

Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Chair's factual summary*

1. States parties reaffirmed their commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. They recalled their resolve to seek a safer world for all and to achieve the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the objectives of the Treaty.
2. States parties underlined the fundamental importance of effective and balanced implementation of the Treaty across its three pillars, full compliance with all the Treaty's provisions, and universal adherence to the Treaty. They emphasised that strengthening implementation of the Treaty and of decisions taken by States parties, complying with the Treaty and effectively addressing compliance issues, and achieving universal adherence to the Treaty were key challenges for the review process.
3. In this context, States parties underlined the necessity of implementation of Decisions 1 and 2 and the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Extension and Review Conference, the Final Document adopted by the 2000 Review Conference, and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted at the 2010 Review Conference.
4. States parties again called on India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States promptly and without conditions and to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements as required by the Treaty. States parties also called on South Sudan to accede to the Treaty.
5. While acknowledging some progress in the implementation of the commitments contained in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted by the 2010 Review Conference, States parties recognised that greater implementation efforts were required. States parties recalled the importance of regular reporting of their implementation efforts.
6. Many States parties made a number of recommendations for further implementation efforts and to produce recommendations for possible consideration and adoption at the 2015 Review Conference in further pursuit of the Treaty's objectives, including a world without nuclear weapons.

* The present document is being issued without formal editing.



7. States parties recalled the unequivocal undertaking of the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI. Many States parties emphasised that the indefinite extension of the Treaty at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference did not imply the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons. States parties recalled the need for the full implementation of concrete actions leading to nuclear disarmament as contained in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted at the 2010 Review Conference.

8. States parties recalled their commitment to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons. Some States parties underlined the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Some States underlined that the goal of nuclear disarmament should be achieved in the context of general and complete disarmament, as provided for in article VI. States parties recalled their commitment to apply the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency to the implementation of Treaty obligations. Many States parties considered that this applied particularly in the field of nuclear disarmament.

9. States parties recalled the commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. They encouraged, in particular, those States with the largest nuclear arsenals to lead efforts in this regard. Many States parties expressed the expectation that significant reductions should be undertaken during the current review cycle for the Treaty. Some States parties noted the discussions and proposals aimed at increasing mutual understanding on non-strategic nuclear forces.

10. States parties recalled that significant steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament should promote international stability, peace and security, and be based on the principle of increased and undiminished security for all. It was emphasised that nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation were mutually reinforcing. Many States parties expressed their concern that the continued possession of nuclear weapons might provide an incentive for additional States to acquire nuclear weapons.

11. The nuclear-weapon States informed the States parties about the outcome of their conference, held in Geneva from 18 to 19 April 2013, under the chairmanship of the Russian Federation, which built upon their previous conferences, including in London in 2009, Paris in 2011 and in Washington, D.C. in 2012. At their April 2013 meeting, the nuclear-weapon States reviewed progress towards fulfilling their commitments made at the 2010 Review Conference and continued their discussions pertaining to issues related to the Treaty. In this context, they discussed, inter alia, an approach to reporting on their activities at the 2014 session of the Preparatory Committee, and progress towards the development of a glossary of key nuclear terms. They are working toward the establishment of a firm foundation for mutual confidence and further disarmament efforts. The nuclear-weapon States announced that they would continue to meet at all appropriate levels on nuclear issues and to follow up with a further conference in 2014.

12. States parties recalled their deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons. Many States parties referred to the unacceptable harm that would result from a detonation and expressed further concern about the wider and longer-term impact on socio-economic development and their expectation that the humanitarian consequences would continue to be addressed during the current review cycle. Many States parties referred to the Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons held in Oslo from 4 to 5 March 2013. Following from the discussions at the Oslo Conference, those States parties stressed their serious concern that in such an event, these humanitarian consequences would be unavoidable and emergency relief could not be provided to affected areas. The same States parties looked forward to the follow-on conference to be hosted by Mexico in order to deepen understanding on this matter through a fact-based dialogue.

13. Many States parties expressed concern that any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be inconsistent with fundamental rules of international humanitarian law. Some nuclear-weapons States outlined that under their respective national policies any use of nuclear weapons would only be considered in extreme circumstances in accordance with applicable international humanitarian law. States parties reaffirmed the need for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law.

14. Many States parties cited the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, issued at The Hague on 8 July 1996.

15. Many States parties stressed the need for the negotiation of a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including a nuclear weapons convention. Some States parties called for the elaboration of a comprehensive framework of mutually reinforcing instruments, backed by a strong system of verification and including clearly defined benchmarks and timelines, for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons. It was recalled that achieving progress on nuclear disarmament was a shared responsibility of all States.

16. The nuclear-weapon States provided information on their efforts to implement their nuclear disarmament commitments and recalled their commitment to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, in a way that promotes international stability, peace and undiminished and increased security. Certain nuclear-weapon States parties noted they are not pursuing new missions or new capabilities for their nuclear forces. States parties took note of these efforts. Increased transparency by some of the nuclear-weapon States was welcomed by many States parties, including by disclosing the total number of nuclear weapons they possess. States parties recalled that transparency was essential to building trust and confidence as an important part of the disarmament process. Non-nuclear-weapon States parties encouraged the nuclear-weapon States to enhance transparency on all nuclear weapons as an essential confidence-building measure. The nuclear-weapons States reaffirmed the contribution of the pragmatic, step-by-step process to nuclear disarmament and stressed the validity of this route.

17. Many States parties welcomed the steps taken to implement the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The Russian Federation and the United States of America provided information on steps

taken to implement that Treaty. The Russian Federation and the United States of America were encouraged to continue negotiations to achieve greater reductions in their nuclear arsenals, including non-strategic nuclear weapons.

18. While acknowledging these efforts, many States parties expressed concern that the total estimated number of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, still amounted to several thousands.

19. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland recalled the information provided on implementation of planned reductions of nuclear weapons. France recalled that it had achieved a number of planned reductions and dismantlement of related facilities.

20. Many States parties considered that multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations provided the only sustainable method of addressing disarmament and international security issues. States parties recalled the commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures.

21. States parties recalled that at the 2010 Review Conference the nuclear-weapon States were called upon to report on certain nuclear disarmament undertakings to the 2014 session of the Preparatory Committee. Many States parties underlined the value and the importance of reporting by nuclear-weapon States and called for the reporting to be comprehensive and substantive and made specific proposals in this regard. States parties encouraged efforts by the nuclear-weapon States on a standard reporting form. Many States parties referred to specific suggestions they have made as to the content of a standard reporting form for use by the nuclear-weapon States and the frequency of that reporting. States parties noted positively the progress made by nuclear-weapon States on the development of a glossary of key nuclear terms.

22. Many States parties stressed that they remain deeply concerned at the maintenance of many nuclear weapons on a high alert level. Many States parties continued to call for reductions in the operational status of nuclear weapons and emphasised that concrete agreed measures to reduce further the operational status of nuclear weapons systems would increase human and international security and would represent an interim nuclear disarmament step. Many States parties expressed concern over the continued modernisation of nuclear weapons, their delivery systems and related infrastructure as well as plans to further invest in upgrading, refurbishing or extending the lives of nuclear weapons and related facilities.

23. Many States parties expressed concerns regarding the continued role of nuclear weapons in national and regional military doctrines, noting that quantitative reductions in nuclear weapons should be accompanied by steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in all such concepts, doctrines and policies. Some States parties called for the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons which continued to be stationed outside the territories of the nuclear-weapon States. Some States affirmed that they had reduced the role of nuclear weapons in their strategic doctrines.

24. States parties expressed deep concern at the continuing stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament, including the persistent failure to agree on, and

implement, an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work, despite further attempts to achieve consensus. States parties took note of the efforts and discussions in the United Nations General Assembly related to revitalizing the multilateral disarmament machinery.

25. States parties continued to call on the Conference on Disarmament to immediately begin negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein. Some States parties emphasised that negotiation of such a treaty was the next logical step on the negotiating agenda for the multilateral disarmament machinery. Pending the negotiation and entry into force of such a treaty, some States parties called for nuclear-weapons States and all other relevant States to maintain or implement declared moratoria on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. States parties considered the group of governmental experts, to be established pursuant to General Assembly resolution A/RES/67/53 as an opportunity to contribute to such a treaty. Many States parties expressed interest in participating in the aforementioned group of governmental experts.

26. States parties recalled that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament. Many States parties called for the establishment of a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament at the 2015 Review Conference. They also called for the 2015 Review Conference to adopt a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame. A number of States parties called upon the open-ended working group established pursuant to General Assembly resolution A/RES/67/56 to develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons. Other States parties reaffirmed the contribution of a step by step process to nuclear disarmament. Many States parties welcomed the decision of the United Nations General Assembly to convene a high-level meeting on nuclear disarmament on 26 September 2013. They expressed hope that the meeting would contribute to achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament.

27. The achievement of steps by the Russian Federation and the United States of America to implement the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement and its Protocols, including discussion with the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of verification arrangements, was acknowledged by many States parties.

28. A number of States parties continued to call for the earliest development of effective and credible multilateral verification arrangements, in the context of the IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material designated by each nuclear-weapon State as no longer required for military purposes. Those States parties called for the nuclear-weapon States to initiate or accelerate the development of such arrangements.

29. States parties maintained that the total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. States parties recalled that non-nuclear-weapon States parties had a legitimate interest in receiving unequivocal and legally binding security assurances from nuclear-weapon

States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them. In this regard, many States parties emphasised that these assurances should be unconditional. States parties recalled that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately begin discussion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, with a view to elaborating recommendations dealing with all aspects of this issue, not excluding an internationally legally binding instrument. Many States parties emphasised the need to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States. Many States parties called for the establishment of a subsidiary body at the 2015 Review Conference on this issue.

30. Ahead of any such further steps, the nuclear-weapon States were called upon to respect fully and extend their existing commitments with regard to security assurances. China reaffirmed its policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons and its unconditional commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones.

31. States parties underlined the urgent importance of bringing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty into force, as a core element of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. States parties welcomed the recent ratifications of the Treaty by Brunei Darussalam and Chad.

32. All States that have not yet done so were called upon to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty without delay, particularly the eight remaining States whose ratifications were necessary for the Treaty to enter into force. States parties recalled that positive decisions on the Treaty by the nuclear-weapon States would have a beneficial impact towards the ratification of the Treaty. Those States were called upon not to wait for other States to ratify that Treaty first. States parties reaffirmed the special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States to encourage Annex 2 countries to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and called upon them to take initiative in this regard. States parties recognised the contribution of the Article XIV Conferences on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to the process of the Treaty's universalization, and encouraged the use of this and other mechanisms for the promotion of the Treaty, including outreach activities and capacity-building initiatives. All States, particularly those that have recently ratified the Treaty, were urged to engage with States that have yet to ratify, to share their experiences of ratification and to encourage further ratifications of the Treaty.

33. Pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, all States were urged to maintain or implement declared moratoria on the conduct of nuclear weapon test explosions or other nuclear explosions.

34. Many States parties called for the immediate closure and dismantlement of any remaining sites for nuclear test explosions and their associated infrastructure, the prohibition of nuclear weapons research and development, as well as for all States to refrain from the use of alternate means of nuclear testing and the use of new technologies to upgrade nuclear weapon systems. Many States parties expressed concern that any development of new types of nuclear weapons might result in the resumption of nuclear testing and defeat the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

35. States parties stressed the need to support the important work of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization to establish the verification system for the Treaty, and encouraged further development of related technical capacity in States. Support was expressed by a number of States parties for the civil use of data from the international monitoring system, particularly in the context of natural disasters and other emergency situations.

36. States parties described various initiatives they had made in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation education. They also stressed the need to raise awareness of the public, in particular of future generations, on all topics related to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, in support of achieving a world without nuclear weapons. States parties reaffirmed the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education, including continued efforts to educate young people, the use of new information and communications technology, as well as collaboration among governments, international organisations, non-governmental organisations, academic institutions and the private sector, including industry.

37. States parties recognised the valuable role played by civil society in the implementation of the objectives of the Treaty as well as in promoting accountability. They welcomed the increased interaction with the civil society during the specific session at the Committee. Appreciation was expressed for the information and monitoring reports made available by civil society and academic organizations. A number of States parties expressed interest in intensifying engagement with non-governmental organizations in the context of the review process of the Treaty, as well as in the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives.

38. States parties emphasized that IAEA safeguards were a fundamental component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, played an indispensable role in the implementation of the Treaty and helped to create an environment conducive to nuclear cooperation.

39. States parties reaffirmed that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with the Statute of IAEA and the IAEA safeguards system, compliance by States parties with their safeguards agreements undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. A number of States parties emphasised the statutory role of the IAEA Board of Governors and the Director General in the full implementation of safeguards agreements.

40. Many States parties considered that safeguards should be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of the Treaty and avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities.

41. States parties recalled the importance of the application of IAEA comprehensive safeguards to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities in the States parties in accordance with the provisions of article III of the Treaty. They welcomed that seven additional States had brought into force comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA since the 2010 Review

Conference, and urged the 13 States parties that had not yet brought their comprehensive safeguards agreements into force to do so as soon as possible. States Parties also encouraged South Sudan to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and conclude with the IAEA a comprehensive safeguards agreement.

42. States parties acknowledged that the revised small quantities protocol had been accepted by 55 States and encouraged all States with small quantities protocols either to amend or rescind them, as appropriate.

43. States parties welcomed the fact that 119 States parties had brought the additional protocol into force, including the fact that 18 States parties had brought the additional protocol into force since the 2010 Review Conference. They encouraged all States that had not yet done so to conclude and bring into force additional protocols and to implement them provisionally pending their entry into force as soon as possible.

44. Many States parties noted that comprehensive safeguards agreements were not sufficient for the IAEA to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. They noted that implementation of an additional protocol provided the IAEA with additional information and access, strengthened the Agency's ability to provide assurances of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State, and provided increased confidence about the State's compliance with its obligations under the Treaty. A number of those States parties considered that a comprehensive safeguards agreement, together with an additional protocol, represented the current verification standard.

45. Many States parties noted that it was the sovereign decision of any State to conclude an additional protocol, but once in force, the additional protocol was a legal obligation. Many States parties emphasised the need to distinguish between legal obligations and voluntary confidence-building measures and to ensure that such voluntary undertakings were not turned into legal safeguards obligations. They noted that additional measures related to safeguards should not affect the rights of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

46. In order to achieve greater adherence to the additional protocol, a number of States parties highlighted the need to provide guidance and assistance in order to develop national processes and to build the required legal and institutional domestic infrastructure. Some States parties offered assistance towards that end.

47. Many States parties emphasised that adherence to the Treaty and to full-scope safeguards should be a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not party to the Treaty.

48. Some States parties noted the importance of the voluntary offer agreements and related additional protocols implemented by the nuclear-weapon States. They noted that such agreements provided the IAEA with valuable experience in implementing safeguards. Many States parties proposed that the nuclear-weapon States undertake to accept full-scope safeguards.

49. States parties recalled that IAEA safeguards should be assessed and evaluated regularly. Decisions adopted by the IAEA policy bodies aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of IAEA safeguards should be supported and implemented.

50. States parties acknowledged additional technical and financial contributions by States to help the IAEA meet its safeguards responsibilities, and to enhance the related technology base, including the construction of a new Safeguards Analytical Laboratory.

51. A number of States parties welcomed the work being undertaken by the IAEA in the conceptualisation and the development of State-level approaches to safeguards implementation and also welcomed the implementation of State-level integrated safeguards approaches by the IAEA.

52. Many States parties underlined the significance of maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality with respect to safeguards information and underlined the responsibility of the IAEA in this regard. Given concerns about cases of leakage of such information, they emphasised that the confidentiality of such information should be fully respected and that the measures for its protection should be strengthened, with a view to preventing the leakage of sensitive or confidential information.

53. States parties reaffirmed the importance in complying with non-proliferation obligations, addressing all compliance matters in order to uphold the Treaty's integrity and the authority of the safeguards system. Many States parties expressed concern with respect to matters of non-compliance with safeguards obligations, including cases currently subject to resolutions by the United Nations Security Council and IAEA Board of Governors, and called on any non-compliant States to provide full cooperation with the IAEA and move promptly into full compliance with their obligations.

54. Many States parties underlined that the reporting of the IAEA on the implementation of safeguards should continue to be factual and technically based and reflect appropriate reference to the relevant provisions of safeguards agreements. It was stressed that, in accordance with article XII.C of the Statute of the IAEA and INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), the inspectors shall report any non-compliance to the Director General who shall thereupon transmit the report to the Board of Governors, which shall call upon a State in question to remedy forthwith any non-compliance which it finds to have occurred, and shall report the non-compliance to all members and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations.

55. Many States parties emphasised the importance of access to the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly by the IAEA, including its Director General, in accordance with article XII.C of the Statute of the IAEA and paragraph 19 of INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), and the role of the Security Council and the General Assembly, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in upholding compliance with IAEA safeguards agreements and ensuring compliance with safeguards obligations by taking appropriate measures in the case of any violations notified to it by the IAEA.

56. A number of States parties emphasised that responses to concerns over compliance with any obligation under the Treaty by any State party should be pursued by diplomatic means, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations.

57. States parties recalled the need to ensure that their nuclear-related exports did not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that such exports were in full conformity with the objectives

and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated, particularly, in articles I, II and III, as well as the decision on principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference. A number of States parties expressed the view that export controls were a legitimate, necessary and desirable means of implementing the obligations of States parties under article III of the Treaty. States parties recalled their encouragement for the use of multilaterally negotiated and agreed guidelines and understandings by States parties in developing their own national export controls.

58. Many States parties expressed deep concern regarding limitations and restrictions on exports to developing countries of nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes, which those States considered to be inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty. They called for the immediate removal of any restrictions or limitations posed on peaceful uses of nuclear energy which were incompatible with the provisions of the Treaty. Many States parties expressed the view that effective export controls were essential for facilitating the fullest possible cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in conformity with the Treaty.

59. Many States parties stressed that any new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of the full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. A number of States parties expressed the view that any such new supply arrangements should also require acceptance of an additional protocol based on INFCIRC/540 (Corrected).

60. States parties noted the importance of effective physical protection of all nuclear material and nuclear facilities and the need for strengthening international cooperation in this respect. States parties recognised that the primary responsibility for nuclear security rested with individual States. States parties recalled that, when developing nuclear energy, including nuclear power, the use of nuclear energy must be accompanied by appropriate and effective levels of security, consistent with States' national legislation and respective international obligations.

61. Some States parties considered that the IAEA had an essential role in efforts to improve the global nuclear security framework, and to promote its implementation. They also stressed the need to strengthen the coordination and complementarity of nuclear security activities. States parties welcomed the initiative of IAEA to organize the International Conference on Nuclear Security: Enhancing Global Efforts, to be held in Vienna in July 2013. States parties recalled their encouragement to States to maintain the highest possible standards of security and physical protection of nuclear material and facilities. States parties were encouraged to apply, as appropriate, the recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities contained in IAEA document INFCIRC/225/Revision 5 and in other relevant international instruments at the earliest possible date. States parties were encouraged to take full advantage of the IAEA advisory services in the field of nuclear security.

62. States parties welcomed the recent accessions to the amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and all States that had not yet done so were encouraged to ratify the amendment to the Convention at the earliest possible date. Some States parties welcomed the establishment of the

Nuclear Security Guidance Committee in the IAEA and the continuing development of the Nuclear Security Series.

63. A number of States parties noted with serious concern the issue of illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials. States parties recalled the need to improve their national capabilities to prevent, detect and respond to illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials throughout their territories, in accordance with their relevant international obligations, and called upon those States parties in a position to do so to work to enhance international partnership and capacity-building in this regard. The work of the IAEA in support of the efforts of States parties to combat such trafficking, including the IAEA's activities undertaken to provide for an enhanced exchange of information and the continued maintenance of its incident and trafficking database was noted. They also recalled the need for States parties to establish and enforce effective domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with their relevant international legal obligations. It was suggested that States parties could agree to share, subject to their respective national laws and procedures, information and expertise through bilateral and multilateral mechanisms. A number of States parties emphasised the importance of developing nuclear forensics as a tool in determining the origin of detected nuclear and other radioactive materials and in providing evidence for the prosecution of acts of illicit trafficking and malicious uses.

64. Many States parties expressed concerns related to the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-State actors might acquire nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. The contribution of the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism in enhancing the physical protection of nuclear facilities and fissile material worldwide was welcomed. The need to implement fully Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) was noted. States parties recalled that all States parties that had not done so should become party to the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

65. Many States parties acknowledged the new national commitments made at the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul and noted the continuing efforts to implement the Seoul Communiqué. A number of States parties looked forward to the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague to further strengthen nuclear security.

66. States parties reaffirmed their support for internationally recognised nuclear-weapon-free zones established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, and in accordance with the 1999 Guidelines of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. The contributions of the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty), the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) and the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia towards attaining the objectives of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation were recognised. States parties welcomed the efforts to consolidate the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia and welcomed the parallel declarations adopted by the nuclear-weapon States and Mongolia, concerning Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status on 17 September 2012. States parties welcomed the increased cooperation amongst the parties to the zones and noted with satisfaction the preparations to convene in 2015 the Third Conference of the States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Established Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia.

67. States parties welcomed progress towards consolidating existing nuclear-weapon-free zones, including the progress towards operationalizing the African Commission on Nuclear Energy and the continuing efforts of the parties to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone and the nuclear-weapon States pertaining to the Protocol to that Treaty. States parties looked forward to the nuclear-weapon States signing and ratifying the Protocol to that Treaty as soon as possible. States parties looked forward to continued consultations between the nuclear-weapon States and the parties to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia pertaining to the Protocol to that Treaty. Many States parties expressed concern that reservations and interpretive declarations with respect to the protocols to the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties had yet to be withdrawn. Many States parties expressed the view that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones did not substitute for legal obligations and unequivocal undertakings of the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.

68. States parties recalled the importance of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and recalled the affirmation of its goals and objectives by the 2000 Review Conference and in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted at the 2010 Review Conference. They recalled that the resolution remained valid until the goals and objectives were achieved and that the resolution, which had been co-sponsored by the depositary States of the Treaty, was an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty had been indefinitely extended without a vote in 1995. States parties recalled their resolve to undertake, individually and collectively, all necessary measures aimed at its prompt implementation.

69. States parties recalled the importance of a process leading to the full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and the practical steps to that end endorsed at the 2010 Review Conference. In the context, States parties emphasized the importance of the agreement for the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, to convene a conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region, and with the full support and engagement of the nuclear-weapon States.

70. States parties noted the report of the facilitator, Mr. Jaakko Laajava (Finland), contained in NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/10 and expressed appreciation for his tireless efforts, including his extensive consultations with the States of the region and other stakeholders, aimed at supporting the implementation of the 1995 Resolution and undertaking preparations for the convening of the 2012 Conference. A number of States parties expressed support for the facilitator's efforts for multilateral preparatory consultations involving the States of the region.

71. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland delivered a joint statement on behalf of itself, the Russian Federation and the United States of America, in which they fully endorsed the efforts of the facilitator to build consensus amongst the States of the region on next steps. They fully supported the preparations of the facilitator for the Conference as well as his tireless and creative efforts. They supported intensification of those efforts in order to bring the States of the region together to advance the objective of the Middle East zone through constructive dialogue.

72. States parties expressed disappointment and regret at the postponement of the 2012 Conference. A number of States parties noted the position paper circulated by the League of Arab States pertaining to the organization, agenda, outcome document, working methods and other issues related to the Conference. They expressed appreciation for the constructive engagement of the Arab States with the facilitator. They also rejected arguments for postponing the Conference, which a number of states consider a violation of commitments agreed to in the 2010 NPT final document. These states expressed concern about negative repercussions to the Treaty resulting from the uncertain situation pertaining to the Conference.

73. States parties reaffirmed their support for the convening of the Conference in accordance with the mandate agreed to in 2010. Many States parties expressed support for convening the Conference as soon as possible and no later than the end of 2013. The view was also expressed that a successful Conference attended by all the States of the region required direct engagement of the States of the region, including agreement by consensus on its agenda and date, and that a Conference could be convened immediately after such agreement was reached. States parties recognized that while the deadline for convening the Conference had not been met, the opportunity had not been lost.

74. States parties recalled the necessity of strict adherence by all States parties to their obligations and commitments under the Treaty and the need for all States in the region to take relevant steps and confidence-building measures to contribute to the realisation of the objectives of the 1995 Resolution. They recalled that all States should refrain from undertaking any measures that precluded the achievement of this objective.

75. States parties recalled the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. States parties recalled the urgency and importance of achieving universality of the Treaty and the need for all States in the Middle East that had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States so as to achieve its universality at an early date.

76. States parties recalled the need for India and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States promptly and without conditions and to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements as required by the Treaty. Some States parties called on India and Pakistan to restrain their nuclear weapon and missile programmes and, pending their accession to the Treaty, to take and advance practical nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation measures.

77. States parties condemned the nuclear test conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 12 February 2013, and expressed serious concerns about the 12 December 2012 launch by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Serious concern was also expressed about its nuclear programme, including its uranium enrichment programme, as a challenge to the Treaty. States parties called on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to refrain from restarting the operation of all nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. States parties emphasised that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea could not have the status of a nuclear-weapon State in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in any case. States parties urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to fulfil the commitments under the Six-Party Talks, including the complete, verifiable and irreversible abandonment of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear

programmes, in accordance with the September 2005 joint statement, to return at an early date to the Treaty and to its NPT Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. States parties urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply fully with its obligations under relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea was called upon to refrain from further actions, including any further nuclear tests, which would cause security concerns in the region and beyond. States parties pledged to continue their efforts, including in the framework of Six-Party Talks, to find peaceful diplomatic solutions, so as to achieve the goal of the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula, as well as maintaining peace and security in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia.

78. States parties welcomed the meetings held between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the E3+3 in Almaty, Kazakhstan, and noted that progress needs to be achieved. Many States parties reiterated the urgency to take concrete steps, guided by a step-by-step approach and the principle of reciprocity, to reach a sustainable solution which would effectively address the specific concerns articulated by many States parties and would restore international confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of the Iranian nuclear programme, while fully respecting that country's right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in conformity with articles I, II, and III of the Treaty. States parties recognized and supported the essential role of the IAEA and called for the intensification of dialogue and cooperation between Iran and the IAEA in order to resolve all outstanding issues to this country's nuclear programme. Full implementation of the relevant resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors was stressed. The Islamic Republic of Iran reiterated that its nuclear programme was exclusively for peaceful purposes and in conformity with the Treaty, underlining its inalienable right under article IV of the Treaty.

79. Many States parties continued to stress that they sought specific outstanding issues in respect of the nuclear activities of the Syrian Arab Republic to be resolved, including through that country's full cooperation with the IAEA. The Syrian Arab Republic was called upon to remedy its non-compliance with its safeguards agreement. The Syrian Arab Republic stated that it was committed to its comprehensive safeguards agreement and to the implementation of a work plan with the Agency.

80. States parties recalled that nothing in the Treaty should be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty. This right constituted one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty. States parties stressed that this right must be exercised in conformity with obligations under the Treaty. States parties recalled that each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardising its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel cycle policies.

81. States parties recalled their undertaking to facilitate, and their right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in conformity with all the provisions of the Treaty. States parties recalled the importance of facilitating transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation among

States parties in conformity with the Treaty, and eliminating in this regard any undue constraints inconsistent with the Treaty. Many States parties emphasised that the transfer of nuclear technology and international cooperation should be supported and pursued in good faith without discrimination. States parties recalled that, in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment should be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries, in particular, into account.

82. Many States parties stressed the importance of nuclear knowledge sharing and the transfer of nuclear technology to developing States for the sustainment and further enhancement of their scientific and technological capabilities, thereby also contributing to their socio-economic development. States parties underscored the central role of the IAEA in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. States parties emphasised the value and importance of the IAEA technical cooperation programme, particularly in the areas of human health, food and agriculture, water resources, environmental protection, industrial application, nuclear and radiation safety, and nuclear energy.

83. States parties recalled the need to strengthen the IAEA technical cooperation programme in assisting developing States parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. States parties emphasised the need for continued efforts, within the IAEA, to enhance the effectiveness, efficiency and transparency of its technical cooperation programme and to ensure that IAEA resources for technical cooperation activities are sufficient, assured and predictable. Many States parties stressed that the technical cooperation and assistance provided by the IAEA should not be subject to any conditions incompatible with the provisions of its Statute.

84. A number of States parties continued to express their support for the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI). Some States parties provided information on contributions to the PUI since 2010, and called upon all States in a position to do so to help further expand access to nuclear technologies and applications.

85. States parties acknowledged that the primary responsibility for nuclear safety rested with individual States. States parties recalled that, when developing nuclear energy, including nuclear power, use of nuclear energy must be accompanied by appropriate and effective levels of safety, consistent with States' national legislation and respective international obligations.

86. Many States parties emphasised the IAEA's central role in promoting international cooperation and in coordinating international efforts to strengthen global nuclear safety, including its role in the development and promotion of nuclear safety standards.

87. States parties reaffirmed the importance of continuing international efforts to strengthen the global nuclear safety, including the robust implementation of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety. They emphasized the important role of IAEA in sharing the lessons learned from the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station and in promoting international cooperation as well as in coordinating international efforts to strengthen global nuclear safety, including its role in the development and promotion of nuclear safety standards.

88. States parties welcomed the convening of the second extraordinary meeting of the contracting parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, in August 2012, and noted the establishment of an effectiveness and transparency working group. States

parties also welcomed the outcome of the Fukushima Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety, hosted by the Government of Japan, in co-sponsorship with IAEA, and held in Fukushima Prefecture, in December 2012.

89. Many States parties expressed the view that measures and initiatives aimed at strengthening nuclear safety and security must not be used to deny or restrict the right of developing countries to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

90. States parties that had not yet done so were called upon to become a party to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. States parties welcomed new ratifications to these conventions since 2010. Further, States parties that had not yet done so were called upon to implement the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.

91. States parties encouraged further voluntary steps to minimise the use of high-enriched uranium in the civilian sector, where technically and economically feasible. Some States parties provided information on their efforts to minimise the use of high-enriched uranium and to return all their stockpiles of high-enriched uranium to the countries of origin. These efforts were welcomed. Some States parties encouraged the further use of low-enriched uranium targets for radioisotope production.

92. States parties recalled that it was in the interests of all States parties that the transport of radioactive materials continues to be conducted consistent with international safety, security and environmental protection standards and guidelines. A number of States parties welcomed the informal discussions on communication between shipping States and coastal States with IAEA involvement regarding concerns over potential accidents or incidents during the transport of radioactive materials.

93. Many States parties noted the continuing efforts of IAEA related to implement the decisions of the Board of Governors pertaining to assurances of supply, including the reserve of low-enriched uranium in the Russian Federation and the Model Nuclear Fuel Assurance Agreement. Preparations for Kazakhstan to host the low-enriched uranium bank under the auspices of the IAEA were also noted. A number of States parties encouraged further discussions on the development of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle. Many States parties noted that such discussions should take place in a non-discriminatory and transparent manner without affecting rights under the Treaty and without prejudice to national fuel cycle policies, while tackling the technical, legal and economic complexities surrounding these issues.

94. States parties recalled that all States should abide by the decision adopted by consensus at the IAEA General Conference on 18 September 2009 on prohibition of armed attack or threat of attack against nuclear installations, during operation or under construction.

95. States parties recalled the need for States to put in force a civil nuclear liability regime by becoming party to relevant international instruments or adopting suitable national legislation, based upon the principles established by the main pertinent international instruments.

96. States parties recalled that each State party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interest of its country, in accordance with article X.1 of the Treaty.

97. A number of States parties called for further discussion pertaining to article X.1 of the Treaty, including possible responses to a notice of withdrawal, and the continued application of IAEA safeguards and the disposition of equipment and materials acquired or developed under safeguards while Party to the Treaty, in the event of a withdrawal. Some States parties stressed that a State party remained responsible under international law for violations committed while Party to the Treaty.

98. States parties affirmed that they did not support efforts to reinterpret or restrict the sovereign right of withdrawal, as these could be detrimental to the implementation of the Treaty. A number of States parties emphasised the importance of encouraging States to remain in the Treaty by variously reaffirming the role of the Treaty and achieving its universality, implementing all the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted at the 2010 Review Conference, and addressing the root causes that might lead a State party to withdraw. Many States parties expressed interest in the discussions aimed at broadening consensus among States parties on this issue during the current review cycle.

99. States parties continued their examination of means to improve the effectiveness of the strengthened review process of the Treaty. They welcomed the implementation of the PaperSmart documentation system and encouraged its further development. Many States parties expressed support for measures aimed at reducing costs and increasing the efficiency of the review process. States parties exchanged views on a number of specific proposals, including, inter alia, the venue of meetings, transitioning from summary records to digital audio recordings, making better use of information technology and webcasting, enhancing interactive discussions and engagement with civil society, focusing discussions on the implementation of commitments undertaken at previous Review Conferences and enhancing the link between each session of the Preparatory Committee as well as with the Review Conference. A number of States parties looked forward to the continued development and consideration of various proposals over the remainder of the review cycle as well as for appropriate action at the 2015 Review Conference.
