

Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

**Working paper submitted by Australia, Austria, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway and Sweden (the Vienna Group of Ten)**

Key points

- The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is of the utmost urgency.
- All States that have yet to do so should sign and/or ratify the Treaty without delay, in particular those remaining eight Annex 2 States necessary for the Treaty's entry into force.
- All States should refrain from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, pending its entry into force.
- The nuclear tests by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of 9 October 2006 and 25 May 2009, and most recently that of 12 February 2013, which were detected by the Treaty's verification system and internationally condemned, undermine the international non-proliferation regimes and the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
- Existing moratoriums on nuclear weapon test explosions and any other nuclear explosions must be maintained, pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
- The use of the data from the Treaty's International Monitoring System for civil uses should be encouraged, especially in the context of natural disasters and other emergency situations.
- Continued development of the Treaty's verification regime is vital to the effectiveness of the Treaty. States Signatories should support the work of the Provisional Technical Secretariat by providing adequate resources and political support, as well as relevant expertise, and make every effort to ensure that the technical aspects of the work of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization continue to move ahead and sustain political progress towards entry into force.



Working paper on implementation of the action plan

1. The Vienna Group of Ten firmly believes that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty constitutes a core element of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects and is vital to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Test-Ban Treaty was an integral part of the 1995 decision to indefinitely extend the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Group therefore stresses that the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is of the utmost urgency and recalls that the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences reaffirmed the vital importance of the Treaty's entry into force, with the action plan from the 2010 Review Conference again emphasizing the resolve of States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to achieve that aim. The Group reaffirms that the provisions of article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty are to be interpreted in the light of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
2. Reiterating that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty constrains the development of nuclear weapons and their qualitative improvement, the Vienna Group reaffirms that the Treaty combats both horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation. The Group is concerned that any development of new types of nuclear weapons may result in the resumption of tests and a lowering of the nuclear threshold. The Group calls upon all States to refrain from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, pending its entry into force.
3. The nuclear tests by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of 9 October 2006 and 25 May 2009, and most recently that of 12 February 2013, which were detected by the Treaty's verification system and internationally condemned, undermine the international non-proliferation regimes and the object and purpose of the Treaty. These events further underlined the need for a universal and effective international monitoring and verification system for detecting nuclear explosions and highlight the importance of bringing the Treaty into force as soon as possible.
4. The Vienna Group underlines that existing moratoriums on nuclear weapon test explosions and any other nuclear explosions must be maintained, pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The Group stresses, however, that such moratoriums cannot serve as a substitute for ratifying the Treaty and that only the entry into force of the Treaty provides the global community a permanent, non-discriminatory, and legally binding commitment to end nuclear weapon testing and all other nuclear explosions.
5. The Vienna Group notes with concern that, over 15 years after it was opened for signature, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has yet to enter into force. However, it warmly welcomes the continuing progress in ratifications and all efforts to that effect, in particular the ratification by Indonesia in February 2012, the first Annex 2 State to ratify since 2008. The Treaty has now been signed by 183 States of which 159 have ratified, including 36 whose ratification is necessary for entry into force. The Group renews its call upon all States yet to do so to sign and/or ratify the Treaty without delay, in particular the eight remaining Annex 2 States, and to recognize the value of the Treaty for regional and international security.
6. The Ministerial Conference on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty held in New York in September 2012 reaffirmed strong support for the early entry into force of the Treaty, as it would establish a legally binding, comprehensive prohibition on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. The Vienna Group notes that the joint Ministerial Statement that was issued at the

Conference was endorsed by a record 101 States, including all five nuclear-weapon States for the first time. The Group welcomes the eighth Article XIV Conference, to be held in September 2013 in New York to consider measures to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry into force of the Treaty.

7. The Vienna Group welcomes the progress made by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization to build the system to verify compliance with the Treaty at its entry into force. The goal of this work should be an effective, reliable, participatory and non-discriminatory verification system with global reach. All major components of the verification system, including the capability to conduct an on-site inspection, must be ready to operate by the time of entry into force. The Vienna Group welcomes the plans being made by the Preparatory Commission to hold an integrated field exercise in 2014 in Jordan to help develop, test and refine the procedures and tools to conduct on-site inspections, as well as provide inspectors with hands-on experience.

8. In order to enable the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission to complete its mandate, the Vienna Group calls on States Signatories to support the work of that organization by providing adequate resources and political support, as well as relevant expertise, and make every effort to ensure that the technical aspects of the work of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization continue to move ahead and sustain political progress towards entry into force.

9. The Vienna Group is convinced of the potential benefits of widespread advocacy for further ratifications of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The Group urges all States, but particularly those that have recently ratified, to engage with countries yet to ratify, sharing their experiences of ratification and encouraging further ratifications of the Treaty. The Group also encourages use of other mechanisms for the promotion of the Treaty, including outreach activities and capacity-building initiatives. In this respect, the Group particularly appreciates the extensive training courses in the framework of the capacity development initiative as well as the pilot project to bring relevant experts from developing countries to technical meetings. These capacity-building activities contribute to enhanced awareness of the Treaty. They help to enable States Signatories to effectively fulfil their verification responsibilities and address possible technical, scientific and legal challenges.

10. The Vienna Group looks forward to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Science and Technology 2013 Conference, aimed at further enhancing the involvement of individual Governments, scientists and national scientific institutions that are being pursued as a useful way to create broader national support for the benefits of the Treaty and to maintain levels of expertise and investment required for verification of the Treaty.

11. The Vienna Group encourages the use of the data from the International Monitoring System for civil and scientific uses, especially in the context of natural disasters and other emergency situations. The Group notes that the International Monitoring System demonstrated its effectiveness during the tragic events of Fukushima, including the data it provided for seismic and tsunami warning systems, as well as tracking dispersal of radionuclides released by the accident. The Group welcomes the enhanced cooperation with other international organizations in this field.