
**Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

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Summary record (partial)* of the 6th meeting**

Held at Palais des Nations, Wednesday, 24 April 2013, at 3 p.m.

Chair: Mr. Feruta..... (Romania)

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General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory
Committee (*continued*)

* No summary record was prepared for the rest of the meeting.
** No summary record was prepared for the 5th meeting.

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The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Ben-Acquaah** (Ghana) said that Ghana had joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968, in the hope that the Treaty would achieve its objectives of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in the shortest possible time. However, those objectives, as well as the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East continued to elude States parties to the Treaty and must be addressed in the common interest of humanity.

2. The promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology had progressed significantly through technical cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and States parties with advanced nuclear capacities. That cooperation had benefited his country, which operated a research reactor and trained nuclear experts for the benefit of the whole of sub-Saharan Africa, and used nuclear technology to support its poverty eradication and disease control campaigns. Furthermore, Ghana planned to build a nuclear power station to address its growing energy needs.

3. While the arrangements made by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their arsenals were a welcome development, they must be brought under internationally accepted, transparent and accountable mechanisms in order to serve as a confidence-building measure that would ultimately include all nuclear-weapon States. Ghana urged all States to adhere to the spirit and letter of the Treaty so as to ensure its sustainability. As no country was safe from a potential accident caused by nuclear weapons, he entreated all non-nuclear-weapon States to avoid pursuing nuclear-weapon programmes and to continue admonishing nuclear-weapon States to turn their nuclear swords into nuclear ploughshares.

4. The parties to the Treaty of Pelindaba, which established a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa, continued to await the voluntary ratification of that treaty by all nuclear-weapon States and hoped that the stalled talks concerning the proposed conference on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would recommence as soon as possible. They also hoped that a revitalized Conference on

Disarmament would agree on a programme of work as soon as possible and expand its membership.

5. Lastly, Ghana called on all States that had signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) to ratify it as soon as possible and on non-signatory States to accede to it without further delay.

6. **Mr. Richer** (Namibia) said that his Government fully subscribed to the principles of nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful application of nuclear science and technology — the three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Full and non-discriminatory implementation of the Treaty and total destruction of all nuclear weapons were the only way to guarantee international peace and security. It also attached great importance to the provision of the Treaty that recognized the inalienable right of all States parties to develop research and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II.

7. The multilateral setting of the NPT provided security for both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. All States parties, especially nuclear-weapon States, had a special responsibility to disarm and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, while promoting the peaceful application of nuclear technology. Energy security was important for promoting sustainable development and achieving the Millennium Development Goals. IAEA had an important role to play in helping States parties to the Treaty develop effective programmes to improve their technical and regulatory capabilities for the peaceful use of nuclear technology.

8. Namibia had started developing its nuclear fuel cycle policy in order to strengthen its nuclear safety and security regime and fulfil its international obligations under the Treaty. It also undertook to abide by the principles articulated in international legal instruments that promoted disarmament, safeguarding of nuclear material and facilities, and the peaceful application of nuclear energy, as demonstrated by the ratification of its additional protocol with IAEA and the Treaty of Pelindaba.

9. **Mr. Almubaraaki** (Kuwait) said that, unfortunately, since the 2010 NPT Review Conference, military expenditures had increased and nuclear-weapon States had retained their arsenals. At the same time, States tarried in implementing the outcomes of that Review Conference, especially its fourth action

plan, which called for the convening in 2012 of a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons. Kuwait remained committed to supporting disarmament and non-proliferation efforts and endorsed the convening of that conference in 2013.

10. It was regrettable that, in spite of the commitment of all countries in the Middle East to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to implementing their comprehensive safeguards agreements, Israel persisted in its refusal to accede to the Treaty or even to place its nuclear facilities under the IAEA comprehensive safeguards system. That attitude was a major obstacle to achieving universality of the Treaty and a reason for other States attempting to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons.

11. All States had the inalienable right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under IAEA safeguards and supervision, a right that came with many responsibilities, particularly in the area of safety and security of nuclear facilities. Cooperation with the Agency in a transparent manner would strengthen nuclear safety. The Preparatory Committee must therefore guarantee the application of the highest nuclear safety standards in States that had nuclear facilities.

12. **Mr. Laasel** (Morocco) said that, in a period marked by open defiance of the principles of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including the stalled negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, the issue of disarmament should be brought back to the heart of the international agenda where it belonged. In that connection, he welcomed the high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament, to be held in September 2013, and called on States parties to take advantage of the momentum created by the implementation of the Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (new START Treaty) and the adoption an action plan at the 2010 NPT Review Conference to strengthen the NPT.

13. Although nuclear-weapon States had taken some action towards gradually reducing their arsenals — a decade after initially committing to do so at the 2000 Review Conference — the ultimate objective of verifiable nuclear disarmament had not been attained. Non-nuclear-weapon States were understandably

concerned about the delayed entry into force of the CTBT due to the failure of eight States parties to ratify it, and about the absence of a legally binding instrument on negative security assurances. It was therefore urgent for nuclear-weapon States to effectively implement the 2010 action plan.

14. Furthermore, greater emphasis must be placed on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones as a complementary measure to protect non-nuclear-weapon States and to discredit the idea that possessing nuclear weapons could be effective in deterring other countries from acquiring them. He deplored the postponement of the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and hoped that the conference would be convened as soon as possible.

15. His delegation welcomed the fundamental role of IAEA in both combating nuclear proliferation and promoting the inalienable right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. In light of the challenges posed by the scarcity of natural resources and climate change, it was all the more necessary to ensure that States parties had access to nuclear technologies in such vital areas as energy, medicine, water, agriculture and the environment.

16. **Ms. Chaves** (Argentina) said that several recent developments had dampened the cautiously optimistic outlook that States parties had exhibited at the close of the 2010 Review Conference. Those developments included weapons testing and threats by a State that had withdrawn from the Treaty under questionable circumstances; restrictions that IAEA faced in carrying out its verification mandate; failure to convene the conference on a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons; slow progress of nuclear-weapon States towards nuclear disarmament; failure to achieve universality of the Treaty; refusal by nuclear-weapon States to withdraw their reservations to the Treaty of Tlatelolco; delayed entry into force of the CTBT; and failure to commence negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty.

17. Strict compliance by States parties with the provisions of the NPT, ensuring a balanced approach to its three pillars, provided the only way out of the current impasse. As the Treaty was in essence a security treaty, its implementation must take into account the security of all Parties. However, as the obligations undertaken were in no way interrelated, the failure of some States parties to comply with the Treaty

could not be used to justify the non-compliance of others.

18. In order to preserve the integrity of the Treaty, it must be made clear that nuclear proliferation, failure to abide by the Treaty, and withdrawing or threatening to withdraw from its legally binding commitments were inadmissible actions that must be strongly condemned by the international community. However, the Treaty's broad framework, based on a mutual commitment to security — in particular the defence and security of countries that did not possess nuclear weapons — must not be overlooked in favour of debates on new tools, lest the non-proliferation regime as a whole should suffer.

19. Lastly, her Government was fully committed to initiatives concerning the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons in the context of disarmament and non-proliferation.

20. **Mr. Kmentt** (Austria) said that, in fulfilling its responsibility as a State Party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, his country had submitted a report with detailed information about its implementation of the decisions adopted at the 2010 Review Conference. As the cornerstone of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, the Treaty must be protected and kept in good health, the measure of which was not agreement on a consensus document, or lack thereof, but rather the actions taken by States parties.

21. His delegation was deeply concerned about the credibility of implementation of disarmament commitments, with all signs pointing to nuclear-weapon States wishing to retain such weapons indefinitely. Equally alarming was the dubious reliability of the Treaty as a means of preventing nuclear proliferation, as evinced by the actions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Iranian nuclear programme and the unresolved issue of the nuclear-weapon-free zone to be established in the Middle East.

22. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation must be seen as mutually reinforcing concepts, but it was just as crucial to agree on what the terms should mean, given the different and even conflicting views on each held by States parties to the Treaty. Moreover, during past review cycles, the underlying fundamental contradictions in the Treaty had been brushed aside using vague consensus language. Those contradictions

and different perceptions must be addressed in order for the Treaty to retain its credibility as a key instrument of collective security.

23. Austria hoped that all States interested in nuclear disarmament would use such multilateral initiatives as the open-ended working group on nuclear disarmament established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 67/56 to help overcome the current deadlock and advance multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations. The discourse on nuclear weapons, for one, needed to move away from outdated military security concepts that had originated from the cold war, to conclusions drawn from the common understanding that any use of nuclear weapons would cause catastrophic consequences for all humankind. In that regard, the Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, held in Oslo in 2013, had been an important milestone.

24. As his Government considered the generation of electricity through nuclear fission neither sustainable nor safe and a non-viable means of combating climate change, it had eliminated nuclear power from its national energy mix. While all States had the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, that right came with responsibilities and obligations. Hence, countries that chose to develop their capacities in that regard must do so under the highest safety, security and non-proliferation conditions and with IAEA supervision.

25. **Mr. Minty** (South Africa), speaking on behalf of a group of States parties concerned about the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, said that the unacceptable and indiscriminate devastation caused by those weapons had been consistently ignored in the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation discourse. The effects of a nuclear weapon detonation, ranging from immediate death and destruction to widespread socioeconomic, health and environmental disaster, would not be constrained by national borders and were therefore an issue of deep concern to all.

26. The humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons had been recognized as a fundamental global concern that must be at the core of all deliberations on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Participants at the Oslo Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons had concluded that no State or international body could address the immediate humanitarian emergency caused by a nuclear

detonation or provide adequate assistance to victims. The group welcomed Mexico's offer to host a follow-up conference on the matter.

27. All efforts must be made to eliminate the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, a feat that could only be accomplished through their total elimination. Preventing the use and proliferation of nuclear weapons and achieving nuclear disarmament were the shared responsibilities of all States, including through fulfilling the objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and achieving its universality. Measures must be taken to raise awareness of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, an issue that should inform work under the Treaty regime and engage not only Governments but also civil society and, indeed, every citizen in an interconnected world.

28. **Mr. Chebihi** (Algeria) said that the progress achieved towards implementing the Treaty must not conceal the challenges it faced, including the failure to achieve nuclear disarmament and the refusal of some countries to accede to the Treaty, along with the risks of proliferation and nuclear terrorism. Those challenges, however, must not be used as a pretext to retain weapons of mass destruction or to infringe upon the inalienable right to develop the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The role of IAEA in promoting those uses was crucial, all the more given the contribution of nuclear science and technology to sustainable development and environmental preservation.

29. The Country Programme Framework his Government had signed with the Agency for 2012-2017 would foster bilateral relations and technical cooperation between them. The lack of progress towards nuclear disarmament — exemplified by the stalled negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament — constituted a serious threat to the authority of the Treaty. There was therefore an urgent need for policies and measures aimed at reducing the role of nuclear deterrence in efforts being made to rid the world of nuclear weapons. In that context, the Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons had highlighted the devastating and irreversible impact of such weapons on human beings, something his own country had experienced as the site of nuclear testing in the 1960s.

30. Nuclear-weapon States bore the brunt of the responsibility for taking practical steps towards nuclear disarmament. Efforts must also be made to bring the

CTBT into force and to negotiate a legally binding instrument on nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, non-nuclear-weapon States must be protected from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by the adoption of a legally binding document on negative security assurances.

31. His delegation welcomed the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and deplored the unjustifiable postponement of the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons. He called upon the sponsors of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and the United Nations to take all necessary actions to convene the conference at the earliest date possible.

32. **Ms. Ubeda Rivers** (Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL)) said that the imbalanced implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the halting progress towards nuclear disarmament must not hinder efforts to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world. The recent Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons had infused the nuclear debate with new hope. OPANAL welcomed Mexico's offer to convene a follow-up conference on the issue, as well as the establishment of a General Assembly open-ended working group on nuclear disarmament and the convening of the high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament in 2013.

33. Progress in respect of nuclear-weapon-free zones continued, including Mongolia's declaration regarding its nuclear-weapon-free status. OPANAL looked forward to the signature or ratification of additional protocols to the treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Africa and the Pacific. It urged the permanent members of the Security Council that had issued interpretative declarations upon signature and/or ratification of the additional protocol to the Treaty of Tlatelolco to modify or withdraw them, especially those that affected the denuclearized status of the Latin American and Caribbean region.

34. OPANAL regretted the postponement of the 2012 conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons, and hoped that it would be convened as soon as possible. While it welcomed initiatives for the reduction of nuclear weapons, OPANAL considered that multilateral negotiations on total and complete nuclear disarmament should be

promoted so as to redress the imbalance in the implementation of the three pillars of the Treaty. It also urged States that had neither signed nor ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, especially the remaining annex 2 States, to do so.

35. The 2011 joint declaration in which OPANAL had agreed to join international efforts to take forward the negotiation of a legally binding instrument on the prohibition of nuclear weapons served as one of the guidelines of the Agency's agenda, which was based on the indivisibility of non-proliferation and disarmament. OPANAL would continue to implement its peace, disarmament and non-proliferation education programmes in conjunction with Governments and civil society.

The discussion covered in the summary record ended at 6 p.m.