisms. Existing mechanisms must be allowed to play their role in order to guarantee effective participation of all key actors and take into account the legitimate concerns of all parties. Eradication of those mechanisms, which included the First Committee of the General Assembly, the Disarmament Commission, the Conference on Disarmament, IAEA, and the review process, was not a viable option. China believed that the universality, authority and effectiveness of the Treaty should be enhanced and supported the work of the Conference on Disarmament, including starting negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty.

25. Fourthly, balanced progress and consensus should be the basic principles. Equal importance should be attached to all three pillars of the Treaty. Since nuclear issues were related to international security and strategic stability as well as the vital security and development interests of all countries, scientific and democratic decisions on those issues should be made by consensus, on an equal footing. Each State should be permitted to enjoy its full right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy while fulfilling its nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation obligations. China insisted on the principle of consensus; relevant concerns should be addressed through dialogue and consultation. Targets should be established and the objectives of the Treaty should be implemented collectively.

26. Lastly, the broad participation of the international community must be ensured. Global nuclear governance was not the responsibility of one single country, nor was it the exclusive responsibility of Governments. It must be ensured that all countries played their role as stakeholders, and initiatives of international and regional organizations, non-governmental organizations and civil society should also be mobilized to ensure broad participation, active interaction and the achievement of mutual benefits. China attached great importance to such cooperation and not only made its own efforts and contributions, but also drew lessons from other countries.

27. China was fully committed to maintaining regional peace and security and promoting security cooperation with neighbouring countries. It therefore respected and actively supported the aspirations and efforts of countries in the region to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The five nuclear-weapon States and the Central Asian countries were launching a signing ceremony of the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia. His Government would sign the Protocol, thereby demonstrating its firm commitment to maintaining peace, stability and development in Central Asia. China respected Mongolia's nuclear-weapons-free status and, together with the other four nuclear-weapon States, had issued a joint statement in 2012 reiterating support for that status and providing security assurances to that country. China was in favour of signing the Protocol to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone as early as possible and supported the efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the convening of a conference on that issue.

28. As required under the 2010 action plan, China had submitted its national report on the implementation of the Treaty. The report covered China's nuclear strategy based on self-defence, its engagement with foreign counterparts in the nuclear field, its efforts in nuclear non-proliferation, and its endeavours to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy, enhance international cooperation in nuclear safety and security, and raise public awareness in that regard.

29. **Mr. Feruță** (International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)) said that in 2013, the Director General of IAEA had announced the launch of the ReNuAl project to renovate the Agency's nuclear sciences and applications laboratories in Seibersdorf, Austria, to ensure that they would be able to meet the needs of IAEA member States. The strategic plan for the project would be presented to the IAEA Board of Governors in June 2014 and all countries that were in a position to support it were urged to do so.

30. In 2013, a number of major IAEA activities had focused on improving the understanding, assessment and management of marine and terrestrial environments, including the 2013 IAEA Scientific Forum, which had highlighted the contribution of nuclear applications to a sustainable marine environment. The Agency's new Ocean Acidification International Coordination Centre in Monaco, supported by the Peaceful Uses Initiative, was

contributing to a better understanding of how the increasing acidity of the world's oceans might impact marine ecosystems and biodiversity, and was producing data which could be used by policymakers to develop sustainable development plans for marine resources. The Agency also continued to advance the use of nuclear and isotope techniques for the better assessment and management of water resources and development of climate change adaptation strategies. Another important scientific development was the decoding of the tsetse fly genome, which had been achieved by the Joint Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)/IAEA Division of Nuclear Techniques in Food and Agriculture and would greatly improve animal and human health in Africa. In the area of human health, the IAEA Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy continued to promote effective partnerships to support the cancer control capacity of low- and middle-income Member States.

31. IAEA provided assistance in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology via its technical cooperation programme, which provided support to over 125 countries and territories. The current two year programme cycle included some 500 new projects, mostly in the areas of health and nutrition. Projects were run in conjunction with other United Nations bodies and development actors to ensure their sustainability and greatest possible impact.

32. In the area of nuclear power, the Agency continued to provide assistance to and share knowledge among Member States with existing operational nuclear power programmes and those considering developing such programmes, in order to help them to use nuclear power in a safe, responsible and sustainable manner. There were currently 435 nuclear power reactors operating in 30 countries to provide approximately 11 per cent of the world's electricity. Four new nuclear power reactors had been connected to the grid in 2013 and another would be added in 2014. In addition, 72 nuclear power reactors were under construction in 15 countries, including Belarus and the United Arab Emirates which currently had no existing nuclear power plants. That was the highest number of constructions since 1989, with Asia the main centre of expansion. According to the latest IAEA projections, global nuclear power generation was expected to increase by between 17 and 94 per cent by 2030, owing to the increasing global demand for

energy, the need for a secure energy supply, and growing global concerns about climate change. A key message of the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Power in the Twenty-First Century, held in St. Petersburg in June 2013, was that nuclear power would play an important role in achieving energy security and sustainable development goals for many countries. In that connection, the Agency was working with the Government of Kazakhstan to establish an IAEA low enriched uranium bank to assure the supply of nuclear fuel.

33. In the three years since the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station, significant progress had been made in implementing the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety and the IAEA Fukushima report was expected to be finalized by the end of 2014. At the recent sixth review meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident and the implementation of associated safety improvements had been considered and it had been agreed that a diplomatic conference would be held in 2015 to consider a proposed amendment to the Convention on Nuclear Safety to address the design and construction of both existing and new nuclear power plants.

34. As part of its work to strengthen global nuclear security, IAEA had provided training in all aspects of nuclear security, issued several new publications and carried out four international physical protection advisory service missions and ten international nuclear security advisory service missions in 2013. Although the amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material had been adopted in 2005, it had not yet entered into force as not enough countries had ratified it. The expanded scope of the amended Convention, covering the protection of nuclear facilities against sabotage and of nuclear material for peaceful domestic purposes, would make an important contribution to global nuclear security and its entry into force was a priority for IAEA. The IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security, held in Vienna in July 2013, had also reaffirmed support for the Agency's central role in strengthening nuclear security worldwide and had called on the Agency to organize periodic high-level international conferences on nuclear security to provide continuity to international nuclear security processes.

35. Since the 2010 Review Conference, nine non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had concluded and brought into force comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA, but 12 others had still not done so, in contravention of their obligations under article III of the Treaty. Similarly, 24 States had concluded additional protocols to comprehensive safeguards agreements, bringing the number of States with additional protocols in force to 122. The Agency could provide credible assurances that there was no diversion of declared or undeclared nuclear material and activities only with regard to States that had both comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force. He therefore urged all States to conclude and bring into force such agreements as soon as possible. All States with small quantities protocols should either amend or rescind those protocols, as appropriate.

36. In August 2013, the Director General had issued a report on the conceptualization and development of safeguards implementation at the State level. The ongoing dialogue with Member States would form the basis for a future report on the matter and allow the Agency to focus its verification efforts better and allocate its resources more efficiently, given that its safeguards responsibilities were constantly expanding; it now applied safeguards for 180 States to more than 1,250 facilities, nearly 100 more than in 2010.

37. Although IAEA had not been able to carry out any verification measures in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea since April 2009, it stood ready to play an essential role in verifying that country's nuclear programme. The Director General continued to call upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply fully with its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions, to cooperate promptly with the Agency in implementing its safeguards agreement, and to resolve all outstanding issues.

38. On the issue of safeguards implementation in the Islamic Republic of Iran, he said that the IAEA Director General and the Iranian Vice President had signed a joint statement on a framework for cooperation in November 2013, under which they had agreed to cooperate further with respect to verification activities undertaken by the Agency and to resolve all current and past issues. The Agency had also started the monitoring and verification activities required under the Joint Plan of Action agreed between the Islamic Republic of Iran, China, France, Germany, the

Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States. The measures implemented by the Islamic Republic of Iran and its commitments represented a positive step forward, but much remained to be done to resolve all outstanding issues, particularly those related to possible military dimensions of its nuclear programme and its implementation of its additional protocol.

39. With regard to the Syrian Arab Republic, IAEA had concluded in June 2011 that the building destroyed at the Dair Alzour site in September 2007 was very likely to have been a nuclear reactor that should have been declared to the Agency. The Board of Governors had reported the Syrian Arab Republic's non-compliance with its safeguards agreement to all member States of IAEA and to the Security Council and General Assembly. The Agency's conclusion was still valid. The Director General had called upon the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate fully with IAEA in connection with unresolved issues related to the Dair Alzour site and other locations.

40. Further to the forum on experience of possible relevance to the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East hosted by IAEA in November 2011, the Agency continued to assist efforts to establish new nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and elsewhere.

41. **Mr. Och** (Mongolia) said that his delegation welcomed the positive developments and efforts of the past year in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, which included the second Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, and the Joint statement of the P5 Beijing Conference: enhancing strategic confidence and working together to implement the nuclear non-proliferation review outcomes adopted on 15 April 2014. The High-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament, held in September 2013, had generated momentum for meaningful steps to be taken towards nuclear disarmament and had led to the adoption of General Assembly resolution 68/32.

42. His delegation looked forward to broader support for its proposal for a second comprehensive study to be undertaken of all aspects of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, in order to take stock of the progress made and to chart the future course of action to support the zones as a practical regional measure to

promote the goals of a world without nuclear weapons. His country was pursuing efforts in that regard, through advancement of its nuclear-weapon-free status and support of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Existing zones needed to be strengthened and measures taken to promote the establishment of new zones, including in the Middle East and in north-east Asia.

43. Given that every country could and should contribute to the cause of nuclear non-proliferation and the total elimination of nuclear weapons, his country had adopted a law to institutionalize its nuclear-weapon-free status, a step that had been recognized with an honourable mention at the 2013 Future Policy Awards. In January 2014, the standing committee on security and foreign policy of the Mongolian parliament had set up a working group to assess and monitor the implementation of that law and had recommended that close cooperation should be maintained with the five nuclear-weapon States, the States parties to the nuclear-weapon-free zones treaties, and other States and international organizations to further strengthen Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status. The group's report would be issued as an official document of the General Assembly.

44. **Mr. Lomónaco** (Mexico) said that the current session of the Committee was taking place amid new regional tensions in different parts of the world that some would use to justify the existence of nuclear weapons and even argue in favour of a new era of proliferation. Yet a global security system could not be based on the accumulation of weapons of mass destruction or the threat of their use.

45. While some progress had been made with regard to non-proliferation, particularly horizontal non-proliferation, and protection of the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, the third pillar of the Treaty, disarmament, was far from being accomplished. Despite the provisions of article VI of the Treaty, negotiations on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race or for a treaty on general and complete disarmament had not even been held. More worryingly, the indefinite extension of the Treaty seemed to have been interpreted by some countries as a recognition of an alleged right to indefinitely possess nuclear weapons. His delegation strongly rejected that notion and had long argued that the possession of nuclear weapons by a handful of States could only be countenanced on the basis that the Treaty was a temporary and transitional arrangement,

pending the total elimination of those weapons. Such tolerance had never implied acceptance of the legality or legitimacy of the possession of nuclear weapons.

46. In the light of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, his delegation would follow with interest the suit filed by the Marshall Islands before that Court for breach of the obligations of nuclear-weapon States to conclude negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

47. While there were fewer nuclear weapons in the world and the risk of a military conflagration was lower than 50 years earlier, there was no guarantee that nuclear weapons would never be used, either intentionally or accidentally. The mere existence of such weapons presented incalculable risks of war, accident, errors or diversion into the hands of non-State actors. The humanitarian impact and risk posed by the existence of nuclear weapons should serve to revitalize the disarmament machinery, which had been paralyzed for 18 years, and to restart multilateral negotiations to advance the international law of disarmament and the creation of new international standards. At the second International Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, held in Nayarit, Mexico, from 13 to 14 February 2014, participants had addressed the technical and scientific aspects of the devastating humanitarian consequences that could arise from the detonation of a nuclear weapon. His delegation believed that the time had come to initiate a diplomatic process and define specific timelines and the most appropriate forum to develop a legally binding instrument prohibiting nuclear weapons.

48. **Mr. Balslev** (Denmark) said that in addition to its significant regular contributions to the IAEA budget and Technical Cooperation Fund, his country had pledged an extra 1.1 million euros to the Nuclear Security Fund and 270,000 euros to the Agency's work related to monitoring and verifying the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

49. The general public was becoming increasingly impatient at the lack of progress in the area of nuclear disarmament and wanted States to redouble their efforts towards eliminating the risk that those immensely destructive and indiscriminate weapons would ever be used again. States parties were behind schedule in implementing the provisions of the Treaty

and achieving its goals. In the area of disarmament, while his Government acknowledged the considerable progress achieved in reducing stockpiles and the number of deployed warheads, and welcomed the New START Treaty, it was inexcusable that there were still more than 17,000 nuclear warheads on the planet and that CTBT had still not entered into force. His delegation supported the call by the United States President for reciprocal reduction of United States and Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe.

50. There had also been little progress on the non-proliferation agenda. Despite the encouraging reports from IAEA that the Iranian Government was complying with the Joint Plan of Action and with the Framework for Cooperation between Iran and the Agency, international confidence needed to be restored in the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme over the long term. His delegation remained deeply concerned about activities in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including ballistic missile launches, nuclear tests, uranium enrichment and the construction of a light water reactor, in flagrant violation of that country's international obligations.

51. The credibility of, and trust in, the multilateral disarmament machinery had been worn thin by the continued and unacceptable stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament. Credibility and trust had been lost with the Russian Federation's illegal military intervention in Ukraine and purported annexation of Crimea, violating a host of international obligations, including those under the Budapest Memorandum, and by the inability to convene the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, attended by all States of the region. Confidence and trust must be built, by pursuing the approach set out in the working paper, "Building blocks for a world without nuclear weapons" ([NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.23](#)). States should not lose sight of the objective of general and complete nuclear disarmament, as expressly set forth in the Treaty.,

52. **Ms. Mxakato-Diseko** (South Africa) said that nuclear weapons, which had the capacity to cause untold human suffering and damage for many generations, had no place in the post-cold-war era and were of no use in addressing the threats facing the modern world. It was clear that the impact of a nuclear weapon detonation, whether by accident or design,

would have long-term consequences with regard to social and economic infrastructure, food security, public health and the environment, and that the poor and vulnerable would be the most severely affected. Given the devastating effects of a nuclear weapon detonation, coupled with their indiscriminate and uncontrollable nature, the use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances would constitute a violation of international law, particularly humanitarian law. Those considerations must be at the core of all deliberations, actions and decisions on nuclear weapons. The challenge now facing States parties was how to translate the considerable and growing cross-regional support for eliminating the threat posed by those weapons into concrete action to fulfil the collective obligations under article VI of the Treaty.

53. Her delegation had long supported a systematic and progressive approach to nuclear disarmament, through a framework of mutually reinforcing agreements. For that approach to be credible, however, it must deliver sustained, concrete progress on clearly benchmarked steps that met the nuclear disarmament principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability, many of which had already been agreed upon, but not yet implemented.

54. The development of new categories of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems clearly indicated that some countries continued to harbour aspirations for the indefinite retention of such weapons, contrary to their legal obligations and political commitments. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, which was the only guarantee that they would never be used, the provision of effective, legally-binding, negative security assurances within the framework of the Treaty would be a pragmatic interim measure that would strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

55. Her delegation urged all States that had not yet done so to enter into comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols as soon as possible. The only authority that was internationally recognized and competent to verify and assure compliance with those agreements was IAEA.

56. Nuclear-weapon-free zones, established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the regions concerned, played an important role in preventing the vertical and the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, enhancing global and regional peace and security, and strengthening the nuclear

disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regime. All States should redouble their efforts to ensure that a conference was convened on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction at the earliest possible date, involving all the States of the region.

57. She cautioned against any decision that would amount to a reinterpretation or restriction of the inalienable right to develop, research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as set out in article IV of the Treaty. Nuclear power and the peaceful applications of nuclear technology, if optimized fully, could contribute to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and the post-2015 development agenda. Such technology was also of particular relevance and importance in attaining sustainable and accelerated economic growth in Africa. Her delegation therefore attached great importance to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, and the need for that Programme to receive sufficient, assured and predictable funding.

58. **Ms. Higgie** (New Zealand) said that New Zealand rejected fatalistic predictions of failure of the 2015 Review Conference. Keeping the review process on track was entirely in the hands of States parties, who must ensure that satisfactory progress was being made on all three pillars of the Treaty. Greater insistence was needed on nuclear disarmament efforts, as stipulated in action 5 of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference. Her delegation regretted that the nuclear-weapon States had chosen not to participate in the two Conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, a pivotal part of efforts to ensure progress on article VI of the Treaty. She expressed the hope that the facilitator and the co-conveners would be able to set a date as soon as possible for the postponed conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.

59. New Zealand strongly believed that nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation were inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing. Out of its commitment to ensuring the integrity of the Treaty's safeguards system, New Zealand had signed the modified small quantities protocol to its comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA and had joined the Zangger Committee. She welcomed recent progress in international efforts to resolve outstanding safeguards concerns in the Islamic Republic of Iran and

encouraged all relevant parties to pursue constructive dialogue with a view to gaining assurance about the exclusively peaceful nature of that country's nuclear programme. The right of States parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes carried with it the obligation to ensure the highest possible standards of safety and security. New Zealand remained actively engaged in efforts to strengthen the global nuclear security regime, including by monitoring implementation of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety.

60. **Mr. Simon-Michel** (France) said that over the previous year, some progress had been made in dealing with proliferation crises, but much remained to be done. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea continued to pursue the development of its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, in violation of its international obligations. With regard to the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear programme, the joint plan of action adopted in November 2013 was an encouraging development, as was the launch of constructive negotiations on a comprehensive solution. In that connection, his Government's objective in the P-5 + 1 discussions was to reach an agreement that complied with strict principles. Those crises posed a major threat to international and regional security and stability, an impediment to the development of civilian nuclear cooperation and an obstacle to disarmament, making it more necessary than ever to determine conclusively what the consequences of proven non-compliance with the Treaty and abuse of the right to withdraw should be.

61. France would continue to fully shoulder its responsibilities as a nuclear-weapon State. The five nuclear-weapon States were pursuing the P5 conference process with a view to strengthening mutual confidence and working on nuclear terminology, verification and transparency. Progress was also being made on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones. France would shortly be signing the protocol to the Central Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty and had signed two declarations with Mongolia on the nuclear-weapon free status of that country. It was also preparing to sign the protocol to the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. It looked forward to the convening of a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction at the earliest possible date. Multilaterally, France

attached priority to moving forward on the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty. It would have preferred to conduct negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament; however, the discussions of the Group of governmental experts in April 2014 had been very useful.

62. The objective of a world without nuclear weapons could not be decreed in the abstract, without taking the international strategic context into account; the achievement of that objective must be the outcome of gradual and collective work, along with concrete measures. Undermining existing forums, including the Committee, by creating parallel processes and calling into question the step-by-step approach of the 2010 Action Plan, as was the case of certain recent initiatives within and outside the United Nations, would do nothing to advance nuclear disarmament, and, indeed, would jeopardize it.

63. France remained committed to the responsible development of nuclear energy, in compliance with the highest safety, security and non-proliferation standards, by all States that scrupulously met their international obligations and pursued civilian nuclear programmes in good faith. To that end, international cooperation, in particular with regard to training, was essential. France supported all actions taken to further strengthen the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards System, especially the continued development of safeguards at State level. Verification should be based on the implementation of a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol.

64. Regarding nuclear security, there was a need to strengthen the protection of radioactive sources in order to ensure the same conditions of safety and security as those that existed for nuclear materials. In that connection, his Government had recently announced an initiative calling for the establishment of a group of suppliers of high-activity radioactive sources.

65. France condemned the Russian Federation's violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity, which was contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, adopted in connection with Ukraine's accession to the Treaty.

66. **Ms. Golberg** (Canada) said that while much remained to be done to ensure the full implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

Weapons, the world was far safer with it than without it. Canada therefore rejected the pessimistic claims that the 2015 Review Conference was destined to fail. The solution to the challenges faced by the Treaty was not to establish processes outside the Treaty but to redouble efforts to meet existing commitments. Agreement upon an agenda and recommendations for consideration in 2015 would set the stage for a positive outcome at the forthcoming Review Conference.

67. The continued absence of commitment of several States parties to the fundamental principles of the Treaty was a matter of deep concern. The nuclear proliferation activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and continued non-compliance with their Treaty obligations, undermined the Treaty's integrity and authority. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's ongoing nuclear and ballistic programmes were a clear threat to regional and international peace and security and constituted a flagrant violation of multiple Security Council resolutions; that Government must fulfil its international non-proliferation obligations and resume adherence to the Treaty. States parties must ensure that no State could ever again benefit from peaceful nuclear cooperation and then proceed to illegally use for weapons purposes the technology and material received and claim that the Treaty no longer applied. Meanwhile, despite recent diplomatic progress, much remained to be done to resolve all non-compliance issues in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The IAEA Board of Governors must ensure that the Agency fully investigated the Iranian activities reported to the international community in 2011 and verify that Government's compliance with its obligations. In that connection, she underscored the importance of IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols as the nuclear verification standard for all non-nuclear-weapon States.

68. Canada condemned the Russian Federation's military intervention in Ukraine, a clear violation of the latter's sovereignty and territorial integrity and of the Russian Federation's obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. Her Government reiterated its call for the Russian Federation to withdraw its troops.

69. The continued production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices was another challenge to the Treaty. Canada had long facilitated efforts to advance the negotiation of a fissile

material cut-off treaty and would be presiding over the Group of governmental experts on that issue. With the Conference on Disarmament unable to commence negotiations, her Government invited all States parties to engage with the Group, whose recommendations could serve as a reference for future negotiations. Canada and its partners in the expanded cross-regional Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative were continuing to work to advance the implementation of other key elements of the 2010 Action Plan.

70. Stressing the need for States — in particular the nuclear-weapon States — to fulfil their disarmament commitments, she said that effective communication of their efforts would help bolster confidence in those commitments under article VI of the Treaty. Canada looked forward to receiving comprehensive reports from the nuclear-weapon States at the current session and at future meetings with a view to further strengthening transparency on nuclear disarmament activities.

71. The success of the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction would depend on the attendance of all parties in the region, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at. Her delegation hoped that the informal consultations would be able to achieve that objective.

72. Canada had participated in recent discussions on the devastating humanitarian consequences that could result from a nuclear-weapon detonation, an occurrence that every effort must be made to prevent. States parties must therefore strive to implement the 2010 Action Plan to the greatest extent possible before the next Review Conference in order to ensure its success.

73. **Mr. Koncke** (Uruguay) said that his country, a non-nuclear-weapon State, was firmly committed to strengthening the disarmament and non-proliferation regime. All States must demonstrate greater political will to achieve the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and to ensure regional and global security. As a fervent advocate of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and a member of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean, Uruguay regretted the failure to convene a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction and urged all parties to facilitate the holding of that conference at the earliest possible date. His Government also called on

nuclear-weapon States and any other States mentioned in the protocols of treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones to sign and ratify those protocols as soon as possible and to withdraw unconditionally all reservations and other unilateral interpretations which impacted the denuclearized status of such zones.

74. The recent conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons had revealed how defenceless humanity would be in the event of intentional or accidental use of nuclear weapons. For that reason, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, priority must be accorded to the negotiation of a legally binding and unconditional agreement on negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use of threat of use of such weapons. Nonetheless, disarmament negotiations must resume immediately.

75. He reiterated the importance of the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and called on Annex II States to promptly ratify it and on all States to respect the moratorium on nuclear tests and related activities. Moreover, steps must be taken to commence negotiations of a fissile material cut-off treaty. Lastly, the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards System must continue to be strengthened and thereby equipped to confront proliferation risks, hence the need for all States to accede to its additional protocol.

76. **Mr. Oyarzun Marchesi** (Spain) said that his Government urged nuclear-weapon States to strengthen their commitment to nuclear disarmament, as stipulated in article VI of the Treaty, and highlighted the special responsibility of the States in possession of the largest arsenals. In that regard, the proposal by the President of the United States of America in 2013 to reduce the amount of strategic weapons by one third was a positive step. All States parties must reaffirm their commitment to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty and to continue to move towards universal adherence and implementation.

77. Twenty-two years after Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine had renounced the nuclear weapons inherited from the Soviet Union and acceded to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, the guarantees of territorial integrity and security given to those countries remained especially relevant.

78. The entry into force of CTBT must be promoted, and the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament

on a fissile material cut-off treaty must not be subject to further delays. Progress needed to be achieved in combating the asymmetric proliferation of nuclear weapons, by preventing their acquisition by non-State actors with terrorist aims and strengthening physical security. Efforts to implement Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and the convening of the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague were noteworthy in that regard. Agreement must be reached among States parties about how to respond in the event of a withdrawal from the Treaty of any State party.

79. His Government highlighted the importance of convening a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. It condemned the nuclear explosions conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and called on that country to resume compliance with the Treaty and its IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement and to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. It welcomed the establishment of a plan of action for the Islamic Republic of Iran and hoped that that country would comply fully with the measures it had agreed to.

80. **Ms. Natividad** (Philippines) said that her Government was seriously concerned that States parties would be unable to follow through on the commitments made at the 2010 Review Conference, in light of the failure of the recently concluded session of the Disarmament Commission to produce consensus recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the delay in convening the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. That conference would be a crucial first step towards achieving lasting peace in the Middle East.

81. Fifty years into the global campaign to eliminate nuclear weapons, the world was well aware of the destructive potential of a single warhead, and far too many remained in existence. The time for patience had passed; it was unrealistic to demand that the world stand idly by while insisting on a formula that had consistently failed to work. Her delegation welcomed further engagement by the nuclear-weapon States on the implementation of their commitments under the Treaty and the 2010 Action Plan, in the hope that such engagement would eventually evolve into a forum for multilateral reduction of nuclear arsenals. The

Philippines would insist on a definitive timeframe for the fulfilment of the commitments in Actions 3 and 5.

82. For its part, as a non-nuclear-weapon State, her country continued to abide by its obligations under its Constitution and the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone; however, that Treaty would not be effective without the cooperation of the nuclear-weapon States, which should sign and accede to the Protocol as soon as possible. Nuclear weapons were illegal under international law, including international humanitarian law; the notion of control was meaningless, and the idea of military necessity absurd. Her Government had strongly supported the High-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament in September 2013 and was committed to the immediate start of negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention. Her Government had also supported and participated in the two Conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, which had significantly contributed to furthering disarmament education, and urged all States to take part, especially the nuclear-weapon States.

83. **Mr. Laggner** (Switzerland), noting that the Treaty had made an important contribution to limiting the risks of proliferation since its entry into force decades earlier, said that it was in the international community's shared interest to ensure that the review process steadily reinforced the Treaty rather than alternating between success and failure. The 2015 Review Conference would allow States parties to assess the implementation of their commitments under the three pillars of the Treaty. In order to get a clear picture of the situation, States parties must make additional efforts to achieve transparency. Switzerland had submitted a second national report on its implementation of the 2010 Action Plan.

84. There had been some encouraging developments in the area of nuclear non-proliferation, including the negotiation process on the Iranian nuclear programme, under the joint plan of action agreed in late 2013, and the consultations with regard to the postponed conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. His delegation encouraged the States in that region to pursue constructive discussions with a view to implementing the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. Lastly, the results achieved at the IAEA Ministerial Conference in 2013 and at the Nuclear Security Summit in March 2014 were also promising.

85. Advances in non-proliferation contrasted sharply with the lack of additional progress in the area of nuclear disarmament. There was currently no sign of a decisive change in the nuclear doctrines of the nuclear-weapon States or in the composition of their nuclear arsenals; instead, those States were pursuing the qualitative development of their nuclear weapons and maintaining large arsenals. The imbalance in the implementation of the three pillars of the Treaty was all the more regrettable in that the non-nuclear-weapon States had committed themselves to promoting processes favouring nuclear disarmament, including the approach that focused on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. All States parties should explore that essential path. The non-participation of nuclear-weapon States in that discussion and in the open-ended working group on nuclear disarmament constituted missed opportunities to demonstrate leadership and commitment to nuclear disarmament.

86. A year away from the 2015 Review Conference, a substantial number of actions had not yet been implemented, and there were significant differences among States parties regarding their understanding of the deadline and how the relevant actions were to be carried out. The current session should therefore serve to determine how the lack of implementation should be resolved, in 2015 and beyond. The 2010 Action Plan and the commitments contained in the final documents of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference should remain the road map; first of all, unfulfilled commitments should be identified, and then, measures should be defined within a clear timeframe in order to accelerate the implementation of the unfulfilled commitments during the next review cycle.

The meeting rose at 6.10 p.m.