

Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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**Working paper submitted by Australia, Austria, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway and Sweden (the Vienna Group of Ten)**

Key points

- The Vienna Group calls for the acceleration of efforts to develop and implement a fully effective global nuclear security framework based on prevention, detection and response. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) plays an essential role in the global efforts to improve the global nuclear security framework and to promote its implementation.
- All States parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material should ratify the 2005 Amendment to the Convention as soon as possible and we encourage them to act in accordance with the object and purpose of the amendment until such time as it enters into force. All States that have not yet done so should adhere to the Convention, and ratify and adopt the amendment as soon as possible.
- All States should apply, as appropriate, the recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities contained in IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13, (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5) and in other relevant international instruments at the earliest possible date.
- With regard to curbing illicit trafficking, all States need to reinforce efforts on improving existing control mechanisms and cooperation mechanisms, in particular through membership of the Incident and Trafficking DataBase.
- We encourage States concerned, on a voluntary basis, to further minimize highly enriched uranium stocks and their use, and to convert radioisotope production to low-enriched uranium targets, where technically and economically feasible.



Working paper on implementation of the action plan

1. The Vienna Group of Ten notes that article III of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is designed to detect and prevent the diversion of nuclear material, equipment and technology. This relates to not only diversion at the State level but also diversion to individuals or subnational groups. The Group notes in this regard that physical protection and measures to combat illicit trafficking are parts of a national nuclear security regime, the existence of which should be made a precondition for transfers of nuclear material, sensitive equipment or technology.
2. The Vienna Group emphasizes the essential role of IAEA in the global efforts to improve the global nuclear security framework and to promote its implementation. The Group underlines the importance of ensuring that the Agency continues to have the appropriate structure, resources and expertise needed to carry out its mandated nuclear security activities in accordance with its statute, relevant resolutions of its General Conference and its Nuclear Security Plans. The Group also welcomes the work of the Office of Nuclear Security of IAEA. In continuing and strengthening this function, IAEA should take an active role in facilitating effective cooperation and coordination at the international and regional levels.
3. Noting the importance of strengthening coordination and complementarity among nuclear security activities, the Group welcomes the initiative by IAEA to organize the International Conference on Nuclear Security: Enhancing Global Efforts, to be held in Vienna in July 2013.
4. The Vienna Group welcomes the progress made by IAEA in developing the Nuclear Security Series, comprising a comprehensive set of Nuclear Security Fundamentals, Recommendations, Implementing Guides and Technical Guidance publications and, in particular, the approval by the Board of Governors of IAEA of the *Nuclear Security Fundamentals* in September 2012. We also welcome the establishment of the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee in March 2012. The Group acknowledges the important contribution of IAEA in assisting States in meeting appropriate security standards and calls on all States to take full advantage of the advisory services of IAEA in that regard, including the International Physical Protection Advisory Service and the establishment of Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans. In this regard, the Group welcomes the missions of the International Physical Protection Advisory Service, along with other IAEA efforts, including those being held in nuclear-weapon States, and welcomes the increasing number of Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans.
5. The Vienna Group underlines the paramount importance of effective physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities and the need for all States to maintain the highest standards of physical protection. The Group welcomes the latest revision of *Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities* (Nuclear Security Series No. 13, INFCIRC/225/Rev.5), and calls on all States to apply, as appropriate and at the earliest possible date, the recommendations contained in it and in other relevant international instruments.
6. The Vienna Group welcomes new accessions to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, noting that Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) calls on all States to accede to the Convention. The Group strongly

supports the 2014 target as an achievable objective to bring into force the 2005 Amendment to the Convention. The Group calls on all States parties to the Convention to ratify the Amendment as soon as possible and to act in accordance with the object and purpose of the Amendment until such time as it enters into force. The Group calls on all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Convention and adopt the Amendment as soon as possible. The Group notes that continued and enhanced efforts are needed to provide for the full and effective implementation of the Convention.

7. In particular the Vienna Group stresses the importance of implementing article 14 of the Convention, which stipulates that each State party shall inform the depositary of its laws and regulations which give effect to the Convention. Implementation will foster public trust in the system of internationally binding nuclear security requirements.

8. The Vienna Group recognizes the non-proliferation and security benefits of the minimization of the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian applications, including the conversion of civilian research reactors to low-enriched uranium fuel. The Group welcomes the efforts of IAEA to assist countries which, on a voluntary basis, have chosen to take steps to minimize the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian nuclear applications. The Group encourages States concerned, on a voluntary basis, to further minimize highly enriched uranium stocks and use and to convert radioisotope production to low-enriched uranium targets, where technically and economically feasible, and taking into account the need for an assured supply of medical isotopes. The Group encourages international dialogue on the elimination of civilian uses of highly enriched uranium. In this context, the Group recalls the discussions organized by Norway, Austria and the Nuclear Threat Initiative in cooperation with IAEA at the second International Symposium on Highly Enriched Uranium Minimization, held in Vienna, from 23 to 25 January 2012.

9. The Vienna Group notes with serious concern the illicit trade in highly sensitive nuclear equipment and technology. The Group stresses the importance of full cooperation from all IAEA member States in identifying the supply routes and sources of the technology, related equipment and nuclear and non-nuclear materials. The Group recognizes the increased need for all States to reinforce their efforts on improving existing control mechanisms and cooperation mechanisms as appropriate in order to achieve higher degrees of efficiency in the efforts to curb illicit trafficking.

10. The Vienna Group welcomes the work of IAEA in support of efforts of States parties to combat illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and other radioactive substances. The Group welcomes IAEA efforts to assist IAEA member States in strengthening their regulatory control on the applications of radioactive materials, including the Implementing Guide entitled *Security of Radioactive Sources* (IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 11). The Group also welcomes IAEA activities undertaken to provide for the enhanced exchange of information, including the continued maintenance of its Incident and Trafficking DataBase and encourages the enhanced membership of the Database. The Group recognizes the need for enhanced coordination among States and among international organizations, such as the Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Unit of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and the World Customs Organization, in

preventing, detecting and responding to illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials.

11. The Vienna Group is convinced of the importance of nuclear forensics in determining the origin of detected nuclear and other radioactive materials. Nuclear forensics can also be an effective tool in providing evidence for the prosecution of acts of illicit trafficking and malicious uses. The Group encourages States and IAEA to develop and enhance nuclear forensics capabilities, and to foster international cooperation in this regard. The skills of both traditional and nuclear forensics could be combined by developing a common set of definitions and standards, undertaking research and sharing information and best practices. In this regard, we particularly note the effort made by the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism to produce a document on nuclear forensics fundamentals and we support the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group in its work to further enhance knowledge in this field. The Group also supports the initiative of the Government of the Netherlands and the Netherlands Forensic Institute to create and maintain a nuclear forensics forum, which serves as a platform for the discussion of a new nuclear forensics lexicon.

12. In the conviction that States and industry have a common interest in fostering nuclear security, the Vienna Group considers a deeper involvement of nuclear industry in evaluating nuclear security regulations is essential. While strengthening this cooperation, possible divergences of interest and the ultimate responsibility of national authorities should duly be taken into consideration.

13. The Vienna Group welcomes the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and urges all States that have not yet done so to become party to the Convention as soon as possible.

14. The Vienna Group notes that Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), as reiterated in Security Council resolutions 1673 (2006), 1810 (2008) and 1977 (2011), requires all States to establish appropriate effective controls over materials related to nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and to this end, to establish appropriate effective physical protection measures, and appropriate effective border controls and law enforcement efforts, to detect, deter, prevent and combat illicit trafficking and brokering in nuclear-weapon-related materials. The Group further notes that Security Council resolution 1887 (2009), inter alia, calls on States to share best practices with the aim of securing all vulnerable nuclear material, to manage responsibly and minimize the use of highly enriched uranium for civilian purposes and to improve national capabilities to detect, deter and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials.

15. The Vienna Group believes that fostering nuclear security culture through nuclear security education, training and proper certification of nuclear security managers should be a priority for States and the nuclear industry. In this regard, close cooperation with IAEA is essential. We welcome the establishment of centres of excellence and other nuclear security training and support centres, as well as an international nuclear security education network.

16. The Vienna Group welcomes the extension beyond 2012 of the 25-member Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, launched in 2002 by the Group of Eight, and its continued multi- and bilateral contributions to enhance the physical protection of nuclear facilities and

weapons-usable material worldwide. The Group likewise welcomes the contribution of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and similar programmes to the reduction and protection of vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials located at civilian sites worldwide.

17. The Vienna Group strongly supports the activities of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which aims at developing partnership capacity to combat nuclear terrorism consistent with the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The Group welcomes IAEA participation as an observer in the Initiative and encourages IAEA to continue to play a constructive role in this and other international nuclear security-related initiatives.

18. The Vienna Group commends the work of the Proliferation Security Initiative and welcomes the increasing participation of States in these efforts, which further enhance international cooperation in combating illicit trafficking of nuclear material. We recall that the Interdiction Principles endorsed by participants in the Initiative are in accordance with Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). The Group welcomes the high-level meeting of the Initiative.

19. The Vienna Group supports the effective implementation of the workplan adopted by the Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, D.C., in 2010. The Group also encourages participating States to effectively follow up on the outcomes of the Nuclear Security Summit held in Seoul, in 2012, and supports a thorough preparation for the Nuclear Security Summit to be hosted by the Netherlands in 2014. We consider that an early reflection on the future of the Nuclear Security Summit process is important for the overall success of the 2014 Summit.
