

Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 28 April 2014, at 10 a.m.

Chair: Mr. Roman-Morey (Peru)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.15 a.m.

Opening of the session

1. **The Chair** declared open the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Statement by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs

2. **Ms. Kane** (High Representative for Disarmament Affairs) said that at its third session, the Committee must attempt to formulate concrete recommendations to the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on principles, objectives and ways to promote the full implementation and universality of the Treaty that had been considered at its first and second sessions. Implementation of the action plan on nuclear disarmament adopted at the 2010 Review Conference was at a crucial phase; that plan had given new purpose to the engagement of the nuclear-weapon States to accelerate progress towards nuclear disarmament and had also sparked new interest in better understanding the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. States parties would need to take stock of what had been accomplished since 2010 and diagnose obstacles that continued to inhibit progress. Lowering expectations was not an appropriate response to the challenges.

3. She recalled that during the negotiations on nuclear non-proliferation that had begun in 1965, the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee had spent a mere three years considering various proposals for general and complete disarmament on the basis of principles agreed to in 1961 by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America. Under those remarkably ambitious principles, States would be left with only those non-nuclear weapons, forces, facilities and establishments that were agreed to be necessary to protect the personal security of citizens and support a United Nations peacekeeping force. While that Committee and its successors had been unable to resume negotiations on the basis of those principles, the Treaty enshrined an international obligation to negotiate in good faith on effective measures related to the cessation of the arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, as well as to a treaty on general and complete disarmament. General

and complete disarmament had come to be regarded as the ultimate objective of States, with the objective of nuclear disarmament considered the urgent priority. All States parties must take bold steps to accomplish that goal in good faith and with the necessary ambition and resolve.

4. Efforts to convene the Helsinki conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction had benefited in recent months from the constructive engagement of the States of the region in the multilateral consultations convened in Glion, Switzerland. It was to be hoped that the conference would be convened as early as possible in 2014.

5. There had been no progress at all towards the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea had threatened to conduct further nuclear tests, and its ballistic missile launches had prompted a response by the Security Council. Elsewhere, there were reports that certain States that were not parties to the Treaty were building up their nuclear forces and fissile material stockpiles without restriction, but there were also signs of progress. She hoped that within the next few months, the E3+3 Governments (China, France, Germany, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States) and the Islamic Republic of Iran would reach an agreement that would restore confidence in the peaceful nature of the latter's nuclear programme and provide the international community with the necessary assurances.

Organization of work

6. **The Chair** recalled that in decision 1 of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, it had been determined that the purpose of the Committee's meetings would be to consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, and to make recommendations thereon to the Review Conference. At its current session, the Committee should make all necessary efforts to produce a consensus document based on the discussions and outcomes of the previous two sessions and containing recommendations for the forthcoming 2015 Review Conference. It would need to address a number of procedural issues, including the draft rules of procedure, the draft agenda, the allocation of items to the main committees, and the revised cost estimates. The negotiations required a

blend of idealism and realism, with the latter based on compliance with the legal instruments that had been adopted and implementation of the commitments undertaken by the States parties, on the basis of the 13 practical steps adopted in 2000 and the 2010 action plan on disarmament.

7. He recalled that the agenda for all Committee's sessions had been adopted at the first session in 2012 and issued as document [NPT/CONF/2015/PC.I/14](#). He took it that the Committee wished to take note of the programme of work contained in document [NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/INF.3](#).

8. *It was so decided.*

9. **The Chair** recalled that, at its first session, the Committee had adopted a decision regarding participation at its sessions of representatives of States other than States parties, representatives of specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental organizations as well as representatives of non-governmental organizations; and that, in accordance with the rules of procedure of the 2010 Review Conference, which applied mutatis mutandis to the work of the Committee, representatives of the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were entitled to attend the meetings of the Committee and to submit material, both orally and in writing. He informed the Committee that the Palestinian delegation had submitted a request to attend the meetings of the Committee as an observer; that the following specialized agencies and intergovernmental organizations had asked to attend the Committee's meetings: the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, the European Union, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the League of Arab States, and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization; and that, in addition, 68 non-governmental organizations listed in document [NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/INF.4](#) had submitted requests to attend meetings of the Committee. He took it that the Committee wished to take note of those requests.

10. *It was so decided.*

11. **The Chair** said that representatives of the European Union, the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, the League of

Arab States and the Arab Atomic Energy Agency had asked to make statements during the general debate. He took it that the Committee wished to invite those representatives to make statements during the general debate.

12. *It was so decided.*

13. **The Chair** said that it was clear from the previous two sessions that significant differences of opinion remained on a number of issues across the spectrum of the three pillars of the Treaty. The Committee should try to assist the Review Conference by making recommendations that had a reasonable prospect of producing a consensus. Such recommendations could be conveyed for further consideration at the Review Conference without regard to their priority and without prejudice to other initiatives that States parties might wish to offer, thereby leaving the negotiations to the Review Conference itself.

General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee

14. **Mr. Natalegawa** (Indonesia), speaking on behalf of the Group of States parties that were members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, said that nuclear disarmament was the Group's highest priority; it was therefore extremely concerned over the slow pace of progress in that regard. Reductions in deployment and in operational status were no substitute for irreversible cuts in and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States must fulfil their obligations under article VI of the Treaty and their commitments under the 13 practical steps and the 2010 action plan on disarmament. In that regard, the application by nuclear-weapon States of the principles of transparency, irreversibility and international verifiability was of great importance.

15. Indefinite extension of the Treaty did not imply the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons, which would be incompatible with the object and purpose of the Treaty. The nuclear-weapon States and the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) must exclude completely the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from their military and security doctrines, as well as concepts based on promoting military nuclear alliances and nuclear deterrence policies. The Group expressed grave concern about continuing nuclear-weapon related research and

development, alternative forms of nuclear weapons testing, and the use of new technologies to upgrade existing nuclear weapons systems or develop new types of nuclear weapons; all such activities must be halted.

16. Any horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and sharing of nuclear weapons by States parties constituted a clear violation of articles 1 and 2 of the Treaty on the part of the States transferring nuclear weapons and of the recipients. The adoption of General Assembly resolution 68/32 had demonstrated that nuclear disarmament remained the highest priority for the international community; that resolution must be implemented in full.

17. The Conference on Disarmament must agree as soon as possible on a comprehensive and balanced programme of work that provided for an urgent start to negotiations on a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, prohibiting their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and providing for their destruction. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, negotiations must begin without delay on effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable, universal, legally binding negative security assurances by all nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

18. The Group emphasized the vital importance of the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of article IV of the Treaty. Each State party had a sovereign right to define its national energy and fuel-cycle policies, including the inalienable right to develop, for peaceful purposes, a full national nuclear fuel cycle. Those choices and decisions must be fully respected, and could not be restricted by concerns related to nuclear proliferation. States parties should refrain from any action that would limit certain peaceful nuclear activities on the grounds of their supposed sensitivity, as there was no such prohibition in the Treaty. Any measure aimed at hampering, in full or in part, the exercise of the inalienable rights under article IV of the Treaty would seriously jeopardize the delicate balance between rights and obligations of States parties and widen the gap between developed and developing countries.

19. Proliferation concerns were best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements. Non-proliferation control arrangements should be

transparent and open to participation by all States and should not impose restrictions on access by States parties to the Treaty to material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes. Such arrangements must include the condition of adherence to the Treaty and IAEA comprehensive safeguards as a condition for supply to or cooperation with States that were not parties to the Treaty.

20. Any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities, whether operational or under construction, posed a threat to international peace and security and a serious danger to human beings and the environment and constituted a grave violation of international law, the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and IAEA regulations.

21. The exclusive purpose of safeguards was to verify the fulfilment of obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty. They must be implemented in compliance with article IV of the Treaty, in a way that avoided hampering the economic or technological development of the parties to the Treaty or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities. IAEA was the sole competent authority for the verification of the fulfilment of safeguards obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty. The Group rejected any politically motivated attempts by any State to politicize the work of the Agency. Strict observance of the IAEA Statute and safeguards agreements was of vital importance in conducting verification activities. Given undesirable incidents of leakage of confidential safeguard information, there was a need to strengthen the regime for the protection of such information.

22. The Group rejected any attempt to reinterpret the rights and obligations under the Treaty in a manner inconsistent with its object and purpose and rejected any conditionalities that went beyond the provisions of the Treaty. It believed that the right of withdrawal from treaties should be governed by international treaty law and, in that regard, it reaffirmed its position, expressed in 2005, that the proposals put forward at that time went beyond the provisions of the Treaty.

23. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was not a substitute for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, nuclear-weapon States must fulfil their obligations under nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and withdraw any reservations and unilateral

interpretative declarations that were incompatible with the objectives and purposes of such treaties.

24. The Group strongly supported the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and expressed serious concern about the lengthy delay in the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. The failure to convene the conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East in 2012 as scheduled was a source of profound disappointment, and ran counter to the letter and spirit of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and the 2010 action plan on disarmament. The Group rejected the explanations which had been put forward for not convening the conference on schedule and urged the Secretary-General, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States to convene the conference without further delay, as early as possible in 2014, in order to avoid negative repercussions for the credibility of the Treaty, the 2015 review process and the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime as a whole. The conveners and the facilitator should obtain credible assurances regarding the unconditional participation of Israel, the only country in the region that had not declared its participation in the conference.

25. The Group recalled the outcome document of the Sixteenth Summit of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in Tehran in 2012, in which the Heads of State or Government had reiterated their support for the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction and, as a priority step to that end, reaffirmed the need for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. They had demanded that Israel renounce possession of nuclear weapons, accede to the Treaty without precondition and further delay, place promptly all its nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards and conduct its nuclear-related activities in conformity with the non-proliferation regime. They had also called for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear-related scientific or technological fields to Israel.

26. The Group reaffirmed that universal adherence to the Treaty was an urgent priority; all States which were not yet parties to the Treaty should accede to it without

any further delay. The Group would continue collective efforts to begin negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention as called for in General Assembly resolution 68/32. It believed that the outcome document of the 2015 review process needed to be comprehensive, balanced, practical and substantive, with clear, time-bound commitments by the nuclear-weapon States to eliminate all nuclear weapons and related delivery systems and infrastructure.

27. **Mr. deBrum** (Marshall Islands) recalled that between 1946 and 1958, his country, then a Trust Territory, had been used as a nuclear testing ground for 67 large-scale surface tests of nuclear weapons. He himself had personally witnessed nuclear detonations. The Marshall Islanders' memories and experience of nuclear testing remained vivid, and the consequences were a burden that no people or nation should ever have to carry again. The world seemed to have lost focus on the nuclear threat, treating it as a casual risk rather than as the dire and grave danger that it represented.

28. His Government believed that awareness of the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons must underpin any approach towards nuclear disarmament, with the ultimate aim of the total elimination of such weapons, including through implementation of the Treaty and achievement of its universality. It should be the collective goal of the United Nations and States parties to the Treaty not only to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, but also to pursue the peace and security of a world without them. States parties must show the political will to progress towards fulfilling the Treaty's obligations as a matter of collective security, breaking the cycle of unmet promises. The action plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference was an important benchmark for measuring progress in the implementation of the Treaty. Nuclear-weapon States must intensify their efforts to address their responsibilities towards effective and secure disarmament. While significant progress had been made bilaterally, much more needed to be done to ensure the collective and universal purpose of the Treaty.

29. He had participated in recent filings against the world's major nuclear Powers at the International Court of Justice and elsewhere. States must be held accountable for their obligations under international treaties and customary international law.

30. While the Marshall Islands recognized the right of all States parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the relevant articles of the Treaty, that right entailed an obligation to ensure the highest standards of safety and security. Recent incidents indicated that those standards had not been a priority, however. That right should not be abused or used as false cover. States must be held fully accountable for Treaty violations or abuse of withdrawal provisions.

31. He reiterated his country's support for a Pacific nuclear-free zone, that had long been overshadowed by other agreements. It was encouraging that the United States was now offering a new perspective on the protocols to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Rarotonga Treaty).

32. **Mr. Kishi** (Japan), speaking on behalf of Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the Philippines, Poland, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), said that the Foreign Ministers of NPDI had heard the testimonies of atomic bomb survivors (*hibakushas*) during a recent visit to Hiroshima, which that had served as a reminder of why a nuclear war should never be fought and reinforced the commitment of NPDI to achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. The Foreign Ministers had urged other political leaders to visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki in order to see firsthand the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of atomic bombing.

33. NPDI was committed to the Treaty, which was the essential foundation for the achievement of nuclear disarmament, the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and the basis for the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. Universal adherence to the Treaty was crucial; all States that were not parties to the Treaty must accede to it immediately as non-nuclear-weapon States. With the 2015 Review Conference fast approaching, NPDI urged all States parties to comply fully with the Treaty's obligations and commitments, especially the full and prompt implementation of the 2010 action plan.

34. The only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was their total elimination. There was thus a need for the systematic and continued reduction of all types of nuclear weapons, including non-strategic and non-deployed

nuclear weapons, by nuclear-weapon States, through a pragmatic and step-by-step approach aimed at their total elimination. Unilateral and bilateral nuclear weapons reductions had a positive impact, but could not replace multilateral negotiations. NPDI urged those not yet engaged in nuclear disarmament efforts to reduce their arsenals. At the same time, nuclear-weapon States and other States must reduce the role and significance of nuclear weapons in security strategies and military doctrines; such efforts were important contributions towards complete nuclear disarmament and would be mutually reinforcing.

35. Another important step towards a world free of nuclear weapons was the de-alerting of nuclear forces, which could also help to reduce the risk of catastrophic humanitarian consequences from any unauthorized or accidental launch of nuclear weapons. The immediate commencement of negotiations on a treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT) was also a priority. NPDI urged the Conference on Disarmament to launch negotiations on such a treaty as soon as possible. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was also an essential component for achieving nuclear disarmament; States that had not yet done so should sign and ratify that treaty without delay.

36. NPDI was committed to strengthening the effectiveness and efficiency of the IAEA safeguards system and underscored the crucial role of export controls in supporting the fulfilment of nuclear non-proliferation obligations under article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty. Furthermore, recognizing the serious threat of nuclear terrorism, it reaffirmed its commitment to joint action to strengthen nuclear security, including through the full implementation of relevant international requirements.

37. NPDI strongly condemned the nuclear and ballistic missile programmes of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which undermined the Treaty and the global non-proliferation regime and also posed a grave threat to regional and global peace and stability. It condemned and expressed deep concern at that country's launching of ballistic missiles in March 2014, in violation of relevant Security Council resolutions. It strongly urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply with its commitments under the Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks and obligations under all relevant Security Council resolutions, to abandon all nuclear

weapons and existing nuclear programmes and to return to compliance with its safeguards agreement with IAEA. It also urged that country's Government to refrain from further provocations, including ballistic missile launches, nuclear tests or the threat of the use of nuclear weapons.

38. On the Islamic Republic of Iran, NPDI welcomed the start of the implementation of the first steps under the Joint Plan of Action agreed in Geneva on 24 November 2013 and hoped that the ongoing negotiations of E3+3 Governments and the Islamic Republic of Iran would lead to the final and comprehensive resolution of that country's nuclear situation. It urged the Islamic Republic of Iran to swiftly and steadily implement measures, including the ratification and implementation of its additional protocol, to remove international concerns regarding its nuclear activities.

39. NPDI was following with great concern the situation in Ukraine. International obligations and commitments must be respected, including the 1994 Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine's Accession to the Treaty.

40. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the region concerned, was an important measure in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament process. NPDI called for the earliest possible convening of the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction with the participation of all States of the region.

41. NPDI urged all States to reiterate their deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons. The ongoing discussion on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, which underpinned all non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament efforts, should be inclusive and universal, and serve as a catalyst for united, global action towards the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. In that respect, awareness must be raised across borders and generations. NPDI welcomed efforts based on fact-based, scientific studies, which helped to deepen understanding of that impact, including in the context of the second Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons.

42. **Ms. Ubeda Rivera** (Costa Rica), speaking on behalf of the 33 member States of the Community of

Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), reaffirmed the Community's pride in being the world's first nuclear-weapon-free zone to have been established in a densely populated area, through the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco). The commitment of CELAC to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation had been confirmed from its very foundation, in 2012, at which time relevant heads of State and Government had adopted a special communiqué on the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The region had also been proclaimed as a zone of peace at its II summit held in Havana, Cuba, in January 2014.

43. CELAC member States reaffirmed that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was a crime against humanity and a violation of international law, including international humanitarian law, and the Charter of the United Nations. The only effective guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was their complete prohibition and total elimination. CELAC was committed to the implementation of General Assembly resolution 68/32. It expressed deep concern at the humanitarian impact of the use of nuclear weapons, a matter which should be addressed in every discussion on nuclear weapons, and welcomed the successful conclusion of the second Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons in February 2014. In that context, CELAC firmly supported the conclusion of a universal and legally-binding instrument prohibiting nuclear weapons that would lead to transparent, irreversible and verifiable nuclear disarmament in order to achieve the goal of the total elimination of all nuclear weapons, under a multilaterally agreed timetable. As an interim measure, CELAC urged the negotiation and adoption of a universal and legally-binding instrument on negative security assurances as soon as possible. CELAC totally rejected the modernization of existing nuclear weapons and development of new types of nuclear weapons, as that was inconsistent with nuclear disarmament obligations. Furthermore, the role of nuclear weapons in strategic doctrines, security policies and military strategies must be eliminated and reliance on nuclear weapons for security must be renounced.

44. CELAC remained firmly in favour of the full, balanced and non-discriminatory implementation of the three main pillars of the Treaty — namely, nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of

nuclear energy — and reaffirmed the inalienable right of States to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, and in conformity with articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty. All parties to the Treaty must facilitate, and participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Furthermore, the Treaty must be made universal: States that had not yet done so should accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States, and nuclear-weapon States must comply with their commitments towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, and report on their progress.

45. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, constituted an important contribution to the achievement of nuclear disarmament. The Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) had been a political, legal and institutional reference point for the establishment of other nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world. In that respect, CELAC urged nuclear-weapon States to withdraw all reservations and interpretative declarations to the Protocols of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and to respect the denuclearized nature of the Latin American and Caribbean region, thus helping to eliminate the possible use of nuclear weapons against the countries of the region.

46. CELAC hoped that the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction would be convened as soon as possible. Such a zone would also be a significant step in the peace process in the Middle East.

47. The step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament had failed to help meet the objectives of the Treaty, achieve the entry into force of CTBT or initiate negotiations for a fissile material treaty, let alone achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons. In that respect, CELAC reiterated the importance of the early entry into force of CTBT and urged those States whose ratification were essential in that regard to accelerate their ratification process. All States must refrain from nuclear weapons test explosions, other nuclear explosions, or any other relevant non-explosive

experiments, including subcritical tests, as those actions were contrary to the objectives of CTBT.

48. CELAC welcomed reductions in nuclear arsenals, and in that respect, looked forward to the full implementation of the Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (new START Treaty) while also calling for further accelerated reductions, including of non-deployed and non-strategic nuclear weapons, in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner. Verifiable nuclear disarmament was imperative for confidence-building, and there was an urgent need to develop adequate and effective verification capabilities and legally binding verification arrangements.

49. On the matter of safeguards and verification, CELAC underscored the work that the IAEA had been conducting in accordance with the provisions of its Statute and safeguards agreements, drawing particular attention to its functions under article III.A, paragraph 5 of its Statute.

50. It was unacceptable to continue to condemn the existence of some weapons of mass destruction while allowing the existence of others — the time was ripe for the adoption of a legally-binding instrument prohibiting nuclear weapons. The indefinite extension of the Treaty agreed upon at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference should not be viewed as justifying indefinite possession of such weapons. The 2015 Review Conference must advance the goal of achieving full and effective nuclear disarmament; merely extending previously agreed plans for another five years was not acceptable, especially in the light of the lacklustre implementation of most disarmament-related actions.

51. **Mr. Tesch** (Australia), speaking on behalf of Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden (the Vienna Group of Ten), recalling the issues on which the Group had been encouraging discussion and substantive progress since its establishment in 1980: peaceful uses of nuclear energy; nuclear safety, security and safeguards; export controls; and nuclear testing, and underscored the Group's view that the Treaty made a fundamental contribution to international peace and security, played a unique role in fostering international confidence and cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and

must be universalized. Each of its three pillars was equally important and mutually reinforcing. While some progress that had been made towards implementing the 2010 action plan, progress on implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments had been slow, which undermined confidence in the Treaty itself. The Group called upon all States, including those outside the Treaty, to redouble their efforts to advance the Treaty's fundamental goals.

52. **Mr. Woolcott** (Australia) said that collective, determined efforts were needed to strengthen implementation of the Treaty across its three pillars, and to strengthen the commitments and obligations which States parties — whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States — had agreed to undertake. Nuclear-weapon States had an enormous responsibility to drive disarmament. In that respect, he acknowledged the considerable reductions in nuclear arsenals made by some of the nuclear-weapon States, especially the Russian Federation and the United States, and commended the progress made by the United Kingdom and France in that respect. The results of the new START treaty were also encouraging. Nevertheless, the five permanent members of the Security Council and other nuclear-weapon States could do much more and should show a genuine commitment to transparency in nuclear matters, which would help foster further progress. Greater strategic trust was particularly crucial, as nuclear disarmament could not be achieved unilaterally.

53. His Government regretted the failure of the Conference on Disarmament to open negotiations on the long-overdue FMCT. It welcomed the ratification of CTBT by Guinea Bissau, Iraq and Niue, but was deeply disappointed that the treaty had still not entered into force. Australia reaffirmed the right of States to access nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; however, such use must be underpinned by effective safeguards to address the proliferation risks inherent in the spread of nuclear technology. His Government continued to advocate the adoption of additional protocols to IAEA safeguards agreements and was ready to assist with their implementation.

54. Australia strongly supported the convening of a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction as soon as possible. It called on all States in the region to engage in a spirit of genuine and constructive cooperation on that important goal.

55. His Government remained deeply concerned by the actions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which was the only nation in the twenty-first century to maintain an active nuclear testing programme, challenging the disarmament and non-proliferation regime and contravening the provisions of CTBT. It called on that country to cease its provocations and abide by its international commitments. His Government also remained concerned about the possible military dimensions of the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran, but was encouraged by progress made in discussions between Iran and the P5+1 countries under their Joint Plan of Action, and in the context of the Framework for Cooperation agreed between Iran and IAEA in November 2013. He called upon the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to cooperate fully and unconditionally with the Agency and to demonstrate convincingly to the international community the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme.

56. **Mr. Alhakim** (Iraq), speaking on behalf of the Group of States parties that were members of the League of Arab States, said that the Group supported the statement delivered by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Group of States parties that were members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. The Group stressed that the only guarantee against the dangers of nuclear weapons was their complete renunciation. The credibility of the Treaty depended on balanced implementation of the three pillars. In that regard, the Group welcomed the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament and General Assembly resolution [68/32](#).

57. The defence strategies of nuclear-weapon States continued to allow for the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, in violation of the positive and negative assurances given to non-nuclear-weapon States parties by each of the nuclear-weapon States in April 1995, and Security Council resolutions [255 \(1968\)](#) and [984 \(1995\)](#). It was essential that international arrangements should be made for unconditional and binding guarantees against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons until such time as they were completely eliminated. While welcoming voluntary reductions in numbers of nuclear warheads, the Group expressed concern over the renovation by some nuclear-weapon States of their arsenals.

58. The goals of the Treaty would not be achieved until it was universalized. In that regard, the Group

called upon Israel, the only State in the Middle East region that was not a party to the Treaty, to accede to the Treaty and place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards as called for in Security Council resolution 487 (1981). The failure to implement the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and to hold the conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East threatened to undermine the entire review process. Implementation of the 2010 action plan was the key to success in 2015, and that conference needed to be held before the end of 2014.

59. **Ms. O'Brien** (Ireland), speaking on behalf of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and South Africa (the New Agenda Coalition), said that the risk that a nuclear weapon would detonate, whether by accident, miscalculation or design, would persist as long as those weapons remained in existence. While the Treaty's nuclear non-proliferation pillar had succeeded in limiting the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, and non-proliferation obligations had been strengthened, there continued to be questions surrounding the disarmament pillar. Awareness of the catastrophic consequences of the use of nuclear weapons had been raised by the second international Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, which had demonstrated that no State, group of States, or international agency could adequately respond to a nuclear weapon detonation and that the risk of a detonation occurring was far greater than had previously been perceived. Given the scale of devastation that nuclear weapons were designed to inflict, the continued reliance upon them in security doctrines and concepts was unacceptable. Yet security reasons were foremost among the motivations cited by States which aspired to acquire such weapons.

60. The 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament and the beginning of the work of the open-ended working group to develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons demonstrated the desire for progress on nuclear disarmament. Nevertheless, the international community should continue to heed the call made in the 1998 founding declaration of NAC not to remain complacent at the reluctance of the nuclear-weapon States to make a clear commitment to the swift and total elimination of their nuclear weapons and nuclear

weapons capability. NAC looked forward to hearing the progress reports of the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the commitments made at the 2000 Review Conference and the 2010 action plan, based on the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency. Irreversibility was a cardinal principle of the nuclear disarmament process which could be guaranteed only through the strict and transparent implementation of relevant legal and technical commitments. Transparency had become closely associated with accountability, and was central for the credibility of any disarmament measures and to measure compliance with the Treaty.

61. Pending the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, NAC believed that nuclear-weapon-free zones made a valuable contribution to enhancing global and regional peace and security. It was deeply concerned that, although the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East had been an integral element of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the resolution on the Middle East remained unimplemented. It was crucial to fix a date in 2014 for the holding of the conference on the establishment of the zone.

62. NAC affirmed the vital importance of the universality of the Treaty and called upon all States to promote universal adherence and not to undertake any activity that could adversely affect the prospects for universality. It urged India, Israel and Pakistan to join the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States promptly and without conditions, and looked forward to the accession of South Sudan as early as possible. It called on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to verifiably dismantle any nuclear weapons, return to the Treaty and place all its facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.

63. Two decades after the indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995, the presumption of indefinite possession could no longer go unchallenged. A selective approach to implementation of the Treaty's provisions undermined the regime and reinforced inequalities. The Treaty must be fully implemented and strengthened. Work must begin in earnest on the construction of a comprehensive legally binding framework of mutually reinforcing instruments for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons. Such a framework should include

clearly defined benchmarks and timelines and should be backed by a strong system of verification.

64. **Mr. Çevik** (Turkey) said that striking a balance between disarmament and non-proliferation was a challenge, but there had been some progress, notably with regard to the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran and in the context of the high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament. Turkey's security policy excluded the production and use of weapons of mass destruction. As a country seeking to integrate nuclear power into its energy supply, it supported the greatest possible enjoyment of the benefits of nuclear energy by States that were in full compliance with their international obligations. Despite its shortcomings, the Treaty remained the cornerstone of the global system in addressing the issues of disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a balanced manner. The non-proliferation regime should be safeguarded and further strengthened, and the international community should strive for the Treaty's universalization.

65. As the end of the review cycle approached, it was regrettable that little progress had been made on the implementation of the 2010 action plan. Both the overall reduction of the global stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their elimination from military doctrines were necessary in order to reach the goals of the Treaty. The establishment of internationally recognized and effectively verifiable zones free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction should also be a priority. His country was extremely disappointed by the postponement of the convening of the conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, which would have severe repercussions for the 2015 Review Conference.

66. Turkey hoped to see the resumption of substantive work at the Conference on Disarmament. His Government was actively contributing to the process of consideration of the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons; however, it was important not to create parallel processes that could undermine the non-proliferation regime.

67. **Mr. Kamau** (Kenya), speaking on behalf of the African Group of States parties, said that the Group aligned itself with the statement made by Indonesia on behalf of the Group of States parties that were

members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. The Group supported the decision, in General Assembly resolution 68/32, to convene, no later than 2018, a United Nations high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament. He noted that the continent of Africa had been established as a nuclear-weapon-free zone in 2009, under the Treaty of Pelindaba.

68. The Group considered the total elimination of nuclear weapons to be the only absolute guarantee against their use or threat of use, and was disturbed by the lack of progress by nuclear-weapon States towards that goal. Reductions in the numbers or operational status of nuclear weapons were no substitute for their complete elimination. The Group called on the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their obligations under article VI of the Treaty and their undertakings under the 13 steps and the 2010 action plan, in particular with regard to the total elimination of nuclear weapons as envisaged in action 5.

69. The Group was concerned over the failure to convene a conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, in violation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and the 2010 action plan, and had serious repercussions for the future of the Treaty. The Group welcomed the 2013 Egyptian initiative for concrete action in support of the establishment of that zone, and urged that such a conference should be convened as soon as possible with the attendance of all States in the region, including Israel.

70. The Group welcomed the two recent conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons and looked forward to the third conference to be held later in 2014. Continued inclusion of nuclear weapons in defence doctrines promoted retention of nuclear weapons. Nuclear-weapon States should move towards complete elimination based on the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility. The indefinite extension of the Treaty should not be taken to imply indefinite possession. While the rights of all States to peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be protected, the Group called on all States to accede to the Treaty without preconditions and submit all their nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards.

71. **Mr. Khalil** (Egypt) said that the States Parties to the Treaty were anything but prepared to reach an

agreed outcome at the 2015 Review Conference. Progress in implementing the Treaty, the resolutions and decisions of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and even the 2010 action plan fell well short of the expectations of the international community. The growing disconnect between what should be done under the Treaty, and what was actually being done, often in contradiction to the Treaty, raised the question of whether efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament, or even to review the implementation of the Treaty, were still on the right track. The failure to convene a conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East was particularly disappointing.

72. The decision on a date for the 2015 Review Conference was being held hostage to linkages and preconditions by those who claimed that the preparatory documentation must first be approved. That linkage kept the timeframe open and entailed a risk that the conference would not be convened in 2015, which would call in question the existence of political will. While nuclear disarmament remained a legal commitment for nuclear-weapon States, practices by those States, including policies of extended deterrence, nuclear umbrellas for non-nuclear-weapon States, cooperation with non-States parties to the Treaty and, above all, their continuing possession of nuclear weapons, raised questions about their disarmament intentions. The 2015 Review Conference should review the status of implementation of each of the 13 steps and take into account General Assembly resolution [68/32](#).

73. Egypt was alarmed by attempts to curtail the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Several international forums and initiatives promoted policies that diverged from the letter and spirit of article IV of the Treaty. In order to preserve the credibility of the Treaty, and its centrality to the non-proliferation and disarmament regime, the current review cycle needed to ensure the fulfilment of commitments and obligations with regard to the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, as well as the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

The meeting rose at 1.00 p.m.